Public Opinion of Regional Cooperation and the Formation of the Asean Community: a Comparative Study in Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore

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PUBLIC OPINION OF REGIONAL COOPERATION AND THE FORMATION OF THE ASEAN COMMUNITY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN MALAYSIA, INDONESIA AND SINGAPORE

Thesis · July 2012 DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.1.3671.3205

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PUBLIC OPINION OF REGIONAL COOPERATION AND THE FORMATION OF THE ASEAN COMMUNITY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN MALAYSIA, INDONESIA AND SINGAPORE

GUIDO BENNY

THESIS SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES UNIVERSITI KEBANGSAAN MALAYSIA BANGI

2012

PENDAPAT AWAM MENGENAI KERJASAMA SERANTAU DAN PENUBUHAN KOMUNITI ASEAN: KAJIAN PERBANDINGAN DI MALAYSIA, INDONESIA DAN SINGAPURA

GUIDO BENNY

THESIS YANG DIKEMUKAKAN UNTUK MEMPEROLEH IJAZAH DOKTOR FALSAFAH

FAKULTI SAINS SOSIAL DAN KEMANUSIAAN UNIVERSITI KEBANGSAAN MALAYSIA BANGI

2012

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the work in this dissertation is my own except for quotations and summaries which have been duly acknowledged.

13 December 2012 GUIDO BENNY P48998

111

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Such a conducive community enable me to complete my doctoral dissertation. Many people advised, supported, and encourage me throughout the process of writing. First of all, I had an amazing dissertation committee, which include Prof. Dr. Mohd. Kamarulnizam bin Abdullah, Dr. Ravichandran K. Dhaksinamoorthy and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mohamed Anwar Omar Din who provided me with guidance, assistance, and support throughout the entire process of completing this research. I would like to thank to my reader Mr. Belaetham K. for his supports. My deep appreciation is also bestowed to Prof. Dr. Vedi Hadiz from Murdoch University as my external examiner and Associate Prof. Dr. Kuik Cheng-Chwee as my internal examiner. Special thank is owed to Associate Professor Dr. Mohamed Anwar Omar Din that his decision to select me to be his Graduate Research Assistant made it possible to finance my study and research. I also appreciate the scholarship for partially paying tuition fee from the Department of Administrative Science, University of Indonesia. I would like to thank to the professors lecturers and staffs at the School of History, Politics and Strategy Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (National University of Malaysia): Profesor Dr. Nordin Hussin, Assoc. Prof. Zarina Othman, Assoc. Prof.Ruhanas Harun, Prof. Dr. K. S. Nathan, Dr. Arujunan Narayanan, and Dr. Kuik Cheng Chwee. I would like to thank to the support staff Encik Ishak Bin Selamat. I would like to thank all of my seniors and colleagues at the University of Indonesia, Prof. Dr. Bambang Shergi Laksmono, MSc., Dr. Roy Valiant Salomo, Prof. Dr. Chandra Wijaya, Prof. Dr. Martani Huseini, Prof. Dr. Ferdinand D. Saragih, Prof. Dr. Masliana B. Sitepu, Dr. Bernardus Y. Nugroho, Fibria Indriati, Milla Setyowati, Retno Kusumastuti, Achmad Fauzi, M. Azis Moeslim, and Radityo Kusumo Santoso. I would like to thank the respondents and interview participants who took time out of their busy schedule to discuss with me and fill the questionnaires. In Indonesia, they are students, staffs, or alumni from Universitas Indonesia Jakarta, Universitas Sumatera Utara Medan, Universitas Tanjungpura Pontianak, Universitas Hasanuddin Makassar, Universitas Airlangga Surabaya, Institut Teknologi Sepuluh November Surabaya. In Malaysia, they are from Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, University of Malaya, Universiti Sains Malaysia Penang, Universiti Teknikal Melaka, Universiti Teknologi Mara Melaka, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia Johor Bahru, and Universiti Malaysia Sabah, and Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS). In Singapore, they are from National University of Singapore, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore Management University, and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), National Institute of Education, Management Development Institute of Singapore, SIM University, Temasek Polytechnic and Republic Polytechnic. Finally, I dedicate this dissertation to my late father Joseph Setyawan Sunardi, my mother Juliana Dermawati Sukardi, my wife Linyanty Simon, my daughter Bianca Esther Sunardi, and the family of my brother Romanus Kristiawan. I will be forever indebted to them all for their love, patience, and forgiveness for the countless hours spent away to complete this journey.

ABSTRACT The study examines public opinions on the formation of ASEAN Community in Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. It argues that the Southeast Asian regionalism initiatives need to be more attentive to public opinions and give more rooms for public involvements as it may become the agents influential for the social-construction of ASEAN Community. This quantitative study is guided by six objectives; firstly, to discuss and analyze public knowledge, perceptions and awareness on ASEAN Community. Secondly, the study examines the public attitudes, opinions, and aspiration towards the formation of ASEAN Community. Thirdly, the study analyses the extent of nationalism sentiments, cultural identities and perceptions on regional identities. Fourthly, the study examines the perceived obstacles for the formation of this regional integration. Fifthly, the study discusses the perceived impacts of ASEAN Community on national sovereignty, national security and national identities. Finally, the study discusses the impact of public opinion on the pace and direction of ASEAN Community building. Primary sources of research data derived from the surveys conducted in eleven cities in these three countries. The study reveals several findings; firstly, the respondents indicated significant awareness about ASEAN, they considered it relevant and important to their country and the region. However, they lacked the awareness regarding the ASEAN Community. Secondly, the respondents displayed positive attitudes and support for the ASEAN Community process, but their aspirations appeared to be different from the European regionalism. Thirdly, there were strong nationalism sentiments and national identities - however, their regional identities were weak. Fourthly, respondents indicated strong agreement on the ten proposed obstacles for establishing ASEAN Community. Fifthly, most of the respondents perceived that the formation of ASEAN Community would not affect the national sovereignty, security and identities of their countries respectively. Several implications can be inferred from the study; firstly, national governments should put extra efforts to prepare the public by intensively socializing the idea of regional integration. Secondly, regular public opinion surveys and specific strategies need to be revealed and influence the true aspiration and attitudes of the public in the region. Thirdly, national governments should address the issue of nationalism sentiments and formulate specific measures to neutralize excessive nationalism. Fourthly, the ASEAN values should be specified to address the question of regional identities. Fifthly, public's perceived obstacles should be given sufficient attention and be solved. Sixthly, to integrate further, the region needs several transfer of sovereignty from the national governments to the supra-national institution; otherwise, ASEAN will ever be a casual regional cooperation in terms of political and socio-cultural community. Seventhly, perception that threats would come from neighbouring countries need to be neutralized by effective strategies. Finally, the study suggests that future studies to be conducted in ten ASEAN countries by using different types of questions, sampling procedures, and methods of analysis. Future studies can also be conducted by involving other variables of the public opinion on regionalization, regionalism or regional security.

ABSTRAK

Kajian ini menganalisis pendapat awam di Malaysia, Indonesia dan Singapura mengenai penubuhan Komuniti ASEAN. Kajian berpendapat bahawa inisiatif regionalisme di Asia Tenggara perlu memberikan lebih ruang bagi pendapat dan penglibatan orang awam kerana ia boleh menjadi agensi yang berpengaruh bagi konstruksi sosial pada Komuniti ASEAN. Terdapat enam objektif kajian kuantitatif ini. Pertama, menganalisis pengetahuan masyarakat, persepsi pencapaian dan kesedaran mengenai ASEAN. Kedua, menganalisis sikap, pendapat dan aspirasi masyarakat terhadap Komuniti ASEAN. Ketiga, menganalisis nasionalisme, identiti kebangsaan dan identiti serantau. Keempat, mengkaji persepsi berkenaan halangan kepada integrasi serantau. Kelima, kajian ini membincangkan persepsi mengenai impak penubuhan Komuniti ASEAN pada kedaulatan, keselamatan dan identiti kebangsaan. Akhirnya, mengkaji impak daripada pendapat awam terhadap kemajuan dan arah konstruksi Komuniti ASEAN.Sumber utama kajian adalah daripada kaji selidik pendapat awam yang dijalankan di sebelas bandaraya. Kajian in menghasilkan beberapa rumusan; pertamanya, responden telah menunjukkan kesedaran yang sangat tinggi mengenai ASEAN, dan menganggap institusi serantau ini sebagai penting dan relevan. Walau bagaimanapun, kesedaran mereka terhadap gagasan Komuniti ASEAN adalah rendah. Keduanya, responden menunjukkan sikap yang positif dan menyokong penubuhan Komuniti ASEAN, tetapi mereka memiliki aspirasi integrasi yang berbeza dengan Kesatuan Eropah. Ketiga, Tedapat sentimen nasionalisme dan identiti kebangsaan yang kuat, tetapi identifikasi mereka dengan rantau Asia Tenggara adalah lemah. Keempatnya, responden menunjukkan persetujuan mengenai sepuluh halangan untuk mewuudkan Komuniti ASEAN. Kelima, kajian ini mendapati kebanyakan responden mempunyai persepsi bahawa kedaulatan nasional, keselamatan negara dan identiti kebangsaan tidak akan terjejas dengan pembentukan Komuniti ASEAN. Beberapa implikasi boleh disimpulkan daripada kajian ini; pertamanya, setiap negara mesti menyiapkan masyarakat dengan mensosialisasikan idea integrasi serantau secara intensif. Kedua, kajian-kajian dan strategi diperlukan untuk mempengaruhi pendapat awam. Ketiga, masing-masing negara perlu memberi perhatian dan merumuskan langkah-langkah untuk meneutralkan nasionalisme yang berlebihan. Keempat, `Nilai ASEAN' perlu dinyatakan untuk menjawab soalan identiti serantau. Kelima, halangan menurut pendapat awam perlu diselesaikan. Keenamnya, untuk mempercepatkan proses integrasi, rantau ini memerlukan pemindahan sesetengah kedaulatan daripada negara kepada institusi ASEAN; jika tidak, ASEAN akan selama-lamanya menjadi organisasi kerjasama serantau yang kasual. Ketujuh, persepsi bahawa ancaman akan datang daripada negara jiran perlu dineutralkan dengan strategi yang berkesan. Akhir sekali, kajian ini mencadangkan bahawa kajian akan datang hendaknya dijalankan di sepuluh negara ASEAN dengan menggunakan pelbagai jenis soalan, prosedur persampelan, dan kaedah analisis yang berlainan dengan kajian ini. Kajian akan datang juga boleh dijalankan dengan melibatkan pembolehubah lain dalam bidang regionalisasi, regionalisme dan keselamatan serantau.

CONTENTS

Page

DECLARATION ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENT iii ABSTRACT iv ABSTRAK v CONTENTS vi LIST OF TABLES .. x LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS xiii CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background 1 1.2 Constructing an ‘ASEAN Community of Nations’ 3 1.3 Problem Statement 6 1.4 Research Inquiries 9 1.5 Research Objectives 11 1.6 Scope of the Study 11 1.7 Study Limitation 12 1.8 Literature Review 14 1.8.1 Studies of public opinion on regionalism 14 1.8.2 Studies on ASEAN Communities 21 1.8.3 Public opinion studies on ASEAN regional integration 35 1.9 THESIS ORGANISATION 37

CHAPTER II CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 2.1 Regional Integration Theories and Constructivism 39 2.1.1 Regional Integration Theories 41 2.1.2 Constructivism 42 2.2 The Concept of Regional Integration and ASEAN Community 46 2.3 Political-Security Integration and the ASEAN Security Community 51 2.4 Economic Integration and the ASEAN Economic Community 57

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2.5 Socio-Cultural Integration and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community 63 2.6 Regional Identity and National Identity 67 2.6.1 Regional Identity 69 2.6.2 National Identity and Nationalism 73 2.7 Sovereignty and Security 76 2.7.1 Sovereignty 76 2.7.2 National and Regional Security 81 2.8 Defining and Operationalizing Key Terms 84 2.8.1 Research question 1: How knowledgeable are the public about ASEAN, ASEAN Community and how is its perceived relevancy? 85 2.8.2 Research question 2: What are the public’s attitudes, opinions, and aspirations for the ASEAN Community? 85 2.8.3 Research question 3: How does the public identify themselves with their nation and their region regarding the formation of the ASEAN Community? 86 2.8.4 Research question 4: What Challenges does the public perceive for the social construction of the ASEAN Community? 89 2.8.5 Research question 5: What are the impacts of the construction of the ASEAN Community on national sovereignty, security and identity? 89

CHAPTER III RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 3.1 Research Approach 91 3.2 Methods of Data Collection 91 3.3 Research Variables and Indicators 94 3.4 Methods of Data Analysis 102 3.5 Profile of Respondents 109 3.5.1 Description of Malaysian respondents 109 3.5.2 Description of Indonesian respondents 112 3.5.3 Description of Singaporean respondents 113 3.5.4 Comparisons of respondents in the three countries 114

CHAPTER IV FINDINGS 4.1 Public Knowledge on and Perceived Relevancy of ASEAN 116 4.1.1 Public knowledge and understanding on ASEAN 116 4.1.2 Public perception of the relevancy of ASEAN 120

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4.1.3 Public awareness of the concept of ASEAN Community 122 4.2 Public Attitudes, Opinions and Aspirations towards the Construction of the ASEAN Community 128 4.2.1 Public attitudes towards the construct of the ASEAN Community 128 4.2.2 Public attitudes towards the construct of ASEAN Security Community (ASC) 130 4.2.3 Public attitudes towards the formation of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 134 4.2.4 Public attitudes towards the formation of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) 141 4.2.5 Public opinion on the formation process of ASEAN Community 143 4.2.6 Aspiration for the formation of ASEAN Community 145 4.3 National and Regional Identities towards the Social Construction of ASEAN Community 147 4.3.1 Patriotism 147 4.3.2 Reactive Nationalism 150 4.3.3 Economic Nationalism 153 4.3.4 Consumer Nationalism 155 4.3.5 National Cultural Identity 158 4.3.6 ASEAN Regional Identity 160 4.4 Perceived Challenges for Constructing the ASEAN Community 167 4.4.1 Disparity in levels of education 169 4.4.2 Lack of economic competitiveness 171 4.4.3 Dependency on the developed countries 173 4.4.4 Disparity in socio-economic development 177 4.4.5 Differences in legal and political system 179 4.4.6 Limitation of mastery and creation of technology 184 4.4.7 Poverty in the region 188 4.4.8 Militancy, terrorism, and insurgency in some part of the region 194 4.4.9 Ethnic-Chinese economic domination 198 4.4.10 Pluralism in the region (ethnics, tribes and religions) 200 4.5 Perceived Impacts of ASEAN Community on National Sovereignty, Security and Identity 202 4.5.1 Perceived impact on national sovereignty 202 4.5.2 Perceived impact on national security 203 4.5.3 Perceived impact on national identity 206

CHAPTER V DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 5.1 Analysis on Public Knowledge and Perceived Relevancy of ASEAN 208 5.2 Analysis on Public Attitudes, Opinions and Aspirations Towards The Construction of the ASEAN Community 214 5.3 Analysis on National and Regional Identities Towards the Social Construction of ASEAN Community 228 5.4 Analysis on Perceived Challenges For Constructing the ASEAN Community 233 5.5 Analysis on Perceived Impacts of ASEAN Community On National Sovereignty, Security and Identity 244 5.6 Analysis on Perceived Impacts of Public Opinion On ASEAN Community Building 252

CHAPTER VI CONCLUSION 6.1 Opinions on the Asean Community 262 6.2 Implications for the Construction of ASEAN Community 265 6.3 Theoretical Implication 270 6.4 Suggestions for Future Research 273

REFERENCES 276 APPENDICES A Questionnaire (Bahasa Malaysia) for Malaysian Respondents 324 B Questionnaire (Bahasa Indonesia) for Indonesian Respondents 336 C Questionnaire (English) for Singaporean Respondents 348 D Online Survey Questionnaire (In English) Using Questionpro Website for Respondents in Singapore 358

LIST OF TABLES

Table No. Page

2.1 The different views of International Relations Theories on Regional Security Communities 43 2.2 Typology of security system 53 3.1 Univariate tools of analysis 103 3.2 Example of statistical output of Kruskal-Wallis and Mann- Whitney U Tests 105 3.3 Example of statistical output of One-Way ANOVA procedure 107 3.4 Profile of respondents 110 3.5 Profile of non-student respondents 111 4.1 Knowledge about ASEAN 117 4.2 Understanding on ASEAN Security Community 118 4.3 Learning about ASEAN at schools in the three countries 119 4.4 Perception of the relevancy of ASEAN 121 4.5 Awareness of ASEAN Community, Bali Concord II, and ASEAN Charter 122 4.6 Reasons why the respondents were not aware of the ASEAN Community 124 4.7 Level of knowledge of the respondents aware of the ASEAN Community 125 4.8 Sources of information on ASEAN Community 127 4.9 Attitudes towards the formation of ASEAN Community 129 4.10 Attitudes towards the formation of ASEAN Security Community 131 4.11 Attitudes towards the formation of the ASEAN Economic Community 135 4.12 Attitudes towards the formation of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) 141 4.13 The opinion on the formation process of ASEAN Community 143 4.14 Aspiration for the establishment of ASEAN Community 146 4.15 Patriotism of the respondents 148 4.16 Reactive nationalism of the respondents 151 4.17 The economic nationalism of the respondents 154

4.18 The consumer nationalism of the respondents 156 4.19 The national cultural identity 158 4.20 Language as national identity 159 4.21 Opinion of ASEAN identity 161 4.22 Opinion on the possibility of “the spirit of same ancestry” and Islam as the principle of establishing the ASEAN Community 162 4.23 Distribution of the ten largest ethnic groups in Southeast Asia 164 4.24 Distribution of the religions believers in the Southeast Asia 165 4.25 Respondents’ Opinion on the possibility of having a unifying language for the ASEAN Community 166 4.26 Opinion on the challenges to the establishment of ASEAN Community 168 4.27 Comparison of education of the people in ten ASEAN countries 169 4.28 Ranking of competitiveness of ASEAN Countries 172 4.29 Sources of financing in ASEAN countries 174 4.30 Top ten sources of foreign direct investment inflow to ASEAN countries 176 4.31 The socioeconomy of ASEAN Countries based on Human Development Index (HDI) Method 178 4.32 Democracy in ASEAN countries 180 4.33 Statistics of technology diffusion and mastery in ASEAN countries and other selected countries 185 4.34 Statistics of technology creation in ASEAN countries and other selected countries 186 4.35 Income poverty in the ASEAN countries 189 4.36 Multidimensional (non-income) poverty in ASEAN countries 192 4.37 List of conflicts in the ASEAN countries (HIIK 2010) 195 4.38 The Number of Chinese population in ASEAN countries 199 4.39 The distribution of major ethnic groups in the ASEAN countries 201 4.40 Opinion on the effect of the establishment of ASEAN Community on the sovereignty of states 202 4.41 Opinion on the effect of the establishment of ASEAN Community to the national security 203 4.42 Indonesian respondents perception of threats to their national security and sovereignty 205

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4.43 Malaysian respondents perception of threats to their national security and sovereignty 205 4.44 Singaporean respondents perception of threats to their national security and sovereignty 205 4.45 Opinion of respondents on the effect of the establishment of ASEAN Community on the national identity 206 5.1 The result of Chi-Square Tests for analyzing the relationship between the awareness and attitudes towards ASEAN Community 214

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations AEC ASEAN Economic Community AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Area APT ASEAN Plus Three ARF ASEAN Regional Forum ASC ASEAN Security Community ASCC ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community CLMV Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam EC European Community EEC European Economic Community EP European Parliament EU European Union FDI Foreign Direct Investment HIIK Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research ICJ International Court of Justice MPI Multidimensional Poverty Index TAC Treaty of Amity and Cooperation

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

Regionalism – the proliferation of regional groupings of states – is perhaps the most notable and consequential feature of the international economic and political landscape to take shape since the end of the Cold War.1 As a worldwide phenomenon of increased interaction between actors (state and non-state) in regard to economic, security, political, social and cultural issues, 2 regionalism has shown its most developed form in the European Union (EU) and has flourished in various parts of the world. However, in contrast to European regionalism, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is characterized by its elitist and state-centric and lacked public involvement in its formation.3 Thus, there is a huge gap between the public and the elite in terms of decision making and the formation of ASEAN Community. This study is intended to bridge the gap by examining public opinion in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore regarding regional cooperation and the social construction of ASEAN Community.

ASEAN has already become an institution catering for regional cooperation in the Southeast Asian region for more than 42 years. The region, which covers the mainland Indochina Peninsula, the maritime archipelagos of Indonesia and the

1 Devlin and Estevadeordal (2011); Jupille and Jolliff (2011); Nsabua (2011); Kupchan (1996); Weiss (1999). 2 Frost (2008); Van Ginkel and Van Langenhove (2003); De Lombaerde and Van Langenhove (2007). 3 Acharya (2003 and 2009); Cabellero-Anthony (2009); Chavez (2007); Sutherland (2009).

Philippines, and the city state of Singapore, is surrounded by China (including Hong Kong and Taiwan), Japan and Korea in the north, Australia in the south, Bangladesh and India in the west, and Papua New Guinea in the east.4 The combined land area estimated to cover 4,435,830.30 square kilometres or about 2.90 percent of the land territory of the world was populated by approximately 591,841,374 people in 2009 or about 8.72 percent of the world population. 5

ASEAN has been regarded as a paragon of successful regional co-operation.6 It has become one of the most stable and successful regional groupings of the developing world, and a force for stability and cooperation in Asia.7 The regional institution was founded in 1967 by five states (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, and Singapore) in the context of a Cold War environment, at a time when Southeast Asia was considered as one of the hottest zones of ideological conflicts. 8 However, ASEAN has now long outlived the Cold War and has successfully built an embracing coalition of ten nations including those which were adversaries during the Cold War era.9 In fact, the acceptance of the countries that were once considered as enemies 10 – because of their communist ideology – can be perceived as one of the successes of ASEAN in its effort to ensure peace in the region.11

4 Severino (2006: 41 ). 5 ASEAN Secretariat (2010a ). 6 Nischalke (2000: 89 ). 7 Acharya (2011a: 2 ). 8 After the end of Second World War, the Southeast Asia region had turned into competition and battle field of proxy wars for the two superpowers (The Soviet Union and The United States). The region was divided into two blocs: communist and non-communist (K. S. Balakrishnan 1989: 23-24; Kamarulnizam Abdullah 2010: 1; Ruhanas Harun 2010: 28). 9 Thompson and Thianthai (2010 ). 10 After the end of the Cold War, two communist states (Vietnam and Lao PDR) joined ASEAN. The membership of the organisation then increased to ten countries, consisting of Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. 11 Van Dijk (2008 ); Ruhanas Harun (2010 ).

The raison d'être for ASEAN was a political one, to secure the region's peace, stability, and development.12 However, the aims of the organisation have developed to the promotion regional economic, social, and cultural cooperation among the five founding countries of Southeast Asia. In the 1967 Bangkok Declaration – the document that declared the establishment of ASEAN – seven objectives were outlined, covering economic growth, social development, training and research, agricultural cooperation, industry and trade, and regional cultural development. In security affairs, ASEAN ’s objective was to promote regional peace and stability.13 This core objective has been translated into various regional sectoral programmes in agriculture, forestry, energy, and environment to accelerate the economic growth of the region. In fact, the organisation continues to be actively involved in socio- economic collaboration and cooperation both intra- and inter-regionally.14

Since its establishment, ASEAN has contributed significantly to the security, peace and economic development of the region. Notwithstanding substantial criticism over the past two years due to the border crises in Thailand – Cambodia and Indonesia – Malaysia, ASEAN is considered as quite successful in containing conflicts between its member countries so that it does not escalate into protracted tension. Thus, a Filipino political scientist, Estrella Solidum contends : “With the highest commitment to its goals of peace, freedom, stability, prosperity, rule of law, and security, ASEAN has remained vibrant and relevant as the 21 st century has begun.” 15

1.2 CONSTRUCTING AN ‘ASEAN COMMUNITY OF NATIONS’

Fuelled by the widespread, rapid economic growth over several decades, ASEAN has aspired to become more than just an elite diplomatic talk shop. ASEAN has strived to be an organisation – or even more optimistically, an affective entity – upon which a sense of ‘one sharing, caring community’ of Southeast Asians can be envisioned and

12 Tan (2004: 935). 13 Barraclough (1988: 5). 14 Benny and Kamarulnizam Abdullah (2011). 15 Solidum (2003: 222).

enacted.16 After being hit by severe economic crisis in 1997, the subsequent ASEAN Summits agreed to a plethora of plans and protocols designed both to strengthen regional integration and to establish a wider regional leadership role for the organisation.17

The idea of an ASEAN Community was formally announced during the Ninth ASEAN Summit in Bali and was explicitly enunciated in the Bali Concord II.18 It outlined three pillars of the community expected to materialize in 2020, namely ASEAN Security Community (ASC), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). Furthermore, the Eleventh ASEAN Summit held in Malaysia in December 2005, consented to accelerate the implementation of the idea of the ASEAN Community as a ‘One Vision, One Identity, One Community’ to 2015. As the idea matured in the 28th ASEAN Inter Parliamentary Assembly on 21st August 2007, members of national parliamentary bodies of ASEAN countries agreed to change the goals of ASEAN from building a loose ‘association of regional countries’ into a much closer ‘ASEAN Community of nations’ .19

The idea of ASEAN Community was finalized in ASEAN Charter 20 signed by the heads of member governments at the 13th ASEAN Summit in November 2007. For the first time, ASEAN constructed a legal personality of its own, making an organisational identity separable from the identities of its individual member states.21 One year later, the new charter was accepted by the parliaments of ten member countries.

16 Thompson and Thianthai (2008: 1). 17 Jones (2008: 736). 18 ASEAN Secretariat (2003). 19 AIPA (2007). 20 ASEAN Secretariat (2008). 21 Jones (2008: 736).

It can be argued that there are two views on ASEAN Community building. The first is the optimistic one as exhibited by nearly all the leaders of ASEAN. For example, in a message in conjunction with the 42nd ASEAN Day celebrations, the current Prime Minister of Malaysia Datuk Seri Najib Razak stated that with the cooperation with other ASEAN leaders, the ASEAN’s v ision to establish a stable, secure, peaceful and prosperous community would be accomplished. He stated, "We will strive to ensure that the people of ASEAN continue to live in an environment abundant with opportunities for development and prosperity". He also stated that ASEAN’s ambition of becoming a politically cohesive, economically integrated and socially responsible ASEAN Community was on track to be achieved by 2015.22

Contrary to the optimism of the leaders of ASEAN nations, several observers were sceptical about the idea of ASEAN Community-building as they consider the idea as ‘too good to be true’ when taking into account the current regional situation. For example, Kavi Chongkittavorn – a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Chulalongkorn University – argued , “Nobody expects ASEAN to move in the direction of the EU. But as with the EU, the realisation of an AC (sic, ASEAN Community) will need more than just words and niceties”. 23 The same scepticism was shown by Ikrar Nusa Bakti – a former chairman of the Department of Political Studies at the Indonesian Institute of Science (LIPI) – who argued that, “ASEAN has long been known as an elitist organisation, controlled by bureaucrats and politicians. ASEAN should belong to the general public, so the organisation can be relevant to its members and other states outside the region”. 24 The pessimistic views, in fact, do seem to reflect with the current situation in the region. For example, while the economic aspects are the most likely element to be integrated quickly, there

22 Foreign Ministry of Malaysia’s website, 8th August (2009 ). 23 The Nation , Thailand, 27 November (2006). 24 Kompas , Indonesia, 2nd March (2009).

are, however, serious economic development gaps among ASEAN countries that might make the regional integration difficult to achieve.25

1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT

Despite the optimistic statements of nation-leaders in the region about the ASEAN Community, the general public of ASEAN countries has not been involved in its building process. The involvement of the general public is crucial as history showed that it was one of key agents in the social-construction of other similar regional initiatives such as the EU. The EU's current status and its success in economic, political and social integration have clearly been the outcome of consensus, active mutually-constitutive involvement of the public and policies based on the Eurobarometer surveys on the grassroots. The idea of a European community (EC) took years to materialize since the process did not only involve policy makers ’ structure, rules, norms, identities and interests, but also the public’s positive perception, acceptance, and understanding. Even prior to the realisation and formalisation of the EU, policy makers and academicians had conducted extensive studies to determine the public’s understanding and acceptance of the idea of a regional community.

Public opinion needs to be gauged and attended to for the success of the integration and for making effective decisions that can satisfy the needs and wants of the public. The three traditions of regional integration theories – transactionalist, neo- functionalist and democratic theory – although at variance in their explanation on which attitudes and support are needed for the success of regional integration – have shown that opinions and participation of the general public would determine the success of such efforts. 26 Given the current plurality of political systems in the

25 Severino (2006: 52) highlighted this point by mentioning that a former minister of one of the ASEAN-6 countries opining that it was a mistake to bring the later 4 countries into ASEAN in “so quickly” in the light of their mu ch lower levels of development. 26 Collins (2008); Deutsch (1957); Lindberg and Scheingold (1970); Hewstone (1986); Ortuoste (2008).

region, 27 it is difficult to gauge the voice of the public by direct voting mechanism as in the European context. Thus, the most feasible measure is the public opinion surveys. However, there is no comprehensive measurement on the support, opinions, or consensus of the public on the creation of the ASEAN Community. There is also an absence of studies that have attempted to capture the voices of the public on an ASEAN Community.

This study argues that, as public is one of agents that is potential in influencing in the social-construction of Southeast Asian regional integration, their opinion may have an impact on the pace and direction of ASEAN Community building. Observation on the current pace of regional integration finds that the process is very slow and far from the expectation to achieve its target date of 2015 for the creation of ASEAN Community; 28 thus, information from the public regarding their awareness, attitudes, aspirations, opinions, sentiments, and so on may serve as an input that will influence the nation leaders to become more committed in accelerating the preparation for the conformance to the ASEAN Community in 2015. Public opinion may also influence the direction of ASEAN Community building that is currently elitist and state-centric to become more people-centric.

More specifically, the study argues that Southeast Asian regionalism needs to address several issues regarding the public opinion in ASEAN countries. Firstly, the public awareness and perception of ASEAN regionalism needs to be assessed because it will influence the public opinion on ASEAN regional integration. Secondly, public attitudes, opinions, and aspirations towards the concept and formation of ASEAN Community need to be studied in order to plan effective strategies for its social construction. Thirdly, regarding national and regional identities need to be examined because they may influence the social construction of ASEAN Community. Fourthly, the public perspectives on the perceived challenges for the establishment of regional integration from the public perspectives need to be understood because the public is the true stakeholder of the integration initiatives. Finally, the public perception of the

27 See Figure 4.32 on the plurality of political systems in ASEAN. 28 Das (2012: 328).

impact of regional integration on national sovereignty, security and identity need to be investigated because they may influence the way the public perceives regional integration.

At present, such a study is clearly lacking. Therefore, this study will contribute significantly to the ASEAN regional initiatives because until recently, ASEAN is an elitist organization; thus, this study may contribute as a call for ASEAN leaders to be more attentive to the opinion of the public by highlighting the importance of public opinion survey in providing information on the opinion of the grassroots on regionalism initiatives.

This study also contributes to the discipline of international relations because there is rarely similar studies exist in Southeast Asian context. Most IR studies on ASEAN conducted in the perspective of elites or states; thus, this study is a call for experts to attend to the perspectives or interests of the public. In addition, most IR studies on ASEAN used qualitative analysis; therefore, this study contributes on providing an example on how quantitative measurements used for measuring the opinion of the public regarding the regionalism initiatives in the Southeast Asia.

More specifically, this study contributes in giving the present pictures of how the public think about ASEAN and its new initiatives of ASEAN Community: their knowledge, the significance of ASEAN to them, their attitudes, and supports, etc. This study also contributes in giving the present pictures of and showing how the nationalism sentiments be measured across ASEAN countries. These measurements are badly needed because these issues may become obstacles for ASEAN regional integration.

Regarding the obstacles for ASEAN integration, this study shows the present pictures and new perspective on how the obstacles for integration should be measured through the perspectives of the public. Finally, the study contributes in showing how the public see the impact of new ASEAN regional integration initiative (ASEAN Community) on national sovereignty, security and identity.

1.4 RESEARCH INQUIRIES

It can be argued that most of the literature on the concept and ideas of an ASEAN Community has relied on academic opinion of several scholars. Studies conducted based on the opinion of the public are scanty. The lack of the public’s perspectives and responses to the concept of ASEAN Community has resulted in a gap in the literature on ASEAN regionalism. This study, thus, attempts to fill the gap.

The study focuses on six main research inquiries. The first is on public knowledge and perceived relevancy of ASEAN and the ASEAN Community. In order to answer this inquiry, the study discusses survey results on the public knowledge on ASEAN, the public perception of the relevancy of ASEAN, and the public awareness of the concept of an ASEAN Community.

The second inquiry is on the public attitudes, opinions, and aspirations towards ASEAN Community. In order to answer this inquiry, the study discusses the public attitudes and opinions towards the formation of ASEAN Community and its three pillars, and aspirations for its formation.

The third inquiry is on the sentiments regarding national and regional identities and their effects to the social construction of ASEAN Community. To answer the inquiry, the study examines the nationalist sentiments of the public that consist of patriotic, reactive, economic, and consumer nationalism. Then, the study discusses the perception of national and regional identities towards the construction of ASEAN Community.

The fourth inquiry is on the obstacles faced in establishing the ASEAN Community. In order to satisfy the inquiry, the study examines and discusses the obstacles that might inhibit the establishment of ASEAN Community.

The fifth inquiry is on the impact of the establishment of the ASEAN Community on national sovereignty, security and identity. To answer this inquiry, the study examines and discusses the respondents’ pe rception on the issues.

Finally, the sixth inquiry is on the impact of public opinions on the pace and direction of ASEAN Community building. To answer this inquiry, the study discuss the implication on the whole study on the questions of whether the opinion will have effects on the pace and direction of the social construction of the Regional Community of the Southeast Asian nations.

Based on these six research inquiries, the research questions are as follows:

1. How knowledgeable are the public about ASEAN, ASEAN Community and its perceived relevancy? 2. What are the public’s attitudes, opinions, and aspirations for the ASEAN Community? 3. How does the public identify themselves with their nation and their region regarding the establishment of the ASEAN Community? 4. What challenges does the public perceive for the establishment of the ASEAN Community? 5. What are the perceived impacts of the establishment of the ASEAN Community on national sovereignty, security and identity? 6. In what specific ways and to what extent, the public opinions discussed may have an impact on the pace and direction of ASEAN Community building? Which areas of regional cooperation and community building are most likely and most unlikely to be affected by the opinions, attitudes, and sentiments of the general public? Whether, and to what extent, the proclaimed goal of a more “people - centred ASEAN” may slowly transform the elitist nature of the regional organisation over the long run?

1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The main objective of the study is to obtain primary information from the public in relation to the building of ASEAN Community. Furthermore, the study aims to:

1. discuss and analyze the public ’s knowledge on ASEAN, their perceptions on the relevancy of ASEAN, and their awareness of the concept of the ASEAN Community.

2. examine the public attitudes and aspirations for the creation of an ASEAN Community and the public opinions of process of its formation.

3. investigate the extent of nationalist sentiments of and the public opinion on the ASEAN identity towards ASEAN Community building.

4. examine the perceived challenges to establishing ASEAN Community.

5. discuss and analyze the perceived impacts of the establishment of ASEAN Community on national sovereignty, national security and national identities and analyze the implication of those on the establishment of an ASEAN Community.

6. discuss the impact of public opinion on the pace and direction of ASEAN Community building, the regional cooperation and community building areas those are most likely and most unlikely to be affected by the public opinions, and the possibility of whether the proclaimed goal of a more “people -centred ASEAN” slowly transform the elitist nature of the regional organisation over the long run.

1.6 SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The study focuses on the public opinions on the construction of an ASEAN Community. The concepts used in the study include nationalism and identity sentiments; knowledge and opinion of ASEAN; knowledge, attitude, aspiration, ideas, and perceived obstacles to ASEAN Community building; and the perceived impact of ASEAN Community building on the sovereignty of the state, national security and

national identity. The data collection for the study was conducted between January and December 2010.

The study involves the opinion of the public in three of the original members of ASEAN: Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. In Indonesia and Malaysia, the respondents were selected from five major cities in each country. The choice of the three countries was mainly based on practical reasons due to the limited resources (funding, time, energy) and study duration. Since the surveys were restricted to only three countries, the study does not make any claims that its findings can be generalized to other countries of ASEAN. However, the three countries chosen for the study are considered important for the following reasons:

(1) The three countries are among the founding members of ASEAN, besides Thailand and the Philippines. For this reason, it is expected that the public in these countries would exhibited a better understanding and knowledge of ASEAN than those in the newer member countries.

(2) These three countries are considered pivotal in ASEAN in terms of size of territory, population, and economy. In 2009, the three countries accounted for 49.40% of the land size of ASEAN, 44.72% of the regional population, 61.39% of the regional Gross Domestic Product, 66.24% of trade, and attracted 63.72% of foreign direct investments in ASEAN.29

(3) The three countries have maintained close relationships and interdependence both at the governmental and people-to-people levels.

1.7 STUDY LIMITATION

This study has some methodological and theoretical limitations. The first limitation is the choice of mainly quantitative methods and reliance of quantitative closed-ended questions. Nonetheless, such questions actually helped this study to get more

29 ASEAN Secretariat (2010a).

respondents to take part in the project willingly because of the ease and practicality of these questions that required less effort from the respondents to answer. For example, to reveal whether the respondents were aware of the year ASEAN was established, this study just asked, “Do you know that ASEAN was established in 1967?” instead of asking the respondents directly, “When was ASEAN founded?” The choice of the strictly structured close-ended questions might be a limitation as the choice of answers was more restricted, but respondents may have refused to be involved in this study if they had to answer long and complicated questions.

The second limitation is that the study only covered three out of the ten ASEAN member countries: Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Thus, the study does not make any claims that its findings can be generalized to other countries of ASEAN.

The third limitation is the convenience quota, non-random sampling used to select the targeted public in the three cities (see 3.2). The choice of the targeted public – only those with tertiary education background – was required because of the complexity of the study design. Therefore, the findings from the study cannot be generalized to the general public in the three countries. However, due to the large number of respondents involved, the results can be used to understand possible trends among the educated public on the issues studied.

The fourth limitation is the indicators used to measure public opinions. Because of the lack of previous study existed on these research area, the study chose simple questions for measuring the public opinion on ASEAN regionalism (See 3.3). These questions might be considered as simple, but sufficient enough for a study that accommodates so many inquiries.

The fifth limitation is the descriptive methods used in the analyses. Reviews on the literature on ASEAN regionalism found no research similar to the inquiries of this study. Thus, this study is an exploratory one which used descriptive methods that showed the opinion of public on ASEAN regionalism. Due to the lack of research

with similar research inquiries in the context of ASEAN, this study was unable to explain the phenomena further by using causal relationships statistical tests.

1.8 LITERATURE REVIEW

The review examines the studies on public opinion on regionalism, studies on ASEAN, and public opinion studies on ASEAN regionalism.

1.8.1 Studies of public opinion on regionalism

Reviews on the literature of public opinion on regionalism found sixty four studies that focus on the public opinion on regional integration. Most of the studies were conducted in the European context, with only three on the South and North America region, and the other four studies in the context of Northeast Asian regionalism conducted in South Korea. Based on themes, these studies can be categorized into: (1) attitudinal studies; (2) perception studies; (3) regional and national identity studies; and (4) aspiration and expectation studies. a. Attitudinal Studies of the Public Opinion on Regional Integration

The public’s attitudes toward regionalism, regional integration, regional institutions and regional policies are the first theme of the studies of public opinion on regional integration. In fact, they are one of the main themes of the study as most of the studies fall under this category. These studies can be categorized into five sub-themes: (1) attitudes towards and support for regional integration, supra-national regional institution and their enlargement; (2) hostility to and scepticism of regional integration projects; (3) attitudes towards and support for a single regional currency and the European Monetary Union; (4) attitudes towards and support for the policy of the regional institution; and (5) attitudes towards the social and economic aspects of regional institutions.

The typical studies under the first sub-theme are the attitudes towards the European Economic Community (EEC),30 the EU,31 the enlargement of the EU,32 American regionalism, 33 and the Northeast Asian regional integration in Korea. 34 Other studies examined public attitudes in the post-communist European countries towards membership of the EU 35 and attitudes in Turkey towards membership in the EU.36

On the second sub-theme, i.e. hostility towards and scepticism of regional integration projects, there are two studies portraying the hostilities to the European integration for reasons of fear of loss of national identity.37 It is argued that this scepticism about the regional integration projects has been caused by national identity and interest, institutional distrust,38 and its interaction with the macroeconomic factors.39

The third sub-theme – attitudes towards and support for a single regional currency and the European Monetary Union – has been analyzed by using economic explanations, 40 social explanations, 41 and psychological constructs.42

30 Allington and Jones (1994); Dimitras (1992); Eichenberg and Dalton (1993); Handley (1981); Inglehart (1970b); Kriesberg (1959); Mennis and Savant (1975); and Worcester (1992). 31 Anderson (1998); Anderson and Reichert (1995); Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996); Balestrinni (2010); Brinegar and Jolly (2005); Gabel and Palmer (1995); Gabel (1998); Gabel and Whitten (1997); Garry and Tilley (2009); Jones and van der Bijl (2004); Mahler, Taylor and Wozniak (2000); Mau (2005); Rohrschneider (2002); Serricchio (2010); and Sigalas (2010). 32 Jones and Van der Bijl (2004); Rohrschneider (2002); Schoen (2008a and (2008b); Serricchio (2010); and Tománková (2007). 33 Attitudes towards the American regionalism were the topics of studies by Rankin (2004); and Seligson and Wallace (1999). 34 Hyeok (2010 and (2011) and Jhee (2009). 35 Cichowski (2000); Slomczynski and Shabad (2003); and Tucker, Pacek, and Berinsky (2002). 36 De Vreese, Boomgaarden and Semetko (2008) and Kentmen (2008). 37 McLaren (2002 and 2004). 38 De Vries and Edwards (2009); Lubbers and Scheepers (2010); McLaren (2007). 39 Garry and Tilley (2009); Serricchio (2010). 40 Deroose, Hodson and Kuhlmann (2007), Gärtner (1997); and Van Everdingen and Van Raaij (1998).

The fourth sub-theme is on attitudes towards and support for the EU ’s integration policy. This sub-theme includes the attitudes towards and support for the Common Agricultural Policy, 43 the immigration policy 44 and the combination of several EU policies.45

The fifth sub-theme is on attitudes towards the social and economic aspects of regional institutions. This includes the attitudes towards the economic aspects of regional integration in the EU 46 and Latin America; 47 and towards social and identity aspects of the European regional integration. 48 b. Perception Studies of the Public Opinion on Regional Integration

Public perception of various aspects of regional integration is the second most popular theme. These studies can be categorized into two sub-themes: (1) the perception of benefits of regional integration; and (2) the perception of the economic situation during regional integration.

The first sub-theme is on the perceived benefits of regional integration. This utilitarian approach has dominated the study of perceptions on regional integration since 1990 and has focused on studying the perceived benefits gained from regional integration. These studies used statistical tests to relate the perceived economic gains from membership of regional organisation to the support for it. 49 The other studies

41 Meier and Kirchler (1998), Müller-Peters (1998), and Van Everdingen and Van Raaij (1998). 42 Pepermans and Verleye (1998). 43 Klandermans, Sabucedo, and Rodriguez (2004). 44 Luedtke (2005). 45 Allington and Jones (1994). 46 Gabel (1998); Koch (1974). 47 Davis, Gabel and Coleman (1998). 48 Koch (1974) and Deflem and Pampel (1996). 49 Anderson and Reichert (1995); Gabel (1998a and 1998b); Gabel and Palmer (1995); Hooghe and Marks (2005); Hyeok Yong Kwon (2010); Luedtke (2005); Mahler, Taylor and Wozniak (2000); Mau (2005); McLaren (2007); Meier and Kirchler (1998); Rankin (2004); Seligson and Wallace (1999); Serricchio (2010); Sigalas (2010); Slomczynski and Shabad (2003); Worcester (1990).

focus on the perceived effects of regional integration movement on the lives or well- being of the public and relate them to public support for regional integration. 50

The second sub-theme is on the perceived economic situation during regional integration. The studies relate national and global economic, political, and socio- cultural conditions with economic perceptions and public support for regional integration. 51 c. Regional and National Identity Studies of the Public Opinion on Regional Integration

Opinions on regional and national identities are another popular theme of the studies of public opinion on regional integration. Studies measuring opinions of the public with regard to regional and national identity can be categorized into four sub-themes: (1) opinions on regional identities of the EC; (2) opinions on regional identities in relation to national identities; (3) opinion on the European Single Currency as a social identity of the European integration; and (4) relation of national and regional identities with the support for enlargement of regional institutions.

The first sub-theme is the opinions of regional identities of the EC. Several aspects of regional identities -- attachment, regional citizenships, and communal identities -- are assessed. Some studies examine the level and pattern of attachment of these critical elites as regards to their Europeanness in the regional integration of Western Europe. 52 Another study assesses the identification of farmers in Galicia (Spain) and the Netherlands linked to experience with national and EU ’s political institutions. 53 The study by Hooghe and Marks tests theories of economic calculus and communal identities in a multi-level analysis of Eurobarometer data and find that the

50 Kriesberg (1959); Mahler, Taylor and Wozniak (2000); Mennis and Sauvant (1975); and Seligson and Wallace (1999). 51 Anderson (1998), Davis, Gabel and Coleman (1998); Gabel and Whitten (1997); Rohrschneider (2002); and Seligson and Wallace (1999) fell under this sub-theme. 52 Mennis and Sauvant (1975), Pollman (2010), and Wilkins, Busher, Lawson, Acun and Göz (2010). 53 Klandermans, Sabucedo and Rodriguez (2004).

influence of communal identities on the public attitudes towards regional integration is greater than that of economic calculus. 54

In the second sub-theme, several aspects that relate regional and national identities are assessed. Some studies assessed how the national identities of citizens affected their regional identities, where the regional identities were often perceived as threats to national identities and sovereignty. 55 The other studies link national identities with economic interests in the relationship with the regional identities and support for regional integration. 56

The third sub-theme is the public opinion on the European Single Currency or the European Monetary Union as a social identity of the European integration.57 However, several studies contradict the economic expectation for the Euro with the feeling of national identities, relative national status, and national pride. 58

The fourth sub-theme relates the national and regional identities to the support for enlargement of regional institutions. A study relates the regional identities to the support for enlargement and finds that the common identities or 'we-feeling' grew with greater European regional cooperation and interaction.59 However, there are also studies that showed that national identities contradicted the regional ones in the context of the public support for the accession of Turkey into the EU.60

54 Hooghe and Marks (2005). 55 Cinnirella (1997); De Vries and Edwards (2009); Kim and Jhee (2008); McLaren (2002 and 2004); and Pollmann (2007). 56 De Vries and Edwards (2009); Deflem and Pampel (1996); Gabel and Palmer (1995); Garry and Tilley (2009); Hyeok (2010); McLaren (2007); Rankin (2004); and Serricchio (2010). 57 Meier and Kirchler (1998). 58 Meier and Kirchler (2003); Müller-Peters (1998); Pepermans and Verleye (1998); and Van Everdingen and Van Raaij (1998). 59 Jones and Van der Bijl (2004). 60 Schoen (2008); Kentmen (2008); De Vreese, Boomgaarden and Semetko (2008); Wilkins, Busher, Acun, and Göz (2010).

d. The Eurobarometer

The Eurobarometer studies merit discussion in the context of public opinion studies on European regional integration. Several projects, carried out on behalf of the European Commission, have been conducted since 1973 and have become continuous sources of data on public opinion on European regional integration. In fact, the extensiveness of the surveys that have been conducted twice yearly for more than 37 years have made it one of the largest survey databases in the world. Reviews on the literature of public opinion on European regional integration found that almost 25% of the studies were based on Eurobarometer data.

The Eurobarometer refers to the series of survey of public opinion on issues relating to the EC across the member states.61 The results have been published by the Public Opinion Analysis Sector of the European Commission of the EU's Directorate General of Communication (DGC). The results have helped in the preparation of documents, decision-making, and evaluation of the work of the EC. The surveys – executed in the EU member countries – have provided quantitative and qualitative results that gauge public opinions on the business climate, common monetary policy, citizen affiliation and identity, and EU enlargement, amongst other topics.62 Currently, the DGC publishes five types of Eurobarometer studies, namely the standard Eurobarometer, the special Eurobarometer, the flash Eurobarometer, qualitative analysis, and the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer.63

61 Bratislava (2006); Laffan (1992: 123). 62 Dulfano (2006: 78). 63 The Standard Eurobarometer is a survey that consists of approximately 1000 face-to-face interviews per Member State conducted between 2 and 5 times per year with reports published twice yearly. The Special Eurobarometer reports are based on in-depth thematical studies carried out for various services of the European Commission or other EU institutions and integrated in Standard Eurobarometer’s polling waves. The Flash Eurobarometer are ad hoc thematical telephone interviews conducted at the request of any service of the European Commission; so it has the advantage for enabling the Commission to obtain results relatively quickly and to focus on specific target groups, as and when required (i.e. doctors, SMEs, etc.). The qualitative studies investigate in- depth the motivations, the feelings, the reactions of selected social groups towards a given subject or concept, by listening and analyzing their way of expressing themselves in discussion groups or with non-directive interviews. Finally, the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (CCEB) studies were carried out in between 2001 and 2004 in all the 13 countries applying for membership. Its

The Standard Eurobarometer survey series are some of the studies conducted by the European Commission and have been carried out by the ‘ TNS Opinion and Social’ for the European Commission since autumn 2004. The studies are cross- national longitudinal, designed to compare and gauge trends within member states of the EU (formerly the European Communities). The surveys are carried out in autumn and spring each year. Although the range of questions has been expanded over the years, the programme aims to keep most of the survey constant, so that the data are comparable over time. Special-supplementary surveys on specific topics have been conducted since 1990. 64 In the case of some supplementary studies, youth and elderly samples have been drawn. The youth supplements to the standard Eurobarometer have been published irregularly and issued in 1982, 1987, 1990, and 1997.

Most studies using the Eurobarometer data agree that there was a high degree of support for the notion of European unification and the ‘idea of Europe’, showing that attitudes toward membership of the EC varied across the member states and that the support tended to be utilitarian. In other words, support for the EC did not translate to the willingness to make sacrifices for other member states in economic difficulties and nor were large sections of the Western European population truly interested in the Community.65

The literature on public opinion suggest that there was a ‘permissive consensus’ in favour of the idea of European integration, but the level of support was not high enough to exhort the governments towards further integration. National elites had a relatively free hand in determining integration policies, provided that they maintained the passive support of the public.66

methodology was almost identical to that of the Standard Eurobarometer. One report was published each year, excluding the special reports (European Commission’s Public Opinion Website 2010). 64 Special irregularly repeated modules investigate topics such as agriculture, biotechnology, energy, environment, gender roles, family, youth, elderly, health related issues, immigration, poverty, regional identity, science and technology, working conditions, consumer behaviour, urban traffic etc. in a European perspective. 65 Handley (1981: 69 – 87); Laffan (1992: 123); Slater (1982: 69 – 87). 66 Laffan (1992: 123-124).

The studies also show the existence of enormous gaps between the small but growing numbers of intellectuals, politicians, civil servants, and academics who are committed pro-Europeans and the indecisive and confused public in the member states.67 This lack of public support – which was one of the obstacles to integration – was not overcome until the beginning of the EC. It can be observed in different cases, especially at the ratification of treaties by referendums and percentage of participation in the elections of European Parliament (EP). Overall turnout for the EP elections has declined gradually but steadily, since direct elections were introduced in 1979.68

Identification with the EU has mostly been conditional upon the benefits. Unlike the national identification, identification with the EU is unlikely to survive if there were serious policy failures. If the EU were unsuccessful in its institutional project, it is likely that the formation of a stronger common European identity will also fail.69

Finally, the studies also find that those who are uneducated and unemployed perceive regional integration as a threat rather than an opportunity, as proven in the case of European integration.70 It is much harder for them to identify with the EU. It is obvious that only emphasis on the material benefits of integration would not guarantee continued commitment of the Europeans to the process.

1.8.2 Studies on ASEAN Communities

Reviews on the literature of ASEAN Communities found 264 studies from January 2000 to April 2011. Based on theoretical paradigms used, realism and neo-realist theories are mainly used in analyzing ASEAN. 71 However, constructivist theories also gains popularity in the ASEAN studies as the number of writings almost balances

67 Llobera (2001: 188). 68 Bretherton and Vogler (1999: 225). 69 Waever and Kelstrup (1993: 82). 70 Bretherton and Vogler (1999: 229). 71 Katsumata (2006), Ferguson (2004), Haacke (2005), Kai (2008), Buszynki (2003), Khoo (2004), Eaton and Stubbs (2006), Narine (2009), Yuzawa (2005), and Kawasaki (2006).

those of the realist and neo-realist. 72 In addition, several discussions also use the liberalist theories, 73 neo-liberalist theories, 74 and the English School theories. 75

Based on themes, topics on ASEAN studies can be categorized into: (1) ASEAN Regionalism; (2) ASEAN Principles and Identity issues; (3) Elite versus People Centric ASEAN; (4) The development of the situation in the Southeast Asia; (5) the international relations of ASEAN; (6) and the security issues of ASEAN. a. Studies on ASEAN Regionalism

There are many studies on ASEAN regionalism. These studies can be categorized into several sub-themes: (1) the free trade agreement; (2) ASEAN Community formation process; (3) ASEAN Security Community; (4) ASEAN Economic Community; (5) ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community; (6) ASEAN Plus Three Regionalism; and (7) the Enlargement of ASEAN regional integration.

The first sub-theme has become the trend since 2000. Some of the studies discussed ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), which was implemented among ASEAN member countries as the attempts to foster economic regional integration. 76 However, some studies have enlarged the discussion of FTA beyond ASEAN to include other

72 Ba (2006), Acharya (2001, (2004, (2005, (2009 and (2011), Katsumata (2006), Rüland (2000 and (2009), Manea (2008), Jones (2004), Nguyen Vu Tung (2007), Eaton and Stubbs (2006), Timo (2001), and Yeo (2007). 73 Pang (2005), Rüland (2009) and Yuzawa (2005). 74 Dent (2005), Kai (2008), Katsumata (2006) and Ofreneo (2008). 75 Haacke (2005); Narine (2006) and Tongzon (2005). 76 Arnold (2006); Bun, Klaassen, and Tan (2009); Daquila and Le (2003); Nesadurai (2003); Nguyen and Ezaki (2005); Robles (2004); Selmier II and Oh (2008); and Tan (2004).

countries in the East Asia and China. 77 In addition, the FTAs between several ASEAN countries and EU 78 and the Russia 79 are also discussed in their studies.

The second sub-theme – the formation process of ASEAN Community – has become popular since the Declaration of Bali Concord II in 2003. Some studies discuss the Declaration of Bali Concord II or ASEAN Concord II as the fruitful outcome of the Ninth ASEAN Summit in Bali 2003. 80 After ASEAN Charter has been adopted, the issues that might emerge in relation to the Charter and the implication of its implementation became the hot topic of discussion. 81 Some studies even focus on the formation process of ASEAN Community and argue that substantial impulses for cooperation have come from outside Southeast Asia, most importantly from Europe.82 However, Anja Jetschke and Jürgen Rüland 83 show their pessimism about the changes in ASEAN, as the social structure and political culture in the region will not be sufficient to produce mechanisms that may facilitate international cooperation. Furthermore, Geoffrey Cockerham 84 also shows his scepticism and points out at many agreements develop within ASEAN framework that tends to operate mostly in functional areas and exhibit low levels of transparency and delegation.

The third sub-theme – ASEAN Security Community (ASC) – has appeared since 2002. Most of the studies under this sub-theme discuss the formation of a pluralistic security community in ASEAN as the fruitful outcome of the Ninth

77 Some studies enlarged the discussion of FTA beyond ASEAN to include other countries in the East Asia (Dent 2005; Eng 2003; Fukugawa 2005; and Kurlantzick 2001). The development of ASEAN FTA that includes China is also a hot topic of the studies (Cai 2003 and 2005; Devadason 2010; Tongzon 2005; Wong and Chan 2003). 78 Robles (2008). 79 Lisovolik (2010). 80 Ferguson (2004), Freistein (2005), Narine (2009); Haacke (2010a); Smith (2004a and 2004b). 81 Ba (2009a and (2009b); Caballero-Anthony (2008); Hernandez (2008); Jones (2008); Lin (2010); Linton (2008); McCarthy (2009); Morada (2008); Narine (2009); Rahim (2008); Seah (2009); and Voronin (2008). 82 Jetschke (2009). 83 Anja Jetschke and Jürgen Rüland (2009). 84 Geoffrey Cockerham (2010).

ASEAN Summit in Bali 2003.85 However, some authors warn about the challenges and difficulties faced by ASEAN in building the ASC.86 In addition, related with the ASC, some studies focus on the role of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in building confidence among partners in several security issues. 87

The fourth sub-theme is about the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). The majority of writers under this sub-theme discuss the transformation of ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) into the proposed AEC after the Bali Summit 2003. 88 Some studies go further to discuss the economic cooperation of ASEAN, 89 the financial cooperation of Chiang Mai Initiatives, 90 the exploration of the possibility of the currency integration in the region, 91 the impact of ASEAN regional integration on economic growth, poverty and income distribution,92 and the conflicting priorities and perceptions of economic regionalism among members.93

The fifth sub-theme is about the ASCC. Under this sub-theme, most of the discussions focused on the education cooperation under the ASCC initiatives. 94 However, Surin Pitsuwan writes about the challenges in contagious infection in

85 Acharya (2009b); Emerson (2005); Freistein (2005); Lokshin (2008); Severino (2007 and 2008); and Smith (2004a and 2004b). 86 For example, Khoo (2004) warned the pitfalls of imagining ASEAN as a security community as it contained the temptations of orthodoxy in the regional integration. 87 Caballero-Anthony (2002); Emmers (2001); Emmers, Greener-Barcham, and Thomas (2006); Garofano (2002); Haacke (2009); Heller (2005); Katsumata (2003, 2006, and 2011); Kawasaki (2006); Kuik (2005); Kurlantzick (2001); Ogilvie-White (2006); Yuzawa (2005 and 2006). 88 Freistein (2005); Ofeneo (2008); Robles (2004); Rogozhin (2010); Selmier II and Oh (2008); Severino (2007); and Tan (2004). 89 Chen (2006), Fukugawa (2005), Koh (2000), and Stubbs (2004). 90 V. Amirov (2010) and Hyoung-kyu Chey (2009). 91 Achsani and Partisiwi (2010) and Cortinhas (2009). 92 Nguyen and Ezaki (2005). 93 Watanabe (2004). 94 Koh (2007), Umemiya (2008), and I-Hsuan Cheng (2010).

ASEAN as he asserts that the movement of people across open borders as a factor behind the rise in the number of infectious disease outbreaks in the region. 95

The sixth sub-theme is on ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Regionalism. Under this sub-theme, several writers discuss the rise of APT regionalism to catalyze a process of 96 economic and political integration in East Asia and the critics towards it. In addition, the roles of China, Japan and the United States in relation to the arrangement are also discussed. 97 However, several writers argue that the future trajectory of APT would continue to be constrained by internal tensions and the continuing influence of the United States.98

The seventh sub-theme is on the enlargement of ASEAN regional integration. Ali Alatas, for example, write about the enlargement of ASEAN that includes all ten countries in the region. 99 However, Kraft refutes this expansion by arguing that the enlargement is problematic because the four later countries joining ASEAN are considered unprepared to participate and overwhelmed with the problems of the legitimacy of the governments in those countries. 100 b. Studies on ASEAN Principles and Identities Issues

The issues of ASEAN principles and identities are also the concerns of many studies. On this issue, the studies can be categorized into several sub-themes: (1) the ASEAN Way; (2) ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and ASEAN principles; and (3) ASEAN’s regional identity and norms issues; (4) ASEAN’s principle of democracy;

95 Surin Pitsuwan (2011). 96 Ba (2009); Beeson (2003); Hund (2003); Hidetaka (2005); Fukagawa (2005); Stubbs (2002); Watanabe (2004); Webber (2001); and Zhang (2005). 97 Kevin G. Cai (2003), Kuik Cheng-Chwee (2005), and Ming Wan (2010) discussed the roles of China in making the ASEAN Plus Three regionalism possible; whereas Terada (2008) discussed the role of Japan, and Cook (2008) discusses the role of the United States in the arrangement. 98 Ba (2009); Beeson (2003); Hund (2003); Hidetaka (2005). 99 Alatas (2001). 100 Kraft (2000).

(5) ASEAN’s principles of promoting and protecting human rights; and (6) ASEAN’s principles of respect for national identity.

The first sub-theme is ASEAN Way, which is the informality, consultations (musyawarah ) and consensus ( mufakat ) processes conducted in the socialisation and decision making. 101 Under this sub-theme, various studies are conducted by various scholars in debating the effectiveness of ASEAN Way in the context of foreign policy and diplomacy, 102 in conflict management and in regional security, 103 in dealing with the Myanmar issues, 104 in stimulating the regionalism of the Southeast Asian countries and in stimulating the regionalism of the East Asian nations. 105

The second sub-theme is the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) altogether with its upheld principles of respect of national sovereignty, non- interference in the internal affairs of member states and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of the members.106 Under this sub-theme, various studies are conducted by various scholars debating the TAC and its effectiveness for regional security. 107 Other scholars assert that the TAC is crucial in maintaining the respect for the national sovereignty and avoiding interference and intervention in the internal affairs of member states. 108 However, several scholars argue that TAC may bring more difficulties in dealing with democratisation process, human rights, Myanmar

101 Acharya (2001). 102 Katsumata (2003); Nischalke (2000 and 2002); and Yuzawa (2006). 103 Askandar, Bercovitch and Oishi (2000); Öjendal (2004); and Yuzawa (2006). 104 Haacke (2010b) and McCarthy (2009). 105 Cockerham (2010); Jetschke and Rüland (2009); Jones (2008); Lauwrence (2007); and Öjendal (2004) argued that the ASEAN Way stimulated the regionalism of the Southeast Asian countries. Furthermore, Cockerham (2010); Hidetaka (2005); Kivimäki (2011); Susumu (2005) argued that the ASEAN Way could be used to enlarge the regionalism to the East Asian one. 106 ASEAN Secretariat (2008). 107 Lemaye (2007); Maletin (2010); Smith (2004); and Xiao (2009). 108 Cockerham (2010); Dunn, Nyers and Stubbs (2010); Hund (2002); Jones (2007 and 2010); Katanyuu (2006); Katsumata (2003); Narine (2004 and 2006); Ramcharan (2000); Sutherland (2009).

issues, humanitarian intervention, the diffusion of small-arms in the region, dealing with radicalism and terrorism, and management of armed conflicts in the region. 109

The third sub-theme is the regional identity and norms issues. Under this sub- theme, various studies are conducted by various scholars in debating the ASEAN identity and its formation in ASEAN;110 while another scholar focuses on the effect of the Asian crisis on the formation of regional identity. 111

The fourth sub-theme is the ASEAN’s principle of democracy. The ASEAN Charter has aspired for the “adherence to the rule of law, good governance, the principles of democracy and constitutional government ” as one of their principles .112 Under this sub-theme, various studies are conducted by various scholars in describing the situation of democracy in the region, the process of democratisation, the effect of the democratisation process in regional security, and the Myanmar issue in the context of democratisation in ASEAN. 113

The fifth sub-theme is the ASEAN’ s principles of promoting and protecting human rights in the region. The ASEAN Charter has aspired for the “respect for fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protection of human rights, and the promotion of the social justi ce” as one of their principles .114 Under this sub-theme,

109 Acharya (2003); Jones (2008), and Kuhonta (2006) discussed on the difficulties of TAC with the democratization process in the region, while Katsumata (2009), Manea (2009), and Mohamad (2002) discuss about the TAC and the human rights issues in the region. Ganesan (2006), Katanyuu (2006), and Rahim (2008) focus the TAC with Myanmar issues. Narine (2005) studies the TAC in relations with humanitarian intervention. The other writers discussed the TAC in relations with the diffusion of small-arms in the region (Capie 2008), radicalism and terrorism (Desker 2003), and the management of armed conflicts in the region (Vatikiotis 2009). 110 Acharya (2005); Eaton and Stubbs (2006); Jones (2004); Freistein (2005); Kivim ä ki (2001); and Manea (2009). 111 Rüland (2000). 112 ASEAN Secretariat (2008). 113 Crossette (2006), Dibb (2001), Emmerson (2005), Hernandez (2008), Kuhonta (2006), and Munro (2009) discussed the situation of democracy in the region. The other studies discussed the democratization process in the region (Acharya 2003; Chavez 2007; Ibrahim 2005; Jones 2009; Morada 2008; Rüland 2009; Susumu 2005), effect of democratization process on regional security (Jones 2008); and the Myanmar issue in the context of democratization (Emmerson 2008; Haacke 2010b; McCarthy 2008 and 2009; Morada 2008; and Rahim 2008). 114 ASEAN Secretariat (2008).

various studies are conducted by various scholars in placing human rights on ASEAN Agenda, the evolution towards an ASEAN human rights body, the reservations of several ASEAN states to Human Rights Treaty, human rights and the interregional dialogue between Asia and Europe, and the issue of repeated human rights violations in Myanmar. 115

The sixth sub-theme is the ASEAN’s principles of respect for national identity of all ASEAN member states. The ASEAN Charter has aspired for the “resp ect for national identity of ASEAN member states” as one of their principles. 116 Under this sub-theme, various studies were conducted by various scholars in the problem of incomplete nation-building of states in the region 117 and the contradiction of AEC and national identity.118 c. Studies on Elite versus People Centric ASEAN

The third theme of studies on ASEAN discusses about the elite versus people centric ASEAN. The development and process of ASEAN community appeared to be elitist and state-centric:119 it has been leaders, bureaucrats, and businesspeople deciding the due course of ASEAN Community creation.

Furthermore, Timo 120 and Acharya 121 asserted that it was the elite groups that had controlled most of the countries as the political system of illiberal non-democracy existed in most ASEAN countries. Both writers argued that the elite groups had been

115 Several studies discussed the human rights on ASEAN Agenda (Aviel 2000; Manea 2008b; Mohamad 2002; Munro 2009), the evolution towards an ASEAN human rights body (Duy Phan 2008; McCarthy 2009; Phan 2009), the reservations of several ASEAN states to Human Rights Treaty (Linton 2008), human rights and the interregional dialogue between Asia and Europe (Manea 2008a), and the issue of repeated human rights violations in Myanmar (Chin 2007; Clapp 2003; McCarthy 2008 and 2009; Rahim 2008). 116 ASEAN Secretariat (2008). 117 Jones and Smith (2002); Sutherland (2009). 118 Anwar, Doran, and Sam (2009); Rüland (2009). 119 Acharya (2003 and 2009); Cabellero-Anthony (2009); Chavez (2007); Sutherland (2009). 120 Timo (2001). 121 Acharya (2003).

able to manipulate the social consciousness in the region for the purpose of creating a pacific union, similar to the one which had been socially constructed by liberal democracies.

Although the formation of ASEAN Community has been an elite-centric process, ASEAN Charter has set the goal of a people-centred ASEAN Community to be realized by 2015.122 The drive toward the people-centred ASEAN Community was influenced a lot by democratisation in the Philippines, Thailand and more recently Indonesia where the civil society in the region demanded greater openness in Southeast Asian regionalism. Acharya 123 then proposed a conceptual framework for analyzing the relationship between democratisation and regionalism, with the key argument being that the displacement of traditional patterns of the regional elite socialisation has been offset by potential gains such as advances in regional conflict management, transparency and rule-based interactions. But the realisation of a more 'participatory regionalism' in Southeast Asia faced a number of barriers, including obstacles to further democratisation, the continued salience of the non-interference doctrine and the diminished space for civil society in the wake of the 11 September terrorist attacks. 124 This argument is also supported by Hernandez 125 who believes that the people-centred ASEAN Community goal would remain a dream for decades to come unless there were transformative democratic changes in the way ASEAN member states govern their people. The ASEAN member countries are advised to amend the ASEAN Charter to put the peoples of ASEAN truly at the centre of community building. d. Studies on the Evolving Situation in the Southeast Asia

The fourth theme of studies on ASEAN focuses on the evolving situation in the region. On this issue, the studies can be categorized into several sub-themes: (1) The

122 ASEAN Secretariat (2008). 123 Acharya (2003). 124 Acharya (2003). 125 Hernandez (2008).

economic and global financial crisis; (2) the environmental issues; (3) the situation of foreign direct investment (FDI); and (4) the situation of workers in the region.

The first sub-theme is the global economic and financial crisis. Several studies relate the 1997 Asian Economic Crisis with theoretical implication and practical consequences of rapid and fundamental changes in the international and regional economic, political and security environment for the Southeast Asian regionalism, the rise of Asian multilateral institutions as the response to the crisis, and the broadening of the concept of security in the region. 126 Another crisis is the 2008 global financial crisis and recession, in which the studies give a prediction of its effects to the region.127 In addition, the 2008 crisis is described to trigger ASEAN to provide a means for its members to coordinate their monetary and fiscal policies to continue economic development 128 and built closer ties with China 129 and Russia. 130

The second sub-theme is the environmental issues. Under this sub-theme, various studies are conducted by various scholars in explaining the ASEAN agenda on environmental issues;131 discussing the ASEAN norms, interest and identity on environmental issues;132 examining the ASEAN agreement and initiatives on transboundary haze pollution;133 and discussing the ASEAN efforts on adapting to Climate Change.134

126 There were several studies related the 1997 Asian Economic Crisis with the rapid and fundamental changes in the international and regional economic, political and security environment for the Southeast Asian regionalism (Alatas 2001; Lee Kuan Yew 2001; Narine 2002; Rüland 2000). Furthermore, several studies related it with the rise of Asian multilateral institutions (Harris 2000; Stubbs 2002; Webber 2001), and the broadening of the concept of security in the region (Cheng 2006). 127 Rillo (2009). 128 Rillo (2009). 129 Amer (2011); Ming (2010). 130 Lavrov (2010). 131 Aviel (2000). 132 Elliott (2003). 133 Florano (2003); Jones (2004); Mayer (2006). 134 Lee Poh Onn (2007).

The third sub-theme is the foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region. This issue regains its importance because it is arguable that FDI relates wi th a country’s economic growth.135 However, the continuous growth of China and India has threatened the inflow of FDI to ASEAN as they have become the stronger competitors in attracting FDI. These issues are discussed in the context of China, as the ASEAN’s approach of involving China in its free trade agreement might become a bane or boon for the region. Meanwhile, other studies also discuss this issue in the context of India. 136

The fourth sub-theme is the employment issues in the region. While AEC proposed for free movement of professional workers, the movement of low- and unskilled workers, many of whom are undocumented, has received especially little attention in ASEAN as each country had its own policy on this issue.137 Then, emulating the experience in the EU, several authors propose the social policy for ASEAN on this issue in order to strengthen the relevance and profile of ASEAN among the citizens of member countries. 138 e. Studies on the International Relations of ASEAN

The fifth theme concentrates on the international relations in the region. On this aspect, the studies can be categorized into several sub-themes: (1) Intra-ASEAN relations; (2) inter-regionalism between ASEAN and other regions; and (3) the relations between ASEAN and key external powers.

135 Srinivasan, Kalaivani and Ibrahim (2010). 136 Several writers disputed on whether the Chinese involvement in the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement might become a bane or boon for Southeast Asian efforts to attract Foreign Direct Investment (Arnold 2006; Frost 2004; Lee Kuan Yew 2001; Leong 2001; Meng 2007; Nesadurai 2003; Ravenhill 2006; Siew, Chen, and Hui 2010; Tongzon 2005; Wong and Chan 2003). Meanwhile, other studies also discussed this issue in the context with India (Ambatkar 2001; Pradhan 2010). 137 Cheah (2009). 138 Bhatnagar and Manning (2005); Chaves (2007).

The first sub-theme under the theme of international relations in the region is the relations between countries in the region. Under this sub-theme, various studies are conducted by various scholars in: discussing the intra-relations between ASEAN countries; while some writers discuss the relations between some ASEAN countries with the other countries in the region. 139

The second sub-theme under the theme of international relations in the region is the inter-regionalism between ASEAN and other regions. Under this sub-theme, most studies are conducted by various scholars in discussing the relations between ASEAN with the Europe region. 140 However, there is a study conducted by Yahya in the context of relations between ASEAN and the SAARC. 141

The third sub-theme under the theme of international relations in the region is the relations ASEAN and key external powers. Under this sub-theme, various studies are conducted by various scholars in discussing the relations between ASEAN and China, 142 India, 143 Japan, 144 Russia, 145 the United States 146 and Australia. 147

139 Bun, Klassen, and Tan (2009), Kraft (2000), and Kurlantzik (2001) discussed the relations between ASEAN countries in the region. In addition, other studies discuss the relations between Indonesia (Dibb 2001), Myanmar (Ganesan 2006; Jam es 2004; McCarthy 2008), Singapore’s (Thompson 2006), Thailand (Chulasiriwongs 2006; Ganesan 2001 and 2006; Thianthai and Thompson 2007) and Vietnam (Amer 2011; Nguyen 2002 and 2007; Sutherland 2009) with other ASEAN countries. 140 Camroux (2010), Gilson (2005), Kanaev (2010), Koldunova (2010), Lokshin (2008), Manae (2008), Moeller (2007), Robles (2008), and Yeo (2007). 141 Yahya (2004). 142 Amer (2011), Arase (2010), Ba (2003 and 2006), Beeson (2010), Cai (2003), Cheng (2001 and (2004), Chien, Chao and Chen (2007), Eng (2003), Devadason (2010), Emmers (2007), Evans (2003), Frost (2004), Ganesan (2000), Goh (2007), Jian (2003), Kuik (2005), Lee (2001), Leong (2001), Mahbubani (2008), Men (2007), Ming (2010), Öjendal (2004), Ravenhill (2006), Storey (2000), Stuart-Fox (2004), Vatikiotis (2003), Wong and Chan (2003), Xiao (2009), Zhai (2005), and Zhao (2007). 143 Ambatkar (2001), Jha (2008), Limaye (2003), Mohan (2008), Pradhan (2010), Yahya (2003), Yong and Mun (2009), and Zhao (2007). 144 Chow (2003), Eng (2003), Corning (2009), Ganesan (2000), Gilson (2004), Hernandez (2005), Hwee (2006), Jian (2003), Mahbubani (2008), Öjendal (2004), Rowan (2005), Singh (2002), Terada (2001) and (2008), Yoshimatsu and Trinidad (2010), and Yuzawa (2005). 145 Buszynski (2006), Ivanov (2006), Kanaev (2010), Koldunova (2010), Lavrov (2010), Lisovolik (2010), Mazyrin (2010), Rangsimaporn (2009), Sumsky (2010), Urlyapov (2010), and Voronin (2008).

f. Studies on the Security Issues of ASEAN

The sixth theme of studies on ASEAN focuses on the security issues of the region. On this issue, the studies can be categorized into several sub-themes: (1) managing conflicts and disputes in the region; (2) dealing with terrorism and counter-terrorism issues; (3) the nuclear weapon and weapon of mass destruction issues; (4) the energy security issues; (5) the trans-national crimes issues; and (6) the economic and human security issues in the region.

The first sub-theme is on managing conflicts and disputes in the region. Under this sub-theme, various studies are conducted by various scholars in: discussing the role of ASEAN in managing conflicts; 148 the adoption of norms associated with the collective management of conflicts; 149 proposal for ASEAN peace-keeping operations; 150 managing disputes in the South China Sea; 151 and managing border disputes. 152

The second sub-theme is on the dealing with terrorism and counter-terrorism issues in the region. Under this sub-theme, various studies are conducted by various scholars in: discussing the challenge of Islamic fundamentalism in the region; 153 the securitisation of terrorism in the region (Febrica 2010); the terrorism challenge and the counterterrorism cooperation in the region. 154

146 Capie (2004), Chau (2008), Eng (2003), Cook (2008), Emmers (2001), Ganesan (2000), Haacke (2010a), Limaye (2007), Mahbubani (2008), Öjendal (2004), and Rowan (2005). 147 Chau (2008); Richardson (2005). 148 Askandar, Bercovich and Oishi (2002), Caballero-Anthony (2002), Dupont (2000), Kivimäki (2011), Nguyen (2002), and Vatikiotis (2009). 149 Acharya (2003), Jones (2002), and Katsumata (2011). 150 Caballero-Anthony (2002), and Smith (2004). 151 Buszynski (2003), Keyuan (2006), Nguyen (2003), Odgaard (2003), Rowan (2005), Shicun and Huaifeng (2003), Storey (2009), Yann (2003), and Zhai (2005). 152 Smith (2004) and Tagliacozzo (2001). 153 Desker (2003) and Dibb (2001). 154 Acharya and Acharya (2007), Borgu (2004), Chau (2008), Cheng (2006), Chow (2003), Capie (2004), Emmers (2009), Ogilvie-White (2006), Öjendal (2004), and Stubbs (2004).

The third sub-theme is on the nuclear weapon and weapon of mass destruction issue in the region. Abad discusses the relevancy of nuclear weapon-free zone agreement in the Southeast Asia. 155 Ogilvie-White further discusses the relationship between global and regional governance in tackling terrorism in Southeast Asia, with reference to the security of nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological (NBCR) materials. 156

The fourth sub-theme is on the energy security issue in the region. Under this sub-theme, various studies are conducted by various scholars in discussing the ASEAN energy security issues and the need for securing the clean and sustainable energy. 157

The fifth sub-theme is on the transnational crimes in the region, including the trade of illicit drugs, illicit arms and weapons, and human trafficking. Under this sub- theme, various studies are conducted by various scholars in discussing the issues of transnational crimes in the region; 158 the issue of illicit trade in small arms and light weapons;159 the issue of human trafficking; 160 and the drugs trafficking and abuse. 161

The sixth sub-theme is on the economic and human security. Under this sub- theme, various studies are conducted by various scholars in discussing economic security issue in the region 162 and the human security issue in the region.163

155 Abad (2005). 156 Ogilvie-White (2006). 157 Carroll and Sovacool (2010), Lee (2007), Lidula, Mithulananthan, Ongsakul, Sovacool (2009), Thomson (2006), Widjaya and Henson (2007). 158 Capie (2008); Emmers (2003). 159 Capie (2008). 160 Emmers, Greener-Barcham, and Thomas (2006). 161 Emmers (2007). 162 Morrision (2004); Caballero-Anthony (2004). 163 Nishikawa (2009).

1.8.3 Public opinion studies on ASEAN regional integration

While there are many qualitative studies on ASEAN, there are only a few involving public opinion on ASEAN regionalism. The lack of comprehensive data like the Eurobarometer in the region discourages studies of public opinion in the context of Southeast Asian nations.

Amongst the few studies carried out is one entitled “Culture and International Imagination in Southeast Asia” 164 which was conducted within the cognitive anthropology discipline. Using the opinion of university students in Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand, the study examines the relationship between particular national discourses, cultural concepts and subjective ideas about the international system of nation-states by drawing cognitive maps of the world regions and countries. Similar methods and research objectives were also used in two studies of Thailand 165 and Singapore.166

A more comprehensive study on public opinion on ASEAN was conducted in 2007 by Eric. C. Thompson and Chulanee Thianthai amongst university students in ten ASEAN countries. 167 Their study investigates attitudes towards the region and the association, knowledge of ASEAN, orientation towards countries within the region, sources of information about the region, and aspirations for the region and ASEAN.

In their study, attitudes towards the institution were measured by three indicators: (1) “I feel that I am a citizen of ASEAN”; (2) “Membership in ASEAN is beneficial to my country”: and (3) “My country’s membership in ASEAN is beneficial to me person ally”. In addition, attitudes towards the region were measured by three indicators of similarity: (1) “ASEAN countries are similar culturally”; (2) “ASEAN countries are similar economically”; and (3) “ASEAN countries are similar

164 Thompson, Thianthai and Hidayana (2006). 165 Thianthai and Thompson (2007). 166 Thompson (2006). 167 Thompson and Thianthai (2008).

politically”. The study found that student attitudes towards ASEAN were positive in most indicators.

Thompson and Thianthai 168 measured the participants’ knowledge of the region and ASEAN by the subjective question “In general, how familiar are you with ASEAN?” and some objective questions – identifying the ASEAN flag, the year of its founding, and its member states. The subjective and objective questions showed that most respondents had strong or at least stronger than expected knowledge about the region and the association.

Orientation towards the region and individual countries in ASEAN was measured by a cultural salience index when the respondents were asked to list the names of ASEAN countries. In addition, their familiarity with countries in the region was also tested. The study found that the response could be differentiated among those who came from the mainland (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam) and those from the maritime nations (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore). In general, students from each of these sub-regions were more familiar with countries in their own sub-region.169

Sources of information on ASEAN were also explored in the study. The study found that television, school, newspapers and book were the primary sources of information, while the secondary sources of information included the internet and radio. Sports, advertising, and friends ranked in the middle. 170

Finally, aspirations for integration and action were measured by asking the agreement or disagreement with the importance of eight aspects of integration and cooperation: cultural exchanges, economic cooperation, development assistance, educational exchanges, security and military cooperation, political cooperation, sports competitions, and tourism. The study found a strongly positive attitude across all

168 Thompson and Thianthai (2008). 169 Thompson and Thianthai (2008). 170 Thompson and Thianthai (2008).

nations on the aspirations. Economic cooperation, tourism, and development assistance were rated as the most critical areas for integration and cooperation in all countries, while cultural exchanges and political cooperation uniformly ranked low relative to other issues. However, there were various levels of agreements on education exchanges, security and military cooperation, and sports competitions. 171

1.9 THESIS ORGANISATION

The study, made up of six chapters, is organized as follows. The first chapters, the introduction, gives an overview of the study and this includes the background of the study, the problem statement, research inquiries, research objectives, scope of study, study limitation, literature review and thesis organisation.

The second chapter describes the conceptual framework for the study. It includes the theories and concepts of regional integration and the ASEAN Community; the political-security integration and ASEAN Security Community; the economic integration and ASEAN Economic Community; the Socio-Cultural Communities and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community; regional identities versus national identities; and the concept of sovereignty and security.

The third chapter discusses the research methodology, including the research approach, methods of data collection, explanation of research variables and indicators, methods of data analysis, and description of respondents.

The fourth chapter presents the findings of the study. It examines the results on public knowledge and relevancy of ASEAN; public attitudes, opinions and aspirations towards the formation of an ASEAN Community; sentiments of national and regional identities towards the social construction of the ASEAN Community; perceived challenges for establishing the ASEAN Community; and perceived impacts of the ASEAN Community on national sovereignty, security, and identity.

171 Thompson and Thianthai (2008).

The fifth chapter discusses and analyses the result of the study. It discusses the six research inquiries based on the analysis of the finding of the study (see 1.4).

The conclusions of the study are presented in the final chapter. Firstly, the conclusions of the study are outlined. Then, the implications of the study for the construction of the ASEAN Community are discussed, followed by theoretical implications of the study. Finally, this chapter discusses the study limitations and provides suggestions for future research.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter discusses the conceptual framework of the study. It includes the theories of regional integration; the concepts of regional integration and the ASEAN Community; political-security integration and the ASEAN Security Community; economic integration and the ASEAN Economic Community; socio-cultural integration and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community; regional identities and national identities; and sovereignty and security.

2.1 REGIONAL INTEGRATION THEORIES AND CONSTRUCTIVISM

The concept of regional integration generates different responses in the discipline of International Relations. Realism, for example, rejects the idea of regional integration and examines the phenomena of regionalism as ‘regional alliances’, as the primary structure of cooperation to maintain order and security in the region 1. On the contrary, the Regional Integration Theory introduced the concept in the 1950s and has become one of the leading theories discussing the regionalism for the next two decades. The interest in the concept of regional integration fell sharply after 1970s, because of the faltering state of EC in the Middle East oil crisis which, at that moment, showed the irrelevance of the regional integration theories. Mainstream international relations theories only returned to the concept of regional integration in the wake of constructivism. This study, thus, uses the theory of regional integration and constructivism as the main approaches of analysis.

1 Cronin (1999: 1); Butler (1997: 411).

This study uses the underlying assumptions of regional integration theories. These theories see integration as a process by which the evaluation and societal behaviours based in political decisions get modified by the conduct of transactions and communications between actors. Thus, these approaches argue that transactions and communications may redefine perceptions and relationships among actors in ASEAN regionalism and lead to the establishment of a regional community in which the use of force become illegitimate for solving problems among nations .2

This study also uses the underlying assumptions of social constructivism. The principal contribution of constructivism is its ideational ontology. This approach believes that construction of social interests and ideational factors such as ideas, norms, and values become highly relevant. Then, the success of the formation of the ASEAN Community would depend on its ability to socially construct the regional community – both th e infrastructure and in the public’s mind. The success would also depend on establishing and implementing norms and values that regulate state behaviour, interests, and identities. The success of ASEAN, thus, would also depend on the interplay of inter-subjective factors – ideas, culture, and identities -- in shaping the relations in the region. Thus, the study argues that the formation of the ASEAN Community should be attentive to the public’s regional and national identity .

The link between constructivism and regional integration theory becomes real in the understanding of regionalism as a paradigmatic case of structural change in international relations not capable of being explained by material aspects, but by ideational ones. Indeed, it is affirmed that “integration theorists appreciated this suggestion long ago, but their nascent sociology of international community has been lost in the economics of international cooperation developed by realists and rationalists”. For this reason, it is important to em phasize that constructivist approach to regional integration is more comprehensive than rationalist ones in explaining the phenomena of ASEAN regionalism.3

2 Acharya (2009a: 9). 3 Santos (2008: 23).

2.1.1 Regional Integration Theories

Regional integration theories challenge the dominance of realism with its attendant focus on the security dilemma. The idea of the security community, by contrast, is integral to the approach that perceives international relations as a process of social learning and identity formation, driven by transactions, interactions, and socialisation. It recognizes the possibility of change being a fundamentally peaceful process with its sources lying in the ‘perceptions and identifications’ among actors .4 Such a process can explain why states may develop greater mutual interdependence and responsiveness, develop ‘we feelings’, and ultimately come to abandon the use of force to settle problems among them.5 International relations can thus be reconceptualised as a “world society of political communities, consisting of soci al groups, a process of political communication, machinery for enforcement, and popular habits of compliance”. 6

Neo-functionalism is one of leading schools in the regional integration theory. Marked by the work of Ernst Haas and Joseph Nye, it holds that cooperation in areas of low politics would produce a spill-over effect into areas of high politics . Neo- functionalism is a revised version of classical functionalism. David Mitrany, the classical functionalist scholar, asserted that the prospects for integration could be enhanced if actors focused their initial efforts on issues of low politics (such as functional and technical economic issues), before moving into issues of high politics (such as political and military affairs). However, different from the classical functionalist, the neo-functionalists emphasized to the role of institutions in promoting higher and more centralized forms of political authority and expanded the view of the range of actors involved in the integration process, including elements of civil society (such as pressure groups).7 In ASEAN context, ASEAN promotion of cooperation, interaction and communication among members in the areas of low politics – such as

4 Puchala (1984). 5 Jacob and Teune (1964). 6 Eberwein (1995). 7 Acharya (2009a: 9 – 10).

the ASEAN Economic and Socio-Cultural Community – will produce spill-over effects into areas of high politics in the ASEAN Security Community.

The security communities approach or transactionalism of Karl Deutsch is another major school in the Regional Integration Theory. It can be framed as a position close to neofunctionalism but focused specially on order and security. Transactionalism implies a challenge to state-centric theories such as realism in that it brings the possibility of driving forces other than the ones coming from the government itself. Transactionalism is characterized by the conception of integration as a process by which the evaluation and societal behaviours based on political decisions get modified. 8 This approach suggests that transactions and communications between ASEAN countries could redefine their perceptions and relationships and led to the establishment of security communities in which the use of force for solving problems among nations become illegitimate.9

Both the transactionalist and neo-functionalist theories provide powerful and popular conceptual tools for ‘investigations into peaceful transnational problem - solving. 10 According to the regional integration theories, state actors in ASEAN would share values, norms, and symbols that provide a social identity, while they engaged in various interactions in myriad spheres that reflect long-term interests, diffuse reciprocity and trust in the region.

2.1.2 Constructivism

Constructivism has been widely used in explaining regional integration. After widely challenged by the theories of neorealism and neoliberalism in 1970s, the mainstream international relations theory would only return to the concept of regional integration in the wake of constructivism in the late of 1980s and early of 1990s. Subsequently, constructivism has been the main theoretical framework for the study of regional

8 Santos (2008: 6). 9 Acharya (2009a: 9). 10 Acharya (2009b).

communities.11 Simplified comparison on the standing of constructivism, neorealism, and neoliberal institutionalism is exhibited in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1 The different views of International Relations Theories on Regional Security Communities

Variables Neorealism Neoliberal institutionalism Constructivism Notion to · Skeptic of peaceful change. · Accept the realist’s anarchy · Change is always possible Change · Change can only happen as and balance of power as a peacefully because the a consequence of shifts in given of international condition of anarchy and the balance of powers, often system. balance of power are by violent manners. · Change can occur socially constructed. peacefully through the working of international institutions. Cooperation · Cooperation is for · Cooperation among states, · Cooperation among states is among states bandwagoning or balancing while possible, would ar ise also a social process that the great power only in response to states may redefine the interests of pursuing their short-term the actors in matter of war self-interests. and peace. · The habits of war avoidance in the security communities are the results from interactions, socialization, norm setting and identity building, rather than from forces outside of these processes. Notion of · Institutions are only on the · Institutions are created by · Institutions may form the International margin of international self-interested states and at state behaviors by Institutions relations; they are created most constrain state choices interactions, socializations, for the self-interest of great and strategies. They do not norms setting, and identity power with only a marginal fundamentally alter state building. effect in regulating the interests an d identities (as behavior of states. self-interested egoists) and do not c hange the condition of anarchy. Norms · Recognize the importance · Recognize the importance · Norms not only regulate of norms to regulate the of norms to regulate the states’ behavior, but also states’ behavior set to states’ behavior set to redefine state interests and maintain the self-interests maintain balance of power. co nstitute state identities, of the great powers. including the development of collective identities. The impact of · Material forces and · Material forces and · While material forces material forces concerns (power and concerns (power and remain important, the and the wealth) shape the state wealth) shape the state intersubjective factors position of interests. interests. (ideas, culture and identities intersubjective · Perceptual, ideational, and · Perceptual, ideational, and play a determining, rather factors cultural factors derived cultural factors derived from than secondary, role in from material based. material based. foreign policy interaction.

Source : Adapted from Acharya 2009; Wulan and Bandoro 2007; Santos 2008; Ndayi 2006; Hettne 1991; Gilpin 1981.

11 Adler and Barnett (1998: 12).

The principal constructivist contribution is its ideational ontology, inherited from sociologist such as Durkheim and Weber. According to this ontology, the construction of social interest and ideational factors such as ideas, norms, and values becomes highly relevant at the expense of material capacities and externally given interests, which characterize the rationalist approaches. 12 Thus, constructivists view ASEAN regionalism as a social construction of intersubjective interest, ideas, norms, rules, and values held by ten ASEAN nations in the structure of political-security, economic, and socio-cultural community in Southeast Asia.

As Acharya noted, 13 constructivist’s influence in shaping the new discourse on security communities can be found in three areas (Acharya 2009: 3 – 4). The first area is the social construction of security community . According to constructivism, a security community is socially constructed and cooperation among states is also to be understood as a social process that may redefine the interests of the actors in matters of war and peace. The habit of war avoidance found in security communities results from interactions, socialisation, norms setting and identity building, rather than from forces outside of these processes (such as the international distribution of power). 14 In the case of Southeast Asian regionalism, social process within ASEAN is assumed to influence ten ASEAN state actors and redefine the interests of the ten ASEAN nations and the habits of the states in settling differences and disputes between them peacefully.

The second area is the transformative impact of norms . Constructivist scholarship has injected into the Deutschian literature on security communities a clear focus of this concept. To be sure, all theories of international organisation, including neo-liberal institutionalism, recognize the importance of norms. However, constructivism also allows for a much deeper impact of norms in shaping international relations. Norms not only regulate state behaviour as in neo-liberal institutionalism, but also redefine state interests and constitute state identities, including the

12 Santos (2008: 19). 13 Acharya (2009b: 3 – 4). 14 Wulan and Bandoro (2007: 7).

development of collective identities. By focusing on the constitutive effects of norms, constructivism has thus restored some of the original insights of integration theory regarding to the impact of socialisation in creating collective interests and identities. Norms play a crucial role in the socialisation process leading to peaceful conduct among states, which form the core of security communities. 15 For these reasons, each member of ASEAN is requested to acknowledge, sign and conform to the norms outlined in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 16 and the ASEAN Charter .17

The third area is the impact of material forces and inter-subjective factors in shaping international politics. Neo-realism and most liberal theories take state interest to be shaped by material forces and concerns, such as power and wealth. According to constructivists, while material forces remain important, inter-subjective factors – including ideas, cultural and identities – play a determining, rather than secondary, role in foreign policy interactions. Thus, constructivism provides important insight into the role of cultural norms and the emergence of ‘we feelings” which has been identified by Deutsch as a crucial feature of security communities. 18 Constructivist theories focus on regional awareness and regional identity, on the shared sense of belonging to a particular regional community, and on what has been called ‘cognitive regionalism’. They stress the extent to which regional cohesion depends on a sustained and durable sense of community based on mutual responsiveness, trust, and high levels of what might be called ‘cognitive interdependence’.19 At the same time, the construction of identity is central to the kind of ‘we -feeling’ that Deutsch identified as a key feature of security communities. The notion of identity runs deep into the heart of constructivist approaches because of its central claim that the development of a collective identity can ameliorate the security dilemma among

15 Wulan and Bandoro (2007: 7). 16 ASEAN Secretariat (1976a). 17 ASEAN Secretariat. 2008 18 The constructivists assert that, while material forces remain important, inter-subjective factors – including ideas, cultural and identities – play a determining, rather than secondary, role in foreign policy interactions. Thus, constructivism provides important insight into the role of cultural norms and the emergence of ‘we feelings’ which has been identified by Deutsch as a crucial feature of security communities (Wulan and Bandoro 2007: 7-8). 19 Santos (2008: 21).

states”. 20 Hence, given the vast differences in the identities of ASEAN nations, the identification of this “we feeling” or an ASEAN identity becomes more crucial fo r integrating the ten nations as a Regional Community.

Regarding actors in international relations, Alexander Wendt maintained a state-centric perspective based in the idea of states as the most important actors – but not the only ones – in international relations. 21 However, constructivists in general do not privilege any particular agent, actor or unit of analysis. The agents may be states, but also non-state actors to include individuals or groups as well as social movements, corporations, international organizations, non-governmental advocacy groups, or classes. 22 In this case, non-state agents inside or outside Southeast Asia have the potential to influence the creation of regional structures (the ASEAN Community), ASEAN norms, identities, and the behaviour of states just as the ten ASEAN states can similarly impact non-state actors in the region; hence, agents and ASEAN structures and its inter-subjective factors are mutually constitutive one another.

2.2 THE CONCEPT OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND ASEAN COMMUNITY

As integration 23 in regional level, ‘regional integration’ can be explained as a condition or a process,24 as a description of a system in which elements are already in existence, or as an explanation of how a political system is sustained and developed in a regionalized direction. 25

20 Acharya (2009b: 27). 21 Wendt (1994: 385). 22 Viotti and Kauppi (2010: 285). 23 ‘Integration’ is “the creation and maintenance of intense and diversified patterns of interaction among previously autonomous units. These patterns may be partly economic, partly social, and partly political in character: definitions of political integration all imply accompanying high levels of economic and social interaction” (Wallace 1990: 9). 24 Asciutti (2010: 45); van Ginkel and Van Langenhove (2003: 1 -9). 25 Philippe De Lombaerde and Luk Van Langenhove (2007: 377-383) defined regional integration as a worldwide phenomenon of territorial systems that increases the interactions between their components and creates new forms of organisation, co-existing with traditional forms of state-led organisation at the national level.

As a process, regional integration is a phenomenon of increased interaction between actors (both state and non-state) in the Southeast Asian region in regard to economic, security, political, social and cultural issues.26 It is a worldwide phenomenon of territorial systems that increase the interaction between components and create new forms of organisation, coexisting with traditional forms of state-led organisation at the national level.27 Fiona Buttler asserted that integration might be formal or informal. 28

As the description of a system, regional integration is the fruit of the processes of regionalisation and regionalism.29 In short, ‘Regionali sation ’ is the spontaneous process of regional integration which takes place inside the Southeast Asian region. Meanwhile ‘regionalism’ is government -driven integration movements – the ASEAN process is one of the examples – which include the political initiatives of government members in order to strengthen political and economic cooperation among states and actors of the region.30

Regionalisation is a bottom-up and spontaneous process of regional integration 31 as it is not driven by governments. It can be defined as “the creation or realignment of transactions and attitudes along regional lines as a manifestation of

26 Frost (2008); Van Ginkel and Van Langenhove (2003), and Frost (2008: 15) described many varieties of integration. For an economist, the integration of markets requires the disappearance or substantial reduction of national barriers to market entry, measured by flows of goods and capital; the convergence of prices, wages, and interest rates; and other indices. The integration of technology marks the distribution of know-how and "best practices." The integration of financial systems refers to common and/or closely coordinated fiscal and monetary policies, leading to coordinated exchange rate policy, a unified bond market, a common currency unit or "basket," and eventually a single currency. The integration of labor permits a free flow of workers across national boundaries, regardless of their skill level. The integration of society features the disappearance of formal and informal barriers to social connections and the subsequent mingling of different groups. In today's Asia, the integration of markets and technology far outstrips other forms. 27 De Lombaerde and Van Langenhove (2007). 28 Buttler (1997: 411) described the formal integration as the one that involves conscious political decisions. Then, informal integration, that is economic, social and cultural flows, did not involve the political decisions. 29 Frost (2008: 15). 30 Frost (2008); Santos (2008). 31 "Spontaneous" is a better way to describe this form of integration than "bottom-up," because many of the people who embody it -- from corporate executives and tourists to criminal bosses-possess powerful connections and a great deal of money (Frost 2008: 14; Pempel 2005).

globalisation ”32 which “are driven, brokered, and carried out primarily by private individuals acting on their own”. 33 The national and local governments of ten countries and the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations can create the framework for integration and pave the way for the region, but none of them can make it happen because the real-life integration requires more than government efforts; it requires multinational corporations, small-scale traders, representatives of civil society organisations, and many others.34 As in most part of the world, Southeast Asia has gone through regionalisation process at such a breathtaking pace as the impact of the recent and ongoing globalisation in information, telecommunications, and transportation technology. This process has been triggered by the economic regionalism process – taken by ten nations in the region within the AFTA and AEC initiatives – which lowered the tariffs and promoted free flow of goods, services, resources and people movement; such changes have enabled companies to adapt, customize, and rapidly deliver goods and services around the world. These same innovations have sped up travel and personal communication and made them much more affordable for many people of the region. Unfortunately, this regionalisation process has also nourished the globalisation of non-traditional security threats such as criminal networks and other cross-border threats, which stimulated region wide counter-measures.

Initiative to further integrate the Southeast Asian region in the framework of ASEAN Community is the example of regionalism movement occurring in the region. In contrast to regionalisation, regionalism is a governments-driven regional- integration movement 35 where the governments and the states may be the key actors in

32 Chufrin (2006). 33 Pempel (2005). 34 Frost (2008). 35 Frost (2008: 15) asserted that regionalism connoted a political movement based on awareness of and loyalty to a region, combined with dedication to a region-wide agenda of some kind. It provides a way of filtering knowledge and grouping perspectives on the rest of the world. The suffix ("-ism") suggests a conscious set of related ideas or ideology capable of forming the basis of a political movement or an intellectual trend. It implies top-down, coordinated action on the part of governments based on some vision or set of ideas. Essentialy political, it is driven by government fiat and stemmed from the actions of political authorities. Although it derives legitimacy from a collective vision of a more integrated community, it is planned and executed for reasons of the states.

some regional groupings, whilst corporate and economic interests may be more influential actors in others.36 It is also the regional inter-state cooperation where states or governments may sponsor agreements or co-ordination among themselves to manage common problems and ‘to protect and enhance the role of the state and the power of the government’ .37

As a formal-conscious regional-integration process designed to deepen interrelatedness and exchanges between countries, regionalism is considered as the pragmatic solution for responding to international and regional problems. Regional groupings may be concerned primarily with maximizing economic welfare and gains from intra-regional trade and investment, whilst others may be more concerned with defence and security, or the protection of social and cultural traditions.38 Regionalism constitutes a middle-range approach of responding to international problems, with unilateralism on one side and universalism (or globalism) on the other. In most cases, unilateralism and universalism are incapable for resolving interstate problems or conflicts. Thus, the regionalists argue that pragmatic solutions are most likely to be found at the regional level.39

Regionalism is also considered as the expression of general consciousness of the region for a sense of identity as well as for conducting cooperation to attain common goals. Regionalism requires not merely geographical proximity and increased economic interdependence for underpinning potential development of regional problem solving processes, but also other factors such as historical experience, power and wealth distribution within and outside the grouping, cultural social and ethnic traditions, and ideological or political preferences.40 In this sense, ‘regional awareness and identity’ 41 is involved where a mixture of historical, cultural,

36 Frost (2008). 37 Hurrell (1995b). 38 Hurrell (1995a); Nye (1968). 39 Habib (1996: 7). 40 Buttler (1997: 410). 41 A. Hasnan Habib (1996: 7) in his “Defining the Asia Pacific Region” defined regionalism as “the expression of general consciousness that develops from a sense of identity among states situated in

and social traditions lead to a ‘shared perception’ of belonging to a community. Regional cohesion is attained whereby ‘a combination of these first four processes (regionalism, regional awareness and identity, regional inter-state co-operation, and state-promoted regional economic integration) that may lead to the emergence of a cohesive and consolidated regional unit’. Such a highly politically cohesive grouping can have a decisive impact upon both its ‘internal’ environment and upon global politics.42

Regional community is a form of regionalism that has been used by the Southeast Asian leaders for their regional integration as enunciated explicitly in the Bali Concord II.43 Compared to other forms of regionalism, regional community has a looser meaning and tends to convey the sense of ‘big family’ rather than pooled sovereignty. 44 It suggests that people coexist peacefully and cooperate with each other according to common sense, courtesy, and habit. Different from the European-like integration, members of a regional community rely on informal compromise, not formal rules and adjudication, to settle differences.45

ASEAN Vision 2020, issued in Kuala Lumpur on 15 December 1997, is the first document aspiring for an ASEAN Community. Although there is no explicit reference to of ‘ASEAN Community’ and its three pillars in ASEAN Vision, the main idea does call for a closer integration within the region bound by a common regional identity. 46

geographical proximity which motivates them to mutual cooperate in one or another mode to attain common goals, satisfy common needs, or to solve political, military, economic, and other practical problems”. 42 Hurrell (1995). 43 ASEAN Secretariat (2003). 44 A ‘community’ can be defined as a human collection formed by shared norms and understanding among its members (Wulan and Bandoro 2007: 8). A community is a body of persons or nations having a common history or common social, economic, and political interests and may imply common rights and duties (Frost 2008: 16). 45 Frost (2008: 16). 46 In the documents, there is no term such as “ASEAN Community”, “ASEAN Security Community”, “ASEAN Economic Community”, or “ASEAN Socio -Cultural Community”. However, the

The concept of an ASEAN Community, however, is clearly enunciated in the Declaration of Bali Concord II. 47 In the Declaration, ASEAN leaders agreed to establish ASEAN Community comprising the three pillars, namely ASEAN Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community, and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. The declaration mentions clearly that the three pillars are closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing for the purpose of ensuring durable peace, stability and shared prosperity in the region.

2.3 POLITICAL-SECURITY INTEGRATION AND THE ASEAN SECURITY COMMUNITY

Fiona Buttler defined political-security regionalism as one form of regional integration that may involve not merely the formation of institutional mechanisms and decision- making procedures but also the development of shared values and expectations, peaceful resolution of disputes, and socio-political cohesiveness. 48 Together with the development of the new concept of security after the end of the Cold War, political- security regionalism focuses on allaying the fears, threats and tensions that give rise to the ubiquitous security dilemma in international relations. 49 In a marked contrast to the traditional concepts of security, the newer concepts of security make different assumptions about the prospects for reducing armed violence. 50 In general, the newer concepts take a systems approach to security, seeking to create security communities

document explicitly defines the vision of building the regional community of Southeast Asia nations. The vision of the ASEAN Security Community is defined under the subtitle of “A Concert of Southeast Asia Nations”. The vision of the ASEAN Economic Community is defined under the subtitle of “A Partnership in Dynamic Development”. The vision of the ASEAN Socio -Cultural Community was defined under the subtitle of “A Community of Caring Societies”. 47 ASEAN (2003). 48 Buttler (1997: 411). 49 The end of the Cold War has generated renewed and widespread interest in new ways to address the problem of security. The development of proposals such as common security, cooperative security, comprehensive security and related ideas of non-provocative defense, transparency and confidence- building all reflect this trend. 50 While traditional policies of deterrence, armed self reliance, balance of power and alliance, among others, have been able to offer the foundations of state security in the past, they all assume that the threat and use of military force by states is all pervasive part of the international system (Trood (1996: 121).

in which cooperation, rather than competition (with its attendant potential for violence), as the primary norm of behaviour.51

What constitutes a regional security institution? The security dimension of regional institutions 52 can be understood in two different, though related ways. Firstly, it can be interpreted as an attempt to promote peaceful and predictable relations among its members by building security and community through cooperation.53 This definition is the loose understanding of security that may be said to apply to any regional organisation. Secondly, and more formally, a regional security institution can be understood as an organisation whose charter contains an explicit reference to security provision through the coordination of defence, security and foreign policy in some level.54

Bruce Cronin described seven possible types of security arrangements and called them ‘transnational political communities’, 55 namely: (1) International State of Nature; (2) Balance of Power System; (3) Pluralistic Security Community; (4) Collective Security System; (5) Concert System; (6) Common Security Association; and (7) Amalgamated Security Community. He identifies four primary characteristics

51 Trood (1996: 121). 52 All three terms – ‘regional’, ‘security’, and ‘institutions’ – are subject to differing interpretations (Fawcett 2008: 311). In International Relations, institutions refer to formal organisations with ‘prescribe hierarchies and capacity for purposive action’ and to international regime with ‘complexes rules and organisations as the core elements of which have been negotiate d and explicitly agreed upon by states’ (Keohane 1988). Regional institutions are regimes and formal organisations comprising a membership which is limited to a particular geographical region, or perhaps to two or more proximate regions (Fawcett 2008: 311). 53 Adler and Barnett (1998). 54 Fawcett (2008: 311). 55 Cronin (1999: 8 – 13).

Table 2.2 Typology of security system Patterns of Security system Common identity Constitutive Rules Primary institutions behaviors International State of War of all against None None None Stature all. Balance of Power Sovereignty and Balancing and Alliances Statism System independence bandwagoning Regional Pluralistic Security Cognitive Peaceful settlements Demilitarization organisation s and Community regionalism of disputes and cooperation regimes Collective Security International law and Cosmopolitan Peace is indivisible Collective action System organisations Multilateral security Consultation / Concert System Great power Congress / Summits management joint action Common Security Institutional or Transnational Solidarity Mutual support System ideological association Amalgamated Security Collective as Pan -Nationalism Political integration Federal government Community singularity

Source : Adapted from Bruce Cronin (1999: 8 – 13) to distinguish one community from the others: constitutive rules; patterns of behaviour; types of institutions; and common identity (see Table 2.2).

A security community , as originally defined by Deutsch, refers to a group of states between which war has become inconceivable as the states share an understanding that force should not be used to resolve disputes between them. 56 Thus, besides the security policy cooperation, Deutsch defined stable relations between the social environments of the states as the characteristic of a security community. 57 Deutsch considered the following components to be essential to a security community: (1) mutual interdependence within the intraregional relations; (2) a high degree of collective identity and common values; as well as (3) a tight network of common institutions and standards, which regulated the relations and contributes to the peaceful conflict resolution.58

56 According to Karl W. Deutsch (1961: 98), a security community is identified by the following features: “A security community is a group of states that has become integrate d, where integration is defined as the attainment of a sense of community accompanied by formal or informal institutions or practice, sufficiently strong and widespread to assure peaceful change among members of a group with ‘reasonable’ certainty over a ‘long period of time’” 57 Deutsch (1957). 58 Flemes (2005).

Jeannie Anderson described security community as an imaginary community of states and non-state players adhering to the peaceful process of resolving conflicts among them and pursuing cooperative measure with one another against what they perceive as common threats to their national security. 59 It is an imaginary community because, despite the complex diversities of players in the community, there is a general perception or shared imagination. Hence, relative peace and security may be attained by cooperating with one another and by ruling out the threat or the actual use of force in settling their disputes. This security community may be in the form of a formal organisation of states with a permanent secretariat. Another form is an informal grouping of states without a permanent secretariat but with a regular process of constant dialogues and consultations. Since a security community may be viewed as an imaginary community, it is socially constructed. Therefore, the process of forming it will be a little time consuming.

According to Karl Deutsch and his associates, a security community can either be ‘amalgamated’ through the formal political merger of the participating units, or remain ‘pluralistic’, in which case the members retain their independence and sovereignty – as in the case of ASEAN. 60 Deutsch argued that it was the building of a security community that can eliminate ‘war and expectation of war’ within the boundaries of participating nation states.61

A ‘pluralistic security community’ can be defined as a political and security arrangement where participating states or units retain their legal independence. 62 In line with this definition, Acharya defined pluralistic security community as ‘a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change’. 63 Deutsch identified the following conditions for the formation of a pluralistic security community: (1) comparability of values among

59 Anderson (1991: 16). 60 Acharya (2009b). 61 Stein (1985: 600). 62 Wulan and Bandoro (2007). 63 Acharya (2001).

decision makers; (2) mutual predictability of behaviour among decision-makers of units to be integrated; and (3) mutual responsiveness of a government to actions and communications of other governments. 64

While the Deutschian notion of security communities may have an explanatory appeal in Europe and North America, other scholars in the field have been trying to apply the Deutschian framework on security communities in the developing countries. Amitav Acharya, for example, examined the prospects of building a security community in Southeast Asia and identified the following four basic requirements: (1) Total absence of armed inter-state conflict, or prospects for such conflict within a region; (2) Absence of a competitive military build-up or arms race of the regional actors; (3) Existence of formal or informal institutions and practices; and (4) Existence of a high degree of political and economic integration as a necessary precondition for a peaceful relationship. 65

Among the four requirements above, Acharya mentioned the two key features of a security community: (1) absence of war or violence in solving intra-regional conflicts, 66 and (2) absence of arms race or organized preparation for war vis-a-vis any other members. 67 By citing these features, another scholar, Carlyle Thayer argued that

64 Acharya (1996). 65 Acharya (1996). 66 Absence of war or violence is the first important feature of a security community. Ronald J Yalem (1979) noted that the regional security communities were groups of states that have ‘renounced the use of force as a means of resolving intra-regional conflicts. As Karl J Holsti (1998) observed, some serious differences, disputes or conflicts of interests had arisen among states in security communities, but some special characteristics of relationships among members of a security community had prevented the quarrelling governments from adopting forms of behavior typical in conflicts involving threat or use of force. Thus, it is an ability to manage conflicts within the group peacefully, rather than the absence of conflict per se which distinguish a security community from other types of security relationships (Acharya 2009). 67 Security communities are also marked by the absence of a competitive military buildup or arm race as the organized preparation for war among their members. Within a security community, war among the member states comes to be considered as illegitimate and serious preparations for it no longer command popular support (Deutsch 1988). Then, member states usually abstain from acquiring offensive weapons and do not think of the contingency planning and war-oriented resource mobilization against other actors within the community.

since its creation in 1967, “ASEAN has gradually evolved into a security community”. 68

The establishment of ASC as the first pillar of the ASEAN Community was formalized by the heads of governments of ten ASEAN countries in the Bali Summit 2003. The security community, in this sense, refers to a group of states which has developed a long-term habit of peaceful interaction, renounces war as the way to resolve disputes between them, and pursues cooperative measure with one another against what they perceive as common threats to their national security.69 ASC is intended as the institution where the members would live at peace with each other where the causes of conflict have been eliminated, through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law and the strengthening of national and regional resilience. This concept is clearly defined in the Declaration of ASEAN Vision 2020.70

Furthermore, the Declaration of Bali Concord II makes clear the content of ASC by prescribing “to bring ASEAN’s political and security cooperation to a higher plane”. The declaration marked out seven areas where int ensified political and security cooperation will take place: setting values and norms, maritime security, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and transnational crime, defence cooperation, ASEAN Regional Forum, and cooperation with the United Nations.71 This concept is further elaborated in the ASC Blueprint by mentioning the three characteristics of ASC: (1) a rules-based Community of shared values and norms; (2) a cohesive, peaceful, stable and resilient region with shared responsibility for comprehensive security; and (3) a dynamic and outward-looking region in an increasingly integrated and interdependent world. 72

68 Wulan and Bandoro (2007: 11). 69 Deutsch (1957); Laakso (2005); Wulan and Bandoro (2007); Sukma (2003); Jeannie Anderson (1991). 70 ASEAN Secretariat (1997a). 71 Severino (2006: 356). 72 ASEAN Secretariat (2009a).

The Blueprint of ASC elaborates the five thrusts in the Vientianne Action Programme 2004-2010: (1) political development; (2) shaping and sharing norms; (3) conflict prevention; (4) conflict resolution and (5) post-conflict peace building. In addition, it also addresses the non-traditional security issues; the cooperation on disaster management and emergency response; and the response to urgent issues or crisis situations affecting ASEAN. In addition, the Blueprint addresses the three issues not specifically addressed by the VAP 2004 – 2010: (1) ASEAN centrality in regional cooperation and community building, (2) enhanced ties with external parties, and (3) multilateral issues of common concern.

2.4 ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND THE ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

Economic regionalism is the second dimension of regionalism outlined by the Bali Concord II. 73 Historically, economic regionalism has been marked by the wake of widespread enthusiasm shown by the states for developing regional groupings and schemes to promote economic integration that has evolved since the 1960s.74 In line with Nye ’s explanation, Hurrell asserted that state-promoted regional economic integration was often the most common form of regionalism, where government and business interests pursue economic integration (this can differ in terms of depth or sectoral scope) in order to promote trade liberalisation and economic growth. 75

One of the first definitions of economic integration was introduced by Tinberger. 76 He defined the term ‘positive integration’ as “the adjustment of existing, and the establishment of new, policies and institutions endowed with coercive powers”; while ‘negative integration’ was defined as “the removal of discriminatory and restrictive institutions and the introduction of freedom of economic transaction”.

73 ASEAN Secretariat (2003). 74 Joseph Nye (1968: vii) suggested that processes of regionalism and integration across many areas of the globe are aided by the growing number of newly independent former colonies; by some degree of relaxation in tense superpower relations; by a growing realization that economic interdependence and an open multilateral trading regime brought their own pitfalls; and by a successful rapprochement of key West European countries through economic integration schemes. 75 Hurrell (1995). 76 Tinberger (1954: 122).

All the definitions of international economic integration reveal that integration is a complex notion which must be defined with care. Definitions are often vague and do not offer adequate tools for the easing of the process of integration among countries. Integration means different things in different countries and at different times. 77

After comparing several definitions, Jovanovic concluded that international economic integration is a process and a means by which a group of countries strives to increase its level of welfare. 78 It involves the recognition that a weak or strong partnership between countries can achieve this goal in a more efficient way than by unilateral and independent pursuance of policy in each country. Integration requires at least some division of labour and freedom of movement for goods and services within the group. Relatively ‘higher’ types of int egration arrangements also require free mobility of factors of production within the integrated area, as well as certain restrictions on these movements between the integrated area and countries outside of it. In addition, at least some consultations, if not coordination of competition, monetary, fiscal and regional development policies are one of the necessary conditions for success and durability of integration. This is to be supported by an effective dispute settlement mechanism.

77 Reviews of the definitions of economic integration find that it is about the development of deep and stable relationships between national economies (Maksimova 1976: 33); the introduction of freedom of economic transaction (Tinberger 1954: 122); progressive removal of discriminatory and restrictive institutions (or barriers) of the member countries along national borders (Balassa 1973:1; El-Agraa 1985:1; Holzman 1976:59; Kahnert et al 1969:11; Pinder 1969:143-5; Robson 1987:1; Tinberger 1954:122); the elimination of economic frontiers between two or more economies that ease the mobility of goods, services and – sometimes – factors of production (Pelksman 1984: 3; Robson 1987: 1); a process toward economic union, a single region or a single market that implicitly assumes that there are no barriers to the movements of goods, services and factors between the two regions. (Holzman 1976: 59; Pinder 1969: 143-145); linking up and merging of the industrial apparatus, administration and economic policies of participating countries through the establishment of coordination between them (El-Agraa 1985: 1; Mennis and Sauvant 1976: 75); and the creation and implementation of common policies in trade or factor mobility or both (Kahnert et al 1969: 11; Pinder 1969: 143-5). The European Commission (1997: 23) defines market integration “as a state where the outcomes of economic decisions were independent of national frontiers”. 78 Jovanovic (2006: 21).

There are many kinds of economic integration. However, there is no specific definition of ‘Economic Communities’. In economics, the concept is usually discussed within the context of regional integration, where a collection of autarkical economies evolves to become an integrated economic unit.79 In this sense, an economic community may take the form of a Free Trade Area (FTA) like in the ASEAN Free Trade Area Agreement in 1992, a Custom Union (CU), a Common Market (CM), an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) or an Economic and Political Union (EPU). 80

The concept of an economic community suggests a substantial deeper economic integration than a Free Trade Area.81 Theoretically, international economic integration between at least two countries may have the following seven theoretical types:82 1. Preferential Tariff Agreement (PTA) among countries, that assumes that the customs duties charged on trade among the signatory countries are set lower than the duties charged on trade with third countries. 2. Partial Customs Union (PCU) that is formed when the participating countries retain their initial tariffs on their mutual trade and introduce a common external tariff on trade with third countries. 3. Free Trade Area (FTA) that is an agreement among countries about the elimination of all tariff and quantitative restrictions on mutual trade between member countries. However, every country in this area retains its own tariff and other regulation of trade with non-member countries. The bases of this agreement are the rule of origin to prevent trade deflection. 4. Customs Union (CU), in which participating countries not only remove tariff and quantitative restrictions on their internal trade, but also introduce a common external tariff (CET) on trade with third countries. The participating countries take part in international negotiations about trade and tariffs as a single unity.

79 Tham Siew Yean (2008: 36). 80 Balassa (1961); Dent (2002); Jovanovic (2006); and Pelkmans (2001). 81 Ravenhill (2007). 82 Dent (2002: 81 – 82); Jovanovic (2006: 22).

5. Common Market (CM) or Internal Market that involves the elimination of the remaining barriers that impede free trade between participants. Apart from a customs union, businesses enjoy the same rights of establishment irrespective of their own national identity or where they wish to conduct business activities within the market. Factors of production (including people) enjoy free mobility as traded products do. Common regulations (on restriction) on the movement of factors with third countries are also introduced. 6. Economic and Monetary Union (EU/EMU) that assumes not only a common market, but also the harmonisation of fiscal, monetary, industrial, regional, transport and other economic policies. The central aspect here is the adoption of a common currency by its member-states. Monetary Union implies that the countries involved must collaborate to a much closer degree on a variety of economic policies. 7. Total Economic and Political Union/Integration (EPU) as the ultimate stage of regional integration. It assumes a union with a single economic policy and a supranational government of this confederation with substantial economic authority. A common political institution would be formed that further extend the fraternity of supranational organisation s to manage the Union’s affairs. The national sovereignty of member-states is foregone, and their people would be obliged to adopt union citizenship.

Although it seems the process is step-by-step, in fact, the process of international economic integration does not have to be gradual from one type to another. In order to explain the concept clearly, the description of each type of economic integration is exhibited in Table 2.3.

The term ‘Economic community’ was first used for explaining the European economic integration that occurred after the Second World War. 83 The Treaty of Rome, better known today as the Treaty Establishing the European Community

83 The European Economic Community (EEC) was built based on The Treaty of Rome signed on 25 March 1957, and came into operation on 1 January 1958. The membership was the same six countries that had come together to form the European Coal and Steel Communities in 1951, namely Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.

Table 2.3 Selected types of international economic integration

Policy Characteristics Removal Common Factor Harmoni- Total options of tariffs external mobility zation of unification of and quotas tariffs economic economic policies policies Free Trade · Tariffs and quotas abolished for Yes No No No No Area (FTA) imports from area members. · Area members retain national tariffs (and quotas) against third countries. Customs · Suppressing discrimination for Yes Yes No No No Union (CU) CU members in product markets. · CET (Common External Tariffs): Equalization of tariffs (and no or common quotas) in trade with non-members. Common · All CU characteristics. Yes Yes Yes No No Market · Plus: Free movement of factors (CM) from area members. Economic · All CM characteristics. Yes Yes Yes Yes No Union · Plus: some degree of harmonization of national economic policies in order to remove discrimination. Economic · Unification of monetary, fiscal, Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes and Political social, and counter cyclical Union policies. · Setting up a supranational authority where decisions are binding for member states.

Source : Adapted from Balassa 1961; Jovanovic 2006; Pelkmans 2001; Dent 2002.

(TEC), is mainly concerned with the economic framework of integration, establishing a customs union, and common markets for capital and labours. The signatories are also committed to the development of common policies in a number of fields, including agriculture, transportation and the European Investment Bank. 84

While there are several theoretical types of Economic Community, ASEAN has chosen an FTA-Plus economic community, which includes some elements of a common market, but does not include the common external tariff / CET.85 It is chosen due to the difficulties of different degree of openness and stages of economic

84 Dinan (1999: 30-33); Laffan (1992: 33 - 34); Pelksman (2001: 7); Williams (1991: 22 – 25). 85 Guerrero (2008).

development among its members. 86 The blueprint of AEC emphasizes the importance of external trade to ASEAN and the need for ASEAN Community to remain outward looking. It is stated that AEC envisages four key goals: (a) a single market and production base; (b) a highly competitive economic region; (c) a region of equitable economic development; and (d) a region fully integrated into the global economy.

Tham Siew Yean argued that AEC would include seven characteristics and eleven priority sectors. 87 She outlined the seven characteristics of AEC: (1) free movement of goods, services, investments and capital, including a zero-tariff AFTA and the elimination of all non-tariff barriers; (2) An attractive regional production platform for FDI; (3) Free movement of skilled labour and creative talent; (4) Free movement of tourists from all ASEAN countries; (5) Harmonisation of customs procedures and minimisation of customs requirements; (6) Harmonisation of standards; and (7) A well-developed institutional and legal infrastructure to facilitate the economic integration of ASEAN. The pace of economic integration in the region was also accelerated for eleven priority sectors, with the coordination of efforts by different member countries. The eleven priorities sectors are the wood-based products (coordinated by Indonesia), automotive (coordinated by Indonesia), rubber-based products (coordinated by Malaysia), textiles and apparels (coordinated by Malaysia), agriculture-based products (coordinated by Myanmar), fisheries products (coordinated by Myanmar), electronics (coordinated by the Philippines), e-ASEAN/IT-Linkages and development (coordinated by Singapore), health care (coordinated by Singapore), air travel (coordinated by Thailand), and tourism (coordinated by Thailand).

86 Review on the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint (ASEAN Secretariat 2008) shows that the ISEAS’s concept of FTA -Plus, instead of the ASEAN-ISIS’s “Common Market Minus Approach”, is chosen to be the form of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). The “FTA -Plus” arrangement includes some elements of a common market, but does not include the common external tariff / CET (Guerrero 2008). The exclusion of the CET means AEC will allow its members to have different tariffs with non members. The ISEAS argued that, given the different degrees of openness and stages of economic development among ASEAN countries, forming a custom union with CET (as proposed by the ASEAN-ISIS) would be extremely difficult to achieve by the year 2015 deadline (Hew and Soesastro 2003). 87 Tham Siew Yean (2008).

2.5 SOCIO-CULTURAL INTEGRATION AND THE ASEAN SOCIO- CULTURAL COMMUNITY

The socio-cultural community is the third pillar of the ASEAN Community.88 ASEAN leaders deemed this pillar as necessary because Political and Economic Communities are built not only based on material benefits, but also on sentiment, loyalty, identity, and solidarity; 89 so these emotional elements also have to be used.90

Review on the literature finds no coherent theories and concepts of socio- cultural community. However, it is considered essential to pay attention to social and cultural aspects in establishing the regional community 91 . Such a review also finds that the term ‘Socio -Cultural Community’ is unique to A SEAN. However, the concept is not radically unique to ASEAN because it is essentially embodied in the concept of the social dimension and the cultural dimension of regionalism embedded in the EU. Gijsbert Van Liemt stated that some of the problems related to the social dimensions of regional integration were unemployment, 92 uneven bargaining power between labour and capital, 93 uneven distribution of benefits, 94 and regulatory competition. 95

88 ASEAN Secretariat (2003). 89 Regionalism requires not merely geographical proximity and increased economic interdependence for underpinning potential development of regional problem solving processes, but also other factors such as historical experience, power and wealth distribution within and outside the grouping, cultural social and ethnic traditions, and ideological or political preferences (Buttler (1997: 410). In this sense, regional awareness and identity is involved where a mixture of historical, cultural, and social traditions lead to a ‘shared perceptions’ of belonging to a particular community. Regional cohesion is attai ned whereby ‘a combination of these first four processes (regionalism, regional awareness and identity, regional inter-state co-operation, and state-promoted regional economic integration) might lead to the emergence of a cohesive and consolidated regional unit’. Such a highly politically cohesive grouping can have a decisive impact upon both its ‘internal’ environment and upon global politics (Hurrell 1995b). 90 Laffan (1996). 91 Emphasizing only on the material benefits of integration will not guarantee continued commitment of the people to the process because the political security and economic communities to build are based not only on material benefits, but also on sentiment, loyalty and solidarity. If the regional community is expected to be established, these kind of emotional elements also have to be managed (Laffan 1996: 95 – 96). 92 It is debatable whether the integration will create jobs or create unemployment. However, in many cases, regional integration did potentially threaten jobs in vulnerable sectors and accordingly, job losses were often concentrated geographically, by skill category and by age group (Van Liemt 2004: 2). 93 The elimination of barriers to trade and capital movements has given capital the easier option to exit, whereas labour is still the immobile production factor. This appears to give leverage to the

Jacques Robert asserted several socio-cultural problems that the EC has faced: the impact of globalisation on the lifestyles, the relationships between ethnic or religious groups, immigration from outside Europe, terrorism, social divide with its growing negative impact in the field of poverty, social exclusion and crime, social and economic polarisation, housing and urban crisis, strong suburbanisation, isolation of the peripheral regions and sub-regions, and so on. 96

The EC has not formally built the socio-cultural community nor does it have a strictly defined policy of socio-cultural development and integration.97 However, some policies that relate to the socio-cultural dimensions of regional integration have been long in existence, namely environmental policy, social policy, and cohesion policy embodied in the Treaty of EU (TEU) and the Amsterdam Treaty.98 Jacques Robert 99 stated that the EU policies on socio-cultural development and integration can be divided into:

· Employment-related EU socio-cultural policies. The European Employment Strategy supported by the Social Fund, has three interrelated objectives: working towards full employment; quality and productivity at work and social cohesion and

representatives of capital over those of labour by threatening to relocate production to lower labour cost countries (Van Liemt 2004: 2). 94 Uneven distribution of benefits can be the social problem of regional integration. Within groupings of uneven economic strength, the less developed countries were concerned that their more developed trading partners would have an advantage and thereby benefit disproportionately (Van Liemt 2004: 2). 95 Regulatory competition is the consequence of competition between states to attract investors to come and do business in their territory. To win the competition, states would design their regulation to make the most attractive package for investors. Regulatory competition could be found in areas such as taxation, investment rules, industrial policies and environmental and labour standards. The concern was that increased competition brought through freer trade would extend the government regulation thereby putting downward pressure on higher standard countries and potentially undercutting their stakeholders -- people, domestic businesses, labours, environment, and so on (Van Liemt 2004: 2). 96 Robert (2006: 196). 97 Robert (2006). 98 Dinan (1999: 407). 99 Robert (2006: 1999).

an inclusive labour market. 100 The Social Agenda (2000), aimed at implementing the Lisbon Strategy with the objective to return to full employment, has been putting new and better forms of governance of social policy forward. The new Social Agenda (2005) has two key priorities: employment and fighting poverty and promoting equal opportunities. · Non-employment related EU socio-cultural policies, comprising the EU cultural policy, 101 public health policy, 102 policy aiming at eradicating poverty 103 and policy for combating discrimination. 104

Former ASEAN Secretary General Rodolfo C. Severino argued that the core of the ASEAN Community should be the Socio-Cultural Community if one stands on fundamental premises and taking a long-term perspective. He suggested that the ASCC should be a vehicle for developing a sense of Southeast Asian identity, building a regional awareness and fostering mutual understanding among the people of

100 To achieve these objectives, the European Employment Strategy laid down employment guidelines, valid for the whole EU. Quality was the watchword: investment in education and training; schemes to help women, the long-term unemployed and older workers return to or remain on the labour market reduce unemployment and boost productivity. Progress in labour law, health and safety and social dialogue have helped the EU to develop its social model. Faced with far-reaching changes in the economy and labour market, new responses to improving working conditions are needed: fostering economic dynamism and innovation, ensuring social stability and accommodating the needs of those adversely affected by the changes (Robert 2006: 1999). 101 EU initiatives in the cultural sector aimed at encouraging cooperation between member states and, if necessary, supporting and supplementing their actions. The aim is to encourage the creation of a ‘European Cultural Area’. Cultural cooperation is encouraged by mea ns of the Culture 2000 Programme, but also by specific actions financed by other European programmes. Various other policies are also supporting cultural activities in the EU (structural policies, R&D policy, European Neighbourhood Policy, etc) (Robert 2006: 1999). 102 In September 2002, the European Parliament and the Council adopted a Decision on the programme of Community action in the field of public health 2003 – 2008 which entered into force on 1st January 2003. In 2002, the Commission proposed a new Community strategy on health and safety at work to cover the period until 2006, building on the knowledge that the absence of high quality occupational health and safety policy generates a significant economic cost (Robert 2006: 1999). 103 In the context of Lisbon Strategy, the EU governments set the goal of making a decisive impact on eradicating poverty by 2010. The Commission’s plan was for member states to coordinate their social protection policies within a single coherent framework, setting targets for reducing the number of people significantly at risk of poverty and social exclusion with measures to help the most vulnerable as one of the priorities (Robert 2006: 1999). 104 Non-discrimination was considered as important to tackle poverty and deprivation and bring the marginalized into mainstream society, groundbreaking the EU legislation on combating discrimination based on race or ethnic origin, religion or belief, age, and disability (Robert 2006: 1999).

ASEAN; and in turn, it would contribute significantly and essentially to the building of ASC and ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). 105

As Severino emphasized,106 ASCC shows the world that ASEAN is not just about politics and security, the concern of states, politicians and bureaucrats, the economics, the business of business and governments. It is the third pillar that shows to the world that ASEAN is a real regional community which is also about ‘the people’ – their health, education and social security – and their environment and general quality of life, including in particular that of the ‘marginalized’ and ‘disadvantaged’ groups. 107

The declaration of Bali Concord II has emphasized that the ASCC envisages a Southeast Asia bonded together in partnership as a community of caring societies. It is defined as cooperation in social development aimed at: raising the standard of living of disadvantaged groups and the rural population; preparation of the workforce for benefiting from the economic integration and human resources development; cooperation in public health areas, including preventing and controlling of infectious diseases; nurturing and promoting interaction of scholars, writers, artists and media practitioners and promoting cultural heritage; and addressing social problems such as population growth, unemployment, environment degradation, trans-boundary pollution and disaster management. 108

The tenth ASEAN Summit in Vientiane, Laos, pursued the Vientiane Action Programme (VAP) for 2004 – 2010. In the section on the ASCC, the VAP emphasizes the action programme under four main thrust: (1) building a community of caring

105 Severino (2006: 368) argued that identity, awareness, and mutual understanding among people are necessary for the adoption of common norms and for the sharing of common values. They make regional cooperation easier on a broad range of security concerns. Then, they also contribute to the building of ASEAN Security Community. He also argues that the identity, awareness and mutual understanding among people would also smoothen the path to regional economic integration by cultivating mutual trust, and thereby, building confidence in regional institutions, arrangements and understandings. 106 Severino (2006). 107 Severino (2006). 108 ASEAN Secretariat (2003).

societies; (2) managing the social impact of economic integration; (3) promoting environmental sustainability; and (4) promoting an ASEAN identity. 109

The latest document on ASCC is the 2009 ASCC Blueprint that tries to ensure concrete actions for promoting the establishment of ASCC. 110 The document emphasizes that ASCC envisages six characteristics: human development, 111 social welfare and protection, 112 social justice and rights, 113 ensuring environmental sustainability, 114 building the ASEAN identity, 115 and narrowing the development gap.

2.6 REGIONAL IDENTITY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

Identity is the way to define and differentiate someone from the others. Collective identity is usually defined as sameness of the essential character as someone claim to

109 ASEAN Secretariat (2004). 110 ASEAN Secretariat (2009a). 111 In the ASCC Blueprint, Human Development programmes include: advancing and prioritizing education, investing in human resource development, promotion of decent work, promotion of information and communication technology, facilitating access to applied science and technology, strengthening entrepreneurship skills for women, youth, elderly and persons with disabilities, and building civil service capability (ASEAN Secretariat 2009a). 112 In the ASCC Blueprint, Social Welfare and Protection programmes include: poverty alleviation, social safety net and protection from the negative impacts of integration and globalization, enhancing food security and safety, access to healthcare and promotion of healthy lifestyles, improving capability to control communicable diseases, ensuring a drug-free ASEAN, and building disaster-resilient nations and safer communities (ASEAN Secretariat 2009a). 113 In the ASCC Blueprint, Social Justice and Rights programmes include: promotion and protection of the rights and welfare of women, children, the elderly, and persons with disabilities, protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers, and promoting Corporate Social Responsibilities (ASEAN Secretariat 2009a). 114 In the ASCC Blueprint, Ensuring Environmental Sustainability programmes include: addressing global environmental issues, managing and preventing transboundary environmental pollution, transboundary movement of hazardous wastes, promoting sustainable development through environmental education and public participation, promoting environmentally sound technology, promoting quality living standards in ASEAN cities/urban areas, harmonizing environmental policies and databases, promoting the sustainable use of coastal and marine environment, promoting sustainable management of natural resources and biodiversity, promoting sustainability of water resources, responding to climate change and its impact, and promoting sustainable forest management (ASEAN Secretariat 2009a). 115 In the ASCC Blueprint, Building ASEAN Identity programmes include: promotion of ASEAN awareness and a sense of community, preservation and promotion of ASEAN cultural heritage, promotion of cultural creativity and industry, and engagement with the community (ASEAN Secretariat 2009a).

be.116 It means the attitude, which all members of that group have in common in their thoughts and behaviour , which differentiate them from the ‘other s’. 117 Collective identification implies belonging or membership, in turn which implies the exclusion of non members.118 Every in-group implies the existence of the out-group; it is based upon the distinction between the in-group and the out-group. 119

For constructivists, identities are relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about one’s self that are acquired by interacting with a structure composed of social relationships, collective shared-meanings, beliefs, rules, norms and practices.120 Due to this conception of interaction, identity breaks down the realist and liberal dichotomy between the systemic and state level of analysis and provides a broader perspective on the mutual constitution of state (as the agent) and (as the structure), respectively. 121

Although relatively stable, identities are not immutable; it can change over time and across contexts. Identities are not given, but produced. They are influenced by any number of sources. Domestic or endogenous sources may include broad cultural aspects of a society, military doctrine, race, gender, nationality, religions, or ideologies. External or exogenous sources can include such international norms as multilateralism and the role it assumes in relations with other countries. Principle

116 Wulan and Bandoro (2007: 13). 117 Műnch (2001: 137 ). 118 Bretherton and Vogler (1999: 236). 119 Dubravko (1998: 828). 120 Viotti and Kauppi (2010: 286) explained how to recognize the existence of particular identity. First, by looking for practices or the habitual actions consistent with the identity and their interpretations. Second, by monitoring the discourse or combination of language and techniques employed to maintain these practices (such as diplomatic language emphasizing constructive engagement, balance of power, the use of force, and deterrence). 121 Viotti and Kauppi (2010: 286) gave an example that the anti-Soviet and anti-communist as the critical element of how the Americans tended to identify themselves and their role in the Cold War. The identity also provided the framework through which American viewed with suspicion and interpreted all Soviet actions. As the social relationship between US and Russia changed after the collapse of the communist regime, the part of American identity associated with anti-communism also began to change. As the result, the U.S. definition of international threats and national interests began to shift as well.

beliefs such as the moral illegitimacy of slavery and commitment to human rights are additional examples.122

2.6.1 Regional Identity

Regional identity is the third element in the making of security communities, besides institutions and norms. The constructivists put intersubjective factors, including ideas, culture and identities as the determinant in foreign policy interactions.123

Similar to other social communities, members of a regional community perceive common attributes, which display mutual responsiveness, confidence, and esteem, and who self-consciously self-identity.124 Deutsch, who viewed the development of a security community as an exercise in identity building, defined the concept of regional identity as ‘some degree of generalized common identity or loyalty’. 125 He argued that:

In the development of a security community, the objective of compatibility or consonance of key values of the participation populations must be supplemented by indications of common subjective feelings of legitimacy of the integrated community, making loyalty to it also a matter of internalized psychic compulsion. 126

Deutsch also asserted that ‘identification’ as one of the instruments of integration, with ‘identification’ being defined as ‘the deliberate promotion of processes and sentiments of mutual identification, loyalties and ‘we’ -feelings.

122 Viotti and Kauppi (2010: 286). 123 Acharya (2009b). 124 Puchala (1984). 125 Deutsch (1988: 271). 126 Deutsch (1988: 272).

Constructivists defined identity as an intersubjective notion. Simply stated, it refers to ‘basic character of states’ .127 Identity formation entails developing a collective sense of not only ‘who we are’ (the image of individuality), but also ‘how we differ from others’ (the i mage of distinctiveness). So, it also involves securing outside recognition of the community’s own distinctiveness. Then, the definition of identity, as Ted Hopf mentioned:

Identity has three necessary functions in a society: they tell you and others who you are and they tell you who others are. In telling you who you are, identities strongly imply a particular set of interests or preferences, with respect to choices of action in particular domains, and with respect to particular actors.128

Constructivists assert the construction of identity as central to the ‘we feeling’ and suppose it as a key feature of security communities. Defining identity will result in the definition of ‘self’, which includes the consciousness of individual or groups of individuals about recognizing the identity of self. Defining self may lead to defining who others are. Once the self-identity is defined, individual or group of individuals can justify who are others. These aspects become crucial in establishing a group or association. Furthermore, it becomes influential in defining interest. Interests are dependent on identities.129

Wendt asserted that “through interaction, states may form collective identities and interests”. 130 It is the central claim of the constructivist that the development of collective identity can ameliorate the security dilemma among states. Like what norms do, collective identities develop and redefine state interests and move them beyond the logic of power politics. The collective identity of a security community is not given but is derived largely or even exclusively from fixed or preordained material sources. Like norms, collective identities are also made and remade through interaction and

127 Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein (1996: 33). 128 Hopf (1998: 175). 129 Wendt (1994: 384). 130 Wendt (1994: 384).

socialisation, rather than being exogenous to those processes as claimed by the rationalist theorist.131

Opposing to the realist argument that community is not possible due to the international anarchy, Cronin argues that political community is possible to be established in the international level under the environment of anarchy. Cronin and his predecessor, Karl W. Deutsch, along with other scholars – Acharya, Adler and Barnett, also mentioned that the key element towards contracting security community is through identity formation.132 Specifically, Cronin claimed that transnational identities determine the cohesiveness of a security arrangement. 133 Then, the transnational pluralistic security community can be constructed through three elements: trans-national identity, perception of communality, and the extent of the trans-national identity.

The explanation of Benedict Anderson’s analysis of nationalism 134 may provide a fundamental conceptual basis for a constructivist understanding of the emergence of security communities. In fact, the nationalism in the nation-states is alike the collective identity in the security community. As the construction of nationalism is one vast exercise in learning, adaptation and collective self- imagination, so is the construction of collective identity in a community. 135 This process overcomes significant cultural, linguistic, political and other differences and conflict of material interests between social group inhabiting different geographic areas of the region and lays the basis of the formation of the security community. 136

In the Southeast Asia, it has not been easy to identify a regional identity, as the ten countries are diverse: four major world religions – Islam, Christianity, Buddhism,

131 Acharya (2009b). 132 Wulan and Bandoro (2007: 14). 133 Cronin (1999: 30). 134 Anderson (1991). 135 Anderson (1991). 136 Acharya (2009b).

and Hinduism – exist in the Southeast Asian countries. Major and minor languages, as well as various races, are presents. Countries are at different stages of economic development. Even political ideologies are not always in conformity. Extreme diversity is the main characteristic of the region and to promote a regional identity has meant to promote ‘unity in diversity’. This has guaranteed regional integration and prevented regional disintegration. 137 To overcome these obstacles, Acharya viewed the expression of ASEAN Way, which is the informality, consultations ( musyawarah ) and consensus ( mufakat ) processes conducted in the socialisation and decision making, as a process of identity building. 138

There can be several indicators of collective identity, but three are especially noteworthy. 139 The first is a commitment to multilateralism, including a desire to place an expanding number of issues on the multilateral agenda which have been previously tackled through unilateral or bilateral channels. The second is the development of security cooperation, including collective defence, collaboration against internal threats, collective security, and cooperative security measures. Third, identity formation can be sensed from the boundaries and membership criteria of the security communities; so, the definition of what constitutes a region and commonly held notions about who is included and who is excluded are key indicators of collective identity.

What is the relationship between collective identities of a security community and the national identities of the community member states? Acharya answered that even if national identities and norms remained different among the members of a community, a community could develop collective identities and approach of its own. 140 ASEAN Way, for example, can develop and function despite differing kinds of national identity among its members.

137 Asciutti (2010: 46). 138 Acharya (2001). 139 Acharya (2009b). 140 Acharya (2001).

2.6.2 National Identity and Nationalism

National identities are one of object of study in social constructivism. The theory attempts to explain the formation and transformation of identities and interests, in particular those of the state. For constructivist, the fundamental structures of international politics are socially constructed and are responsible for shaping actors’ (agents’) identities and interest , not just their behaviours.141

Nationalism emphasizes ‘collective national identity’; 'people' must be autonomous, united, and expresses a single national culture.142 For a nationalist, national flags, national anthems, and other symbols of national identity are often considered sacred, as if they were religious rather than political symbols. Deep emotions are aroused.143

Benedict Anderson defined a nation as “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”. 144 He built on Renan’s postulation that “the essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things in common, also that th ey have forgotten many things”, and somehow managed a ‘fusion of their component popu lations’. 145

Nationalism may stand for a political doctrine or ideology as well as a social and political movement in a state involving a strong identification of the citizen with a nation. Whether it is an ideology or a movement, it usually includes the belief that the state is of primary importance, or the belief that one state is naturally superior to all other states. 146 In terms of loyalty, nationalism can be defined as the claim that the individual, by dint of birth or subsequently acquired citizenship, owes loyalty first and

141 Viotti and Kauppi (2010). 142 Hutchinson and Smith (1994: 4 – 5). 143 Billig (1995); Canovan (1996); Gellner (2009); Miller (1995). 144 Anderson (1991: 6). 145 Renan (1990: 10-11). 146 Gellner (2009: 1); Smith (1993: 72).

foremost to the nation, and in most circumstances, the nation is represented by the state.147

As an ideology, nationalism is a set of political principles that movements and individual espouse holds that the political and the national should be congruent.148 It claims that nations do exist, and they should coincide with the same people or political communities, so they should be self-ruling.149 Nationalism as an ideology is, therefore, above all a moral or normative principle, a belief about how the world is and should be. 150

Besides an ideology, nationalism is also a movement. As a social and political movement, it is a tendency that has, over the whole globe and for the past two centuries, affected all societies and transformed their politics.151 Often, nationalism is the belief that an ethnic group has a right to statehood,152 or that citizenship in a state should be limited to one ethnic group, or that multi-nationality in a single state should necessarily comprise the right to express and exercise national identity even by minorities.153 In this sense, nationalism is used to describe a movement to establish or protect a homeland (usually an autonomous state) for an ethnic group; and in some cases, the identification of a national culture is combined with a negative view of

147 In effect, an individual has three possible objects onto which to attach his or her primary loyalty: the nations-state, some community that is larger than or goes beyond the state (religion, the working class, [humanity as a whole, or a region as the Europe), or a grouping that is smaller than, contained within, the state (family, tribe, local community, business enterprise) (Halliday 1997: 370). 148 Gellner (1983: 1). 149 Halliday (1997: 362). 150 The core themes of nationalist ideology were described by Anthony Smith (1983: 21) in seven points. First, humanity is naturally divided into nations; Second, each nations has its peculiar character; Third, the source of all political power is the nation, the whole collectivity; Fourth, for freedom and self-realization, men must identify within a nation; Fifth, nations can only be fulfilled in their own states; Sixth, loyalty to the nation-state overrides other loyalties; and Finally, the primary condition of global freedom and harmony is the strengthening of the nation-state. 151 Nationalism was evident first in Western Europe and in the Americas in the late eighteenth and nineteenth century. After the World War I, the collapse of the multi-ethnic empires in Eastern Europe nationalism movement spread in Eastern Europe. It also spread in Asia and Africa after World War II (Halliday 1997: 363 – 365). 152 Smith (1993). 153 Kymlicka (1995).

other races or cultures. 154 Conversely, nationalism might also be portrayed as collective identities towards imagined communities those are not naturally expressed in language, race or religion but rather socially constructed by the mere individuals that belong to a given nation.155

Nationalism may be positive for nation-building. However, it negatively impacts the international relations. Halliday described the four negative sides of nationalism for international relations: (1) nationalism has become the source of conflict, and often of war; 156 (2) nationalism may become an obstacle for regional cooperation and integration; 157 (3) nationalism by promoting the breakup of states destroys viable political and economic unit; 158 (4) nationalism may create a climate of intolerance and dictatorship. 159

The implications of nationalism for globalisation are many. In the first place, it is clear that globalisation sets in train different, often contradictory processes with nationalism. Globalisation and regionalism provokes responses, and resistance by the nationalists who feel their interests are threatened because it creates a world market and flows of goods, technology, and people between states. Hostility to migration or

154 Blank and Schmidt (2003). 155 Anderson (1991: 37 –46). 156 Firstly, nationalism has become the source of conflict, and often of war. By making irreconcilable claims to territory and rising the emotional temperature of national and international politics, states actions poured with nationalism has been responsible for the two World Wars, ethnic massacres, genocide, and unending low-level crises across the world. Nationalism may present as a reasonable legitimate ideology, but it very soon lapses into other forms of nasty political thinking, such as xenophobia, chauvinism, militarism, and imperialism (Halliday 1997: 365). 157 Nationalism, even when it avoids military confrontation, may serves as an obstacle for co-operation on international issues – be this trade, migration, the environment, or any other issue in contemporary international politics (Halliday 1997: 369). 158 Nationalism has often involved in the movements that aim to break up existing states, through secession of fragmentation of various forms. The fragmentation of larger states usually brings problems of political equity and resource allocation (Halliday 1997: 365-369). 159 Nationalism may create a climate within states of intolerance and dictatorship. This may take the form of a particular ruler using nationalism and arguments of national security to justify their own holding of power. It may also involve the use of nationalism by one major group, to oppress, to expel or in extreme cases to exterminate those not considered part of that majority. On the cultural level, nationalism provokes a small-mindedness, a mean inward-looking, approach that is inimical to cultural exchange and which denies the rich interaction that has always characterized culture, religion, and language in the modern world (Halliday 1997: 365-369).

free trade in the developed countries is one example of this resistance. However, in the Third World countries, some parts of the societies felt that they were being overwhelmed by the developed world, and they responded it with some gimmick of nationalism. Nationalism can, therefore, be seen as a reaction against globalisation.160

2.7 SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY

2.7.1 Sovereignty

Originally, sovereignty means that the state has supreme authority to make and enforce laws within its territorial space; that the sovereign state is inextricably bound up with the use of force.161 Other actors such as multinational corporations or international organisations all have to work within the framework of inter-state relations 162 . However, the United Nations has put the limit to the concept by giving the responsibility dimension of states for their citizen. Then, sovereignty is defined as a condition necessary in states in that they are not subject to any higher authority, but the government of a sovereign state is ultimately responsible for its citizens. In practice, sovereignty has often been conditional. Internally governments have been subject to conventional standards, and externally conditions may mean that governments are more or less free to act independently. A sovereign government is free to choose within the framework of these conventions and standards.163

For constructivists, sovereignty consists of a set of rules or standards of behaviour providing guidance for states interacting with one another. It set the rules

160 Halliday (1997: 360). 161 Dunne (1997: 115). 162 From the perspective of realism and neo-realism, state is seen as the main and central actor in the international politics. Such perception is based on the legitimacy of states mandated by its people to represent the people’s interest. Therefore, state is considered to have sovereignty over its people and its territory, which is represented by sovereign government (Wulan and Bandoro 2007: 14). State is the supreme, independent, and final authority, having the right to exercise complete jurisdiction over its own territory. In international relations, states as sovereign unit have a right ‘externally’ to be independent or autonomous with respect to other states. States may differ in their power, but as sovereign entities, all are legally equals (Viotti and Kauppi 2010: 476). 163 Taylor (1997: 270).

that sovereign states come to claim under international law a right to complete jurisdiction over their own territories (the internal or domestic dimension), hence the development of the international norm prescribing non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Second, states claim a right to be independent or autonomous in the conduct of their foreign relations (the external or international dimension). This standard of behaviour is intersubjectively shared and socially constructed institution or normative structure among states. 164

The emergence of sovereignty was marked in the Peace of Augsburg (1555) and the Peace of Westphalia (1648) among the German and other states as a convenient norm that effectively placed authority in ruling princes, dukes, and kings of the day. From the time, these norms became globalized in both its domestic and external dimensions. Sovereignty came to be expressed through rules of behaviour as exemplified by diplomatic practices. These practices reflected mutual understandings about providing order in the international system, stabilizing actors’ expectations, and managing power relations. Similarly, the development of the norm of territorial integrity helped reinforce the norm of sovereignty by acknowledging the socially constructed sanctity of state boundaries. 165

Globalisation and regionalisation have made the concept of national sovereignty weaker than it is in the past. Sovereignty means that the state has supreme authority to make and enforce laws within its territorial space; 166 that the sovereign state is inextricably bound up with the use of force. 167 However, while the concept continues to be relevant in political rhetoric, but judicially and practically, state

164 Viotti and Kauppi (2010: 281). 165 Viotti and Kauppi (2010: 281). 166 It means that there is no actor above the state that can compel it to act in specific ways; while the other actors such as multinational corporations or international organisations all have to work within the framework of inter-state relations (Smith and Baylis 1997: 4). 167 Dunne (1997: 115).

regulatory capacities have ceased due to the state’s inability to control contemporary global phenomena.168

Globalisation has also reduced some vital cultural and psychological underpinnings of sovereignty. As a result of the growth of trans-border networks, many people have acquired loyalties that supplement and perhaps even override feelings of national solidarity that previously lent legitimacy to state sovereignty. In addition, many people in the contemporary globalizing world have become increasingly ready to give values such as economic growth, human rights, and ecological sustainability a higher priority than state sovereignty and the associated norm of national self-determination. 169

Histories have shown that sovereignty may be transferred to regional organisation by states to carry out tasks previously reserved to the national government. Sovereignty can be interpreted as being ultimately responsible. Then, international and regional organisation takes some parts of states’ sovereignty to exercise some functions. The exercise of functions such as control of foreign policy and defence used to be regarded as being central to sovereignty, and could not be allocated to other centres. But the member states of the EU in the late 1990s could accept that the Union should have a role in their harmonized foreign policy. In addition, they also reconsidered that it might increase its involvement in the common defence. There was a majority of support for this among the Union ’s citizens. This was an astonishing development which seemed to remove the dilemma, discussed inter alia by Rousseau, that responsibility for maintaining the peace could not be

168 The numbers of material developments have undercut state sovereignty. The contemporary state is quite unable by itself to control phenomena like global companies, satellite remote sensing, global ecological problems, and global stock and bond trading because all of them cannot be grounded in a territorial space over which a state might endeavor to exercise exclusive jurisdiction. Computer data transmission, nuclear fallout, and telephone calls do not halt at frontier checkpoints. Global mass media have detracted from the state’s dominion over language and education. In the face of the extensive transnationalization of major companies, the huge offshore bank deposits, and massive worldwide electronic money transfers, states have also lost sole ownership of another former hallmark of sovereignty, the national currency and foreign trade 168 (Scholte 1997: 21; Willets 1997: 293). 169 Scholte (1997: 21-22).

allocated to a higher, federal authority without fatally damaging the entity which was design to protect, namely the state itself. 170

The dilemma can be avoided by insisting that ‘ultimate responsibility’ remains with the states as they retain ‘reserve powers’, including ‘the power to recover the competences’. Public opinion and gove rnments can accept the transfer of responsibility for foreign policy and defence without necessarily thinking of this as an infringement of sovereignty: as long as the ‘reserve power’ is kept. It is expected that the chances of the reserve powers being utilized would be progressively reduced. The hierarchy of issues, with defence and foreign policy being regarded as high politics and questions such as trade policy as low politics, would be compressed.171

Although the practice of transferring defence and foreign policy has not yet existed outside the EU, it was common for other policies, especially in economic, social, and other technical areas, previously regarded as essential to the exercise of national sovereignty, to be handled elsewhere in whole or in par t. However, the state’s survival rests on the assumption that this transfer could not be guaranteed: the competences could still be recalled in principle if this in practice were unlikely. It means that the condition of sovereignty had changed, but not that the state was under threat. The new arrangements are to strengthen not weaken the state. 172

The doctrine of protecting the sovereignty of states has existed long before the existence of ASEAN. It is a well-established principle of the modern Westphalian state system. 173 The seeds of state sovereignty and non-intervention that those seventeenth-century states people planted would eventually evolve into the Charter of

170 Taylor (1997: 279). 171 Taylor (1997: 279). 172 Taylor (1997: 279). 173 The Westphalian international society is based on three principles derived from the Peace of Westphalia (1648). The first principles is rex est imperator in regno suo (the king is emperor in his own realm). This norm specifies that sovereign is not subject to any higher political authority. Every king is independent and equal to every other king. The second principle is cujus regio, ejus religio (the ruler determines the religion of his realm). This norm specifies that religion was no longer a legal ground for intervention of war among European states. The third principle is the balance of power: that was intended to prevent any hegemony from arising and dominating everybody else.

the United Nations, the Geneva Conventions and other contemporary bodies of international law.174 It is also explicitly stated as the founding documents of numerous regional organisations, such as the OAU (Organisation of African Union), the OAS (Organisation of American States), and the Arab League. In the Southeast Asia, it is a key principle reaffirmed at the Bandung Asian-African Conference in 1955.

From the founding of ASEAN, this doctrine has become the single most fundamental set of rules that underpinning ASEAN regionalism. The doctrine has been incorporated in all the key political statements of ASEAN, from the very outset. The founding Bangkok Declaration of 8th August 1967 considers that Southeast Asian countries “… to be determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation ”.175 This doctrine has been maintained by the ‘Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) Declaration’ on 27th November 1971,176 ‘The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation’ and ‘The Declaration of ASEAN Concord (Bali Co ncord)’ on 24th February 1976 .177 The doctrine is also reiterated in the documents of ASEAN Community, which are the Bali Concord II 178 and the ASEAN Charter. 179 The Bali Concord II, signed by ASEAN leaders on 7 th October 2003, reiterates the principle by defining it on the framework of ASC.

In ASEAN, the doctrine of protection of sovereignty and non interference has four main aspects: (1) refraining from criticizing the action of a member government towards its own people – including violation of human rights – and from making the domestic political system of states and the political styles of governments a basis for

174 Jackson (1997: 40 – 41). 175 ASEAN Secretariat (1967). 176 ASEAN Secretariat (1971). 177 ASEAN Secretariat (1976a and 1976b). 178 The Bali Concord II, which was signed by ASEAN leaders on 7th October 2003, reiterated the principle in the framework of ASEAN Security Community (ASEAN Secretariat 2003). 179 In the ASEAN Charter, it was em phasized in Article 2 that “ASEAN and its member states shall act in accordance with the following principles: …. of respects for the independence, sovereignty … of all ASEAN member states”. The principle was also reemphasized in the document by stating t he principle of “abstention from participation in any policy or activity, including the use of its territory, pursued by any ASEAN Member State or non-ASEAN States or any non-State actor, which threatens the sovereignty … of ASEAN member states” (ASEAN Sec retariat 2008).

deciding their membership in ASEAN; (2) criticizing the action of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interfering principle; (3) denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support for any insurgent groups seeking to destabilize or overthrow the government of a neighbouring state; (4) providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against subversive and destabilizing activities.180

Acharya explained the source and exceptional salience of the doctrine of sovereignty and non-interference in the context of the regional search for internal stability and regime security. 181 ASEAN states perceive that the primary sources of threat to the national security were not external, but internal, because most of them are new political entities with weak state structures and an equally problematic lack of strong regime legitimacy. In this sense, ASEAN find no useful regional security cooperation unless it counters the internal enemy and enhances regime security. Regional order cannot be maintained without an agreement on the fundamental importance of regime security anchored in the principles of sovereignty and non- interference.

The emphasis on national security and state sovereignty might seem to go against the spirit of regionalism. However, Jusuf Wanandi defended the doctrine by asserting, “If each member nation can accomplish an overall national development and overcome internal threats, regional resilience will automatically result much in the same way as a chain derives its overall strength from the strength of its constituent parts” .182

2.7.2 National and Regional Security

Security is an essentially contested concept; the definitions may differ from one expert or actor to another. Nevertheless, Paul D. Williams asserted that security was most

180 Acharya (2009b: 58 – 59). 181 Acharya (2001). 182 Wanandi (1984: 305).

commonly associated with the alleviation of threats to cherished values; especially those which, if left unchecked, threaten the survival of a referent object in the near future. 183 In line with Williams, Ken Booth has called security as ‘survival-plus’, while the ‘plus’ being some freedom from life -determining threats. 184

The strategic definition of national security relates with the ‘strategic core internal values of a nation’. In this sense, national security means the ability of a nation to protect its core values from external threats. A nation then is secure if there is an absence of fear of such values will be attacked.185 These values come in several terms: core values,186 vital national values,187 and society basic values.188 Trager and Kronenberg defines security as “part of government policy having as its objective the creation of national and international political conditions favourable to the protection or extension of vital values against existing and potential adversaries”. 189

Experts are still debating about what values are considered as strategic core internal values. Klause Knorr, for instance, stressed ‘national will ’ as the core for security policy,190 while Ray Cline considered ‘national spirit’ as a clue to national power and national security. 191 Meanwhile, many experts advocate that independence, territorial sovereignty and integrity as the prime object of security policy. 192

States in the Southeast Asia have put a heavy emphasis on national and regional security; and the founding of ASEAN can be understood in the context of the

183 Williams (2008: 5). 184 Booth (2007). 185 Al-Mashat (1985: 20-21). 186 Lippman (1943). 187 Trager and Kronenberg (1973: 4). 188 Raskin (1979: 43). 189 Trager and Kronenberg (1973: 4). 190 Knorr and Trager (1977: 1 – 18). 191 Cline (1980: 16). 192 Al-Mashat (1985: 21).

regional continuous searching of national and regional security. 193 The leaders of the states in the Southeast Asia have understood that “security begins at home”, that “we have been strong on the domestic side in order to be stronger on the outside”. For example, Singapore has adopted the concept of total defence; Indonesia has a concept of national resilience; while Malaysia has stressed the importance of domestic issues. They have focused on internal and external as well as military and non-military aspects of security in their comprehensive security approach. To ASEAN, domestic matters are considered as related to national security goals, which include political stability, economic well-being, and social harmony.194

‘Regional security’ in terms of comprehensive security is a broader concept to national security. This concept, adopted since the mid 1980s, made the Southeast Asian region as different from other developing regions. The concept is a liberal approach to security which has also been adopted by others in the more developed countries, suc h as ‘common security’ in Europe and ‘cooperative security’ in Canada.195

The comprehensive security concept that ASEAN has adopted was originally adapted from Japan’s concept in the 1970s. 196 As in Japan, the ASEAN’s comprehensive security is broader than the realists’ concept of security, including high political issues as well the low ones. It goes beyond the traditional military threats, or

193 ASEAN emerged in a threatening foreign policy context. In 1967, ASEAN was born as a foreign policy and security caucus, but without any organisation or secretariat. The driving forces consisted of a complicated amalgam or communist threats nearby (Russian-dominated-Vietnam and China) as well as domestically via insurgencies, besides a realization by political leaders of the five non- communist countries that the numerous border disputes had to be chilled, if not pre-empted, by regular and ever warmer contacts (Pelksman 2009: 4). 194 Alagappa (1989). 195 Cooperative security concept developed in Canada is broader and more flexible than either Japan’s compre hensive security or Europe’s common security. It recognizes the value of existing bilateral and balance of power arrangements in contributing to regional security. The key focus of cooperative security is the habit of having dialogue and moving toward inclusive participation in addressing any given conflict (Zarina Othman 2009: 1041). 196 Japan’s comprehensive security go further than the traditional American realists’ view of security, and yet it does not discount the importance of defense or territorial security (Zarina Othman 2009: 1041; Radtke 2000: 2). It is concerned with non-military issues, but mostly issues that are seen as not originating from within the country.

the internal violence and disorder that arise from ethnic conflicts. It includes non- traditional such as maritime piracy; famine; environmental pollution; illegal immigration; trafficking -- human, illicit drugs and weapons – all which are considered as threatens the stability of the region. However, it does not neglect the importance of military security.197

Although comprehensive security extends the issues to include non-traditional security ones, the focus under the approach continues to be mainly on traditional security where the referent object is the state. Review on the literature of comprehensive security reveals that: 198 (1) The domestic factors such as political stability, economic development and social harmony are considered as essential ingredients of security;199 (2) Interdependence grew in the region, including the possibility of cooperative efforts to resolve conflicts;200 and (3) Overall well-being of individuals within a state (including human rights) is necessary for the state’s comprehensive security.201

2.8 DEFINING AND OPERATIONALIZING KEY TERMS

Having reviewed the literature of the study, this theoretical exploration came to a crucial conjuncture that the conceptual and operational definition of Public Opinion towards ASEAN Community used in the study.

In this study, ‘public opinion toward ASEAN Community’ refers to the aggregate of the individual views, perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, and aspirations toward the concept and formation of ASEAN Community expressed. The five research questions guided the operational definition provided below.

197 Zarina Othman (2009: 1041). 198 Zarina Othman (2009: 1041). 199 Alagappa (1989); Euraskul (1998). 200 Hermann (1998); DuPont (1997); Baviera (1996); Feddema (2000). 201 Hassan (1996); Yamamoto (1996).

2.8.1 Research question 1: How knowledgeable are the public about ASEAN, ASEAN Community and how is its perceived relevancy?

The first research inquiry contains three concepts – knowledge of ASEAN, perceived relevancy of ASEAN, and awareness of the ASEAN Community. The first concept – knowledge of ASEAN – is defined as the awareness about ASEAN and issues associated with the regional organisation -- the goal and objectives of ASEAN, the organisational structure of ASEAN, the founding year of ASEAN, and the difference of ASEAN with other security frameworks. In addition, the study also examines to what extent the public learned about ASEAN at schools; whether they gained sufficient knowledge of ASEAN at school; and whether they perceived it to be important enough to be taught at school.

The second concept – perception of the relevancy of ASEAN – is defined as the respondents’ perception of the importance of ASEAN to them personally and to their country. The concept also includes the respondents’ perception of ASEAN’s success and the perceived problems that would occur in the respondents’ country if ASEAN did not exist.

The third concept – awareness of the ASEAN Community – is defined as the cognizance about the concept of the ASEAN Community and its two most important documents (The Declaration of Bali Concord II and the ASEAN Charter). Besides the awareness of the regional community, the study also discussed the sources of information of ASEAN Community, the reasons why certain respondents were not aware of ASEAN Community, and the level of knowledge of the respondents who were aware of the Community.

2.8.2 Research question 2: What are the public’s attitudes, opinions, and aspirations for the ASEAN Community?

The second research inquiry includes three concepts – attitudes towards the ASEAN Community and its three pillars, opinion on the formation process of the ASEAN Community, and aspiration for the formation of the ASEAN Community. The first

concept – attitudes towards ASEAN Community and its three pillars – is defined as the respondents’ support , perceptions of benefits for the respondents’ country and its people, and their optimism (or pessimism) for the ASEAN Community and its three pillars – political security, economic, and socio-culture.

The second concept – opinion on the formation process of the ASEAN Community – is defined as attitudes and evaluation of the process of establishing the regional community. The concept measures the respo ndents’ assessment on the formation process of ASEAN Community and whether it involved the public, the perception of the objectives of the ASEAN Community, and the perception of difficulties on realizing the objectives.

The third concept – aspiration for the formation of the ASEAN Community – is defined as the evaluation about the future direction of the regional community. It includes the aspiration for the establishment of European-like integration, single monetary union, abolition of visa and passport, and the formation of the ASEAN Commission, ASEAN Court of Justice, and the ASEAN Parliament.

2.8.3 Research question 3: How does the public identify themselves with their nation and their region regarding the formation of the ASEAN Community?

The third inquiry includes six concepts – patriotism, reactive nationalism, economic nationalism, consumer nationalism, cultural identity and regional identity. The first concept – patriotism – is defined as the feelings of attachment, love and loyalty to one’s own country, manifested in the commitment or readiness to sacrifice for the nation.202 However, compared to nationalists, patriots are more moderate and do not relapse in the extremities of nationalists and tend to take a more cooperative approach to the world. 203 In this study, the concept was measured with the view of patriotism as

202 Adorno et al (1950: 107); Druckman (1994); Feshbach (1990); Kosterman and Feshbach (1989). 203 Adorno et al (1950) noted that there is a difference between ‘healthy patriotism’ (love of country) which is not related with bias against outgroups and “ethnocentric patriotism’ (or pseudopatriotism) which is accompanied by such bias. Ethnocentric patrio tism is one’s ‘blind attachment to certain national cultural values, uncritical conformity with the prevailing group ways, and rejection of other nations as outgroups” (Adorno et al, 1950: 107). The difference between healthy patriotism and

one of the objectives of education. Patriotism was also measured in terms of what extent they were proud of the beauty, history and cultural heritage, as well as the cultural values and wisdoms of their country.

The second concept – reactive nationalism – is defined as the feelings or emotions of love and advocating for one own’s country as the response toward some provoking stimulus from outside the country. This phenomenon was observed in Turkey in the context of reaction towards Islamic revivalism and Kurdish separatism,204 in China and Japan in the context of the ‘Clash of Nationalisms’ among them, 205 and in China in the context of Chinese foreign policy, particularly with regards to the Taiwan issue and Sino-US relations. 206 In their study, Chan and Bridges 207 affirm that reactive nationalism usually manifests itself through radical wordings and behaviours against the targeted state; but its nature is different from assertive nationalism, in that it is responsive rather than initiating. It is usually manifested in protests against a perceived injustice. It is also usually a release of emotions that have fermented for a considerable time, in response to a collective experience or sentiment with the feeling of being discriminated against, mistreated, “shame imposed,” or hurt. One characteristic of reactive nationalism is that the greater

pseudopatriotism was empirically clarified by Kosterman and Feshbach (1989). They factor- analyzed data on 120 items capturing attitudes towards one’s own country towards other countries and identified three meaningful factors: patriotism, nationalism and internationalism. Patriotism refers to strong feelings of attachment and loyalty to one’s own country without the corresponding hostility towards other nations. Nationalism (which is similar to Adorno et al.’s (1950) ethnocentric patriotism) encompasses views that one’s c ountry is superior and should be dominant (and thus implies a denigration of other nations). 204 Direnç Erşahin (2010) studied about the emergence of TűrkSolu, a secular/leftists nationalist organisation that became viable in Turkey in 2000s, as a form of reactive nationalism against Islamic revivalism and Kurdish separatism in the country. 205 Chan and Bridges (2006) studied the anti-Japanese demonstrations in China in April 2005 and the Japanese reactions that have been characterized as a “clash of nationalisms.” They concluded that, contrary to perceptions within each country that the other country was practicing assertive nationalism, in fact reactive nationalism better encapsulates the type of nationalism that was occurring. 206 Brittingham (2005) studied Chinese nationalism within the context of Chinese foreign policy, particularly the Taiwan issue and Sino-US relations. They concluded that Chinese nationalism was a product of China’s interaction with the West and represent a transformationin identity from cultural- state to a nation-state. This Chinese nationalism is a reaction to a perceived identity threat from the United States and has led to a marked deterioration in Sino-US relations since Tiananmen Square. 207 Chan and Bridges (2006).

the outside pressure (or external stimulus), the firmer or fiercer is the response. In this study, the concept was measured with the emotions (anger, dislike and protest) the respondents showed towards some stimulus (another country claiming the territory and cultural artefacts or a leader of a foreign country insulting the pride of their country).

The third concept – economic nationalism – is defined as the attitudes and actions of protecting domestic products, companies, working opportunities, industries and people from foreign businesses who are considered as the out-group.208 The attitude then triggers the emergence of expectations on other parties – government, business players, or the general public – to play a role in protecting the domestic economy. In this study, this concept was measured gauging the feeling towards imported products, overseas business set-ups, and foreign workers in their country.

The fourth concept – consumer nationalism – is defined as the nationalism that is reflected in the actions of the citizens of whether to purchase or avoid foreign products. This variable was adapted from the construct of consumer ethnocentrism of Shimp and Sharma 209 that tried to measure the moral feelings of the consumer on buying foreign products. A nationalistic consumer will choose not to buy imported products because it is perceived as damaging the national economy, so it is considered as an unpatriotic action. In this study, this concept was measured by the respondents’ feeling towards buying domestic and imported products. The concept was also measured by the willingness of respondents to switch to domestic products, to recommend domestic products to others, and to make sacrifice by buying domestic products even if they are slightly higher priced.

The fifth concept – cultural identity – is defined as how someone identified himself with the culture at the national-level. In this study, this concept measures the respondents’ identification with the culture of the societies, involvement in cultural

208 Baugh and Yaprak (1996). 209 Shimp and Sharma (1987).

activities, and preference for reading materials in the mother tongue to those in foreign languages.

Finally, the sixth concept – opinion on ASEAN identity -- is defined as how someone identified himself with the Southeast Asian region. This concept measures the identification of the respondents with the ASEAN Community, its norms and values, histories, and social systems. This concept also measures the respondents’ attitudes towards a unifying language, the spirit of ‘the nations that come from the same ancestry/root’ and the possibility of a particular religion (in this case –Islam) becoming the unifying factor of ASEAN.

2.8.4 Research question 4: What Challenges does the public perceive for the social construction of the ASEAN Community?

The four research inquiry includes ten concepts that may challenge the establishment of an ASEAN Community – (1) lack of competitiveness in the economy of most countries of ASEAN; (2) The socio-economy of most nations in the region is still low; (3) The level of education of the majority of the people which is still low and the huge gap in terms of access of education; (4) The limitation of technology mastery and creation in most of the countries; (5) The dependence of most ASEAN countries on the developed countries; especially for capital; (6) The poverty in most ASEAN countries; (7) ASEAN economy being dominated by the ethnic Chinese; (8) Differences in political and legal system; (9) The variety of ethnic and religious group in the region; and (10) The militancy of some Muslims in the region (especially in South Thailand and Southern Philippines). The respondents were asked about their perception of those ten items – whether they are ’definitely’ or ’possibly’ or definitely not’ obstacles for establishing an ASEAN Community.

2.8.5 Research question 5: What are the impacts of the construction of the ASEAN Community on national sovereignty, security and identity?

The fifth research inquiry includes three concepts – impact on national sovereignty, impact on national security, impact on national identity. The first concept – impact on

national sovereignty – is defined as the perception that the establishment of ASEAN Community would negatively affect the sovereignty of their country. It is measured by the perception of the possibility of national sovereignty being negatively affected by the ASEAN Community.

The second concept – impact on national security – is defined as the perception that the establishment of the ASEAN Community would negatively affect the security of their country. It is measured by the perception of the possibility of national security being negatively affected by the ASEAN Community. In addition, the perceived threats from various countries were also analyzed.

The third concept – impact on national identity – is defined as the perception that the establishment of the ASEAN Community would negatively affect the identity of their country. It is measured by the perception of the possibility of national identity being merged into one ASEAN identity and the threat to their national language from the international language used in ASEAN.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study focuses on quantitative methods to answer the research inquiries outlined in Chapter I. However, given the weakness of quantitative studies, the study uses qualitative data and references to achieve its objective. The following section discusses the research design, methods of data collection, research variables and indicators, methods of data analysis. A profile of respondents is also given.

3.1 RESEARCH APPROACH

This study emphasizes the concept of ASEAN Community in the context of ‘regional community building’ and not about ‘nation building’. The term ‘community’ is contextual in meaning and is used to refer to a ‘large imagined regional community’.

This study uses quantitative method in exploring the answers to the inquiries of the study. Quantitative methods and data are employed to examine the public knowledge and perception of relevancy of ASEAN, the public attitudes, opinion and aspiration for ASEAN Community, the national identities and perceived obstacles for establishing ASEAN Community, and the impacts of the establishment of ASEAN Community on national sovereignty, security and identities.

3.2 METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION

Combinations of primary and secondary data collection are exercised to collect the data. The study used surveys supported by literature study and documents study.

Survey was the primary method used for data collection. The surveys gathered information at the grassroots level on the sentiments and opinions of the targeted public in three neighbouring countries, namely Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. Attention was given to these three countries because of a number of substantive and practical reasons (see 1.6).

The questionnaire for the survey combined close-ended and open-ended questions. Due to the differences in languages, the questionnaire was made available in three languages (Bahasa Indonesia, Bahasa Malaysia, and English) with careful translations which were checked carefully by the candidate’s supervisors to ensure that the original ideas of the questions were not diluted. The questionnaire was screened in a pre-test, in each country, to check the structure of the questions and understanding of the target respondents.

The survey drew samples in eleven cities of the three countries (Kuala Lumpur, Penang, Melaka, Johor Bahru and Kota Kinabalu in Malaysia; Jakarta, Medan, Surabaya, Makassar and Pontianak in Indonesia, and Singapore) between June 2009 and October 2010. The purposive – quota sampling was employed because of resources and time constraints, and logistics (Burnham et al. , 2008, p. 106-107; Black, 2002, p.54-55; Christensen, Johnson and Turner, 2011). In fact, the non-existence of the infrastructure necessary for conducting a probability sampling -- such as a sampling frame in each university -- made the random sampling procedure nearly impossible. The sample consisted of undergraduate and graduate university students and staff from leading public universities in each city, since it was logistically impossible (given time and resource constraints) to extend the sample to include the general public in the three countries. The survey involved 451 Malaysians, 511 Indonesians and 294 Singaporeans. A description of the respondents is summarized in Table 3.4.

The quota-sampling procedure was employed to ensure that the respondents were balanced by gender and working status. For working status, it strived to achieve a balanced proportion between the students and the non-students. In Malaysia, a

stratified quota system based on ethnicity was employed to get a sample that reflected the ethnic diversity of the nation.

The combination of convenience and quota sampling technique represented the best approximation of a statistically random sample possible under the constraints imposed by local conditions, logistics and available resources. While this might be less than satisfactory to some statistical-methodological purist, it was considered as the best the researcher could do under those constraints.

To collect responses from the students of the three countries, the study directly contacted the respondents in public spaces on the university’s campus (such as cafeterias, libraries, or university corridors) and asked them to fill in the self- administered questionnaire. Using this procedure, the study successfully gathered 246 student-respondents in Malaysia, 221 in Indonesia and 126 in Singapore by using this procedure. The researcher also tried to get a balanced representation of students in the first procedure by conducting the survey in different faculties (for example natural sciences, engineering, business and economics, and social sciences) in each university.

To collect responses from non-student respondents in Indonesia and Malaysia, the procedure was by meeting the respondents directly in their office or in public spaces and asking them to fill in the self-administered questionnaire. This procedure collected 190 non-student Malaysian respondents 1 and 290 non-student respondents in Indonesia. 2 Again, the researcher tried to obtain a balanced representation by selecting respondents from different background; for example academic staff from natural sciences, engineering, business and economics, and social sciences. The non-students respondents found in the public spaces of universities also had the backgrounds; of

1 In Malaysia, respondents were from the following institutions: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (Klang Valley), Universiti Malaya (Klang Valley), Universiti Sains Malaysia (Pulau Pinang), Universiti Teknikal Melaka and Universiti Teknologi Mara Melaka (Melaka), Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (Johor Bahru), and Universiti Malaysia Sabah (Kota Kinabalu). 2 In Indonesia, respondents were from the following institutions: Universitas Indonesia (Jakarta), Universitas Sumatera Utara (Medan), Universitas Tanjungpura (Pontianak), Universitas Hasanuddin (Makassar), Universitas Airlangga (Surabaya), and Institut Teknologi Sepuluh November (Surabaya).

civil service, private sector employees, soldiers or police, and business-owners (see Table 3.5).

In Singapore, however, the procedure could not be applied to collect responses from university staff and other non-student respondents due to the difficulty in keeping up to their hectic schedule. It was almost impossible to meet the staff directly because it would take up much time for making appointments and meeting them one- by-one. In order to overcome this obstacle, the survey was conducted through email. Firstly, an online website was designed by using the service of Questionpro , an independent online survey company, for a month (October 2010). After the survey website was designed, emails with a link to the online survey were sent to the target groups, which included 5,804 staff in nine Singaporean universities and institutions. 3 After a month, the study gathered 168 responses from the institutions. Regrettably, the response rate was about 2.89%. In addition, this procedure was also used to gather responses from 15 Malaysian respondents who are the staff of Universiti Malaya and Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS).

3.3 RESEARCH VARIABLES AND INDICATORS

There were 18 variables used in the study. The first variable – the demography of the respondents – explains identity of the respondents involved in terms of their gender, age category, marriage status, family expenditure, and occupation:

1. Demography 1.1. Gender: male, and female. 1.2. Age group: 18 – 34 years old, 35 – 49 years old, above 50 years old. 1.3. Marriage status: single, married, widow/widower. 1.4. Family expenditure

3 In Singapore, the online survey respondents were from the following institutions: National University of Singapore (NUS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore Management University (SMU), and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), National Institute of Education (NIE), Management Development Institute of Singapore (MDIS), SIM University, Temasek Polytechnic and Republic Polytechnic.

· Malaysia : MYR 1,000 (≈ US$300) or less; MYR 1,001 to 5,000 (≈ US$301 to 1,500); MYR 5.001 to 10,000 (≈ US$1,501 to 3,000) ; MYR 10,001 to 15,000 (≈ US$3,001 to 4,500); MYR 15,001 to 20,000 (≈ US$4,501 to 6,000) ; more than MYR 20,000 (≈ US$6,00 0).

· Indonesia : IDR 1 million or less (≈ US$110) ; IDR 1 – 2 million (≈ US$111 to 220) ; IDR 2 – 3 million (≈ US$221 to 330) ; IDR 3 – 4 million (≈ US$331 to 440) ; IDR 4 – 5 million (≈ US$441 to 550) ; more than IDR 5 million (≈ US$550 ).

· Singapore : S$1,250 (≈ US$960) or less; S$ 1,251 – 3,500 (≈ US$961 to 2,690) ; S$ 3.501 – 6,000 (≈ US$2,691 to 4,615) ; S$ 6,001 – 10,000 (≈ US$4,616 to 7,690) ; S$ 10,001 – 20,000 (≈ US$7,691 to 15,385) ; more than S$ 20,000 (≈ US$15,385) . 1.5. Occupations: lecturers; civil servants; private-sector employees; soldiers/police; students; not working; others.

In order to satisfy the first research inquiry (knowledge and perceived relevancy of ASEAN), the second to the seventh variable were formulated:

2. Knowledge of ASEAN 2.1. Do you know about ASEAN? (Yes/No). 2.2. Do you understand about the goals and objectives of ASEAN? (Yes/No). 2.3. Do you know that ASEAN was established in 1967? (Yes/No). 2.4. Do you know about the organisational structure of ASEAN? (Yes/No). 2.5. Is ASEAN a security community with a security force dedicated to the security of ASEAN? (Yes/No). 2.6. Is the ASEAN Security Community similar to NATO? (Yes/No).

3. Learning about ASEAN at schools 3.1. Did you learn about ASEAN at school (primary to secondary school/pre- University)?(Yes/No). 3.2. Is ASEAN important to be taught at school (primary to secondary school/pre- University)? (Yes/No).

4. Perception of ASEAN as successful 4.1. In your opinion, is ASEAN successful? (5 semantic differential scale) 4.2. Is ASEAN important to you and your country? (5semantic differential scale) 4.3. Do you think that if ASEAN did not exist, there would be no problem in the country? (5 semantic differential scale)

5. Awareness of the concept of ASEAN Community 5.1. Have you ever heard/read about the ASEAN Community? (Yes/No). 5.2. Have you ever heard/read about the Bali Concord II 2003? (Yes/No). 5.3. Have you ever heard/read about the ASEAN Charter 2007? (Yes/No). 5.4. Sources of information on the ASEAN Community, the Bali Concord II and the ASEAN Charter? (Teachers or lecturers/newspapers/television programmes/radio programmes/seminars/ magazines/ASEAN Secretariat documents/others)

6. Reasons of the respondents who are not aware of ASEAN Community 6.1. The development on ASEAN is not important to notice (5-Likert scale). 6.2. I have never heard any explanation about it from the government (5-Likert scale). 6.3. I would not be affected by the development of ASEAN (5-Likert scale). 6.4. I think ASEAN is merely the concern of the leaders (5-Likert scale).

7. Level of knowledge of the respondents who are aware of ASEAN Community 7.1. I know that ASEAN Community will be formed (5-Likert scale). 7.2. I know that ASEAN Community will comprise of ASEAN Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community, and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. (5-Likert scale). 7.3. I know that ASEAN Community will be effective by 2015 (5-Likert scale). 7.4. I have sufficient knowledge/information on ASEAN Community (5-Likert scale).

To answer the second research inquiry (public attitudes, opinion, and aspiration for ASEAN Community), the eighth to the thirteenth variable were formulated:

8. Attitudes towards ASEAN Community 8.1. I support the establishment of ASEAN Community (5-Likert scale). 8.2. The establishment of ASEAN Community is good for my country and the people (5- Likert scale). 8.3. My country will benefit from membership in ASEAN Community (5-Likert scale). 8.4. I believe that ASEAN Community will be able to foster the dynamic cooperation in a caring community, committed to upholding the cultural diversity and social harmony (5- Likert scale). 8.5. I am optimistic for the success of the establishment of ASEAN Community (5-Likert scale).

9. Attitudes towards ASEAN Security Community (ASC) 9.1. I support the establishment of ASC (5-Likert scale). 9.2. The formation of ASC is good for my country and society (5-Likert scale). 9.3. I believe that every ASEAN country would be fully committed to the peaceful resolution of conflicts and differences (5-Likert scale). 9.4. I support the principle of non interference in the foreign and security policy of each ASEAN country (5-Likert scale). 9.5. I support the rights of governance free from interference in the home affairs of each ASEAN country (5-Likert scale). 9.6. I believe that each ASEAN member will not use violence in solving differences and conflicts (5-Likert scale). 9.7. With ASEAN Community, the bargaining position of each ASEAN country with countries outside the region will be stronger compared to that doing it unilaterally (5-Likert scale). 9.8. I believe that ASEAN countries will be able to cooperate in combating terrorists, drugs trading, human trafficking, and cross border crimes (5-Likert scale).

10. Attitudes towards ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 10.1. I support the establishment of AEC (5-Likert scale). 10.2. I support the free flow of goods and services in the region (5-Likert scale). 10.3. I support the free flow of skilled/professional ASEAN workers in the region (5-Likert scale). 10.4. I support that ASEAN businesspeople should be freely allowed to establish companies anywhere in the region (5-Likert scale). 10.5. My country will get benefits from membership in AEC (5-Likert scale). 10.6. I think that the formation of AEC is good for the people in my country (5-Likert scale). 10.7. I think that the formation of AEC is good/positive for business in my country (5-Likert scale). 10.8. When buying goods, we should give priority to goods from ASEAN rather than non- ASEAN (5-Likert scale). 10.9. Priority should be given to investment and investors from ASEAN countries than to those from countries outside ASEAN (5-Likert scale). 10.10. Priority should be given to skilled/professional workers from ASEAN countries than those from countries outside ASEAN (5-Likert scale). 10.11. I believe that AEC will be able to match the economic interests of each ASEAN country (5-Likert scale). 10.12. I believe that AEC will lead to greater competitiveness to the region (5-Likert scale). 10.13. I believe that AEC will not only benefit the more developed countries because it will be able to accelerate the development in the less developed countries as well (5-Likert scale).

10.14. The idea of AEC is merely an effort to solving the poor economic condition of ASEAN countries after the Asian Economic Crisis 1997 and the economic threat from China and India (5-Likert scale).

11. Attitudes towards ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) 11.1. The establishment of ASCC is good for the social and cultural development of my country (5-Likert scale). 11.2. I support the establishment of ASCC (5-Likert scale). 11.3. I believe that ASCC will be able to create a more caring community (5-Likert scale). 11.4. I believe that ASCC will be able to uplift the health of its people/society (5-Likert scale). 11.5. I believe that ASCC will increase the variety and richness of ASEAN Culture (5-Likert scale).

12. Opinion on the formation of ASEAN Community 12.1. The formation of the ASEAN Community does not involve the people in its building (Agree/Disagree). 12.2. The formation of ASEAN Community is merely a declaration of ASEAN leaders not fruitful to the people (Yes/No). 12.3. The formation of ASEAN Community is merely a dream (Agree/Disagree). 12.4. The objective of ASEAN Community is very amazing, but is very difficult to materialize (Agree/Disagree). 12.6. It is obvious that the support of a country toward ASEAN Community is only for its own interests; not because of the common interests of the region (Agree/Disagree).

13. Aspiration for the formation of ASEAN Community 13.1. The formation of ASEAN Community should be directed towards the establishment of regional integration as in the European Union (Yes/No). 13.2. The ASEAN Community should include one single currency which valid in all area of ASEAN (Yes/No). 13.3. The ASEAN Community should include the abolition of passports for ASEAN citizens when visiting other ASEAN countries (Yes/No). 13.4. The ASEAN Community should include the ASEAN Parliament which has full authority as a legislative power over the region (Yes/No). 13.5. The ASEAN Community should include a single executive body (ASEAN Commission) which has full authority as an executive in the region (Yes/No). 13.6. The ASEAN Community should include a single judicial body which has full authority as a judicial body in a country (Yes/No). 13.7. The ASEAN Community should include the abolition of visa for ASEAN citizens visiting other ASEAN countries (Yes/No).

To answer the third research inquiry (sentiments regarding national and regional identities and their effects to the formation of ASEAN Community), the fourteenth to the nineteenth variable were formulated, with the following indicators:

14. Patriotism 14.1. Patriotism should be the main objectives of education, so our children believe that our country is one of the best in the world (5-Likert scale). 14.2. I am always proud of the beauty of my country (5-Likert scale). 14.3. I am very proud of the history and cultural heritage of my country as it forms the roots of history and culture for the Southeast Asian region (5-Likert scale). 14.4. I am sure that the cultural values and local wisdom of our country is one of the best in the world (5-Likert scale).

15. Reactive nationalist sentiments 15.1. I will be really angry if there is/are foreign country(ies) claiming the territory of my country (5-Likert scale). 15.2. I don’t like any other country to cla im our authentic cultural artefacts as theirs. (5-Likert scale). 15.3. I will protest if the leader of a foreign country undermines the pride of my nation and country (5-Likert scale).

16. Economic nationalist sentiment 16.1. We should only accept imported products from the countries which accept our products (5-Likert scale). 16.2. Government should try its best not to purchase goods and services from foreign companies/countries (5-Likert scale). 16.3. Government should protect domestic industries by creating trade barriers for foreign products (5-Likert scale). 16.4. I dislike foreigners owning/operating business in my country (5-Likert scale). 16.5. Government should try to control the involvement of foreign business in every sector of our economy (5-Likert scale). 16.6. I will support politician/public officials/political parties which want to reduce foreign business set-up in the country (5-Likert scale). 16.7 Foreign workers can be harmful to our society because they rob locals of employment opportunities (5-Likert scale).

17. Consumer nationalist sentiment 17.1. Buying domestic products is always the best choice (5-Likert scale).

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17.2. I always try my best not to buy and to use foreign products, unless they cannot be avoided (5-Likert scale). 17.3. I always recommend others (my relatives and friends) not to buy foreign products (5- Likert scale). 17.4. I am willing to stop buying foreign products and switch to domestic ones instead (5- Likert scale). 17.5. If the quality is similar, I will buy domestic products although the price is slightly higher (5-Likert scale).

18. Cultural identity 18.1. In my family, many activities or traditions resemble the culture of my country (such as ceremonies, food, religious practice, homecoming, etc) (5-Likert scale). 18.2. I prefer songs in my national and/or local languages to those in English (5-Likert scale). 18.3. I prefer watching movies in my country's national/local language to those in English (5- Likert scale). 18.4. I prefer reading materials in my country's national/local language to those in English (5- Likert scale). 18.5. For me, it is not a big problem if I do not learn a foreign language (5-Likert scale). 18.6. I am actively involved in the national cultural/art activities (5-Likert scale).

19. Opinion on ASEAN Identity 19.1. I regard myself as a part of the ASEAN Community (5-Likert scale). 19.2. I think all ASEAN countries have comparable norms and values (5-Likert scale). 19.3. I think all ASEAN countries share common historical experiences (5-Likert scale). 19.4. I think the people in all ASEAN countries have a comparable intelligence level (5- Likert scale). 19.5. The spirit of among the people of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore that they share the same ethno-cultural root/ancestry can serve as a principle for establishing ASEAN Community (Yes/No). 19.6. Does the idea of “spirit of the nations that come from the same ancestry/root” among the natives of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore make the other ethnic groups feel threatened? (Yes/No). 19.7. Can Islam become the unifying factor for ASEAN? (Yes/No). 19.8. Will the non-Muslims feel threatened if Islam serves as the unifying factor for ASEAN? (Yes/No). 19.9. I think it is urgent to have a unifying language in ASEAN Community (Agree/Disagree). 19.10. Which language feasible to become the unifying language? (opened-ended question)

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To satisfy the fourth research inquiry (the obstacles for establishing ASEAN Community), the twentieth variable (the obstacles for establishing ASEAN Community) were formulated with the following indicators:

20. The obstacles for establishing of ASEAN Community 20.1. Lack of competitiveness in the economies of most ASEAN countries; is it an obstacle? (definitely yes/possibly yes/definitely not) 20.2. Disparity in socioeconomic development in the region; is it an obstacle? (definitely yes/possibly yes/definitely not) 20.3. Low level of education of the majority of the people and unequal access to education; is it an obstacle ? (definitely yes/possibly yes/definitely not) 20.4. The limitation of technology mastery and creation in most of the countries; is it an obstacle? (definitely yes/possibly yes/definitely not) 20.5. The dependency of ASEAN countries on developed countries, especially for financing their economic activities; is it an obstacle? (definitely yes/possibly yes/definitely not) 20.6. Poverty in many ASEAN countries; is it an obstacle? (definitely yes/possibly yes/definitely not) 20.7. The structure of ASEAN economies which is dominated by the Chinese; is it an obstacle? (definitely yes/possibly yes/definitely not) 20.8. Differences in the legal and political systems; is it an obstacle? (definitely yes/possibly yes/definitely not) 20.9. The variety of ethnic and religious group in the region; is it an obstacle? (definitely yes/possibly yes/definitely not) 20.10. Militancy, terrorism, and insurgency in some parts of the region (especially among some Muslims in South Thailand and Southern Philippines); is it an obstacle? (definitely yes/possibly yes/definitely not)

Finally, to answer the fifth inquiry which is the impact of the establishment of ASEAN Community on national sovereignty, security and identity, the twenty-first variable was formulated. The details of indicators are as follows:

21. Perceived Impacts of ASEAN Community on the National Sovereignty, Security and National Identity 21.1. It is possible that national sovereignty will be negatively affected by ASEAN Community (Agree/Disagree). 21.2. I think the establishment of ASEAN Parliament and Judicial body will influence the sovereignty of my country (Agree/Disagree).

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21.3. I think it is possible that the national security will be negatively affected by ASEAN Community (Agree/Disagree). 21.4. I am a little bit worried that the less developed countries (such as Vietnam, Cambodia and Myanmar) would become a threat if they develop in the future (Agree/Disagree). 21.5. It is possible that the national identity will be merged into one ASEAN identity (Agree/Disagree). 21.6. Will the use of English as the language of communication between ASEAN countries diminish the importance of national languages? (Yes/No). 21.7. Which countries which we should be careful to for they will threat the security or the sovereignty of our country? (opened-ended question)

3.4 METHODS OF DATA ANALYSIS

This study generated both qualitative and quantitative data. The quantitative data were obtained from surveys in eleven cities, and then processed using ‘SPSS For Windows’ software.

In order to achieve the research objectives, data were analyzed univariately in order to obtain the descriptive statistical profile of the variables. Whenever relevant, univariate data were analyzed by using the univariate analysis methods such as frequency distribution, percentage, mode, median and mean. To ease the analysis, the frequency distributions of 5-scale responses were regrouped into three response- categories. In this sense, those who disagree to the statement were combined with those who completely disagree. Additionally, those who agree to the statement were combined with those who completely agree. Further explanation of the method is shown in Table 3.1.

The study examined compared the responses from the three countries. For this purpose , the study used ‘compare group for significant difference’ procedure for each data distribution in the indicators and variables.

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Table 3.1 Univariate tools of analysis

Tools Description

A frequency of distribution for categorical data is a table that displays Frequency the possible categories along with the associated frequencies and/or distribution relative frequencies. The frequency for a particular category is the number of times the category appears in the data set.

The percentage for a particular category is the fraction or proportion of the observations resulting in the category. It is calculated as: Percentage percentage = frequency x 100% number of observation in the data set

The sample mode is the value that occurs the most frequently in a Mode data set or a probability distribution.

The sample median is the middle value in the ordered list of sample observation. It is obtained by first ordering the n observation from smallest to largest (with any repeated values included, so that every Median sample observation appears in the ordered list. If the n is odd, the sample median is the single middle value. If n is even, the median is the average of the two middl e values.

The sample mean is the average of all x values in the entire sample. The sample mean of a sample of numerical observation x , x , ... , x Mean 1 2 n is: sum of all observation in the sample = x1 + x 2 + ... + x n= Σ x number of observation in the sample n n

Source : Peck, Olsen and Devore 2009.

Various types of quantitative data were used in the study. There were categorical data consisting of nominal or ordinal data. Other types of data included scale numerical data which consisted of interval and ratio data.

In this study, some variables were nominal categorical data. Dichotomous questions such as the ‘ Yes-No ’ or ‘Agree-Disagree ’ are examples of nominal categorical data. The indicators of ‘the Knowledge of ASEAN’, ‘Learning about

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ASEAN at schools’, ‘Awareness of the concept of ASEAN Community’, ‘Opinion on the Formation of ASEAN Community’, and ‘Aspiration for the Formation of ASEAN Community’, and ‘Perceived Impacts of ASEAN Community on the National Sovereignty, Security and National Identity’ were asked using dichotomous questions. The other examples of nominal categorical data are the data on ‘obstacles for establishing ASEAN Community ’ with three possible answers: ‘definitely an obstacle’, ‘possibly an obstacle’, and ‘definitely not an obstacle’.

In order to compare the distribution of nominal categorical data, the study used the tests of Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U. The Kruskal-Wallis Test is a non- parametric test that compares the score on some continuous variable for three or more groups.4 The Kruskal-Wallis Test indicates whether the respondents in the three countries had significant different position on an issue.

The SPSS software provides the cross tabulation of the variables and the Kruskal-Wallis scores (including the Chi-Square, degree of freedom and asymptotic significance scores) that were useful to compare the responses. If the asymptotic significance score (asymp. sig. score) is equal to or greater than 0.05 (asymp. sig. > 0.05), it can be concluded that there is no significant difference between the responses in the three countries. However, if the asymptotic significance score is less than 0.05 (asymp. sig. < 0.05), it can be concluded that the true category proportions are not the same for all of the responses in the three countries.

Take, for example, indicator 2.3 that measures knowledge about the organisational structure of ASEAN (see Table 3.2). The scores of Kruskal-Wallis showed that the chi-square score for the indicator was 59.79; the degree of freedom was 2, and then the asymp. sig. score was 0.00. Because the asymp. sig. score was lower than 0.05, then it could be concluded that there were significant differences in the responses in the three countries.

4 Pallant (2003: 263).

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Table 3.2 Example of statistical output of Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U Tests

Respondents Kruskal-Wallis Tests for Response Malaysia Indonesia Singapore Average Comparison of countries’ responses Indicator 2.3: Chi-Square 59.79 df: 2 Do you know about the organisational structure of Asymp. Sig. 0.00 ASEAN? · Yes 44% 21% 34% 33% Meaning: There are significant differences. · No 56% 79% 66% 67% Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: · Knowledge in Malaysia is significantly higher than that in Singapore and in Indonesia. · Knowledge in Singapore is significantly higher than that in Indonesia.

As shown in Table 3.2, The Kruskal-Wallis Tests can confirm whether the respondents in the three countries have significantly different positions on an issue. However, the tests did not provide enough information on which response was significantly different from another response and which response was not significantly different. To obtain this information, the Mann-Whitney U Tests are necessary to employ.

Mann-Whitney U Test is a non-parametric test for examining differences between two independent groups on a continuous measure.5 They are used to confirm whether the respondents in the two countries exhibit significant differences on the issue. 6 However, this test cannot examine the differences in the responses of more than two countries. Therefore, it was required to do three comparisons for the indicator: between Malaysia and Singapore; Malaysia and Indonesia; and Indonesia and Singapore.

5 Pallant (2003: 260). 6 The Mann-Whitney U test is the most popular of the two-independent-samples tests. It is equivalent to the Wilcoxon rank sum test and the Kruskal-Wallis test for two groups. Mann-Whitney tests that two sampled populations are equivalent in location. The observations from both groups are combined and ranked, with the average rank assigned in the case of ties. The number of ties should be small relative to the total number of observations. If the populations are identical in location, the ranks should be randomly mixed between the two samples. The test calculates the number of times that a score from group 1 precedes a score from group 2 and the number of times that a score from group 2 precedes a score from group 1. The Mann-Whitney U statistic is the smaller of these two numbers. The Wilcoxon rank sum W statistic, also displayed, is the rank sum of the smaller sample. If both samples have the same number of observations, W is the rank sum of the group that is named first in the Two-Independent-Samples Define Groups dialog box (SPSS 15 2006).

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The SPSS software provides the scores for the Mann-Whitney test (the Mann- Whitney U, Wilcoxon W, Z value and asymptotic significance scores) that were useful to compare the responses. If the asymp. sig. score is equal to or greater than 0.05 (asymp. sig. > 0.05), it can be concluded that there is no significant difference between the responses in the two countries. However, if the asymp. sig. score is less than 0.05 (asymp. sig. < 0.05), it can be concluded that there is a significant difference between the responses in the two countries.

This study will not present Mann-Whitney statistics due to the complicatedness of the output of the statistics, impracticality to address all the statistical scores, and the risk of confusing the readers. Thus, only the final results of the Mann-Whitney Tests are indicated in the tables.

For example, indicator 2.3 measured the knowledge about the organisational structure of ASEAN (see Table 3.2). The Kruskal-Wallis statistics confirmed that there was a significant difference in the responses in the three countries. To examine which response of the three countries are different, three Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted. A Mann-Whitney test comparing the responses in Malaysia to that in Singapore showed that the response in Malaysia is significantly higher than that in Singapore. The other Mann-Whitney test comparing the response in Malaysia to that in Indonesia showed that the response in Malaysia is significantly higher than that in Indonesia. Finally, the Mann-Whitney test comparing the response in Singapore to that in Indonesia showed that the response in Singapore is significantly higher than that in Indonesia.

Scale numerical data consisting of either interval or ratio data were the quantified-qualitative data. The response to the five-point Likert-type question (completely disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree and completely agree) is an example of scale numerical data. The indicators of the ‘reasons of why certain respondents do not have knowledge on ASEAN Community ’, ‘level of knowledge of the respondents who are not aware of ASEAN Community ’, ‘attitudes

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towards ASEAN Community ’, ‘opinion on ASEAN identity’, ‘ nationalist sentiment s’, and ‘national identity sentiment’ are examples of the Likert-type questions indicators.

The study used One-Way Analysis of Variance (The One-Way ANOVA) statistics for comparing the distribution of scale numerical data. The One-Way ANOVA procedure produces a one-way analysis of variance for a quantitative dependent variable by a single factor (independent) variable. Analysis of variance is used to test the hypothesis that several means are equal. 7 Using the one-way ANOVA, it was possible to verify whether the respondents in the three countries had significant different positions on an issue.

The SPSS software provides the scores for the ANOVA test (the ANOVA F score and significance statistics scores) that were useful to compare the responses. If the sig. score is equal to or greater than 0.05 (asymp. sig. > 0.05), it can be concluded that there is no significant difference between the responses in the three countries. However, if the sig. score is less than 0.05 (asymp. sig. < 0.05), it can be concluded that there is a significant difference between the responses in the three countries.

Take, for example, indicator 8.1 (in the eighth variable) that measures the support for the formation of ASEAN Community (see Table 3.3). The statistics of One-Way ANOVA showed that the F-Score for the indicator was 3.97, implicating the

Table 3.3 Example of statistical output of One-Way ANOVA procedure

Respondents Analysis of Variance Response Malaysia Indonesia Singapore Average Comparison of countries’ responses F score: 3.97 I support the formation of ASEAN Community. Sig. : 0.02 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 2% 1% 2% 2% · Neither agree nor disagree 14% 7% 15% 12% · Agree or completely agree 84% 91% 84% 87% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree · The attitude of Indonesians is significantly · Mean 4.05 4.14 4.00 4.08 more positive than that of the Malaysians and Agree Agree Agree Agree Singaporeans. · No significant difference between the attitude of the Malaysians and the Singaporeans.

7 SPSS (2006).

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sig. score of 0.02. Because the significance-score was less than 0.05, it can be concluded that there was a significant differences in responses in the three countries.

In addition to determining that differences exist among the means, it was necessary to know about what the difference is. To achieve this objective, ANOVA’s Post Hoc LSD (Least Square Difference) Tests were employed. For example, indicator 8.1 (in the eighth variable) measures the support for the formation of ASEAN Community (see Table 3.3). The Post-Hoc LSD Tests revealed that the attitude of Indonesians was significantly more positive than that of the Malaysians and Singaporeans. However, no significant difference between the attitude of the Malaysians and the Singaporeans was found on the Post-Hoc LSD Tests.

Finally, to analyze the relationship between the awareness (nominal variable) and attitudes towards the ASEAN Community (interval variable), the study used the Pearson Chi-Square statistics – the most common test for determining if the relationship between two variable is significant. The Pearson chi-square statistics tests whether the two variables are independent. The significant (Asymp. Sig.) score has the information: the lower the significant value, the less likely it is that the two variables are unrelated. 8 Take, for example, the result of the tests in Table 5.1 (see 5.1.1). The scores of Pearson Chi-Square showed that the Asymp.Sig. score was below 0.100, implying that there were significant relationships between the awareness and the indicators of attitudes towards ASEAN Community.

Besides quantitative data, qualitative data were obtained from the surveys, documents, and literature. The qualitative data from the survey were processed and analyzed descriptively by using the ‘Microsoft Office’ software (Microsoft Words and Microsoft Excel) in helping to categorize and compare the responses.

8 SPSS (2006).

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3.5 PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS

Surveys were conducted to collect primary data between June 2009 and October 2010 in Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. The surveys involved 451 Malaysians, 511 Indonesians and 294 Singaporeans (Table 3.4).

3.5.1 Description of Malaysian respondents

In Malaysia, the surveys involved 451 respondents in five cities. More than half of them were students (54.3%) and the rests were non students. Klang Valley (Greater Kuala Lumpur and Selangor: 27.7%) was chosen to represent the Central Malaysia; Melaka (20.6%) and Johor Bahru (17.5%) to South Malaysia; Penang (19.3%) to North Malaysia; and Kota Kinabalu (14.7%) to East Malaysia (see Table 3.4).

The gender of Malaysian respondents was almost equal: 51.1% male and 48.9% female (Table 3.4). Most of them were from the younger generation (18 to 34 years old, 73.1%). However, the analysis that excluded of the students showed that the older mature respondents (35 to 49 years old: 46.3%) exceeded the younger mature group (40.9%) (Table 3.5).

Most of the respondents (70.7%) were single; while non-students were mainly married (60.9%). The education background of two-thirds of the respondents was undergraduate (67.0%); while 22.6% of respondents had master degree and 10.4% of them had PhD (see Table 3.4). However, when the students were excluded from analysis (Table 3.5), the number respondents who had master-degree (49.3%) exceeded them who had bachelor-degree (28.3%); while the percentage doctoral- educated respondents increased to 22.4%.

Most the Malaysian respondents came from lower and middle class group. More than two-thirds of them (71.2%) spent up to MYR 5,000 expenditure per month (Table 3.4). Besides students (54.3%), the three most common occupations of the respondents were lecturers (26.4%), civil servants (6.4%) and soldiers/police (5.1%).

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Table 3.4 Profile of respondents

Country Malaysia Indonesia Singapore Overall Number of respondents 451 511 294 1,256 Cities of domicile Klang Valley Greater Jakarta 156 Singapore 294 - Greater Kuala 125 (30.6%) (100%) Lumpur and (27.7%) Medan - 80 Selangor North Sumatera (15.7%) Kota Kinabalu 67 Surabaya 80 - Sabah (14.9%) - East Java (15.7%)

Johor Bahru - 79 Pontianak - West 80 Johor (17.5%) Kalimantan (15.7%) Melaka 93 Makassar 81 (20.6%) / South Celebes (15.9%) P. Pinang 87 Other 33 (19.3%) (6.5%) Male 51.1% 48.0% 55.5% 50.8% Gender Female 48.9% 52.0% 44.5% 49.2% Age Younger mature 73.1% 83.8% 63.7% 75.4% (18 to 34 yrs) Older mature 20.9% 13.4% 22.0% 18.1% (35 to 49 yrs) Senior 6.0% 2.8% 14.3% 6.5% (50 yrs. or more) Marital Single 70.7% 74.6% 63.6% 70.7% status Married 28.2% 25.2% 35.7% 28.6% Widow/er 1.1% 0.2% 0.7% 0.7% Formal Undergraduate 67.0% 89.2% 50.7% 72.4% education Master degree 22.6% 10.2% 14.4% 15.7% PhD 10.4% 0.6% 34.9% 12.0% Expenditure per month MYR 1,000 32.7% IDR 1 million 13.9% S$ 1,250 18.8% (≈ US$300) (≈ US$110) (≈ US$960) or or less or less less MYR 1,001 38.5% IDR 1,000,001 20.8% S$1,251 27.3% to 5,000 to 2,000,000 to 3,500 (≈ US$301 to (≈ US$111 (≈ US$961 to 1,500) to 220) 2,690) MYR 5,001 19.6% IDR 2,000,001 21.8% S$3,501 21.4% to 10,000 to 3,000,000 to 6,000 (≈ US$1,501 (≈ US$221 (≈ US$2,691 to to 3,000) to 330) 4,615) MYR 10,001 6.0% IDR 3,000,001 11.9% S$6,001 19.6% to 15,000 to 4,000,000 to 10,000 (≈ US$3,001 (≈ US$331 (≈ US$4,616 to to 4,500) to 440) 7,690) MYR 15,001 1.6% IDR 4,000,001 7.9% S$10,001 8.1% to 20,000 to 5,000,000 to 20,000 (≈ US$4,501 (≈ US$441 (≈ US$7,691 to to 6,000) to 550) 15,385) MYR 20,001 1.6% IDR 5,000,001 23.8% S$20,001 4.8% (≈ US$6,001) (≈ US$551) (≈ US$15,386) or more or more or more Occu- Lecturer 26.4% 7.1% 40.8% 21.9% pation Civil servant 6.4% 8.2% 5.8% 7.0% Private-sector employee 2.7% 33.5% 2.0% 15.1% Soldier/Police 5.1% 0.0% 0.0% 1.8% Doing business 0.0% 3.1% 0.7% 1.4% Housewife 0.0% 1.8% 0.3% 0.8% Student 54.3% 40.9% 42.9% 46.2% Not working 1.3% 3.1% 0.0% 1.8% Other 3.8% 2.4% 7.5% 4.1%

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Table 3.5 Profile of non-student respondents

Country Malaysia Indonesia Singapore Overall Number of respondents 205 290 168 634 Cities of domicile Klang Valley Greater Jakarta 106 Singapore 168 - Greater Kuala 74 (36.6%) (100%) Lumpur and (35.1%) Medan - 42 Selangor North Sumatera (14.5%) Kota Kinabalu 19 Surabaya 40 - Sabah (9.3%) - East Java (13.8%)

Johor Bahru - 33 Pontianak - West 41 Johor (16.1%) Kalimantan (14.1%) Melaka 44 Makassar 41 (21.5%) - South Celebes (14.1%) P. Pinang 35 Other 22 (17.1%) (6.9%) Gender Male 53.9% 50.0% 60.8% 53.8% Female 46.1% 50.0% 39.2% 46.2% Age Younger 40.9% 72.6% 32.7% 53.1% mature (18 to 34 yrs) Older mature 46.3% 22.4% 40.8% 34.4% (35 to 49 yrs) Senior 12.8% 5.0% 26.5% 12.5% (50 yrs. or more) Marital Single 37.1% 58.2% 32.9% 45.5% status Married 60.9% 41.4% 65.8% 53.3% Widow/er 2.0% 0.4% 1.4% 1.1% Formal Undergraduate 28.3% 84.9% 13.9% 50.0% education Master degree 49.3% 14.1% 24.7% 27.7% PhD 22.4% 1.0% 61.4% 22.3% Expenditure per month MYR 1,000 3.9% IDR 1 million 7.7% S$ 1,250 4.8% (≈ US$300) (≈ US$110) (≈ US$960) or or less or less less MYR 1,001 40.9% IDR 1,000,001 19.5% S$1,251 19.3% to 5,000 to 2,000,000 to 3,500 (≈ US$301 to (≈ US$111 to (≈ US$961 to 1,500) 220) 2,690) MYR 5,001 37.9% IDR 2,000,001 24.7% S$3,501 25.5% to 10,000 to 3,000,000 to 6,000 (≈ US$1,501 (≈ US$221 to (≈ US$2,691 to to 3,000) 330) 4,615) MYR 10,001 11.3% IDR 3,000,001 12.8% S$6,001 30.3% to 15,000 to 4,000,000 to 10,000 (≈ US$3,001 (≈ US$331 to (≈ US$4,616 to to 4,500) 440) 7,690) MYR 15,001 3.4% IDR 4,000,001 6.4% S$10,001 12.4% to 20,000 to 5,000,000 to 20,000 (≈ US$4,501 (≈ US$441 to (≈ US$7,691 to to 6,000) 550) 15,385) MYR 20,001 2.5% IDR 5,000,001 29.5% S$20,001 7.6% (≈ US$6,001) (≈ US$551) (≈ US$15,386) or more or more or more Occu- Lecturer 58.0% 12.4% 71.4% 41.4% pation Civil servant 14.1% 14.4% 10.1% 13.3% Private-sector 5.9% 57.4% 3.6% 27.9% employee Soldier/Police 11.2% 0.0% 0.0% 3.5% Doing business 0.0% 5.2% 1.2% 2.6% Housewife 0.0% 3.1% 0.6% 1.5% Not working 2.4% 3.4% 0.0% 2.1% Other 8.3% 4.1% 13.1% 6.8%

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3.5.2 Description of Indonesian respondents

In Indonesia, the surveys involved a total of 511 respondents in five cities (Table 3.4); 40.9% of them were students and 59.1% were non students. Jakarta (30.6%), the capital of Indonesia – and together with its eight neighbouring territories that make up the area of Greater Jakarta – is the home for about 27,942,983 populations. 9 Surabaya (East Java, 15.7%) is the second largest city in Indonesia 10 and is immensely influential for the economy of central and eastern parts of Indonesia. Medan (North Sumatera, 15.7%) is the fourth largest city in Indonesia and is the centre of economy of Sumatera island. Being the seventh largest city of Indonesia, Makassar (South Celebes/Sulawesi: 15.9%) is the largest city in Eastern Indonesia and a particularly influential port for the region. Pontianak (West Kalimantan/Borneo 15.7%) – which is amongst the largest cities in Borneo – was also chosen in the survey for its people’s relatedness to Ma laysian’s Sarawak.

The gender of Indonesian respondents was almost equal: 48.0% male and 52.0% female. Most of the respondents were from the younger generation (18 to 34 years old, 83.8%) and single - marital status category (74.6%). Most of them had undergraduate education background (89.2%), and only 10.2% and 0.6% of them had master and doctoral degree (Table 3.4).

9 According to the 2010 census by Indonesian Office for Statistic, the population of Jakarta and the other eight cities and districts surrounding the capital city of Indonesia are: (1) Jakarta – 9,588,198; (2) Kabupaten Bogor – 4,763,209; (3) Kota Bogor - 949,066; (4) Depok – 1,736.565; (5) Kota Bekasi – 2,336.489; (6) Kabupaten Bekasi – 2,629,551; (7) Kota Tangerang – 1,797,715; (8) Kota Tangerang Selatan – 1,303,569; and (9) Kabupaten Tangerang – 2,838,621. and. All of them made up the 27,942,983 population of the Greater Jakarta (Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Banten 2010; Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi DKI Jakarta 2010; and Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Jawa Barat 2010). 10 According to the 2010 census by Indonesian Office for Statistics (Biro Pusat Statistik 2010), the ten largest city in Indonesia are: (1) Jakarta – 9,588,198; (2) Surabaya – 2,765.908; (3) Bandung – 2,393,633; (4) Medan – 2,109,339; (5) Semarang – 1,553,778; (6) Palembang – 1,452,840; (7) Makassar – 1,339,374; (8) Pekan Baru 903,902; (9) Padang – 833,584 and (10) Malang – 819,708 (Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi DKI Jakarta 2010; Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Jawa Timur 2010; Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Jawa Barat 2010; Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Sumatera Utara 2010; Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Jawa Tengah 2010; Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Sumatera Selatan 2010; Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Sulawesi Selatan 2010; Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Riau 2010; and Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Sumatera Barat 2010).

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Most of the Indonesian respondents came from lower and middle class group. Most of respondents’ household (56.5%) spent up to IDR 3 millio n per month. Besides students (40.9%), the three most common occupations were private-sector employees (33.5%), civil servants (8.2%) and university lecturers (7.1%) (Table 3.4).

3.5.3 Description of Singaporean respondents

In Singapore, the surveys involved a total of 294 respondents (see Table 3.4); 42.9% of them were students while 53.8% are non students. The students were met face-to- face in the three public universities in Singapore. 11 The responses of non-student respondents were collected through targeted e-mailed surveys.

The gender of Singaporean respondents was not equal because it was impossible to control the respondents of e-mailed survey: 55.5% male and 44.5% female. Most of the respondents were younger age (18 to 34 years old, 63.7%). The single - marital status category was the major group (74.6%) (Table 3.4); however, the respondents from older mature ages (35 to 49 years old) exceeded the younger mature age group, if the students respondents were excluded from the analysis (Table 3.5) .

Most of the Singaporean respondents had undergraduate formal education background (50.47%), but the number of those with PhD education background (34.9%) substantially exceeded the number in Indonesia and Malaysia (Table 3.4) . A high percentage of Singaporean respondents had PhD because most of them were academic staff of university. In Singapore, a Ph.D. is a prerequisite for teaching position.

Most of the Singaporean respondents came from lower and middle class group. Most of their household (67.5%) spent up to S$6,000 per month. Besides students (42.9%), the three most common occupations of the respondents were the university lecturer (40.5%), civil servants (5.8%) and private employee (2.0%) (Table 3.4).

11 The three public universities are: National University of Singapore, Nanyang Technological University and Singapore Management University.

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3.5.4 Comparisons of respondents in the three countries

As planned in the research proposal, the gender of the respondents was almost equal: 50.8% male and 49.2% female. However, in the implementation of the research plan, a slight variation was found because it was extremely difficult to control the respondents in the field. The males exceeded the females in Malaysia (51.1% : 48.9%) and Singapore (55.5% : 44.5%), while the females exceeded the males in Indonesia (52% : 48%) (Table 3.4).

The younger mature age (18 to 34 years old) was the major category (75.4%) because the study was designed to have students as half of the respondents (Table 3.4). If students (46.2% of the respondents) were excluded from analysis, the younger mature age group still constituted the majority of the respondents (53.8%), followed by the older mature age group (35 to 49 years old: 34.4%) and senior (50 years old or more: 12.5%) (Table 3.5).

Most of the respondents in the three countries (70.7%) declared themselves to be single; while 28.6% were married and 0.7% were widow/ers (Table 3.4). However, if students were excluded from the analysis, more than half the respondents were married (53.3%) (Table 3.5).

Due to the complexity of the questions, tertiary education was a required criteria for the respondents. The respo ndents’ education background was 72.4% undergraduate, 15.7% master-degree, and 12.0% doctoral-degree (Table 3.4). If students were excluded from the analysis, the education level of respondents was 50.0% undergraduate, 27.7% master degree, and 22.3% doctoral degree (Table 3.5). The education level of the respondents differed in the three countries. Analysis on the profile of non-student respondents shows that most of the Indonesian respondents (84.9%) only had only bachelor degree; almost half of the Malaysian respondents had master degree (49.3%), and most of the Singaporean respondents (61.4%) had Ph.D (Table 3.5).

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Most of the respondents were from the lower and middle class group. In Malaysia, 71.2% of the respondents’ household spent up to MYR 5,000 (equivalent to US$1,500) per month. In Indonesia, 56.5% of the respondents’ household spent up to IDR 3 million (equivalent to US$1,000) per month. In Singapore, 67.5% of them spent up to S$6,000 (equivalent to US$4,615) per month (Table 3.4).

Students represented 46.2% of the respondents (Table 3.4). If students were excluded from the analysis, the three most common occupations were lecturers (41.4%), private-sector employees (27.9%) and civil servants (13.3%) (Table 3.5).

CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS

This chapter discusses the findings of the study. In line with the five research inquiries, this chapter is divided into five sections that presents the finding of the survey inquiry on (1) public knowledge and perceived relevancy of ASEAN and the ASEAN Community; (2) public attitudes, opinions and aspiration for ASEAN Community; (3) sentiments regarding national and regional identities; (4) the perceived challenges for establishing the ASEAN Community; and (5) the impacts of the establishment of the ASEAN Community on national sovereignty, security and identity.

4.1 PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE ON AND PERCEIVED RELEVANCY OF ASEAN

This study argues that public awareness and perceptions of ASEAN regionalism need to be assessed because it would influence public opinion on ASEAN regional integration. For this purpose, the survey results on those issues are discussed below.

4.1.1 Public knowledge and understanding on ASEAN

To measure the knowledge and understanding of respondents on ASEAN, six yes-no questions were posed to the respondents. The study showed that the respondents’ knowledge in the three countries surveyed was quite high (see Table 4.1).

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Table 4.1 Knowledge about ASEAN

Respondents Kruskal-Wallis Tests for Response Malay- Indo- Singa- Average comparing the responses sia nesia pore Chi-Square 4.10 df: 2 Do you know about ASEAN? Asymp. Sig. 0.13 · Yes 96% 98% 97% 97% Meaning: There is no significant difference. · No 4% 2% 3% 3% Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: There is no significant difference in the knowledge of respondents in Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore.

Do you understand about the goals and Chi-Square 3.626 df: 2 objectives of ASEAN? Asymp. Sig. 0.16 · Yes 69% 66% 62% 66% Meaning: There is no significant difference. · No 31% 34% 38% 34% Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: There is no significant difference in the knowledge of respondents in Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore.

Do you know that ASEAN was established in Chi-Square 20.02 df: 2 1967? Asymp. Sig. 0.00 · Yes 58% 66% 51% 58% Meaning: There are significant differences · No 42% 34% 49% 42% Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: · The knowledge of Indonesian respondents is significantly higher than that in Malaysia and Singapore. · The knowledge of Malaysia respondents is not significantly different than that in Singapore.

Do you know about the organisational structure Chi-Square 59.79 df: 2 of ASEAN? Asymp. Sig. 0.00 · Yes 44% 21% 34% 33% Meaning: There are significant differences · No 56% 79% 66% 67% Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: · The knowledge of Malaysian respondents is significantly higher than that in Singapore and Indonesia. · The knowledge of Singaporean respondents is significantly higher than that in Indonesia.

Most respondents in the three countries shared the same level of knowledge. Nearly all of them claimed that they knew about ASEAN (in general 97%: 96% Malaysians, 98% Indonesians and 97% Singaporeans). Nearly two-thirds of them claimed that they knew the goals and objectives of ASEAN (in general 66%: 69% Malaysians, 66% Indonesians and 62% Singaporeans). More than half the respondents claimed that they knew about the year of the establishment of ASEAN (in general 58%: 58% Malaysians, 66% Indonesians and 51% Singaporeans).

While most of the respondents claimed to know about ASEAN, the year of its founding, and its vision and goals, only one-third of the respondents admitted that they knew about the organisational structure of ASEAN. The Kruskal-Wallis and

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Table 4.2 Understanding on ASEAN Security Community

Respondents Kruskal-Wallis Tests for Response Malay- Indo- Singa- Average comparing the responses sia nesia pore Chi-Square 10.71 df: 2 Is the ASEAN Security Community similar to NATO? Asymp. Sig. 0.01 · Yes 22% 14% 16% 17% Meaning: There are significant differences · No 78% 86% 84% 83% Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: · The knowledge of Indonesian respondents is significantly higher than that in Malaysia. · The knowledge of Singaporean respondents is not significantly different with that of the Malaysians and the Indonesians.

Is ASEAN a security community with a security force Chi-Square 35.74 df: 2 dedicated to the security of ASEAN? Asymp. Sig. 0.00 · Yes 32% 16% 20% 23% Meaning: There are significant differences · No 68% 84% 80% 77% Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: · The knowledge of Indonesian and Singaporean respondents is significantly higher than that in Malaysia. · No significant difference in the knowledge of Singaporeans and of the Indonesians.

Mann-Whitney U procedures showed that the knowledge level was significantly lower in Indonesia (21%) and Singapore (34%) than those in Malaysia (44%).

To measure the level of understanding of respondents on ASEAN Community, two questions were asked: “Is the ASC similar to that of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation )?” and “Is ASEAN a security community with a security force dedicated to the security of ASEAN ?” (see Table 4.2). Large majority of the respondents answered correctly that the ASC was not similar to that of NATO (in general 83% answered correctly: 78% Malaysian respondents, 86% Indonesians, and 84% Singaporeans). However, the degree of understanding differed between countries: understanding of the Indonesians was significantly higher than that of the Malaysians; while knowledge of the Singaporeans did not differ significantly from that of the Indonesians and the Malaysians.

In response to the second indicator of understanding, most respondents were able to answer correctly that ASEAN was not a security community with a dedicated security forces (in general 77%: 68% Malaysian respondents, 84% Indonesians, and 80% Singaporeans could answer correctly). However, the degree of understanding

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was also different between countries. The understanding of the Indonesian and Singaporean respondents were significantly higher than that of the Malaysians; while there was no significant difference between the knowledge of Singaporeans and Indonesians.

Learning at school seemed to contribute positively to the level of knowledge and understanding on ASEAN. In the three countries, students in the primary to senior high school were taught about ASEAN. Most of the respondents admitted that they had learned about ASEAN at school (61% Malaysians, 94% Indonesians, and 60% Singaporeans). However, this study found that there were significantly more respondents in Indonesia that stated that they learned about it at school than those in Malaysia and Singapore (see Table 4.3).

Finally, the respondents were asked about the necessity to learn about ASEAN at school. The study found that most respondents supported learning about ASEAN at schools. Nearly three-quarters of them (69% Malaysians, 85% Indonesians, and 70% Singaporeans) admitted that it was important or very important. The statistical modes

Table 4.3 Learning about ASEAN at schools in the three countries

Respondents Kruskal-Wallis / Analysis of Variance Tests for Response Malaysia Indonesia Singapore Average comparing the responses Did you learn about ASEAN at school (primary to secondary Chi-Square 160.32 df: 2 school/pre-University) Asymp. Sig. 0.00 · Yes 61% 94% 60% 71% Meaning: There are significant differences · No 21% 2% 27% 16% Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: · Do not remember 19% 5% 13% 12% · The number of respondents who admit they studied about ASEAN is significantly higher in Indonesia than those in Singapore and in Malaysia. · No significant difference between the Malaysians and the Singaporeans.

Is ASEAN important to be taught at school (primary to F score: 22.65 secondary school/pre -University) Sig. : 0.00 · Unimportant and Meaning: There are significant differences very unimportant 11% 7% 9 % 9 % · Not Important nor Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: unimportant 20% 8% 21 % 15% · The perception of importance is significantly higher in · Important and very Indonesia than that in Malaysia and Singapore. important 69% 85 % 70 % 76 % · No significant difference between the Malaysians and the · Mode Important Important Important Important Singaporeans. · Mean 3.67 4.01 3.67 3.81 Important Important Important Important

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and means of the response also showed this support. However, it can be noted that the perception of importance was significantly higher in Indonesia (mean = 4.01) than those in Malaysia and Singapore (both mean = 3.67); while there was no significant difference in the perception of the Malaysians and Singaporeans.

4.1.2 Public perception of the relevancy of ASEAN

As ASEAN has existed in the region since 1967, it is quite interesting to examine whether the respondents perceived it as successful and relevant. As presented in Table 4.4, the respondents showed that they were rather uncertain of the success of ASEAN: in general, 45% of respondents perceived ASEAN as neither successful nor unsuccessful; while 41% perceived ASEAN as successful. Only 14% of the respondents perceived ASEAN as unsuccessful.

Regarding the perception of ASEAN ’s success, there was a significant difference between the responses from the Indonesian respondents with those from the other two countries. The number of Indonesian respondents who perceived ASEAN as “neither successful nor unsuccessful” (49%) exceeded those who perceived it as successful (35%); while it was vice versa in Singapore and Malaysia. Statistical test using the ANOVA procedure showed that there was a significant difference between the responses in the three countries; while the Post-Hoc LSD Tests showed that the perception of success was significantly lower in Indonesia than those in Malaysia and Singapore.

While the respondents felt rather uncertain of ASEAN’s success, it was quite interesting to note that more than three-quarters of the respondents perceived ASEAN as important or very important for them and their country (in general 77%: 79% Malaysians, 77% Indonesians and 71% Singaporeans). ANOVA statistical tests showed that there were significant differences in the responses in the three countries; while the post-hoc LSD tests showed that the perception of importance was significantly higher in Malaysia (mean = 3.97) and Indonesia (mean = 3.90) than that in Singapore (mean = 3.79).

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Table 4.4 Perception of the relevancy of ASEAN

Kruskal-Wallis / Analysis of Variance Tests for Respondents Response comparing the responses Malaysia Indonesia Singapore Average F score: 5.16 In your opinion, is ASEAN successful? Sig. : 0.01 · Unsuccessful and very Meaning: There are significant differences unsuccessful 12% 16% 14 % 14 % · Neither successful nor Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: unsuccessful 42 % 49% 42 % 45 % · The perception of successful is significantly · Successful and very lower in Indonesia than those in Malaysia and successful 46% 35 % 44% 41% Singapore. · Mode Successful Neither Neither Neither · No significant difference between the Malaysians successful successful successful nor nor nor and the Singaporeans. unsuccessful unsuccessful unsuccessful · Mean 3.36 3.20 3.30 3.28 Neither Neither Neither Neither successful successful successful successful nor nor nor nor unsuccessful unsuccessful unsuccessful unsuccessful F score: 4.07 Is ASEAN important to you and your country? Sig. : 0.02 · Unimportant and very Meaning: There are significant differences unimportant 6% 5% 6% 6% · Not Important nor Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: unimportant 15% 18% 23% 18% · The perception of importance is significantly · Important and very higher in Indonesia and in Malaysia than that in important 79% 77% 71% 77% Singapore. · Mode Important Important Important Important · No significant difference between the Malaysians · Mean 3.97 3.90 3.79 3.90 and the Indonesians. Important Important Important Important Do you think that if ASEAN did not exist, there will be no problem in the Chi-Square 374.45 df: 2 country? Asymp. Sig. 0.00 · Yes 78% 21% 19% 39% Meaning: There are significant differences · No 22% 79% 81% 61% Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: · The perception of ASEAN’s relevancy is more positive in Indonesia and in Singapore than in Malaysia. · No significant difference between the Indonesians and the Singaporeans.

The relevancy of ASEAN was also measured by the response to the perception “if there were no ASEAN”. The finding were interesting in that almost two-thirds of the respondents (in general 61%: 22% Malaysians, 79% Indonesians and 81% Singaporeans) denied that there would not be any problem if there were no ASEAN. Statistical Kruskal-Wallis tests showed that there were significant differences in the responses in the three countries. The Mann-Whitney U Tests revealed that the perception was significantly more positive in Indonesia and Singapore than in Malaysia.

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4.1.3 Public awareness of the concept of ASEAN Community

Table 4.5 shows the respondents’ awareness of the ASEAN Community and the main legal arrangements. This study found that only half of them (in general 51%: 53% Malaysians, 46% Indonesians, and 55% Singaporeans) had heard about the ASEAN Community. The Kruskal-Wallis tests showed that there were significant differences in the three countries; while the Mann-Whitney U Tests showed that the awareness was significantly lower in Indonesia than in Malaysia and Singapore.

The 2003 Declaration of Bali Concord II (or the Bali Concord II) is the official declaration that initiated the move towards building the ASEAN Community.1 The study revealed that most respondents (in general 79%: 73% Malaysians, 83% Indonesians and 80% Singaporeans) were not aware of the document as they had never heard or read about it. Statistical Kruskal-Wallis tests showed that there were

Table 4.5 Awareness of ASEAN Community, Bali Concord II, and ASEAN Charter

Respondents Kruskal-Wallis Tests for Response Malaysia Indonesia Singapore Average comparing the responses Chi-Square 8.31 df: 2 Have you ever heard about the ASEAN Community? Asymp. Sig. 0.02 Meaning: There are significant differences · Yes 53% 46% 55% 51% Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: · No 47% 54% 45% 49% · Awareness in Malaysia and in Singapore is significantly higher than that in Indonesia. · No significant difference between the awareness of the Singaporeans and the Malaysians.

Have you ever heard/read about The Bali Concord II Chi-Square 15,94 df: 2 2003? Asymp. Sig. 0.00 · Yes 27% 17% 20% 21% Meaning: There are significant differences · No 73% 83% 80% 79% Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: · Awareness in Indonesia and Singapore is significantly lower than that in Malaysia. · No significant difference between the awareness of the Singaporeans and that of the Indonesians. Have you ever heard/read about the ASEAN Charter Chi-Square 1,33 df: 2 2007? Asymp. Sig. 0.51 · Yes 43% 41% 39% 41% Meaning: There is no significant difference. · No 57% 59% 61% 59% Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: · No significant difference between the awareness of respondents in the three countries.

1 ASEAN Secretariat (2003).

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significant differences in the three countries. The Mann-Whitney U Tests revealed that the awareness was significantly lower in Indonesia and Singapore than that in Malaysia.

The ASEAN Charter 2007 has been hailed as a crucial document that served as the legal instrument for the establishment of the ASEAN Community. Yet, more than half the respondents claimed that they had never heard of the document (in general 59% answered agreed or completely agreed: 57% Malaysians, 59% Indonesians and 61% Singaporeans). The Kruskal-Wallis tests and the Mann-Whitney U Tests indicated that the awareness of the respondents in the three countries did not differ significantly.

Since almost half of the respondents were not aware of the ASEAN Community, it is worth examining the reasons for this. It was hypothesized that there could be four plausible reasons for that: (1) the respondents thought that the development of ASEAN was not important to notice; (2) they had not heard any explanation about it from the government; (3) they thought they would not be affected by the development of ASEAN; and (4) they thought of ASEAN as merely the concern of the leaders (see Table 4.6).

Of the four alternatives, more than half of the respondents chose the response “they have not heard of any explanation about the ASEAN Community from the government” as the main reasons (in general 56%: 43% Malaysians, 66% Indonesians and 53% Singaporeans). Statistical tests showed that there were significant differences in the responses in the three countries; while the post-hoc LSD tests indicated that there were significantly more agreement to this reason by the respondents in Indonesia (mean = 3.64) than those in Malaysia (mean = 3.31) and Singapore (mean = 3.43).

The other three reasons got less support from the respondents than the first. In general, only slightly more than a quarter of the respondents (28% in general: 30% Malaysians, 28% Indonesians, and 25% Singaporeans) agreed that ASEAN as merely the concern of leaders. In addition, only 21% of respondents (19% Malaysians, 23%

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Table 4.6 Reasons why the respondents were not aware of the ASEAN Community

Respondents Analysis of Variance Response Malaysia Indonesia Singapore Average comparing the responses F score: 8.42 I have not heard any explanation about it from the government. Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 16% 12% 11% 13% · Neither agree nor disagree 40% 22% 36% 31% · Agree or completely agree 43% 66% 53% 56% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Neither agree Agree Agree Agree · The Indonesians’ level of agreement is nor disagree significantly higher than those of the · Mean 3.31 3.64 3.43 3.49 Malaysians and of the Singaporeans. Neither agree Agree Neither agree Agree · No significant difference between the nor disagree nor disagree Singaporeans and the Malaysians. F score: 2.69 I think ASEAN is merely the concern of the leaders. Sig. : 0.07 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 40% 54% 48% 48% · Neither agree nor disagree 30% 17% 27% 24% · Agree or completely agree 30% 28% 25% 28% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree · The Indonesians’ level of agreement is · Mean 2.89 2.66 2.72 2.75 significantly lower than that of the Neither agree Neither agree Neither agree Neither agree Malaysians. nor disagree nor disagree nor disagree nor disagree · The Singaporeans’ opinion is not significantly different with that of the Singaporeans and of the Malaysians. F score: 0.17 I would not be affected by the development of ASEAN. Sig. : 0.84 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There is no significant difference. disagree 41% 48% 45% 45% · Neither agree nor disagree 39% 29% 38% 34% · Agree or completely agree 19% 23% 17% 21% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Neither agree Disagree Disagree Disagree There is no significant difference between the nor disagree levels of agreement of the respondents in the · Mean 2.76 2.71 2.71 2.73 three countries. Neither agree Neither agree Neither agree Neither agree nor disagree nor disagree nor disagree nor disagree F score: 20.67 The development of ASEAN is not important to notice. Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 71% 78% 46% 69% · Neither agree nor disagree 19% 15% 34% 20% · Agree or completely agree 9% 7% 20% 11% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree · The Singaporeans’ level of disagreement is · Mean 2.19 2.14 2.71 2.27 significantly lower than those of the Disagree Disagree Neither agree Disagree Indonesians and of the Malaysians. nor disagree · No significant difference between the Indonesians and the Malaysians.

Indonesians, and 17% Singaporeans) agreed that they would not be affected by developments in ASEAN. More than two-thirds of the respondents, however, denied that they thought of developments in ASEAN as not important to notice (in general 69% disagreed or completely disagreed: 71% Malaysians, 77% Indonesians, and 46% of Singaporeans).

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Of the other half who admitted having heard about the ASEAN Community, what do they know about the concept? (see Table 4.7). When asked whether they knew that the ASEAN Community would be formed, two-thirdss of them admitted it (in general 65% agreed or completely agreed: 77% Malaysians, 53% Indonesians, and

Table 4.7 Level of knowledge of the respondents aware of the ASEAN Community

Respondents Analysis of Variance Response Malaysia Indonesia Singapore Average comparing the responses F score: 16.594 I know that ASEAN Community will be formed. Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 4% 18% 17% 12% · Neither agree nor disagree 19% 29% 21% 23% · Agree or completely agree 77% 53% 62% 65% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree · The level of knowledge of Malaysians is · Mean 3.85 3.40 3.52 3.61 higher than those of the Indonesians and Agree Neither agree Agree Agree the Singaporeans. nor disagree · No significant difference between the knowledge of the Indonesians and that of the Singaporeans. I know that ASEAN Community will comprise of ASEAN Security F score: 33.296 Community, ASEAN Economic Community, and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 3% 12% 24% 11% · Neither agree nor disagree 14% 25% 31% 22% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Agree or completely agree 84% 63% 45% 67% · The Malaysians’ level of knowledge is · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree significantly higher than those of the · Mean 3.96 3.60 3.24 3.66 Indonesians and Singaporeans. Agree Agree Neither agree Agree · The Singaporeans have lower level of nor disagree knowledge than those of the respondents in Malaysia and Indonesia.

F score: .372 I know that ASEAN Community will be effective by 2015. Sig. : 0.689 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There is no significant difference. disagree 18% 22% 23% 20% · Neither agree nor disagree 50% 37% 42% 43% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Agree or completely agree 33% 41% 35% 37% There is no significant difference between the · Mode Neither agree Neither agree Neither agree Neither agree levels of knowledge of respondents in the nor disagree nor disagree nor disagree nor disagree three countries. · Mean 3.18 3.23 3.15 3.19 Neither agree Neither agree Neither agree Neither agree nor disagree nor disagree nor disagree nor disagree

F score: .284 I have sufficient knowledge/information on the ASEAN Community. Sig. : 0.753 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 40% 54% 48% 48% · Neither agree nor disagree 30% 17% 27% 24% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Agree or completely agree 30% 28% 25% 28% There is no significant difference between the · Mode Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree levels of knowledge of respondents in the · Mean 2.89 2.66 2.72 2.75 three countries. Neither agree Neither agree Neither agree Neither agree nor disagree nor disagree nor disagree nor disagree

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62% Singaporeans). The ANOVA tests showed that there were significant differences in the responses in the three countries. Furthermore, the post-hoc LSD tests revealed that the level of knowledge was significantly higher among the Malaysian respondents (mean = 3.85) than that in Indonesia (mean = 3.40) and Singapore (mean = 3.52).

Furthermore, two-thirds of the respondents who were aware of the Community admitted that they knew that it would consist of three pillars (in general 67% agreed or completely agreed: 84% of Malaysians, 63% of Indonesians, and 45% of Singaporeans). The ANOVA test showed significant differences in the responses in the three countries. The post-hoc LSD tests, furthermore, indicated that the level of knowledge was significantly higher in Malaysia (mean = 3.96) than in Indonesia (mean = 3.60) and Singapore (mean = 3.24).

The study also found that most of the respondents were aware that the ASEAN Community consisted of three pillars. However, the number dropped significantly when they were asked whether they knew that ASEAN Community would be effective by 2015. Only slightly more than one-third knew about the timeline (37%: 33% Malaysians, 41% Indonesians, and 35% Singaporeans). A larger number were, however, unsure (in general 43% answered ” neither agree nor disagree ”: 50% Malaysians, 37% Indonesians, and 42% Singaporeans). The ANOVA test showed that there was no significant difference in the responses in the three countries.

In response to the statement of sufficient knowledge, almost half of the respondents denied that they had sufficient knowledge or information on the ASEAN Community (in general 48%: 40% of Malaysians, 54% of Indonesians, and 48% of Singaporeans). The ANOVA tests showed that there was no significant difference in the responses.

The sources of information on the ASEAN Community are displayed in Table 4.8. From whom or what did those surveyed obtain information on ASEAN Community? Although there was a slightly difference in the ranks, respondents listed newspapers, teachers/lecturers, and television programmes as the three main sources

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Table 4.8 Sources of information on ASEAN Community

A. Sources of Information on the ASEAN Community

Malaysian responses: Indonesian responses: Singaporean responses: Source of Source of Source of Percentage Percentage Percentage Information Information Information 1. Newspaper s 33.7% 1. Newspaper s 23.3% 1. Newspaper s 33.7% 2. Teachers/ 2. Television 2. Television 33.3% 20.2% 15.6% Lecturers programmes programmes 3. Television 3. Teachers/ 25.3% 19.6% 3. Teacher s/ Lecturers 14.6% programmes Lecturers 4. Seminars 12.6% 4. Magazines 5.9% 4. Seminars 9.5% 5. ASEAN Secretariat 5. Magazines 12.2% 5. Seminars 5.3% 8.2% Documents 6. ASEAN Secretariat 8.0% 6. Radio programmes 3.1% 6. Magazines 6.8% Documents 7. Radio 7. ASEAN Secretariat 7.3% 1.8% 7. Radio programmes 6.5% programmes Documents

B. Sources of Information on the ASEAN Charter and Bali Concord II

Malaysian responses: Indonesian responses: Singaporean responses: Source of Source of Source of Percentage Percentage Percentage Information Information Information 1. Newspaper s 20.8% 1. Newspaper s 18.8% 1. Newspaper s 23.8% 2. Teachers/ 2. Television 20.6% 18.2% 2. Teacher s/ Lecturers 10.5% Lecturers programmes 3. Television 3. Teachers/ 3. Television 9.8% 9.2% 9.9% programmes Lecturers programmes 4. ASEAN Secretariat 4. Seminars 8.9% 4. Magazines 3.3% 8.2% Documents 5. Magazines 7.5% 5. Seminars 2.7% 5. Seminars 7.8% 6. ASEAN Secretariat 6. ASEAN Secretariat 7.1% 1.6% 6. Radio programmes 2.4% Documents Documents 7. Radio 2.2% 7. Radio programmes 1.4% 7. Magazines 2.4% programmes

of information on ASEAN Community, Bali Concord II and the ASEAN Charter (see Table 4.8).

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4.2 PUBLIC ATTITUDES, OPINIONS AND ASPIRATIONS TOWARDS THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE ASEAN COMMUNITY

This study argues that public attitudes, opinions, and aspirations towards the concept and formation of the ASEAN Community need to be studied in order to plan effective strategies for its social construction. The survey results on those issues are discussed below.

4.2.1 Public attitudes towards the construct of the ASEAN Community

The attitudes of respondents in the three countries, as exhibited in Table 4.9, were positive. A great majority of respondents in the three countries surveyed supported the establishment of the ASEAN Community (in general 87% agreed or completely agreed, 84% Malaysians, 91% Indonesians and 87% Singaporeans). They perceived the establishment as beneficial to their country and people (in general 85% agreed or completely agreed: 85% Malaysians, 87% Indonesians and 82% Singaporeans). In addition, they also thought that their country would benefit from membership in the Community (in general 81% agreed or completely agreed: 82% Malaysians and Indonesia and 79% Singaporeans). When the attitudes of the respondents were compared, ANOVA statistics revealed that there were significant differences; the attitudes of the Indonesians were more positive than those of the other two countries.

Furthermore, the majority of the respondents expressed their belief that the Community would be able to create a partnership in dynamic development and a community of caring societies with diverse cultures and social harmony as mentioned in the 2003 Declaration of Bali Concord II (in general 75% agreed or completely agreed, 77% Malaysians, 76% Indonesians and 69% Singaporeans). ANOVA statistical tests showed that there were significant differences in the responses in the three countries; the post-hoc LSD tests revealed that the belief was significantly higher in Malaysia (mean = 3.95) and Indonesia (mean = 3.91) than in Singapore (mean = 3.74).

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Table 4.9 Attitudes towards the formation of ASEAN Community

Respondents Analysis of Variance Response Malaysia Indonesia Singapore Average comparing the responses F score: 3.97 I support the establishment of ASEAN Community. Sig. : 0.02 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 2% 1% 2% 2% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Neither agree nor disagree 14% 7% 15% 12% · The support of the Indonesians is significantly · Agree or completely agree 84% 91% 84% 87% higher than those of the Malaysians and the · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree Singaporeans. · Mean 4.05 4.14 4.00 4.08 · No significant difference between the attitude of Agree Agree Agree Agree the Malaysians and the Singaporeans.

The establishment of ASEAN Community is good for my country F score: 4.33 and the people. Sig. : 0.01 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 1% 2% 2% 2% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Neither agree nor disagree 14% 11% 16% 13% · The attitude of the Malaysians and the · Agree or completely agree 85% 87% 82% 85% Indonesians is significantly more positive than · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree that of the Singaporeans. · Mean 4.07 4.08 3.94 4.05 · No significant difference between the attitude of Agree Agree Agree Agree the Malaysians and the Indonesians.

F score: 3.11 My country will benefit from membership in ASEAN Community. Sig. : 0.05 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 1% 2% 3% 2% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Neither agree nor disagree 16% 17% 18% 17% · The attitude of the Malaysians and Indonesians is · Agree or completely agree 82% 82% 79% 81% significantly more positive than that of the · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree Singaporeans. · Mean 4.04 4.01 3.91 4.00 · The attitude of the Indonesians does not differ Agree Agree Agree Agree significantly from that of the Singaporeans and the Malaysians.

I believe that ASEAN Community will be able to create a F score: 6.92 partnership in dynamic development and in a community of caring Sig. : societies with diverse culture and social harmony. 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 2% 3% 6% 3% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Neither agree nor disagree 21% 21% 26% 22% · The attitude of the Malaysians and the · Agree or completely agree 77% 76% 69% 75% Indonesians is significantly more positive than · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree that of Singaporeans. · Mean 3.95 3.91 3.74 3.89 · No significant difference between the attitudes of Agree Agree Agree Agree the Malaysians the Indonesians.

I am optimistic that the establishment of ASEAN Community will F score: 15.78 be successful Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 2% 4% 8% 4% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Neither agree nor disagree 30% 37% 40% 35% · The attitude of the Malaysians is significantly · Agree or completely agree 67% 59% 52% 61% more positive than those of the Indonesians and · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree the Singaporeans. · Mean 3.81 3.65 3.48 3.67 · The attitude of the Indonesians is significantly Agree Agree Agree Agree more positive than that of the Singaporeans.

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Finally, the majority of those surveyed were optimistic that the establishment of the ASEAN Community would be successful (in general 61% agreed or completely agreed: 67% Malaysians, 59% Indonesians and 52% Singaporeans). ANOVA statistical tests showed that there were significant differences in the responses; the post-hoc LSD tests showed that the optimism was significantly higher in Malaysia (mean = 3.81) than in Indonesia (mean = 3.65) and Singapore (mean = 3.67).

4.2.2 Public attitudes towards the construct of ASEAN Security Community (ASC)

The attitudes of the respondents towards the establishment of the ASC, as exhibited in Table 4.10, were positive. The majority of the respondents in Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore expressed their support for the formation of ASC and perceived its formation as good for their country and society.

Most of the respondents in the three countries supported the formation of ASC (in general 80% answered agreed or completely agreed: 79% Malaysians, 84% Indonesians and 75% Singaporeans). ANOVA statistical tests showed that there were significant differences in the responses in the three countries; the post-hoc LSD tests indicated that the support was significantly higher in Indonesia (mean = 4.00) and Malaysia (mean = 3.92) than Singapore (mean = 3.84).

The survey showed that majority of those surveyed perceived the formation of ASC as good for their country and society (in general 80% agreed or completely agreed, 80% Malaysians, 84% Indonesians and 74% Singaporeans). ANOVA statistical tests showed that there were significant differences between the responses; the post-hoc LSD tests indicated that the perception was significantly more positive in Indonesia (mean = 3.99) and Malaysia (mean = 3.94) than in Singapore (mean = 3.82).

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Table 4.10 Attitudes towards the formation of ASEAN Security Community

Respondents Analysis of Variance Response Malay- Indo- Singa- comparing the responses sia nesia pore Average F score: 4.09 I support the formation of the ASC. Sig. : 0.02 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 4% 3% 3% 3% · Neither agree nor disagree 17% 13% 22% 17% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Agree or completely agree 79% 84% 75% 80% · The support of the Indonesians and Malaysians is significantly · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree higher than that of the Singaporeans. · Mean 3.92 4.00 3.84 3.94 · The attitude of the Malaysians does not significantly differ to Agree Agree Agree Agree those of the Indonesians and the Singaporeans. The formation of the ASC is good for my country and F score: 4.82 society. Sig. : 0.01 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 3% 3% 4% 3% · Neither agree nor disagree 17% 14% 23% 17% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Agree or completely agree 80% 84% 74% 80% · The attitude of the Malaysians and the Indonesians is · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree significantly more positive than that of the Singaporeans. · Mean 3.94 3.99 3.82 3.94 · No significant difference between the attitude of Malaysians Agree Agree Agree Agree and that of Indonesians. I believe that every ASEAN country would be fully F score: 6.857 committed to the peaceful resolution of conflicts and Sig. : differences. 0.001 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 5% 5% 14% 7% · Neither agree nor disagree 25% 25% 28% 26% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Agree or completely agree 69% 69% 58% 67% · The attitude of the Malaysians and the Indonesians is · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree significantly more positive than that of the Singaporeans. · Mean 3.78 3.78 3.55 3.73 · No significant difference between the attitude of the Agree Agree Agree Agree Malaysians and that of the Indonesians.

With the ASEAN Community, the bargaining position of F score: 1.87 each ASEAN countr y with countries outside the region will be stronger compared to that doing it unilaterally. Sig. : 0.15 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There is no significant difference. disagree 4% 3% 5% 4% · Neither agree nor disagree 21% 16% 23% 19% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Agree or completely agree 75% 80% 73% 77% · The attitude of Malaysians, Indonesians and Singaporeans · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree does not differ significantly. · Mean 3.89 3.98 3.89 3.93 Agree Agree Agree Agree I believe that ASEAN countries will be able to cooperate in F score: 7.46 combating terrorists, drugs trading, human trafficking, and Sig. : cross border crimes. 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 5% 3% 9% 5% · Neither agree nor disagree 23% 22% 26% 23% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Agree or completely agree 72% 75% 65% 72% · The attitude of the Malaysians and the Indonesians is · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree significantly more positive than that of the Singaporeans. · Mean 3.88 3.94 3.69 3.86 · No significant difference between Malaysians’ and Agree Agree Agree Agree Indonesians’.

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I support the principle of non -interference in the foreign and F score: 23.74 security policy of each ASEAN country. Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 11% 5% 13% 9% · Neither agree nor disagree 17% 13% 28% 18% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Agree or completely agree 72% 82% 59% 73% · The attitude of the Indonesians is significantly more · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree positive than that of the Malaysians and Singaporeans. · Mean 3.77 4.04 3.57 3.84 · The attitude of the Malaysians is significantly more Agree Agree Agree Agree positive than that of the Singaporeans.

I support the principle of non-interference in the internal F score: 4.16 affairs of each ASEAN country. Sig. : 0.02 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 8% 17% 10% 12% · Neither agree nor disagree 19% 12% 25% 18% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Agree or completely agree 73% 71% 64% 70% · The attitude of the Malaysians is significantly more · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree positive than that of the Singaporeans. · Mean 3.85 3.74 3.62 3.75 · The attitude of the Indonesians does not significantly Agree Agree Agree Agree differ with that of the Malaysians and the Singaporeans.

The respondents were also asked about the function of ASC and the expected behaviour of ASEAN member states. In general, the respondents showed their optimism on ASC. For example, two-thirds of them expressed their belief that ASEAN countries would be fully committed to the peaceful resolution of conflicts and differences (in general 67% agreed or completely agreed, 69% Malaysians, 69% Indonesians and 58% Singaporeans). ANOVA statistical tests showed significant differences in the responses in the three countries; the post-hoc LSD tests revealed that the belief was significantly higher in Malaysia (mean = 3.78) and Indonesia (mean = 3.78) than in Singapore (mean = 3.55).

In addition, the majority of the respondents also expressed the belief that, with the ASC, the bargaining position of each ASEAN country would be stronger when dealing with other countries, comparing to acting unilaterally (in general 77% agreed or completely agreed: 75% Malaysians, 80% Indonesians and 73% Singaporeans). ANOVA statistical tests showed that there was no significant difference in the responses in the three countries.

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Furthermore, majority of the respondents indicated, with the ASC, the ASEAN countries would be able to cooperate better in combating transnational security problems, such as terrorism, drugs trafficking, trafficking in persons, and cross border crimes. In general, 72% of the respondents (72% Malaysians, 75% Indonesians and 65% Singaporeans) agreed or completely agreed to the statement. ANOVA statistical tests showed that there were significant differences in the responses; the post-hoc LSD tests showed that the belief was significantly higher in Indonesia (mean = 3.94) and Malaysia (mean = 3.88) than in Singapore (mean = 3.69).

The Bali Concord II 2 and the ASEAN Charter 3 explicitly affirm the principles of non-interference in the foreign and security policy and internal affairs of member countries in the ASC. How did the respondents react to these principles?

The study found that generally most of the respondents supported those principles (see Table 4.10). As for the principle of non interference on the foreign and security policy, almost three-quarters of respondents supported (in general 73% agreed or completely agreed: 72% Malaysians, 82% Indonesians and 59% Singaporeans). ANOVA statistical tests, however, did show significant differences in the responses; the post-hoc LSD tests showed almost overwhelming support in Indonesia (mean = 4.04) and in Malaysia (mean = 3.77); it was significant lower in Singapore (mean = 3.57).

Majority of the respondents also demonstrated their support for the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN member states (in general 70% agreed or completely agreed: 73% Malaysians, 71% Indonesians and 64% Singaporeans). ANOVA statistical tests showed that there were significant differences in the responses; the post-hoc LSD tests showed that the support was significantly higher in Malaysia (mean = 3.85) than in Indonesia (mean = 3.74) and Singapore (mean = 3.62).

2 ASEAN Secretariat (2003). 3 ASEAN Secretariat (2008).

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4.2.3 Public attitudes towards the formation of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC)

In general, the majority of respondents showed their positive attitudes towards the formation of the AEC – the second pillar of the ASEAN Community (see Table 4.11).

Most of those surveyed in the three countries (in general 81% agreed or completely agreed: 85% Malaysians, 83% Indonesians and 73% Singaporeans) supported the establishment of AEC. ANOVA statistical tests, however, showed significant differences in the responses; the post-hoc LSD tests indicated that the support for the ASEAN Community was significantly higher in Malaysia (mean = 4.00) and Indonesia (mean = 3.96) than in Singapore (mean = 3.81).

One of the features of AEC is the free flow of goods and services across the region. The study found that almost three-quarters of respondents in the three countries supported this feature (in general 72% agreed or completely agreed: 84% Malaysians, 58% Indonesians and 81% Singaporeans). ANOVA and the post-hoc LSD tests indicated that the support was much lower in Indonesia (mean = 3.55) than those in Malaysia (mean = 3.98) and Singapore (mean = 3.95). The level of support in Indonesia which was just slightly more than the middle line (mean only 3.55 with only 58% of respondents showing their support) was rather worrying. Indonesia is the largest country with almost 40% of the ASEAN population. Thus, their full-support was expected for the common-market. Without the participation of Indonesia, the AEC would not be so attractive for businesspeople investing in the region.

The free flow of skilled/professional ASEAN workers across the region is another feature of AEC that brought a greater economic integration to the region. The study found that three-quarters of the respondents surveyed in the three countries supported this (in general 74% agreed or completely agreed: 73% Malaysians, 76% Indonesians and 70% Singaporeans). Thus, ANOVA and the post-hoc LSD tests found no difference in the level of support in the three countries.

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Table 4.11 Attitudes towards the formation of the ASEAN Economic Community

Respondents Analysis of Variance Response Malaysia Indonesia Singapore Average comparing the responses F score: 6.07 I support the establishment of AEC. Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 3% 4% 3% 3% · Neither agree nor disagree 13% 14% 24% 15% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Agree or completely agree 85% 83% 73% 81% · The support of the Malaysians and the · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree Indonesians is significantly higher than that · Mean 4.00 3.96 3.81 3.94 of the Singaporeans. Agree Agree Agree Agree · No significant difference between the attitude of the Malaysians and the Indonesians.

F score: 39.41 I support the free flow of goods and services in the region. Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning There are significant differences. disagree 4% 13% 2% 7% · Neither agree nor disagree 13% 29% 17% 20% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Agree or completely agree 84% 58% 81% 72% · The support of the Singaporeans and the · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree Malaysians is significantly higher than that of · Mean 3.98 3.55 3.95 3.80 the Indonesians. Agree Agree Agree Agree · No significant difference between the attitude of the Malaysians and the Singaporeans.

I support the free flow of skilled/professional ASEAN workers in the F score: 1.33 region. Sig. : 0.27 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There is no significant difference. disagree 7% 8% 11% 8% · Neither agree nor disagree 20% 16% 18% 18% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Agree or completely agree 73% 76% 70% 74% · No significant difference between the · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree supports of the Malaysians, the Indonesians · Mean 3.83 3.84 3.73 3.81 and the Singaporeans. Agree Agree Agree Agree I support that ASEAN businesspeople should be freely allowed to F score: 29.79 establish companies anywhere in the region. Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 8% 21% 11% 14% · Neither agree nor disagree 25% 33% 17% 27% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Agree or completely agree 67% 46% 71% 59% · The support of the Singaporeans and the · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree Malaysians is significantly higher than that of · Mean 3.71 3.30 3.70 3.54 the Indonesians. Agree Neither agree Agree Agree · No significant difference between the attitude nor disagree of the Malaysians and that of the Singaporeans.

F score: 2.46 My country will get benefits from membership in AEC. Sig. : 0.09 · Disagree or completely Meaning There is no significant difference. disagree 2% 3% 3% 3% · Neither agree nor disagree 20% 21% 25% 22% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Agree or completely agree 78% 75% 72% 75% · No significant difference between the · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree attitudes of the Singaporeans, the Indonesians · Mean 3.91 3.82 3.82 3.86 and the Singaporeans. Agree Agree Agree Agree

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F score: 4.28 The formation of AEC is good for the people in my country. Sig. : 0.01 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 4% 3% 5% 4% · Neither agree nor disagree 13% 15% 23% 16% · Agree or completely agree 84% 82% 73% 81% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree · The attitude of the Malaysians and the · Mean 3.97 3.96 3.82 3.93 Indonesians is significantly more positive than Agree Agree Agree Agree that of the Singaporeans. · No significant difference between the attitudes of the Malaysians the Indonesians. F score: 1.22 The formation of AEC is good/positive for business in my country. Sig. : 0.30 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There is no significant difference disagree 3% 4% 5% 4% between countries. · Neither agree nor disagree 20% 20% 24% 21% · Agree or completely agree 77% 77% 71% 76% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree · No significant difference between the attitudes · Mean 3.89 3.88 3.80 3.87 of the Malaysians, the Indonesians and the Agree Agree Agree Agree Singaporeans.

When buying goods, we should give priority to goods from ASEAN rather F score: 63.41 than Non -ASEAN’s . Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 9% 13% 37% 17% · Neither agree nor disagree 22% 33% 31% 28% · Agree or completely agree 68% 54% 32% 55% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Agree Agree Not agree Agree · The attitude of the Malaysians is significantly nor disagree more positive than that of the Indonesians and · Mean 3.72 3.47 2.91 3.45 the Singaporeans. Agree Neither agree Neither agree Neither agree · The attitude of the Indonesians is significantly nor disagree nor disagree nor disagree more positive than the Singaporeans.

Priority should be given to investment and investors from ASEAN F score: 39.38 countries than to those from countries outside ASEAN. Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 10% 18% 32% 18% · Neither agree nor disagree 24% 31% 32% 28% · Agree or completely agree 66% 51% 36% 54% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Agree Agree Not agree Agree · The attitude of the Malaysians is significantly nor disagree more positive than the attitude of the · Mean 3.69 3.40 3.03 3.43 Indonesians and the Singaporeans. Agree Neither agree Neither agree Neither agree · The attitude of the Indonesians is significantly nor disagree nor disagree nor disagree more positive than that of the Singaporeans.

Priority should be given to skilled/professional workers from ASEAN F score: 39.27 countries than those from countries outside ASEAN. Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 11% 13% 30% 15% · Neither agree nor disagree 21% 26% 31% 25% · Agree or completely agree 68% 61% 39% 59% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree · The attitude of the Malaysians is significantly · Mean 3.71 3.55 3.06 3.51 more positive than the attitude of the Agree Agree Neither agree Agree Indonesians and the Singaporeans. nor disagree · The attitude of the Indonesians is significantly more positive than that of the Singaporeans.

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I believe that AEC will be able to match the economic interests of each F score: 48.87 ASEAN country. Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 5% 4% 16% 7% · Neither agree nor disagree 20% 26% 42% 27% · Agree or completely agree 75% 70% 42% 66% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Agree Agree Neither agree Agree · The Malaysians’ and the Indonesians attitude nor disagree are significantly more positive than that of the · Mean 3.86 3.76 3.26 3.70 Singaporeans. Agree Agree Neither agree Agree · No significant difference between the attitudes nor disagree of the Malaysians and that of the Indonesians.

F score: 10.54 I believe that AEC will lead to greater competitiveness to the region. Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 4% 3% 7% 4% · Neither agree nor disagree 22% 21% 31% 23% · Agree or completely agree 74% 75% 62% 72% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree · The attitude of the Malaysians and the · Mean 3.83 3.85 3.59 3.79 Indonesians is significantly more positive than Agree Agree Agree Agree that of the Singaporeans. · No significant difference between the attitudes of the Malaysians and that of the Indonesians. I believe that AEC will not only benefit the more developed countries, F score: 5.30 because it will be able to accelerate the development in the less developed countries as well. Sig. : 0.01 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 3% 4% 8% 5% · Neither agree nor disagree 26% 31% 29% 29% · Agree or completely agree 70% 65% 64% 67% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree · The attitude of the Malaysians is significantly · Mean 3.80 3.71 3.61 3.72 more positive than that of the Indonesians and Agree Agree Agree Agree the Singaporeans. · No significant difference between the attitudes of Indonesians and that of the Singaporeans. The idea of AEC is merely an effort to solving the poor economic condition F score: 23.16 of ASEAN countries after the Asian Economic Crisis 1997 and the Sig. : economic threat from China and India. 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 7% 12% 25% 13% · Neither agree nor disagree 35% 40% 37% 37% · Agree or completely agree 58% 48% 38% 50% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Agree Agree Neither agree Agree · The attitude of the Malaysians is significantly nor disagree more positive than that of the Indonesians and · Mean 3.60 3.42 3.15 3.43 the Singaporeans. Agree Neither agree Neither agree Neither agree · The attitude of the Indonesians is significantly nor disagree nor disagree nor disagree more positive than that of the Singaporeans.

Freer flow of investments and businesspeople is a necessary feature for the success of ASEAN economic integration. The study found that most respondents in the three countries supported this feature (in general 59.03% agreed or completely agreed: 67% Malaysians, 46% Indonesians and 71% Singaporeans). ANOVA and the

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post-hoc LSD tests revealed that the support was much lower in Indonesia (mean = 3.30) than those in Malaysia (mean = 3.71) and Singapore (mean = 3.70).

The attitude towards AEC was also indicated by the perception of benefits from AEC. The results indicated that most of the respondents perceived that their countries would benefit from membership in AEC (in general 75%: 78% Malaysians, 75% Indonesians and 72% Singaporeans). ANOVA statistical tests showed that there was no significant difference in the responses in the three countries.

The study also found that the majority of respondents perceived the AEC as good or positive to the people in their country (in general 81% agreed or completely agreed: 84% Malaysians, 82% Indonesians and 73% Singaporeans). ANOVA statistical tests showed that there were significant differences in the responses; the post-hoc LSD tests revealed that the attitude was significantly more positive in Malaysia (mean = 3.97) and Indonesia (mean = 3.96) than in Singapore (mean = 3.82).

More than three-quarters of the respondents surveyed perceived the AEC as good/positive to the business in their country (in general 76% agreed or completely agreed: 77% Malaysians, 77% Indonesians and 71% Singaporeans). ANOVA statistical tests showed no significant difference in the responses in the three countries.

In this study, the attitudes towards AEC were also indicated by the commitment that ASEAN citizens should give priority to goods, investments and workers from ASEAN rather than those from Non-ASEAN countries. The study revealed that about 55% of the respondents thought that they should give priority for ASEAN goods rather than those from outside ASEAN (68% Malaysians, 54% Indonesians and 32% Singaporeans). ANOVA statistical tests showed that there were significant differences in the responses; the post-hoc LSD tests indicated that the commitment of the Singaporeans (mean = 2.91) was significantly lower than those of the Malaysians (mean = 3.72) and Indonesians (mean = 3.47).

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The study also slightly found that more than half of the respondents thought that they should give priority to investments and investors from ASEAN than those from outside ASEAN (in general 54% agreed or completely agreed: 66% Malaysians, 51% Indonesians and 36% Singaporeans). ANOVA statistical tests showed that there were significant differences in the attitudes of the respondents; the post-hoc LSD tests showed that mean of the Singaporeans (mean = 3.03) was significantly lower with those of the Malaysians (mean = 3.69) and Indonesians (mean = 3.40) surveyed.

When the respondents were asked about whether they should give priority to skilled or professional workers from ASEAN rather than those from outside ASEAN, in general 59% agreed or completely agreed: 68% Malaysians, 61% Indonesians and 39% Singaporeans. ANOVA statistical tests showed that there were significant differences in their responses; the post-hoc LSD tests revealed that the mean score of the Singaporeans (mean = 3.06) was significantly lower than those of the Malaysians (mean = 3.71) and Indonesians (mean = 3.55).

Further analysis showed that two-thirds of the Malaysian respondents agreed or completely agreed to give priority to goods, investments and workers from ASEAN (68% for goods, 66% for investments, and 68% for workers). More than half the Indonesians agreed (54% for goods, 51% for investments, and 61% for workers) but the number of those who did not agree nor disagree was almost one-third of the total Indonesian respondents (33% for goods, 31% for investments, and 26% for workers). On the contrary, only about a third of the Singaporeans agreed to give priority to ASEAN’s goods (32%), investment from ASEAN countries (36%), and ASEAN workers (39%).

The study also measured the respondents’ attitudes towards AEC by asking them about the function of the AEC. In general, the respondents showed their optimism as shown in their agreement to the indicators. For example, the majority of respondents expressed their belief that AEC would be able to match the economic interests of each ASEAN country (in general 66% agreed or completely agreed: 75% Malaysians, 70% Indonesians and 42% Singaporeans). ANOVA statistical tests

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showed that there were significant differences in the responses in the three countries; the post-hoc LSD tests showed that the belief was significantly higher in Malaysia (mean = 3.86) and Indonesia (mean = 3.76) than in Singapore (mean = 3.26).

Almost three-quarters of the respondents believed that AEC would lead to greater competitiveness to the region (in general 72% agreed or completely agreed: 74% Malaysians, 75% Indonesians and 62% Singaporeans). ANOVA statistical tests showed that there were significant differences between the respondents; the post-hoc LSD tests showed that the belief was significantly higher in Indonesia (mean = 3.85) and Malaysia (mean = 3.83) than in Singapore (mean = 3.59).

There is often the fear that greater economic integration would be at the advantage of the more developed countries at the expense of the less developed. But the result of the survey showed that about two-thirds of the respondents thought otherwise: that AEC would not only bring advantage to the more developed countries because it would be able to accelerate the development in the less developed countries as well (in general 67% agreed or completely agreed: 70% Malaysians, 65% Indonesians and 64% Singaporeans). ANOVA statistical tests showed that there were significant differences in the responses; the post-hoc LSD tests showed that the belief was significantly higher in Malaysia (mean = 3.80) than in Indonesia (mean = 3.71) and Singapore (mean = 3.61).

Finally, the respondents were asked to respond to the statement “ the idea of AEC is merely an effort to solving the poor economic condition of ASEAN countries after the Asian Economic Crisis 1997 and the economic threats of China and India ”. The study found that the respondents were generally unsure. Furthermore, the number of those who responded “neither agree nor disagree” (37%) was also high. ANOVA statistical tests showed that there were significant differences in the responses; the post-hoc LSD tests indicated that the belief was significantly higher in Malaysia (mean = 3.60) than in Indonesia (mean = 3.42) and Singapore (mean = 3.15)

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4.2.4 Public attitudes towards the formation of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC)

The ASCC is the third pillar of the ASEAN Community. In general, more than three- quarters of the respondents supported the formation of ASCC (in general 77%: 77%

Table 4.12 Attitudes towards the formation of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC)

Respondents Analysis of Variance Response Malaysia Indonesia Singapore Average comparing the responses I support the formation of ASCC. F score: 1.02 · Disagree or completely 3% 3% 2% 3% Sig. : 0.36 disagree Meaning: There is no significant difference. · Neither agree nor disagree 20% 18% 27% 21% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Agree or completely agree 77% 79% 70% 77% · The supports of the respondents in the · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree three countries do not differ significantly. · Mean 3.89 3.89 3.82 3.87 Agree Agree Agree Agree The formation of ASCC is good for the social and cultural development of F score: 1.39 my country. Sig. : 0.25 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There is no significant difference. disagree 4% 4% 3% 4% · Neither agree nor disagree 18% 20% 29% 21% · Agree or completely agree 78% 77% 68% 75% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree · The attitude of the respondents in the three · Mean 3.87 3.84 3.78 3.84 countries does not differ significantly. Agree Agree Agree Agree F score: 8.47 I believe that ASCC will be able to create a more caring community. Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 3% 3% 11% 5% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Neither agree nor disagree 22% 28% 28% 26% · The attitude of the Malaysians and the · Agree or completely agree 74% 70% 61% 70% Indonesians is significantly more positive · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree than that of the Singaporeans. · Mean 3.84 3.78 3.59 3.76 · No significant difference between the Agree Agree Agree Agree attitude of Indonesians and Malaysians.

I believe that ASCC will be able to improve the health of the F score: 11.28 people/society. Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 4% 3% 9% 5% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Neither agree nor disagree 25% 38% 32% 32% · The attitude of Malaysians is significantly · Agree or completely agree 72% 58% 59% 63% more positive than that of the · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree Singaporeans and Indonesians. · Mean 3.80 3.62 3.55 3.68 · No significant difference between the Agree Agree Agree Agree attitudes of the Singaporeans and the Indonesians.

I believe that ASCC will increase the variety and richness of ASEAN F score: 1.36 culture. Sig. : 0.26 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There is no significant difference. disagree 4% 4% 9% 5% · Neither agree nor disagree 23% 22% 21% 22% · Agree or completely agree 73% 74% 70% 73% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree · The attitude of the respondents in the three · Mean 3.83 3.83 3.74 3.81 countries does not differ significantly. Agree Agree Agree Agree

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Malaysians, 79% Indonesians and 70% Singaporeans) (see Table 4.12). Majority of the respondents agreed that the formation of ASCC would be good for the social and cultural development of their country (in general 75% agreed or completely agreed: 78% Malaysians, 77% Indonesians and 68% Singaporeans). ANOVA statistical tests proved that there was no significant difference in the responses in the three countries on these two indicators.

Respondents showed their optimism for ASCC, as they believed that it would bring about positive results. For example, the majority of respondents showed their feeling that ASCC would be able to create a more caring community (in general 70% agreed or completely agreed: 74% Malaysians, 70% Indonesians and 61% Singaporeans). ANOVA statistical tests showed significant differences in their responses; the post-hoc LSD tests showed that the belief was significantly higher in Malaysia (mean = 3.84) and Indonesia (mean = 3.78) than in Singapore (mean = 3.59).

When asked to response to the statement “I belief that ASCC would be able to improve the health of the people/society ”, the majority of respondents answered in the positive (in general 63% agreed or completely agreed: 72% Malaysians, 58% Indonesians and 59% Singaporeans). ANOVA statistical tests, however, did show significant differences and the post-hoc LSD tests showed that the belief was significantly higher in Malaysia (mean = 3.80) and Indonesia (mean = 3.62) than in Singapore (mean = 3.55).

Finally, more than 70% of the respondents also believed that ASCC would increase the variety and richness of ASEAN Culture (in general 73% agreed or completely agreed: 73% Malaysians, 74% Indonesians and 70% Singaporeans agreed or completely agreed to the statement). ANOVA statistical tests proved that there was no significant difference in the responses on this indicator.

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4.2.5 Public opinion on the formation process of ASEAN Community

The study results showed that the idea of the ASEAN Community was supported by the majority of the respondents. However, it must be admitted that the process of making it a reality lacked an important component: the involvement of the public. The idea of EU, for example, took years to materialize and involved not only the elites but

Table 4.13 The opinion on the formation process of ASEAN Community

Res- Respondents Kruskal-Wallis Tests for ponse Malaysia Indonesia Singapore Average comparing the responses Chi-Square 8.79 df: 2 Asymp. Sig. 0.01 The formation of the ASEAN Community is the initiative of the elite and does not involve the Meaning: There are significant differences. people. Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: · Agreement to the statement is significantly higher in Indonesia than · Yes 45% 51% 40% 46% that in Singapore. · No 55% 49% 60% 54% · The opinion of the Malaysians is not significantly different with that of the Indonesians or Singaporeans.

The formation of ASEAN Community is merely a Chi-Square 19.39 df: 2 declaration of ASEAN leaders not fruitful to the Asymp. Sig. 0.00 people. Meaning: There are significant differences. · Yes 35% 22% 29% 28% Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: · No 65% 78% 71% 72% · Agreement to the statement is significantly higher in Singapore and Malaysia than that in Indonesia. · There is no significant difference between the opinion of the Malaysians and Singapore. The formation of ASEAN Community is merely a Chi-Square 51.71 df: 2 dream. Asymp. Sig. 0.00 · Yes 44% 29% 56% 43% Meaning: There are significant differences. · No 56% 71% 44% 57% Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: · Agreement to the statement is significantly higher in Singapore than that in Malaysia and Indonesia. · Agreement to the statement is significantly higher in Malaysia than that in Indonesia. The objective of ASEAN Community is very Chi-Square 16.91 df: 2 impressive but is very difficult to materialize. Asymp. Sig. 0.00 · Yes 73% 61% 74% 69% Meaning: There are significant differences. · No 27% 39% 26% 31% Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: · Agreement to the statement is significantly lower in Indonesia than that in Malaysia and Singapore. · There is no significant difference between the opinion of the Malaysians and Singapore. It is obvious that the support of a country toward Chi-Square 5.28 df: 2 ASEAN Community is only for their own Asymp. Sig. 0.07 interests; not because of the common interests of Meaning: There is no significant difference. the region. · Yes 51% 55% 60% 56% Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: · No 49% 45% 40% 44% · Agreement to the statement is significantly higher in Singapore than that in Malaysia. · The opinion of the Indonesians is not significantly different with that in Malaysia or Singapore.

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also the positive perception, acceptance, and understanding of the people in the region. Thus, it would be useful to gauge the opinion of the respondents to the process of fostering greater regional integration.

When asked whether the formation of ASEAN Community involved the public, the response from the Indonesians was significantly different from those in the other two countries. Almost two-thirds (60%) of the Indonesian respondents thought that the formation did not involve the public. However, there were more respondents in Singapore and Malaysia who thought that the formation did involve the public than those who thought it did not involve (see Table 4.13).

Although the responses were different on the issue of the involvement of the public in the formation process of the Community, most respondents in the three countries thought that the formation of ASEAN Community would be fruitful to the people. Further analysis using Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U Tests showed that the optimism of Indonesian respondents (78% denied) was higher than those in Malaysia (65%) and Singapore (71%).

When asked whether the formation of ASEAN Community is merely a dream that would be impossible to materialize, the majority of the respondents in Indonesia (71%) and Malaysia (56%) answered no. However, the Singaporeans had a significantly different opinion (as confirmed by the Kruskal-Wallis and Mann- Whitney U Tests), as only a smaller number of them (44%) answered no. This result was in line with the optimism (see Table 4.9) the respondents in Indonesia and Malaysia had shown about the formation of ASEAN Community.

Although almost all the respondents in the three countries showed their optimism, they also admitted that there would be difficult to establishing ASEAN Community. The majority of them (in general 69%: 73% of Malaysians, 61% of Indonesians, and 74% of Singaporeans) admitted that whilst the objective of ASEAN Community was very impressive, it would be very difficult to materialize. In addition, the more than half of the respondents (in general 56%: 51% of Malaysians, 55% of

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Indonesians, and 60% of Singaporeans) admitted that the support of a country for ASEAN Community was obviously only for their own interests; not because of the common interests of the region.

4.2.6 Aspiration for the formation of ASEAN Community

In the study, the aspiration refers to what respondents aspired to include in the formation of an ASEAN Community. The study obtains some interesting findings.

Firstly, most respondents (in general 70%: 76% of Malaysians, 77% of Indonesians, and 57% of Singaporeans) aspired that the formation of ASEAN Community should be directed towards forging regional integration as in the EU. Although this sentiment was significantly stronger in Indonesia and Malaysia than that in Singapore (as confirmed by the Kruskal Wallis and Mann Whitney U Tests), the majority of the respondents in each country agreed on this issue.

Two-thirds of the respondents showed the aspiration for the abolition of visa (in general 66%: 55% of Malaysians, 73% of Indonesians, and 68% of Singaporeans). Further statistical tests using the Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U procedures showed that this expectation is is significantly higher in Indonesia and Singapore than in Malaysia.

A careful examination of the responses in the three countries seemed to indicate that regional integration as in the EU was not the true model they aspired for. For example, there was little support for the idea of a single ASEAN currency. The idea was rejected by 54% of Malaysians and an amazing 79% of the Singaporean respondents. In Indonesia, this idea was supported by 52% of respondents; but surely this support would not be enough for the establishment of a single currency regime for ASEAN.

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Table 4.14 Aspiration for the establishment of ASEAN Community

Res- Respondents Kruskal-Wallis Tests for ponse Malaysia Indonesia Singapore Average comparing the responses The formation of ASEAN Community should be Chi-Square 36.15 df: 2 directed towards the establishment of regional Asymp. Sig. 0.00 integration as in the European Union. Meaning: There are significant differences. · Yes 76% 77% 57% 70% Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: · No 24% 23% 43% 30% · Agreement to the statement is significantly higher in Malaysia and in Indonesia than that in Singapore. · There is no significant difference between the opinion of the Malaysians and Indonesians. The ASEAN Community should include one Chi-Square 66.84 df: 2 single currency which valid in all area of Asymp. Sig. 0.00 ASEAN. Meaning: There are significant differences. · Yes 46% 52% 21% 40% Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: · No 54% 48% 79% 60% · Agreement to the statement is significantly higher in Malaysia and in Indonesia than that in Singapore. · There is no significant difference between the opinion of the Malaysians and that of the Indonesians.

The ASEAN Community should include the Chi-Square 36.773 df: 2 abolition of passports for ASEAN citizens when Asymp. Sig. 0.00 visiting other ASEAN countries. Meaning: There are significant differences. · Yes 42% 56% 34% 44% Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: · No 58% 44% 66% 56% · Agreement to the statement is significantly higher in Indonesia than that in Malaysia and Singapore. · There is no significant difference between the opinion of the Malaysians and Singapore. The ASEAN Community should include the Chi-Square 103.657 df: 2 ASEAN Parliament which has full authority as a Asymp. Sig. 0.00 legislative power over the region. · Yes 62% 40% 24% 42% Meaning: There are significant differences. · No 38% 60% 76% 58% Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: · Agreement to the statement is significantly higher in Malaysia than that in Indonesia and Singapore. · Agreement to the statement is significantly higher in Indonesia than that in Singapore. Chi-Square 142.265 df: 2 The ASEAN Community should include a single Asymp. Sig. 0.00 executive body (ASEAN Commission) which has Meaning: There are significant differences. full authority as an executive in the region. Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: · Yes 70% 39% 28% 46% · Agreement to the statement is significantly higher in Malaysia than · No 30% 61% 72% 54% that in Indonesia and Singapore. · Agreement to the statement is significantly higher in Indonesia than that in Singapore. The ASEAN Community should include a single Chi-Square 127.875 df: 2 judicial body which has full authority as a Asymp. Sig. 0.00 judicial body in a country. Meaning: There are significant differences. · Yes 71% 44% 29% 48% Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: · No 29% 56% 71% 52% · Agreement to the statement is significantly higher in Malaysia than that in Indonesia and Singapore. · Agreement to the statement is significantly higher in Indonesia than that in Singapore.

The ASEAN Community should include the Chi-Square 33.93 df: 2 abolition of visa for ASEAN citizens visiting Asymp. Sig. 0.00 other ASEAN countries. Meaning: There are significant differences. · Yes 55% 73% 68% 66% Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: · No 45% 27% 32% 34% · Agreement to the statement is significantly higher in Indonesia and in Singapore than that in Malaysia. · There is no significant difference between the opinion of the Singaporeans and Indonesians.

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As for the abolition of passports for ASEAN citizens visiting other ASEAN countries, more than half of those surveyed rejected the idea. The Indonesian respondents, however, responded quite favourably to the idea. While the idea was rejected by 58% of Malaysian and 66% of Singaporean respondents, the idea was supported by 56% of the Indonesian respondents.

The EU-like government infrastructure, such as the ASEAN Parliament, an ASEAN Commission (executive body), and a single judicial body (ASEAN Court of Justice) were also rejected by most Indonesian and Singaporean respondents. The idea of ASEAN Parliament, for example, was accepted by 62% Malaysians but rejected by 60% Indonesian and 76% Singaporean respondents. The idea of a stronger executive body (like the European Commission in the EU) was accepted by 70% Malaysians but rejected by 61% Indonesians and 72% Singaporean respondents. The idea of ASEAN Court of Justice (modelled after the European Court of Justice) was accepted by 71% Malaysians but rejected by 56% Indonesians and 71% Singaporean respondents.

4.3 NATIONAL AND REGIONAL IDENTITIES TOWARDS THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF ASEAN COMMUNITY

This study argues that the regarding national and regional identities need to be examined because they may influence the social construction of ASEAN Community. It differentiates the variables of national identity into patriotism, reactive nationalism, economic nationalism and consumer nationalism.

4.3.1 Patriotism

In this study, the variable of patriotism refers to the feelings of attachment, love and loyalty to one’s own country, manifested in the commitment or readiness to sacrifice for the nation 4. However, compared to nationalists, patriots are more moderate and do not relapse in the extremities of nationalists and tend to adopt a more cooperative

4 Adorno et al, (1950: 107); Druckman (1994); Feshbach (1990); Kosterman and Feshbach (1989).

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Table 4.15 Patriotism of the respondents

Respondents Analysis of Variance Response Malaysia Indonesia Singapore Average comparing the responses Patriotism should be one of the main objectives of education, so our F score: 231.26 children believe that our country is one of the best in the world Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant disagree 10% 9% 59% 26% differences. · Neither agree nor disagree 14% 15% 21% 17% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Agree or completely agree 76% 76% 20% 58% · The Singaporeans ’ patriotism is · Mode Agree Agree Disagree Agree significantly lower than that of the · Mean 3.97 4.01 2.39 3.67 Indonesians and of the Malaysians. Agree Agree Disagree Agree · No significant difference between the patriotism of the Indonesians and that of the Malaysians. F score: 98.72 I am always proud of the beauty of my country. Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant disagree 4% 1% 8% 4% differences. · Neither agree nor disagree 9% 3% 17% 8% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Agree or completely agree 86% 96% 75% 88% · The Indonesians’ patriotism is significantly · Mode Completely Completely Agree Completely higher than that of the Malaysians and of agree agree agree the Singaporeans. · Mean 4.28 4.68 3.86 4.36 · The Malaysians’ patriotism is significantly Agree Completely Agree Agree higher than that of the Singaporeans. agree 62.55 I am very proud of the history and cultural heritage of my country as it F score: forms the roots of history and culture for the Southeast Asian region. Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 3% 4% 13% 6% · Neither agree nor disagree 12% 7% 26% 13% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Agree or completely agree 84% 89% 61% 81% · There is no significant difference between · Mode Completely Completely Agree Agree the patriotism of the Indonesians and of the agree agree Malaysians. · Mean 4.25 4.32 3.59 4.15 · The Malaysians’ and the Indonesians’ Agree Agree Agree Agree patriotism is significantly higher than that of the Singaporeans. F score: 160.12 I am sure that the cultural values and local wisdom of our country is one of the best in the world. Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 7% 2% 27% 9% · Neither agree nor disagree 14% 10% 38% 17% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Agree or completely agree 79% 88% 35% 74% · The Indonesians’ patriotism is significantly · Mode Agree Agree Neither agree Agree higher than that of the Malaysians and of nor disagree the Singaporeans. · Mean 4.11 4.29 3.08 3.98 · The Malaysians’ patriotism is significantly Agree Agree Neither agree Agree higher than that of the Singaporeans. nor disagree

approach to the world. In general, they exhibit a willingness to sacrifice for their country and subordinate their personal interests to national interests.5

5 Adorno et al, (1950: 107); Balabanis et al. (2001); Feshbach (1990); Kosterman and Feshbach (1989).

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As shown in Table 4.15, the study found that level of the patriotism of respondents was high. In general, the patriotism of the Indonesians was the highest among respondents. While Malaysians’ patriotism was higher than that of the Singaporeans, it was lower than that of the Indonesians. However, the patriotism of the Malaysians and Indonesians were significantly higher than that of the Singaporeans.

Firstly, the majority of the respondents thought that patriotism should be one of the main purposes of education, so their children would believe that their country was one of the best in the world (in average 58% agreed or completely agreed: 76% Malaysians, 76% Indonesians, and 20% Singaporeans). ANOVA test showed significant differences between the responses in the three countries. Further analysis by using Post-Hoc LSD Test showed that although the responses of the Malaysians (mean = 3.97: ‘agree’) and Indonesians (mean = 4.01: ‘agree’) were not significantly different, they were significantly higher than that of the Singaporeans (mean = 2.37: ‘disagree’).

Secondly, the great majority described themselves as being proud of the beauty of their country (in average 88% agreed or completely agreed: 86% Malaysians, 96% Indonesians, and 75% Singaporeans). ANOVA test showed significant differences in the responses. Further analysis by using Post-Hoc LSD Test showed that the Indonesian responses (mean = 4.68: ‘completely agree’) was significantly higher than those of the Malaysians’ (mean = 4.28: ‘agree’) and Singaporeans’ (mean = 3.86: ‘agree’). However, the response of the Malaysians was also significantly higher than that of the Singaporeans.

Thirdly, most of the respondents stated that they were very proud of the history and culture of their country as it was considered as the root of the history and culture for the region (in average 81% agreed or completely agreed: 84% Malaysians, 89% Indonesians, and 61% Singaporeans). ANOVA test showed significant differences in the responses : The responses of the Malaysians (mean = 4.25: ‘agree’) and Indonesians (mean = 4.32: ‘agree’) were not significantly different. However, the

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responses of the Malaysians and Indonesians were significantly higher than that of the Singaporeans (mean = 3.59: ‘agree’).

Finally, most of the respondents claimed that the cultural values and local wisdom of their country were one of the best in the world (in average 74% agreed or completely agreed: 79% Malaysians, 88% Indonesians, and 35% Singaporeans). ANOVA test showed significant differences in the responses . The Indonesians’ pride in their cultural values and local wisdoms (mean = 4.29: ‘agree’) was significantly higher than those of the Malaysians (mean = 4.11: ‘agree’) and Singaporeans (mean = 3.08: ‘neither agree nor disagree’); while the Malaysians’ responses were also significantly higher than that of the Singaporeans.

4.3.2 Reactive Nationalism

In this study, the variable reactive nationalism is defined as the feelings or emotions of love and advocating for one own’s country in response to some external provocation. The phenomena was observed in Turkey in the context of reaction towards Islamic revivalism and Kurdish Separatism,6 in China and Japan in the context of the ‘Clash of Nationalisms ’ among them,7 and in China in the context of Chinese foreign policy, particularly the Taiwan issue and Sino-US relations.8 In their study, Chan and Bridges 9 affirm that reactive nationalism usually manifests itself through radical wordings and behaviours against the targeted state; but its nature is different from assertive nationalism, in that it is responsive rather than initiating. It is usually

6 Direnç Erşahin (2010) studied the emergence of TűrkSolu, a secular/leftist nationalist organisation that emerged in Turkey in 2000s, as a form of reactive nationalism against Islamic revivalism and Kurdish separatism in the country. 7 Chan and Bridges (2006) studied the anti-Japanese demonstrations in China in April 2005 and the Japanese reactions that have been characterized as a “clash of nationalisms.” They co ncluded that, contrary to perceptions within each country that the other country was practicing assertive nationalism, in fact reactive nationalism better encapsulates the type of nationalism that was occurring. 8 Brittingham (2005) studied Chinese nationalism within the context of Chinese foreign policy, particularly the Taiwan issue and Sino-US relations. They concluded that Chinese nationalism was a product of China’s interaction with the West and represent a transformationin identity from cultural - state to a nation-state. This Chinese nationalism is a reaction to a perceived identity threat from the United States and has led to a marked deterioration in Sino-US relations since Tiananmen Square. 9 Chan and Bridges (2006).

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Table 4.16 Reactive nationalism of the respondents

Response Respondents Analysis of Variance Malaysia Indonesia Singapore Average comparing the responses I will be really angry if there is/are foreign country(ies) claiming the F score: 87.99 territory of my country. Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 9% 2% 12% 6% · Neither agree nor disagree 21% 3% 15% 12% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Agree or completely agree 71% 95% 73% 81% · The Indonesians’ nationalism is · Mode Agree Completely Agree Completely significantly higher than that of the agree agree Malaysians and of the Singaporeans. · Mean 3.92 4.62 3.88 4.21 · The Malaysians’ nationalism is Agree Completely Agree Agree significantly higher than that of the agree Singaporeans.

I don’t like any other country to claim our authentic cultural artifacts as F score: 170.02 theirs . Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 11% 3% 24% 10% · Neither agree nor disagree 21% 4% 29% 16% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Agree or completely agree 67% 93% 47% 74% · The Indonesians’ nationalism is · Mode Agree Completely Agree Agree significantly higher than that of the agree Malaysians and of the Singaporeans. · Mean 3.82 4.57 3.27 4.02 · The Malaysians’ nationalism is Agree Completely Neither agree Agree significantly higher than that of the agree nor disagree Singaporeans.

I will protest if the leader of a foreign country undermines the pride of my F score: 106.01 nation and country. Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 13% 2% 21% 10% · Neither agree nor disagree 23% 6% 21% 15% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Agree or completely agree 64% 92% 59% 75% · The Indonesians’ nationalism is · Mode Agree Completely Agree Agree significantly higher than that of the agree Malaysians and of Singaporeans. · Mean 3.75 4.45 3.44 3.98 · The Malaysians’ nationalism is Agree Agree Neither agree Agree significantly higher than that of the nor disagree Singaporeans.

manifested in protests against a perceived injustice. It is also usually a release of emotions that have fermented for a considerable time, in response to a collective experience or sentiment with the feeling of being discriminated against, mistreated, “shame imposed,” or hurt. One characteristic of reactive nationalism is that the greater the outside pressure (or external stimulus), the firmer or fiercer is the response.

As shown in Table 4.16, the study found that the respondents in all the three countries exhibited high levels of reactive nationalism. In general, the sentiments of the Indonesians were much higher than the Malaysians and Singaporeans. While the

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Malaysians’ sentiments were higher than that of the Singaporeans, they were lower when compared to the Indonesians.

Firstly, the study found that the majority of the respondents agreed to the statement that they would be very angry if any foreign country claimed their territory (in average 81% agreed or completely agreed: 71% Malaysians, 95% Indonesians, and 73% Singaporeans). ANOVA test showed that there were significant differences in the responses: the reactive nationalism of the Indonesians (mean = 4.62: ‘completely agree’) was significantly higher than those of the Malaysians (mean = 3.92: ‘agree’) and Singaporeans (mean = 3.88: ‘agree’). The Malaysian mean was also significantly higher than the Singaporeans (see Table 4.16).

Secondly, most of the respondents stated that they would not like another country disputing and/or claiming ownership of their culture or cultural artefacts (in average 74 % agreed or completely agreed: 67% Malaysians, 93% Indonesians, and 47% Singaporeans). ANOVA test showed significant differences in the responses of those surveyed . The Indonesians’ reactive nationalism (mean = 4.57: ‘completely agree’) was significantly higher than those of the Malaysians (mean = 3.82: ‘agree’) and Singaporeans (mean = 3.27: ‘ neither agree nor disagree ’); while the Malaysians’ nationalism was also significantly higher than that of the Singaporeans.

Finally, most of the respondents showed their willingness to protests if the leader of a foreign country undermines the pride of their nation (in average 75% agreed or completely agreed: 64% Malaysians, 92% Indonesians, and 59% Singaporeans). ANOVA test showed significant differences in the responses. The reactive nationalism of the Indonesians (mean = 4.45: ‘completely agree’) was significantly higher than those of the Malaysians (mean = 3.75: ‘agree’) and Singaporeans (mean = 3.44: ‘neither agree nor disagree’); while the Malaysians’ nationalism was also significantly higher than that of the Singaporeans.

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4.3.3 Economic Nationalism

The study defined economic nationalism as attitudes and actions of protecting domestic products, companies, employment opportunities, industries and people from foreign businesses who are considered as the out-group.10 The attitude then causes the emergence of expectation on other parties – government, business players, or the general public – to play a role in protecting the domestic economy.

The survey results found economic nationalism in the three countries to be at a moderate level (see Table 4.17). In general, this phenomenon/sentiment was the highest among Indonesian respondents. While Malaysians’ nationalism was higher than that of the Singaporeans, it was slightly lower than that of the Indonesians. In all indicators, the economic nationalism of the Singaporeans was lower than those of the Malaysians and Indonesians.

The economic nationalism of the Indonesians was significantly higher than that of the Malaysians and Singaporeans in relation to the issue of foreign businesses in their country. Their a greement was higher on the item “government should try its best not to purchase goods and services from foreign companies/countries” (50% Indonesians agreed, compared to 39% Malaysians, and only 6% Singaporeans). In responding to the item “I dislike foreig n ownership of business operating in my country”, 73% Indonesians agreed, compared to 64% Malaysians, and only 4% Singaporeans). When asked if the “government should try to control the involvement of foreign business in our economy”, 85% Indonesians agreed , compared to 74% Malaysians, and 33% Singaporeans. In response to the item “I will support politician/public officials/political parties which want to reduce foreign business set- up in the country”, 57% Indonesians agreed, compared to 52% Malaysians, and only 9% Singaporeans). The Malaysian respondents’ agreement on these issues was significantly lower than that of the Indonesians but significantly higher than the Singaporeans. In general, the Singaporeans were not in favour of restriction on foreign economic interests.

10 Baugh and Yaprak (1996).

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Table 4.17 The economic nationalism of the respondents

Respondents Analysis of Variance Response Malaysia Indonesia Singapore Average comparing the responses We should only accept imported products from the countries which accept F score: 37.60 our products. Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant disagree 31% 48% 61% 45% differences. · Neither agree nor disagree 20% 14% 18% 17% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Agree or completely agree 49% 37% 21% 38% · Malaysians’ nationalism is significantly · Mode Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree higher than that of the Indonesians and · Mean 3.27 2.92 2.46 2.96 of the Singaporeans. Neither agree Neither agree Disagree Neither agree · Indonesians’ nationalism is significantly nor disagree nor disagree nor disagree higher than that of the Singaporeans. Government should try its best not to purchase goods and services from F score: 117.34 foreign companies/countries. Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant disagree 34% 33% 80% 43% differences. · Neither agree nor disagree 26% 17% 14% 20% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Agree or completely agree 39% 50% 6% 37% · Indonesians’ nationalism is significantly · Mode Disagree Agree Disagree Disagree higher than that of the Malaysians’ and · Mean 3.09 3.26 2.00 2.94 of the Singaporeans. Neither agree Neither agree Disagree Neither agree · Malaysians’ nationalism is significantly nor disagree nor disagree nor disagree higher than that of the Singaporeans. Government should protect domestic industries by creating trade barriers F score: 90.53 for foreign products. Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant disagree 23% 30% 61% 34% differences. · Neither agree nor disagree 18% 21% 23% 20% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Agree or completely agree 58% 50% 16% 46% · Malaysians’ nationalism is significantly · Mode Agree Agree Disagree Agree higher than that of the Indonesians’ and · Mean 3.51 3.31 2.35 3.19 Singaporeans. Agree Neither agree Disagree Neither agree · Indonesians’ nationalism is significantly nor disagree nor disagree higher than that of the Singaporeans. F score: 305.73 I dislike foreigners owning/operating business in my country. Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant disagree 16% 13% 78% 27% differences. · Neither agree nor disagree 20% 15% 18% 17% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Agree or completely agree 64% 73% 4% 56% · Indonesians’ nationalism is significantly · Mode Agree Agree Disagree Agree higher than that of the Malaysians and of · Mean 3.68 3.90 1.98 3.43 the Singaporeans. Agree Agree Disagree Neither agree · Malaysians’ nationalism is significantly nor disagree higher than that of the Singaporeans. Government should try to control the involvement of foreign business in F score: 171.15 every sector of our economy. Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant disagree 11% 9% 48% 17% differences. · Neither agree nor disagree 15% 6% 19% 12% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Agree or completely agree 74% 85% 33% 71% · Indonesians’ nationalism is significantly · Mode Agree Agree Disagree Agree higher than that of the Malaysians and of · Mean 3.93 4.16 2.77 3.79 the Singaporeans. Agree Agree Neither agree Agree · Malaysians’ nationalism is significantly nor disagree higher than that of the Singaporeans.

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I will support politician/public officials/political parties which want to F score: 150.73 reduce foreign business set-up in the country. Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 23% 21% 70% 32% · Neither agree nor disagree 25% 22% 21% 23% · Agree or completely agree 52% 57% 9% 46% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Agree Agree Disagree Agree · Indonesians’ nationalism is significantly · Mean 3.36 3.52 2.13 3.18 higher than that of the Malaysians and Neither Agree Disagree Neither Singaporeans. agree nor agree nor · Malaysians’ nationalism is significantly disagree disagree higher than that of the Singaporeans. Foreign workers can be harmful to our society because they rob locals of F score: 90.01 employment opportunities. Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 20% 29% 62% 32% · Neither agree nor disagree 22% 20% 19% 20% · Agree or completely agree 59% 51% 18% 47% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Agree Agree Disagree Agree · Malaysians’ nationalism is significantly · Mean 3.57 3.35 2.38 3.24 higher than that of the Indonesians and Agree Neither agree Disagree Neither Singaporeans. nor disagree agree nor · Indonesians’ nationalism is significantly disagree higher than that of the Singaporeans.

The economic nationalism of the Malaysian respondents was significantly higher than that of the Indonesians and Singaporeans in relation to protectionism and the attitude towards foreign workers. Their agreement was high er on “we should only accept imported products from the countries which accept our products” (48% Malaysians agreed, compared to 37% Indonesians, and only 2% Singaporeans) when asked if the “government should protect domestic industries by creating trade barriers for foreign products” (58% Indonesians agreed, compared to 50% Malaysians, and only 16% Singaporeans); and in responses to the statement “foreign workers can be harmful to our society because they rob employment opportunities from the locals” (59% Indonesians agreed, compared to 51% Malaysians, and 18% Singaporeans). The Indonesian respondents’ agreement on these issues was significantly lower than that of Malaysians but significantly higher than that of the Singaporeans. In general, the Singaporean positions were markedly different from those in Malaysia and Indonesia.

4.3.4 Consumer Nationalism

Consumer nationalism, in this study, is viewed as more tangible than the other two nationalism constructs. It reflects the stand of the citizens on foreign products:

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Table 4.18 The consumer nationalism of the respondents

Response Respondents Analysis of Variance Malaysia Indonesia Singapore Average comparing the responses F score: 131.24 Buying domestic products is always the best choice. Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 17% 20% 63% 27% · Neither agree nor disagree 21% 18% 21% 20% · Agree or completely agree 62% 62% 17% 53% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Agree Agree Disagree Agree · Singaporeans ’ nationalism is significantly · Mean 3.62 3.64 2.40 3.38 lower than that of the Indonesians and of the Agree Agree Disagree Neither agree Malaysians. nor disagree · No significant difference between Indonesians’ nationalism and that of the Malaysians. I always try my best not to buy and to use foreign products, unless they F score: 122.13 cannot be avoided. Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 43% 36% 87% 49% · Neither agree nor disagree 20% 22% 7% 18% · Agree or completely agree 37% 42% 6% 33% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Disagree Neither agree Disagree Disagree · Indonesians’ nationalism is significantly nor disagree higher than the Malaysians’ and that of the · Mean 2.92 3.10 1.79 2.77 Singaporeans. Neither Neither agree Disagree Neither agree · Malaysians’ nationalism is significantly agree nor nor disagree nor disagree higher than that of the Singaporeans. disagree · Singaporeans ’ nationalism is the lowest of those in the three countries. I always recommend others (my family, friends and relatives) not to buy F score: 128.23 foreign products. Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 39% 49% 90% 54% · Neither agree nor disagree 30% 23% 8% 23% · Agree or completely agree 31% 28% 2% 24% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Neither Disagree Disagree Disagree · Singaporeans ’ nationalism is significantly agree nor lower than that of the Indonesians and of the disagree Malaysians. 2.87 2.78 1.64 2.58 · Mean · No significant difference between Neither Neither agree Disagree Neither agree agree nor nor disagree nor disagree Indonesians’ nationalism and that of the disagree Malaysians. I am willing to stop buying foreign products and switch to domestic ones F score: 84.50 instead. Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 34% 19% 58% 33% · Neither agree nor disagree 32% 27% 23% 28% · Agree or completely agree 34% 53% 19% 39% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Neither agree Agree Disagree Neither agree · Indonesians’ nationalism is significantly nor disagree nor disagree higher than that of the Malaysians’ and of · Mean 2.99 3.45 2.37 3.06 the Singaporeans. Neither agree Neither agree Disagree Neither agree · Malaysians’ nationalism is significantly nor disagree nor disagree nor disagree higher than that of the Singaporeans. · Singaporeans ’ nationalism is the lowest of those in the three countries.

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If the quality is similar, I will buy domestic products although the price is F score: 122.07 slightly higher. Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences. disagree 22% 13% 54% 25% · Neither agree nor disagree 21% 15% 21% 18% · Agree or completely agree 57% 72% 25% 57% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Agree Agree Disagree Agree · Indonesians’ nationalism is significantly · Mean 3.45 3.85 2.57 3.44 higher than that of the Malaysians’ and of Neither agree Agree Neither Neither agree the Singaporeans. nor disagree agree nor nor disagree · Malaysians’ nationalism is significantly disagree higher than that of the Singaporeans. · Singaporeans ’ nationalism is the lowest of those in the three countries.

whether to purchase or avoid the products. This variable was adapted from the construct of consumer ethnocentrism of Shimp and Sharma 11 that measured the moral feelings of the consumer in relation to buying foreign products. A nationalistic consumer will choose not to buy imported products because it is perceived as damaging to the national economy, and is thus considered as an unpatriotic act.

In general, the consumer nationalist sentiments of the respondents were rather low and this is indicated by the responses “neither agree nor disagree” (see Table 4.18). However, for some indicators, the Indonesians and Malaysians did exhibit their consumer nationalism. For example, almost two-thirds of the respondents in Malaysia (62%) and Indonesia (62%) stated that buying domestic products was always the best choice. Their consumer nationalism was significantly higher than that of the Singaporeans (only 17% agreed). However, not many respondents (37% Malaysians, 42% Indonesians and 6% Singaporeans) admitted they always tried their best not to buy or use foreign products and to recommend others not to buy them (31% Malaysians, 28% Indonesians and 2% Singaporeans).

The Indonesian respondents displayed greater consumer nationalism than those in Malaysia and Singapore in two other issues. Firstly, more than half of them (53% of Indonesians, compared to 34% Malaysians and 19% Singaporeans) stated that they

11 Shimp and Sharma (1987).

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were willing to stop buying foreign products and switch to domestic ones instead. Secondly, more than two-thirds (72% of Indonesians, compared to 57% Malaysians and 25% Singaporeans) stated that they were willing to buy domestic products at a slightly higher price if the quality were similar.

4.3.5 National Cultural Identity

The study defines national-cultural identity as how an individual identifies himself with national culture. The study showed that a large majority of Malaysian (87%) and Indonesian (87%) respondents agreed that their families traditional/cultural practices resemble the national traditional/cultural practices. This includes traditional ceremonies, food, religious practice, balik kampong or homecoming, etc. However, the situation in Singapore was significantly different with only 58% agreeing with the statement. Furthermore, the study found that a third of the respondents in the three countries showed that they neither agreed nor disagreed to the statement “I am actively involved in national cultural/arts activities ”. (in general 34%: 35% Malaysians, 33% Indonesians, and 31% Singaporeans).

Table 4.19 The national cultural identity

Respondents Analysis of Variance Response Malaysia Indonesia Singapore Average comparing the responses In my family, many activities or traditions resemble the culture of my F score: 97.17 country (such as ceremonies, food, religious practice, homecoming, etc). Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant disagree 6% 5% 30% 10% differences. · Neither agree nor disagree 8% 8% 12% 9% · Agree or completely agree 87% 87% 58% 81% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree · Malaysians’ perceived identity is not · Mean 4.21 4.13 3.28 3.99 significantly different with that of the Agree Agree Neither agree Agree Indonesians. nor disagree · Singaporeans ’ perceived identity is the lowest of those in the three countries. F score: 0.65 I am actively involved in the national cultural /arts activities. Sig. : 0.52 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There is no significant disagree 36% 33% 35% 35% difference. · Neither agree nor disagree 29% 34% 33% 32% · Agree or completely agree 35% 33% 31% 34% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Neither agree Neither agree Completely Neither agree · There is no significant difference between nor disagree nor disagree disagree nor disagree the perceived identity between · Mean 2.97 3.04 2.96 3.00 respondents in the three countries. Neither agree Neither agree Neither agree Neither agree nor disagree nor disagree nor disagree nor disagree

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Table 4.20 Language as national identity

Analysis of Variance Response Respondents comparing the responses I prefer reading materials in my country's national/local language to those in F score: 64.80 English. Sig. : 0.00 Malaysia Indonesia Average Meaning: There are significant · Disagree or completely differences. disagree 32% 12% 21% · Neither agree nor disagree 18% 14% 16% · Agree or completely agree 50% 74% 63% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Agree Agree Agree · The identity of Indonesians is · Mean 3.23 3.80 3.54 significantly higher than that of the Neither Agree Agree Malaysians. agree nor disagree F score: 7.43 I prefer songs in my national and/or local languages to those in English. Sig. : 0.01 Malaysia Indonesia Average Meaning: There are significant · Disagree or completely differences. disagree 34% 21% 27% · Neither agree nor disagree 20% 31% 26% · Agree or completely agree 46% 48% 47% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Agree Agree Agree · The perceived identity of Indonesians is · Mean 3.20 3.41 3.31 significantly higher than that of the Neither Neither agree Neither agree nor disagree Malaysians. agree nor nor disagree disagree I prefer watching movies in my country's national/local language to those in F score: 21.32 English. Sig. : 0.00 Malaysia Indonesia Average Meaning: There are significant · Disagree or completely differences. disagree 53% 41% 47% · Neither agree nor disagree 24% 23% 24% · Agree or completely agree 23% 35% 30% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Disagree Disagree Disagree · The perceived identity of Indonesians is · Mean 2.61 2.97 2.80 significantly higher than that of the Neither Neither agree Neither agree nor disagree Malaysians. agree nor nor disagree disagree F score: 0.91 It is not a big problem if I do not learn foreign languages. Sig. : 0.40 Malaysia Indonesia Singapore Average Meaning: There is no significant · Disagree or completely difference. disagree 55% 51% 49% 52% · Neither agree nor disagree 16% 18% 19% 18% · Agree or completely agree 28% 31% 32% 30% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree · There is no significant difference · Mean 2.60 2.74 2.72 2.68 between the perceived identity between Neither agree Neither agree Neither Neither agree respondents in the three countries. nor disagree nor disagree agree nor nor disagree disagree

Cultural identity is usually expressed by the public preferred languages for social interaction, reading, songs, movies, and so on. This issue is relevant in Indonesia and Malaysia where their national language is not an international language; rather they have developed their own national language to unify the nation. For example, the national language of Indonesia is Bahasa Indonesia, which was

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developed based on the Malay language. Since the language was officially declared as the national language during the 1928 National Youth Congress, it has been successfully used to unify the nation which is pluralistic in terms of diverse ethnic groups, languages and dialects, religions and traditions. Malaysia tried the similar track when it declared Bahasa Malaysia – based on the Malay Language – as her national language. Thus, this issue is not relevant in Singapore as they have chosen international language such as English, Mandarin, as well as Bahasa Melayu as their official languages. Due to this, Singapore was omitted from the analysis.

The use of the national language as the marker of national cultural identity was stronger in Indonesia than in Malaysia (see Table 4.20). The respondents in Indonesia displayed greater preference for reading materials, songs and movies in Bahasa Indonesia to those in international languages, such as English, Arabic or Mandarin. However, the issue here might not be the love for the national language but proficiency in the international language. Thus, the Indonesians’ preference for the national language could be due to their lack of mastery of international languages.

4.3.6 ASEAN Regional Identity

The majority of the respondents in the three countries identified themselves as a part of the ASEAN Community (in general 69% agreed or completely agreed: 73% Malaysians, 75% Indonesians, 59% Singaporeans) (see Table 4.21). ANOVA statistical tests found that there were significant differences in the responses in the three countries; while the Post-Hoc LSD Tests confirmed that the perception of ASEAN identity was significantly higher in Malaysia (mean = 3.82) and Indonesia (mean = 3.79) than in Singapore (mean = 3.43).

The majority of the respondents also believed that all ASEAN countries share similar common norms and values (in general 69% agreed or completely agreed: 68% Malaysians, 74% Indonesians, and 62% Singaporeans). Further analysis with the ANOVA test showed that the perception of ASEAN identity of the Indonesians and the Malaysians were significantly higher than that of the Singaporeans.

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Table 4.21 Opinion of ASEAN identity

Respondents Analysis of Variance Response Malaysia Indonesia Singapore Average comparing the responses F score: 19.69 I regard myself as a part of the ASEAN Community. Sig. : 0.00 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences disagree 6% 7% 15% 9% between countries. · Neither agree nor disagree 21% 19% 26% 22% · Agree or completely agree 73% 75% 59% 69% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree · The perception of ASEAN Identity of the · Mean 3.82 3.79 3.43 3.73 Indonesians and the Malaysians is Agree Agree Neither agree Agree significantly higher than that of the nor disagree Singaporeans. · No significant difference between the opinion of the Malaysians and the Indonesians. F score: 3.83 I think all ASEAN countries have comparable norms and values. Sig. : 0.02 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There are significant differences disagree 7% 7% 9% 7% between countries. · Neither agree nor disagree 24% 20% 28% 23% · Agree or completely agree 68% 74% 62% 69% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree · The perception of ASEAN Identity of the · Mean 3.70 3.74 3.57 3.69 Indonesians and the Malaysians is Agree Agree Agree Agree significantly more positive than that of the Singaporeans. · No significant difference between the opinion of the Malaysians and the Indonesians. F score: 1.19 I think all ASEAN countries share common historical experiences. Sig. : 0.31 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There is no significant difference disagree 7% 8% 10% 8% between countries. · Neither agree nor disagree 23% 26% 20% 24% · Agree or completely agree 71% 66% 69% 68% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree · There is no significant difference between · Mean 3.72 3.65 3.64 3.68 respondents in the three countries. Agree Agree Agree Agree I think the people in all ASEAN countries have a comparable intelligence F score: 0.41 level. Sig. : 0.66 · Disagree or completely Meaning: There is no significant difference disagree 12% 13% 16% 13% between countries. · Neither agree nor disagree 33% 35% 22% 32% · Agree or completely agree 55% 52% 62% 55% Results from the Post-Hoc LSD Tests: · Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree · There is no significant difference between · Mean 3.49 3.45 3.50 3.48 respondents in the three countries. Neither agree Neither agree Neither agree Neither agree nor disagree nor disagree nor disagree nor disagree

More than two-thirds of the respondents in the three countries also agreed to the statement that all ASEAN countries share common historical experiences (in general 68% agreed or completely agreed: 71% Malaysians, 66% Indonesians, and 69% Singaporeans). More than half also agreed that the people of ASEAN have a similar intelligent level (in general 55% agreed or completely agreed: 55%

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Malaysians, 52% Indonesians, and 62% Singaporeans). On this issue, there was little difference in the opinion of the respondents from the three countries surveyed.

As part of the variable of regional identity, the study explored whether the respondents thought that ‘the spirit of same ancestry ’ and Islam could serve as an instrument of identity for establishing ASEAN Community (see Table 4.22).

Regarding the importance of the same ancestry as being a positive factor in establishing the ASEAN Community, the Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U Tests indicated significant differences. The respondents in Malaysia and Indonesia tended to agree that this issue of ancestry can become the principle of establishing ASEAN

Table 4.22 Opinion on the possibility of “the spirit of same ancestry” and Islam as the principle of establishing the ASEAN Community

Res- Respondents Kruskal-Wallis Tests for ponse Malaysia Indonesia Singapore Average comparing the responses Chi-Square 95.84 df: 2 The spirit of among the people of Malaysia, Asymp. Sig. 0.00 Indonesia and Singapore that they share the same ethnocultural root/ancestry can serve as a Meaning: There are significant differences. principle f or establishing ASEAN Community. Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: · Agreement to the statement is significantly higher in Malaysia and in 75% 77% 43% 65% · Yes Indonesia than that in Singapore. · No 25% 23% 57% 35% · There is no significant difference between the opinion of the Malaysians and the Indonesians.

Does the idea of “spirit of the nations that come Chi-Square 73.22 df: 2 from the same ancestry/root ” among the natives Asymp. Sig. 0.00 of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore make the Meaning: There are significant differences. other ethnic groups feel threatened? · Yes 50% 27% 55% 44% Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: · No 50% 73% 45% 56% · Agreement to the statement is significantly higher in Malaysia and in Singapore than that in Indonesia. · There is no significant difference between the opinion of the Malaysians and that of the Singaporeans. Can Islam become the unifying factor for Chi-Square 166.16 df: 2 ASEAN? Asymp. Sig. 0.00 · Yes 65% 61% 15% 47% Meaning: There are significant differences. · No 35% 39% 85% 53% Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: · Agreement to the statement is significantly higher in Malaysia and in Indonesia than that in Singapore. · There is no significant difference between the opinion of the Malaysians and the Indonesians. Will the non-Muslims feel threatened if Islam Chi-Square 56.75 df: 2 serves as the unifying factor for ASEAN? Asymp. Sig. 0.00 · Yes 40% 28% 57% 41% Meaning: There are significant differences. · No 60% 72% 43% 59% Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: · Agreement to the statement is significantly higher in Singapore than that in Indonesia and in Malaysia. · Agreement to the statement is significantly higher in Malaysia than that in Indonesia.

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Community (77% of Indonesian and 75% of Malaysian respondents agreed). However, only 43% of Singaporeans agreed that this factor would contribute to the realisation of the Community.

The difficulty in materializing the idea was indicated by the study. The study revealed that the majority of the respondents in Singapore and half of them in Malaysia admitted that the idea of ‘spirit of the nations that come from the same ancestry’ might make the other ethnic groups feeling threatened (73% of Singaporeans and 50% of Malaysian respondents agreed or completely agreed).

In fact, the idea of using the common roots or shared ancestry as the identity of ASEAN would be quite a challenge if we examine the distribution of ethnic groups of ASEAN (see Table 4.23). There is no ethnic group which even constitutes 15% of the population of ASEAN. The Javanese as the largest ethnic group make up 14.96% of the ASEAN population and almost all of them reside in Indonesia. The Kinh or the Vietnamese, the second largest ethnic group in the region, make up 12.77% of the regional population and 99.2% reside in Vietnam. The Thais, the third largest ethnic group who make up 9.24% of the regional population, reside almost exclusively in Thailand. The Malays are scattered all over ASEAN but they make up only 5.09% of the regional population. Thus, the feasibility of using the idea of common roots as a possible unifying factor is rather remote.

Another issue raised was the feasibility of Islam acting as the unifying factor for ASEAN since Islam is the major religion of Indonesia (86.1%), Malaysia (60.4%) and a significant portion of Singaporeans (14.9%). This appeared to be an interesting indicator to investigate.

On this issue, the Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U Tests revealed that the opinions of respondents were different in the countries surveyed. The respondents in Malaysia and Indonesia tended to agree that Islam can function as the unifying factor for the ASEAN Community (61% of Indonesian and 65% of Malaysian respondents

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Table 4.23 Distribution of the ten largest ethnic groups in Southeast Asia (2009 estimate)

Ethnic Countries 1 Number of Percentage groups Population of the whole Southeast Asian population 2 1 Javanese Indonesia 88,368,000 14.96% 2 Kinh Vietnam (99.2%), Cambodia (0.8%) 75,422,000 12.77% (Vietnamese) 3 Thai Thailand 54,495,080 9.24% 4 Sundanese Indonesia 35,105,000 5.94% 5 Malays Indonesia (43.6% of the total Malays in the region), 30,054,060 5.09% Malaysia (42.8%), Thailand (5.8%), Philippines’ Moro (3.7%) Singapore (2.3%), Bruneis Malays (0.7%), Cambodia (1.2%), Myanmar’s Malay Salon (0.1%) 6 Chinese Malaysia (29.9% of the total Chinese in the region), 26,209,980 4.78% Thailand (25.5%), Indonesia (14.8%), Singapore (11.3%), Vietnam (8.1%), Myanmar (3.8%), Philippines (3.6%), Cambodia (2.2%), Lao PDR (0.5%), and Brunei (0.2%). 7 Burmese Myanmar 28,175,700 4.77% 8 Filipino The Philippines 27,926,260 4.73% 9 Khmer Cambodia (91.6%) and Vietnam (8.4%) 14,340,610 2.43% 10 Visayan/Cebuano The Philippines 18,295,000 3.10% Note: 1 The percentage under the column of countries is the percentage of the ethnic groups in the respective countries compared with the total population of the ethnic group in the region. 2 Percentage of the whole Southeast Asian population is the percentage of the ethnic groups in all countries in the region compared with the po pulation of the region in 2009, which is 590,638,300 (ASEAN Secretariat, The ASEANStat , 15 July 2010).

Source : Processed from Joshua Project Peoples Data (2010) agreed or completely agreed). However, most Singaporeans disagreed (57%) to the statement.

The response to the question “will the non -Muslims feel threatened if Islam serves as the unifying factor for ASEAN ?” indicated similar results. 72% of the respondents in Indonesia and 60% in Malaysia answered in the negative, but more than half of the Singaporeans (57%) admitted that it would be a threat (Table 4.22). The idea of utilizing Islam as the unifying factor for establishing the ASEAN Community ” would indeed be difficult if we take into account the religious affiliation

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Table 4.24 Distribution of the religions believers in the Southeast Asia (2009 estimate) Ranking Percentage of based on the Number of the whole Religion believers Distribution Major religion in: number of believers regional believers population 1 Muslims Almost in all ASEAN. Indonesia (86.1%); Malaysia (60.4%); 225,731,961 38.8% Brunei (67%). 2 Buddhists Almost in all ASEAN. Thailand (94.6%); Burma (89%); Cambodia 147,356,708 25.4% (96.4%); Laos (67%). Singapore (42.5%) 3 Christians Almost in all ASEAN. The Philippines (90%) 117,257,288 20.2% 4 Hinduism Malaysia, Brunei - Darussalam, Singapore, 6,128,380 1.1% Indonesia 5 Other Almost in all ASEAN - 13,454,627 7% countries. 6 Agnostic/Atheis Vietnam, Philippines, Vietnam (80.8%); 71,369,428 2.3% Singapore Source : Data processing from World Bank (2010)

of the people in the region (see Table 4.24). At the moment, there are more Muslims than followers of other religions. However, they do not constitute the majority of the population, as they make up only 38.8% of the population. The other major religious groups – the Buddhists and the Christians – are also significant in number as each group make up more than 20% of the population. Furthermore, of the ten ASEAN countries, Muslims are the majority in only three countries – Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam; and only Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam state Islam the official religion of the state. Indonesia – the country with the biggest Muslim population in the region – it must be noted that it does not consider herself as an Islamic country as its founding fathers declared Pancasila – which respects pluralism – as the foundation of the country. This reality would then mean that Islam is unlikely to serve as a unifying factor for the ASEAN Community.

This issue was highlighted in a discussion with Drs. Patrice Lumumba, MA, who was the chairman of the Department of International Relations in Universitas Hasanuddin, Indonesia. He pointed out that, in the relations among states in the region, Islamic law was difficult to be the unifying factors when we see the statistics. Only three out of ten ASEAN countries have a significant number of Muslims. In fact, there are five of ASEAN countries have significant numbers of Buddhists; while the Philippines’ popula tion was mainly Christians. With the existence of extremist

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Table 4.25 Respondents’ O pinion on the possibility of having a unifying language for the ASEAN Community

Respondents Kruskal-Wallis Tests for Response Malaysia Indonesia Singapore Average comparing the responses Chi-Square 52.98 df: 2 It is urgent to have a unifying language for the ASEAN Asymp. Sig. 0.00 Community . Meaning: There are significant differences. · Yes 50% 56% 27% 44% Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: · No 50% 44% 73% 56% · Agreement to the statement is significantly higher in Malaysia and in Indonesia than that in Singapore. · There is no significant difference between the opinion of the Malaysians and the Indonesians. Which language(s) is (are) feasible to become the unifying language of ASEAN? English 58.8% 50.3% 70.4% 58.0% Bahasa Melayu 31.5% 11.4% 3.4% 16.7% Bahasa Indonesia 4.9% 18.2% 0.7% 9.3% Mandarin 4.7% 0.6% 2.4% 2.5%

Muslim secessionist groups in Southern Thailand, Southern Philippines, and Myanmar’s Karen, the issue might become more a dividing factor than a unifying factor of the relations of the states in the region. So, he argued that the most possible option was the religion plurality ASEAN Community.

Finally, the study explored the feasibility of a unifying language in the region. Most of the respondents in Singapore (73%) and half of the respondents in Malaysia (50%) felt that there was no urgency of a unifying language for ASEAN Community. When asked which language could feasibly serve as the unifying language, most of the respondents chose English. Only 16.7% selected Bahasa Melayu and another 9.3% chose Bahasa Indonesia. The choice of English was supported by the majority of respondents in the three countries (58.8% Malaysians, 50.3% Indonesians and 70.4% Singaporeans).

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4.4 PERCEIVED CHALLENGES FOR CONSTRUCTING THE ASEAN COMMUNITY

This study argues that the public perspectives on the perceived challenges for the construction of regional integration need to be understood from the public perspectives because the public is the true stakeholder of the integration initiatives.

The study, thus, explored the respondents’ perception of the challenges for establishing the ASEAN Community. Table 4.26 shows ranking of the challenges based on the number of respondents perceiving the items as ’definitely’ or ’possibly’ an obstacles. The ’definitely and possibly’ options (in Table 4.26) have been grouped together to show the total percentage of agreements solicited from the respondents.

Based on the ranking order, item 1 (disparity in levels of education) registered 92% agreement. Items 2 to 6, also registered high agreement rate in the range between 87% - 88%. Items 7 and 8 registered 77% agreement, while items 9 and 10 registered 65% and 60% respectively. There were no items that registered below 50% agreement responses. These figures suggest that there is overwhelming agreement among the respondents that the ASEAN Community building initiative will face the listed obstacles. In relation to the descriptive items outlined in the Table 4.26, the empirical comparison of the ‘significance’ of these categori es has been analyzed. The analysis showed that, with regards to item 1 to 4 and 7, there was no significant difference in the feedback received from the three countries. The other items show significant differences among the countries concerned – further elaborated in the following sub- sections.

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Table 4.26 Opinion on the challenges to the establishment of ASEAN Community

Malaysian Indonesian Singaporean Kruskall-Wallis Tests The three countries Respondents Respondents Respondents for comparing the responses Results from Ranks Obstacle Defini- Possi- Defini- Possi- Defini- Possi- Defini- Possi- Chi- Asymp. the Mann-Whitney U Tests Total Total Total Total d.f. Meaning tely bly tely bly tely bly tely bly square sig. Low level of education of the majority No significant 1 of the people and unequal access to 44% 47% 91% 52% 40% 92% 46% 46% 92% 47% 44% 92% 4.92 2 0.09 · No significant difference in the responses. education. difference Lack of competitiveness in the No significant 2 economies of most ASEAN 27% 63% 90% 31% 54% 85% 29% 61% 90% 29% 59% 88% 0.17 2 0.92 · No significant difference in the responses. countries. difference The dependency of ASEAN countries No significant 3 on the developed countries, especially 42% 48% 90% 40% 44% 84% 34% 54% 88% 39% 49% 88% 4.50 2 0.11 · No significant difference in the responses. for financing economic activities. difference Disparity in socioeconomic No significant 4 37% 52% 89% 37% 44% 80% 35% 58% 92% 36% 51% 87% 3.77 2 0.15 · No significant difference in the responses. development. difference · More in Singapore than in Malaysia and Differences in the legal and political Significant Indonesia agree that it is an obstacle. 5 35% 52% 87% 36% 44% 80% 50% 45% 96% 40% 47% 87% 27.88 2 0.00 systems . difference · No signicant difference between the Malaysians and Indonesians. · More in Malaysia and Indonesia than in Limitation of technology mastery and Significant Singapore agree that it is an obstacle. 6 43% 46% 89% 47% 38% 84% 33% 54% 86% 41% 46% 87% 7.88 2 0.02 creation in most of the countries . difference · No signicant difference between the Malaysians and Indonesians. No significant 7 Poverty in many ASEAN countries . 31% 44% 75% 32% 38% 70% 29% 57% 87% 31% 46% 77% 4.34 2 0.12 · No significant difference in the responses. difference · More in Malaysia and Singapore than in Militancy, terrorism, and insurgency Significant Indonesia agree that it is an obstacle. 8 33% 52% 85% 19% 42% 61% 36% 49% 85% 29% 48% 77% 78.49 2 0.00 (especially among some muslims) . difference · No signicant difference between the Malaysians and Singaporeans. · More in Malaysia than Singapore than The ASEAN economies dominated by Significant Indonesia agree that it is an obstacle. 9 22% 53% 75% 22% 39% 61% 14% 44% 58% 19% 45% 65% 22.45 2 0.00 the Chinese. difference · No signicant difference between the Singaporeans and Indonesians.

The variety of ethnic and religious Significant · More in Singapore than Malaysia than 10 22% 44% 65% 12% 27% 40% 36% 39% 75% 23% 37% 60% 106.7 2 0.00 Indonesia agree that it is an obstacle. group in the region . difference · More in Malaysia than in Indonesians. Notes: The column under “Definitely” stands for the percentage of respondents in the country who think that it i s definitely an obstacle; “Possibly” stands for the percentage who think that it is possibly an obstacle; The column under “Total” stands for the percentage who think that it is possibly or definitely an obstacle.

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4.4.1 Disparity in levels of education

Low level of education of the majority of the people and unequal access to education is the first perceived challenge for establishing ASEAN Community. It was realized by nearly all respondents (in general 92%: 91% Malaysians, 92% Indonesians and 92% Singaporeans), and was put to the first rank of the list of obstacles for establishing ASEAN Community (see Table 4.26). The Kruskal-Wallis and Mann- Whitney tests indicated no significant difference among the responses in the three countries.

The statistics of education in the Southeast Asian countries, as shown in Table 4.27, confirm this issue. For example, the literacy rate statistics 403 show that 90.67%

Table 4.27 Comparison of education of the people in ten ASEAN countries

Brunei Average Cambo- Indo- Lao Myan- Malay- Philip- Singa- Thai- Viet- Country Darus- of dia nesia PDR mar sia pines pore land nam salam ASEAN 1 Number of Population, 0.41 14.96 231.37 5.92 59.53 28.31 92.23 4.99 66.90 87.23 (in million, 2009 estimates) 2 Literacy rate, adult total 94.85% 76.32% 90.4% 72.70% 89.89% 91.90% 92.60% 94.43% 94.15% 90.28% 3 90.67% (% of people 15+) (2007) (2007) (2004) (2005) (2000) (2007) (2000) (2007) (2007) (1999) Mean years of schooling 7.5 5.8 8.7 4.6 4.0 9.5 8.7 8.8 6.6 5.5 7.4 (years, 2000 – 2007) 4 Expected years of schooling 14.4 9.8 12.7 9.2 9.2 12.5 12 14.0 13.5 10.4 11.8 (years, 2000 - 2007) 5 Education No education 24.91% NA 8.65% NA NA 9.61% 2.58% 15.94% 8.90% 7.61% 8.03% level of adults Primary 49.66% NA 43.98% NA NA 21.76% 31.29% 12.74% 55.50% 60.97% 44.71% (25+), 2010 6 Secondary 24.04% NA 38.98% NA NA 55.22% 41.40% 44.13% 21.44% 26.46% 35.60% Tertiary 1.40% NA 8.39% NA NA 13.40% 24.73% 27.19% 14.16% 4.96% 11.67% Notes and Sources: 1 The number in the column of “ Average of ASEAN ” was counted by accumulating the results of multiplication of the related numbers of each country with the proportion of population of each country in ASEAN. 2 Number of Population of ASEAN Countries , source: ASEAN Secretariate, ASEANStats . 2009. 3 Literacy rate , adult total (% of people 15+) , data source: The World Bank, Education Statistics, 27 April 2010. 4 Mean years of schooling (years), d ata source UNESCO Institute for Statistics in Human Development Report 2010 (UNDP 2010). 5 Gross enrolment rate is used as a proxy to compensate for the lack of data by age for tertiary and partial data for the other ISCED levels (UNESCO Institute for Statistics). Data Source: The World Bank, Education Statistics, 27 April 2010 in Human Development Report 2010 (UNDP 2010). 6 Estimates are from the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, IIASA. Data source: The World Bank, Education Statistics, 27 April 2010.

403 Literacy rate, adult total (% of people 15+) is the percentage of people (male, female) ages 15 and older who can, with understanding, both read and write a short, simple statement about their everyday life out of the whole population (total, male, female) ages 15 and older (UNDP 2010).

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of the people ages 15 and older in the region are able to read and write. However, the access is unequal – the figures are only 76.32% in Cambodia and 72.70% in Laos.

Mean years of schooling statistics reveal the unequal access of education (See Table 4.27). 404 The average years of schooling of 25 years old or above in the region is still 7.4 years, meaning the average people are only able to attend the second year of junior high school. The condition is better in Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei Darussalam, and Thailand where the figures are above 6 years. However, the figures are below 6 years in the CLMV countries. Thus, in average, an individual in those four countries drops out before he finishes primary education.

The expected years of schooling statistics also show the disparity of education in ASEAN countries (See Table 4.27).405 The numbers clearly differentiates the CLMV with the other former ASEAN countries. While it is expected that the children in ASEAN-6 learn for more than 11 years at school, the children of CLMV can only expect for less than 10.5 years. The children are expected to study for 10.4 years in Vietnam, 9.8 years in Cambodia, and 9.2 years in Lao PDR and Myanmar.

The statistics of education level of adults also indicate this issue (See Table 4.27).406 For example, secondary education is attended by only 47.27% of adult population; however, the figures are even worse in CLMV countries. Only 31.22% Vietnamese and 25.44% of Cambodians attend secondary school.

Disparity of education is also obvious when the statistics of tertiary education were examined. Tertiary education was still a luxury item to most people in the

404 Mean years of schooling (years) is the average number of years of education received by people ages 25 and older in their lifetime based on education attainment levels of the population converted into years of schooling based on theoretical durations of each level of education attended (UNDP 2010). 405 Expected years of schooling (years) is the number of years of schooling that a child of school entrance age can expect to receive if prevailing patterns of age-specific enrolment rates were to stay the same thoughout the child’s life (UNDP 2010). 406 Education level of adults (15+) is the percentage of people (male and female) ages 15 and older with specific education level. The specific education level is the no education category, primary education category, secondary education category, and tertiary education category.

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region. While more than 24% of the people have attended tertiary school in Singapore and the Philippines, the figures are only 8.39% in Indonesia, 4.96% in Vietnam, and 1.40% in Cambodia.

4.4.2 Lack of economic competitiveness

The lack of competitiveness in the economies of most ASEAN countries is the second challenge perceived by respondents. This issue was realized by a great majority of respondents (in general 88%: 90% Malaysians, 85% Indonesians and 90% Singaporeans), and they put it to the second rank of the list of obstacles (see Table 4.26). The tests of Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney confirmed that there was no significant difference in the three countries.

There are two studies that show the weakness of most ASEAN countries. The world rank of the global competitiveness index from the World Economic Forum (WEF) shows the competitiveness of ASEAN countries among 131 countries surveyed. (Table 4.28). 407 The statistics show that Singapore is the most competitive economy in ASEAN – and even the third most competitive economy in the world. Its competitiveness has strengthened from the seventh world rank (2007/2008) to the fifth (2008/2009) and to the third (2009/2010 and 2010/2011).

The second most competitive ASEAN country – Malaysia – was positioned in the 26th rank compared to 131 economies surveyed in 2010. Further examination shows that the Malaysian competitiveness’ rank has decreased from the 21st (2007/2008 and 2008/2009) to the 24th (2009/2010) and the 26th (2010/2011). The third most competitive ASEAN country – Brunei Darussalam – was positioned in the 28th world rank in 2010/2011. Its competitiveness has jumped up from just the 39th (2008/2009) to the 32nd (2009/2010) and the 28th (2010/2011).

407 The WEF Global Competitiveness Index World Ranks is the rank of the competitiveness of the respected country compared to a number of countries surveyed. For the 2007/2008 rank, it should be compared to 131 countries surveyed. For the 2008/2009 rank, it should be compared to 134 countries surveyed. For the 2009/2010 rank, it should be compared to 133 countries surveyed. For the 2010/2011 rank, it should be compared to 131 countries surveyed.

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Table 4.28 Ranking of competitiveness of ASEAN Countries

World Rank of Global Competitiveness Index based on survey of World Economic Forum (WEF) 1 ASEAN ASEAN countries Ranks 2007/2008 2008/2009 2009/2010 2010/2011

(involved 131 (involved 134 (involved 133 (involved 131 countries) countries) countries) countries) 1 Singapore 7 5 3 3 2 Malaysia 21 21 24 26 3 Brunei Darussalam n.a. 39 32 28 4 Thailand 28 34 36 38 5 Indonesia 54 55 54 44 6 Vietnam 68 70 75 59 7 The Philippines 71 71 87 85 8 Cambodia 110 109 110 109

World Rank of Global Competitiveness Index based on survey by IMD (International Institute for Management Development) 2 ASEAN ASEAN countries Ranks 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

(involved 53 (involved 55 (involved 55 (involved 57 (involved 58 countries) countries) countries) countries) countries) 1 Singapore 3 2 2 3 1 2 Malaysia 22 23 19 18 10 3 Thailand 29 33 27 26 26 4 Indonesia 52 54 51 42 35 5 Philippines 42 45 40 43 39 Note: 1 Source: World Economic Forum, 2010, Global Competitiveness Report 2010 – 2011. http://www3.weforum.org. 2 Source: International Institute for Management Development (IMD) World Competitiveness Yearbook 2010.

The fourth most competitive ASEAN country – Thailand – was placed in the 38th world rank in 2010/2011. Its position has decreased from the 28th (2007/2008) to the 34th (2008/2009), the 36th (2009/2010), and the 38th (2010/2011). The fifth most competitive ASEAN country is Indonesia which was placed in the 44th world rank in 2010/2011. Its competitiveness jumped up from just the 54th and the 55th world rank (2007/2008, 2009/2010, and 2009/2010) to the 44th (2010/2011).

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Unfortunately, the rest five ASEAN countries – are lower than the 50th world rank – still lack of competitiveness. Vietnam – the sixth rank of ASEAN – was in the 59th world rank. The Philippines – the seventh rank of ASEAN – was in the 85th world rank. Cambodia – the eighth rank of ASEAN – was in the 109th world rank. The other two countries – Lao PDR and Myanmar – were not surveyed in 2010 by the WEF due to its lack of competitiveness.

The IMD Global Competitiveness Index World Rank is another scorecard refered for the competitiveness of ASEAN countries compared to 58 countries in the world (Table 4.28). 408 Similar to the WEF’s rank, the IMD’s rank showed that Singapore was the most competitive economy in ASEAN and was the most competitive economy in the world in 2010. Its competitiveness was relatively stable from 2006 to 2009 which always placed it in the 3rd and 2nd world most competitive economy. The second rank in ASEAN is Malaysia, which was in the 10th world rank in 2010. In the IMD’s surveys, Malaysia’s competitiveness strengthened from just the 22nd (2006) to the the 10th (2010). However, the positions of the other three ASEAN countries were not so satisfactory, as they were placed after the 25th rank from the 58th economies surveyed. Thailand was placed in the 26th rank, Indonesia in the 35th rank and the Philippines in the 39th rank.

4.4.3 Dependency on the developed countries

The respondents perceived the dependency on developed countries as the third challenge for establishing the ASEAN Community. In general, a great majority of those surveyed (in general 88%: 90% Malaysians, 84% Indonesians and 88% Singaporeans) realized that the dependencies on the developed countries for financing the economic activities as an obstacle for establishing ASEAN Community, and they put it to the third rank of the list of obstacles (see Table 4.26). The tests of Kruskal-

408 The IMD Global Competitiveness Index World Ranks is the rank of the competitiveness of the respected country or economy compared to a number of countries surveyed. The Overall Competitiveness Scoreboard, which ranks the world's leading economic nations, is calculated by combining four factors of competitiveness: economic performance, government efficiency, business efficiency and infrastructure.

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Table 4.29 Sources of financing in ASEAN countries

Countries Foreign sources financing Domestic credit Lending Foreign Direct External debt provided by Investments, stocks, long -term, interest banking sector 2008 4 net inflows, 2008 3 rate (%) 2 (US$ Million) (US$ Million) 1 (US$ Million) Brunei Darussalam 239 - 2,676 5.50 Cambodia 815 3,892 1,796 16.40 Indonesia 9,318 124,286 188,437 13.60 Lao PDR 228 4,923 554 24.00 Malaysia 7,318 43,382 256,623 6.08 Myanmar 976 5,413 5,678 17.00 Philippines 1,544 57,855 76,498 8.75 Thailand 8,571 40,587 356,180 7.04 Vietnam 9,579 21,618 85,980 15.78 Singapore 10,912 - 162,802 5.38 TOTAL 49,500 301,958 1,137,224

Source: Adapted from the data of World Bank, 2010 (World Development Indicators & Global Development Finance, 19 April, advanced Excel tables).

Wallis and Mann-Whitney confirmed that there was no significant difference in the three countries.

The statistics that shows the sources of financing in ASEAN countries (see Table 4.29) confirms that the financing of almost ASEAN countries, except in Brunei Darussalam and Singapore, are heavily dependent on foreign sources. The statistics of foreign sources financing, for example, shows that half of ten ASEAN nations – Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam – relies heavily on foreign financing for the development and business. Moreover, most of ASEAN countries also relied on long-term external debt stocks – In 2008, the figure exceeded US$ 124 billion in Indonesia, US$ 57 billion in the Philippines , US$ 43 billion in Malaysia, US$ 40 billion in Thailand, and US$ 22 billion in Vietnam.409 The debt

409 External debt stocks, long-term: Long-term debt is debt that has an original or extended maturity of more than one year. It has three components: public, publicly guaranteed, and private nonguaranteed debt.

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levels of Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos are not better as their long-term debts exceeded the domestic credit provided by banking sectors.410 Only two countries in the region – Singapore and Brunei Darussalam – did not possess external long term debts in 2008.

The domestic banking systems in five countries of the ten countries are, in fact, inefficient in providing credit to the community, as they charge more than 10% for lending interest rate. 411 The 2008 lending interest rates were 24% per annum in Lao PDR, 17% in Myanmar, 16% in Cambodia and Vietnam, and 13.60% in Indonesia This has led the governments and business people to rely on foreign creditors and foreign direct investment for financing their activities.

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is one of the important sources for business in the region as it has played a cruci al role in the Southeast Asia’s economic development (Singh 2010). 412 In fact, FDI in the region are sourced mainly from developed countries as the banking systems and accumulation of finance for investment from those countries are easily available. 413 It is obvious in the statistics (in Table 4.32) that the FDI inflows to ASEAN countries are mainly the developed countries: The EU, Japan, USA, Cayman Island, Republic of Korea, China, Hong Kong, Bermuda, and Taiwan. Those nine countries contributed 62.6% of investment

410 Domestic credit provided by banking sector includes all credit to various sectors on a gross basis, with the exception of credit to the central government, which is net. The banking sector includes monetary authorities and deposit money banks, as well as other banking institutions where data are available (including institutions that do not accept transferable deposits but do incur such liabilities as time and savings deposits). Examples of other banking institutions are savings and mortgage loan institutions and building and loan associations. 411 Lending interest rate is the rate charged by banks on loans to prime customers. The data is in percentage for annual terms basis. 412 Foreign direct investment, net inflows: Foreign direct investment are the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. This series shows net inflows (new investment inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy from foreign investors, and is divided by GDP. 413 Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) and technology from developed countries have played an important role in the economic development of the Southeast Asian countries. FDI in manufacturing from Japan, America and Europe have provided jobs for societies with rapid expanding populations and have boosted economic growth rates starting in the 1970s and 1980s (Singh 2010).

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Table 4.30 Top ten sources of foreign direct investment inflow to ASEAN countries

Value Share to total inflow (in US$ million) (%) Country/region 1/ 2007- 2007- 2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009 2009 2009 EU -25 17,765.50 9,520.10 7,297.20 34,582.80 23.9 19.2 18.4 21.1

Japan 8,828.70 4,657.80 5,308.40 18,794.90 11.9 9.4 13.4 11.5

USA 8,067.60 5,132.60 3,357.70 16,557.90 10.8 10.4 8.5 10.1

Cayman Island 1,595.40 4,605.40 3,015.20 9,216.00 2.1 9.3 7.6 5.6

Republic of Korea 2,715.50 1,583.50 1,421.80 5,720.80 3.7 3.2 3.6 3.5

China 1,684.30 2,109.50 1,509.50 5,303.30 2.3 4.3 3.8 3.2

Hong Kong 1,495.60 1,447.30 1,582.10 4,525.00 2.0 2.9 4.0 2.8

Bermuda 3,259.20 58.6 1,164.40 4,482.20 4.4 0.1 2.9 2.7

Taiwan (ROC) 784.8 1,745.10 687.9 3,217.80 1.1 3.5 1.7 2.0 Total FDI from selected 46,196.60 30,859.90 25,344.20 102,400.70 62.1 62.3 64.0 62.6 countries ASEAN sources 9,682.00 10,461.50 4,428.90 24,572.40 13.0 21.1 11.2 15.0

Others / 18,516.70 8,178.30 9,849.90 36,544.80 24.9 16.5 24.9 22.3 Total FDI inflow to 74,395.30 49,499.80 39,623.00 163,518.10 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 ASEAN

Source: ASEAN Statistics (ASEAN Secretariat, 2010)

in 2007 – 2009; meanwhile, the intra-ASEAN investors contributed only 15% for the same period.

The high dependency on FDIs posed the region with some problems in the 1990s. FDIs have contributed to high economic growth in 1970s and 1980s, but the its figure has eroded from about the mid-1990s, as large parts of the world which previously had closed or semi-closed economies were opening up, most notably China. Southeast Asia has to face the reality that the same products could be produced by multinational corporations (MNCs) for a lower cost and just as efficiently in these new locations, which had much larger pools of workers as well as larger markets than individual Southeast Asian countries. In fact, the Southeast Asia’s share s of FDIs in developing Asia fell from 34.3% in 1995 to 10.1% in 2000 (Singh 2010).

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4.4.4 Disparity in socio-economic development

The fourth challenge perceived by those surveyed was the disparity in socioeconomic development in the region. A great majority of respondents (in general 87%: 90% of Malaysians, 80% of Indonesians and 92% of Singaporeans) placed this challenge to the fourth rank of obstacles (see Table 4.26). The Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney Tests confirmed that there was no significant difference in the three countries.

The UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI) – a composite index measuring the average achievement of a country in three basic dimensions of human development, consisting of a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living 414 – confirms this issue (see Table 4.31). The Human Development Report 2008, 2009, and 2010 consistently placed most ASEAN countries in the medium level of HDI. Singapore (27 th world rank), Brunei Darussalam (37 th world rank) and Malaysia (57 th world rank) performed better than the other seven countries in the 2008 HDI. In the scorecard, Singapore and Brunei Darussalam was categorized as ‘very high HDI” countries, while Malaysia as “high HDI” country.

The scorecard showed that the world ranks of the other seven ASEAN countries were much lower than Singapore, Brunei and Malaysia. Six ASEAN countries were categorized as ‘medium HDI’ nations and Myanmar was categorized as a ‘low HDI’ country. In terms of life expectancy at births, that indicating the long and healthy life of the people, the figures were 80.7 years in Singapore, 77.4 in Brunei Darussalam and 74.7 in Malaysia. However, the figures in CLMV countries were much shorter: 65.9 in Laos, 62.2 in Cambodia and 62.7 in Myanmar. 415

414 The variable of a long and healthy life was measured by the indicator of the life expectancy at birth; knowledge was measured by indicators of mean years of schooling and expected year of schooling; and a decent standard of living was measured by the indicator of the gross national income per capita). For details on how the index was calculated, see Technical Note 1 or the Human Development Report 2010 (UNDP 2010: 215 - 217). 415 Life expectancy at birth (years) is the number of years a newborn infant could expect to live if prevailing pattern of age-specific mortality rates at the time of birth were to stay the same throughout the infant’s life. Source: UNDP (2010).

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Table 4.31 The socioeconomy of ASEAN Countries based on Human Development Index (HDI) Method

HDI 2008 HDI 2007 5 HDI 2006 5 ASEAN World Gross Life Mean Expected National HDI HDI World World Countries HDI HDI expectancy years of years of Income HDI HDI HDI HDI Ranks Ranks HDI HDI 1 2 Category 3 Value 4 at birth schooling schooling (GNI) Category Value Category Value 2008 2008 Ranks Ranks (years) (years) (years) per capita (PPP 2008) 1 27 Singapore Very high 0.846 80.7 8.8 14.4 $ 48,893 23 Very high 0.944 25 Very high 0.922 Brunei 2 37 Very high 0.805 77.4 7.5 14.0 $ 49,915 30 Very high 0.920 30 Very high 0.894 Darussalam 3 57 Malaysia High 0.744 74.7 9.5 12.5 $ 13,927 66 High 0.829 63 High 0.811 4 92 Thailand Medium 0.654 69.3 6.6 13.5 $ 8,001 87 Medium 0.783 78 Medium 0.781 5 97 Philippines Medium 0.638 72.3 8.7 12.0 $ 4,002 105 Medium 0.751 90 Medium 0.771 6 108 Indonesia Medium 0.600 71.5 5.7 12.7 $ 3,957 111 Medium 0.734 107 Medium 0.728 7 113 Vietnam Medium 0.572 74.9 5.5 10.4 $ 2,995 116 Medium 0.725 105 Medium 0.733 8 122 Lao PDR Medium 0.497 65.9 4.6 9.2 $ 2,321 133 Medium 0.619 130 Medium 0.601 9 124 Cambodia Medium 0.494 62.2 5.8 9.8 $ 2,172 137 Medium 0.593 131 Medium 0.598 10 132 Myanmar Low 0.451 62.7 4.0 9.2 $ 1,596 138 Medium 0.586 132 Medium 0.583 Notes and sources: 1 ASEAN HDI Ranks 2008 is the rank of year 2008 HDI of respected country based on 10 ASEAN countries measured by 2008 HDI value. 2 World HDI Ranks 2008 is the rank of year 2008 HDI of respected country based on 169 countries measured by HDR 2010. Source: UNDP 2010. 3 HDI Category 2008 is the category of respected country based on the year 2008 HDI Value reported in HDR 2010. 4 HDI Value 2008 is a composite index measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development – a long and healthy life (measured by indicator of the life expectancy at birth), knowledge (measured by indicators of mean years of schooling and expected y ear of schooling) and a decent standard of living (measured by indicator of the gross national income per capita). 5 World HDI Ranks, HDI Category, and HDI Value for 2006 and 2007 are the world rank, category, and value of year 2006 and 2007 Human Development Index based on Human Development Reports 2008 and 2009. Source: UNDP 2008 (for HDI 2006) and UNDP 2009 (for HDI 2007). The HDI value is a composit e index measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development – a long and healthy life (measured by indicator of the life expectancy at birth), knowledge (measured by indicators of adult literacy rate (% age d 15 and above) and combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary education), and a decent standard of living (measured by indicator of the gross domestic product per capita (PPP US%). The rank of year 2007 HDI of respected country based on 182 countries measured by HDR 2010.

Source: Processed from the data of Human Development Report 2010 (UNDP 2010).

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There is also huge disparity in the education level between the top three HDI ASEAN countries and the rest. The mean years of schooling 416 were 9.5 years in Malaysia, 8.8 years in Singapore, and 7.5 years in Brunei. The expected years of schooling 417 were 14.4 years in Singapore, 14 years in Brunei, and 12.5 years in Malaysia. However, in CLMV, the figures were much lower. The mean and the expected years of schooling were 5.5 and 10.4 years in Vietnam; 4.6 and 9.2 in Lao PDR; 5.8 and 9.8 in Cambodia; and 4.0 and 9.2 in Myanmar.

The scorecard also shows that income gap exists between the top three HDI ASEAN countries and the rest. While the 2008 Per Capita Gross National Income was US$ 48,893 in Singapore, US$49,915 in Brunei, and US$13,927 in Malaysia, the figures were below US$ 2,400 in CLMV countries.418

4.4.5 Differences in legal and political system

The fifth challenge perceived by a great majority of respondents (in general 87%: 87% Malaysians, 80% Indonesians and 96% Singaporeans) was the differences in the legal (including degree of law enforcement) and political system (including the adoption of democracy) of the countries in the region (see Table 4.26). The tests of Kruskal- Wallis and Mann-Whitney confirmed that there were more respondents in Singapore who considered the issue as an obstacle than those in Indonesia and Malaysia.

416 Mean years of schooling (years) is the average number of years of education received by people ages 25 and older in their lifetime based on education attainment levels of the population converted into years of schooling based on theoretical durations of each level of education attended (UNDP 2010). 417 Expected years of schooling (years) is the number of years of schooling that a child of school entrance age can expect to receive if prevailing patterns of age-specific enrolment rates were to stay the same thoughout the c hild’s life (UNDP 2010). 418 Gross National Income (GNI) per capita is the sum of value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad, divided by midyear population. Value added is the net output of an industry after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. When expressed in PPP US dollar terms, it is converted to international dollars using PPP rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP that a US dollar has in the United States.

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Table 4.32 Democracy in ASEAN countries Political freedom / Satisfaction Human rights Press Democracy with violations freedom Countries Number of (score 0 – 2) 1 freedom of (score 1 - 5) 3 index 4 and Type of Journalists choice Government imprisoned 5 Score Meaning (% Score Meaning Score Meaning satisfied) 2 Brunei Darussalam No data No data 0 Undemocratic n.a. n.a. n.a. 0 (Absolute available available Monarchy) Cambodia Quite free with (Constitutional 0 Undemocratic 93 1 Fewest 35.2 some 1 Monarchy) consideration Indonesia Relatively 2 Democratic 75 3 Moderate 28.5 0 (Republic) free Lao PDR Almost no 0 Undemocratic 84 1 Fewest 92.0 0 (Communism) freedom Malaysia Democratic Quite free with (Constitutional 1 with no 83 2 Few 44.3 some 0 Monarchy) alternation consideration Thailand Quite free with (Constitutional 2 Democratic 84 3 Moderate 44.0 some 0 Monarchy) consideration Myanmar Almost no 0 Undemocratic n.a. 5 Highest 102.7 9 (Republic) freedom Philippines Relatively 2 Democratic 87 4 High 38.3 0 (Republic) free Democratic Quite free with Singapore 1 with no 73 1 Fewest 45.0 some 0 (Republic) alternation consideration Vietnam Almost no 0 Undemocratic 73 3 Moderate 81.7 1 (Communism) freedom

Notes and sources: 1 Political freedom / Democracy is the score that characterized the political freedom in the country. Score of 0 stands for undemocratic. Score of 1 stands for democratic with no alternation. Score of 2 stands for democratic. Source: Gallup World Poll Database 2010, cited in UNDP (2010). 2 Satisfaction with freedom of choice (% satisfied) is the percentage of people surveyed as satisfied to the freedom of choice in their respective countries. Source: Gallup World Poll Database 2010, cited in UNDP (2010). 3 Human rights violations (score 1 - 5): score 1 is fewest human right violations, 5 is most human right violations. Source: Chelbub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010), cited in UNDP (2010). 4 Press freedom index: a lower index score indicate more freedom of the press. Source: Gibney, Cornett and Woods (2010), cited in UNDP (2010). 5 Number of Journalists imprisoned . Source: Reporters Without Borders (2009), cited in UNDP (2010).

Almost all countries in the region but Thailand were occupied by the Western Colonialists, so their legal and political systems are influenced by their colonial masters. If the legal and political systems were not formed by their colonial masters, they were formed the midst of Cold War as the reaction to the colonialisation. As the result, there are different forms of political and legal system in the region. The region has heterogenous political systems, ranging from absolute monarchy (Brunei

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Darussalam), liberal democracy republics (Singapore, the Philippines, and Indonesia), constitutional monarchy (Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand), communism (Lao PDR and Vietnam), and the softening totalitarian militarism (Myanmar).

It is also a fact that democracy has little legacy as the original and history of governments in the regions experienced a long time of authoritarianism. The region’s pre-colonial rulers were chiefs or kings with absolute powers while the colonial rule itself was authoritarian. 419 While political cultures take a long time to change, these traditional systems still retain influence on politics and political imagination of post- colonial Southeast Asia.420 In terms of democracy, the Cheibub, Gandhi, an Vreeland’s “Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited Dataset ” differentiates three forms of democracy, which are ’democratic’, ’democratic with no alternation’, and ’undemocratic’ (see Table 4.32). 421 Based on that scorecard, there were three democratic governments (Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand), two ’democratic with no alternation’ governments (Malaysia and Singapore) and even five undemocratic governments (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam).

One of the youngest nations in the region, Brunei Darussalam, is an absolute monarchy. The Sultan and his family are at the apex of the social and political hierarchy in the hereditary monarchy of Brunei. 422 However, the country has been able

419 The political systems of absolute kingdoms existed in Burma and the countries of Indochina as recently as the second half of the nineteenth century, and in Thailand until 1932. Brunei Darussalam, which became independent in 1984, remains an absolute monarchy even today (Singh 2010). 420 Singh (2010). 421 Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2009). 422 The Sultan also head both the country and government, that is, he is both Head of State and Head of Government (Sultan and Yang Di-Pertuan). He heads the Prime Minister Office, and also the Minister of Defense and of Finance, as well as the Supreme Commander of the Royal Brunei Armed Forces, the Inspector General of the Royal Brunei Police Force and the head of the Islamic religion. The other important positions and ministries in the country are headed by the Crowned Prince and the brother of Sultan (Thambipillai 2010).

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to provide a positive economic, social, cultural and religious environment for its people. The Sultan enjoys considerable support and loyalty from his subjects.423

The four CLMV countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) are usually categorized as authoritarian states. Laos and Vietnam remain one-party states with the ruling Communist parties determined to maintain their monopoly of political power although they liberalized their economy and sought gradual integration with the international economy.424 Myanmar has adopted one-party rule since 1962 and has continued to this day despite international opprobrium and loss of legitimacy.425 In Cambodia, there have been four elections after 1993, but the Cambodian regime still seems reluctant to adhere to democratic ideals and practice. 426

The Gallup World Poll Database (2010) categorized Singapore and Malaysia as ‘democratic countries with no alternation’ while several Western political scientists to classify these two countries as illiberal democracies.427 Singapore has become a

423 Singh (2010); Thambipillai (2010). 424 The Marxist-Leninist regimes in Vietnam and Laos at first established closed economies with state control over economic activities. However, when this course threatened economic failure, they chose to follow in footsteps of China by liberalizing their economies and seeking gradual integration with the international economy. Politically, they remain one-party states with the ruling Communist parties determined to maintain their monopoly of political power (Singh 2010; Le and Pham 2010; Jőnsson 2008). 425 Myanmar started its independence with liberal multi-party democracy in 1948 but the continuing ethnic and Communist insurgencies from 1948 and political infighting in the ruling party prompted the military to stage a coup in 1962 in the name of preventing national disintegration and restoring stability. It set up one-party rule under its Burma Socialist Party, nationalized the economy and banned public political activity. As these policies brought the country to the verge of economic disaster, in 1998, the generals tried to move towards market economies and a political system more answerable to the people through elections. But they mismanaged the change they sought and, when faced with the specter of loss of power in a national election in 1990, they quickly reverted to military rule, which has continued to this day despite international opprobrium and loss of legitimacy (Singh 2010; Tin and Kyaw 2010; Jőnsson 2008). 426 Since took an initial step towards democracy through UN-sponsored elections in 1993, Cambodia has held four elections. However, critics had claimed that Cambodian democracy is only on paper. Elections may have opened up the political process but it has not fundamentally altered the nature of political power in the country. In reality, one man, Hun Sen, governs the country by virtue of a monopoly on power (Robert 2002a and 2002b; Jőnsson 2008). 427 Both countries had similar history that they inherited liberal democratic multi-party systems from the British. Free election continue to be held but restriction on the media and freedom of assembly and sensitivity to political criticism have led some Western political scientists to classify these two countries as illiberal democracies (Singh 2010; Saravanamuttu and Ooi 2010; Ho 2010).

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one-party dominant state. Malaysia is a coalition-dominant one, in which one party has entrenched dominance, though opposition parties are represented in Parliament.

Indonesia and the Philippines now are liberal democracy republics. However, their democracy has rocky path. The biggest nation in the region, Indonesia has changed its political systems several times and embraced a presidential liberal democracy system with free elections, a multi-party system and guarantees of civil rights and freedoms after the collapse of the Suharto regime in 1998. 428 In the Philippines too, liberal democracy has restored after 14 years of dictatorship. 429 However, the relatively young democratic culture in both countries has remained blemished by the problems of weak rule of law and corruption.430 Thailand has been an on-and-off democratic state. 431 The most liberal constitution of 1997 to remedy some of the shortcomings of Thai democracy, come to grief in 2006 when the military staged another coup 432 .

There are also differences in the legal system applied in the region. For example, while Laws in Malaysia are influenced heavily by Britain’s Westminster Law system, the Indonesian laws are heavily influenced by Continental Law System of the Netherlands. These difficulties are more complex because, as sovereignty is kept as the main principle of ASEAN, it will be difficult to harmonize the law in the region.

428 Indonesia tried liberal democracy from 1955 to 1958 there was too much political infighting and a stable governing coalition could not be formed. This led President Soekarno to ban elections in 1959 and established an authoritarian “guided democracy”. The New Order regime of his successor, President Suharto, from 1966 to 1998, was also authoritarian, with regulated political parties and elections to provide a degree of legitimacy to the regime and some voice to the main political interest groups. After the collapse of President Suharto, the political democracy was restored in 1998. 429 The Philippines has had undergone a dictatorship from 1972 to 1986 under the administration of President Ferdinand Marcos. Freedom was restored after his removal in 1986. 430 Singh (2010); Djiwandono and Sebastian (2010); Morada (2010). 431 In Thailand, absolute monarchy was overthrown in 1932 by groups that wanted change. However, for most of the period since then, Thailand has been ruled by military dictators or as a semi- democracy, with a few short periods of democracy in 1944 to 1947, 1973 to 1976, 1988 to 1991, and 2001 to 2006 (Singh 2010). 432 Singh (2010); Chachavalpongpun (2010).

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4.4.6 Limitation of mastery and creation of technology

A great majority of those surveyed (in general 87%: 89% Malaysians, 84% Indonesians and 86% Singaporeans) perceived the limitation of technology mastery and creation as the sixth challenge for the establishment of ASEAN Community (see Table 4.26). The Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U Test confirmed that there were significantly more respondents in Indonesia (46%) and Malaysia (43%) who considered the issue as clearly an obstacle than those in Singapore (33%).

The statistics in Table 4.33 showed that most of ASEAN countries are weak in technology mastery. For example, the statistics of ‘diffusion of phone line subscription ’ showed the weakness of technology diffusion in seven of the ten ASEAN countries. In Thailand, although phone subscriptions were 102 per 100 people in 2008, mobile phone networks only covered 38% population. In Vietnam, 116 per 100 people subscribed to phone line, but the networks only covered 70% of population. In Indonesia and the Philippines, networks had covered 90% and 99% of population, but only 75 and 80 per 100 people subscribed to phone line. The actual people subscribed to phone line could be less than 60% in those countries as it is usual that people subscribe to two or three services as the service may be unsatisfactory. The situation was worse in Lao PDR, Cambodia, and Myanmar as there were only 35, 29, and 2 per 100 people subscribed to phone line.

The diffusion of internet technology in the region is even worse than that of mobile phone technology (see Table 4.33). In 2008, less than 50% of the people in ASEAN countries (except Singapore, Brunei Darussalam and Malaysia) used internet. Furthermore, ‘the high-speed broadband internet subscription ’ was below 5% in nine of ASEAN ten countries in 2008. These figures were far below the developed countries – such as Australia, Canada, Ireland, Japan, the Netherland, United States, Republic of Korea, Sweden, and Finland – where more than 60% of the people connected to the internet and more than 20% subscribe to the broadband internet.

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Table 4.33 Statistics of technology diffusion and mastery in ASEAN countries and other selected countries

Notes and sources: 1 Mobile and fixed line phone subscriptions (per 100 people) 2008 is calculated based on data on cellular subscribers and telephone lines from World Bank, cited from the Human Development Report 2010 (UNDP 2010). 2 Populations covered by mobile phone networks (%) are calculated based on data on cellular subscribers and telephone line from World Bank (2010) and data on population from UNDESA (2009), cited from the Human Development Report 2010 (UNDP 2010). 3 Internet Users (per 100 people) 2008 . Source: World Bank 2010, cited from the Human Development Report 2010 (UNDP 2010). 4 Broadband subscriptions (per 100 people) 2008 is the number of subscriptions to digital subscriber lines, cable modems or other fixed broadband expressed per 100 people, including digital subscriber line/analog with speeds of 56 kilobits per second and higher. Source: ITU 2009, cited from the Human Development Report 2010 (UNDP 2010). 5 High-technology exports (% of exports) annually in the last 10 years (2008) are calculated as the percentage of high-technology exports compared to the total exports. High-technology exports are products with high R&D intensity, suc h as in aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments, and electrical machinery. Exports of goods and services comprise all transactions between residents of a country and the rest of the world involving a change of ownership from residents to nonresidents of general merchandise, goods sent for processing and repairs, nonmonetary gold, and services. Source: United Nations, 2010, Comtrade database.

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Table 4.34 Statistics of technology creation in ASEAN countries and other selected countries

ASEAN Countries Compared to other selected developed countries Brunei Indo- Singa- Cambo- Lao Malay- Myan- Philip- Thai- Viet- Austra- Nether- United Republic United Darus- nesia pore Canada Ireland Japan Sweden Finland dia PDR sia mar pines land nam lia land States of Korea Kingdom salam Patents granted to 0 0 0.78 0 17.88 0 2.11 140 11.96 0.68 119 144 219 2,820 140 671 2,046 324 322 399 residents (per (highest) million people) annually in the last 10 years (2008) 1 Receipts of royalties 0 0.01 0.26 0 1.67 0.01 0.06 26.60 0.20 0.001 24.34 86.01 161.4 120.79 197.53 146.05 29.64 139.02 153.6 173.50 and license fees 3 (highest) (US$) per person annually in the last 10 years (2008) 2 Research and 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.64 0.16 0.12 2.61 0.25 0.19 2.17 2.03 1.34 3.45 1.75 2.67 3.47 1.84 3.68 3.47 Development (2004) (2002) (2005) (2002) (2006) (2002) (2005) (2007) (2006) (2002) (2006) (2007) (2007) (2007) (2007) (2007) (2007) (2007) (2007) (2007) (R&D) expenditures (highest) (% of GDP), 2002 - 2007 3 Researchers in R&D 281 16.87 205 15.54 372 17.67 80.66 6,088 310.9 115 4,231 4,157 2,849 5,573 2,680 4,663 4,627 2,881 5,215 7,382 (per million people), (2004) (2002) (2001) (2002) (2006) (2002) (2005) (2007) (2005) (2002) (2006) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2007) (2006) (2007) (2007) (2007) (2007) 2001 – 2007 4 (highest) Scientific and 0 0 0.58 0 14.35 0 1.45 451 9.53 1.41 519 510 295 309 549 468 180 537 769 653 technical journal (highest) articles (per million people) annually in the last 10 years (2008) 5

Notes and sources: 1 Patents granted to residents (per million people) annually in the last 10 years (2008) are calculated on the basis of data on patents from WIPO 2010 and data on population from UN 2007. Source: cited from the United Nations Population Division (2009, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision. New York). 2 Receipts of royalties and license fees (US$ per person) annually in the last 10 years (2008) is calculated on the basis of data on royalties and license fees from World Bank 2010 and data on population from UN 2007. Source: cited from the United Nations Population Division (2009, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision. New York). Data are in current U.S. dollars. 3 Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics, 2010. 4 Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics, 2010. 5 Scientific and technical journal articles (per million people) annually in the last 10 years (2008) refer to the number of scientific and engineering articles published in the following fields: physics, biology, chemistry, mathematics, clinical medicine, biomedical research, engineering and technology, and ear th and space sciences. Sources: National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators. 2010.

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While the diffusion and mastery of technology in the region is weak, the technology creations are even weaker. Measured by ‘patents granted to residents (per million people) annually in the last 10 years (1999 – 2008)’, only Singapore performed at 140 patents. 433 The other countries such as Malaysia and Thailand only produced 17.88 and 11.96 patents annually; while the figure was even only 2.11 in the Philippines; below 1 in Indonesia and Vietnam; none in Brunei, Cambodia, Lao, and Myanmar (see Table 4.34). Measured by ‘receipts of royalties and license fees (US$) per person annually in the last ten years (1999 – 2008)’, only Singapore performed at US$ 26.60. 434 In Malaysia, the region second best in this indicator, the amount was only US$ 1.67 per person, while they were below US$1 or even zero on the other eight ASEAN countries (see Table 4.34).

Research and development (R&D) initiatives and experts play a great role in the technology creation. I n terms of ‘ the research and development (R&D) expenditures (as the percentage of GDP) ’,435 it is obvious that the commitment to R&D to create technology was low in most ASEAN countries. Only in Singapore the expenditure was above 1% of GDP. The figure was only 0.64% GDP in Malaysia and less than 0.25% GDP in the other eight ASEAN countries (see Table 4.34).

In terms of ‘researchers in R&D as fractions of per million people’ ,436 besides Singapore, the figures were below 500 in nine ASEAN countries. These figures were

433 Patent applications are worldwide patent applications filed for exclusive rights for an invention--a product or process that provides a new way of doing something or offers a new technical solution to a problem. A patent provides protection to the owner of the patent, generally for 20 years. 434 Royalty and license fees are payments and receipts between residents and nonresidents for the authorized use of intangible, nonproduced, nonfinancial assets and proprietary rights (such as patents, copyrights, trademarks, industrial processes, and franchises) and for the use, through licensing agreements, of produced originals of prototypes (such as films and manuscripts). 435 Research and Development (R&D) expenditures (% of GDP) (2002 – 2007) are current and capital expenditures (both public and private) on creative work undertaken systematically to increase knowledge, including knowledge of humanity, culture, and society, and the use of knowledge for new applications. R&D covers basic research, applied research, and experimental development. Its aggregates were calculated for HDRO by the World Bank. 436 Researchers in R&D (per million people) (1990 - 2005) are professionals engaged in the conception or creation of new knowledge, products, processes, methods, or systems and in the management of the projects concerned. Postgraduate PhD students (ISCED97 level 6) engaged in R&D are included.

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extremely low compared to Singapore which had 6,088 researchers in 2007; while the selected developed countries have more than above 2,500 researchers per million populations (see Table 4.34).

The number of ‘scientific and technical journal articles (per million people) annually in the last 10 years (1999 – 2008)’ is one of the indicators of technology creation (see Table 4.34). Unfortunately, academicians and researchers only produce 14.35 journals per million population annually in Malaysia in the last ten years; 9.53 journal articles in Thailand; 1.45 and 1.41 articles in the Philippines and Vietnam; while it was only 0.58 in Indonesia and none in Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar. These numbers were extremely low compared to Singapore which had produced 451 journal articles; while the selected developed countries produce more than 290 journal articles per million populations.

4.4.7 Poverty in the region

Poverty in many countries in the region was ranked the seventh most important challenge to ASEAN integration. In the three countries of the survey, this issue was realized by more than three-quarters respondents as definitely (31% in Malaysia, 32% in Indonesia, and 29% in Singapore) or possibly an obstacle (44% in Malaysia, 38% in Indonesia, and 57% in Singapore) for establishing ASEAN Community (see Table 4.26). Further analysis of the Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney Tests confirmed that there were more respondents in Singapore who considered the issue as an obstacle than those in Indonesia and Malaysia. Statistics, shown in Table 4.35 indicates that almost all countries in the region but Singapore and Brunei had a significant portion of poor people.

The indicators of income poverty – using either international standards 437 or a certain national poverty line 438 – are often used to measure of poverty. The percentage

437 Usually the international standard used are the population living under PPP $1.25 a day and they who live under PPP $2 a day at 2005 international prices. 438 UNDP (2010). Population under national poverty lines is the proportion of the population living below the national poverty line. For example, for Malaysia, the standard is RM500 per month.

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Table 4.35 Income poverty in the ASEAN countries

Population below income poverty line Number of living under Population, living under National Poverty Line, Country PPP$1.25 a day, 2000 - 2008 estimates PPP$2 a day, 2000 - 2007 3 2005-2008 4 2007 2 1 Estimated Estimated Estimated (%) (%) (%) number number number Lao PDR 6,205,341 43.96% 2,727,868 76.85% 4,768,805 33.50% 2,078,789

Philippines 90,348,437 22.62% 20,436,816 45.04% 40,692,936 32.90% 29,724,636

Myanmar 46,588,126 n.a. n.a. 32.00% 14,908,200 Cambodia 14,562,008 25.84% 3,762,823 57.83% 8,421,209 30.14% 4,388,989 Vietnam 86,210,781 21.45% 18,492,213 48.42% 41,743,260 28.90% 24,914,916 Indonesia 227,345,082 29.40% 66,839,454 59.99% 136,384,315 16.70% 37,966,629 Thailand 67,386,383 2.00% 1,347,728 11.52% 7,762,911 12.00% 8,086,366 Malaysia 27,014,337 2.00% 540,287 7.81% 2,109,820 3.60% 972,516 Brunei Darussalam 392,280 ------Singapore 4,839,400 - - - Overall ASEAN 10 570,892,175 19.99% 114,147,188 42.37% 241,883,256 21.55% 123,041,041 Nota: 1 Number of Population of ASEAN Countries is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship--except for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of their country of origin. The values shown are midyear estimates . Source: United Nations Population Division. 2009. World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision. New York, United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (advanced Excel tables). 2 Population living under PPP $1.25 a day (%) is the percentage of the population living on less than $1.25 a day at 2005 international prices. Data refer to the most recent years available during the period specified (2000 – 2008). Data is taken from World Bank, 2010; World Development Indicators & Global Development Finance Database MDG Database 2009 (advanced Excel tables). The Estimated Numbers were taken by multiplying the percentage with the number of population in 2008. 3 Population living under PPP $2 a day (%) is the percentage of the population living on less than $2.00 a day at 2005 international prices. Data refer to the most recent years available during the period specified (2000 – 2008). Data is taken from World Bank, 2010; World Development Indicators & Global Development Finance Database MDG Database 2009 (advanced Excel tables). The Estimated Numbers were taken by multiplying the percentage with the number of population in 2008. 4 Population under national poverty lines (%) is the percentage of the population living below the national poverty line. National estimates are based on population-weighted subgroup estimates from household surveys. Data refer to the most recent years available during the period specified (2000 – 2008). Data is taken from World Bank, 2010; World Development Indicators & Global Development Finance Database MDG Database 2009 (advanced Excel tables). However, data of Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand is taken from ASEAN Community in Figures 2009 (ASEAN Secretariat 2009) and reflect the data of year 2005. The Estimated Numbers were taken by multiplying the percentage with the number of population in 2008. and numbers of people living in income poverty is exhibited in Table 4.35. Measured using national lines, poverty covered about 21.55% of the regional population (or 123,041,041 people) in 2008. Deeper examination on each country revealed that the percentage of poverty even exceeded 25% in five out of ten ASEAN countries: Lao PDR 33.5%; the Philippines 32.90%; Myanmar 32.00%; Cambodia 30.14%; and

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Vietnam 28.90%. Poverty in Indonesia constituted 16.70% of the population (37,966,629 people) was also need to be given more attention as the number comprised 25% of the poor people in the region.

The international standard of $1.25 a day at 2005 international prices has been widely accepted as the extreme poverty since 2008 439 . The World Bank statistics show that 1.44 billion people (or 21.50 percent of the world population) are estimated to live below this standard (UNDP 2010: 96). In the context of ASEAN, at least 114,147,188 people or about 19.99% of the regional population lived with this poverty standard in 2008 (see Table 4.35).440 Deeper examination on each country reveals that the percentage of poverty exceeded the world average in four of ten ASEAN countries. The figures also exceeded the regional average in five of ten ASEAN countries: Lao PDR 43.96%; Indonesia 29.40%; Cambodia 25.84%; the Philippines 22.62%; and Vietnam 21.45%.

The international standard of $2 a day at 2005 international prices was determined by the World Bank for the cut-off point of poverty. Under these indicators, 2.60 billion people (or 38.80 percent of the world population) are estimated to live on below this standard 441 . In ASEAN, more than 241,883,256 people or about 42.37% of the regional population lived on less than $2 a day. Thus, poverty in ASEAN under this indicator was higher than that of the world.

Deeper examination on the population that lived on less than $2 a day on each ASEAN country reveals that the percentage of poverty exceeded the world and the regional average in five of ten ASEAN countries: Lao PDR 76.85%; Indonesia 59.99%; Cambodia 57.83%; Vietnam 48.42%; and the Philippines 45.04%.

439 Ravallion, Chen and Sangraula (2009). 440 The number could be even more than that as there was no statistic available in Myanmar for this indicator. 441 UNDP (2010: 96).

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To describe poverty better than the income poverty line, UNDP published the measurement of multidimensional poverty in its 2010 Human Development Report. The focus of the poverty measurement is deprivation that is more fundamental to human development. The dimensions of poverty go far, not only to inadequate income, but also to poor health and nutrition; low education and skills; and inadequate livelihoods, bad housing conditions, social exclusion and lack of participation. 442 UNDP argues that the measurement is important as the households facing multiple deprivations are likely to be in worse situations than what income poverty suggests.443

Based on the UNDP’s multidimensional poverty index (MPI), seven of ten ASEAN countries are listed on the 2008 index (see Table 4.36). In general, it was estimated that 15.69% of the people in ASEAN experienced deprivation, while other 18.41% of the people were at risk of multidimensional poverty. The statistics showed that 24.54% of them were deprived of the low living standards, 14.70% of the lack of education) and 12.39% of the lack of health and nutrition.

According to the scorecard, Lao PDR is the poorest country in the region. Her MPI score was 0.267. Almost half of her people (47.30%) were multidimensionally poor; while the average intensity of deprivation experienced by people was 56.50%. The Laotians were mainly deprived of low living standards (59.70%), lack of education (43.90%), and lack of health and nutrition (22.30%).

442 Multidimensional poverty is measured by UNDP (2010) using ten indicators of the three dimensions of poverty. The health and nutrition dimension is measured by two indicators: (1) nutrition (at least one member is malnourished); (2) child mortality (at least one child die). The education dimension is measured by two indicators: (1) years of schooling (no member has finished five years of schooling); and (2) children enrollment (at least one school-age child who is not attending school). The living s tandards dimension is measured by six indicators ; (1) cooking fuel used (using “dirty” cooking fuel such as dung, wood or charcoal); (2) sanitation (have no adequate toilet); (3) access to running water (no access of clean drinking water); (4) access to electricity (not having electricity); (5) home flooring (having a home with a dirt floor); and (6) assets owned (owning at most one of these assets: bicycle, motorcycle, radio, refrigerator, telephone or television). 443 UNDP (2010: 94).

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Table 4.36 Multidimensional (non-income) poverty in ASEAN countries

Population Population with at least Multidimensional Poverty at risk of one severe deprivation in: Number of Intensity of multidimensional Living Population, 3 4 Education Health Country Multidimen Headcount deprivation poverty 6 7 standards 2008 estimates 5 (%) (%) 8 1 sional (%) (%) (%)

Poverty Estimated Estimated Estimated Estimated Estimated Index 2 (%) number (%) number (%) number (%) number (%) number Lao PDR 6,205,341 0.267 47.30% 2,935,126 56.50% 14.10% 874,953 43.90% 2,724,145 22.30% 1,383,791 59.70% 3,704,589 Cambodia 14,562,008 0.263 53.90% 7,848,922 48.90% 20.20% 2,941,526 40.90% 5,955,861 36.00% 5,242,323 78.40% 11,416,614 Indonesia 227,345,082 0.095 20.80% 47,287,777 45.90% 12.20% 27,736,100 12.60% 28,645,480 14.40% 32,737,692 31.20% 70,931,666 Myanmar 46,588,126 0.088 14.20% 6,615,514 62.00% 17.60% 8,199,510 32.70% 15,234,317 11.70% 5,450,811 22.80% 10,622,093 Vietnam 86,210,781 0.075 14.30% 12,328,142 52.50% 12.00% 10,345,294 12.30% 10,603,926 10.80% 9,310,764 30.10% 25,949,445 Philippines 90,348,437 0.067 12.60% 11,383,903 53.50% 53.50% 48,336,414 13.60% 12,287,387 14.20% 12,829,478 18.20% 16,443,416 Thailand 67,386,383 0.006 1.70% 1,145,569 38.50% 9.90% 6,671,252 12.60% 8,490,684 5.60% 3,773,637 1.50% 1,010,796 Overall ASEAN 10 570,892,175 0.082 15.69% 89,544,953 46.14% 18.41% 105,105,048 14.70% 83,941,801 12.39% 70,728,496 24.54% 140,078,618

Nota: 1 Number of Population of ASEAN Countries is based on the de facto definition of the population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship--except for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of their country of origin. The values shown are midyear estimates . Source: United Nations Population Division. 2009. World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision. New York, United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (advanced Excel tables). 2 Multidimensional poverty index is the share of the population that is multidimensionally poor adjusted by the intensity of the deprivation. 3 Multidimensional poverty – headcount is the percentage of the population that suffers deprivation in more than three of the weighted indicators used to construct the Multidimensional Poverty Index. 4 Multidimensional poverty – intensity of deprivation is the average percentage of deprivation experienced by people in multidimensional poverty. 5 Multidimensional poverty – population at risk is the percentage of the population that suffers a deprivation count between 2 and 3 of the weighted indicators used to construct the Multidimensional Poverty Index. 6 Population with at least one severe deprivation in education is the percentage of the population suffering a deprivation in at least 1.5 of the weighted indicators in the education dimension. 7 Population with at least one severe deprivation in health is the percentage of the population suffering a deprivation in at least 1.5 of the weighted indicators in the health dimension. 8 Population with at least one severe deprivation in living standards is the percentage of the population suffering a deprivation in at least 1.5 of the weighted indicators in the living standards dimension. Data Source: Human Development Report 2010 (UNDP 2010).

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Cambodia is the second poorest country in the region. Her MPI score was 0.263. More than half the Cambodian (53.90%) were multidimensionally poor with average intensity of deprivation was 48.90%. The deprivation was mainly caused by low living standards (78.40%), lack of education (40.90%); and lack of health and nutrition (36%).

In Indonesia, the MPI score was 0.095 – making her the third poorest country in the region. Although only 20.80% of her people were multidimensionally poor, the figure constituted more than 50% of the poor people in the region. The average intensity of deprivation was 45.90% – a figure that was only slightly lower than in Cambodia. The deprivation was mainly of low living standards (31.20%), lack of health and nutrition (14.40%); and lack of education (12.60%).

Myanmar’s MPI ( score = 0.088) was better than Lao PDR, Cambodia and Indonesia. Although she was placed in the ’lower Human Development Index’ in 2010, her MPI score was much better than those of Lao PDR, Cambodia and Indonesia, due to the better condition of living standard, education and health. However, her intensity of deprivation was 62.00% – the highest deprivation in the region. The scorecard shows that the Burmese was deprived mainly of lack of education (32.70%), low living standards (22.80%); and lack of health and nutrition (11.70%).

Vietnam is the fifth MPI-poorest country in the region (score = 0.075). Her intensity of deprivation was 52.50%. The deprivation experienced by the Vietnamese was mainly of low living standards (30.10%); lack of education (12.30%), and lack of health and nutrition (10.80%).

The Philippines is the sixth poorest in the region. Her MPI score was 0.067 and its intensity of deprivation was 53.50% – higher than the figures in Indonesians, Cambodian and Vietnamese. The deprivation of the Filipinos was mainly caused by low living standards (18.20%); and lack of health and nutrition (14.20%), lack of education (13.60%).

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Thailand’s MPI whic h was 0.006 placed it in the seventh rank of the poorest MPI countries in the region. In general, there were only 1.70% of Thais experienced deprivation with 38.50% in the intensity. The Thais were deprived mainly of lack of education (by 12.60% of the people), lack of health and nutrition (by 5.60% of the people), and low living standard (by 1.50% of the people).

4.4.8 Militancy, terrorism, and insurgency in some part of the region

Militancy, terrorism, and insurgency was ranked number eight by the more than three- quarters of respondents (in general 77%: 85% Malaysians, 85% Singaporeans and 61% Indonesians) The Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U Test confirmed that there were significantly more respondents in Singapore and Malaysia who considered the issue as definitely an obstacle than those in Indonesia (see Table 4.26).

Militancy, terrorism, and insurgency (especially among some muslims in South Thailand and Southern Philippines) have raised some protracted conflicts disturbing the security of the region. According to the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) in their Report of “Conflict Barometer 2009” , there were 37 conflicts in the Southeast Asia region in 2009; 30 of them were the internal ones. 444 Of the 30 internal conflicts in the region, the conflicts that involve the extremist Muslim in some parts of the region were of the most complicated internal conflicts because they involved the systemic ideology issue of primordialism (nationalism and religious issues) and secessionism which was very difficult to solve.

Four conflicts between the Indonesian national government and Muslim extremists in the national or the locals were listed in 2010 by the HIIK. 445 The conflict in Aceh between the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement) and Indonesian government, involving the objective of establishing of Islamic Law

444 Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (2010). The institute defines conflict as ”the clashing of interests (positional differences) over national values of some duration and magnitudes between at least two parties (organized groups, states, groups of states, organisations) that were determined to pursue their interests and to achieve their goals”. 445 Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (2010).

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Table 4.37 List of conflicts in the ASEAN countries (HIIK 2010)

Type of No Country Name of conflicts 1 Conflicting parties Conflict Items Begin Intensity 2 conflict

International Conflicts 1 Cambodia Cambodia – Cambodia vs. Vietnam Territory International 1969 1 - Vietnam Vietnam Territorial (latent) Conflict 2 Indonesia Indonesia – Timor Indonesia vs. Timor Other International 2002 1 – Timor Leste Conflict Leste (latent) Leste 3 Malaysia Migrant workers Malaysia vs. Indonesia Other International 1998 2 conflict and Philippines (manifest) 4 Singapore Singapore – Singapore vs. Territory, International 1963 1 – Malaysia Malaysia Conflict Malaysia International (latent) power 5 Thailand – Thailand – Thailand vs. Territory, International 1954 3 Cambodia Cambodia Border Cambodia international (crisis) Conflict power 6 Thailand – Thailand – Thailand vs. Myanmar Territory, other International 1948 1 Myanmar Myanmar Border (latent) Conflict 7 China – Spratly Islands China vs. Vietnam vs. Territory, International 1945 1 Vietnam et Malaysia vs. resources (latent) al. Philippines vs . Brunei vs. Singapore vs. Indonesia

Internal Conflict 1 Cambodia Cambodia CFF CFF vs. government National power Internal 2000 1 Conflict (latent) 2 Cambodia Cambodia FUNCINPEC, SRP vs. System/ideolog Internal 1997 2 Opposition government y, national (manifest) Conflict power 3 Indonesia Aceh Conflict GAM, Partai Aceh, Autonomy, Internal 1953 3 KPA vs. government resources (crisis) 4 Indonesia Jemaah Islamiyah Jemaah Islamiyah vs. System/ideolog Internal 1981 3 Conflict government y, national (crisis) power 5 Indonesia Moluccas Conflict Laskar Jihad vs. Regional Internal 1998 3 Christians predominance (crisis) 6 Indonesia Sulawesi Conflict Muslims vs. Christians Regional Internal 1998 2 predominance (manifest) 7 Indonesia Papua conflict OPM vs. government Secession, Internal 1949 3 resources (crisis) 8 Indonesia RMS Moluccas RMS, FKM, Laskar Secession Internal 1950 2 Conflict Jihad vs. government (manifest) 9 Malaysia KMM conflict KMM vs. government System/ideolog Internal 1998 1 y (latent) 10 Malaysia Ethnic conflicts Malays vs. minorities Regional Internal 1946 1 (Chinese & Indian) predominance (latent) 11 Malaysia Malaysian Hindraf, Pakatan National power Internal 1998 2 Opposition Party Rakyat, DAP, PAS, (manifest) PKR vs. government 12 Myanmar Rakhine state Arakan Army, NUFA, Secession Internal 1948 2 conflict vs. government (manifest) 13 Myanmar Chin state conflict CNA, CNF vs. Secession Internal 1988 2 government (manifest) 14 Myanmar Kachin state KIA, KIO vs. Autonomy Internal 1961 2 conflict government (manifest) 15 Myanmar Kayah state KNPP, KnA, KNLP Autonomy Internal 1948 2 conflict vs. government (manifest) 16 Myanmar Karen state conflict KNU, KNLA vs. Secession Internal 1948 4 government, UWSA, (severe DKBA crisis) continue …

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… continued

17 Myanmar Mon State conflict MNLA, NMSP, MRA, Secession Internal 1948 2 HRP vs. government (manifest) 18 Myanmar Myanmar NLD, NCGUB, System/ideolog Internal 1962 2 opposition conflict ABFSU, ABSDF, y, national (manifest) NULF, AABBM vs. power government 19 Myanmar Myanmar Rohingyas, ARNO vs. Other Internal 1948 2 Rohingya conflict government (manifest ) 20 Myanmar Shan state conflict SSA-S, SSNA, SSA-N Autonomy Internal 1952 2 1 vs. government (manifest ) 21 Myanmar Shan state conflict UWSA, UWSP, Autonomy Internal 1988 3 2 MNDAA, NDAA -ESS (crisis) vs. government 22 Philippines Abu Sayyaf / Abu Sayyaf Islamic Secession, Internal 1991 4 Mindanao Fundamentalists vs. system/ideology (severe government crisis) 23 Philippines CPP, NPA NPA, CPP vs. Autonomy, Internal 1968 3 government system/ideology (crisis) , resources 24 Philippines MILF/Mindanao MILF vs. government Autonomy, Internal 1977 4 system/ideology (severe , resources crisis) 25 Philippines MNLF/Mindanao MNLF vs. government Autonomy, Internal 1969 3 system/ideology (crisis) , resources 26 Singapore Jemaah Islamiyah - Jemaah Islamiyah vs. System/ideolog Internal 1999 1 Singapore Conflict government y (latent) 27 Thailand Southern Thai Muslim separatist vs. Secession, Internal 1902 4 Conflict government system/ideology (severe crisis) 28 Thailand Northern Thai Northern Hill Tribes Other Internal 1955 1 Conflict vs. government (latent) 29 Thailand Thai Opposition PPP, PTD, UDD vs. National power Internal 2006 3 Conflict PAD, government (crisis) 30 Vietnam Montagnards Montagnards vs. Autonomy, Internal 1958 2 Conflict government other (manifest )

Note : 1 Conflict is defined as the clashing of interests (positional differences) over national values of some duration and magnitudes between at least two parties (organized groups, states, groups of states, organisations) that are determined to pursue their inte rests and achieve their goals (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 2010). 2 Heidelberg defines five level of conflict intensity: State of Intensity Level of Name of Definition violence group intensity intensity Non- Low 1 Latent A positional difference over definable values of national violent conflict meaning is considered to be latent conflicts if demands are articulated by one of the parties and perceived by the other as such. 2 Manifest Include the use of measures that are located in the stage conflict preliminary to violent force, e.g.: verbal pressure, threatening explicitly with violence, or the imposition of economic sanction. Violent Medium 3 Crisis A tense situation in which at least one of the parties uses violent force in sporadic incidents. High 4 Severe crisis Violent force is used repeatedly in an organized way 5 War A violent conflict in which violent force is used with certain continuity in an organized and systematic way. The extent of destruction is massive and of long duration.

Source : Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 2010, Conflict Barometer 2009 . University of Heidelberg.

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(šarīʿah or qānūn ʾIslāmī ) in the province where pluralism were practice in national level, went into crises in 2009. The conflict of Jemaah Islamiyah movement versus Indonesian National Government, which involved the motives of establishing a Fundamentalist Islamic State that unified Indonesia, Southern Philippines, Malaysia, and Southern Thailand, went into crisis in 2009. The Moluccas Conflict and the Sulawesi Conflict that involved Muslim fundamentalists’ Laskar Jihad versus the local Christians and the national government were manifest in 2009 (see Table 4.37).

Another conflicts listed by the HIIK in 2010 occurs in Southern Thailand where the Pattani muslim separatist seeking for secession has become a complicated issue since 1902. The conflicts that involved the muslim separatist versus the Thai National Government in the southern provinces of Thailand went into severe crisis in 2009 (see Table 4.37). In Southern Philippines, the Bangsamoro muslim separatist who seeks for secession has been more difficult solve because the separatist were well-organized while the Filipino government were relatively weak in the locals. The conflicts between the muslim separatist (Abu Sayyaf, Moro Islamic Liberation Front / MILF, and Moro National Liberation Front / MNLF) and the Philippines National Government in the southern provinces of Thailand went into severe crisis in 2009 (see Table 4.37).

In Myanmar’s Karen State, the muslim separatist who seeked for secession had also gone into severe crisis in 2009. The conflicts involved the muslim separatist (KNU, KNLA) versus the Myanmar National Government in the Karen State of Myanmar (see Table 4.37) began in 1948 and was extremely difficult to solve.

Daljit Singh argued that the internal conflicts in the region were often the legacy of the western colonialists. 446 The national borders – drawn by the British, the French, Spanish and the Dutch who occupied them in the colonial era 447 – often left

446 Singh (2010). 447 The borders of present-day Southeast Asian states were drawn largely by the colonial powers to suit their interests. For instance, the boundaries between what is today Indonesia and Malaysia and Singapore were settled under the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 to demarcate British and Dutch spheres of influence and control in the region. The boundary between peninsular Malaysia and

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ethnic or religious minorities on the wrong side of the borders, as it were, cut off from their compatriots on the other sides. For example, the Pattani Muslim minorities in Thailand were left from their brothers in Malaysia, due to the agreement between Britain and Siam and later on, it was to cause a problem of integration for Thailand. 448

Incomplete or unsuccessful nation-building and the political and socio- economic marginalisation of minorities are also one cause of the conflicts and violence in the post-colonial Southeast Asia. These issues were true in Myanmar with numerous ethnic insurgencies over the years, Malaysia with its several racial riots, Indonesia with its Acehnese and Papuan rebellions, the Philippines and Thailand with the Muslim secessionist in the southern part of the countries, and the periodic violence in Cambodia against its Vietnamese minority. 449

4.4.9 Ethnic-Chinese economic domination

The ninth challenge perceived was the Ethnic-Chinese economic domination. In the three countries surveyed, almost two-thirds respondents (in general 65%: 73% Malaysians, 61% Indonesians, and 44% Singaporeans) realized the potential obstacle of this issue for the establishment of ASEAN Community (see Table 4.26). The Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U Test confirmed that there were significantly more respondents in Indonesia and Singapore who considered the issue as an obstacle than those in Malaysia.

The Chinese, constitute 4.44 percent of the Southeast Asian population (see Table 4.38), are the sixth largest ethnic group in the region after the Javanese (14.96), the Vietnamese (12.77%), the Thai (9.24%), the Sundanese (5.94%) and the Malays (5.09%). Only in Singapore they are the majority making up 63.65% of the population. They are minorities in the other nine ASEAN countries: Malaysia

Thailand was agreed to under the 1907 Anglo-Siamese Treaty, while the boundary between Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand were drawn by the French (2010). 448 The 1907 border agreement between Britain and Siam, in which the British made the Siamese give up their claims to Kedah, Perlis and Kelantan, also left the Pattani Muslim minority on the Siamese side of the border in today’s southern Thailand ( Singh 2010). 449 Singh (2010).

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Table 4.38 The Number of Chinese population in ASEAN countries

Ranks Number of Chinese Population based on Number of (2009 estimation) percentage Country population (2009 % of the estimation) 1 Estimated number population in the country 1 Singapore 4,987,600 3,174,800 63.65% 2 Malaysia 28,306,700 6,437,800 25.20% 3 Thailand 66,903,000 7,195,810 10.76% 4 Brunei Darussalam 406,200 63,660 15.67% 5 Indonesia 231,369,500 6,189,000 2.67% 6 Myanmar 50,000,419 1,082,070 2.16% 7 Philippines 92,226,600 1,018,110 1.10% 8 Cambodia 14,957,800 613,200 4.10% 9 Lao PDR 5,922,100 155,000 2.62% 10 Vietnam 86,024,600 2,280,530 2.65%

All ASEAN 590,638,300 26,209,980 4.44% Note: 1 Number of population is based on the data of ASEANStats 2010 (ASEAN Secretariat, The ASEANStats , 15 July 2010). 2 Number of Chinese population is based on the data of Joshua Project Peoples Data (2010).

(25.20% of population); Brunei Darussalam (15.67%); Thailand (10.76%); Indonesia, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines (less than 5%).

Although covers only 4.44% of the population of the region, the Chinese control the disproportionate share of the economic wealth of almost all countries in ASEAN.450 In Indonesia, the Chinese constitute about 3 percent of the population but are said to control as much as 60 percent of the nation’s wealth .451 In Malaysia, less than 25 percent of Malaysian population are of Chinese origin, but they were significantly richer than the other ethnic groups in the country. The statistics from the Malaysian Prime Minister Office show that the average household income in 2009 of

450 Singh (2010). 451 Cunningham (2001).

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the Malaysian Chinese were 38 percent higher than the Bumiputera. 452 In addition, the economic dominance of the Malaysian Chinese in Malaysia is also obvious on the statistics of equity ownership of limited companies 453 .

The acceptance of the native groups on the Chinese ethnic groups was different in various Southeast Asian countries. Thailand and the Philippines have successfully fairly well in assimilating the local Chinese, 454 but this policy was not successful in some other countries. The Chinese have often been viewed with envy, even resentment, and periodically made scapegoats for other misfortunes.455

4.4.10 Pluralism in the region (ethnics, tribes and religions)

Pluralism of ethnics, tribes, and religions in the region was put in the tenth rank among the listed challenges to ASEAN integration. Almost two-thirds of those surveyed (in general 60%: 65% Malaysians, 40% Indonesians, and 75% Singaporeans) realized the potential obstacle of this issue for the establishment of ASEAN Community (see Table 4.26). The Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U Test confirmed that the answers in the three countries were significantly different. There

452 In Malaysia, the economies of the Chinese compared to other ethnic groups can be traced from the statistics of economic ownership based on ethnicity. The statistics of average monthly household income by ethnicity (Malaysia Prime Minister Office 2010) shows that the 2009 household income of the Chinese Malaysians (MYR 5,011) was typically higher than those of the Natives (Bumiputera) (MYR 3,624), the Indian Malaysians (MYR 3,999), and the other ethnic groups (MYR 3,640). The statistics of the level of poverty by ethnicity (Malaysia, RMK-9, 2005) showed that there were only 0.6% poor Chinese people in 2005; the number was significantly lower than those of Malays (8.3%), and Indians (3.5%). Based on those two statistics, the economies of the Chinese was significantly better than the other ethnic groups. 453 The statistics of equity ownership showed that the Chinese Malaysians owned 34.9% of the equity of the limited company in 2008, compared to 21.9% by the Natives (Bumiputera), 1.6% by the Indian Malaysians, and 0.1% by the other ethnic group (Malaysia Prime Minister Office (2010). 454 In Thailand, the Chinese which was known as ”Sino -Thai” had been successfully assimilated (Singh 2010). The Chinese did the integration through intermarriage and long years of residence. They form a significant part of Thai society, particularly in Bangkok, and hold positions of economic and political power. One example is former Prime Minister Thaksin Sinawatra (Chachavalpongpun 2010). In the Philippines, the Chinese who had become the citizen of the country was not discriminated; however, the process of naturalization was difficult in the past (Singh 2010). The Chinese community accounts for about 10 percent of the population of the Philippines. A number of Filipinos have Chinese ancestry, including the national hero, Dr. Jose Rizal, and former President Corazon Cojuangco Aquino. 455 Ongkokham (1998); Singh (2010).

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Table 4.39 The distribution of major ethnic groups in the ASEAN countries

No Country Number of Number of Five largest ethnics/tribes ethnics/ languages (% of the population in the country) tribes and dialects 1 Brunei 26 23 Malays (45.1%), Chinese (15.7%), Filipino (8.0%), Darussalam Dusun Kadazan (7.1%), and Iban (5.6%). 2 Cambodia 42 33 Khmer Central (85.3%), Vietnamese (4.2%), Chinese (4.1%), Cham (2.2%), and Kampuchea Krom (1.7%). 3 Indonesia 785 715 Javanese (38.19%), Sunda (15.6%), Madura (3.38%), Minangkabau (2.76%), and Bugis (2.53%). 4 Laos 147 139 Lao (44.33%), Khmu (8.82%), Hmong Daw (3.68), Hmong Njua (3.16%) and Phu Thai (2.91%). 5 Malaysia 183 160 Malay (41.64%), Chinese (25.20%), Indian (7.50%), Iban (2.78%), and Minangkabau (2.08%). 6 Myanmar 142 135 Burmese (56.12%), Shan (8.51%), Karen (8.99%), Rakhine (3.92%), and Yangbye (3.62%). 7 Philippines 186 179 Filipino (26.93%), Visayan (19.99%), Ilocano (9.11%), Hiligayno (7.69%), and Bikol Central (4.17%). 8 Singapore 52 41 Chinese (63.7%), Malay (13.9%) , Tamil (5.6%), Filipino (2.9%), and Thai (1.1%). 9 Thailand 114 105 Thai (81.5%), Chinese (10.76%), Malay (2.52%), Khmer (1.71%), and Pu Thai (0.71%). 10 Vietnam 114 110 Vietnamese (84.5%), Chinese (2.65%), Tay (1.9%), Muong (1.5%), and Khmer Central (1.4%). Total 1,518 1,272

Source: Processed from Joshua Project Peoples Data (2010)

were significantly more respondents in Indonesia (60%) considered the issue as definitely not an obstacle than those in Malaysia (35%) and Singapore (25%).

Statistics in table 4.23 and 4.39 shows the plurality of tribes and ethnicity in the region. Although the Javanese, the Vietnamese Kinh, the Thais, the Sundanese, and the Malays were the five major tribes in the region, none of them make up more than 15% of the population of the region (see Table 4.23). The data also shows that there are approximately 1,518 tribes and ethnic groups and 1,272 languages spoken in the region. Indonesia, the most populous country of the region, is the home for 785 tribes speaking about 715 local languages and dialects.

The diversity of religious beliefs also has been an important feature of the region. As exhibited in table 4.24, no religious group can claim to be overwhelming majority in the region. The muslims which was the largest religious group of the

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region only covered 38.8% of the regional population. The Bhuddists and Christians were also large in number as they covered 25.4% and 20.2% of the regional population. The situation of double plurality might hinder cooperation, if they moved fundamentalism, extremism and narrow mindedness.

4.5 PERCEIVED IMPACTS OF ASEAN COMMUNITY ON NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, SECURITY AND IDENTITY

This study argues that the public perception of the impact of regional integration on national sovereignty, security and identity need to be investigated because they may influence the way the public perceives regional integration. The following section describes the study results on those issues.

4.5.1 Perceived impact on national sovereignty

The perception of the respondents on the impact of the establishment of the ASEAN Community on national sovereignty is shown in Table 4.40. In general, the respondents perceived that their national sovereignty would not be negatively affected by the ASEAN Community. However, the Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney Tests confirmed that the perception of the Malaysian respondents that tended to agree that

Table 4.40 Opinion on the effect of the establishment of ASEAN Community on the sovereignty of states Res- Respondents Kruskal-Wallis Tests for ponse Malaysia Indonesia Singapore Average comparing the responses Chi-Square 20.74 df: 2 It is possible that national sovereignty will be Asymp. Sig. 0.00 negatively affected by ASEAN Community. Meaning: There are significant differences. · Yes 54% 42% 37% 44% Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: · No 46% 58% 63% 56% · Agreement to the statement is significantly higher in Malaysia than that in Indonesia and in Singapore. · There is no significant difference between the opinion of the Singaporeans and the Indonesians.

The establishment of ASEAN Parliament and Chi-Square 13.13 df: 2 ASEAN Court of Justice will diminish the Asymp. Sig. 0.00 sovereignty of my country. Meaning: There are significant differences. · Yes 73% 61% 67% 67% Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: · No 27% 39% 33% 33% · Agreement to the statement is significantly higher in Malaysia than that in Indonesia. · The opinion of the Singaporeans does not differ significantly with the Indonesians and the Malaysians.

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their national sovereignty would be affected were significantly different with the perception of the Singaporeans and Indonesians who tended to disagree on that.

While the respondents in Indonesia and Singapore were quite optimistic that ASEAN Community would not affect their sovereignty negatively, they perceived the ASEAN Parliament and ASEAN Court of Justice differently. On this issue, about two- thirds agreed that the establishment of the two bodies would diminish the sovereignty of their countries. The Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney Tests showed that the agreement to the statement was higher in Malaysia than that in Indonesia.

4.5.2 Perceived impact on national security

The survey results showed that more than 60% of the respondents in the three countries disagreed that their national security would possibly be negatively affected (see Table 4.41). Further analysis showed that the disagreement were significantly higher in Indonesia (70%) and Singapore (67%) than that in Malaysia (50%).

Table 4.41 Opinion on the effect of the establishment of ASEAN Community to the national security

Res- Respondents Kruskal-Wallis Tests for ponse Malaysia Indonesia Singapore Average comparing the responses Chi-Square 41.08 df: 2 It is possible that the national security will be Asymp. Sig. 0.00 negatively affected by ASEAN Community. Meaning: There are significant differences. · Yes 50% 29% 33% 38% Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: · No 50% 70% 67% 62% · Agreement to the statement is significantly higher in Malaysia than that in Indonesia and in Singapore. · There is no significant difference between the opinion of the Singaporeans and the Indonesians. I am a little bit worried that the less developed Chi-Square 41.83 df: 2 countries (such as Vietnam, Cambodia and Asymp. Sig. 0.00 Myanmar) will become a threat if they developed in Meaning: There are significant differences. the future. · Yes 38% 19% 24% 27% Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: · No 62% 81% 76% 73% · Agreement to the statement is significantly higher in Malaysia than that in Indonesia and in Singapore. · There is no significant difference between the opinion of the Singaporeans and the Indonesians.

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Related to the issue of national security, it was also interesting to gauge the perception of the respondents on the three new ASEAN members (Vietnam, Cambodia and Myanmar). During the Cold War, these countries had appeared to be a threat to the peace and stability of Southeast Asia. In Cambodia, the government under the Khmer Rogue had carried out genocide on its own people based on party and ideological differences. Vietnam had intervened in the internal affairs of Cambodia and, in fact, invaded it. Myanmar had also shown an aggressive stand towards the international community in order to preserve its totalitarian military junta. However, on average, more than 70% of the respondents did not show much concern that the three countries would become a threat if they developed in the future (see Table 4.41 ). Further analysis showed that the ”feeling of not worry” was significantly higher in Indonesia (81% of respondents) and Singapore (76%) than in Malaysia (62%).

Further, respondents were asked which countries did they perceive to be a threat to their national security. This was measured by an open-ended question “Which countries do you perceive to be a threat to the security or the sovereignty of your country?” No choice of answers was provided, so as not to influence the respondent’s perception (see 3.3). To this question, the Indonesian respondents answered that the top five countries threatening their country’s national sovereignty were Malaysia (60.5%), Singapore (20.4%), the United States (3.5%), China or Australia (2.2%) (Table 4.42). It was rather surprising that more than 80% number of Indonesian respondents perceived their immediate neighbours – Malaysia and Singapore – as threats to their national security or sovereignty.

Similar findings were obtained when the question was posed to the Malaysian and Singaporean respondents. The Malaysian respondents listed Singapore (20.8%), Indonesia (11.5%), Thailand (5.1%), The United States (2.4%) and The Philippines (2.2%) as the top five countries threatening their national sovereignty or security (see Table 4.43). Likewise, the Singaporeans named Malaysia (10.2%), Indonesia (6.5%), Myanmar (4.1%), China (3.1%) and the United States (2.4%) as their main threats

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Table 4.42 Indonesian respondents perception of threats to their national security and sovereignty

No Threats from: % 1 Malaysia 60.5% 2 Singapore 20.4% 3 United States 3.5% 4 China, Australia 2.2% 5 Vietnam, Thailand 1.2% 6 The Philippines 0.6% 7 Israel, Japan, North Korea, Timor Leste 0.4% 8 Brunei, India, Myanmar, Middle East, European Union 0.2% 9 All countries 0.6%

Table 4.43 Malaysian respondents perception of threats to their national security and sovereignty

No Threats from: % 1 Singapore 20.8% 2 Indonesia 11.5% 3 Thailand 5.1% 4 United States 2.4% 5 The Philippines 2.2% 6 Myanmar 1.6% 7 India, China, Vietnam 0.9% 8 Israel 0.4% 9 Cambodia, European Union 0.2% 10 All countries 0.4%

Table 4.44 Singaporean respondents perception of threats to their national security and sovereignty

No Threats from: % 1 Malaysia 10.2% 2 Indonesia 6.5% 3 Myanmar 4.1% 4 China 3.1% 5 United States 2.4% 6 Thailand 1.4% 7 Less developed countries, North Korea, India 0.7% 8 Cambodia, Japan, Russia, Srilanka, Philippines, Vietnam 0.3% 9 All countries 1.4%

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(Table 4.44). Thus, respondents in the three countries perceived their immediate neighbours as the main threat to their security.

4.5.3 Perceived impact on national identity

Finally, how did the respondents perceive the impact of the establishment of ASEAN Community on their national identity? On the issue of whether it was possible that their national identity would be merged into one common identity, the position of Malaysian respondents was different from those in Singapore and Indonesia (see Table 4.45). Almost two-thirds of Malaysian respondents (62%) tended to agree to this statement, but only 29% of Singaporeans and the 32% of Indonesians agreed.

Table 4.45 Opinion of respondents on the effect of the establishment of ASEAN Community on the national identity

Respondents Kruskal-Wallis Tests for Response Malaysia Indonesia Singapore Average comparing the responses Chi-Square 101.36 df: 2 It is possible that the national identity will be merged into Asymp. Sig. 0.00 one ASEAN identity. Meaning: There are significant differences. · Agree 62% 32% 29% 41% Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: · Disagree 38% 68% 71% 59% · Agreement to the statement is significantly higher in Malaysia than that in Indonesia and in Singapore. · There is no significant difference between the opinion of the Singaporeans and the Indonesians.

Will the use of English as the language of communication Chi-Square 36.80 df: 2 between ASEAN countries diminish the importance of Asymp. Sig. 0.00 national languages? Meaning: There are significant differences. · Agree 42% 23% 27% 31% Results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests: · Disagree 58% 77% 73% 69% · The disagreement to the statement is significantly higher in Indonesia and in Singapore than that in Malaysia. · There is no significant difference between the opinion of the Singaporeans and the Indonesians.

Because of the variety of national languages in the region, English is often used as the medium of communication in ASEAN for regional events and for communicating between the people of ASEAN countries. The majority of the respondents predicted that the use of English would not diminish the importance of national languages. Further analysis by using the Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U Test showed that the disagreement was significantly higher in Indonesia (77%) and Singapore (73%) than in Malaysia (58%).

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

This chapter presents further analysis on the results of the study. As mentioned in 1.3, this study argues that, as public is one of agents that is potential in influencing in the social-construction of Southeast Asian regional integration, their opinion may have an impact on the pace and direction of ASEAN Community building. Thus, ASEAN and national governments need to be more attentive to public voices and opinions to ensure the success of regionalism initiatives and for making effective decisions that satisfy the needs and expectations of the public. More specifically, the study contends that regionalism needs to address several issues regarding the opinions of the public in the region (See 1.3).

In line with the research argument, this chapter is divided into six sections. The first section discusses the findings on public knowledge and perceived relevancy of ASEAN and the ASEAN Community. The second section analyzes the findings on public attitudes, opinions and aspiration for ASEAN Community. The third section answers the inquiry on the national and regional identities towards the establishment of ASEAN Community by analyzing the finding on it. The fourth section discusses the findings on the perceived obstacles for establishing the Community, whilst the fifth section further probes the impact of the establishment of ASEAN Community on national sovereignty, security and identity based on the findings. Finally, the sixth section discusses the perceived impacts of public opinions on ASEAN Community building.

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5.1 ANALYSIS ON PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND PERCEIVED RELEVANCY OF ASEAN

This study argues that public awareness and perception of ASEAN regionalism needs to be assessed because it would influence the public opinion on ASEAN regional integration. In general, this study found that the respondents’ awareness of ASEAN was quite high, but they lacked awareness of the ASEAN Community.

Most respondents claimed that they were aware of ASEAN, when it was formed, and its objectives. Moreover, they were able to differentiate between ASEAN and other types of security forums with military establishment such as NATO. Interestingly, however, the respondents’ claim of awareness was not fully translated into a more comprehensive understanding of the technical aspects of ASEAN – such as the historical set-up, structure and its mode of operations as a regional organisation – because most information they got was from news in mass media which usually superficial. When the respondents’ knowledge of ASEAN was compared, it was found that the knowledge level in the three countries was not significantly different.1

Compared to the previous study by Thompson and Thianthai 2, the finding of this study was quite similar on this issue . In their study, the respondents’ knowledge on ASEAN , measured by ‘the familiarit y with ASEAN’, showed a slightly-but- insignificant difference from this study.3 Surprisingly, the result of the knowledge of the year of ASEAN founding on this study was also not significantly different with the study of both authors.4

1 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.1 and 4.2 in 4.1.1. 2 Thompson and Thianthai (2008). 3 The study by Thompson and Thianthai (2008) found that the familiarity of the respondents, ranging from 99.5% (Indonesians), 98.8% (Malaysians) and 92.9% (Singaporeans). In this study, the knowledge of the association -- ranging from 98% (Indonesians), 96% (Malaysians) and 97% (Singaporeans) -- showed just a slightly-but-insignificant difference. 4 The study by Thompson and Thianthai (2008) found that the number of respondents which could correctly identified the year of ASEAN founding ranged from 66% (Indonesians), 53% (Malaysians) and 48% (Singaporeans). In this study, the knowledge of the year of ASEAN founding -- ranging from 66% (Indonesians), 58% (Malaysians) and 51% (Singaporeans) -- showed just a slightly-but-insignificant difference.

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The findings suggest the knowledge of ASEAN ought to be taught as one of the subjects or in some way integrated into in the school curriculum because it would help to increase the level of knowledge on the organisation. This study reveals that most of the respondents in the three countries claimed that they obtained their knowledge of ASEAN at schools – a finding that was consistent with the study by Thompson and Thianthai (2008) 5. In addition, the majority of them also felt that schools should teach about ASEAN. The consistency of the findings on knowledge about ASEAN, the acknowledgement by respondents that they acquired information about ASEAN at school and the perception of importance of studying ASEAN at school indicate that these three variables were related. The respondents’ knowledge level was quite high because they had learned about ASEAN at schools.6

Most of the respondents perceived ASEAN as relevant and important for the region and their countries. 7 Some critics, such as Mely Caballero-Anthony,8 Leng Thearith 9 and CPF Luhulima 10 , argued that ASEAN has not been effective or relevant

5 The study by Thompson and Thianthai (2008) found that school was one of the primary sources of which knowledge of ASEAN was obtained. Some 77.5% of Indonesians, 74.0% of Malaysians and 73.9% of Singaporeans got this information from schools. In this study, the respondents claimed that their knowledge of ASEAN was obtained from schools -- ranging from 94% (Indonesians), 61% (Malaysians) and 60% (Singaporeans). Although there were some significant differences in the percentage, majority of respondents in the two study shared that they learned about ASEAN at schools. 6 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.3 in 4.1.1. 7 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.4 in 4.1.2. 8 Mely Caballero-Anthony (2010) argued that ASEAN countries had often come under criticism for their limited engagement in peace operations, especially within the region, because of its strong adherence to a traditional understanding of state sovereignty and non-interference. 9 Leng Thearith (2009) argued that ASEAN appeared to be less relevant to the security of its members because it has failed or made inadequate efforts to tackle various pressing economic and security concerns. Given the traditional security threats, ASEAN was not able to prevent the eruption of armed clashes or even ease tensions between Cambodia and Thailand over their border issue. Regarding the South China Sea issue, ASEAN could not effectively provide support to its members in seeking a long-term conflict resolution with China. In addition, concering the East Timor problem, ASEAN also failed to meet its members’ desire to play an effective role in the peacebuilding mission. In non-traditional security issues, ASEAN failed to cope with the haze problem. The only security problem that ASEAN could successfully tackle was terrorism, and this success was possible because of the interests of all ASEAN members, also the pressure of the US. The main reasons of those failures were the strict adherence to the non-interference principle and the lack of means to enforce compliance from its members. 10 CPF Luhulima (1999) argued that ASEAN seems to be less relevant in the field of economics. He argued that ASEAN was paralysed by the 1997 crisis and had since not been able to devise and develop a mechanism in times of crisis, to face conventional and non-conventional security threats.

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for peace and development of the region. The finding of this study, however, does not appear to support that. Although there were significant numbers of respondents who were not so sure about the success of ASEAN, only some respondents in the three countries thought that ASEAN had been unsuccessful or very unsuccessful. In fact, there were more respondents who perceived of ASEAN as having been successful than those who thought to the contrary.11

A significant number of respondents did express doubts over ASEAN’s success as they viewed ASEAN as neither successful nor unsuccessful; however, they thought of ASEAN as quite important and still relevant to the region. In addition, measured by the perception of problems “if there were no ASEAN” , the study found that most of the respondents in Indonesia and Singapore admitted that there would be probably some problems if ASEAN did not exist. 12 This finding highlights the fact that the majority of respondents thought of ASEAN as important and relevant to the region.

It is interesting to highlight why more Indonesian and Singaporean respondents admitted the relevancy of ASEAN compared to their counterparts in Malaysia. In Indonesia, most of the respondents have learned about ASEAN since primary school 13 and the importance of ASEAN for their country is discussed in their syllabus. For Singaporean, ASEAN is perceived highly relevant because of geopolitical and historical contexts. Singaporeans were highly aware of the small size of their geography and population compared to their neighbours. Before ASEAN was established in 1967, the situation was considered as threatening for Singapore;14 thus,

11 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.4 in 4.1.2. 12 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.4 in 4.1.2. 13 Table 4.3 shows that 94% of Indonesian respondents admitted that they had learned about ASEAN since primary or secondary school. This figure is much greater compared to 61% of Malaysian and 60% of Singaporean respondents. 14 Singapore perceived threatening situation in years after her independence. It was expulsed from the Federation of Malaysia and was involved in the “Konfrontasi” dispute with Indonesia over the formation of Malaysia. Given Singapore’s geographical weakness as a small islan d state surrounded by two neighbours still harbour some emotional baggage with regard to the formation of and Singapore’s split from the Malaysian Federation in 1965, Singapore naturally fears for her safety and sovereignty (Ho 2010: 192).

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ASEAN has been perceived to provide better security and economic cooperation with their neighbours and stability for the region and their country which are required for their high economic development.

The findings on the perceived relevancy of ASEAN are consistent with that of Thompson and Thianthai. In their study, the relevancy of ASEAN – measured by the perception of ASEAN membership as beneficial to the respondents and their countries – found that the majority of respondents regarded ASEAN membership as beneficial for them and their countries. The finding of this study is quite consistent with their study 15 .

Finally, the findings on the public awareness of the concept of ASEAN Community are of considerable interest. Compared to the level of awareness of ASEAN, the concept of ASEAN Community recorded a much lower level of awareness. Only half of the respondents across the three countries surveyed answered that they had heard about the ASEAN Community, but in Indonesia, the percentage was lower. The level of awareness regarding the two founding documents of ASEAN Community – the Declaration of the Bali Concord II and the ASEAN Charter – was even lower. 16

What could have caused the low level of awareness of the concept of ASEAN Community? The study found that lack of socialisation both from national governments and the regional organisation itself was the key problem. This shortcoming could become a key concern for the Indonesians since almost two-thirds of the respondents in this ASEAN ’s largest country, claimed that they had never heard any explanations about the Community from the government. This issue needs

15 The study by Thompson and Thianthai (2008) found that most of the respondents (91% of Malaysians, 84% of Indonesians and 92% of Singaporeans) agreed that membership in ASEAN was beneficial to their countries. They also found that most of the respondents agreed that membership in ASEAN was beneficial to them personally (66% of Malaysians, 49% of Indonesians and 66% of Singaporeans). In this case, the finding of this study – that some 79% of Malaysians, 77% of Indonesians and 71% of Singaporeans regarded ASEAN as important for them and their countries – showed the similar trends with the finding of the study by Thompson and Thianthai. 16 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.5 in 4.1.3.

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to be addressed because the interest of the public in the Community was high. The majority of respondents in the three countries denied that ASEAN is merely the concerns of the leaders. In addition, they also denied that they would not be affected by the developments in ASEAN, and, in fact, asserted that the development of ASEAN is crucial and deserved attention.17

There are some interesting findings about those who admitted that they were aware of the ASEAN Community. Majority of them answered that they knew that the Community would consist of three pillars. However, only some of them were aware that 2015 would be the year for the regional community to take effect. They also stated that they did not have sufficient knowledge and information on ASEAN Community.18

These finding are of concern for the establishment of ASEAN Community. The study found that, though the public has strong interests in the regional integration, it is obvious that the national governments have failed to provide the public with sufficient information. The socialisation efforts of the national governments – at the current level seemed to have been aimed at limited elites of the public – are simply not sufficient enough. Sufficient socialisation is a necessity because the public is the key stakeholder of ASEAN Community. In fact, their involvement is needed to move ASEAN regionalism from the hands of the bureaucratic elite to the hands of the public. Since awareness and sufficient information are crucial to gain support from the public, it is necessary to socialize the idea widely to the public in each ASEAN country.

ASEAN regionalism should learn from the experience of the EC that had made vast investments on enhancing public awareness and attitudes towards their regional integration. Several studies have found that creating public awareness related to public support to have been an important component of European integration.19 Several

17 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.6 in 4.1.3. 18 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.7 in 4.1.3. 19 Gabel (1998b: 333).

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experts who studied the European public opinion on regional integration found positive relationship between public knowledge and attitudes towards or support for regional integration initiatives. For example, studies by Ronald Inglehart, Rabier and Reif, Janssen, and Gabel found that public knowledge influenced their identification with the supranational political community 20 . Another scholar, Bernd Hayo found a significant positive relationship between the level of knowledge of the EU and their attitudes towards further monetary integration 21 . Popkin and Dimmock who investigated the phenomena of ‘low information rationality’ explained that scepticism toward European integration might be related to poor information about it.22 In addition, Constantelos and Diven argue that a public that understands the institutions, goals, and costs of the EU are more likely to support the organisation.23

What is the relationship between the public knowledge and attitudes towards the ASEAN Community? Analysis of the survey data using the Pearson Chi-Square tests indicated that public awareness of the ASEAN Community had significant impacts to the attitudes towards the ASEAN Community and its three pillars (Political Security Community, Economic Community, and Socio-Cultural Community) (see Table 5.1). The attitudes of the respondents who had greater awareness of ASEAN Community were more positive than those who were not.

Finally, it can be summed up that respondents were indeed highly aware of ASEAN and considered it as relevant and necessary for the region and their countries. Nevertheless, awareness of the proposed ASEAN Community was much lower than the awareness of ASEAN, due to the inadequate socialisation from the national

20 Ronald Inglehart (1970a), Rabier and Reif (1991), Janssen (1991), and Gabel (1998b) argue that high cognitive mobilization, characterized by a high level of political awareness well-developed skills in political communication, enables citizens to identify with a supranational political community; thus, as a citizen’s awareness increases, she is more familiar with and less threatened by the top ic of regional integration. 21 Bernd Hayo (1999), used the 1993 Eurobarometer data to analyze the relationship between objective knowledge of EU and people’s attitudes towards the European Monetary Union (EMU), and found that a higher level of EU knowledge could influence people’s opinion towards further monetary integration positively. 22 Popkin and Dimmock (2002). 23 Constantelos and Diven (2010).

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government and the regional organisation. As argued in the study, the findings show significant positive relationship between the respondents’ awareness and their attitude towards the ASEAN Community.

Table 5.1 The result of Chi-Square Tests for analyzing the relationship between the awareness and attitudes towards ASEAN Community Pearson Chi Square Value df Asymp. Relationships between the awareness and: Sig Result of analysis (2-sided) Support for the establishment of ASEAN 15.191 4 0.004 Significant Community relationship Optimism for the success of the 16.422 4 0.003 Significant establishment of ASEAN Community relationship Perception that their country will benefit 12.816 4 0.012 Significant from membership in ASEAN Community relationship Perception that the establishment of 8.182 4 0.085 Significant ASEAN Community will be positive / relationship good for my country and its people Support for the establishment of ASEAN 12.366 4 0.015 Significant Security Community (ASC) relationship Perception that the formation of ASC is 13.619 4 0.009 Significant positive to country and society relationship Support for the establishment of ASEAN 17.815 4 0.001 Significant Economic Community (AEC) relationship Perception that the formation of AEC is 21.071 4 0.000 Significant good for their country relationship Perception that the formation of AEC is 13.024 4 0.011 Significant good for the people in my country relationship Support for the establishment of ASEAN 10.315 4 0.035 Significant Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) relationship Belief that ASCC will be able to create a 14.701 4 0.005 Significant more caring community relationship

5.2 ANALYSIS ON PUBLIC ATTITUDES, OPINIONS AND ASPIRATIONS TOWARDS THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE ASEAN COMMUNITY

This study argues that public attitudes, opinions, and aspirations towards the concept and formation of ASEAN Community need to be studied in order to formulate effective strategies for the social construction of the ASEAN Community.

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Literature on regional integration theories from the three major traditions – the transactionalist, neo-functionalist, and democratic theories – share the ideas that opinions (the attitudes, opinions, and aspirations) and participation of the general public determine the success of regionalism initiatives. 24 Several scholars have argued that positive public attitudes, opinions, and aspiration are important for regional integration. Wilson argues that one of the major barriers to regional integration in North America is the lack of public support for closer integration. 25 Similarly, Gabel asserts that public attitudes are an important component of European integration because they provide the political foundation for integration as well as shape and constrain the process of the integration. 26 Furthermore, the endurance of the EU political system vitally depends on public compliance with and acceptance of EU law which lacks a supranational means of enforcement.27 Jones argues that public attitudes are important both for the euro and the European Central Bank because of the problem of legitimacy in regional financial policy. 28 Furthermore, the persistent work of Eurobarometer – that have assessed public attitudes, opinions, and aspirations towards European regional integration for more than 38 years – shows us that public attitudes, opinions, and aspirations are important to be assessed.

Regarding the ASEAN Community, the study found that the attitudes of the respondents in the three countries were positive. Most respondents in Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore supported the formation of the regional community and were optimistic about its success. The successful implementation of its objectives, they felt, would be able to create the aspired partnership in dynamic development and a community of caring societies with diverse cultures and social harmony. The respondents also exhibited optimism regarding the benefits of the ASEAN

24 Collins (2008); Deutsch (1957); Lindberg and Scheingold (1970); Hewstone (1986); Ortuoste (2008). 25 Wilson (2004). 26 Gabel (1998b). 27 Gabel (1998b). 28 Jones (2009).

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Community to their country and thought the formation would be beneficial for their country and the people. 29

The study found that the support, optimism and perception of benefits were interrelated. The relationship was indicated by the consistency in those indicators: the support, optimism and perceived benefits of the Indonesians and the Malaysians were consistently higher than that of the Singaporeans. In general, the attitudes toward the ASEAN Community were significantly more positive in Indonesia and Malaysia than those in Singapore, as confirmed by the Post-Hoc LSD Tests shown in the previous chapter. 30 Some reasons may explain the lower level of supports from the Singaporean compared to those of Indonesian and Malaysian. It is arguable that the Singapore is usually a pragmatic society. The formulation of the goal of ASEAN Community ”t o create a partnership in dynamic development and in a community of caring societies with diverse culture and social harmony” is perceived to idealistic that would be difficult to realize.

This study’s finding that public support is related to the perceived benefits are consistent with the finding of previous studies on European regionalism. Several scholars including Constantelos and Diven 31 , Gabel 32 , McLaren 33 and Inglehart 34 describe how economic utilitarianism plays an important role in determining the support for the EU. Constantelos and Diven argue that it is rational that the citizens of EU states weigh the potential benefits against the costs of membership because the primary rationale for integration is economic.35 The study by Gabel 36 , McLaren 37 and

29 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.9 in 4.2.1. 30 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.9 in 4.2.1. 31 Constantelos and Diven (2010). 32 Gabel (1998b). 33 McLaren (2006). 34 Inglehart (1970). 35 Constantelos and Diven (2010). 36 Gabel (1998b). 37 McLaren (2006).

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Inglehart 38 show that low income blue collars workers groups are most likely to oppose the EU because their jobs and social welfare benefits are threatened. On the other hand, the more skilled, educated, and higher income individuals – the professional and executives – are more likely to support the EU because they are in a better position to take advantage of greater educational and economic opportunities in the regional integration.

Regarding the formation of the ASC, this study found that the attitudes of the respondents across the three countries were positive. The respondents’ support was positively related to the optimism towards ASC. They showed their optimism since they believed that the formation would be beneficial for their countries and society; that ASEAN countries would be fully committed to the peaceful resolution of differences/conflicts in ASEAN; and that the bargaining position of each ASEAN country would be stronger in dealing with other countries. In addition, the majority of the respondents expressed their optimism, that with the ASEAN Community, member countries would be able to cooperate in combating transnational security problems (such as terrorism, drugs trafficking, trafficking in persons, and cross border crimes). In general, the attitudes were significantly more positive in Indonesia and Malaysia than those in Singapore, as confirmed by the Post-Hoc LSD Tests shown in the previous chapter. 39

As for the formation of the AEC, the findings found that the attitudes of the respondents in the three countries were positive. Most respondents in Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore supported the formation of AEC and its features such as the free flow of goods and services, the free flow of skilled/professional ASEAN workers, and the freedom of ASEAN businesspeople to establish businesses anywhere in the region. However, the extent of support varied by issues. In general, support for the AEC was significantly more positive in Malaysia and Indonesia than in Singapore. There was no significant difference on the issue of free flow of skilled or professional workers, but, on the issue of free flow of goods and services and freedom for

38 Inglehart (1970). 39 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.10 in 4.2.2.

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businesspeople to operate anywhere in the region, the support of the Indonesians was significantly lower than those of their counterparts in Malaysia and Singapore. 40

The unreadiness of Indonesian business to compete may explain the Indonesian’s lower level of support for free flow of goods and services and freedom for businesspeople to operate anywhere in the region. Firstly, Indonesia is the most populated countries in ASEAN. In terms of economy, it constituted 39.1% of regional market. However, the business in the country is perceived to be not ready for the regional competition. A study by Widdi Mugijayani and Pratiwi Kartika 41 shows that most of Indonesian businesses that consist of small and medium entreprises tended to be more pessimistic to face competition resulting from the AEC. Thus, free flow of goods and services and freedom of direct investment are perceived to threaten the existence of national businesses in Indonesia.

The respondents were highly optimistic of the success of AEC. They were optimistic that their countries would benefit from membership in AEC and that greater economic integration would be advantageous for the people and business in their countries. They expected AEC to set higher competitiveness in the region and to accelerate the development of the less developed countries. However, the respondents in Indonesia and Malaysia did not concur with the Singaporeans on the ability of AEC to match the economic interests of each ASEAN country: while the majority of the Indonesian and Malaysian were optimistic, the Singaporeans expressed their doubt on this issue. 42 Considerably high education of Singaporean respondents 43 may influence their answer on this issue. In this case, they stated their dubiety that AEC would be able to match the economic interests of each ASEAN country as they observe that there is no mechanism to do it under this framework.

40 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.11 in 4.2.3. 41 Mugijayani and Pratiwi Kartika (2012). 42 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.11 in 4.2.3. 43 Almost half of Singaporean respondents possess postgraduate degree (See Table 3.4).

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The attitudes towards AEC were also measured by the commitment of the respondents to give priority to goods, investments and workers from ASEAN than those from non-ASEAN countries. The study revealed some interesting differences. While the majority of the Malaysians and Indonesians supported giving priorities to ASEAN goods, investments and workers, the support from the Singaporeans was significantly lower. The Singaporean seemed hesitant about giving priorities to ASEAN products, workers and investments. This hesitancy is not positive for AEC for it is obvious that the support from the ASEAN public for AEC is related with the optimism that their countries would secure opportunities from the formation of AEC. These opportunities, however, would be limited if no priority is accorded for ASEAN products, workers, and investments. If the benefits of AEC are limited, it is likely to reduce the support of the public from other ASEAN countries. 44

Singaporean doubt reminds us of the discussion with respect to the concept of AEC. There are notable differences between the concept of FTA-Plus AEC from Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) and the concept of ‘Common Market - Minus Approach’ from the ASEAN-ISIS (ASEAN - Institutes of Strategic and International Studies) . The ‘FTA -Plus’ arrangement includes some elements of a common market but does not include the common external tariff or CET.45 The inclusion of the CET means AEC will allow its members to have different tariffs with non-members. ISEAS ’s paper has argued that, given the different degrees of openness and stages of economic development among ASEAN countries, forming a custom union with CET (as proposed by the ASEAN-ISIS) would be extremely difficult to achieve by the year 2015.46 The ISEAS’s argument seemed plausible; however, the refusal to give priorities to ASEAN products through CET would restrict the benefits of economic regional integration.

In general, the findings indicated widespread support for the ASCC. This support for the ASCC is related to the optimism and positive attitudes towards ASCC.

44 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.11 in 4.2.3. 45 Guerrero (2008). 46 Hew and Soesastro (2003).

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The general perception was that ASCC would be beneficial for the social and cultural development of the countries, in creating a more caring community and in increasing the variety and richness of ASEAN culture. 47

While the general attitude toward the ASEAN Community was positive, it is interesting to observe the respondents’ views on the social construction process of the ASEAN Community which some observers – like Rodolfo Severino 48 , Amitav Acharya, 49 Claire Sutherland, 50 Jenina Joy Chavez, 51 Lily Zubaidah Rahim, 52 Melly Caballero-Anthony, 53 Sung Won Kim, 54 and Thi Thu Huong Dang 55 – asserted as elitist and state-centric; it had yet to involve the people directly. They argued that only leaders, bureaucrats, and businesspeople decided the course of the ASEAN Community creation. 56

This study provides additional support for the above stated stand. For example, more than half of Indonesian respondents admitted that the formation of ASEAN Community was the initiative of the elite and did not involve the public in its creation. While the majority of Malaysian and Singaporean respondents did not fully concur with their Indonesian counterparts, there were still a significant number who hold the same opinion with the majority of the Indonesian respondents. However, this did not appear to undermine the perceived benefit of the initiatives, as almost three-quarters of them admitted that the ideas would be fruitful to the people. This perception was also consistent with the previous finding about the optimism of the respondents toward ASEAN Community, measured in their attitudes. Hence, it can be concluded

47 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.12 in 4.2.4. 48 Severino (2007). 49 Acharya (2003 and 2009). 50 Sutherland (2009). 51 Chavez (2007). 52 Rahim (2008). 53 Caballero-Anthony (2009). 54 Sung (2010). 55 Thi (2008). 56 Guido Benny and Kamarulnizam Abdullah (2011).

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that, while the formation process of ASEAN Community was perceived to be elitist, the respondents were still committed to its formation since it was perceived to benefit the people. 57

With regards to the difficulties faced in establishing ASEAN Community, it is particularly surprising that more than two-thirds of the respondents perceived its formation and objectives as merely a dream that would be difficult to materialize. These findings also indicated that more than half of the respondents perceived the support of ASEAN countries toward the regional community was based on their own parochial interests, and not the common interests of the region. 58

Why did the respondents perceive that it would be difficult to materialize the objective of ASEAN? Why did they perceive that the national governments place the national interests above the regional interests? There are three plausible explanations. Firstly, the lack of socialisation might be one of the reasons for the problems. While the lack of socialisation from the government was the first reason why the majority of respondents were unaware of the concept of the ASEAN Community, 59 it also contributed to the perception regarding the difficulties in materializing its objectives. 60 It has been observed that what the government propagated in the mass media was mainly about national policies, with the thick sense of national interests and not about the regional agenda. Rarely would the public hear about the national or regional measures to forge the ASEAN Community 61 . While it cannot be denied that there have been measures of harmonisation in order to solve the difficulties in regionalism, the lack of proper dissemination of information has thwarted these initiatives. In addition, rarely would the public hear about government policies supporting the ASEAN common policy. As a result, the respondents would have thought that the

57 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.13 in 4.2.5. 58 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.13 in 4.2.5. 59 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.6 in 4.1.3. 60 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.13 in 4.2.5. 61 Such measures are publicized in the Blueprints of the ASEAN Security Community (ASEAN Secretariat 2009a), the ASEAN Economic Community (ASEAN Secretariat 2009b), and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASEAN Secretariat 2009c).

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objectives of ASEAN regionalism would be difficult to materialize since the national government focused on national interests and not on the common purposes of ASEAN.

Secondly, national governments are highly preoccupied with internal affairs and the challenging task of national development, so regional affairs are not in their list of top priority for action. Daljit Singh contends that, as young nations, most ASEAN countries are highly preoccupied with their internal problems of incomplete or unsuccessful nation-building. 62 Facts indicates that the governments are challenged by a range of obstacles in terms of disparate education,63 lack of economic competitiveness, 64 disparate socio-economies conditions, 65 lack of technology mastery and creation (see 4.4.6),66 preoccupation with the problems of poverty,67 and heavily burdened by internal conflicts.68 They are also dependent heavily on foreign funding for development projects 69 , so they have to compete against each other to grab the ‘investment pie’ which is scarce. Given these obstacles, national governments become more focused on national rather than the regional interests. This reality might have influenced the perception of the respondents and lead them to view the objectives of ASEAN regionalism as difficult to materialize.

Thirdly, certain events that occurred in the region suggest that national governments place their own interests above the regional ones. Some example of such ‘selfish’ ev ents are: (a) ISEAS’s blueprint for AEC that put the national interest of more developed countries above the regional interests; (b) the concept of free flow of

62 Singh (2010). 63 See the Education Statistics (UNDP 2010) in 4.4.1. 64 See the statistics of Global Competitiveness Index (World Economic Forum 2010; International Institute for Management Development 2010) in 4.4.2. 65 See the Statistics of Socioeconomy of ASEAN Country (UNDP 2010) in 4.4.4. 66 See the Statistics of of Technology Diffusion and Mastery and the Statistics of Technology Creation in 4.4.6. 67 See the statistics of Income Poverty (World Bank 2010) and the Statistics of Multidimensional Poverty (UNDP (2010) in 4.4.7. 68 See the List of Conflicts in the ASEAN Countries (HIIK (2010) in 4.4.8. 69 See the statistics of World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance (World Bank 2010) and the Statistics of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows (ASEAN Secretariat 2010) in 4.4.3.

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professional workers; (c) policies of promoting national over ASEAN ’s products ; (d) the ever-expanding bilateral free trade agreements between ASEAN and non-ASEAN states, and (e) lack of regional governance.

This study argues that the Blueprint of AEC which draw on the ‘FTA -Plus arrangement’ 70 rather than the ‘Common Market Minus Approach’ 71 as one example that national interests of more developed economies are given priority over regional interests. ISEAS argued that “the FTA -Plus AEC would be more suitable given the different degrees of openness and stages of economic development among ASEAN countries and forming a custom union with CET (as proposed by the ASEAN-ISIS) would be extremely difficult to achieve by the year 2015”. 72 The argument of ISEAS 73 seems plausible, but it is arguable that it has been the reluctance hesitant of the more developed countries in the region to sacrifice for the good of the region that had made them propose the ‘FTA -Plus Arrangement’ instead of the ‘Common Market Minus Approach’. The ‘Common Market Minus Approach’ concept of the ASEAN-ISIS, 74 in fact, is better for ASEAN’s regional integration because the ‘Common External Tariff (CET)’ – the underlying prerequisite for the Common Market – would make the regional economic integration more cohesive and offer the member countries in the region more competitive advantage than those from outside the ASEAN region.

This study also argues that the free flow of workers which gives preference to professional workers -- but neglects cross-border movement of unskilled migrant workers -- is the second example of the tendency of national governments to give greater importance to national interests than regional interests. The concept of Southeast Asian economic regionalism is different from that of the EU in terms of the free flow of workers. While free movement of all workers is possible in the EU,75 the

70 ISEAS (2003). 71 ASEAN-ISIS (2003). 72 Hew and Soesastro (2003). 73 ISEAS (2003). 74 ASEAN-ISIS (2003). 75 The free movement of workers constitutes a fundamental principle of the European Union, as stated in Article 39 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. In that Article, nationals of one

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freedom in ASEAN would be limited to business persons, skilled labour and talents.76 The freedom in AEC would be restricted to the freedom of movement in typical FTAs, replicating GATS in favouring only mobility of highly skilled and professional workers, and closely linking them to investment requirements.77 In this case, in order to allow the movement of skilled labour, ASEAN is working for the facilitation of movements in very restricted ways.78 However, each ASEAN country will still have its own requirements, barriers, and policy for foreign professionals/skilled manpower seeking working opportunities in the country.79 Critics argue that ASEAN has stressed freer movements of skilled workers, and largely eschewed mention of unskilled migrants, as part of the vision of achieving an AEC.80 The freedom of movement of ‘blue -collar unskilled workers’ is simply not regulated in ASEAN although it has

EU member state are entitled to work in another EU member state under the same conditions as that member state’s own citizens (European Commission 2002). Nevertheless, transitional periods of up to seven years were implemented, which restricted access of citizens from the new member states to the labour markets in the old member states (Kahanec and Zimmermann 2009). 76 ASEAN Secretariat (2009b). 77 In GATS Mode 4 on movement of national persons (MNP), MNP refers to cross-border mobility of professionals and skilled individuals on a temporary basis either as self-employed individual service providers or as employees of foreign companies supplying services. MNPs cover business visitors (which engage in business without seeking employment), traders and investors (natural persons carrying out specific trading and investment activities), intra-corporate transferees (employees of MNCs that move their staff across borders), and professionas (include doctors and nurses, lawyers, accountants, engineers, IT personnel and other professions). The MNP is restricted by several barriers, including (a) restrictive immigration visa requirements and employment passes and work permits, other administrative constraints and processing costs; (b) quality assurance (pre- employment requirements, health and security clearance, personal and professional references); (c) educational and professional qualification and regulations and licensing requirements by receiving country professional associations; (d) national treatment limitations (qualifications and restriction based on nationality, economic needs test, numerical quotas for each profession, ethnic preferences, and language requirements); and (e) measures to discourage and prevent brain drain (Chia 2010). 78 ASEAN tried to achieve the goals of free flow of skilled labour in the ASEAN Economic Community by year 2015. However, in allowing for the movement of skilled labour, ASEAN restricted its action programmes due to the prevailing regulations of the receiving country. The AEC Blueprint (ASEAN Secretariat (2009b) stated that the action programmes only consists of four items: (1) facilitate the issuance of visas and employment passes for ASEAN professionals and skilled labour who are engaged in cross-border trade and investment related activities; (2) enhance cooperation among ASEAN University Network (AUN) members to increase mobility for both students and staff within the region; (3) develop core competencies and qualifications for job/occupational and trainers skills required in the priority services sectors (by (2009); and in other service sectors (from (2010 to (2015); and (4) strengthen the research capabilities of each ASEAN member country in terms of promoting skills, job placements, and developing labour market information networks among ASEAN member countries. 79 Chia (2010). 80 Manning and Bhatnagar (2003).

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increased rapidly to an estimated 5.3 million workers, equivalent to 9% of global migration.81 It is arguable that some countries in the region objected to the free flow of skilled and unskilled workers because they thought that it is against their national interest.

The third example is the ‘polic y of promoting national products’ in several ASEAN countries. Almost every country in the region has organized ‘buy national products’ campaigns targeted at its national consumers. While the promotion of national products seems plausible to increase – or at least to maintain -- the gross domestic products (GDP) of their own countries, such moves may be detrimental to the free flow of ASEAN products. Instead, national government should promote the sale of ASEAN products to the citizens and promote the use of their national products to consumers in other ASEAN countries.

The fourth example is the move of national government to sign bilateral agreements to establish free trade areas with other non-ASEAN countries. While it was arguable that ASEAN economic regionalism was different with the European one that gave freedom to the national government to sign bilateral agreements for establishing free trade areas, such a move would be potentially detrimental to Southeast Asian economic integration. Such agreements might make the free flow of goods and services in ASEAN less meaningful and potentially reduce the benefits of ASEAN free trade area.

The fifth example is the lack of regional governance. Unlike in the EU, ASEAN regional integration is characterized by the non-existence of a strong single regional executive body and parliamentary institution for the region. Instead, the ASEAN Charter affirms that the ASEAN Summit, an institution comprising of the ten ASEAN Heads of State or Government is the supreme policy-making body of ASEAN. As for the decision-making process, ASEAN chooses to continue to be based on consultation and consensus, as established in Article 20 of the ASEAN Charter.82

81 Hing and Lun (2011). 82 ASEAN Secretariat (2008).

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The persistence of the sovereignty rule is pivotal for ASEAN’s intergovernmental type of regionalism, and it is explained by members’ reliance on social trust than on institutionalisation and governance. Hence, the ASEAN Charter will not transform ASEAN into an institution with hierarchical bureaucratic organisation providing strong socializing effects; rather the Charter will maintain the network governance of ASEAN, meant as an informal way of cooperation providing information and coordinating players’ behaviours and lower transaction costs.83 However, this structure might make the decision-making difficult and slow, especially if there is conflict of interests between the regional and national ones. In fact, the unwillingness of national governments to support a single regional executive and legislative body proves that the supremacy of national interests over the regional ones is the reality in the region.

Regarding the aspiration for the formation of ASEAN Community, this study also found that the respondents’ answers were contradictory. Firstly, they stated that they aspired for the establishment of regional integration as in the EU. However, further examination found that their concept of integration was, in fact, different from the EU. Most of the respondents rejected the idea of a single currency, the abolition of passports, the establishment of ASEAN Parliament, a stronger executive body, and ASEAN Court of Justice. These contradictions can perhaps be explained by the fact that not many of the respondents understand the true concept of European integration. 84

The findings of the study also suggest that the aspirations for the ASEAN Community were different in the three countries. The idea of abolishing passports was supported by many of the Indonesian respondents but rejected by the majority of Malaysian and Singaporean respondents. 85 For example, the chairman of Himsataki (the Association of Indonesian Labor Exporters) Mr. Yunus Yamani proposed that Indonesian migrant workers be allowed to use their Indonesian identity card to travel

83 Asciutti (2010: 59). 84 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.14 in 4.2.6. 85 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.14 in 4.2.6.

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and work in Malaysia because it would save a lot of money. 86 However, for Singapore, Brunei and Malaysia, the abolition of passports is not likely to get support due to the threat it would pose to national security. The economies of these three leading Southeast Asian countries are much stronger than the other ASEAN countries, so the abolition of passports would be considered as a threat to the security of those three countries as it would be extremely difficult to control the flows of immigration into the country. Furthermore, the abolition of passports would also make it more difficult to control transnational crimes and immigration flows.

The study also found that the EU-like regional government infrastructure such as the Regional Parliament, a stronger regional executive body, and a single judicial body (ASEAN Court of Justice) – while accepted by the Malaysian respondents – were rejected by the Indonesian and Singaporean respondents. 87 It shows that it would be difficult to establish the EU-like regionalism in Southeast Asian as it is not supported by the majority of the public.

Finally, it can be summed up that the respondents exhibited positive attitudes towards the concept of ASEAN Community, but their aspirations for Southeast Asian regionalism were distinctive from the European integration model. In addition, while the respondents in the three countries still perceived the proposal to be fruitful to the people, most of them also realized that the realisation of ASEAN Community objectives would be extremely difficult to achieve as most countries gave precedence to their own interests above the regional ones. As the consequence, effective strategies are needed to foster positive attitudes towards ASEAN regional integration. Moreover, as the public opinion may change over time, continuous assessments is needed to assist effective decision making in the region.

86 Chew (2011). 87 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.14 in 4.2.6.

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5.3 ANALYSIS ON NATIONAL AND REGIONAL IDENTITIES TOWARDS THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF ASEAN COMMUNITY

This study argues that the sentiments regarding national and regional identities need to be examined because they may influence the social construction of ASEAN Community. Nationalist sentiments need to be gauged because, as Halliday argues, it may go against international relations and regionalism. 88 Regional identities need to be examined because, as the constructivists argue, they are one of intersubjective factors determining foreign policy in the region.89 Furthermore, Puchala and Deutsch argue that regional identities are the indication of common subjective feelings of legitimacy of integrated community that deliberate the promotion of processes and sentiments of mutual identification, loyalties and ‘we’ -feelings. 90 Constructivists assert the construction of regional identity as a crucial element in establishing regional community because it justifies the members and non-members, and influential in defining interests.91

Regarding national identities, this study found that the reactive nationalist sentiments are still high in the three countries. They would be very angry if another country disputing or claiming the territory. They also admitted that they would not tolerate if there is a foreign country disputes or claims the cultural artefacts of their country. They would even protests if the leader of a foreign country undermines the pride of their nation. In general, the reactive nationalist sentiments in Indonesia were significantly higher than those in the other two countries. 92

The high degree of reactive nationalism is not ideal condition for regional integration. As elaborated by Halliday, high level of nationalism would result in a higher propensity for disputes with neighbouring country; 93 the phenomena that has

88 Halliday (1997: 365-369). 89 Acharya (2009b). 90 Puchala (1984) and Deutsch (1988). 91 Wendt (1994: 384). 92 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.16 in 4.3.2. 93 Halliday (1997: 365-369).

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somewhat strained Indonesia-Malaysia relations in the last ten years. Close cooperation among nations, whether of regional, multilateral and bilateral forums, would prevent the disputes from escalating into confrontation. However, extreme nationalism might impede cooperation on international issues and problems and aggravate difficulties in solving the problems between countries: border problems or territorial disputes, illegal migrant workers, human trafficking, cross-border crimes, environmental pollution (of sea water or air from burning rain forests), the foreign maids’ issues, and so on.

The high level of reactive nationalist sentiment might also hinder regional identity and affect the progress of the ASEAN Community – especially the formation of the ASC and the ASCC. Extreme nationalism would hinder the formation of the outward-looking community aspired in ASEAN Vision 2020. The vision of establishing a ‘caring community ’ would be difficult to realize because extreme nationalism tends to promote parochialism and reject interactions between cultures, religions, and languages.

While reactive nationalist sentiment was at a high level, economic nationalist sentiments of respondents in the three countries was at a moderate level. In general, the economic nationalist sentiment of the Indonesians was significantly the highest among respondents in the three countries. While nationalist sentiment of the Malaysians was higher than that of the Singaporeans, it was slightly lower than that of the Indonesians. 94

Regarding the economic nationalism, it is rather worrisome for the formation of AEC that many respondents in Malaysia and Indonesia asked for protection for national products, workers and businesses. Another expectation was for the government to control the involvement of foreign investors in national economy and trade, support the reduction of foreign business expansion, and explicitly exhibited

94 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.17 in 4.3.3.

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negative attitudes to foreign enterprises. 95 Such protectionism is not conducive for the establishment of AEC that promotes liberal intra-regional trade and investment between ASEAN member countries. The perception of foreign workers as harmful to the locals is also contrary to the concept of AEC that promotes the free flow of professional workers. In addition, there were many of the Indonesian and Malaysian respondents who asked the government to control the involvement of foreign investors to the national economy and trade, supported the reduction of foreign business expansion, and negative attitudes shown to foreign enterprises. Those opinions were adversary to the concept of free flow of investment in AEC. It was also extremely worrying that the targeted objects for demonstration in the anti-Malaysian campaign occurred in August 2010 were Petronas and CIMB Niaga Bank -- the Malaysians’ foreign-direct-investments in Indonesia.

This study found that the respondents exhibited a significant amount of consumer nationalist sentiments. For example, more than 60% of the respondents in Malaysia and Indonesia still stated that buying domestic products was always the best choice. Nevertheless, only a minority admitted that they always tried their best not to buy or use foreign products and recommended others not to buy them. In general, the Indonesian respondents professed consumer nationalism was significantly more than that of the Malaysians and Singaporeans in these issues: willingness to stop buying foreign products and willingness to switch to the domestic products instead and willingness to buy domestic products at a slightly higher price if the quality was similar. 96

Compared to their counterparts in Indonesia and Malaysia, the Singaporean respondents showed lesser consumer nationalist sentiments. Most of them disagreed that buying domestic products as always the best choice and also denied that they always tried their best not to buy and use foreign products or recommend others (their family, friends, and relatives) not to buy foreign products. Most of them were also unwilling to stop buying foreign products and opt for domestic ones instead. They also

95 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.17 in 4.3.3. 96 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.18 in 4.3.4.

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displayed greater pragmatism in that they were not willing to buy domestic products of similar quality with foreign ones but at a slightly higher price. 97 Their stance is understandable as they have limited resources and most of products they consume are imported. This reality may explain why their consumer nationalist sentiment is lower than that of the Malaysians and Indonesians.

Regarding national cultural identities, the study showed that most of those surveyed in the three countries still practised religious and cultural traditions (such as ceremony, food, religious practice, balik kampong or homecoming, etc) that resembled the culture of their countries. This showed that the national cultural identity of the respondents were still strong. 98

With reference to ASEAN identity, the response was very positive as the majority of respondents identified themselves as part of the ASEAN Community. Furthermore, they were of the opinion that norms, values, histories, and intelligent level of people in all ASEAN countries were comparable. However, compared to the national identities, the degree of their regional identities was lower. 99

Compared to their counterparts in Indonesia and Malaysia, the Singaporean respondents showed lesser perception of regional identity. This condition is rational if we examine the difficulties Singapore faces in the creation of its national identity. As a small multiethnic immigrant state with its colonial history and surrounded by two larger Malay states, Singapore cannot define her identity based on ethnicity. 100 Since independence in 1965, the Singaporean government has tried to generate a sense of national identity in Singapore; however, despite countless government campaigns and exhortations, this latter project has not been very successful so far. but have not yet successful in the effort.101 Former President of Singapore S. R. Nathan in an inaugural

97 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.18 in 4.3.4. 98 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.19 and Table 4.20 in 4.3.5. 99 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.21 in 4.3.6. 100 Ortmann 2009: 25. 101 Ortmann 2009: 27.

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Social Sciences Conference organised by the Singapore Management University (SMU) School of Social Sciences in March 2012 even contended that Singaporeans face a common problem of identity as it would take “one or two generations” before a common culture emerged. 102

This study argues that due to of ethnic and religious plurality in the region, the primordial identities such as ‘the sense of coming from same roots, race, and religious beliefs’ is rather difficult to form the basis of regional identity of ASEAN. The statistics on ethnic groups shows that the population of the region comprises of numerous ethnic group, no ethnic group can be considered as dominant in ASEAN. 103 Similarly, the statistics on the distribution of religious believers in the region indicates that the Muslims are the largest religious group in the region, but they do not form the majority of the regional population. 104 Besides, only three out of ten ASEAN countries have Muslim-majority population. Furthermore, the study found that the Singaporeans, as one of the key players in ASEAN regionalism, tended to reject these primordial identities as the basis for regional identity as they argued this would make the people from other religions feel alienated or even threatened. 105 The other seven nations – unfortunately they are not involved in this study – would also object to the idea. The Thais and the Philippines are not likely to be receptive to this idea as they have experienced bitter relations with the Muslim separatist groups in the southern part of their countries.

Finally, it can be concluded that though the respondents demonstrated strong nationalist sentiments and national identities, their regional identities were weaker. In addition, it would be difficult for primordial identities -- such as ethnic and religious roots which were very plural in the region – to become the regional identities. To date, several elements of ASEAN regional identity have been decided upon: ASEAN Vision 2020, ASEAN flag, ASEAN capital city (Jakarta), ASEAN anthem, and so on,

102 Yini 2012. 103 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.23 in 4.3.6. 104 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.24 in 4.3.6. 105 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.22 in 4.3.6.

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but these identities are superficial because they do not touch the most crucial component of an identity – the values as the basic character of the people of ASEAN. So, the next ”assignment” for ASEAN Community is to specify the ASEAN values in order to effectively involve the public in the regional integration.

5.4 ANALYSIS ON PERCEIVED CHALLENGES FOR CONSTRUCTING THE ASEAN COMMUNITY

This study argues that the public perspectives on the perceived challenges for the establishment of regional integration from the public perspectives need to be understood because the public is the true stakeholder of these integration initiatives.

The survey shows that most of the respondents perceived the ten challenges for the establishment of ASEAN Community in the following ranks: (1) disparity in the levels of education; (2) lack of competitiveness in the economy of most ASEAN countries; (3) the dependency of ASEAN countries on the developed countries, especially for financing their economic activities; (4) the socio-economic conditions of most nations in the region which were still low and with wide gaps between countries; (5) the differences in legal and political system; (6) the limitation of technology mastery and creation in most of the countries; (7) poverty in most ASEAN countries; (8) internal conflicts, terrorism, and insurgency in some parts of the region; (9) the structure of ASEAN economies which were dominated by the Chinese ethnic group; and (10) the variety of ethnicities and religions in the region. 106

The disparity of education in the region was ranked number one among the listed challenges to ASEAN integration. The analysis on the data of the Education Statistics of World Bank 107 and UNESCO 108 showed the educational level in the region is extremely low in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMVM)

106 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.26 in 4.4. 107 World Bank (2010). The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.27 in 4.4.1. 108 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2010). The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.27 in 4.4.1.

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countries. In terms of average duration of schooling in the CLMV countries, on average, students would have dropped out of school before finishing elementary school. In terms of the education level of adults, less than half of the adults in the region have attended secondary education – out of which Vietnam and Cambodia registers the lowest. Similarly, tertiary education is still a luxury that most people in the region cannot afford. Given this scenario, it is likely that the lack of education may hinder the majority of the people in the region from grasping the benefit of integration.

The lack of economic competitiveness of most ASEAN countries was ranked the second most important among the listed challenges to integration. Based on the World Economic Forum’s ’global competitiveness index 2010’, which compares 121 countries in the world, only five out of the ten ASEAN countries performed well in this ranking. Singapore was in the 3rd world rank, Malaysia 26th, Brunei Darussalam 28th, Thailand 38th, and Indonesia 44th. The other five ASEAN countries were ranked more than 50 – Vietnam was at 59th, the Philippines at 85th and Cambodia was at 109th position. 109 The other measure, the IMD Global Competitive Index WorldRank 110 , showed that only Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand stood in the better position, whereas five other nations (Brunei, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar) were not ranked due to their uncompetitiveness. The disparity in the levels of development among ASEAN countries and the competitiveness of their economies might impinge on the success of this integration initiative. Challenges pertaining to the shortage of skilled labour, the lack of a developed quality system and product standards, unsophisticated consumer markets, insufficient physical and institutional infrastructure, and inadequate intellectual property rights protection posed numerous governance and competitiveness problems in ASEAN.

The dependency on developed countries, especially for financing the development and business activities was ranked third highest. The statistics of World

109 World Economic Forum (2010). The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.28 in 4.4.2. 110 International Institute for Management Development (IMD) (2010). The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.28 in 4.4.2.

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Development Indicators & Global Development Finance showed that most ASEAN countries depended heavily on foreign financing. Among ASEAN countries, only Singapore and Brunei Darussalam did not have external long term debts; while five out of ten ASEAN countries – Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam – relied heavily on foreign financing for development and business.111 The condition of the three least developed countries of the region (Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar) was even worse as their long-term debts exceeded the domestic credit provided by the banking sector. The domestic banking systems in five out of ten countries are also known for their inefficiency in providing credit to the community, as they charge an interest rate of more than 10%. This has led the governments and business people to rely on foreign creditors and foreign direct investment for financing their activities. 112

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), which has played a pivotal role in Southeast Asia’s economic development, was sourced mainly from developed countries as the banking systems and accumulation of finance for investment from those countries were easily available. 113 The statistics from ASEANStats 114 showed that investment from the EU, Japan, USA, Cayman Island, Republic of Korea, China, Hong Kong, Bermuda, and Taiwan contributed 62.6% of investment to ASEAN countries in 2007 – 2009, while intra-ASEAN investment stood at only 15 percent. Furthermore, rapid liberalisation of global trade and investment in the last two decades, has made ’the once economically attractive ASEAN’ less competitive , especially for certain industries, thus redirecting investors to other developing regions such as China and India. As a result, ASEAN began to promote the regions with numerous initiatives in order to make itself more strategically and economically relevant to the region and beyond. One such initiative was the promotion of regional economic integration to muster regional strength and build shared resources and expertise. The AEC was one such initiative aimed at creating the single market and production base, a highly

111 World Bank (2010). The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.29 in 4.4.3. 112 World Bank (2010). The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.29 in 4.4.3. 113 Singh (2010: 1 – 24). 114 ASEAN Secretariat (2010). The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.30 in 4.4.3.

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competitive economic region, a region of equitable economic development, and a region fully integrated into the global economy. 115

The low levels of socio-economic progress and the wide gap between countries was ranked as fourth among the listed challenges to ASEAN integration . The UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI), which captured the development indicators of countries, revealed the socio-economic disparity among ASEAN countries. The Human Development Reports in 2008, 2009, and 2010 had consistently placed most ASEAN countries in the medium and low level of HDI. 116 These reports revealed socio-economic disparities in terms of life expectancy at birth, education level, and income per capita between the top three HDI ASEAN countries and the rest. The socio-economic gap between the ASEAN-6 and the CLMV countries and within ASEAN-6 countries is quite noticeable, where some isolated pockets of underdevelopment persist. However, the disparities in levels of economic development were much more pronounced than the disparities in levels of human development.

The differences in the legal and political systems were considered to be the fifth most important challenge. However, there were more Singaporean respondents who considered the issue as ’definitely’ an obstacle than those in Indonesia and Malaysia. ASEAN is a conception that came after the decolonisation period, when ASEAN countries were gradually securing independence from their colonial masters. Except for Thailand, all countries in this region were colonies of one or several Western powers. As the result of the spice trade and the zeal of conquests, several European powers, namely Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, Great Britain, France, and the United States had colonized a large part of Southeast Asia. Western systems of administration, governance, and laws were introduced in the colonies by the colonialists. The occupation by different colonial masters meant the nations adopted different legal systems. For example, the legal systems in Malaysia and Indonesia

115 ASEAN Secretariat (2009b). 116 UNDP (2010). World Bank (2010). The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.31 in 4.4.4.

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have different origins. Being a former British colony, the Malaysian legislation originated from Britain’s Anglo -Saxon Westminster Law system – thus showing an inclination towards the Common Law systems. Different from the Malaysian legal system, the legal systems of Indonesia were substantially similar to the Continental Law System of the Netherlands, her former colonial master. Given the historical background, it would be a gargantuan task to harmonize the legislation of the various countries in the region. Any attempt towards this direction may stir up sovereignty issues among ASEAN members.

There are also diverse political systems in the region. The situation of ASEAN is rather intricate compared to the EU. European regionalism put the values of liberal democracy forward as a condition for its members. Liberal democracy originated from the Liberalism movement in Europe, which first became a powerful force in the Age of Enlightenment . It rejected earlier theories of government, such as ‘ hereditary status ’, ‘established religion ’, ‘absolute monarchy ’ and the ‘ divine right of rulers ’. It instead promoted the concept of ‘ natural rights ’, ‘social contract ’ and the ‘ rule of law ’ as preferred precepts of governance. However, ASEAN had a different trajectory. As a result of its heterogenous nature of political systems, it is difficult to find a uniform political value(s) to bind the countries together. The region hosts a myriad form of political entities – from the absolute monarchy of Brunei Darussalam; the liberal democracy republics in Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia; the constitutional monarchy in Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand; communism in Lao PDR and Vietnam; and the military totalitarianism in Myanmar.117

Although there have been clarion calls within ASEAN for greater expression of democracy and liberal values, there are disparities in the inculcation of these values in different member countries – further enforcing the point that political integration as impossible to attain in the near future. This disparity was further illustrated in the Gallup World Poll Database (2010) – which categorized states into ’democratic’, ’democratic with no alternation’, and ’undemocratic’. The poll categorized Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines into ’democratic governments’; Malaysi a and Singapore

117 Severino, Thomson and Hong (2010); Kristina Jőnsson (2008 ); Roberts (2002a and 2002b).

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into the ’democratic with no alternation’ category; and Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Myanmar, Lao PDR and Vietnam into ’undemocratic’. 118

Some have argued that ’an apple to orange’ comparison on democracy between Southeast Asia and the West is erroneous because these regions have very different values and historical experiences 119 . Southeast Asia has experienced a long period of authoritarianism – the region’s pre -colonial rulers (the chiefs, rajas and sultans ), were absolute rulers, exercising tight control over their subjects. In fact, the Hindu rituals conducted by Brahmin priests in many early kingdoms in the Hindu- Buddhist period, were meant to elevate the status of ‘ raja’ (king) to ‘ dewaraja’ (god- king), thus sanctioning the rulers with ‘godly legitimacy’ to rule over their subjects. The subsequent colonial powers also ruled the region with high levels of authoritarianism. Some colonial powers in the region, especially the Spanish, Dutch, and French were repressive – placing the European in a superior legal position, limiting civil and political freedoms of their subjects and restricting educational and economic opportunities. As a result of these experiences, the governments in this region have been increasingly state-centric, and less amenable to embrace liberal democracy ideals. While political cultures take a long time to change, these traditional systems have still retained their influence on politics and political imagination of post- colonial Southeast Asia. 120

The limitation of mastery and creation of technology was ranked the sixth most important challenge to ASEAN integration. Most countries in the region except Singapore are still lacking in technology. In terms of knowledge acquisition and access to technology, there is a clear disparity in the region. For example, the diffusion of phone lines and internet technology is still extremely low in CLMV countries. In terms of export of high-technology products, only Singapore, the

118 UNDP (2010). The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.32 in 4.4.5. 119 Some scholars and nation leaders argued that the democracy in the region cannot be compared with Western democracy because of the difference of values. They argued the existence of the “Asian Values” that operates throughout the Asian region, or even just in East Asia (Milner 1999; Engle 1999). 120 Singh (2010: 1 – 24).

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Philippines and Malaysia performed well. 121 While the diffusion and mastery of technology in the region is weak, the technology creations are even weaker. The indicators of technology creations – such as the patents granted to residents annually, the receipts of royalties and license fees, the budget allocation and expenditures, the generation of researchers and the number of academic publications -- all show that the limited creation of technology in all ASEAN countries except Singapore. 122

Poverty in the region ranked number seven in the list of possible challenges for the formation of ASEAN Community. With the exception of Singapore and Brunei, there are sizable levels of poverty in their society – marginal in some countries and critical in others. Based on either the national poverty line, the $1.25, or the $2 daily income standard, poverty level in Laos, Indonesia, Cambodia, Vietnam and the Philippines even exceeded the world and the regional average.123 Based on the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) of the Human Development Report 2010, seven out of ten ASEAN countries were considered as having multidimensional poor population in 2008. In general, 15.69% of the people in the region experienced deprivation, while another 18.41% was at risk of multidimensional poverty. Further, Laos and Cambodia are the two ASEAN countries with extremely poor populations. However, poverty in Indonesia should be given adequate attention: while only 20.80% of the Indonesians were multidimensionally poor, the figure contributed to more than 50% of the total poor people in the region. 124

Internal conflicts, terrorism and insurgency in ASEAN countries have been cited as one of the plausible reasons that could deter regional integration. The survey has revealed that the majority of respondents ranked the issue as number eight in the list of ten possible challenges for establishing the ASEAN Community. Further, the Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U Tests confirmed that there were significantly

121 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.33 in 4.4.6. 122 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.34 in 4.4.6. 123 World Bank (2010). The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.35 in 4.4.7. 124 UNDP (2010). The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.36 in 4.4.7.

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more respondents in Singapore and Malaysia who considered the issue as an obstacle than those in Indonesia.

It is indeed worrying that violent conflicts proliferated in the region, in the past two decades, as a result of internal problems, communal strifes, ethnic conflicts, terrorist acts and insurgent activities. Almost all countries in the region have experienced some level of violent conflict situations. According to the Conflict Barometer 2009, there were 30 internal conflicts in the region in that year – among those were conflicts that involved Muslim extremists in some parts of Indonesia, Southern Thailand, Southern Philippines, and Myanmar. 125 Those conflicts became more complicated as they involved systemic ideological issues of identities (nationalism and religious issues) and secessionism ideals which were almost impossible to resolve. As a matter of fact, the former US President Bush (Junior), in his ’war of terror’, classified the Southeast Asia region as the second front for combating terrorism.

Daljit Singh has argued that the internal conflicts in the region were often the legacy of Western colonialism, incomplete or unsuccessful nation-building, and the political and socio-economic marginalisation of minorities. 126 He asserted that the borders of ASEAN countries had been drawn by the colonial powers, dividing the regions based on their interests and influence of powers; leaving the ethnic or religious minorities on the ‘wrong side’ of the border, cutting them off from their compatriots on the other side. For example, the Pattani Muslim minority in Thailand was segregated from their Malay-Muslim brothers in Malaysia as a result of the border agreement between Britain and Siam (now Thailand), which placed this community into two separate states. Being more Malay than Thai, the Pattani Malays find it difficult to integrate into the Thai system and society – a situation that eventually turned into violent and bloody uprising in the southern Thai province. Further, Daljit Singh cited ethnic insurgencies in Myanmar; several racial riots in

125 Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (2010). The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.37 in 4.4.8. 126 Singh (2010).

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Malaysia; Acehnese, Mollucans and Papuan rebellions in Indonesia; Muslim secessionist in the southern part of the Philippines and Thailand; and the periodic violence in Cambodia against its Vietnamese minorities as examples of unsuccessful nation-building and socio-economic marginalisation of minorities causing internal conflicts in the region.127

Ethnic-Chinese economic domination was ranked ninth among the listed challenges to ASEAN integration. Ethnic Chinese constitute some 5% o f the region’s population, and they are the sixth largest ethnic group in the region after the Javanese (14.96%), the Vietnamese (12.77%), the Thai (9.24 percent), the Sundanese (5.94 percent) and the Malays (5.09 percent) (See Table 4.46 and 4.48). However, while the Chinese ethnic groups are minorities in the respective ASEAN countries, they control a large share of the economic wealth of almost all countries in ASEAN. 128

The acceptance of the Chinese by the indigenous local population has varied from one country to the other. In Thailand and the Philippines, the local Chinese have been successfully assimilated or integrated into the local populace, but there are different stories in other parts of the region. In certain countries, the Chinese have often been viewed with envy, even resentment, and periodically were blamed for the national problems.129 For example, the Chinese community in the New-Order-Era Indonesia (1968-1998) were often targeted by the locals and severely discriminated by the government, for their domination of the economy. Even the naturalized Chinese citizens faced discriminating regulations by the Suharto administration. Their ethnic cultural identities -- such as language, education and ceremonies -- were denied. This issue came into surface because the difference of religion and the legacy of the racial discrimination in the colonial era. 130 Public celebration of the Chinese New Year was

127 Singh (2010). 128 The overseas Chinese was said to control about 80% of corporate assets and 160 of the (200 largest enterprises in Indonesia, 40% - 50% of corporate assets in Malaysia, 90% of manufacturing and 50% of services in Thailand, and 33% of the 1,000 largest corporations in the Philippines (Chang and Chuang 2009; Dytianquin 2011; Singh 2010). 129 Singh (2010). 130 The Chinese traded and resided in Indonesian islands for centuries but in the nineteenth century, the Dutch brought in many more of them to work on plantations or in mines. The Dutch also establish a

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not allowed for decades until the rule was lifted in 1999 under the administration of President Abdurachman Wahid. There were periodic outbreaks of violence directed toward Chinese persons and property, particularly in Java. 131 In Malaysia, it was noted that there were also several ethnic altercations or conflicts directed at the local Chinese. The 195 7 ‘ Chingay Riot’ and the 1967 ‘ Hartal Riot’ in Penang, the 1964 racial riots in Singapore (under the Malaysian administration at that time), the 13 May 1969 riots of Kuala Lumpur, and the Operasi Lalang of 1987 are examples of such events in Malaysia. 132

Pluralism of ethnics, tribes, and religions in the region was put in the tenth rank among the listed challenges to ASEAN integration. In the survey, although the majority of Indonesian respondents considered this issue as not an obstacle, a sizable majority of Malaysians and Singaporeans agreed that this issue would become an obstacle to integration.

The region has been endowed with numerous groups of people coming from a variety of tribes, ethnicity, communities, and embracing many religions of the world. The Javanese, the Vietnamese Kinh, the Thais, the Sundanese, and the Malays are the five major ethnic groups in the region – however, none of these groups has more than 15% population share of the region. It is also interesting to note that there are approximately 1,518 tribes and ethnic groups and 1,272 languages and dialects spoken in the region. 133

discriminative policies by its social, economic, and legal stratification system that separated Europeans, foreign Asiatics and Indo-Europeans, and Native Indonesians (Onghokham 1988; Cunningham 2001). 131 Muslim small traders, who felt alienated in colonial times and welcomed a change with independence, have been frustrated as New Order Indonesian business, governmental, and military elites forged alliances with the Chinese in the name of ”development” and to their financial benefits. (Cunningham 2001: 1034-1056; Hervandi 2011; Koning and Susanto 2008; Pangabean and Smith 2009; Shi 2009; Sun 2009). 132 Funston (1999); Keng and Lin (2008); Lum and Vaughn (2008); Saravanamuttu and Ooi (2010); Sun (2009). 133 Joshua Project (2010).

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The diversity of religious beliefs also has been an important feature of the region. Analysis from the statistical data of World Bank 134 suggests that there is no single religious group that can claim to be overwhelming majority in the region. The Muslims, the largest religious group in the region, make up 38.8% of the regional population in the year 2010, with the Buddhists and Christians making up 25.4% and 20.2% respectively. 135

It is arguable that although the multiplicity of ethnicity and beliefs, has made the region a melting pot of Eastern cultures, it has been a contributing factor to ethnic and communal strifes within and between countries in this region. The ethnic conflicts in Southeast Asia might be viewed in several categories; firstly between the lowland and highland people, secondly between neighbouring states whose political borders do not coincide with the cultural boundaries that define their peoples, thirdly the groups which composed of large and culturally diverse archipelagic states plagued by regional demands for autonomy or separation, and fourthly the states that were divided by the competing interests of their long-settled native inhabitants and more recent immigrant populations.136 As such, it is feared that the combination of ethnic groups and religious plurality might hinder cooperation, if they moved into fundamentalism, extremism and narrow mindedness. It is interesting to observe that less Indonesian than the Malaysian and Singaporean respondents felt that pluralism might hinder integration. However, the issues surrounding ethnic primordialism had beset Indonesian politics for decades. Although the Indonesian Pancasila state ideology has enunciated unity, plurality and tolerance as core principles of the state, there have been numerous conflicts with ethnic and religious undertones in the archipelago.

Finally, it can be summed up that the respondents in the three countries did view the ten challenges as obstacles for establishing the ASEAN Community. Empirical data from public opinion surveys are useful to gauge people’s concerns and

134 World Bank (2010). 135 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.24 in 4.3.6. 136 Lande (1999).

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levels of acceptance regarding ASEAN Community building. Only through soliciting such feedbacks that policy makers in ASEAN can formulate policies which are relevant and readily acceptable to the people. If the perceived challenges are identified, policy makers can develop effective programmes to remedy structural issues and alleviate the concerns among the people.

5.5 ANALYSIS ON PERCEIVED IMPACTS OF ASEAN COMMUNITY ON NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, SECURITY AND IDENTITY

An important contention of this study is on the public perception of the impact of regional integration on national sovereignty, security and identity that need to be investigated because they may influence the way the public perceives regional integration.

ASEAN has been characterized by the maintenance of the doctrine of national sovereignty and non-interference in the foreign and security policy as well as in the internal affairs of each ASEAN country. For the Southeast Asian countries, the doctrine of protecting the sovereignty of states has a history that predates ASEAN: it was a key principle reaffirmed at the Bandung Asian-African Conference in 1955. Since the founding of ASEAN, this doctrine has remained the single most fundamental principle underpinning ASEAN regionalism. 137 The doctrine has been incorporated in all the key political statements of ASEAN, from the very outset : ‘The Bangkok Declaration’ ,138 ‘The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation’ and ‘The Declaration of ASEAN Concord ’139 (see 2.7.1). These doctrines – as explicitly stated in the Bali Concord II 140 and the ASEAN Charter 141 – would continue to be maintained as one of the key features in the ASEAN Community.

137 Emmerson (2005); Jones (2010); Gerstl (2010); Severino (2007); Sukma (2003). 138 ASEAN Secretariat (1967). 139 ASEAN Secretariat (1976a and 1976b). 140 ASEAN Secretariat (2003). 141 ASEAN Secretariat (2008).

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Despite the maintenance of the doctrine of national sovereignty and non- interference, regionalism is usually characterized by the transfer of sovereignty from member states to a transnational authority such as the regional organisation to carry out tasks previously reserved for the national government. 142 In this sense, the regional organisation might take some parts of states’ soverei gnty to exercise several functions. Even the member states of the EU in the late 1990s could accept that the Union should have a role in a harmonized foreign policy and the involvement of the common defence – something that used to be regarded as being central to sovereignty and could not be transferred to the regional institution. 143 In order to achieve such integration, there should be strong willingness from the national governments and support for this among the citizens of the regional community – something that was achieved by the EU in the late 1990s. Such willingness is simply lacking for ASEAN regionalism.

International Relations scholars have remarked that the maintenance of the doctrine of national sovereignty and non-interference is controversial and against the spirit of regional integration as it would prohibit ASEAN from taking meaningful action over economic crises and transnational security threats, and towards problematic members like Myanmar. 144 However, experts from the region – Rodolfo Severino, 145 Amitav Acharya, 146 Ruhanas Harun, 147 and Sofyan Wanandi 148 – have defended these doctrines and argued that European regionalism could not be applied fully to regionalism in Southeast Asian.

Regarding the maintenance of the doctrine of national sovereignty and non- interference, Rodolfo Severino argued that the historical, international environment

142 Kuhlman and Mensonides (1976); Martínez (1996: 61-62); McMahon and Baker (2006: 4). 143 Taylor (1997: 279). 144 Some experts -- Chau (2008); Leng Thearith (2009); Maznah Mohamad (2002); Mely Caballero- Anthony (2010); Nesadurai (2009); and Ramcharan (2000) – discussed the negative effect of the doctrines of sovereignty and non interference for ASEAN regional integration. 145 Severino (2010). 146 Acharya (2001). 147 Ruhanas Harun (2010). 148 Wanandi (1984).

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circumstances 149 and diversity among the nations of Southeast Asia and within the nations 150 made these set of standards necessary to hold. The potential for conflicts in both this diversity and international environment impelled the founding nations of ASEAN to commit themselves to the fundamental principles of the non-use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, and non-interference in the internal affairs of nations – the principles that animated the Charter of the United Nations and those of other regional associations. 151

Acharya discussed the source and exceptional salience of the doctrine of sovereignty and non-interference in the context of the regional search for internal stability and regime security. 152 Almost all countries in the region were new political entities with weak state structures (e.g. Lack of a close congruence between ethnic groups and territorial boundaries) and an equally problematic lack of strong regime legitimacy, so the states tended to view that the primary sources of threat to the national security were not external but internal. In this sense, ASEAN countries found no use for regional security cooperation unless it countered the internal enemy and enhanced regime security. Regional order could not be maintained without an agreement on the fundamental importance of regime security anchored in the principles of sovereignty and non-interference.

149 Severino (2010) argued that historical, international environment circumstances at the time of the ASEAN founding (in (1967) made the principles of non-interference important. Indonesia had just undergone a violent change of regime and had emerged from a “confrontation” (in (1963 – (1966) with Malaysia and Singapore. Malaysia and Singapore had just gone through an acrimonious separation (in (1965). The Philippines continued to lay claim to the North Borneo territory that had become part of the Malaysian state of Sabah. Malaysia had territorial disputes with all its immediate neighbours. Nearby, the war in Indochina was raging, threatening Thailand. Every ASEAN founding state was imperiled by Communist insurgency or subversion or both. China’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was spilling over into Southeast Asia. The United States was bogged down in the war in Vietnam. The Cold War was at its height. Against such a turbulent background of armed conflict, interference in neighbours’ internal affai rs and mutual suspicion, ASEAN’s members learned important lessons in how to develop and maintain regional peace and stability. 150 Severino (2010) argued that the diversity of races, languages, religions, ethnic origins, historical legacies and experiences, development levels, political, economic and social philosophies, and strategic outlooks in the region made the principles of non-interference important. This diversity could easily upset the stability of the region or any country in it if it is exploited by neighbours or external powers for their own national purposes. 151 Severino (2010). 152 Acharya (2001).

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Another scholar, Jusuf Wanandi defended the do ctrine by asserting, “If each member nation can accomplish an overall national development and overcome internal threats, regional resilience will automatically result much in the same way as a chain derives its overall strength from the strength of its co nstituent parts” .153 In addition, Ruhanas Harun asserted that these norms have helped to unite the ten countries in the association. 154 It is a fact that the acceptance of the countries that were once considered as enemies – because of the clash of ideologies in the Cold War era – was perceived as one of the successes of ASEAN in its effort of ensuring more peace to the region.

Previous studies had noted that the transfer of sovereignty to regional community was possible with the support of the majority of the people; something that happened in the European regionalism.155 However, in the case of the Southeast Asian regionalism, the study found that the respondents supported the upholding of the principles of non-interference on the foreign and security policy of each ASEAN country and the right of national government to be free from interference in the home affairs.156 In addition, the study also found that the majority of the respondents perceived that their national sovereignty would not be negatively affected by ASEAN Community. Nevertheless, the perception would be different if an ASEAN Parliament and ASEAN Court of Justice were established. 157 The respondents perceived that the sovereignty of their countries would be diminished if the two regional institutions were to be established. Thus, the majority of respondents did not show their agreement on this, and they did not aspire for those two bodies. 158

It can, thus, be concluded from the findings that while the national governments were highly convenient with the principles of the non-interference, the

153 Wanandi (1984: 305). 154 Ruhanas Harun (2010). 155 Díez (2003); Qvortrup (2005); Taylor (1997: 279). 156 See 4.2.2. 157 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.40 in 4.5.1. 158 See 4.2.6.

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majority of the respondents supported the maintenance of these principles. 159 It can also be argued that the support for the regional community might be related with the perception that it would not affect the national sovereignty. Furthermore, the finding that the respondents were not in favour of the ASEAN Parliament and the ASEAN Court of Justice may relate with the finding of their perception that the establishment of those two bodies would affect the national sovereignty negatively. So, as a consequence, they did not show support for those two regional bodies.

Regarding the impact on national and regional security, the experience of European regionalism had demonstrated a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the regional community seems to have diminished conflicts between neighbouring nations and increased cooperation between them. On the other hand, the greater integration in Europe and North America has demonstrated the increase of national insecurity in terms of non-traditional and human security. 160 As the flow of goods, services, and human movement become freer as the result of further regional integration, it would be more difficult to control the movement of transnational crimes such as drug trafficking 161 , human trafficking, international terrorist groups, and money laundering. 162 In addition, the long-term impact of free trade on the loss of working opportunities in several uncompetitive countries may create social unrests and threaten the security for the countries and the region.

This study has shown that the respondents did not view regional integration as threats to national and regional security. On the contrary, most of the respondents saw no possibility of their national security being negatively affected by the establishment

159 See Table 4.10. 160 Bartilow dan Eom (2009). 161 Bartilow and Eom (2009) displayed the difficulties by giving illustration of the Los Angeles Port in the United States and the Rotterdam Port in the Netherland. Those two ports processed more than two and three containers annually in the 1990s. Controling these vast volumes were too complicated and this fact were used by the transnational criminals to smuggle drugs and other illicit goods. 162 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (2003) reported that the free trade and the integration of financial market made easier for transnational criminals to do money laundering activities. They did it by reinvesting the money they got from illicit activities through legal economic channels such as the stocks market, internet banking, internet casino, insurance, real estate, credit and debit card schemes, diamond and gold, financial markets, entertainment industries, hotel, and car rental industries.

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of ASEAN Community. In addition, their optimism on the security issue was also shown by their perception that the less developed countries (such as Vietnam, Cambodia, and Myanmar) would not become a threat if they developed in the future. 163 This shows a consistency of their responses with the finding of the optimism among respondents that the formation of ASC would make each ASEAN country fully committed to the peaceful resolution of the differences or conflicts. The finding was also consistent with the respondents’ belief th at, with ASEAN Community, ASEAN countries would be able to cooperate in combating terrorists, drugs trading, human trafficking, and cross border crimes. 164

Another dimension to the issue of national security was the findings on which countries were perceived as threatening the national security of their countries. It was rather surprising that sizable numbers of respondents in the three countries perceived their immediate neighbours as threatening. 165 In Indonesia, the majority of the respondents perceived Malaysia as the major threat to their country’s sovereignty; with Singapore in the second threat. Meanwhile, Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand were perceived by Malaysian respondents as the top three threats. The response in Singapore was similar in that they considered Malaysia and Indonesia as the top two threats.

Why do the respondents tend to view their neighbours as their threats? Although the relations between these neighbouring countries in the last forty years have been characterized by the absence of violent conflicts, several disputes have occurred between them. In countries with high degree of nationalism,166 the disputes could ignite the anger of the public.

Several issues that provoke the public lately seemed to have influenced their answers. For example, Indonesia - Malaysia relations have been soured by territorial

163 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.41 in 4.5.2. 164 See 4.2.2 165 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.42, Table 4.43, and Table 4.44 in 4.5.1. 166 See 4.3.2.

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disputes between these neighbouring countries over the islands of Sipadan, Ligitan and Blok Ambalat. 167 The cultural disputes over shared cultural artefacts (e.g. Barong Dance or Reog Ponorogo, Rasa Sayang(e) Song, batik, and Balinese Pendet Dance), 168 cases of inhumane treatment of Indonesian migrant workers by their Malaysian employers, 169 and the case of the threat of the Malaysian Rela (Malaysian voluntary civil defence forces) to Indonesian citizens in Malaysia in 2007 170 also ignited the nationalist sentiments of the Indonesian public. Blown up by some politicians and fuelled by the provoking news from the mass media, those cases became serious and resulted in several irritating protests in both countries.

Singapore ’s relations with its neighbours have not been easy either. With Malaysia, the island state had some disputes -- the most well-known being the dispute over Pedra Branca or White Rock Island or Batu Puteh which was taken to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).171 Several boundary disputes have yet to be resolved. Cases of sand smuggling from Malaysia and Indonesia for the land reclamation projects in Singapore have added to the difficulties in the relations between the three countries. 172

With Singapore, a number of issues influenced the perception of the Indonesians. The public in Indonesia has long perceived Singapore as a notorious safe-haven for corruption suspects on the run from Indonesia.173 The absence of extradition agreement between the two countries has made the island country a paradise for some economic criminals from Indonesia. 174 In 2007, an extradition pact

167 Mak (2008); Juwana (2003); Asri Salleh, Che Hamdan Che Mohd. Razali and Kamaruzaman Jusoff (2009); Strachan (2009). 168 Rachagan (2010); Jakarta Post (2009); Rachman and Malik (2009); Kusumadara (2011). 169 Bernama (2010); Human Rights Watch (2010); Deutsche Press Agentur (2009); Agence France- Presse (20 10). 170 Raja Petra Kamarudin (2011); Pathoni (2007); DetikNews (2007). 171 Mak (2008); Asri Salleh, Che Hamdan Che Mohd. Razali and Kamaruzaman Jusoff (2009); Strachan (2009). 172 Elliott (2007); Jakarta Post (2002a and 2002b). 173 Lamb (2011); Nazeer (2011); Soedarjo (2010). 174 Jakarta Post 6 th December (2011).

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was almost agreed upon, but the Singaporean move to tie the treaty to a defence agreement sparked protests from Indonesian parliamentarians and the mass media 175 . The Indonesian public then perceived Singapore as having protected the Indonesian corruption fugitives and this perception influenced the perception of Singapore as a threat to Indonesian national security.

The study has found that the ASEAN Community was not perceived to affect national sovereignty and security negatively. Likewise, the respondents also were optimistic that the regional community would not affect the national identity negatively. In general, the majority also denied that it would be possible for the national identity to be merged into one ASEAN identity. 176

As language is part of national identity, it is important to ascertain about the respondents perception of the impact of international language used in ASEAN on the importance of national languages. As each nation in the region has its own national language, English is used as the medium of communication in ASEAN fora and events, and for communication among the officials and the people of ASEAN countries. On this issue, the majority of the respondents predicted that the use of English would not diminish the importance of national languages.

Finally, it can be concluded that the general perception was that regional integration would not negatively impact national sovereignty, security, and identity. The surprising finding, however, is that many of the respondents perceived threats to their national security as coming from neighbouring countries. This is a reality that may undermine the success of ASEAN regional integration initiatives, if it is not well managed.

175 In 2007, Indonesia and Singapore signed an extradition treaty along with a defense cooperation pact as a package. However, the Indonesian Parliament refused to ratify it on the grounds that the defence pact compromised national security (Nazeer 2011). Members of the House of Representatives argued that they refused to ratify the agreement because Singapore attempted to tie the treaty to a defense agreement, which granted both countries the right to conduct naval and air exercises in each other’s territories as part of a regional agreement to counter terrorism in the Malacca Straits, one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world ( Jakarta Post 6th December 2011). 176 The details of data for this analysis are provided in Table 4.45 in 4.5.3.

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5.6 ANALYSIS ON PERCEIVED IMPACTS OF PUBLIC OPINION ON ASEAN COMMUNITY BUILDING

It is argued that that, as public is one of agents that is potential in influencing in the social-construction of Southeast Asian regional integration, their opinion may have an impact on the pace and direction of ASEAN Community building. In this section, firstly, the impact of the study on the pace of ASEAN Community building is discussed. Subsequently, the impact of the public opinion survey on some specific areas of ASEAN cooperation is discussed. Finally, the study discusses on whether, and to what extent, the proclaime d goal of a more “people -centred ASEAN” may slowly transform the elitist nature of the regional organisation over the long run.

The first issue to discuss is on the impact of the study on the pace of ASEAN Community building. Several observers have explicitly noticed that the process of constructing the Southeast Asian integration as considerably slow and some have predicted that it would be far from achieving its target date of 2015 for creating the ASEAN Community. 177 Indonesian political scientist Rizal Sukma, the executive director of the Indonesian Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), for example, contended that “ASEAN is in the middle of traffic jam. We can’t achieve an ASEAN Community and other goals by 2015”. 178

The social construction process towards the ASC, the first pillar of the proposed ASEAN Community, has progressed very slowly and far from the ASEAN rhetoric. David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith 179 argue that process of constructing the ASEAN Security Community is going slow and the regional organisation is seen as unsuccessful to cope with non-traditional security threats such as haze pollution from burning rain forests in the Indonesian provinces of Kalimantan and Sumatra, the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome epidemic in 2002 – 2003, Avian influenza, and transnational terrorism those challenged the individual and

177 Das (2012: 328), Anjaiah (2011), Dennis and Yusof (2003), Teh (2004). 178 Anjaiah (2011). 179 Jones and Smith (2007).

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collective security of the ASEAN states. ASEAN has failed to act as a cohesive Security Community as the responses to those security issues have remained steadfastly bilateral and extra-regional. These responses are contradictory to the constructivist’s or neofunctionalist’s concept of Security Community which assumes that ASEAN would evolve common structures of intelligence gathering and sharing, intra-ASEAN police cooperation, and a shared regional approach to the problem. In the Southeast Asia regionalism, shared norms have not engendered a sense of unity in the face of regionally generated trans-boundary threats that the ASC collectively faces.

The progress towards the construction of the AEC is also far from impressive. A study by David J. Dennis and Zainal Aznam Yusof 180 elaborates that the pace of integration is slowed down in terms of trade integration, opening up of services, liberalisation of inv estment and financial services, implementation of ASEAN’s policies, programs and projects, progress in intellectual property cooperation. Another study by Sanchita Basu Das finds that progress towards AEC is very slow as it faces a number of obstacles such as the non-tariff barriers to trade; corruption in the form of bribery to facilitate import clearance, licence application and renewal, testing, customs inspections, and work permits; lack of private sector awareness; problems with customs procedures; lack of dispute settlement mechanism; protectionism policies against foreign products or services; and national policies against the entry of foreign investment in certain sectors of national economy. 181

The pace of social construction process of ASCC is the slowest compared to the other pillars of ASEAN Community. Although this pillar is considered important to transform the organization from a more state-centric ASEAN to a more people- centric Association, 182 it is the least developed area of ASEAN cooperation. This is the result of the situation that national agendas drive many of ASCC goals, nonexistence of institutional capacity to translate social issues into legislation, and no

180 Dennis and Yusof (2003) 181 Das (2012). 182 Severino (2006); Ishak and Sani (2010).

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common understanding among ASEAN member countries of social issues such as values, ethics and social justice.183 Some observers have criticised the lethargy of ASCC. David Martin Jones and Michael L. R. Smith, for example, contend that ASCC has been slow and unable to solve the issue of cross-border environmental issue such as haze pollution from burning rain forests in the Indonesian provinces of Kalimantan and Sumatra. 184 A study by Julio Santiago Amador III examines the criticism levelled against the ASCC for its slow response in providing aid to the beleaguered in Myanmar and relates that criticism to ASEAN’s disaster management policy. 185 The same author also contends that the slow-process of identity building under the ASCC is because of its top-down implementation processes with the member-states through their governments determining the end-state, objectives and processes; and argues that it poses a risk to the development of the ASCC and the ASEAN as a whole because ultimately, the member-states’ vision of a community may in fact be based on a shared culture of the elites and this kind of international society can be considered fragile. 186

Some observers have defined some factors causing the go-slow ASEAN Community’s construction process. Benny Teh Cheng Guan 187 as well as David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith 188 argued that ASEAN’s diplomatic culture – the ASEAN way or the ASEAN process that embodies the norms of sovereignty, non- intervention and consensus and the supplementation of 'commitment institutions' – as the root cause of ASEAN slow process and as the result, it would not able to weather the storm of globalization and new regional challenges posed by two neighbouring giants, China and India. Rizal Sukma argues that the cause of this problem because of the weakness of leadership and rules in ASEAN, so to solve the problems, ASEAN Charter should be revised to give more power and funding for the ASEAN Secretariat

183 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (2008). 184 Jones and Smith (2007). 185 Amador III (2009). 186 Amador III (2011). 187 Teh (2004). 188 Jones and Smith (2007).

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and to impose stricter rules and sanction mechanism for implementation of ASEAN programmes. 189

In relation to the findings of this study, it is exaggerated to say that the finding of public opinion surveys alone is sufficient to accelerate the pace of ASEAN integration; however, it is arguable that public opinion surveys may support acceleration of the construction process towards ASEAN Community. Public opinion surveys may reveal the true opinion, awareness, attitudes, supports, identification and aspiration of the grassroots on the regional integration and this study has shown that the regionalism initiatives in ASEAN are supported by the public and they aspired for a closer regional integration. This information may be used as a trigger that might influence the nation leaders to become more committed in accelerating the social construction for the ASEAN Community before 2015. Had this information been revealed to ASEAN leaders, they may increase their commitment for the initiatives and expedite the process of national legislations to conform the regional initiatives and programmes.

Public opinion surveys can also be used to detect some problems at the grassroots that may disturb or annoy the construction process of regional integration. For example, respondents showed some level of reactive nationalism and supports for protectionism – a condition that may reflect the cause of go-slow process of ASEAN integration. Had this information been knowledgeable to ASEAN leaders, they could take measures to neutralize excessive nationalism that might slow-down the process of regional integration.

The second issue to discuss is on the impact of the public opinion survey on the some specific areas of ASEAN integration – namely the political-security, the economic, and the socio-cultural cooperation. Regarding this issue, this study argues that regional cooperation in economic and socio-cultural areas would be highly affected by public opinions, awareness, perceptions, attitudes, and sentiments. However, political-security cooperation will be less likely to be affected by public

189 Anjaiah (2011).

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opinion surveys because the national governments still maintain their state-centric elitist paradigm.

Firstly, this study argues that economic integration is the most likely affected by public opinion surveys as this area requires the most active involvement from the public for its success. In her book “Achieving the ASEAN Economic Community 2015”, Sanchita Basu Das 190 writes that the process of constructing an AEC requires a bottom-up style that involves the interests, requirements, opinions, and actions of the business sector and the public in general, taking into account the market forces in operation. Public participation is needed in the qualitative, as well as quantitative monitoring and assessment of the implementation of integration measures. The linkage between domestic and foreign businesses needs to be developed and the flows of information to the business sector needs to be deepened.

To construct a successful economic integration, active participation from business sector and public is required. Unfortunately, the top-down approach to establishing a single-market and production base has been carried out, resulting in the inactive position of public in the establishment of AEC. Studies in Brunei,191 Indonesia, 192 Malaysia, 193 Philippines, 194 Singapore, 195 Thailand 196 and Vietnam 197 have shown that the business-players in the region – one type of public that should be active in the AEC – are not well-informed on the benefits they should get under the AEC. As the result, they did not use AEC facilities - such as the Common Effective Preference Tariffs (CEPT) - when doing businesses in ASEAN countries.

190 Das (2012). 191 Thambipillai (2012). 192 Mugijayani and Kartika (2012). 193 Abidin, Loh, and Aziz (2012). 194 Rosellon and Yap (2012). 195 Giam (2012). 196 Suwannakarn and Wasawong (2012). 197 Thanh and Duong (2012).

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Secondly, this study argues that socio-cultural integration is also more likely to be affected by public opinion surveys as this area requires active involvement from the public for its success. As the Declaration of Bali Concord II suggests, the ideal ASCC is the situation where the people in the region bonded together in partnership as a community of caring societies. 198 Further, in the ASCC blueprint, it is stated that ASCC will contribute to construct an ASEAN Community that is people-centred and socially responsible with a view to achieving enduring solidarity and unity among the nations and peoples of ASEAN by forging a common identity and building a caring and sharing society which is inclusive and harmonious where the well-being, livelihood, and welfare of the peoples are enhanced. 199 This ideal calls for active involvement of the public. Conversely, the process of ASCC community building is well-described by Julio S. Amador III as highly elitist, state-centric, and using top- down approach. 200 Thus, it is arguable that the inclusion of public opinion surveys as a measure to assess public aspirations may be beneficial and would affect the construction of ASCC positively.

The ASCC Blueprint has also called for the identification of an ASEAN Identity which it describes as the “basis of Southeast Asia’s regional interests.” The regional identity is further described as “our collective personality, norms, values and beliefs as well as aspirations as one ASEAN Community.” 201 However, it should be noted that regional-identity building is more complicated than nation-building considering that ASEAN member-states are all multicultural, multi-languages and multi-ethnic.202 The process of building an ASEAN identity through its “imagination”, which is necessary for a regional common identity to develop, is currently an elite and government-led initiative that may not necessarily be a project of the governed and the common people of ASEAN, especially if their aspirations are not assessed properly.

198 ASEAN Secretariat (2003). 199 ASEAN Secretariat (2009c). 200Amador III (2011). 201ASEAN Secretariat (2009c). 202 See Table 4.39.

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Hence, it is arguable that the inclusion of public opinion surveys may be beneficial in the formation of ASEAN regional identity as this initiative should based on the public.

Thirdly, this study argues that the political-security cooperation will be less likely to be affected by public opinion surveys. Traditionally, political-security cooperation is a realist state-centric notion. At the end of the Cold War, ASEAN stood as a diplomatic community of weak states, and its collegial style represented the “institutional fruit” of sub regional conflict resolution between 1976 and 1991. 203 ASEAN in realism concept was very well described by Michael Leifer that contended the regional cooperation as an “embryonic security community” practicing cooperative security. 204 By this, Leifer meant a realist intra-elite undertaking that reconciles previously conflicting states through its machinery of dialogue, dispute management, and conflict avoidance. In this, ASEAN’s practice contained “an evident dimension of balance of power” within “an institutional framework of multila teral constraint” that actively avoided solving intramural problems. 205

Recent development in ASEAN Community building has made regional constructivist scholars to remark that ASEAN is evolving into regional security, economic and socio-cultural community with the norms and the distinctive ASEAN process transforming the region in the process of building a shared identity. 206 Some constructivists maintain that the future of international relations requires regional identities to progressively replace self-interested, state-based ones. However, Jones and Smith demonstrate that the community building is superficial as they point out the contradiction between official ASEAN rhetoric and countervailing reality. In reality, ASEAN remains an elitist and state-centric entity where its norm of non-interference and its practice of non-binding consensus prevented deeper integration either within ASEAN or the wider East Asian region. While the official view of ASEAN emphasizes its political role and the informal, unstructured, cooperative, and

203 Jones and Smith (2007: 151). 204 Leifer (1987: 4). 205 Leifer (2005: 135). 206 Jones and Smith (2007: 182-183).

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consensus-oriented character of the organization, at the quotidian level of policy formulation and implementation, the organization remains an essentially intergovernmental one, dealing primarily with trade and economic issues and dominated by member state bureaucracies, rather than one that possesses the institutional infrastructure to develop into a “mature” security community or establish a common identity. 207 Therefore, study argues that the political-security cooperation will be the least likely of the three areas of ASEAN regional cooperation to be affected by public opinion surveys.

The third issue to discuss is on the possibility of the proclaimed goal of a more “people -centred ASEAN” may slowly transform the elitist nature of t he regional organisation over the long run. This study argues that the proclaimed goal of a more people-centred per se will not transform the elitist nature of the regional organisation, unless it involves the people more actively. Without people involvement, transformation into people-centred ASEAN will remain rhetoric.

Without effective mechanism to gauge public opinion, the study predicts that the transformation into a people-centred will not occur, given the realist influence among the leaders in the region, disparities in ASEAN countries (in terms of history, religiosity, 208 ethnicity, 209 socio-economic development, 210 legal and political systems 211), and non-existence of Copenhagen-like criteria 212 to join ASEAN. The transformation will occur in the very long-run as transactions and communications may slowly redefine perceptions and relationships between actors (as the regional theories contend) while ongoing social construction of interests and ideational factors – such as ideas, norms, and values – of a security community will lead to the establishment of a truly ASEAN Community in which the use of dialogue will

207 Jones and Smith (2007: 184). 208 See Table 4.24 regarding the plurality of religiousity in ASEAN. 209 See Table 4.39 regarding the plurality of ethnicity in ASEAN. 210 See 4.4.4 regarding the disparity in socio-economic development. 211 See 4.4.5 regarding the differences in legal and political systems. 212 Jones and Smith (2007: 184).

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become more legitimate for solving problems among nations. When, the time comes, the leaders will realise that the involvement of the elite per se is not enough while the involvement of the public is really required; therefore the public will be involved more actively in the process, so the elitist state-centric ASEAN Community will become a more people-centric regional integration.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The study focused on assessing public opinions on several aspects of social- construction of the ASEAN Community. This is necessary because while the leaders of ASEAN nations aspire to establish the regional community in 2015, there has never been any study on the support or consensus of the public on the construction of the ASEAN Community. The three traditions of regional integration theories have affirmed that opinions and participation of the general public are important to attend to as they may determine the success of regionalism initiatives. Thus, there is a great need for synthesizing the public’s voices, perceptions, support, identification and aspiration for the establishment of the ASEAN Community.

This quantitative study was guided by six objectives; firstly, to discuss and analyze public knowledge on ASEAN, perceptions on ASEAN and awareness on the ASEAN Community. Secondly, the study examines the public attitudes, opinions, and aspiration for the formation of the Community. Thirdly, the study analyses the extent of nationalist sentiments, cultural identities and perceptions on regional identities. Fourthly, the study examines the perceived obstacles for the formation of this regional integration. Fifthly, the study discusses the perceived impacts of the ASEAN Community on national sovereignty, national security and national identities. Finally, the study discusses the impact of public opinion on the pace and direction of ASEAN Community building, the cooperation areas those are most likely and most unlikely to be affected by the public opinions, and the possibility the transformation of the elitist nature of the ASEAN towards a more “people-centred ASEAN”. The primary sources of research data were derived from surveys conducted to 1,256 respondents in eleven cities in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.

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6.1 OPINIONS ON THE ASEAN COMMUNITY

The central argument of this study is that the public opinions need to be attended to for the success of the regionalism initiatives and for making effective decisions that can satisfy the needs and wants of the public. Arguing that several issues regarding the public opinion need to be addressed, five concluding points – based on the research inquiries – can be inferred from the study.

Firstly, the study argues that the public awareness and perception of ASEAN regionalism needs to be assessed because it will influence the public opinion on ASEAN regional integration. The study found that there was a high degree of awareness of ASEAN among respondents in the three countries and they considered ASEAN as relevant and necessary for the region and their countries. However, the extent of the awareness of the proposed ASEAN Community was much lower than those of ASEAN, due to the inadequate socialisation from the national government and the regional organisation. In addition, there was a feeling that there was not sufficient information on ASEAN Community among the respondents who were aware of the ASEAN Community. The study has also shown that the awareness and perception of ASEAN were positively related with the attitudes towards the ASEAN Community.

Secondly, the study argues that public attitudes, opinions, and aspirations towards the concept and formation of the ASEAN Community need to be studied in order to plan effective strategies for its social construction. This study has found that there were positive attitudes, but aspirations on the Southeast Asian regionalism were different from the European model. The respondents were positive and supportive of the ASEAN Community and its three pillars (political security, economic, and socio- cultural) although the formation process did not involve the public. While the respondents in the three countries perceived the proposal to be fruitful to the people, most of them also realized that the materialisation of ASEAN Community objectives would be extremely difficult as most countries prioritized national rather than regional interests. The European-like regional integration was also not what most respondents

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aspired for as they rejected the key institutions of European integration such as the monetary union, ASEAN Parliament, and a stronger regional executive body. The formation of a regional court of justice was supported by the majority of Malaysian respondents but not by the Indonesians and the Singaporeans. In addition, although the abolition of visa was supported by the respondents, they resisted the abolition of passports for the citizens of Southeast Asian countries travelling to other ASEAN countries.

Thirdly, the study argues that the sentiments regarding national and regional identities need to be examined because they may influence the social construction of ASEAN Community. The study found that there were strong national identities, but weaker regional identities. In general, the nationalist sentiments in the three countries are strong enough to hinder regional integration. The level of patriotism and reactive nationalist sentiments was still high – and this is a condition which could increase conflicts between countries and hinder regional cooperation. The economic nationalist sentiments, however, were at the moderate level – though a good number still asked for protection of local products, workers, and business – a stand that is actually against the spirit of the AEC. The consumer nationalist sentiments were low; nevertheless, the respondents in Malaysia and Indonesia still showed that their consumer nationalism still existed. The cultural identity sentiment was moderate: the respondents admitted that they still conducted traditions resembling the culture of their countries. Linguistic national identities were still strong, but they concurred that learning foreign languages was essential to compete in the era of globalisation. Finally, on ASEAN identity, the majority of respondents in the three countries identified themselves as a part of ASEAN Community and was of the opinion that there were comparable norms, values, histories, and intelligence level of people in all ASEAN countries. Even so, they agreed that it would be impossible for the national identities to be merged into one ASEAN regional identity. Furthermore, the variety of ethnicities and religious plurality in the region meant that primordial identities such as ethnicity and religious beliefs are unlikely to serve as regional identities of ASEAN. Singaporeans, as one of the key players in the regionalism, tended to reject these primordial identities as the

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base for regional identities as they felt this would make the people from different race or religious beliefs feel alienated or even threatened.

Fourthly, as for the perceived challenges for the establishment of regional integration, the study found the following challenges to be the most important: (1) disparity in levels of education; (2) lack of competitiveness in the economy of most ASEAN countries; (3) the dependency of ASEAN countries on the developed countries, especially for financing their economic activities; (4) the socio-economic conditions of most nations in the region which were still low and with wide gaps between countries; (5) the differences in the legal and political system; (6) the limitation of technology mastery and creation in most of the countries; (7) poverty in most ASEAN countries; (8) internal conflicts, terrorism, and insurgency in some parts of the region; (9) the structure of ASEAN economies, which was dominated by the Chinese ethnic group; and (10) the variety of ethnicities and religions. Specific strategies are therefore needed to resolve these issues and accelerate regional integration.

Finally, the study found that most of the respondents perceived that their national sovereignty would not be negatively affected by ASEAN Community, except if ASEAN Parliament and ASEAN Court of Justice were to be established. Most of the respondents perceived that the establishment of the ASEAN Community would not impact their national security negatively. Surprisingly, the respondents perceived threats to the national security as coming from neighbouring countries. Several unresolved issues between those neighbouring countries could have influenced the perceptions. The establishment of ASEAN Community was also perceived not to affect national identity negatively. The possibility of a merger of identities into one ASEAN identity was not seen as a possibility. On the language issue, the consensus was that the use of English would not diminish the importance of national languages.

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6.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF ASEAN COMMUNITY

Several implications for the social construction of ASEAN Community can be inferred from the study. The first implication is on the lack of respondents’ awareness of the proposed ASEAN Community. While most of the respondents claimed that they have strong interests in the regional community and consider it as important, the study suggests that the lack of awareness was caused by the lack of socialisation both from the national governments and the regional institution regarding the regional integration initiatives. Since awareness and sufficient information are crucial to gain public support, there is an urgency to socialize the ideas more widely to the public in each ASEAN country. It is indisputable that national governments have tried to socialize the idea through public seminars or close-door academic meetings that have limited participation from the public on the larger scale; however, the study revealed that the socialisation efforts -- at the current level have been aimed at elites -- were simply not enough. Furthermore, there was a feeling of insufficient information about the ASEAN Community among the respondents. Therefore, it is suggested that national governments and ASEAN engage in massive socialisation by using effective mass communication strategies. Regional collaboration to increase awareness and knowledge of ASEAN among the public has to be strengthened. The socialisation is urgent because the public is one of agents those are potential in influencing in the social-construction of the ASEAN Community. In fact, their involvement is needed to move ASEAN regionalism from ‘state -centric elitist ASEAN ’ to ‘people-centred ASEAN Community ’. Such socialisation efforts may require considerable, but it should be considered as an investment that will be beneficial for the future. If people are fully informed about the regional integration, they will make sufficient preparation. In fact, it is the obligation of the national government to draw up programmes to prepare the public, so they can face the regionalisation with full confidence.

The second implication is related to the Indonesian respondents’ perception that the formation process of the ASEAN Community did not involve the public. Fortunately, most of the respondents were still optimistic that integration would be

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fruitful to the people and their country. Thus, the perception did not undermine their support for the formation of the ASEAN Community. However, since the respondents in Malaysia and Singapore denied the statement that ASEAN Community did not involve the public, the Indonesian response needs to be examined. It showed that there was something amiss in Indonesia that did not occur in Malaysia and Singapore: the Indonesian government might have neglected its public in the formation process of the ASEAN Community. This is of concern because the democratic system that Indonesia has embraced requires more public involvement – something that might have yet to occur when the Indonesian government formulated the ASEAN Community together with their counterparts in the other ASEAN countries. So, the Indonesian government needs to pursue its efforts at socializing the ASEAN Community more aggressively and work together with civil societies to prepare the public to face regional integration. It is also suggested that the Indonesian government ought to involve the public more intensively when they make major decisions about the regional community.

The third implication is on the attitudes and aspiration of the public. The attitudes of the public were positive toward the concept of ASEAN Community, but the public ’s aspiration for regionalism is different from the European model. Although it is arguable that what the governments have done has been supported by their public, the true aspirations and attitudes of the public in the ten ASEAN countries have yet to be revealed. Furthermore, aspirations and attitudes may change over time. The finding implies that the ASEAN Secretariat – together with national governments – needs to formulate effective strategies to maintain positive attitudes and support for the integration initiatives. To find out the actual aspiration and attitudes of the public, it is suggested that the ASEAN Secretariat or ASEAN Foundation establish an agency to conduct r egular ‘ASEANbarometer’ public opinion surveys in the ASEAN countries, so that the decision making for ASEAN Community can be based on the expectations of the people. The survey is considered the best measure because, given the current plurality of political systems of ASEAN countries, it is impossible to conduct direct voting like as in the European Union. Without the regular surveys, the real aspirations

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and attitudes of the public will remain a mystery, and it will be more difficult to make effective decisions that cater to the needs and wants of the public.

The fourth implication is on the nationalist sentiment. Nationalism, a sentiment influencing the attitude of the people towards the formation of regional integration, has never been given enough attention in the establishment of the ASEAN Community. The study has found that there are strong nationalist sentiments in the region which can be detrimental to the formation of ASEAN Community. The high socio-political and socio-cultural nationalism may increase the conflict between countries and between the public’s in the ASEAN countries. The protectionist demand for local products, workers, and business from foreign competitors is not conducive for economic integration. The opinions of the people – especially nationalism -- need to be accorded and appropriate measures need to be taken to neutralize excessive nationalism.

The fifth implication is on the regional identity. Until now, several elements of ASEAN regional identities have been decided upon: ASEAN Vision 2020, ASEAN flag, ASEAN capital city (Jakarta), and so on. However, the most crucial of ASEAN identity – ‘ASEAN values ’ – has yet to be specified. Furthermore, the process of specifying ASEAN identities tends to be elitist and state-centric; something that go against the multicultural ASEAN Community. It is suggested that this issue be resolved by employing bottom-up approach, so the formation of ASEAN Community can progress smoothly.

The sixth implication is on the perceived obstacles. Firstly, three of the ten obstacles pertain to socio-economic disparity – the disparity in levels of education (the first-ranked obstacle), the socio-economic development of most nations which is still low with wide gaps between countries (the fourth-ranked obstacle), and poverty in most ASEAN countries (the seventh-ranked obstacle). These obstacles need to be addressed as the top priority because they directly challenge ASEAN Vision 2020 which defines “ASEAN as a concert of Southeast Asian nations, outward looking, living in peace, stability and prosperity, bonded together in partnership, in dynamic

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development and a community of caring societies”. Certainly, the development programmes of the region should be directed at uplifting the poor, upgrading the health, increasing the life quality, and narrowing the gap in terms of access to education in the region while keeping economic growth high in order to achieve what the ’ASEAN Vision’ aspires . Secondly, three other obstacles need to be given attention – lack of competitiveness in the economy of most ASEAN countries (the second-rank obstacle), dependency on the developed countries especially for financing (the third-rank obstacle), the limitation of technology mastery and creation in most ASEAN countries (the sixth-rank obstacle). Those weaknesses are ironic as Singapore is one of the most competitive nations in the world. The success story of Singapore in their development should be shared and emulated by the others. Thirdly, the differences in legal system and law enforcement (the fifth-ranked obstacle) can be overcome by political commitment and necessary harmonisation. Rule of law must be upheld in the region, so it can increase the region ’s competitive posture, attract more investors, and increase the regional human development. Fourthly, the obstacle of internal conflicts, terrorism, and insurgency in some parts of the region should be solved through increased cooperation and greater participation under the proposed ASC. Solving security problems will be easier with closer cooperation between countries. Finally, the Chinese dominance of ASEAN economies should be used to optimize the development of the region. With the rising China as the second largest economy of the world, the Southeast Asian Chinese could become the strategic point – if they are managed effectively, they can become the engine of growth for the regional economy. In order to develop the economic position of other groups, creative strategies need to be put in place to increase the economic capabilities of the poorer people in the region regardless of their ethnicities or religious beliefs. Even so, the discriminatory policies ought to be reviewed as it will decrease the cohesiveness of the regional identity, given the variety of ethnicities and religions of the people in the region.

The seventh implication is on the impact of the establishment of ASEAN Community on national sovereignty, security and identity. Although several political observers have criticized ASEAN for emphasizing the norm of national sovereignty

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and non-interference, the norms have shown that they serve to unite the ten countries in the regional association. Furthermore, the study has demonstrated that the respondents supported these norms and perceived that their national sovereignty would not be negatively affected by ASEAN Community, except if ASEAN Parliament and ASEAN Court of Justice were to be established. So, as a consequence, the respondents did not show their support for those two regional bodies. Further, the respondents also did not perceive that national security and identity would be affected by the establishment of the ASEAN Community. Thus, barring any unforeseen development, this study predicts that ASEAN will remain a reactive regional organisation in terms of political security and socio-cultural community because the national governments and the public are not ready to transfer sovereignty to any supranational association. In terms of ASEAN Economic Community, regional integration would be characterized by a freer ‘FTA -Plus’ economic integration; not a more rigid ‘Custom Union’. Moreover, because it is not supported by the national governments and the public, further integration as in the EU would be unfeasible in the near future.

The eighth implication is on the perceived threats from neighbouring countries. This is a disturbing phenomenon, because it might hinder the resolution of international issues and disputes between countries in the region and may become “ a thorn” for intra ASEAN relations and negatively affect the formation of ASEAN Community as a caring community. In order to overcome this drawback, relations between neighbouring countries need to be carefully managed. Disputes or conflicts need to be resolved fast, so that it does not prejudice the perception of the public towards their neighbouring countries. The mass media need to be persuaded to disseminate positive news on the good relations between countries. National government should be more proactive to act fast to contain the situation, if there are any developments that may affect relations with other ASEAN countries. Effective public relations strategies should be devised to handle such problems. In addition, a careful and holistic change management programmes need to be conducted. To foster understanding among the public, more programmes involving the public of neighbouring ASEAN countries need to be drawn up. Some programmes – taking the

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forms of sport events, cultural and art events, student exchanges, journalist exchanges – have been implemented, but they have yet to be widely publicized to change the perception of the public.

The ninth implication is on the impact of public opinion surveys on pace of ASEAN Community social construction. The result of public opinion surveys may support the acceleration of ASEAN integration because they reveal the level of public supports for the initiative, public aspirations for the integration and for several issues related to regionalism and regionalisation, and public perception regarding some obstacles for the amalgamation in the region. The information can become the input for the acceleration of national legislation to conform the regional integration agreement in ASEAN.

The tenth implication is on the impact of public opinion surveys on the direction of ASEAN regional integration. ASEAN economic and socio-cultural constructs are the most likely frameworks to be affected by the public opinion surveys as the success of those integration relies on public involvement. However, as political- security cooperation remains state-centric, this area will be the least likely of the three areas of ASEAN regional cooperation to be affected by public opinion surveys.

Finally, on the transformation from elite-and-state centric ASEAN into people- centric regional integration, the study entail that the transformation will remain rhetoric without involvement of the people. Only involvement of the people can transform ASEAN into a people-centric regionalism and regionalisation.

6.3 THEORETICAL IMPLICATION

This study uses the premises of regional integration theories and social constructivism in regional integration constructs. Therefore, the implications of this study on those two theories are highlighted.

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Firstly, by assessing the formation of ASEAN Community from the perspective of the public, this study demonstrates that public is one of non-state actors that should play active roles in regional integration. This study challenges the lack of focus on public involvement in the study of Regionalism under the discipline of International Relations. The studies on Regional integration and constructivist theories in ASEAN – although they emphasize the importance of human-like actions of the states (e.g. transaction, interaction, socialisation, perception, cooperation, identification, social process, and feelings) as well as ideational factors (e.g. ideas, norms, values, cultures and identities) – still focus on states as the legitimate actors and tends to undermine the importance of public.

Secondly, this study showed how the public may become an agent of ASEAN integration process. It demonstrates that the public shared agreement, supports, aspiration, and identification for the construction ASEAN Community’s structure, rules, norms, rules, and identity, although they were not positioned as the main agents in the construction of ASEAN Community.

Thirdly, while regional integration theories argue that transactions, interaction, socialisation and communication among states in ASEAN regional integration initiatives may influence perceptions and relationships among state-actors and lead to the establishment of a regional community that can settle differences and solve problems peacefully, such processes also occur in the public. The public, in this case, play a role as the key stakeholder that observe these processes and may show their supports for such process.

Fourthly, Constructivist theories argue that the success of the ASEAN Community formation would depend on its ability to socially construct the regional community among actors. However, empirical observation demonstrates that these are not sufficient for regional integration. Several studies showed that ASEAN Community were progressing very slowly and may not achieve its targeted objectives in 2015 although several ASEAN infrastructures, summits, ministerial and high-level meetings, agreements, rules, norms, values have been socially constructed and

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transactions, interactions, and communication have been conducted involving state- leaders. Consequently, regional integration and constructivist theories ’ focus on state- actors has failed in achieving regional integration in desired pace. This study demonstrates that public unawareness, unknowledgeable, and non-involvement in the formulation of the regional integration project has resulted in the low level of involvement of activities in ASEAN political-security, economic, and socio-cultural areas of cooperation. Conversely, the study has revealed the public possesses perception of high-relevancy of ASEAN that may relate with their supports, perceived benefits, optimism and aspiration for ASEAN Community. Thus, this study demonstrates that the pace of regional integration and the level of public participation can be increased if they involve public opinion in their initiatives.

Fifthly, Constructivist theories argue about the transformative impact of rules, norms and values because they can regulate state behaviours, redefine state interests, constitute state identities and develop collective identities for the success of regional integration. However, this study demonstrates that ASEAN rules, norms and values are meaningless if the public is not involved. Study by Sanchita Basu Das (2012) demonstrate that the rules, norms and values of ASEAN integration are shared only by states leaders, but not by middle and lower ranking officers in ASEAN countries that tended to obstruct the integration initiatives.

Sixthly, the constructivists that assume that regional community can be constructed by implementing rules, norms, and values among nation leaders to regulate state behaviour. However, this study found that this assumption is not sufficient for a successful construction of regional community. This study observes that the public’s nationalism sentiments are high and it may go against regional integration. In addition, there are perceptions of threats to national security and sovereignty coming from other neighbouring (ASEAN) countries. As the results, there are some levels of resistance among lower level official in national governments and among the public. Thus, this study found that establishing and implementing rules, norms, and values to the state-leaders and elites are not sufficient for regional integration initiatives, unless the public is involved.

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Finally, regional integration and constructivist theories share contention that “we -feeling” or regional identities are crucial for regional integration. The constructivists put intersubjective factors, including ideas, culture and identities as the determinant in foreign policy interactions; thus there is a need to identify the regional identities. This study finds that realising regional identities would not be easy because of plurality and disparities in ASEAN countries (in terms of history, religiosity, ethnicity, socio-economic development, and legal and political systems) may become obstacles for regional integration. The process of socially construct a regional common identity through “imagination” is currently an elite and government -led initiative and tends to alienate multi-cultural ASEAN societies. Thus, this study opposes the notion of both theories for state-centric regional identities formation and suggests that the formation process of ASEAN regional identity should involve the public more actively.

6.4 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This study has several methodological and theoretical limitations described in 1.7 of Chapter 1. Several suggestions for future studies are proposed.

Firstly, the choice of mainly quantitative methods and reliance of quantitative closed-ended questions has restricted the analysis. In order to gain a deeper insight, future studies should be expanded to include more qualitative questions in the questionnaire.

Secondly, the study covers only three countries (Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore). As the consequence, the results cannot be generalized to the other ASEAN countries. Therefore, to gather opinion from a wider base, further studies should be conducted which to cover all the ten countries of ASEAN.

Thirdly, the convenience quota, non-random sampling used to gather the targeted public in the three countries (see 3.2) restricts the generalisation of the study. For future studies, the samples should be expanded to cover all kinds of respondents

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randomly (or at least systematically) chosen from the public in ASEAN. Another option is to use purposive quota sampling that involves all members of the public – not only those who have tertiary education. However, such studies require considerable resources, time, and management.

Fourthly, the indicators to measure the public opinions on ASEAN regionalism may have restricted the depth of the analysis. The questions used in the study might be considered as too simple, though sufficient enough for a study that accommodates so many inquiries. For future studies, however, the questions may be elaborated to include more indicators. Such indicators can be taken from the Eurobarometer studies or other sources or developed based on the requirements. For example, in examining the attitudes toward regional integration, the Eurobarometer surveys asked several types of questions including:

a. The general attitude toward the regional Community: “Generally speaking, do you think that your country’s membership of the EC is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?” (Alternative answers: good / bad / neither good nor bad). b. Whether they were for or against the unification: “In general, are you for or against the efforts being made to unify Europe?” (Alternative answers: for / against). c. The benefit of the regional integration for their country: “Taking everything into account, would you say that (their country) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the EU ?” ( Alternative answers: benefited / not benefited). d. Whether they were aware of the problems of the regional community: “Are you personally (Alternative answers: very interested / a little interested / not at all interested) in the problems of the EC ?” e. Feeling if the regional integration were scrapped: “If you were to be told that the EC/EU had been scrapped, would you be very sorry, indifferent, or relieved?” (Alternative answers: very sorry / indifferent / relieved). f. Willingness to make personal sacrifices for the unification: “Would you or would you not, be willing to make some personal sacrifice – for example, pay a little

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more taxes – to bring about the unification of Eur ope?” ( Alternative answers: very willing / fairly willing / not very willing / not at all willing / don’t know). g. The future of the regional integration: “Would you say that you are very optimistic, fairly optimistic, fairly pessimistic, or very pessimistic about the future of the EU?” ( Alternative answers: very optimistic / fairly optimistic / fairly pessimistic / very pessimistic).

Fifthly, the analyses for the present study used only the descriptive methods due to the unavailability of previous research in the context of public opinion on ASEAN Community. As the result, this study lacked the foundation for employing inferential causal statistic tests, delimiting its potentials for further explaining the phenomena. In this case, this pioneering study may serve as the foundation for future studies that may employ more advanced causal statistical methods.

Finally, the study focused on gauging public opinion on ASEAN regional integration with the concepts of international relations and security embedded in the study. Although it is arguable that ASEAN regional integration will influence the security in the region, they were not elaborated in the study. Further, reviews of the literature on international relations or the security studies found hardly any studies on the public opinion on international relations or regional security. It is suggested that future studies be conducted to examine public perceptions, attitudes and opinions on international relations – be it among ASEAN countries or between ASEAN countries and the great powers. Future research can also be conducted to gauge the public views on national security, regional security, or human security.

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APPENDIX A QUESTIONNAIRE (BAHASA MALAYSIA) FOR MALAYSIAN RESPONDENTS

UNIVERSITI KEBANGSAAN MALAYSIA N a t i o n a l U n i v e r s i t y o f M a l a y s i a

Fakulti Sains Sosial dan Kemanusiaan ● Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities

KAJIAN KERJASAMA SERANTAU KE ARAH MEMBINA KOMUNITI ASEAN: MENELITI PERSOALAN NASIONALISME, IDENTITI, KEDAULATAN DAN KESELAMATAN

SOAL SELIDIK (KOD PENYELIDIKAN UKM-GUP-TKS-O7-10-096)

Ybhg. Tan Sri/Dato/Datuk/Tuan/Puan,

Kajian soal selidik ini bertujuan untuk: mengetahui persepsi, sikap dan respon di kalangan masyarakat mengenai ASEAN, identity ASEAN, dan pembentukan komuniti ASEAN.

Kajian dilakukan di tiga buah Negara: Malaysia, Singapura dan Indonesia. Di setiap negara (kecuali Singapura), soal selidik dibahagikan kepada lima kawasan yang mempunyai tahap pembangunan yang ketara. Rasional dari pemilihan kawasan tersebut adalah dari impak sosioekonomi dan budaya yang tinggi kepada negara terbabit; kepelbagaian masyarakat dalam kawasan kajian dari sudut bangsa atau kumpulan etnik dan agama; kadar penyelidikan masyarakat yang tinggi; merupakan antara pusat perindusterian dan budaya Negara; dan akses masyarakat setempat kepada informasi terutamanya kepada isu serantau.

Arahan soal selidik:  Mohon untuk membaca petunjuk pengisian yang tertera pada soal selidik terlebih dahulu.  Tidak ada jawapan yang boleh dikategorikan sebagai betul atau salah. Apa yang penting ialah pendapat dan kerjasama anda.  Mohon menjawab secara jujur untuk mewakili pendapat anda. Semua jawapan memiliki makna besar, sebab yang kami lebih utamakan adalah jawapan yang menggambarkan kenyataan yang sebenarnya.  Jawapan anda adalah SULIT. Pihak kami menjamin sebarang informasi diberikan tidak akan diberikan kepada pihak yang ketiga.

Sebarang pengesahan mengenai projek soal selidik ini boleh didapati dengan menghubungi ahli-ahli kumpulan penyelidik di bawah.

Di atas perhatian dan kerjasama, kami ucapkan terima kasih.

Kumpulan Penyelidik Dr. Mohamed Anwar Omar Din (+6019-6497009) – ketua Projek. Prof.Madya Dr. Mohd. Kamarulnizam Abdullah (+6012-2022964) Guido Benny (+6019-6321968)

325

Kode: MHS/KYW Kota Klpk No PENDAPAT ANDA TENTANG ASEAN

Sila tanda silang (X) pada jawapan yang paling sesuai dengan penilaian Anda.

Ya Tidak 1-1. Apakah Anda tahu tentang ASEAN?

1-2. Apakah Anda faham tentang cita-cita dan tujuan ASEAN?

1-3. Apakah Anda tahu tentang struktur organisasi ASEAN?

1-4. bahawa ASEAN didirikan pada tahun 1967?

1-5. Apakah ASEAN merupakan Komuniti Keselamatan dengan pasukan keamanan khusus?

1-6. Komuniti Keselamatan ASEAN itu disamakan dengan NATO di Eropa?

2. Bagaimana penilaian/pandangan Anda tentang ASEAN? [Jawap jika anda berasa perlu) ......

3. Apakah ASEAN penting bagi Anda dan negara Anda?

Sangat tidak Tidak penting Ragu-ragu antara penting dan Penting Sangat penting penting tidak penting

4. Pada pendapat Anda, apakah ASEAN berhasil; mencapai sasarannya sehingga kini?

Sangat tidak Tidak berhasil Ragu-ragu antara berhasil dan Berhasil Sangat berhasil berhasil tidak berhasil

5. Informasi mengenai ASEAN pernah diajar di sekolah (Sekolah Rendah sampai Sekolah Menengah)? Ya Tidak Tidak ingat

6. Apakah matapelajaran ASEAN perlu diperkenalkan di sekolah (Sekolah Rendah sampai Sekolah Menengah)?

Sangat tidak Tidak penting Ragu-ragu antara penting dan Penting Sangat penting penting tidak penting

7. Adakah Anda berfikiran bahawa jika ASEAN ( ) Ya Jelaskan jawapan Anda: tidak wujud maka akan ada masalah dalam ( ) Tidak rantau ini? ………………………………………………… ………………………………………………… …………………………………………………

Questionnaire for Malaysian - 2

326

PETUNJUK MENGISI SOAL SELIDIK: Sila tanda silang (X) pada kolom yang paling sesuai dengan penilaian Anda terhadap pernyataan berikut: 1 = STS = Sangat Tidak Setuju 4 = S = Setuju 2 = TS = Tidak Setuju 5 = SS = Sangat Setuju 3 = R = Ragu-ragu antara setuju dan tidak setuju

A. NASIONALISME RESPONDEN/MASYARAKAT

Sila tanda silang (X) pada angka yang paling sesuai dengan penilaian Anda terhadap pernyataan berikut, sesuai dengan pandangan, sikap, dan tindakan Anda: No Pernyataan STS TS R S SS A01. Membeli produk Malaysia selalu merupakan pilihan terbaik 1 2 3 4 5 A02. Kita seharusnya hanya menerima barang import dari negara-negara yang 1 2 3 4 5 menerima import kita. A03. Kerajaan seharusnya berusaha mengawal penguasaan asing dalam sektor 1 2 3 4 5 ekonomi dan perdagangan negara. A04. Kerajaan seharusnya semampu mungkin untuk tidak membeli barang dari 1 2 3 4 5 perusahaan/negara asing. Kerajaan seharusnya melindungi industri tempatan dengan memperkenalkan A05. 1 2 3 4 5 halangan perdagangan untuk produk asing. A06. Pekerja asing dapat merugikan rakyat Malaysia kerana mengambil peluang kerja 1 2 3 4 5 dari masyarakat tempatan. A07. Saya selalu menyarankan kepada orang lain (keluarga, teman, dan kenalan) untuk 1 2 3 4 5 tidak membeli produk asing. A08. Saya tidak akan membeli dan menggunakan produk asing, kecuali bila terpaksa. 1 2 3 4 5 A09. Saya bercadang berhenti membeli produk-produk import dan beralih ke produk 1 2 3 4 5 buatan Malaysia. A10. Jika kualitinya sama, saya akan membeli barang yang dihasilkan di Malaysia 1 2 3 4 5 walaupun harganya sedikit lebih mahal daripada barang dari negara asing. A11. Saya menyokong langkah kerajaan untuk mengurangi pengembangan 1 2 3 4 5 perniagaan asing di Malaysia. A12. Saya tidak suka penguasaan banyak syarikat Luar Negara terhadap perusahaan 1 2 3 4 5 di Malaysia seperti dalam bidang telekomunikasi, hartanah dan perbankan. A13. Patriotisme seharusnya menjadi tujuan utama pendidikan sehingga anak-anak 1 2 3 4 5 kita akan yakin bahawa negara kita yang terbaik di dunia. A14. Saya akan melakukan tindakan protes bila ada pemimpin negara asing 1 2 3 4 5 melakukan tindakan pelecehan terhadap bangsa dan negara Malaysia. A15. Saya sangat marah bila ada negara asing yang melakukan tuntutan atas wilayah 1 2 3 4 5 kedaulatan Malaysia (Contohnya, isu Pulau Batu Putih).

A16. Saya selalu bangga dengan keindahan tanah air saya. 1 2 3 4 5

A17. Saya sangat bangga dengan sejarah dan peninggalan pelbagai jenis budaya di 1 2 3 4 5 Malaysia kerana ianya merupakan akar sejarah dan budaya bagi Asia Tenggara. A18. Pada dasarnya, nilai-nilai budaya yang ada di Malaysia adalah salah satu yang 1 2 3 4 5 terbaik di dunia. A19. Saya merasa tidak suka bila negara lain mempertikaikan dan menuntut bahawa budaya atau sesetengah kesenian mereka adalah hak ekslusif mereka 1 2 3 4 5 (Contohnya, Malaysia yang menganggap Lagu Rasa Sayange adalah hak Malaysia)

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B. PANDANGAN, SIKAP DAN TINDAKAN ANDA (IDENTITI BUDAYA)

Sila tanda silang (X) pada angka yang paling sesuai dengan penilaian Anda terhadap pernyataan berikut, sesuai dengan pandangan, sikap, dan tindakan Anda: No Pernyataan STS TS R S SS B01. Dalam keluarga Saya, kebanyakan kegiatan atau tradisi berdasarkan pada budaya kebanyakan rakyat Malaysia (seperti pesta perayaan, makanan tertentu, 1 2 3 4 5 aktiviti keagamaan, saling berkunjung, balik kampung, dsb). B02. Saya lebih menikmati lagu dalam bahasa Melayu dan/atau bahasa bangsa saya 1 2 3 4 5 daripada lagu berbahasa Inggeris. B03. Saya lebih menikmati filem Malaysia atau film asing yang di-alihsuarakan ke 1 2 3 4 5 dalam bahasa Malaysia daripada film berbahasa Inggeris. B04. Saya lebih menikmati membaca buku/surat khabar/majalah dalam bahasa 1 2 3 4 5 Malaysia/Mandarin/Tamil daripada dalam bahasa Inggeris B05. Buat saya, bukanlah satu masalah besar sekiranya saya tidak mempelajari bahasa Inggeris. Lihat saja Jepun yang tetap maju dalam industri dan ekonomi 1 2 3 4 5 walaupun sebahagian besar penduduknya tidak menguasai bahasa Inggeris. B06. Saya terlibat aktif dalam kegiatan kesenian/budaya Melayu/Cina/India. 1 2 3 4 5

C. PENGETAHUAN MENGENAI KOMUNITI ASEAN C1. Apakah Anda pernah mendengar idea Komuniti ASEAN (The ASEAN Community)? Pernah (sila terus ke soalan nombor C3)

Belum Pernah (sila terus ke soalan nombor C2)

C2. Oleh kerana Anda belum pernah mendengar mengenai idea Komuniti ASEAN, apakah pendapat Anda mengenai pernyatan berikut? No Pernyataan STS TS R S SS C2-1. Perkembangan mengenai ASEAN tidak perlu untuk diambilberat. 1 2 3 4 5 C2-2. Saya tidak pernah mendengar penjelasan dari kerajaan mengenai Komuniti 1 2 3 4 5 ASEAN. C2-3. Saya merasa tidak akan terpengaruh oleh perkembangan ASEAN. 1 2 3 4 5 C2-4. Saya fikir, ASEAN hanyalah urusan kepimpinan negara sahaja. 1 2 3 4 5 (silahkan lanjut ke pertanyaan nomor C5)

C3. Oleh kerana Anda pernah mendengar mengenai idea Komuniti ASEAN, apakah pendapat Anda mengenai pernyatan berikut? No Pernyataan STS TS R S SS C3-1. Saya tahu bahawa akan dibentuk Komuniti ASEAN (ASEAN Community). 1 2 3 4 5 C3-2. Saya telah mengetahui bahawa Komuniti ASEAN mencakup Komuniti 1 2 3 4 5 Ekonomi, Komuniti Keselamatan, dan Komuniti Sosiobudaya ASEAN. C3-3. Saya tahu bahawa Komuniti ASEAN akan ditubuhkan pada tahun 2015. 1 2 3 4 5 C3-4. Saya sudah memiliki pengetahuan yang cukup mengenai Komuniti ASEAN. 1 2 3 4 5

C4. Jika Anda pernah mendengar/membaca mengenai Komuniti ASEAN, darimana Anda mendengar/ membaca mengenainya? (boleh memilih lebih dari satu pilihan jawapan) Guru/Pensyarah Surat Khabar TV Radio

Seminar Majalah Dokumen terbitan Sekretariat ASEAN

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C5. Apakah Anda pernah mendengar/membaca Bali Concord II 2003? Pernah Tidak Pernah

C6. Apakah Anda pernah mendengar/membaca Piagam ASEAN (The ASEAN Charter) 2007? Pernah Tidak Pernah

C7. Darimana Anda pernah mendengar/membaca Bali Concord II dan/atau ASEAN Charter 2007? (boleh memilih lebih dari satu pilihan jawapan) Guru/Pensyarah Surat Khabar TV Radio

Seminar Majalah Dokumen terbitan Sekretariat ASEAN

Lainnya:......

D. SIKAP TERHADAP KOMUNITI ASEAN

Para pemimpin negara ASEAN pada 7 Oktober 2003 telah menandatangani Bali Concord II. Inti dari Bali Concord II itu adalah penerimaan terhadap konsep Komuniti ASEAN yang akan dilancarkan dalam pada tahun 2015.

Piagam tersebut menggambarkan Komuniti ASEAN sebagai suatu gabungan bangsa-bangsa Asia Tenggara, yang bersama-sama terikat dalam suatu kerjasama pembangunan yang dinamik dan dalam suatu komuniti yang saling peduli, berkomitmen untuk melestarikan perbezaan budaya dan harmoni (keselarasan) sosial.

Dalam mewujudkannya, Komuniti ASEAN akan wujudnya 3 tunggak utama, yakni Komuniti Keselamatan Politik ASEAN, Komuniti Ekonomi ASEAN dan Komuniti Sosiobudaya ASEAN. Ketiga-tiga tunjang tersebut akan saling mengait dan saling memperkuat di antara satu sama lain bagi menjamin keselamatan, stabilitas, dan kemakmuran bersama yang berlanjutan.

Bagaimanakah sikap Anda terhadap Komuniti ASEAN?

No Pernyataan STS TS R S SS D1. Saya menyokong pembentukan Komuniti ASEAN. 1 2 3 4 5 D2. Pembentukan Komuniti ASEAN adalah sesuatu yang positif/baik bagi negara 1 2 3 4 5 dan masyarakat Malaysia. D3. Malaysia akan mendapatkan manfaat dari keanggotaan dalam Komuniti 1 2 3 4 5 ASEAN. D4. Komuniti ASEAN akan mencipta kerjasama pembangunan yang dinamik, perihatin, berkomitmen untuk melestarikan perbezaan budaya dan 1 2 3 4 5 menyelaraskan pembangunan sosial. D5. Apabila ada parti politik yang memasukkan gagasan pembentukan komuniti 1 2 3 4 5 ASEAN sebagai manifesto mereka, Saya pasti akan menyokong parti tersebut. D6. Saya yakin dengan pembentukan Komuniti ASEAN. 1 2 3 4 5

D.7. Pada pendapat saya, Malaysia akan memperoleh manfaat dari keanggotaan Komuniti ASEAN dalam aspek: 1) ...... 2) ...... 3) ......

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Menurut Anda, idea dan pembangunan ke arah pembentukan Komuniti ASEAN: Ya Tidak E1. Hanyalah ”satu lagi” deklarasi dari para pemimpin ASEAN yang tidak akan bermanfaat bagi masyarakat. E2. Hanya merupakan komitmen politik para elit negara-negara ASEAN yang pendiriannya tidak melibatkan pendirian masyarakat. E3. Seharusnya Komuniti ASEAN mengarah kepada pembentukan suatu komuniti serantau seperti Kesatuan Eropah. E4. Seharusnya memperkenalkan mata uang bersama/tunggal.

E5. Seharusnya menghapuskan perjalanan visa untuk semua negara anggota.

E6. Seharusnya membenarkan pergerakan tanpa pasport untuk rakyat negara-negara anggota ASEAN.

E7. Seharusnya mewujudkan sebuah Parlimen ASEAN yang mempunyai kuasa-kuasa tertentu seperti Parlimen Eropah. E8. Seharusnya membentuk satu badan eksekutif yang mempunyai kuasa eksekutif seperti di kalangan negara anggota. E9. Seharusnya membentuk Mahkamah ASEAN yang berkuasa penuh seperti badan kehakiman negara ini terutamanya di dalam isu-isu yang membabitkan pertikaian antara negara anggota. E10. Mengurangkan dan mengancam kedaulatan Malaysia?

F. SIKAP TERHADAP KOMUNITI KESELAMATAN POLITIK ASEAN

ASEAN Political Security Community merupakan tunjang pertama dari Komuniti ASEAN. ASEAN Security Community bertujuan membina kerjasama politik dan keselamatan kalangan negara anggota dalam peringkat tertinggi bagi menjamin agar negara-negara di wilayah ini hidup berdamai dengan negara tetangganya dan dengan negara di luar ASEAN dalam lingkungan yang adil, harmoni dan demokratik.

Para anggota ASEAN Security Community akan diminta menunjukkan komitmen penuh pada proses damai untuk mengatasi sebarang perbezaan di antara mereka dan mengakui bahawa keselamatan ASEAN bergantung pada setiap anggota ASEAN yang terikat pada visi dan sasaran bersama.

Bagaimanakah sikap Anda terhadap Komuniti Keselamatan Politik ASEAN?

No Pernyataan STS TS R S SS F1. Saya menyokong pembentukan Komuniti Keselamatan Politik ASEAN. 1 2 3 4 5 F2. Pembentukan Komuniti Keselamatan Politik ASEAN adalah suatu yang 1 2 3 4 5 positif/baik bagi negara dan masyarakat Malaysia. F3. Saya percaya bahawa setiap negara ASEAN akan komited penuh pada proses 1 2 3 4 5 damai untuk mengatasi perbezaan/perselisihan di ASEAN. F4. Saya menyokong prinsip ASEAN untuk tidak ikut campur tangan hal ehwal 1 2 3 4 5 negara anggota ASEAN yang lain. F5. Saya menyokong ASEAN bebas dari campur tangan asing terutamanya di 1 2 3 4 5 kalangan anggotanya. F6. Saya percaya bahawa setiap anggota ASEAN tidak akan menggunakan 1 2 3 4 5 kekerasan dalam menyelesaikan perbezaan dan perselisihan mereka. F7. Saya percaya bahawa dengan kewujudan Komuniti Keselamatan Politik ASEAN, kedudukan negara anggota ASEAN sebagai suatu entiti akan lebih 1 2 3 4 5 kukuh. F8. Saya percaya bahawa Komuniti Keselamatan ASEAN akan mampu bekerjasama dalam menghadapi ancaman teroris, perdagangan narkotik dan 1 2 3 4 5 manusia, dan masalah keselamatan lintas sempadan.

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F.9. Menurut saya, Malaysia akan mendapatkan MANFAAT dari menganggotai Komuniti Keselamatan Politik ASEAN dari segi:

1) ...... 2) ...... 3) ......

F10. Menurut saya, Malaysia akan MENGALAMI KERUGIAN dari menganggotai Komuniti Keselamatan Politik ASEAN dari segi:

1) ...... 2) ...... 3) ......

G. SIKAP TERHADAP KOMUNITI EKONOMI ASEAN

Komuniti Ekonomi ASEAN (ASEAN Economic Community) merupakan pilar kedua dari idea Komuniti ASEAN. Objektif utamanya adalah untuk mengintegrasikan ekonomi sepertimana yang telah digariskan dalam Wawasan ASEAN 2020 (ASEAN Vision 2020). Tujuan utamanya adalah untuk mendirikan kawasan ekonomi ASEAN yang stabil, makmur dan berdaya saing tinggi dimana akan wujudnya perdagangan bebas kalangan negara anggota, pengecualian cukai, intra- pelaburan, dan aliran modal yang lebih bebas. Di samping itu ianya bertujuan mengembangkan ekonomi serantau dengan hasrat untuk menurunkan kadar kemiskinan dan meningkatkan kesejahteraan sosioekonomi serantau menjelang tahun 2020.

Bagaimanakah sikap Anda terhadap Komuniti Ekonomi ASEAN? No Pernyataan STS TS R S SS G01. Pembentukan Komuniti Ekonomi ASEAN adalah sesuatu yang positif/baik bagi 1 2 3 4 5 masyarakat Malaysia. G02. Pembentukan Komuniti Ekonomi ASEAN adalah sesuatu yang baik yang telah 1 2 3 4 5 diusahakan oleh Malaysia. G03. Saya menyokong pembentukan Komuniti Ekonomi ASEAN. 1 2 3 4 5 G04. Saya menyokong konsep perdagangan bebas atas barang dan perkhidmatan dalam 1 2 3 4 5 Kawasan Komuniti Ekonomi ASEAN. G05. Saya menyokong kebebasan bekerja bagi pekerja profesional ASEAN di kawasan 1 2 3 4 5 Asia Tenggara. G06. Saya menyokong perusahaan daripada negara-negara ASEAN bebas mendirikan 1 2 3 4 5 perusahaan mereka di kawasan Asia Tenggara. G07. Malaysia akan mendapatkan manfaat dari keanggotaan Komuniti Ekonomi ASEAN. 1 2 3 4 5 G08. Kita seharusnya memberi keutamaan membeli barang-barang dari negara ASEAN 1 2 3 4 5 daripada dari negara di luar ASEAN. G09. Kita seharusnya memberi keutamaan kepada pelaburan dari negara ASEAN daripada 1 2 3 4 5 dari negara di luar ASEAN. G10. Kita seharusnya memberi keutamaan para tenaga kerja terampil/ profesional dari 1 2 3 4 5 negara ASEAN daripada dari negara di luar ASEAN. G11. Saya percaya bahawa Komuniti Ekonomi akan dapat memaksimumkan kepentingan 1 2 3 4 5 ekonomi masing-masing anggota ASEAN. G12. Saya percaya bahawa Komuniti Ekonomi ASEAN akan memberikan daya saing lebih 1 2 3 4 5 tinggi dibandingkan apabila negara-negara ASEAN tidak membentuknya. G13. Saya percaya bahawa Komuniti Ekonomi ASEAN tidak hanya menguntungkan bagi negara-negara yang lebih maju saja tetapi akan dapat mempercepat pembangunan di 1 2 3 4 5 negara-negara serantau lain yang tertinggal. G14. Timbulnya gagasan Komuniti Ekonomi ASEAN hanyalah suatu usaha serantau di dalam mengatasi masalah ekonomi negara-negara ASEAN pasca Krisis Ekonomi 1 2 3 4 5 Asia 1997 dan ancaman ekonomi dari negara China dan India.

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G15. Malaysia akan mendapat MANFAAT daripada pembentukan Komuniti Ekonomi ASEAN dari segi: 1...... 2...... 3......

G16. Malaysia akan MENGALAMI KERUGIAN daripada pembentukan Komuniti Ekonomi ASEAN dari segi: 1...... 2...... 3......

H. SIKAP TERHADAP KOMUNITI SOSIO-KULTURAL ASEAN

Komuniti Sosiobudaya ASEAN (ASEAN Sosio-Cultural Community) merupakan tunjang ketiga dari idea pembentukan Komuniti ASEAN. Dengan komuniti ini, sejajar dengan Visi ASEAN 2020, adalah diharapkan akan tercipta suatu masyarakat Asia Tenggara yang bersatu dan perihatin, dengan tingkat kemajuan sosial budaya yang tinggi.

Bagaimanakah sikap Anda terhadap Komuniti Sosio-Kultural ASEAN? No Pernyataan STS TS R S SS Pembentukan Komuniti Sosiobudaya ASEAN adalah sesuatu yang baik bagi H01. 1 2 3 4 5 kemajuan sosial dan budaya Malaysia. H02. Saya menyokong pembentukan Komuniti Sosio-Kultural ASEAN. 1 2 3 4 5 H03. Saya percaya bahawa Komuniti Sosiobudaya ASEAN akan mampu menciptakan masyarakat yang saling mengambil tahu terhadap sosiobudaya masyarakat ASEAN 1 2 3 4 5 yang lain. H04. Saya percaya bahawa Komuniti Sosiobudaya ASEAN akan mampu meningkatkan 1 2 3 4 5 proses penambahbaikan kesihatan masyarakat. H05. Saya percaya bahawa Komuniti Sosiobudaya akan meningkatkan keragaman dan 1 2 3 4 5 kekayaan budaya ASEAN.

H06. Malaysia akan mendapat MANFAAT daripada pembentukan Komuniti Sosiobudaya ASEAN dari segi: 1...... 2...... 3......

H07. Malaysia akan MENGALAMI KERUGIAN daripada pembentukan Komuniti Sosiobudaya ASEAN dari segi: 1...... 2...... 3......

I. PENDAPAT MENGENAI IDENTITI ASEAN

No Pernyataan STS TS R S SS I01. Saya merasa diri saya sebahagian dari masyarakat ASEAN. 1 2 3 4 5 I02. Terdapat kesamaan norma dan nilai-nilai moral yang wujud di seluruh negara 1 2 3 4 5 anggota ASEAN. I03. Terdapat kemiripan sejarah yang terjadi di masa lalu di kalangan negara anggota 1 2 3 4 5 ASEAN. I04. Terdapat kemiripan tingkat keintelektualan masyarakat di kalangan negara anggota 1 2 3 4 5 ASEAN. I05. Terdapat kemiripan sistem sosial dan kemasyarakatan di kalangan negara anggota 1 2 3 4 5 ASEAN.

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J. PENDAPAT MENGENAI IDENTITI, KEDAULATAN DAN KEAMANAN NASIONAL

No Pernyataan Pendapat Jelaskan mengapa? J01. Kewujudan Parlimen ASEAN dan Mahkamah Tunggal Serantau akan memberi impak kepada ( ) Setuju ………………………………………………… kedaulatan negara kita. ( ) Tidak ………………………………………………… ………………………………………………… J02. Pembentukan Komuniti Keselamatan Politik ASEAN akan mengurangkan kedaulatan negara ( ) Setuju ………………………………………………… kita. ( ) Tidak ………………………………………………… ………………………………………………… J03. Terdapat kemungkinan bahawa identiti kebangsaan kita akan dibayangi dengan satu identiti bangsa ( ) Setuju ………………………………………………… ASEAN. ( ) Tidak ………………………………………………… ………………………………………………… J04. Terdapat kemungkinan bahawa kedaulatan nasional dapat terganggu oleh penerapan idea ( ) Setuju ………………………………………………… Komuniti ASEAN. ( ) Tidak ………………………………………………… ………………………………………………… J05. Terdapat kemungkinan bahawa keselamatan nasional dapat terganggu oleh penerapan idea ( ) Setuju ………………………………………………… Komuniti ASEAN. ( ) Tidak ………………………………………………… ………………………………………………… J06. Negara mana harus kita berhati-hati kerana akan bertindak mengancam kedaulatan negara Malaysia? ...... J07. Saya agak khuatir bila negara yang kurang Jelaskan mengapa? membangun (seperti Vietnam, Kamboja dan ( ) Setuju ………………………………………………… Myanmar) akan menjadi negara-negara yang ( ) Tidak ………………………………………………… mengancam negara kita bila mereka maju di kemudian hari. ………………………………………………… J08. Perlu ada satu bahasa yang menyatukan Komuniti ( ) Setuju ASEAN ( ) Tidak J09, Bahasa yang dapat layak menjadi ( ) Bahasa Malaysia Jelaskan mengapa? bahasa penyatu tersebut adalah bahasa: ( ) Bahasa Melayu ( ) Bahasa Inggeris ………………………………………………… ( ) Bahasa Mandarin ………………………………………………… ( ) Lainnya: ………………………………………………… ……………………

Ya Tidak J10. Penggunaan bahasa Inggeris sebagai bahasa komunikasi antara kalangan negara-negara anggota ASEAN akan menghilangkan pentingnya bahasa nasional di negara ASEAN J11. Semangat ”bangsa serumpun” di kalangan penduduk Malaysia, Malaysia dan Singapura dapat menjadi asas pendirian Komuniti ASEAN J12. Semangat ”bangsa serumpun” di kalangan masyarakat Malaysia dan Malaysia (dan juga Singapura) akan menimbulkan ”perasaan terancam” bagi masyarakat bukan pribumi di negara-negara tersebut? J13. Agama Islam menjadi agama penyatu di kalangan masyarakat Malaysia, Malaysia dan Singapura?

J14. Agama Islam akan menimbulkan ”perasaan terancam” bagi masyarakat bukan Islam dalam pembentukan Komuniti ASEAN?

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K. PENDAPAT MENGENAI HALANGAN TERHADAP KOMUNITI ASEAN

K-I. Apakah anda setuju dengan pernyataan di bawah ini: Apakah anda setuju dengan pernyataan di bawah ini Pendapat Jelaskan mengapa? KI-1. Pembentukan Komuniti ASEAN merupakan wawasan dan visi kepimpinan Negara saja, dan ( ) Setuju ………………………………………………… belum melibatkan masyarakat umum. ( ) Tidak ………………………………………………… ………………………………………………… KI-2. Pembentukan Komuniti ASEAN hanyalah suatu mimpi yang sukar untuk direalisasikan. ( ) Setuju ………………………………………………… ( ) Tidak ………………………………………………… ………………………………………………… KI-3. Sasaran idea Komuniti ASEAN nampak meyakinkan, tetapi sebenarnya sukar untuk ( ) Setuju ………………………………………………… diwujudkan. ( ) Tidak ………………………………………………… ………………………………………………… KI-4. Sokongan dan dokongan Negara anggota terhadap idea Komuniti ASEAN adalah untuk ( ) Setuju ………………………………………………… kepentingannya sendiri; bukan karena ( ) Tidak ………………………………………………… kepentingan bersama. ………………………………………………… KI-5. Liberalisasi dan pengintegrasian tidak akan melindungi hak pekerja di kawasan ASEAN ( ) Setuju ………………………………………………… karena syarikat akan mementingkan keuntungan ( ) Tidak ………………………………………………… semata-mata. …………………………………………………

K-II. Apakah hal-hal tersebut di bawah dapat menjadi penghalang bagi pembentukan Komuniti ASEAN? Apakah hal-hal tersebut di bawah dapat menjadi Apakah hal Jelaskan mengapa? penghalang bagi pembentukan Komuniti tersebut ASEAN? merupakan penghalang? KII-1. Kurangnya daya saing ekonomi hampir di ( ) Penghalang seluruh negara ASEAN. ( ) Mungkin ………………………………………………… ( ) Tidak ………………………………………………… ………………………………………………… KII-2. Sosial-ekonomi masyarakat di Asia ( ) Penghalang Tenggara masih pada tahap yang rendah. ( ) Mungkin ………………………………………………… ( ) Tidak ………………………………………………… ………………………………………………… KII-3. Tingkat pendidikan sebahagian besar ( ) Penghalang masyarakat masih lagi rendah dan tidak ( ) Mungkin ………………………………………………… seimbang. ( ) Tidak ………………………………………………… ………………………………………………… KII-4. Kelemahan sebahagian besar negara ( ) Penghalang anggota ASEAN adalah di dalam ( ) Mungkin ………………………………………………… penguasaan dan penciptaan teknologi. ( ) Tidak ………………………………………………… …………………………………………………

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Apakah hal-hal tersebut di bawah dapat menjadi Apakah hal Jelaskan mengapa? penghalang bagi pembentukan Komuniti tersebut ASEAN? merupakan penghalang? KII-5. Seluruh negara anggota ASEAN sangat ( ) Penghalang tergantung kepada negara-negara maju ( ) Mungkin ………………………………………………… terutama dalam permodalan. ( ) Tidak ………………………………………………… ………………………………………………… KII-6. Hampir seluruh negara anggota ASEAN ( ) Penghalang masih miskin. ( ) Mungkin ………………………………………………… ( ) Tidak ………………………………………………… ………………………………………………… KII-7. Ekonomi ASEAN didominasi oleh ( ) Penghalang masyarakat Cina. ( ) Mungkin ………………………………………………… ( ) Tidak ………………………………………………… ………………………………………………… KII-8. Perbezaan sistem politik dan pemerintahan ( ) Penghalang (termasuk pula tingkat adopsi demokrasi). ( ) Mungkin ………………………………………………… ( ) Tidak ………………………………………………… ………………………………………………… KII-9. Perbezaan sistem perundangan dan ( ) Penghalang keefisienan pelaksanaan undang-undang. ( ) Mungkin ………………………………………………… ( ) Tidak ………………………………………………… ………………………………………………… KII-10. Kepelbagaian bangsa, kumpulan etnik, ( ) Penghalang agama penduduk negara-negara anggota ( ) Mungkin ………………………………………………… ASEAN. ( ) Tidak ………………………………………………… ………………………………………………… KII-11. Konflik yang membabitkan masyarakat ( ) Penghalang Islam di Asia Tenggara (Thailand Selatan ( ) Mungkin ………………………………………………… dan Filipina). ( ) Tidak ………………………………………………… ………………………………………………… KII-12. Masalah ketidakseimbangan keperluan ( ) Penghalang tenaga kerja professional dan bukan ( ) Mungkin ………………………………………………… professional. ( ) Tidak ………………………………………………… …………………………………………………

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IDENTITI RESPONDEN

1. Nama responden: 8. Pekerjaan: ...... (A) Pensyarah Universiti (B) Kakitangan Kerajaan 2. Bangsa: Melayu / Bumiputera Lain / Cina / India / (C) Kakitangan swasta Lain-Lain, sila nyatakan: ...... (D) Tentera / Polis (E) Bekerja sendiri

(F) Surirumah tangga 3. Jantina: (G) Pelajar / mahasiswa (A) Lelaki (B) Perempuan (H) Tidak/Belum bekerja

(I) Lainnya: ...... 4. Usia:

(A) 18 s/d 34 tahun (B) 35 s/d 49 tahun 9. Apakah Anda bersedia untuk dilibatkan dalam (C) 50 tahun atau lebih diskusi lebih mendalam?

( ) Ya ( ) Tidak 5. Status Perkahwinan: (A) Bujaang (B) Berkahwin (C) Janda/Duda Bila ya, tolong berikan email, no telefon, dan alamat surat Anda:

6. Pengeluaran Isi Rumah Sebulan 10. Email: ...... (A) kurang RM 1,000

(B) Antara RM 1,001 – RM 5,000 11. No. Telpon yang boleh dihubungi: (C) Antara RM 5,001 – RM 10,000 ...... (D) Antara RM 10,001 – RM 15,000 (E) Antara RM 15,000 – RM 20,000 12. Alamat surat Anda: (F) RM 20,001 ke atas ...... 7. Tahap pendidikan: ...... (A) Kolej Komuniti ...... (B) Degree / Sarjana Muda (C) Master / Sarjana

(D) PhD / Doktor Falsafah

AKHIR DARI SOAL SELIDIK TERIMAKASIH ATAS JAWAPAN ANDA

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APPENDIX B QUESTIONNAIRE (BAHASA INDONESIA) FOR INDONESIAN RESPONDENTS

UNIVERSITI KEBANGSAAN MALAYSIA N a t i o n a l U n i v e r s i t y o f M a l a y s i a

Fakulti Sains Sosial dan Kemanusiaan ● Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities

KAJIAN KERJASAMA SERANTAU KE ARAH MEMBINA KOMUNITI ASEAN: MENELITI PERSOALAN NASIONALISME, IDENTITI, KEDAULATAN DAN KESELAMATAN

SOAL SELIDIK (KOD PENYELIDIKAN UKM-GUP-TKS-O7-10-096)

Ybhg. Bapak/Ibu/Saudara/Saudari,

Pertama -tama, kami mengucapkan banyak terima kasih atas kesediaan Anda untuk meluangkan waktu untuk mengisi kuesioner ini.

Sesuai dengan judulnya, penelitian ini ditujukan untuk mengetahui persepsi, sikap dan perilaku di kalangan masyarakat. Kajian ini dilakukan di Indonesia (Jakarta, Surabaya, Medan, Makassar dan Pontianak), Malaysia dan Singapura untuk memperoleh pandangan masyarakat di 2 negara serumpun ini.

Petunjuk pengisian:  Mohon untuk membaca petunjuk pengisian yang tertera pada kuesioner terlebih dahulu.

 Tidak ada jawaban yang salah atau benar. Apapun jawaban Saudara akan sangat

bermanfaat.

 Mohon menjawab secara jujur untuk mewakili pendapat Saudara. Semua jawaban memiliki

makna besar, sebab yang kami lebih utamakan adalah jawaban yang menggambarkan

kenyataan yang sebenarnya.

Kami akan senantiasa menjunjung tinggi komitmen untuk memegang teguh kerahasiaan dan kepercayaan yang telah Saudara berikan.

Atas perhatian dan kerjasamanya, kami ucapkan terima kasih.

Kumpulan Penyelidik Dr. Mohamed Anwar Omar Din (+6019-6497009) – ketua Projek. Prof.Madya Dr. Mohd. Kamarulnizam Abdullah (+6012-2022964) Guido Benny (+6019-6321968)

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PENDAPAT ANDA TENTANG ASEAN

1. Pengetahuan tentang ASEAN

Ya Tidak 1-1. Apakah Anda tahu tentang ASEAN?

1-2. Apakah Anda faham tentang cita-cita dan tujuan ASEAN?

1-3. Apakah Anda tahu tentang struktur organisasi ASEAN?

1-4. bahwa ASEAN didirikan pada tahun 1967.

1-5. Apakah ASEAN merupakan komunitas keamanan dengan pasukan keamanan khusus.

1-6. Komunitas keamanan ASEAN itu disamakan dengan NATO di Eropa?

2. Bagaimana penilaian/pandangan Anda tentang ASEAN? ......

3. Apakah ASEAN penting bagi Anda dan negara Anda?

Sangat tidak Tidak penting Ragu-ragu antara penting dan Penting Sangat penting penting tidak penting

4. Menurut Anda, apakah ASEAN berhasil sampai saat ini?

Sangat tidak Tidak berhasil Ragu-ragu antara berhasil Berhasil Sangat berhasil berhasil dan tidak berhasil

5. Apakah Anda mendapat pelajaran mengenai ASEAN di sekolah (SD sampai SMA) Ya Tidak Tidak ingat

6. Apakah ASEAN penting untuk diajarkan di sekolah (SD sampai SMA)?

Sangat tidak Tidak penting Ragu-ragu antara penting dan Penting Sangat penting penting tidak penting

7. Apakah Anda memandang bila misalnya ( ) Ya Jelaskan jawaban Anda:

ASEAN tidak ada, tidak akan ada masalah ( ) Tidak apa-apa di negara ini. ………………………………………………… ………………………………………………… …………………………………………………

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PETUNJUK MENGISI KUESIONER: Berikan tanda silang (X) pada angka yang paling sesuai dengan penilaian Anda terhadap masing-masing pernyataan berikut dengan pedoman: 1 = STS = Sangat Tidak Setuju 4 = S = Setuju 2 = TS = Tidak Setuju 5 = SS = Sangat Setuju 3 = R = Ragu-ragu antara setuju dan tidak setuju

A. NASIONALISME RESPONDEN/MASYARAKAT

Berikan tanda silang (X) pada angka yang paling sesuai dengan penilaian Anda terhadap masing-masing pernyataan berikut, sesuai dengan pandangan, sikap, dan tindakan Anda: No Pernyataan STS TS R S SS A01. Membeli produk Indonesia selalu merupakan pilihan terbaik 1 2 3 4 5 A02. Kita seharusnya hanya menerima barang impor dari negara-negara yang 1 2 3 4 5 menerima impor kita. A03. Pemerintah seharusnya berusaha mengendalikan keterlibatan bisnis asing 1 2 3 4 5 dalam berbagai sektor ekonomi Indonesia. A04. Pemerintah seharusnya sebisa mungkin untuk tidak membeli barang dan jasa 1 2 3 4 5 dari perusahaan/negara asing. Pemerintah seharusnya memproteksi industri domestik dengan menciptakan A05. 1 2 3 4 5 hambatan perdagangan untuk produk asing. A06. Tenaga kerja asing dapat merugikan bangsa karena mengambil peluang kerja 1 2 3 4 5 dari masyarakat setempat. A07. Saya selalu menyarankan kepada orang lain (keluarga, teman, dan kenalan) 1 2 3 4 5 untuk tidak membeli produk asing. A08. Saya tidak akan membeli dan menggunakan produk asing, kecuali bila terpaksa. 1 2 3 4 5

A09. Saya berkeinginan berhenti membeli produk-produk impor dan beralih ke 1 2 3 4 5 produk buatan Indonesia.

A10. Jika kualitasnya sama, saya akan membeli barang yang dihasilkan di Indonesia walaupun harganya sedikit lebih mahal daripada barang dari 1 2 3 4 5 negara asing. A11. Saya mendukung politisi/pejabat/partai politik yang ingin mengurangi 1 2 3 4 5 keberadaan bisnis asing di Indonesia. A12. Saya tidak suka pada penguasaan banyak perusahaan Malaysia dan Singapura terhadap perusahaan Indonesia seperti dalam bidang telekomukasi dan 1 2 3 4 5 perbankan. A13. Patriotisme seharusnya menjadi tujuan utama pendidikan sehingga anak-anak 1 2 3 4 5 kita akan yakin bahwa negara kita yang terbaik di dunia. A14. Saya akan melakukan tindakan protes bila ada pemimpin negara asing 1 2 3 4 5 melakukan tindakan pelecehan terhadap bangsa dan negara Indonesia. A15. Saya sangat marah bila ada negara asing yang melakukan klaim atas wilayah kedaulatan Indonesia. (Contohnya, pengambil-alihan Pulau Sipadan dan klaim 1 2 3 4 5 atas Pulau Ambalat oleh Malaysia). A16. Saya selalu bangga dengan keindahan tanah air Indonesia. 1 2 3 4 5 A17. Saya sangat bangga dengan sejarah dan peninggalan budaya Indonesia 1 2 3 4 5 karena merupakan akar sejarah dan budaya bagi Asia Tenggara. A18. Pada dasarnya, nilai-nilai budaya dan kearifan lokal Indonesia adalah salah 1 2 3 4 5 satu yang terbaik di dunia. A19. Saya merasa tidak suka bila negara lain yang melakukan klaim atas bentuk 1 2 3 4 5 kesenian asli Indonesia sebagai milik mereka Questionnaire for Indonesian - 3

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B. PANDANGAN, SIKAP DAN TINDAKAN ANDA (IDENTITAS BUDAYA)

Berikan tanda silang (X) pada angka yang paling sesuai dengan penilaian Anda terhadap masing-masing pernyataan berikut, sesuai dengan pandangan, sikap, dan tindakan Anda: No Pernyataan STS TS R S SS B01. Dalam keluarga Anda, kebanyakan kegiatan atau tradisi berdasarkan pada budaya kebanyakan bangsa Indonesia (seperti pesta perayaan, makanan 1 2 3 4 5 tertentu, aktivitas religius, saling berkunjung, mudik, dsb). B02. Saya lebih menikmati lagu dalam bahasa Indonesia dan/atau bahasa daerah 1 2 3 4 5 daripada lagu berbahasa asing. B03. Saya lebih menikmati film Indonesia atau film asing yang di-alihsuarakan ke 1 2 3 4 5 dalam bahasa Indonesia daripada film berbahasa asing. B04. Saya lebih menikmati membaca buku/surat kabar/majalah/ teks dalam 1 2 3 4 5 bahasa Indonesia daripada dalam bahasa asing B05. Buat saya, bukanlah satu masalah besar sekiranya saya tidak mempelajari bahasa asing. Lihat saja Jepang yang tetap maju dalam industri dan ekonomi 1 2 3 4 5 walaupun sebagian besar penduduknya tidak menguasai bahasa asing. B06. Saya terlibat aktif dalam kegiatan kesenian/budaya Indonesia. 1 2 3 4 5

C. PENGETAHUAN MENGENAI KOMUNITAS ASEAN

C1. Apakah Anda pernah mendengar Komunitas ASEAN (The ASEAN Community)? Pernah (silahkan lanjut ke pertanyaan nomor C3)

Belum Pernah (silahkan lanjut ke pertanyaan nomor C2)

C2. Apabila Anda belum pernah mendengar mengenai Komunitas ASEAN, apakah pernyataan berikut sesuai dengan pendapat Anda? No Pernyataan STS TS R S SS C2-1. Perkembangan mengenai ASEAN tidak perlu untuk diperhatikan. 1 2 3 4 5 C2-2. Saya tidak pernah mendengar penjelasan pemerintah mengenai ASEAN 1 2 3 4 5 Community. C2-3. Saya merasa tidak akan terpengaruh oleh perkembangan ASEAN. 1 2 3 4 5

C2-4. Saya pikir, ASEAN hanyalah urusan pimpinan negara belaka. 1 2 3 4 5

(silahkan lanjut ke pertanyaan nomor C5)

C3. Apabila Anda pernah mendengar mengenai Komunitas ASEAN, apakah pernyataan berikut sesuai dengan pendapat Anda? No Pernyataan STS TS R S SS C3-1. Saya telah mengetahui bahwa akan dibentuk Komunitas ASEAN (ASEAN 1 2 3 4 5 Community) tahun 2015. C3-2. Saya telah mengetahui bahwa Komunitas ASEAN mencakup ASEAN Economic Community, ASEAN Security Community, dan ASEAN Socio- 1 2 3 4 5 Cultural Community. C3-3. Saya telah tahu Komunitas ASEAN akan berlaku efektif tahun 2015. 1 2 3 4 5 C3-4. Saat ini Saya sudah memiliki pengetahuan yang cukup mengenai Komunitas 1 2 3 4 5 ASEAN (ASEAN Community).

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C4. Bila Anda pernah mendengar/membaca mengenai Komunitas ASEAN, darimana Anda mendengar/ membaca- nya? (boleh memilih lebih dari satu pilihan jawaban)

Guru/Dosen Surat Kabar Televisi Radio

Seminar Majalah Dokumen terbitan ASEAN Secretariat

Lainnya:......

C5. Apakah Anda pernah mendengar/membaca Bali Concord II 2003? Pernah Tidak Pernah

C6. Apakah Anda pernah mendengar/membaca Piagam ASEAN (The ASEAN Charter) 2003? Pernah Tidak Pernah

C7. Bila Anda pernah mendengar/membaca Bali Concord II dan/atau ASEAN Charter 2007, darimana Anda mendengar/membaca-nya? (boleh memilih lebih dari satu pilihan jawaban)

Guru/Dosen Surat Kabar Televisi Radio

Seminar Majalah Dokumen terbitan ASEAN Secretariat

Lainnya:......

D. SIKAP TERHADAP KOMUNITAS ASEAN

Para pimpinan negara ASEAN pada 7 Oktober 2003 telah menandatangani Bali Concord II. Inti dari Bali Concord II itu adalah penerimaan terhadap konsep ASEAN Community yang akan diberlakukan pada tahun 2015.

Piagam tersebut menggambarkan ASEAN Community sebagai suatu ’konser’ yang terdiri dari bangsa-bangsa Asia Tenggara, yang bersama-sama terikat dalam suatu kerjasama pembangunan yang dinamis dan dalam suatu komunitas yang saling peduli, berkomitmen untuk melestarikan perbedaan budaya dan harmoni (keselarasan) sosial.

Dalam mewujudkannya, ASEAN Community akan terdiri dari 3 pilar, yakni ASEAN Political Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community dan ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. Ketiga pilar tersebut saling terkait dan saling memperkuat untuk maksud ASEAN Community, yakni menjamin perdamaian, stabilitas, dan kemakmuran bersama yang berkelanjutan di kawasan.

Bagaimanakah sikap Anda terhadap Komunitas ASEAN?

No Pernyataan STS TS R S SS D1. Saya mendukung pembentukan Komunitas ASEAN. 1 2 3 4 5 D2. Menurut saya, pembentukan Komunitas ASEAN adalah sesuatu yang 1 2 3 4 5 positif/baik bagi negara dan masyarakat Indonesia. D3. Menurut saya, Indonesia akan mendapatkan manfaat dari keanggotaan 1 2 3 4 5 dalam Komunitas ASEAN. D4. Saya percaya Komunitas ASEAN akan menciptakan kerjasama pembangunan yang dinamis dalam suatu komunitas yang saling peduli, berkomitmen untuk 1 2 3 4 5 melestarikan perbedaan budaya dan harmoni (keselarasan) sosial. D5. Apabila ada partai politik yang memasukkan gagasan pembentukan komunitas 1 2 3 4 5 ASEAN, Saya pasti akan mendukung partai tersebut. D6. Saya optimis akan keberhasilan pembentukan Komunitas ASEAN. 1 2 3 4 5

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D.7. Menurut saya, Indonesia akan memperoleh manfaat dari keanggotaan Komunitas ASEAN dalam hal: 1) ...... 2) ...... 3) ......

Menurut Anda, apakah Anda berpikir/merasa bahwa pendirian/pembangunan Komunitas ASEAN: Ya Tidak E1. Hanyalah ”satu lagi” deklarasi dari para pemimpin ASEAN yang tidak akan bermanfaat bagi masyarakat. E2. Suatu prakarsa para elit pimpinan negara-negara ASEAN yang pendirian-nya tidak melibatkan masyarakat. E3. Seharusnya Komunitas ASEAN mengarah kepada pembentukan suatu integrasi ASEAN seperti di Uni Eropa. E4. Seharusnya mencakup mata uang bersama yang berlaku di seluruh ASEAN.

E5. Seharusnya mencakup peniadaan visa (izin untuk masuk ke suatu negara) untuk warga negara- negara ASEAN ketika berkunjung ke sesama negara ASEAN. E6. Seharusnya mencakup peniadaan passport (buku identitas semacam KTP yang berlaku Internasional) untuk warga negara ASEAN ketika berkunjung ke sesama negara ASEAN. E7. Seharusnya mencakup pembentukan parlemen ASEAN yang berdaulat (berkuasa) penuh sebagai layaknya parlemen di suatu negara. E8. Seharusnya mencakup pembentukan suatu badan eksekutif ASEAN yang berdaulat (berkuasa) penuh sebagai layaknya badan eksekutif di suatu negara. E9. Seharusnya mencakup pembentukan badan yudikatif (Mahkamah/Pengadilan) ASEAN yang berdaulat (berkuasa) penuh sebagai layaknya badan yudikatif di suatu negara. E10. Apakah pembentukan parlemen, badan eksekutif dan badan yudikatif (Mahkamah/Pengadilan) di peringkat ASEAN akan menghilangkan kedaulatan (kuasa) penuh sesebuah negara?

F. SIKAP TERHADAP KOMUNITAS KEAMANAN POLITIK ASEAN

ASEAN Political Security Community merupakan pilar pertama dari Komunitas ASEAN. ASEAN Security Community ditujukan untuk membina kerjasama politik dan keamanan kepada suatu tingkatan yang lebih tinggi untuk menjamin agar negara-negara di wilayah ini hidup berdamai dengan negara tetangganya dan dengan negara di luar ASEAN dalam lingkungan yang adil, demokratis dan harmonis.

Para anggota ASEAN Security Community akan berkomitmen penuh pada proses damai untuk mengatasi perbedaan di dalam wilayah ASEAN dan mengakui bahwa keamanan ASEAN sangat tergantung pada masing-masing anggota ASEAN yang terikat pada lokasi geografis, kesamaan visi dan sasaran bersama.

Bagaimanakah sikap Anda terhadap Komunitas Keamanan Politik ASEAN? No Pernyataan STS TS R S SS F1. Saya mendukung pembentukan Komunitas Keamanan Politik ASEAN. 1 2 3 4 5 F2. Menurut saya, pembentukan Komunitas Keamanan Politik ASEAN adalah 1 2 3 4 5 sesuatu yang positif/baik bagi negara dan masyarakat Indonesia. F3. Saya percaya bahwa setiap negara ASEAN akan berkomitmen penuh pada 1 2 3 4 5 proses damai untuk mengatasi perbedaan/perselisihan di ASEAN.

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No Pernyataan STS TS R S SS F4. Saya mendukung prinsip ASEAN untuk tidak ikut campur tangan pada kebijakan luar negeri dan urusan pertahanan masing-masing negara anggota 1 2 3 4 5 ASEAN. F5. Saya mendukung hak untuk memerintah secara bebas dari campur tangan 1 2 3 4 5 asing dalam urusan dalam negeri di setiap negara anggota ASEAN. F6. Saya percaya bahwa setiap anggota ASEAN tidak akan menggunakan 1 2 3 4 5 kekerasan dalam menyelesaikan perbedaan dan perselisihan. F7. Saya percaya bahwa dengan ASEAN Community, posisi negara anggota ASEAN akan lebih kuat dalam berhubungan dengan negara lain dalam hal 1 2 3 4 5 politik dibandingkan bila bertindak sendiri-sendiri. F8. Saya percaya bahwa ASEAN Community akan mampu bekerjasama dalam menghadapi teroris, perdagangan narkoba dan manusia, dan kejahatan lintas 1 2 3 4 5 batas.

F.9. Menurut saya, Indonesia akan mendapatkan MANFAAT dari keanggotaan dalam Komunitas Keamanan Politik ASEAN dari segi: 1) ...... 2) ...... 3) ......

F10. Menurut saya, Indonesia akan MENGALAMI KERUGIAN dari keanggotaan dalam Komunitas Keamanan Politik ASEAN dari segi: 1) ...... 2) ...... 3) ......

G. SIKAP TERHADAP KOMUNITAS EKONOMI ASEAN

ASEAN Economic Community merupakan pilar kedua dari Komunitas ASEAN. Komunitas ini merupakan realisasi dari tujuan akhir integrasi ekonomi seperti yang digariskan di ASEAN Vision 2020, yakni menciptakan kawasan ekonomi ASEAN yang stabil, makmur dan berdaya saing tinggi dimana terdapat arus bebas barang, jasa, investasi, dan aliran modal yang lebih bebas, perkembangan ekonomi yang lebih setara dan penurunan kemiskinan dan kesenjangan sosioekonomi di tahun 2020.

Bagaimanakah sikap Anda terhadap Komunitas Ekonomi ASEAN?

No Pernyataan STS TS R S SS G01. Menurut saya, pembentukan Komunitas Ekonomi ASEAN adalah sesuatu 1 2 3 4 5 yang positif/baik bagi masyarakat Indonesia. G02. Menurut saya, pembentukan Komunitas Ekonomi ASEAN adalah sesuatu 1 2 3 4 5 yang baik bagi dunia usaha Indonesia. G03. Saya mendukung pembentukan Komunitas Ekonomi ASEAN. 1 2 3 4 5 G04. Saya mendukung perdagangan bebas barang dan jasa dalam Kawasan 1 2 3 4 5 Komunitas Ekonomi ASEAN. G05. Saya mendukung kebebasan bekerja bagi pekerja terampil/profesional 1 2 3 4 5 ASEAN di kawasan Asia Tenggara.

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No Pernyataan STS TS R S SS G06. Saya mendukung pelaku bisnis ASEAN dapat bebas mendirikan perusahaan 1 2 3 4 5 di kawasan Asia Tenggara. G07. Menurut saya Indonesia akan mendapatkan manfaat dari keanggotaan dalam 1 2 3 4 5 Komunitas Ekonomi ASEAN. G08. Kita seharusnya memprioritaskan membeli barang-barang dari negara 1 2 3 4 5 ASEAN daripada dari negara di luar ASEAN. G09. Kita seharusnya memprioritaskan investasi dan investor dari negara 1 2 3 4 5 ASEAN daripada dari negara di luar ASEAN. G10. Kita seharusnya memprioritaskan para tenaga kerja terampil/ profesional 1 2 3 4 5 dari negara ASEAN daripada dari negara di luar ASEAN. G11. Saya percaya bahwa Komunitas Ekonomi akan dapat secara maksimal 1 2 3 4 5 mempertemukan kepentingan ekonomi masing-masing anggota ASEAN. G12. Saya percaya bahwa Komunitas Ekonomi ASEAN akan memberikan daya saing lebih tinggi bagi kawasan dibandingkan apabila negara-negara ASEAN 1 2 3 4 5 tidak bersatu. G13. Saya percaya bahwa Komunitas Ekonomi ASEAN tidak hanya menguntungkan bagi negara-negara yang lebih maju saja karena akan dapat 1 2 3 4 5 mempercepat pembangunan di negara-negara yang tertinggal. G14. Menurut saya, timbulnya gagasan Komunitas Ekonomi ASEAN hanyalah suatu upaya mengatasi buruknya ekonomi negara-negara ASEAN pasca 1 2 3 4 5 Krisis Ekonomi Asia 1997 dan ancaman ekonomi dari negara China dan India.

G15. Menurut saya, Indonesia akan mendapat MANFAAT daripada pembentukan Komunitas Ekonomi ASEAN dari segi: 1...... 2...... 3......

G16. Menurut saya, Indonesia akan MENGALAMI KERUGIAN daripada pembentukan Komunitas Ekonomi ASEAN dari segi: 1...... 2...... 3......

H. SIKAP TERHADAP KOMUNITAS SOSIO-KULTURAL ASEAN

ASEAN Sosio-Cultural Community merupakan pilar ketiga dari Komunitas ASEAN. Dengan komunitas ini, sejalan dengan Visi ASEAN 2020, diharapkan akan tercipta suatu masyarakat Asia Tenggara yang bersatu dan saling peduli, dan dengan tingkat kemajuan sosial budaya yang tinggi.

Bagaimanakah sikap Anda terhadap Komunitas Sosio-Kultural ASEAN? No Pernyataan STS TS R S SS Menurut saya, pembentukan Komunitas Sosio-Kultural ASEAN adalah H01. 1 2 3 4 5 sesuatu yang baik bagi kemajuan sosial dan budaya Indonesia. H02. Saya mendukung pembentukan Komunitas Sosio-Kultural ASEAN. 1 2 3 4 5 H03. Saya percaya bahwa Komunitas Sosio-Kultural ASEAN akan mampu menciptakan masyarakat yang saling peduli terhadap sesama anggota 1 2 3 4 5 masyarakat ASEAN. H04. Saya percaya bahwa Komunitas Sosio-Kultural ASEAN akan mampu 1 2 3 4 5 meningkatkan tingkat kesehatan masyarakat. H05. Saya percaya bahwa Komunitas Sosio-Kultural akan meningkatkan 1 2 3 4 5 keragaman dan kekayaan budaya ASEAN.

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H06. Menurut saya, Indonesia akan mendapat MANFAAT daripada pembentukan Komunitas Sosio-Kultural ASEAN dari segi: 1...... 2...... 3......

H07. Menurut saya, Indonesia akan MENGALAMI KERUGIAN daripada pembentukan Komunitas Sosio-Kultural ASEAN dari segi: 1...... 2...... 3......

I. PENDAPAT MENGENAI IDENTITAS ASEAN

No Pernyataan STS TS R S SS I01. Saya merasa diri saya sebagai bagian dari masyarakat ASEAN. 1 2 3 4 5 I02. Menurut saya, pada dasarnya terdapat kesamaan norma dan nilai-nilai moral 1 2 3 4 5 yang berlaku di seluruh negara anggota ASEAN. I03. Menurut saya, pada dasarnya terdapat kemiripan sejarah yang terjadi di 1 2 3 4 5 masa lalu di seluruh negara anggota ASEAN. I04. Menurut saya, pada dasarnya terdapat kemiripan tingkat intelejensia 1 2 3 4 5 masyarakat di seluruh negara anggota ASEAN. I05. Menurut saya, pada dasarnya terdapat kemiripan sistem sosial 1 2 3 4 5 kemasyarakatan di seluruh negara anggota ASEAN.

J. PENDAPAT MENGENAI IDENTITAS, KEDAULATAN DAN KEAMANAN NASIONAL

No Pernyataan Pendapat Jelaskan mengapa? J01. Menurut saya, pendirian Parlemen ASEAN dan Mahkamah Tunggal akan berdampak pada ( ) Setuju ………………………………………………… berkurangnya kedaulatan negara kita. ( ) Tidak ………………………………………………… J02. Menurut saya, pendirian kerjasama dalam bidang politik dan keselamatan (ASEAN ( ) Setuju ………………………………………………… security community) akan berdampak pada ( ) Tidak ………………………………………………… berkurangnya kedaulatan negara kita. J03. Menurut saya, terdapat kemungkinan bahwa identitas nasional kita akan lebur menjadi satu ( ) Setuju ………………………………………………… bangsa ASEAN. ( ) Tidak ………………………………………………… J04. Menurut saya, terdapat kemungkinan bahwa kedaulatan nasional dapat terganggu oleh ( ) Setuju ………………………………………………… penerapan Komunitas ASEAN. ( ) Tidak ………………………………………………… J05. Menurut saya, terdapat kemungkinan bahwa keamanan nasional dapat terganggu oleh ( ) Setuju ………………………………………………… penerapan Komunitas ASEAN. ( ) Tidak …………………………………………………

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J06. Menurut Anda, negara mana yang paling harus diwaspadai karena akan bertindak mengancam kedaulatan negara Indonesia? ...... J07. Saya agak kuatir bila negara-negara yang lebih Jelaskan mengapa? terbelakang (seperti Vietnam, Kamboja dan ( ) Setuju Myanmar) akan menjadi negara-negara yang ( ) Tidak ………………………………………………… mengancam bila mereka maju di kemudian hari. ………………………………………………… J08. Menurut saya, perlu ada bahasa pemersatu ( ) Setuju dalam Komunitas ASEAN ( ) Tidak J09, Bahasa yang dapat layak menjadi ( ) Bahasa Indonesia Jelaskan mengapa? bahasa pemersatu tersebut adalah ( ) Bahasa Melayu bahasa: ( ) Bahasa Inggris ………………………………………………… ( ) Bahasa Mandarin ………………………………………………… ( ) Lainnya: ………………………………………………… ……………………

Ya Tidak J10. Apakah penggunaan bahasa Inggris sebagai bahasa perhubungan antara kalangan negara-negara anggota ASEAN akan menghilangkan pentingnya bahasa nasional di negara ASEAN? J11. Semangat ”bangsa serumpun” di kalangan penduduk Malaysia, Indonesia dan Singapura dapat menjadi asas pendirian Komunitas ASEAN J12. Apakah semangat ”bangsa serumpun” di kalangan masyarakat pribumi Malaysia dan Indonesia (dan juga Singapura) akan menimbulkan ”perasaan terancam” bagi masyarakat non-pribumi? J13. Dapatkah agama Islam menjadi pemersatu di kalangan masyarakat Indonesia, Malaysia dan Singapura? J14. Apakah agama Islam akan menimbulkan ”perasaan terancam” bagi masyarakat non-pribumi dalam pembentukan Komunitas ASEAN?

K. PENDAPAT MENGENAI HALANGAN TERHADAP KOMUNITAS ASEAN

K-I. Apakah anda setuju dengan pernyataan di bawah ini: Pernyataan Pendapat Jelaskan mengapa? 1. Sampai saat ini, pembentukan Komunitas ………………………………………………… ASEAN merupakan prakarsa pimpinan Negara ( ) Setuju saja, dan belum melibatkan masyarakat umum. ………………………………………………… ( ) Tidak 2. Menurut saya, pembentukan Komunitas ASEAN ………………………………………………… hanyalah suatu mimpi yang sulit terwujud. ( ) Setuju ………………………………………………… ( ) Tidak 3. Sasaran Komunitas ASEAN sebagaimana ………………………………………………… dinyatakan di bagian pertanyaan D – H di atas ( ) Setuju tampak mengagumkan, tapi sulit sekali ………………………………………………… ( ) Tidak diwujudkan.

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Pernyataan Pendapat Jelaskan mengapa? 4. Ada kesan bahwa dukungan negara terhadap ………………………………………………… Komunitas ASEAN adalah untuk kepentingannya ( ) Setuju sendiri; bukan karena kepentingan bersama ………………………………………………… ( ) Tidak secara regional. 5. Liberalisasi dan integrasi ekonomi akan tidak ………………………………………………… kondusif bagi penyediaan perlindungan hak ( ) Setuju pekerja dan masyarakat di kawasan ASEAN ………………………………………………… ( ) Tidak karena bisnis cenderung memaksimalkan laba.

K-II. Apakah hal-hal tersebut di bawah dapat menjadi penghalang bagi pembentukan Komunitas ASEAN? Hal-hal berikut dapat menjadi penghalang Apakah hal Jelaskan mengapa? bagi pembentukan Komunitas ASEAN: tersebut merupakan penghalang? 1. Kurangnya daya saing dalam perekonomian di ( ) Penghalang ………………………………………………… hampir seluruh negara ASEAN. ( ) Mungkin ………………………………………………… ( ) Tidak 2. Tingkat sosial ekonomi bangsa-bangsa di ( ) Penghalang ………………………………………………… Asia Tenggara masih pada tingkatan yang ( ) Mungkin ………………………………………………… rendah. ( ) Tidak 3. Tingkat pendidikan sebagian besar ( ) Penghalang ………………………………………………… masyarakat masih rendah dan tidak merata. ( ) Mungkin ………………………………………………… ( ) Tidak 4. Kelemahan sebagian besar negara anggota ( ) Penghalang ………………………………………………… ASEAN dalam penguasaan dan penciptaan ( ) Mungkin ………………………………………………… teknologi. ( ) Tidak 5. Seluruh negara anggota ASEAN sangat ( ) Penghalang ………………………………………………… tergantung pada negara-negara maju ( ) Mungkin ………………………………………………… terutama dalam permodalan. ( ) Tidak 6. Hampir seluruh negara anggota ASEAN ( ) Penghalang ………………………………………………… masih miskin. ( ) Mungkin ………………………………………………… ( ) Tidak 7. Ekonomi ASEAN berada dalam dominasi ( ) Penghalang ………………………………………………… orang Tionghoa. ( ) Mungkin ………………………………………………… ( ) Tidak 8. Perbedaan sistem politik dan pemerintahan ( ) Penghalang ………………………………………………… (termasuk pula tingkat adopsi demokrasi). ( ) Mungkin ………………………………………………… ( ) Tidak 9. Perbedaan sistem peraturan perundang- ( ) Penghalang ………………………………………………… undangan termasuk pula tingkat penerapan ( ) Mungkin ………………………………………………… hukumnya. ( ) Tidak 10. Keragaman etnis dan agama yang dianut oleh ( ) Penghalang ………………………………………………… penduduk negara-negara anggota ASEAN. ( ) Mungkin ………………………………………………… ( ) Tidak 11. Masyarakat beragama Islam di sebagian ( ) Penghalang ………………………………………………… tempat di Asia Tenggara (Thailand Selatan ( ) Mungkin ………………………………………………… dan Moro) yang menjadi semakin ( ) Tidak terpolitisasi dan militant. 12. Perlakuan sebagian para majikan di ( ) Penghalang ………………………………………………… Singapura dan Malaysia yang tidak baik ( ) Mungkin ………………………………………………… terhadap Tenaga Kerja Pembantu Rumah ( ) Tidak Tangga dan Buruh dari Indonesia

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IDENTITAS RESPONDEN

1. Nama responden: 8. Pekerjaan: ...... (A) Dosen Perguruan Tinggi (B) Pegawai Negeri Sipil 2. Kota kediaman : ...... (C) Karyawan swasta (D) TNI / Polri 3. Jenis Kelamin: (E) Wiraswasta / Usaha sendiri (A) Laki-Laki (B) Perempuan (F) Ibu rumah tangga (G) Pelajar / mahasiswa 4. Usia: (H) Tidak/Belum bekerja (A) 19 s/d 34 tahun (B) 35 s/d 49 tahun (I) Lainnya: ...... (C) 50 tahun atau lebih 9. Jenis Instansi: 5. Status Pernikahan: (A) Pemerintahan / BUMN (A) Belum menikah (B) Menikah (B) Swasta Nasional (C) Janda/Duda (C) Swasta Asing / PMA

6. Pengeluaran rumah tangga per bulan 10. Apakah Anda bersedia untuk dilibatkan dalam diskusi lebih mendalam? (A) Rp 1.000.000 atau kurang ( ) Ya ( ) Tidak (B) Antara Rp 1.000.001 – Rp 2.000.000

(C) Antara Rp 2.000.001 – Rp 3.000.000 Bila ya, tolong berikan email, no telpon, dan (D) Antara Rp 3.000.001 – Rp 4.000.000 alamat surat Anda: (E) Antara Rp 4.000.001 – Rp 5.000.000 11. Email: ...... (F) Rp 5.000.001 atau lebih

12. No. Telpon yang bisa dihubungi: 7. Pendidikan terakhir: ...... (A) D-III (B) S1 (Sarjana)

......

AKHIR DARI KUESIONER TERIMAKASIH ATAS JAWABAN ANDA

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APPENDIX C QUESTIONNAIRE (ENGLISH) FOR SINGAPOREAN RESPONDENTS

UNIVERSITI KEBANGSAAN MALAYSIA N a t i o n a l U n i v e r s i t y o f M a l a y s i a

Fakulti Sains Sosial dan Kemanusiaan ● Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities

THE STUDY ON PERCEPTION, ATTITUDE AND BEHAVIOR OF THE PEOPLE IN MALAYSIA, INDONESIA AND SINGAPORE TOWARD THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ASEAN COMMUNITY

(Project Code: UKM-GUP-TKS-07-10-96)

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MASS SOCIETY

Dear Sir/Madam,

Firstly, we want to thank you for your willingness to participate in this survey.

The survey is aimed to measure the perception, attitude, and responses of the people

toward ASEAN, identity of ASEAN, and the concept of The ASEAN Community. It is conducted in three countries: Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore.

Guidelines for questionnaire:  Please read the guidelines for filling the questionnaire carefully.  There is no wrong or right answer. Your honest response is more important.

 Your response will be treated in confidential manner.

For validating the survey project, you can contact the member of researchers below.

Any suggestion or questions can be addressed to: Center for Research and Innovation Management, National University of Malaysia, 43600 Bangi (Phone: +603-89214678 attn Mr. Syafura Abdul Halim).

Thank you for your kindly attention and cooperation.

Research Group: Ass.Prof. Dr. Mohamed Anwar Omar Din (+6019-6497009) – Head. Ass.Prof. Dr. Mohd. Kamarulnizam Abdullah (+6012-2022964) Dr. Ravichandran Moorthy (+603 89215825)

Guido Benny, S.Sos, ME (+6019-2394761)

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A. BRIEF PERSPECTIVES ON ASEAN

1. Knowledge of ASEAN

Yes No 1-1. Do you know about ASEAN?

1-2. Do you understand about the goals and objectives of ASEAN?

1-3. Do you know the organisational structure of ASEAN?

1-4. Do you know that ASEAN was established in 1967?

Is ASEAN a security community with a security force dedicated to the security of 1-5. ASEAN? Is the ASEAN Security Community similar to NATO (North Atlantic Treaty 1-6. Organization)?

2. As far as you know, what is ASEAN?

......

3. Is ASEAN important to you and your country?

Completely Not Not Important Uncertain Important Very Important Important

4. In your opinion, is ASEAN successful?

Completely Unsuccessful Uncertain Successful Very Successful Unsuccessful

5. Do you think that if ASEAN did not ( ) Yes Please explain your answer exist, there would be no problem in ( ) No (if necessary): the country?

………………………………………………… ………………………………………………… ………………………………………………… …………………………………………………

6. Did you learn about ASEAN at school (primary to secondary school/pre-University)? Yes No Unable to remember

7. Is ASEAN important to be taught at school (primary to secondary school/pre-University)?

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B. PERSPECTIVES, ATTITUDES AND ACTION TOWARD NATIONALISM

Please circle the most appropriate number (of the level of your agreement) for each statement which correspond most closely to your perspectives, attitudes or actions.

No Statements Level of agreement Strongly Dis- Un- Agree Strongly Disagree agree certain Agree B01. Buying Singapore’s product is always the best choice. 1 2 3 4 5 B02. We should only accept imported products from the countries 1 2 3 4 5 which accept our products. B03. Government should try its best not to purchase goods and 1 2 3 4 5 services from foreign companies/countries. B04. Government should protect domestic industries by creating trade 1 2 3 4 5 barriers for foreign products. Government should try to control the involvement of foreign 1 2 3 4 5 B05. business in every sector of our economy. B06. Foreign workers can be harmful to our society because they rob 1 2 3 4 5 locals of employment opportunities. B07. I always recommend others (my relatives and friends) not to buy 1 2 3 4 5 foreign products. B08. I always try my best not to buy and to use foreign products, 1 2 3 4 5 unless they cannot be avoided. B09. I am willing to stop buying foreign products and switch to domestic 1 2 3 4 5 ones instead. B10. If the quality is similar, I will buy domestic products although the 1 2 3 4 5 price is slightly higher. B11. I will support politician/public officials/political parties which want to 1 2 3 4 5 reduce foreign business set-up in the country. B12. I dislike foreigners owning/operating business in my country. 1 2 3 4 5 B13. Patriotism should be the main objectives of education, so our 1 2 3 4 5 children believe that our country is one of the best in the world. B14. I will protest if the leader of a foreign country undermines the pride 1 2 3 4 5 of my nation and country. B15. I will be really angry if there is/are foreign country(ies) claiming the 1 2 3 4 5 territory of Singapore. B16. I am always proud of the beauty of Singapore. 1 2 3 4 5 B17. I am very proud of the history and cultural heritage of Singapore 1 2 3 4 5 as it forms the roots of history and culture for the Southeast Asian region. B18. I am sure that the cultural values and local wisdom of Singapore is 1 2 3 4 5 one of the best in the world . B19. I don’t like any other country to claim our authentic cultural 1 2 3 4 5 artefacts as theirs.

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C. PERSPECTIVE, ATTITUDE AND ACTION TOWARD CULTURAL IDENTITY

Please circle the most appropriate number (of the level of your agreement) for each statement which correspond most closely to your perspectives, attitudes or actions. No Statements Level of agreement Strongly Dis- Un- Agree Strongly Disagree agree certain Agree C01. In my family, many activities or traditions resemble the culture of 1 2 3 4 5 my country (such as ceremonies, food, religious practice, homecoming, etc). C02. For me, it is not a big problem if I do not learn a foreign 1 2 3 4 5 language. C03. I am actively involved in the national cultural/art activities. 1 2 3 4 5

D. KNOWLEDGE ON THE ASEAN COMMUNITY

D1. Have you ever heard about The ASEAN Community? Yes, I have (please proceed to questions D3)

Not yet (please proceed to questions D2)

D2. If you have not yet heard about the ASEAN Community, do you agree on the following statements? No Statements Level of agreement Strongly Dis- Un- Agree Strongly Disagree agree certain Agree D2-1. The development on ASEAN is not important to notice. 1 2 3 4 5 D2-2. I have never heard any explanation about it from the 1 2 3 4 5 government. D2-3. I would not be affected by the development of ASEAN. 1 2 3 4 5 D2-4. I think ASEAN is merely the concern of the leaders. 1 2 3 4 5 (please proceed to question no. D5)

D3. If you have ever heard about the ASEAN Community, do you agree on the following statements? No Statements Level of agreement Strongly Dis- Un- Agree Strongly Disagree agree certain Agree D3-1. I know that ASEAN Community will be formed. 1 2 3 4 5 D3-2. I know that ASEAN Community will comprise of ASEAN Security 1 2 3 4 5 Community, ASEAN Economic Community, and ASEAN Socio- Cultural Community. D3-3. I know that ASEAN Community will be effective by 2015. 1 2 3 4 5 D3-4. I have sufficient knowledge/information on ASEAN Community. 1 2 3 4 5

D4. If you have ever heard/read about the ASEAN Community, where have you heard/read it? (you may choose more than 1 answer) Teachers/Lecturers Newspapers Television program Radio program

Seminars Magazines ASEAN Secretariat’s documents

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D5. Have you ever heard/read about the Bali Concord II 2003? Yes, I have No, I have not.

D6. Have you ever heard/read about the ASEAN Charter 2007? Yes, I have No, I have not.

D7. If you have ever heard/read about the Bali Concord II 2003 and/or the ASEAN Charter 2007, where have you heard/read it? (you may choose more than 1 answer) Teachers/Lecturers Newspapers Television program Radio program

Seminars Magazines ASEAN Secretariat’s documents

Others:......

E. ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ASEAN COMMUNITY

The leaders of ASEAN Countries signed the Bali Concord II on 7th October 2009. The essence of the concord was the acceptance of the ASEAN Community concept that will be effectively implemented in 2015.

The concord defines the ASEAN Community as a concert of Southeast Asian nations, bonded together in partnership in dynamic development and in a community of caring societies, committed to upholding cultural diversity and social harmony.

The ASEAN Community will comprise three pillars, namely the ASEAN Political Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community, and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community that are closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing for the purpose of ensuring durable peace, stability and shared prosperity in the region.

What is your opinion of the ASEAN Community? No Statements Level of agreement Strongly Dis- Un- Agree Strongly Disagree agree certain Agree E1. I support the establishment of the ASEAN Community. 1 2 3 4 5 E2. The establishment of ASEAN Community is good for my country 1 2 3 4 5 and the people. E3. My country will benefit from membership in ASEAN Community. 1 2 3 4 5 E4. I believe that ASEAN Community will be able to foster the 1 2 3 4 5 dynamic cooperation in a caring community, committed to upholding the cultural diversity and social harmony. E5. I am optimistic for the success of the establishment of ASEAN 1 2 3 4 5 Community.

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F. OPINION OF THE FORMATION OF ASEAN COMMUNITY: Yes No F1. The formation of ASEAN Community is merely a declaration of ASEAN leaders not fruitful to the people. F2. The formation of the ASEAN Community does not involve the people in its building.

F3. The formation of ASEAN Community should be directed towards the establishment of regional integration as in the European Union. F4. The ASEAN Community should include one single currency which valid in all area of ASEAN. F5. The ASEAN Community should include the abolition of visa for ASEAN citizens visiting other ASEAN countries. F6. The ASEAN Community should include the abolition of passports for ASEAN citizens when visiting other ASEAN countries. F7. The ASEAN Community should include the ASEAN Parliament which has full authority as a legislative power over the region. F8. The ASEAN Community should include a single executive body (ASEAN Commission) which has full authority as an executive in the region. F9. The ASEAN Community should include a single judicial body which has full authority as a judicial body in a country. F10. The formation of the ASEAN Community will diminish the sovereignty of each ASEAN country.

G. ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ASEAN SECURITY COMMUNITY

The ASEAN Security Community (APSC) is the first pillar of the ASEAN Community. ASC is envisaged to bring ASEAN’s political and security cooperation to a higher plane to ensure that countries in the region live at peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment. The ASEAN Political Security Community members shall rely exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences and regard their security as fundamentally linked to one another and bound by geographic location, common vision and objectives. What is your opinion of the ASEAN Security Community (ASC)? No Statements Level of agreement Strongly Dis- Un- Agree Strongly Disagree agree certain Agree G1. I support the establishment of ASC. 1 2 3 4 5 G2. The formation of ASC is good for my country and society. 1 2 3 4 5 G3. I believe that every ASEAN country would be fully committed to 1 2 3 4 5 the peaceful resolution of conflicts and differences. G4. I support the principle of non interference in the foreign and 1 2 3 4 5 security policy of each ASEAN country. G5. I support the rights of governance free from interference in the 1 2 3 4 5 home affairs of each ASEAN country. G6. I believe that each ASEAN member will not use violence in 1 2 3 4 5 solving differences and conflicts. G7. With ASEAN Community, the bargaining position of each ASEAN 1 2 3 4 5 country with countries outside the region will be stronger compared to that doing it unilaterally. G8. I believe that ASEAN countries will be able to cooperate in 1 2 3 4 5 combating terrorists, drugs trading, human trafficking, and cross border crimes.

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H. ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) is the second pillar of the ASEAN Community. The end-goal, as outlined in the ASEAN Vision 2020, is the total economic integration of the region. They are to create a stable, prosperous and highly competitive ASEAN economic region in which there are free flows of goods, services, investments and freer flows of capital, equitable economic development and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities in year 2020.

What is your opinion of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC)? No Statements Level of agreement Strongly Dis- Un- Agree Strongly Disagree agree certain Agree H01. I support the establishment of AEC. 1 2 3 4 5 H02. I support the free flow of goods and services in the region. 1 2 3 4 5 H03. I support the free flow of skilled/professional ASEAN workers in 1 2 3 4 5 the region. H04. I support that ASEAN businesspeople should be freely allowed to 1 2 3 4 5 establish companies anywhere in the region. H05. My country will get benefits from membership in AEC. 1 2 3 4 5 H06. I think that the formation of AEC is good for the people in my 1 2 3 4 5 country. H07. I think that the formation of AEC is good/positive for business in 1 2 3 4 5 my country. H08. When buying goods, we should give priority to goods from 1 2 3 4 5 ASEAN rather than non-ASEAN. H09. Priority should be given to investment and investors from ASEAN 1 2 3 4 5 countries than to those from countries outside ASEAN. H10. Priority should be given to skilled/professional workers from 1 2 3 4 5 ASEAN countries than those from countries outside ASEAN. H11. I believe that AEC will be able to match the economic interests of 1 2 3 4 5 each ASEAN country. H12. I believe that AEC will lead to greater competitiveness to the 1 2 3 4 5 region. H13. I believe that AEC will not only benefit the more developed 1 2 3 4 5 countries because it will be able to accelerate the development in the less developed countries as well. H14. The idea of AEC is merely an effort to solving the poor economic 1 2 3 4 5 condition of ASEAN countries after the Asian Economic Crisis 1997 and the economic threat from China and India.

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I. ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ASEAN SOCIO-CULTURAL COMMUNITY

The ASEAN Socio Cultural Community (ASCC) is the third pillar of the ASEAN Community. It is in consonance with the goal set by ASEAN Vision 2020, envisages a Southeast Asia bonded together in partnership as a community of caring societies, with a high level of socio-cultural advances throughout the region.

What is your opinion of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC)? No Statements Level of agreement Strongly Dis- Un- Agree Strongly Disagree agree certain Agree I01. The establishment of ASCC is good for the social and cultural 1 2 3 4 5 development of my country. I02. I support the establishment of ASCC. 1 2 3 4 5 I03. I believe that ASCC will be able to create a more caring 1 2 3 4 5 community. I04. I believe that ASCC will be able to uplift the health of its 1 2 3 4 5 people/society. I05. I believe that ASCC will increase the variety and richness of 1 2 3 4 5 ASEAN Culture.

J. OPINION ON ASEAN IDENTITY

No Statements Level of agreement Strongly Dis- Un- Agree Strongly Disagree agree certain Agree J01. I regard myself as a part of the ASEAN Community. 1 2 3 4 5 J02. I think all ASEAN countries have comparable norms and 1 2 3 4 5 values. J03. I think all ASEAN countries share common historical 1 2 3 4 5 experiences. J04. I think the people in all ASEAN countries have a comparable 1 2 3 4 5 intelligence level.

K. OPINION ON NATIONAL IDENTITY, SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY

No Statement Opinion K01. The establishment of ASEAN Parliament and Judicial body will influence the ( ) Agree sovereignty of my country. ( ) Disagree K02. The ASEAN Security Community will impact on the diminishing of my country’s ( ) Agree sovereignty. ( ) Disagree K03. It is possible that the national identity will be merged into one ASEAN identity. ( ) Agree ( ) Disagree K04. It is possible that national sovereignty will be negatively affected by ASEAN ( ) Agree Community. ( ) Disagree

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No Statement Opinion K05. I think it is possible that the national security will be negatively affected by ( ) Agree ASEAN Community. ( ) Disagree K06. Which countries which we should be careful to for they will threat the security or the sovereignty of our country?

...... K07. I am a little bit worried that the less developed countries (such as Vietnam, ( ) Agree Cambodia and Myanmar) would become a threat if they develop in the future. ( ) Disagree K08. I think it is urgent to have a unifying language in ASEAN Community. ( ) Agree ( ) Disagree K09, Which language feasible to become the ( ) Indonesian language ( ) English unifying language? ( ) Malay Language ( ) Mandarin ( ) Others: ………………………………………

Yes No K10. Will the use of English as the language of communication between ASEAN countries diminish the importance of national languages. K11. The spirit of among the people of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore that they share the same ethno-cultural root/ancestry can serve as a principle for establishing ASEAN Community. K12. Does the idea of “spirit of the nations that come from the same ancestry/root” among the natives of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore make the other ethnic groups feel threatened? K13. Can Islam become the unifying factor for ASEAN?

K14. Will the non-Muslims feel threatened if Islam serves as the unifying factor for ASEAN?

L. OPINION ON THE POSSIBLE OBSTACLES TO THE ASEAN COMMUNITY

L-I. Do you agree on the following statements: Statement Opinion LI-1. The formation of ASEAN Community is merely a dream. ( ) Agree ( ) Disagree LI-2. The objective of ASEAN Community is very amazing, but is very difficult to ( ) Agree materialize. ( ) Disagree LI-3. It is obvious that the support of a country toward ASEAN Community is only for its ( ) Agree own interests; not because of the common interests of the region. ( ) Disagree

Questionnaire for Singaporean – 9

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L-II. Will the following elements be the obstacles for the establishment of The ASEAN Community? Element Is it an obstacle? 1. Lack of competitiveness in the economies of most ASEAN ( ) Definitely Yes ( ) Possibly Yes countries. ( ) Definitely No 2. Disparity in socioeconomic development in the region. ( ) Definitely Yes ( ) Possibly Yes ( ) Definitely No 3. Low level of education of the majority of the people and ( ) Definitely Yes ( ) Possibly Yes unequal access to education. ( ) Definitely No 4. The limitation of technology mastery and creation in most ( ) Definitely Yes ( ) Possibly Yes of the countries. ( ) Definitely No 5. The dependency of ASEAN countries on developed ( ) Definitely Yes ( ) Possibly Yes countries, especially for financing their economic activities. ( ) Definitely No 6. Poverty in many ASEAN countries. ( ) Definitely Yes ( ) Possibly Yes ( ) Definitely No 7. The structure of ASEAN economies which is dominated by ( ) Definitely Yes ( ) Possibly Yes the Chinese. ( ) Definitely No 8. Differences in the legal and political systems. ( ) Definitely Yes ( ) Possibly Yes ( ) Definitely No 9. The variety of ethnic and religious group in the region. ( ) Definitely Yes ( ) Possibly Yes ( ) Definitely No 10. Militancy, terrorism, and insurgency in some parts of the ( ) Definitely Yes ( ) Possibly Yes region (especially among some Muslims in South Thailand ( ) Definitely No and Southern Philippines).

RESPONDENT’S IDENTITY 1. Gender: 4. Marital status: (A) Male (B) Female (A) Not yet married (B) Married 2. Age grouping: (C) Divorce (A) 19 s/d 34 (B) 35 s/d 49 (C) 50 or more 5. Last education: (A) Undergraduate 3. Occupation: (B) Master degree (A) Docent/Lecturer (C) Doctoral (PhD) (B) Civil servant/government employee (C) Private sector employee 6. Household expenses per month: (D) Soldier/Police (A) S$ 1,250 atau less (E) Entrepreneur/doing business (B) Between S$ 1,251 – S$3,500 (F) Housewive (C) Antara S$3,501– S$6,000 (G) Student (D) Antara S$6,001 – S$10,000 (E) Antara S$10,001 – S$20,000 (H) Not working (F) S$20,001 or more (I) Other: ......

END OF QUESTIONNAIRE THANK YOU FOR YOUR RESPONSE

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APPENDIX D ONLINE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE (IN ENGLISH) USING QUESTIONPRO WEBSITE FOR RESPONDENTS IN SINGAPORE

UNIVERSITI KEBANGSAAN MALAYSIA N a t i o n a l U n i v e r s i t y o f M a l a y s i a

Fakulti Sains Sosial dan Kemanusiaan ● Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities

THE STUDY ON PERCEPTION, ATTITUDE AND BEHAVIOR OF THE PEOPLE IN MALAYSIA, INDONESIA AND SINGAPORE TOWARD THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ASEAN COMMUNITY

(Project Code: UKM-GUP-TKS-07-10-96)

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MASS SOCIETY

Dear Sir/Madam/Professor,

Firstly, we want to thank you for your willingness to participate in this survey.

As we know, until now the building ASEAN Community has never involved the people directly. Even, until now there is no public opinion measures on it existed. This survey is a part of a research project conducted in the National University of Malaysia (Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia). The survey is aimed to measure the perception, attitude, and responses of the people toward ASEAN, identity of

ASEAN, and the concept of The ASEAN Community. It is conducted in three countries: Malaysia,

Indonesia, and Singapore. Hopefully the result will be beneficial for the regional integration in the Southeast Asia, as it will be presented to the stakeholders in the ASEAN Secretariate and the government.

Guidelines for questionnaire: • Please read the guidelines for filling the questionnaire carefully. • There is no wrong or right answer. Your honest response is more important.

• Your response will be treated in confidential manner. • Please answer all the questions as it will be important. The estimated time needed to fill questionnaire is about 15 minutes.

For validating the survey project, you can contact the member of researchers below. Any suggestion or questions can be addressed to: Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities,

National University of Malaysia, 43600 Bangi.

Thank you for your kindly attention and cooperation.

Research Group: Assoc.Prof. Dr. Kamarulnizam Abdullah (+6012-2022964)

Assoc.Prof. Dr. Mohamed Anwar Omar Din (+6019-6497009) Dr. Ravichandran Moorthy (+603 89215825) Guido Benny, S.Sos, ME (+6019-2394761)

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Online Survey Questionnaire for Singaporean - 1

RESPONDENT IDENTITY did not exist, there would be Please tell us your identity: no problem in the country Did you learn about ASEAN at school (primary to secondary 1. Gender school/pre-University)? 1. Male 1. Yes 2. Female 2. No 3. Unable to remember 2. Your age: 1. 19 to 34 years old Is ASEAN important to be taught at school (primary to secondary 2. 35 to 49 years old school/pre-University)? 3. 50 years old or more 1. Completely unimportant 2. Unimportant 3. Occupation: 3. Uncertain 1. Docent / Lecturer 4. Important 2. Civil servant/government employee 5. Very important 3. Private sector employee 4. Soldier / Police II. KNOWLEDGE ON THE ASEAN COMMUNITY 5. Enterpreneur / Doing business 1. Have you ever heard about The ASEAN Community? 6. Housewive 1. Yes, I have (please proceed directly to question #D3 7. Student 2. Not yet (please proceed directly to question #D2 8. Other ______2. If you have not yet heard about the ASEAN Community, do you 4. Marital status: agree on the following statements? 1. Not yet married Strong- Dis- Un- Agree Strong- 2. Married ly Dis- agree certain ly 3. Divorce agree Agree The development on ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ 5. Last education: ASEAN is not important to 1. High school or lower notice 2. Undergradute I have never heard any ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ 3. Master degree explanation about it from 4. Doctoral (Ph.D.) the government I would not be affected by ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ 6. Household expenditure per month: the development of ASEAN 1. S$1,250 or less I think ASEAN is merely ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ 2. Between S$ 1,251 – S$3,500 the concern of the leaders 3. Between S$3,501– S$6,000

4. Between S$6,001 – S$10,000 3. If you have heard about the ASEAN Community, do you agree on 5. Between S$10,001 – S$20,000 the following statements? 6. S$20,001 or more Strong- Dis- Un- Agree Strong-

ly Dis- agree certain ly 7. Are you the citizen or permanent resident of Singapore? agree Agree 1. Yes I know that ASEAN 2. No ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ Community will be formed

8. What is your citizenship? I know that ASEAN ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ 1. Malaysian Community will comprise 2. Indonesian of ASEAN Security 3. Thailand Community, ASEAN 4. The Philippines Economic Community, and 5. Brunei ASEAN Socio-Cultural 6. Other Community. I know that ASEAN ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ I. KNOWLEDGE OF ASEAN Community will be effective Yes No by 2015 I have sufficient ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ Do you know about ASEAN? ❏ ❏ knowledge/information on Do you understand about the goals and objectives of ❏ ❏ ASEAN Community ASEAN?

Do you know that ASEAN was established in 1967? ❏ ❏ Do you know about the organisational structure of ❏ ❏ 4. If you have ever heard/read about the ASEAN Community, where ASEAN? have you heard/read it? (you may choose more than 1 answer) Is ASEAN a security community with a security force ❏ ❏ 1. Teachers/Lecturers dedicated to the security of ASEAN? 2. Newspapers Is the ASEAN Security Community similar to NATO ❏ ❏ 3. Television Programmes (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)? 4. Radio Programmes 5. Seminars Is ASEAN considered as important and successful? 6. Magazines Strong- Dis- Un- Agree Strong 7. ASEAN Secretariate Documents ly Dis- agree certain -ly 8. Other agree Agree Is ASEAN important to you ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ 5. Have you ever heard/read about the Bali Concord II 2003? and your country? 1. Yes In your opinion, is ASEAN ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ 2. No successful? Do you think that if ASEAN ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ 6. Have you ever heard/read about the ASEAN Charter 2007? 1. Yes 360

2. No Yes No The ASEAN Community should include the abolition ❏ ❏ of passports for ASEAN citizens when visiting other 7. If you have ever heard/read about the Bali Concord and/or ASEAN ASEAN countries Charter, where have you heard/read it? (you may choose more than 1 The ASEAN Community should include the ASEAN ❏ ❏ answer) Parliament which has full authority as a legislative 1. Teachers/Lecturers power over the region 2. Newspapers The ASEAN Community should include a single ❏ ❏ 3. Television Programmes executive body (ASEAN Commission) which has full 4. Radio Programmes authority as an executive in the region 5. Seminars The ASEAN Community should include a single ❏ ❏ 6. Magazines judicial body which has full authority as a judicial 7. ASEAN Secretariate Documents body in a country 8. Other The formation of the ASEAN Community will ❏ ❏ diminish the sovereignty of each ASEAN country.

III. ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ASEAN COMMUNITY V. ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ASEAN SECURITY The leaders of ASEAN Countries signed the Bali Concord II on 7th COMMUNITY October 2009. The essence of the concord was the acceptance of the The ASEAN Security Community (APSC) is the first pillar of the ASEAN Community concept that will be effectively implemented in ASEAN Community. ASC is envisaged to bring ASEAN’s political 2015.The concord defines the ASEAN Community as a concert of and security cooperation to a higher plane to ensure that countries in Southeast Asian nations, bonded together in partnership in dynamic the region live at peace with one another and with the world at large in development and in a community of caring societies, committed to a just, democratic and harmonious environment. upholding cultural diversity and social harmony.The ASEAN The ASEAN Security Community members shall rely exclusively on Community will comprise three pillars, namely the ASEAN Political peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences and Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community, and ASEAN regard their security as fundamentally linked to one another and bound Socio-Cultural Community that are closely intertwined and mutually by geographic location, common vision and objectives. reinforcing for the purpose of ensuring durable peace, stability and shared prosperity in the region. What is your opinion of the ASEAN Security Community (APSC)? Strong- Dis- Un- Agree Strong- What is your opinion toward the ASEAN Community? ly Dis- agree certain ly Strong- Dis- Un- Agree Strong- agree Agree ly Dis- agree certain ly I support the establishment ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ agree Agree of ASC I support the establishment ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ The formation of ASC is ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ of the ASEAN Community. good for my country and The establishment of ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ society ASEAN Community is I believe that every ASEAN ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ good for my country and the country would be fully people committed to the peaceful My country will benefit ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ resolution of conflicts and from membership in differences ASEAN Community I support the principle of ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ I believe that ASEAN ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ non interference in the Community will be able to foreign and security policy foster the dynamic of each ASEAN country cooperation in a caring I support the rights of ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ community, committed to governance free from upholding the cultural interference in the home diversity and social affairs of each ASEAN harmony country I am optimistic for the ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ I believe that each ASEAN ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ success of the establishment member will not use of ASEAN Community violence in solving differences and conflicts

With ASEAN Community, ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ IV. OPINION OF THE FORMATION OF ASEAN the bargaining position of COMMUNITY: each ASEAN country with Yes No countries outside the region The formation of ASEAN Community is merely a ❏ ❏ will be stronger compared declaration of ASEAN leaders not fruitful to the to that doing it unilaterally people I believe that ASEAN ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ The formation of the ASEAN Community does not ❏ ❏ countries will be able to involve the people in its building cooperate in combating The formation of ASEAN Community should be ❏ ❏ terrorists, drugs trading, directed towards the establishment of regional human trafficking, and cross integration as in the European Union border crimes The ASEAN Community should include the abolition ❏ ❏ of visa for ASEAN citizens visiting other ASEAN countries The formation of the ASEAN Community should ❏ ❏ include the abolition of visa (entry permit) to all ASEAN citizens when visiting another ASEAN countries. 361

VI. ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ASEAN ECONOMIC VII. ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ASEAN SOCIO-CULTURAL COMMUNITY COMMUNITY The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) is the second pillar of the The ASEAN Socio Cultural Community (ASCC) is the third pillar of ASEAN Community. The end-goal, as outlined in the ASEAN Vision the ASEAN Community. It is in consonance with the goal set by 2020, is the total economic integration of the region. They are to ASEAN Vision 2020, envisages a Southeast Asia bonded together in create a stable, prosperous and highly competitive ASEAN economic partnership as a community of caring societies, with a high level of region in which there are free flows of goods, services, investments socio-cultural advances throughout the region. and freer flows of capital, equitable economic development and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities in year 2020. What is your opinion toward the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community? Strong- Dis- Un- Agree Strong- What is your opinion toward the ASEAN Economic Community? ly Dis- agree certain ly Strong- Dis- Un- Agree Strong- agree Agree ly Dis- agree certain ly The establishment of ASCC ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ agree Agree is good for the social and I support the establishment ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ cultural development of my of AEC country I support the free flow of ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ I support the establishment ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ goods and services in the of ASCC region I believe that ASCC will be ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ I support the free flow of ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ able to create a more caring skilled/professional ASEAN community workers in the region I believe that ASCC will be ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ I support that ASEAN ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ able to uplift the health of its businesspeople should be people/society freely allowed to establish I believe that ASCC will ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ companies anywhere in the increase the variety and region richness of ASEAN Culture My country will get benefits ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ from membership in AEC VIII. OPINION ON ASEAN IDENTITY I think that the formation of ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ Strong- Dis- Un- Agree Strong- AEC is good for the people ly Dis- agree certain ly in my country agree Agree I think that the formation of ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ I regard myself as a part of ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ AEC is good/positive for the ASEAN Community business in my country I think all ASEAN countries ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ When buying goods, we ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ have comparable norms and should give priority to values goods from ASEAN rather I think all ASEAN countries ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ than non-ASEAN share common historical Priority should be given to ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ experiences investment and investors I think the people in all ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ from ASEAN countries than ASEAN countries have a to those from countries comparable intelligence outside ASEAN level Priority should be given to ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ skilled/professional workers IX. OPINION ON NATIONAL IDENTITY, SOVEREIGNTY from ASEAN countries than AND SECURITY those from countries outside Agree Dis- ASEAN agree I believe that AEC will be ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ I think the establishment of ASEAN Parliament and ❏ ❏ able to match the economic Judicial body will influence the sovereignty of my interests of each ASEAN country country I think it is possible that the national security will be ❏ ❏ I believe that AEC will lead ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ negatively affected by ASEAN Community to greater competitiveness It is possible that national sovereignty will be ❏ ❏ to the region negatively affected by ASEAN Community I believe that AEC will not ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ I am a little bit worried if the less developed countries ❏ ❏ only benefit the more (such as Vietnam, Kamboja, Laos and Myanmar) will developed countries because become a threat if they developed in the future. it will be able to accelerate It is possible that the national identity will be merged ❏ ❏ the development in the less into one ASEAN identity developed countries as well I think it is urgent to have a unifying language in ❏ ❏ The idea of AEC is merely ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ASEAN Community an effort to solving the poor economic condition of Which countries which we should be careful to for they will threat the ASEAN countries after the security or the sovereignty of our country? Asian Economic Crisis 1997 and the economic threat from China and India

Which language feasible to become the unifying language? 1. Bahasa Indonesia 4. Mandarin 2. Bahasa Melayu 5. Other 3. English

362

Yes No Strong- Dis- Un- Agree Strong- Will the use of English as the language of ❏ ❏ ly Dis- agree certain ly communication between ASEAN countries diminish agree Agree the importance of national languages Government should try to ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ The spirit of among the people of Malaysia, Indonesia ❏ ❏ control the involvement of and Singapore that they share the same ethno-cultural foreign business in every root/ancestry can serve as a principle for establishing sector of our economy. ASEAN Community Foreign workers can be ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ Does the idea of “spirit of the nations that come from ❏ ❏ harmful to our society because the same ancestry/root” among the natives of they rob locals of employment Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore make the other opportunities. ethnic groups feel threatened? I always recommend others ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ Will the non-Muslims feel threatened if Islam serves ❏ ❏ (my relatives and friends) not as the unifying factor for ASEAN? to buy foreign products. Does Islam make the Non-Moslems feeling threatened ❏ ❏ I always try my best not to buy ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ in the establishment of ASEAN Community? and to use foreign products, unless they cannot be avoided. X. OPINION ON THE POSSIBLE OBSTACLES TO THE I am willing to stop buying ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ASEAN COMMUNITY foreign products and switch to Do you agree on the following statements? domestic ones instead. Agree Dis- If the quality is similar, I will ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ agree buy domestic products The formation of ASEAN Community is merely a ❏ ❏ although the price is slightly dream higher. The objective of ASEAN Community is very ❏ ❏ I will support politician/public ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ amazing, but is very difficult to materialize officials/political parties which The objective of ASEAN Community is very ❏ ❏ want to reduce foreign amazing, but is very difficult to realize. business set-up in the country. I dislike foreigners ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ Will the following elements be the obstacles for the establishment of owning/operating business in The ASEAN Community? my country. Defini- Maybe Defini- Patriotism should be the main ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ tely an an tely not objectives of education, so our obstacle obstacle obstacle children believe that our Lack of competitiveness in the ❏ ❏ ❏ country is one of the best in economies of most ASEAN countries the world. Disparity in socioeconomic development ❏ ❏ ❏ I will protest if the leader of a ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ in the region foreign country undermines Low level of education of the majority of ❏ ❏ ❏ the pride of my nation and the people and unequal access to country. education I will be really angry if there ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ The limitation of technology mastery and ❏ ❏ ❏ is/are foreign country(ies) creation in most of the countries claiming the territory of The dependency of ASEAN countries on ❏ ❏ ❏ Singapore. developed countries, especially for I am always proud of the ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ financing their economic activities beauty of Singapore. Poverty in many ASEAN countries ❏ ❏ ❏ I am very proud of the history ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ and cultural heritage of The structure of ASEAN economies ❏ ❏ ❏ Singapore as it forms the roots which is dominated by the Chinese of history and culture for the Differences in the legal and political ❏ ❏ ❏ Southeast Asian region. systems I am sure that the cultural ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ The variety of ethnic and religious group ❏ ❏ ❏ values and local wisdom of in the region Singapore is one of the best in Militancy, terrorism, and insurgency in ❏ ❏ ❏ the world . some parts of the region (especially I don’t like any other country ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ among some Muslims in South Thailand to claim our authentic cultural and Southern Philippines) artefacts as theirs.

XI. PERSPECTIVES, ATTITUDES, AND BEHAVIOR XII. CULTURAL IDENTITY TOWARD NATIONALISM Strong- Dis- Un- Agree Strong- Strong- Dis- Un- Agree Strong- ly Dis- agree certain ly ly Dis- agree certain ly agree Agree agree Agree In my family, many ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ Buying Singapore’s product is ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ activities or traditions always the best choice. resemble the culture of my We should only accept ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ country (such as imported products from the ceremonies, food, religious countries which accept our practice, homecoming, etc) products. For me, it is not a big ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ Government should try its best ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ problem if I do not learn a not to purchase goods and foreign language services from foreign I am actively involved in ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ companies/countries. the national cultural/art Government should protect ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ activities domestic industries by

creating trade barriers for foreign products.

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