Rewards and Punishments in Early Chinese Military Thought*
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THE LIMITS OF COERCION: REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS IN EARLY CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT* OLIVER WEINGARTEN ORIENTAL INSTITUTE, CZEcH AcADEMY oF ScIENcES Abstract The present article analyses conceptions of self-interest and motivation as reflected in precepts about rewards and punishments – Han Fei’s “two levers” of power – which are discussed in military writings of the pre-Qin to Han periods (ca. 3rd c. BCE– 2nd c. CE). On a fundamental level, military theorists grappled with the problem of how to establish control and exert power over defiant subjects, like the Legalist works Han Fei zi and Shang jun shu. Whereas the Legalist philosophers proposed exclusively to exploit people’s self-interest, manipulating them through the “two levers”, some military theorists espoused a more nuanced understanding of motivation. They acknowledged the significance of non-selfish obligations and emotional bonds in both horizontal and vertical relationships, and in doing so considered the wider social nexus of military activity. Historiographic records indicate furthermore that commanders employed certain performative strategies suggested by military writers in order to build rapport with their troops. Surprisingly, then, a more complex notion of human nature took shape within the confines of military specialism than in the political philosophy of the Legalists. Keywords Military thought – Warfare – Legalism – Rewards and punishments – Motivation Resumé Cet article analyse les conceptions de l’intérêt personnel et de la motivation telles qu’elles apparaissent dans les préceptes sur les châtiments et les récompenses (les « deux manipules » de pouvoir de Han Fei) qui sont discutés dans les écrits militaires antérieurs aux Qin jusqu’à la dynastie Han (environ du troisième siècle avant JC jusqu’au second siècle de notre ère). Fonda- mentalement, les théoriciens militaires étaient confrontés au problème de savoir comment établir un contrôle et exercer leur pouvoir sur des sujets récalcitrants, tels que les ouvrages légistes Han Fei zi et Shang jun shu. Alors que les philosophes légistes proposaient exclusivement d’exploiter l’intérêt personnel des gens, en les manipulant à travers les deux manipules, certains théoriciens militaires ont adopté une conception plus nuancée de leurs motivations. Ils ont reconnu l’importance des obligations altruistes et des liens affectifs dans les relations horizontales et verticales, aboutissant ainsi à une vue plus large des liens sociaux de l’activité militaire. Les sources historiographiques indiquent en outre que dans la Chine ancienne, pour créer des liens affectifs avec leurs troupes, les chefs militaires ont eu recours à certaines stratégies performatives suggérées dans des écrits spécialisés. De manière surprenante, chez ces spécialistes des armées, il se dégage une notion plus complexe de la nature humaine que dans la philosophie politique des légistes. Mots clefs Pensée militaire – Guerre – Légisme – Châtiments et récompenses – Motivation INTRoDUcTIoN to political order. Thinkers responded differently. Those following in Confucius’s footsteps stressed personal vir- The social transformations and military upheavals of tue and ethics. Meng Ke 孟軻 (fourth c. BCE) in particu- Warring States China called for new intellectual approaches lar postulated instinctive moral sentiments lying dormant * I would like to thank Paul R. Goldin and Zeb Raft for critical Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange comments and corrections. All remaining shortcomings are my sole (grant no. RG-003-EU-13). responsibility. Research for this article has been supported by the Journal Asiatique 308.1 (2020): 85-118 doi: 10.2143/JA.308.1.3287671 86 OLIVER WEINGARTEN in each individual and apt to be nurtured, under the right rejects as relevant political factors. The military thinkers’ circumstances, into fully formed ethical precepts. Other suggestions on how to operationalise psychological thinkers held a more jaundiced view of humanity. The insights in order to manipulate troops into following their Mohists posited a congenital inclination towards strife, to commander’s will present a more nuanced range of be mitigated by ethical norms and strict control under options than the simple binary of the carrot-and-stick a sage leader. Xun Kuang 荀況 (ca. 335–ca. 238 BCE), approach—the “two levers” of power—favoured in Han albeit, like Meng, retrospectively recognised as a Con Fei’s political thought as well as the Shang jun shu. fucian, bemoaned persistent antisocial impulses, to be No less than the social and political philosophy of the reined in by ritual stipulations. Han Fei 韓非 (ca. 280–ca. “Masters”, military thought reveals convictions about 233 BCE), purported to be Xun’s student, identified human motivation and, by extension, human nature. By amoral self-interest as universal behavioural motivation, forcing men—rarely women—to enter into combat, war- and so did the Shang jun shu 商君書, attributed to the fare imposes physical hardship and danger. On and Qin politician Shang Yang 商鞅 (ca. 385–338 BCE). beyond the battlefield, it exacts a heavy emotional toll Their political prescriptions were harsher still. from those who fight, and commanders often have to Different political tenets flowed from diverging con- overcome resistance among the rank and file. As military cepts of human nature. Unlike Confucians, who pro- writings do not fail to stress, rewards and punishments ceeded from a belief in man’s natural inclination towards form a cornerstone of discipline aimed to counteract morality and encouraged benevolent rule and virtue, the uncertainty, fear of the enemy, insubordination, and likes of Shang Yang and Han Fei, commonly, if some- degraded communications. In an environment where the what misleadingly, termed “Legalists”, promoted tech- slightest shortcoming or oversight spells defeat, such niques of efficient rulership designed to surmount peo- obstacles can put the survival of armies at risk and ple’s selfish dispositions, to exploit them even.1 For imperil states. This calls for the most efficient means to them, politics was the practice of manipulating subjects assert control. For these reasons, one would expect that in the service of stability, agricultural productivity, and what respected military texts claim to work will, in some military prowess. Subjects were, at best, reluctant collab- manner, have been tried and tested.3 And indeed, histo- orators, at worst a hindrance to be overcome, if not an riographic records concerning military matters do sug- enemy to be subdued. Order was the crux. Order was gest correspondences between theoretical advice and built on control. Power birthed control.2 In this concep- actual practices. Some will be discussed below. tion of human nature and society there was no place for The present article treats ideas of military thinkers as what a virtue-oriented approach to politics would con- an important strand in ancient thought about human sider human flourishing. nature, leadership, individual motivation, and social rela- Military specialists also faced the challenge to impose tionships—central topics of “Masters” discourse as well. control, though in a more restricted domain. In the unfor- Such a catholic view of early Chinese intellectual history giving world of warfare, one may think, precepts as harsh chimes in with much recent work exploring close con- as those of Han and Shang would prevail. Yet despite nections between philosophical, political, and military their narrower thematic focus and signature brevity, mil- thought.4 itary texts map out a richer and more realistic psychology In giving the psychological and social insights of the of motivation than Han Fei zi 韓非子 and Shang jun shu, military thinkers their due, the article also ties in with preoccupied as they are with rewards and punishments as means to exploit self-interest for political ends. Military 3 This presupposes that engagement with military writings was texts, by contrast, implicitly acknowledge values and more than a purely intellectual pursuit. Late Warring-States or early sentiments beyond self-interest, including emotional Han lore already casts some doubts on the value of theoretical knowl- edge. When Zhao Kuo, son of the general She, is about to be appointed bonds and communal ties, which Han Fei explicitly general, the official Lin Xiangru warns that “Kuo is only capable of reading his father’s writings and accounts, but he has no idea how 1 Goldin 2011 criticises the use of “Legalism” as reference to the to adapt to sudden changes.” (括徒能讀其父書傳,不知合變也。) philosophy of mainly Shang Yang and Han Fei; it will still be used here (Shiji 81.2446) At least in this case, theoretical knowledge is taken to as a convenient collective label. be inferior to first-hand experience. Lewis 1990, 98, asserts “that by 2 A classic study of the Legalist philosophers, including Shen the end of the fourth century there were […] military treatises clearly Buhai 申不害 and Shen Dao 慎到, and their thought is Vandermeersch intended for a specialized audience”, and “the military commander had 1965. For recent approaches to dating Han Fei zi, see Lundahl 1992 thus become […] the exponent of a special set of theories, techniques and Zheng Liangshu 1993. See Goldin ed. 2013 for recent studies of and administrative practices.” See also Lewis 1990, 103, on the “claim- the philosophy of Han Fei zi. On Shang jun shu, see Pines 2016 and ing of authority” in military matters “on the basis of special wisdom, the translation Pines