THE LIMITS OF COERCION: REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS IN EARLY CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT*

Oliver Weingarten Oriental Institute, Czech Academy of Sciences

Abstract The present article analyses conceptions of self-interest and motivation as reflected in precepts about rewards and punishments – Han Fei’s “two levers” of power – which are discussed in military writings of the pre-Qin to Han periods (ca. 3rd c. BCE– 2nd c. CE). On a fundamental level, military theorists grappled with the problem of how to establish control and exert power over defiant subjects, like the Legalist works Han Fei zi and Shang jun shu. Whereas the Legalist philosophers proposed exclusively to exploit people’s self-interest, manipulating them through the “two levers”, some military theorists espoused a more nuanced understanding of motivation. They acknowledged the significance of non-selfish obligations and emotional bonds in both horizontal and vertical relationships, and in doing so considered the wider social nexus of military activity. Historiographic records indicate furthermore that commanders employed certain performative strategies suggested by military writers in order to build rapport with their troops. Surprisingly, then, a more complex notion of human nature took shape within the confines of military specialism than in the political philosophy of the Legalists.

Keywords Military thought – Warfare – Legalism – Rewards and punishments – Motivation

Resumé Cet article analyse les conceptions de l’intérêt personnel et de la motivation telles qu’elles apparaissent dans les préceptes sur les châtiments et les récompenses (les « deux manipules » de pouvoir de Han Fei) qui sont discutés dans les écrits militaires antérieurs aux Qin jusqu’à la dynastie Han (environ du troisième siècle avant JC jusqu’au second siècle de notre ère). Fonda- mentalement, les théoriciens militaires étaient confrontés au problème de savoir comment établir un contrôle et exercer leur pouvoir sur des sujets récalcitrants, tels que les ouvrages légistes Han Fei zi et Shang jun shu. Alors que les philosophes légistes proposaient exclusivement d’exploiter l’intérêt personnel des gens, en les manipulant à travers les deux manipules, certains théoriciens militaires ont adopté une conception plus nuancée de leurs motivations. Ils ont reconnu l’importance des obligations altruistes et des liens affectifs dans les relations horizontales et verticales, aboutissant ainsi à une vue plus large des liens sociaux de l’activité militaire. Les sources historiographiques indiquent en outre que dans la Chine ancienne, pour créer des liens affectifs avec leurs troupes, les chefs militaires ont eu recours à certaines stratégies performatives suggérées dans des écrits spécialisés. De manière surprenante, chez ces spécialistes des armées, il se dégage une notion plus complexe de la nature humaine que dans la philosophie politique des légistes.

Mots clefs Pensée militaire – Guerre – Légisme – Châtiments et récompenses – Motivation

Introduction to political order. Thinkers responded differently. Those following in Confucius’s footsteps stressed personal vir- The social transformations and military upheavals of tue and ethics. Meng Ke 孟軻 (fourth c. BCE) in particu- Warring States China called for new intellectual approaches lar postulated instinctive moral sentiments lying dormant

* I would like to thank Paul R. Goldin and Zeb Raft for critical Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange comments and corrections. All remaining shortcomings are my sole (grant no. RG-003-EU-13). responsibility. Research for this article has been supported by the

Journal Asiatique 308.1 (2020): 85-118 doi: 10.2143/JA.308.1.3287671 86 OLIVER WEINGARTEN in each individual and apt to be nurtured, under the right rejects as relevant political factors. The military thinkers’ circumstances, into fully formed ethical precepts. Other suggestions on how to operationalise psychological thinkers held a more jaundiced view of humanity. The insights in order to manipulate troops into following their Mohists posited a congenital inclination towards strife, to commander’s will present a more nuanced range of be mitigated by ethical norms and strict control under options than the simple binary of the carrot-and-stick a sage leader. Xun Kuang 荀況 (ca. 335–ca. 238 BCE), approach—the “two levers” of power—favoured in Han albeit, like Meng, retrospectively recognised as a Con­ Fei’s political thought as well as the Shang jun shu. fucian, bemoaned persistent antisocial impulses, to be No less than the social and political philosophy of the reined in by ritual stipulations. Han Fei 韓非 (ca. 280–ca. “Masters”, military thought reveals convictions about 233 BCE), purported to be Xun’s student, identified human motivation and, by extension, human nature. By amoral self-interest as universal behavioural motivation, forcing men—rarely women—to enter into combat, war- and so did the Shang jun shu 商君書, attributed to the fare imposes physical hardship and danger. On and Qin politician Shang Yang 商鞅 (ca. 385–338 BCE). beyond the battlefield, it exacts a heavy emotional toll Their political prescriptions were harsher still. from those who fight, and commanders often have to Different political tenets flowed from diverging con- overcome resistance among the rank and file. As military cepts of human nature. Unlike Confucians, who pro- writings do not fail to stress, rewards and punishments ceeded from a belief in man’s natural inclination towards form a cornerstone of discipline aimed to counteract morality and encouraged benevolent rule and virtue, the uncertainty, fear of the enemy, insubordination, and likes of Shang Yang and Han Fei, commonly, if some- degraded communications. In an environment where the what misleadingly, termed “Legalists”, promoted tech- slightest shortcoming or oversight spells defeat, such niques of efficient rulership designed to surmount peo- obstacles can put the survival of armies at risk and ple’s selfish dispositions, to exploit them even.1 For imperil states. This calls for the most efficient means to them, politics was the practice of manipulating subjects assert control. For these reasons, one would expect that in the service of stability, agricultural productivity, and what respected military texts claim to work will, in some military prowess. Subjects were, at best, reluctant collab- manner, have been tried and tested.3 And indeed, histo- orators, at worst a hindrance to be overcome, if not an riographic records concerning military matters do sug- enemy to be subdued. Order was the crux. Order was gest correspondences between theoretical advice and built on control. Power birthed control.2 In this concep- actual practices. Some will be discussed below. tion of human nature and society there was no place for The present article treats ideas of military thinkers as what a virtue-oriented approach to politics would con- an important strand in ancient thought about human sider human flourishing. nature, leadership, individual motivation, and social rela- Military specialists also faced the challenge to impose tionships—central topics of “Masters” discourse as well. control, though in a more restricted domain. In the unfor- Such a catholic view of early Chinese intellectual history giving world of warfare, one may think, precepts as harsh chimes in with much recent work exploring close con- as those of Han and Shang would prevail. Yet despite nections between philosophical, political, and military their narrower thematic focus and signature brevity, mil- thought.4 itary texts map out a richer and more realistic psychology In giving the psychological and social insights of the of motivation than Han Fei zi 韓非子 and Shang jun shu, military thinkers their due, the article also ties in with preoccupied as they are with rewards and punishments as means to exploit self-interest for political ends. Military 3 This presupposes that engagement with military writings was texts, by contrast, implicitly acknowledge values and more than a purely intellectual pursuit. Late Warring-States or early sentiments beyond self-interest, including emotional Han lore already casts some doubts on the value of theoretical knowl- edge. When Zhao Kuo, son of the general She, is about to be appointed bonds and communal ties, which Han Fei explicitly general, the official Lin Xiangru warns that “Kuo is only capable of reading his father’s writings and accounts, but he has no idea how 1 Goldin 2011 criticises the use of “Legalism” as reference to the to adapt to sudden changes.” (括徒能讀其父書傳，不知合變也。) philosophy of mainly Shang Yang and Han Fei; it will still be used here (Shiji 81.2446) At least in this case, theoretical knowledge is taken to as a convenient collective label. be inferior to first-hand experience. Lewis 1990, 98, asserts “that by 2 A classic study of the Legalist philosophers, including Shen the end of the fourth century there were […] military treatises clearly Buhai 申不害 and Shen Dao 慎到, and their thought is Vandermeersch intended for a specialized audience”, and “the military commander had 1965. For recent approaches to dating Han Fei zi, see Lundahl 1992 thus become […] the exponent of a special set of theories, techniques and Zheng Liangshu 1993. See Goldin ed. 2013 for recent studies of and administrative practices.” See also Lewis 1990, 103, on the “claim- the philosophy of Han Fei zi. On Shang jun shu, see Pines 2016 and ing of authority” in military matters “on the basis of special wisdom, the translation Pines 2017, prefaced by a substantial introduction on the increasingly frequently transmitted in texts”. date, structure, and philosophy of the work. The lasting, if only reluc- 4 For studies along these lines, see Lewis 1990, Galvany 2015 and tantly acknowledged influence of Legalist thought on political ideas 2017, Pines 2016, Raphals 2016, Lee 2017, Meyer 2017, and Rand and practice has been argued, for instance, in Zhao Dingxin 2015. 2017, the revised version of a dissertation already written in the 1970s. THE LIMITS OF COERCION: REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS IN EARLY CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT 87 the general orientation of Charles Sanft’s work on ancient Rewards and punishments Chinese society and social thought, which explores the in Han Fei zi and Shang jun shu extent to which communication and cooperation—under- stood game-theoretically as referring to interactions One of the most famous episodes in early Chinese between agents with divergent interests—acted as indis- military lore teaches a simple lesson about how to exer- pensable stabilising factors in the political and adminis- cise control over troops: Intimidation ensures control, trative system created by the state of Qin, which came to and threats are most efficient if flanked by acts of osten- be regarded as a proverbially despotic regime engaged in tatious cruelty. Called upon by King Helü 闔閭 (r. 514– the merciless suppression and exploitation of the popu- 496 BCE) of Wu 吳 to drill a group of palace beauties in lace, but may have been less of a tyrannical outlier than order to demonstrate that his skills do not exhaust them- previously believed.5 selves in the theories of his “thirteen chapters” of mili- The following examination of military writings dis- tary writings, the legendary general Sun Wu 孫武 deftly cusses the interplay between force and compulsion on the cows the giggling ladies into mute submission: When one hand, and motivation and self-interest on the other. they ignore his orders, he executes the most senior ones One of this article’s central tenets, which resonates with among them and parades their bodies in front of the hor- Sanft’s observation that the Qin state could not have been rified assembly, pour encourager les autres.6 The story built on coercion alone, is that threats of punishment and breathes an intuitive plausibility, not as a strictly histor- promises of remuneration are not sufficiently supple ical account, but certainly as regards basic mechanisms instruments to respond to the full range of social constel- of establishing control. lations and human dispositions encountered in military Like Jean Levi, Albert Galvany has interpreted this contexts or, quite possibly, anywhere else. Consequently, story as the symbolic mark of a shift in military values.7 any attempt at manipulating or controlling groups that From now on, he avers, the warrior ethos of the Chunqiu stands a chance to succeed will take the sentiments, aristocracy was to be replaced by qualities “traditionally bonds, and dependencies into consideration which form ascribed to the female domain (subtlety, caution, furtive- naturally in social life, both in military and civilian con- ness, quietude, and moderation)”. The rise of mass con- texts. Whilst some military writers acknowledged this script armies made defeats potentially more devastating fact, the paradigmatic Legalist works, Han Fei zi and and thus dampened the chivalric panache which held Shang jun shu, accord much less relevance to political sway in earlier times. The novel attitude also helped measures not grounded in the psychology of the carrot- solve the task of transforming “a shapeless and anarchic and-stick approach. mass made up of peasants […] into an impeccable, The main body of the article will address (1) rewards orderly, and obedient organism” by enforcing rigorous and punishments in Han Fei zi and Shang jun shu; discipline, the efficiency of which rested on “human (2) varieties of punishment in military texts; (3) rewards beings’ impulse-driven nature”, their innate “rejection of in military texts; (4) considerations of the wider social suffering or detriment”. Hence, the episode exemplifies, context of warfare in military writings; (5) advice as to in Galvany’s reading, “the unquestionable efficacy of how good commanders should act to win their troops’ terror as an instrument in the service of power”.8 support; (6) narratives of bonding and shared hardship The advocacy of fear as an instrument of military between troops and commanders in historiographic and ­discipline agrees with the more general strategy of anecdotal writings; (7) narratives of self-exposure by exploiting innate inclinations for political ends.9 Han military leaders trying to establish and deepen bonds Fei’s “two handles” (er bing 二柄) of government are with the rank and file; and (8) a group of prescriptive a pithy expression of this approach, but discussions of texts about the military effectiveness of a commander who severs his emotional bonds with his everyday sur- 6 Shiji 65.2161–62. There are parallel versions in Wu Yue chunqiu roundings, transforming himself, in a ritual context, sym- 吳越春秋 and the Yinqueshan 銀雀山 manuscripts; see Galvany 2011. bolically into a corpse. (9) The conclusion summarises The historicity of the episode, even of Sun’s name (“the Martial One”), the argument. has been questioned by Petersen 1992. 7 For a brief comment on the story stressing the shift towards char- acteristics traditionally deemed ‘female’, see Levi 1984, 80–81. 8 Galvany 2011, 636, 638, 641. See also Lewis 1990, 104, on the new Warring States conception of the army “as a single body”. Granet 1960, 266–73, amalgamates scenes from Zuozhuan battle narratives into a comprehensive characterisation of aristocratic warfare and the Spring and Autumn warrior ethos. 5 Sanft 2014a, 2014b. In addition to Sanft, other scholars have like- 9 Galvany 2013, 94, notes that Han Fei zi exploits “preferences wise taken a revisionist approach to the traditional image of Qin tyr- and aversions” to enforce order; the point is more fully expressed in anny; see the essays in Pines et al. 2014. Shang jun shu, though (see below). 88 OLIVER WEINGARTEN

“rewards and punishments” (shang xing 賞刑; shang fa calculating mind in dealing with their children, so who 賞罰)—the two incentives thus labelled—are also com- should be surprised that [between superiors and their sub- monly encountered elsewhere in the military and political ordinates] there is no such generosity as between fathers 13 literature. Whilst not denying the pervasiveness of such and sons? a carrot-and-stick model of behavioural control, how- The bleak portrayal of the parent-child relationship ever, there is nevertheless reason to suspect that it strains establishes a paradigm for understanding human interac- to capture the full complexity of psychological relation- tions in general. Even the most intimate familial relation- ships in military settings, which may equally likely be ship cannot soften the relentless egoism of the “calculat- shaped by emotion, persuasion, moral ideals, a sense of ing mind” (ji suan zhi xin 計算之心) so, clearly, no obligation, notions of prestige and desire for reputation emotional bond exists which could reliably steer a person as much as by coercion. Historical studies of soldiers’ towards unselfish action. No sense of mutual affection, “motivation […] defined as a set of attitudes and condi- respect, or obligation will compel one to act in another tions which caused soldiers to perform their duty in person’s interest; the only means left to rein in people’s 10 11 peace and war” suggest just that. Even if control over pursuit of self-interest are externally imposed positive troops or populations can be reduced to incitation and and negative incentives speaking with immediacy to the inhibition respectively, variegated ways existed to effect calculating mind—rewards and punishments. Finally, either. Both types of intervention can employ different that people’s decision-making processes are supposed to stimuli to trigger distinct emotional responses. More be based on a calculus of advantages and disadvantages importantly, discipline’s inhibitory effect will be of little speaks against the assumption that Han Fei depicts use in the absence of a positive impulse to do more than humans as impulse-driven in a manner that bypasses passively submit to orders. Lastly, the deterrence of pun- their considered judgement or cognitive faculties more ishments falters if disregarding punitive regulations has generally.14 consequences as fearsome as—or worse than—the pun- Despite such radical rhetoric, some passages in Han ishment itself, a situation commonly encountered in Fei zi occasionally argue along more nuanced lines. Han warfare. Fei allowed for the existence of sage officials in the For Han Fei, it has been argued, “the only genuine mythical past,15 and he conjured an image of upright 12 force in the world is self-interest”. He regarded the two political advisers beleaguered by power-hungry courtiers handles as superior means to maintain political control. that may well have been a bid for sympathy on his part.16 In a deliberately shocking passage, he dismantled the One of the Laozi commentaries included in Han Fei zi parent-child relationship in order to lay bare what he praises “humaneness” as expression of an entirely deemed to be the irredeemably calculating core of human unselfish concern with the welfare of others: nature, thereby developing a systematic argument for rewards and punishments as the sole effective instru- 仁者，謂其中心欣然愛人也。其喜人之有福，而惡人 ments of political control. 之有禍也。生心之所不能已也，非求其報也。 Humaneness means that someone cares for others from 今上下之接，無子父之澤，而欲以行義禁下，則交必 the innermost of his mind. He is joyful when others 有郤 [~隙] 矣。且父母之於子也，產男則相賀，產女 則殺之。此俱出父母之懷衽 [~妊?]， 然男子受賀，女 子殺之者，慮其後便、計之長利也。故父母之於子 13 Han Fei zi 46, “Liu fan” 六反, 1129. 也，猶用計算之心以相待也，而況無父子之澤乎！ 14 In this context, Galvany 2013, 92, 94, 98, speaks of “natural Nowadays, generosity such as between fathers and sons is impulses”, “the venal, impulsive nature of the human being”, “spon- lacking from interactions between superiors and their sub- taneous impulses”, and “the impulsive condition of human beings”. ordinates. Yet, if [superiors] wished to restrain subordi- This seems to underestimate the degree of deliberation which Han Fei nates by promoting a sense of what is right, inevitably imputed to social actors. 15 說疑 a rift would open up in their mutual dealings. As for Han Fei zi 44, “Shuo yi” , 1078–79. 16 Han Fei zi 11, “Gu fen” 孤憤, portrays officials acting in the ­parents’ attitudes towards their children, moreover, they interest of the state, fighting those who scramble for and exploit illicit congratulate each other on the birth of a son, but if a girl power. The story of “Mr. He” (ch. 13, “He shi” 和氏) repeatedly is born, they will kill her. Both are brought forth from offering uncut jade and undergoing mutilating punishment for his hon- their parents’ embrace—that [parents] will, however, est wish to be of service has been interpreted as an “allegory” illustrat- accept congratulations on a son but kill a girl is because ing “the precarious situation of the Legalists” (Lundahl 1992, 165, they consider their future convenience and calculate their 185). A dialogue featuring Han Fei as speaker elaborates further on this long-term benefits. Thus, even parents will apply a image. Here, Han Fei stresses the moral obligation to render selfless and, in the face of powerful enemies, potentially hazardous service for the benefit of the people (Han Fei zi 42, “Wen tian” 問田, 1063–64). 10 Berkovich 2017, 5. Even if this is a later addition by someone other than Han Fei, it agrees 11 See Berkovich 2017, esp. ch. 6; Crowley 2012. with the self-image of the upright adviser Han most likely wished to 12 Goldin 2005, 62. promote. THE LIMITS OF COERCION: REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS IN EARLY CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT 89

experience good luck and dismayed when they experi- state, a core concern of Han’s philosophy that comes ence misfortune. This is something arising from his mind very close to representing the ultimate justification for that he cannot stop; it is not because he is after some his concept of political order.23 recompense.17 聖人之治也，審於法禁，法禁明著則官治；必於賞 One may note, though, that this chapter has been 罰，賞罰不阿則民用。(官) [民用]24 官治則國富，國富 widely dismissed as inauthentic in twentieth-century 則兵強，而霸王之業成矣。霸王者，人主之大利也。 scholarship, partly because the sentiment expressed here 人主挾大利以聽治，故其任官者當能，其賞罰無私。 conflicts strongly with the tenor of the remaining work.18 使士民明焉，盡力致死、則功伐可立而爵祿可致，爵 Elsewhere, indeed, the “humane man” and the “noble 祿致而富貴之業成矣。富貴者，人臣之大利也。人臣 man” (junzi 君子) are attacked for their corrupting effect 挾大利以從事，故其行危至死，其力盡而不望。此謂 君不仁，臣不忠，則 不 可以霸王矣。25 on the state.19 Whilst morally upright personalities are ( ) In his rule, the sage pays close attention to laws and pro- not entirely absent from Han Fei’s conception of the hibitions. If these are clear, the offices will be in good political world, the number of such men who can be order. He is unwavering about rewards and punishments. relied on to act in their ruler’s interest is minuscule. Fur- If these are administered without favouritism, the people thermore, ministers following their own moral compass can be deployed. If the people can be deployed and offices do not easily submit to the disciplinary regime of rewards are in good order, the state will prosper; if the state is and punishments and may thus have a destabilising influ- prosperous, the army will be strong, and the endeavours ence.20 Their value system upsets the predictable regular- of a hegemon or king will be accomplished. ity of self-interested behaviour and thus falls outside the Being a hegemon or king is one of the greatest benefits purview of the two levers. Such men are, on Jean Levi’s for a ruler, and if he keeps this in mind while adjudicating reading, “monstrosities of nature”, since they fail to on politics, he will confer offices in accordance with abil- ity and be unswayed when meting out rewards and pun- agree with the law, which is modelled on cosmic princi- ishments. By making officers and commoners aware of ples. They pose a threat to order; so much so that their this and having them exert their strength up until their 21 attitudes justify their execution. They are “beyond the death, merits can be established, and ranks and emolu- reach of power”. Worse, they “subvert the very essence ments attained. Ranks and emoluments having been of sovereign power”.22 attained, the endeavours leading to prosperity and nobility The implications of Han Fei’s views about the crucial will be accomplished. role of self-interest are set forth in the following discus- Prosperity and nobility are the greatest benefits for a min- sion. The pursuit of self-interest by ruling elites, so it ister, and if he keeps this in mind while pursuing his tasks, states, bolsters the strength and prosperity of the entire he will consequently wade into danger, right up to his death, and never look back in anger once his powers are exhausted. 17 Han Fei zi 20, “Jie Lao” 解老, 354. This means one can rule in the manner of a hegemon or 18 Lundahl 1992, 223; Zheng Liangshu 1993, 236, based on earlier king even without the prince being benevolent or the min- work by Zheng also quoted by Lundahl. Zheng’s and Lundahl’s mon- isters loyal.26 ographs are extremely useful for their comprehensive and incisive dis- cussions of previous investigations into the dates and authenticity of Han Fei zi chapters and of the work’s contents. However, many ver- dicts on the authenticity of individual chapters or chapter groups are based on expectations of ideological consistency. These are vulnerable 23 Harris 2013, 111, sees Han Fei’s notion of political legitimacy to scepticism on account of the near-total absence of contextual infor- expressed in accounts of ancient sage rulers doubling as cultural mation about Han Fei’s intellectual biography. Some writers do, after heroes: “It was the ability of these rulers to address the pressing prob- all, contradict themselves at different stages of their lives, or simply lems of their times that justified their rule.” In a similar vein, Galvany change their minds on certain issues. Linguistic evidence only plays 2013, 96, sees Han Fei envisioning a “golden age”, “a state of peace a secondary role in the authentication studies reviewed by Zheng and free of all antagonism” achieved by Han’s harsh policies. Lundahl; at best, lexical preferences, especially concerning ideologi- 24 This conjecture follows Gu Guangqi 顧廣圻 (1770–1839); see cally charged keywords, are marshalled as evidence. For this reason, Chen Qiyou ed. 2000, 1008n6. Zhang Jue leaves the text as it is. the methodological tenets underlying the kind of scholarship both dis- 25 Gu Guangqi conjectures that bu 不 should be omitted (Chen cussed and embodied by Zheng’s and Lundahls’s works have been Qiyou ed. 2000, 1008n13). The reason is that Han Fei zi 35, “Wai chu questioned by a number of recent scholars. See Goldin 2005, 62; Pines shuo you xia” 外儲說右下, 884, states a principle very close to the 2013, 68; Graziani 2015, 160. conjectural, negated form of the above sentence: 君通於不仁，臣通 19 Han Fei zi 47, “Ba shuo” 八說, 1143. 於不忠，則可以王矣。 “If the ruler has a thorough understanding of 20 Han Fei zi 50, “Xian xue” 顯學, 1251. Cf. Han Fei zi 40, “Nan how not to be humane and the minister a thorough understanding shi” 難勢, 1045, where it says in a rebuttal of Shenzi that “capable men of how not to be loyal, rule as a true king becomes possible.” This are few, but there are large numbers of degenerates” (賢者寡而不肖 agrees with the thrust of the argument in this paragraph. Zhang Jue 者眾). On the troubling characteristics of morally upright ministers, see (Han Fei zi, 1131n4) notes Gu’s conjecture and references the passage Graziani 2015, 177. in Han Fei zi 35 but does not state his own opinion; Chen Qiyou 21 Levi 1989, 117–18. explicitly agrees with it. 22 Galvany 2013, 100, 101. 26 Han Fei zi 46, “Liu fan”, 1130. 90 OLIVER WEINGARTEN

Orderly rule is, ultimately, based on self-interest. That maternal love in particular, are adduced as examples of allows the ruler to operate the machinery of state without emotional overindulgence and its deleterious after-ef- making himself dependent on the virtuous character of fects. Evidently, Han Fei’s rhetorical goal is not to pres- his ministers—and without having to be virtuous ent a consistent characterisation of parenthood which, himself. elsewhere, serves him once more as a positive foil against The alleged nullity of parental love is, to Han Fei, which calculating selfishness is set off.28 Here, Han Fei such strong evidence of self-interest’s hold over human intends to overturn convictions about essential values on behaviour that he revisits it later in the same chapter, which social order rests. If the paradigmatic case of pos- where he first discusses it in order to throw the efficiency itive emotional attachment—parental affection—can be of harsh policies into sharper relief. shunted aside, no more obstacles stand in the way of 母之愛子也倍父，父令之行於子者十母；吏之於民無 Han’s project to present political control—administered 愛，令之行於民也萬父。母積愛而令窮，吏用威嚴而 through the two handles—as the solely valid prosocial 民聽從，嚴愛之筴亦可決矣。且父母之所以求於子 influence, and the ruler as father figure who “applies 也，動作則欲其安利也，行身則欲其遠罪也；君上之 strictness”, enacting benevolence through regrettable but 於民也，有難則用其死，安平則盡其力。親以厚愛關 inevitable harshness. 子於安利而不聽，君以無愛利求民之死力而令行。明 A further point emphasised by Han Fei—in contrast 主知之，故不養恩愛之心而增威嚴之勢。故母厚愛 to many discussions in military texts presented below—is 處，子多敗，推愛也；父薄愛教笞，子多善，用嚴 that in attempts to influence behaviour no straight line 也。 leads from initial attitudes and aspirations to final out- Mothers love their sons twice as much as fathers, but the comes. Love or empathy cannot guarantee that the person father’s orders are carried out by their sons ten times as one cares for will prosper; on the contrary, a caring atti- often as the mother’s. Low officials have no feelings of care towards the people, but their orders are carried out by tude can precipitate detrimental consequences. The right the people ten thousand times as often as those of their method counts more than good intentions. fathers. Mothers foster an abundance of care, yet their As Pines demonstrates in detail, in the Shang jun shu orders come to nought. Clerks employ authority and selfishness is explicitly identified as an anthropological severity, and the people follow them. One can indeed constant. People single-mindedly pursue their own judge between plans involving strictness and plans involv- advantage (li 利) in the same way as water naturally ing a sense of care. Moreover, the reason why parents flows downward.29 It is in people’s “nature” (xing 性, make demands on their sons is that they want them to be qing 情) to seek comfort by alleviating hunger, toil, hard- undisturbed and enjoy advantages in their activities, but to ship, and humiliation. In pursuing advantages they may stay clear of anything blameworthy in their personal con- disregard man-made norms, “missing the standards of duct. The ruler in his relationship with the people utilises 失禮之法 their death in times of calamity and exhausts their strength etiquette” (shi li zhi fa ). Yet, they will also in times of peace and tranquility. strive to attain a good reputation (ming 名), and in so With their abundant sense of care, parents try to confine doing they may “diverge from the regularities of their their sons to what allows them to be undisturbed and nature” (shi xing zhi chang 失性之常) by courting pre- enjoy advantages; yet they are not heeded. The prince, cisely the kinds of suffering and hardship their inborn without any benefits or sense of care, demands that the tendencies urge them to avoid.30 Hence, under certain people die and exhaust themselves; yet his orders are car- circumstances people’s impulses can contradict each ried out. An intelligent ruler knows this, so he will not other, and some congenital inclinations can be exploited nurture a sense of care and generosity but, instead, to modulate or override others. In concrete terms, people enhance his position of authority and strictness. Hence, have a desire for riches and noble status, and if these can with the mother’s treatment of abundant care, the son will mostly fail, because this care is foisted upon him. If only be attained through military merits, they will a father shows scant care and teaches with the rod, the son will have many accomplishments, because the father applies strictness.27 28 In the following remarks, parental love is set up as the opposite of calculating selfishness: “The minister expends his powers, up to his In a manner somewhat detrimental to the overarching death, to make a deal with the ruler. The ruler dangles noble ranks and stringency of Han’s argument, this discussion reverses emoluments in order to make a deal with the minister. The relationship between ruler and minister is not one of affection, as between father the parents’ role compared to the previous passage. Hav- and son, this is what leads to calculation and reckoning.” 臣盡死力以 ing been paraded earlier on as filicidal egoists, they are 與君市，君垂爵祿以與臣市，君臣之際，非父子之親也，計數之 now castigated for their lack of nerve. Parental care, and 所出也。 (Han Fei zi 36, “Nan yi” 難一, 942). 29 Pines 2017, 65, with reference to Shang jun shu, ch. 23, “Jun chen” 君臣, 260. 27 Han Fei zi 46, “Liu fan”, 1131. Cf. the remarks in Han Fei zi 30 Pines 2017, 66, with reference to Shang jun shu, ch. 6, “Suan 47, “Ba shuo”, 1154–55; for a discussion, see Harris 2013, 121–22. di” 算地, 94. THE LIMITS OF COERCION: REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS IN EARLY CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT 91 welcome war and consider themselves fortunate when but the law applies uniformly across all sociopolitical they can throw themselves into battle.31 spheres and ranks. It is possible to exert power over others because when Despite the severity of the Shang jun shu’s conception their motivational impulses conflict, humans weigh the of laws and punishments, positive social outcomes sup- disinclinations arising from their inborn nature against posedly soften their harshness. Predictable rewards and the strength of their positive desires; if the latter is suf- punishments combined with clear instruction compel ficient, the former can be overcome. In this respect, people to internalise the lessons of all three so thoroughly “likes and dislikes” (hao wu 好惡) are vital to con- that there will no longer be a need for any of them.38 trolling people through rewards and punishments.32 Such forms of motivation eventually bypass deliberation This mechanism is reminiscent of the decision-­making on costs and benefits—Han Fei’s calculating heart—by processes implied by Han Fei’s calculating heart. Not conditioning people into reflexive rule-following. even Han Fei claims that when parents decide to kill their The military chapter of the Shang jun shu assumes the daughter they do so because they lack parental feeling effectiveness of such measures, proclaiming the prece- entirely. They just determine that the anticipated future dence of politics over warfare. benefits of not having a daughter outweigh the emotional 凡戰法必本於政勝，則其民不爭；不爭則無以私意， attachment to her. Elsewhere, Han Fei states this broader 以上為意。故王者之政，使民怯於邑鬬，而勇於寇 assumption explicitly when he explains that a cartwright 戰。民習以力攻難，故輕死。 wants people to be rich so they can buy his chariots, Generally, methods of doing battle must be based on the whereas a coffin-maker wants them to die early. But nei- fact that politics prevails,39 then there will be no strife ther is the one virtuous nor the other malevolent. Their among the people. If there is no strife, they will not form attitudes are purely motivated by self-interest—by their intentions out of selfishness, but [instead] with their supe- calculating hearts, one might say.33 riors in mind. Hence, the government of a true king will In the Shang jun shu’s ideology of total mobilisation, render people cowardly in village brawls, but brave at bat- tling invaders. The people will be inured to attacking with rewards and punishments are naturally deemed applica- 40 ble in both military and civilian contexts.34 force under adversity, hence they will take death lightly. 聖人之為國也：壹賞，壹刑，壹教。壹賞則兵無敵， The brand of retribution-based politics promoted in 壹刑則令行，壹教則下聽上。 Shang jun shu conditions subjects such that they adopt Such is the way the sage governs the state: He unifies their superiors’ intentions as their own. Shying away rewards, punishments, and instruction. If he unifies from domestic conflicts, the people will direct their entire rewards, the troops will be unmatched. If he unifies pun- potential for violence solely at external enemies and, ishments, orders will be carried out. If he unifies instruc- through habituation, accept adversity and peril without 35 tion, subordinates will heed their superiors. second thoughts. The selfishness which Han Fei deems The following clarifies what unifying rewards means: constitutive of people’s motivational ideations is, in the “benefits and emoluments, offices and noble ranks solely Shang jun shu’s politico-military system, entirely blotted derive from military activity” (利祿官爵，摶 [~專] 出 out by the environing apparatus of control and indoctri- 於兵).36 At the same time, “from the grand ministers, the nation. Whilst Han Fei suggests to harness people’s nat- chancellor, and the generals to the grandees and com- ural inclinations for the ruler’s ends, the Shang jun shu moners, whoever fails to follow a royal command, defies proposes to eradicate and replace them. Common to both a state prohibition, or confounds orders by the ruler will approaches, however, is that they manipulate what peo- be sentenced to death, without pardon” (自卿相將軍以 ple perceive to be in their own interest. 至大夫庶人，有不從王令，犯國禁，亂上制者，罪死 不赦).37 Rewards are restricted to military achievements,

31 Pines 2017, 66, with reference to Shang jun shu, ch. 17, “Shang xing” 賞刑, 202–203. 38 Shang jun shu, ch. 17, “Shang xing”, 192–93. 32 Pines 2017, 68–69, with reference to Shang jun shu 9, “Cuo fa” 39 Note the remarks to a similar effect in Huainan zi 15, “Bing 錯法, 131. lüe” 兵略, 1561: 兵之勝敗，本在於政。政勝其民，下附其上，則 33 Han Fei zi 17, “Bei nei” 備內, 308. 兵強矣；民勝其政，下畔其上，則兵弱矣。“The victory or defeat 34 See Pines 2016; 2017, 59–99. of the military has its basis in governance. If governance overcomes the 35 Shang jun shu, ch. 17, “Shang xing”, 190. people, subordinates will follow their superiors, and the military will 36 Shang jun shu, ch. 17, “Shang xing”, 191. See ibid., 202 and be strong. If the people overcome [their] government, subordinates 203, for statements to the effect that “prosperity and noble rank” (fu will rebel against their superiors, and the military will be weak.” Trans- gui 富貴) should only derive from military activity. lation from Meyer 2012, 105. 37 Shang jun shu, ch. 17, “Shang xing”, 196. 40 Shang jun shu, ch. 10, “Zhan fa” 戰法, 136. 92 OLIVER WEINGARTEN

Varieties of punitive action tandem with confidence in the force of threats and vio- in military texts lence to maintain the existing order form axioms of polit- ical and social thought which are best known from Han A punitive system depends on the concrete founda- Fei zi, but evidently enjoyed wider currency among mil- tions of its power and the way in which it is enacted. The itary thinkers as well. political prescriptions of Han Fei zi and Shang jun shu The psychological effects of threats are sometimes employ rewards and punishments, often corporal punish- discussed in detail by military writers. The Wei Liao zi ments. Authority embraced as legitimate by the domi- claims that the kings of old instituted a strict system of nated party does not seem to play any significant role. discipline, resting crucially on the notion of awe-­inspiring Some military texts share this outlook. The following authority (wei 威), which is at the heart of political power example from Liu tao in particular also propounds the for Han Fei as well42 and likewise recognised in Lüshi near-mystical vision of an unfathomable and awe-inspir- chunqiu 呂氏春秋 as a source of military power.43 ing ruler elaborated most systematically in Han Fei zi. 先王明制度於前，重威刑於後。刑重則內畏，內畏則 道 首 This passage—rhyming and punning (dao , shou )— 外堅矣。 hails the authority and power generated by a latent threat The kings of the past clarified the system of order first of violence and amplified by the unpredictable manner in and, in the following, increased fear-inducing punish- which retribution emanates from the—to an onlooker ments. With severe punishments, they were feared inside impenetrable—perceptions, preferences, and intellections their states; feared inside, they attained sturdiness towards of the ruler. the outside.44 夫王者之道 [*lûɁ]，如龍首 [*lhuɁ]，高居而遠望 The author of the following passage elsewhere in Wei [*maŋ]，深視而審聽 [*lhêŋh]。示其形 [*gêŋ]，隱其情 Liao zi elaborates on the same theme. The passage con- [*dzeŋ]。若天之高，不可極 [*gək] 也；若淵之深，不 ceives of the effects of fear and, secondarily, shame as 可測 也。故可怒而不怒 ，姦臣乃作 [*tshrək] [*nâh] disciplinary glue, but also as a psychological weapon by [*tsâk]；可殺而不殺 [*srât]，大賊乃發 [*pat]。兵勢不 which the outcome of battles is determined. 行 [*grâŋ]，敵國乃強 [*gaŋ]。 The way of the true King resembles the head of a dragon: 夫民無兩畏也，畏我侮敵，畏敵侮我。見侮者敗，立 it is to be lofty and far-sighted, observing deeply and lis- 威者勝。凡將能其道者，吏畏其將也；吏畏其將者， tening with acute attention. It is to display one’s outer 民畏其吏也；民畏其吏者，敵畏其民也。是故，知勝 form while obscuring one’s inner states. Like heaven’s 敗之道者，必先知畏侮之權。 loftiness, it is inexhaustible; like the depth of an abyss, it There shall not be two kinds of fear among the people. If cannot be plumbed. they fear our side, they will bring disgrace to the enemy; Hence, if the king fails to become furious when he should, if they fear the enemy, they will bring disgrace to our side. traitorous ministers will stir; if he fails to kill when he Whoever suffers disgrace will be defeated; whoever should, bandits of the worst kind will spring into action. establishes his fearsome authority will be victorious. If military power is not projected, enemy states will just If the general has a grasp of the proper principles, the 41 gain in strength. officers will fear their general; if the officers fear their general, commoners will fear their officers; if commoners In a rhetoric designed to persuade through the impact fear their officers, the enemy will fear them. For this rea- of its imagery and aural patterning, the text posits objec- son, he who understands the principles of victory and tive standards in political reality itself, which dictate defeat will above all understand how to assess fear and punitive action under certain conditions left as yet disgrace.45 unspecified. If these conditions are missed, catastrophic aftereffects loom. Politics is a zero-sum game; whatever Threats of punishment also feature elsewhere, even one side gains, the other loses, both domestically and in outside the military literature, for instance in the Shang- 46 interstate competition. The projection of military power shu 尚書. But here more than elsewhere, fear serves as is a subcategory of requisite punitive action. It is subject to the same logic as any other political measure and inte- 42 Han Fei zi 52, “Ren zhu” 人主, 1276. This holds not only for grated into the same conception of rulership. The insist- the ruler, but also for his entourage, whose “excessive authority” (tai ence on the mysterious nature of princely power in wei 太威) may endanger the ruler’s position. 43 Lüshi chunqiu 8.2, “Lun wei” 論威, 435–36. 44 Wei Liao zi, juan 3, ch. 13: “Zhong xing ling” 重刑令, 82 (orig- 41 Liu tao, juan 1: “Wen tao”, ch. 9: “Shang xian” 上賢, 15 (orig- inal pagination: 4a). inal pagination: 10b). Han Fei zi 12, “Shui nan” 說難, 287–88, also 45 Wei Liao zi, juan 1, ch. 5: “Gong quan” 攻權, 76 (original compares the ruler to a dragon, but in order to stress his sudden irrita- pagination: 8a–b). bility, not his mysteriousness. Here and throughout, phonological 46 In “Mu shi” 牧誓, King Wu of Zhou warns his troops that those reconstructions quoted are Schuessler’s (2009) “Minimal Old who will not exert themselves in the fight against King Zhòu of Shang Chinese”. will be executed: 爾所弗勖，其于爾躬有戮。 “In so far as you do THE LIMITS OF COERCION: REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS IN EARLY CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT 93 organising principle for the entire army. It anchors a to the lowest ranks, this is the extent to which the gener- chain of transitive disciplinary relations extending down- al’s fearsome authority prevails.48 ward through the ranks. Furthermore, as if drawn by cap- The parallel in Wei Liao zi forcefully states the under- illary action, fear spreads from the vertex of the army, lying rationale at the outset: “Any punishment is a way first, into the lower and, from there, second, into the to make one’s martial prowess shine forth” (凡誅者所以 outer reaches of the military organisation, to the point 明武也). Rewards and punishments complement each where it impacts, externally, on the enemy, to decisive other in a bid to firmly install the general atop the chain effect. Whichever side engenders fear will carry off the of command by spreading fear among some subordinates victory, whilst its counterpart will suffer defeat. Being and fostering gratitude in others. mindful of this logic is tantamount to grasping the core Some historical narratives exemplify—and perhaps principle of victory and defeat in general. offer detailed advice on—how acts of systematic intimi- On the face of it, such a view would seem to reduce dation can be carried out. The Qi general Sima Rangju both tactics and military discipline to a skilled manipula- 司馬穰苴 highlights his authority through an act of tion of psychological states. But whilst this will, in effect, demonstrative cruelty calling to mind Sun Wu’s execu- not have amounted to a neglect of practical aspects of tion of the concubines. Claiming that Duke Jing 景 of Qi warfare—like Han Fei’s denigration of parenthood, this 齊 (r. 547–490 BCE) has promoted him beyond the passage should be viewed as a graphic exaggeration—it bounds imposed by his lowly origins, Rangju expresses undoubtedly bespeaks a strong appreciation of psycho- apprehensions that if he were put in charge of an army logical factors in warfare. his men would refuse to cooperate with him: “Officers Other parts of Wei Liao zi stipulate that the staff of and soldiers have not yet formed an attachment to me; generals and officers fallen in battle shall be summarily the hundred families don’t trust me” (士卒未附，百姓 executed, a practice justified by the claim that among the 不信). So he asks for a ducal favourite, Zhuang Jia 莊賈, crucial factors for victory is the general’s ability to to be nominally put in charge. Rangju makes an appoint- “establish fearsome authority” (li wei 立威).47 So pre- ment with him and waits at the gate to the barracks, dis- cious is this authority that both Wei Liaozi and Liu tao playing both a sundial and a clepsydra. Zhuang is late, propose a calculus of intimidation through executions, because his family and followers (qinqi zuoyou 親戚左 according to which capital punishment should be pur- 右) detain him for a farewell banquet. When he finally posely applied to signal power more than penalise arrives, Rangju reminds him of the duties of a general, wrongdoing. The Liu tao explains: including absolute punctuality, and, after a brief harangue, 將以誅大為威，以賞小為明；以罰審為禁止而令行。 has Zhuang cut in half at the waist according to the mil- 故殺一人而三軍震者，殺之；賞一人而萬人說者，賞 itary statutes on cases of missed appointments. Like Sun 之；殺貴大，賞貴小。殺其當路貴重之臣，是刑上極 Wu, who used the corpses of the executed palace ladies 也；賞及牛豎、馬洗、廄養之徒，是賞下通也。刑上 to strike fear into their surviving peers, Rangju parades 極，賞下通，是將威之所行也。 Zhuang Jia’s body in front of the troops, who are, in The general creates his fearsome authority by killing the a verbal echo of the Liu tao’s discussion of demonstra- high and mighty and gains illustriousness by rewarding tive punishments, “rattled and terrorised” (zhen li 振 figures of little consequence. Through punishments and 慄 49 scrutiny he brings it about that whatever is prohibited ). Through this violent performance of his power, stops, whereas his orders are carried out. Hence, whenever Rangju makes it abundantly clear that he is not to be the killing of a single man is apt to rattle the Three trifled with, regardless of his background. Armies, kill him. Whenever rewarding a single man will Aside from striking fear into his men, Rangju estab- please ten thousand others, reward him. lishes his independence from princely interference, The high and mighty are most worth killing; the small and a topic taken up in the abstract by military thinkers as petty most worth rewarding. If one kills the noble and well.50 A narrative epilogue underlines this aspect of weighty ministers controlling access to the ruler, that means punishments extend to the apex. If rewards reach as far as to ox herders and the stable boys who groom the 48 Liu tao, juan 3: “Long tao”, ch. 22: “Jiang wei” 將威, 23 (orig- horses, that means they descend to the lowest ranks. If inal pagination: 6b); see also the close parallel in Wei Liao zi, juan 2, 武議 punishments extend to the apex and rewards reach down ch. 8: “Wu yi” , 78 (original pagination: 3a–b). 49 Shiji 64.2157–58. It says that Rangju “had Zhuang Jia executed and paraded in front of the Three Armies”. Cf. the Sun Wu anecdote, where it says that “he then had the two platoon leaders executed and not exert yourselves, on your (bodies =) persons there will be applied paraded around” 遂斬隊長二人以徇 (Shiji 65.2161). capital punishment.” See Qu Wanli 2009, 92; tr. Karlgren 1950, 29, 50 Referring to Sunzi 8, “Jiu bian” 九變, 171: “There are some no. 10. commands by the ruler one does not follow” (君命有所不受), Meyer 47 Wei Liao zi, juan 5, ch. 24: “Bing ling xia” 兵令下, 88 (original 2012, 19, explains that the commander became “in effect a pro tempore pagination: 6a–7a). king”. Ōba 2017, 250–53, cites this and other narratives to illustrate 94 OLIVER WEINGARTEN the story. After the execution, an envoy arrives from the fails to capture one will die, and his house will be razed. duke, to whom Zhuang Jia had appealed for help. Though When capturing a leader in a further battle, [his guilt] is 53 the envoy’s mission is futile, Rangju does not miss the forgiven. opportunity to proclaim that “when the general is in Similar rules as those for the leader of a group of five the barracks, there are some princely orders he will not also apply to generals. In the spirit of the Shang jun shu, 將在軍，君令有所不受 accept” ( ), an assertion of the rewards and punishments are viewed purely from the commander’s authority which Sun Wu allegedly also 51 perspective of military merit. They are treated like an made in front of King Helü of Wu. Rangju almost has accounting problem—gains and losses can be balanced the envoy put to death as well for going too fast in his against each other in a manner so straightforward it chariot within the camp. But, he states, “one may not kill should have satisfied any calculating heart. Loss of per- 君之使不可殺之 a ducal messenger” ( ). Instead, he gives sonnel could be made up for by presenting a correspond- orders to dispatch the messenger’s charioteer along with ing number of captives. This incentive to inflict at least one of the horses and has parts of the chariot lopped off 52 as much damage on the enemy as sustained by one’s own as further, symbolic punishment. side is further backed up by the threat to execute defeated Rangju’s use of violence is not, he insists, a matter of officers and mete out collective punishment to their fam- personal whim. It is graded in accordance with law and ilies. Historiographic records from the Western Han note convention. Yet, he also communicates his resolve not to that, for indiscipline and treason, military commanders compromise. Whether to kill the messenger or, as Rangju were liable to harsh punishments, including threats of does, his charioteer, as a proxy, is ultimately at Rangju’s execution and collective retribution implicating their discretion, and the decision to forego another direct families.54 Already much earlier, a Zuozhuan report attack on the duke’s authority highlights the sovereignty under the year 699 BCE recounts punishments of unsuc- of his position vis-à-vis the ruler. cessful military leaders.55 Collective punishment as deterrence also assumed What is thus outlined is a system of incentives and institutional forms in the guise of laws and regulations. disincentives operating with high predictability and trans- A detailed exploration of disciplinary mechanisms apt to parency, especially if compared to the Liu tao’s portrayal instil fear in troops and officers alike can be found in Wei of the ruler as wilfully impenetrable font of rewards and Liao zi. punishments. At the same time, the pitilessness of these 束伍之令曰：五人為伍，共一符，收於將吏之所，亡 regulations raises the stakes for those who are subject to 伍而得伍者當之。得伍而不亡有賞，亡伍不得伍，身 them. For believers in the psychological preponderance 死家殘。亡長得長當之，得長不亡有賞，亡長不得 of self-interest, such a system constitutes the optimal 長，身死家殘，復戰得首長，除之。 solution to the problem of how to assert control over Ordinance for assembling pentads: Five men form one troops under the extreme conditions of battle. pentad. They share the same authentication, which is The paramount importance of clarity and predictabil- stored at the commander’s seat. Losing a pentad and cap- ity is pressed home by the following narrative sketch turing an [enemy] pentad balance each other out. If one illustrating the enforcement of battlefield discipline. captures a pentad and loses none, there will be rewards. On losing a pentad but failing to capture one, [the officer 吳起與秦戰未合，一夫不勝其勇，前獲雙首而還。吳 in command] will die, and his house will be razed. 起立命斬之。軍吏諫曰：「此材士也，不可斬！」起 Losing the leader of a pentad and capturing one balance 曰：「材士則是也，非吾令也。」斬之。 each other out. If one captures a leader of a pentad and loses none, there will be rewards. One who loses one and that generals, while in command, held the supreme legal authority to 53 Wei Liao zi, juan 4, ch. 16: “Shu wu ling” 束伍令, 83 (original decide over life and death, to the extent that they could overrule their pagination: 1a). monarchs. Sunzi 10, “Di xing” 地形, 226, states that the commander 54 Four episodes from Li Guang’s Shiji biography indicate this. should act according to the situation and may ignore orders by the ruler (1) Li Guang ransoms himself from a death sentence after losing troops if necessary. In the same vein, Liu tao, juan 3: “Long tao”, ch. 21: ”Li against the Xiongnu and being captured alive; he is demoted to com- jiang” 立將, 23 (original pagination: 6a), explains that once the general moner status (Shiji 109.2870–71). (2) Zhang Qian misses a rendezvous has been appointed and taken over his command, his authority over- with Li Guang, ransoms himself from a death sentence and is demoted rides that of the ruler in the interest of the unity of his troops and, to the rank of commoner (Shiji 109.2872–73). (3) Zhao Yiji misses ultimately, that of military success. Note also Wei Liao zi, juan 2, ch. 8: a rendezvous with Wei Qing, ransoms himself from a death sentence “Wu yi”, 79 (original pagination: 4b): “The general is not under the and is demoted to the rank of commoner (Shiji 109.2876). (4) Li control of heaven above, nor of earth below or man in the middle.” Guang’s grandson Ling 陵 surrenders to a superior Xiongnu force and (夫將者上不制于天，下不制于地，中不制于人。) See also Zhang marries a daughter of the Xiongnu leader; the Han exterminate his Shaoyu 2006, 39 (Sunzi), 71 (Sima fa), 91 (Wei Liaozi), 108 (Liu tao). family (Shiji 109.2878–79). 51 Shiji 65.2161. 55 Zuozhuan, Huan 13.1: Durrant et al., tr., 2016, 118–21. See also 52 Shiji 64.2158. Lewis 1990, 25, on rewards and punishments in Zuozhuan. THE LIMITS OF COERCION: REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS IN EARLY CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT 95

When Wu Qi fought Qin but the armies had not joined in one will dare trail behind at the back.” This speaks about battle, one man could not master his gallantry, advanced, having order.58 captured a pair of heads, and returned. Wu Qi at once ordered to cut him apart at the waist. An officer objected: Here, as previously, the criteria for rewards and pun- “This is a capable soldier. You cannot execute him!” Qi ishments are set out transparently in terms with a quan- replied: “A capable soldier he is indeed, but that was tifiable element. In addition, the officers’ supervisory against my orders.” So he was executed.56 role is stressed. Resembling accountants of military action, their task is to keep track of the troops’ combat The demonstrative application of capital punishment performance to match it afterwards with munificence or for what may be construed as a minor disciplinary condign punishment, whichever is appropriate. In keep- infraction—if not a laudable act of valour—recalls appli- ing with common metaphors employed in such contexts, cation of the same disciplinary means in the Sun Wu it is said that these rules, properly observed and enforced, anecdote discussed at the beginning. A closer similarity will unleash powers on a par with forces of nature. in terms of both plot and theme, however, is displayed The general features in Wei Liao zi as the consum- by a famous episode in Han Fei zi, in which the keeper mate disciplinarian. His powers of command and promo- of a duke’s cap is punished for covering the duke with tion of military discipline rest on minute regimentation a blanket when the latter dozes off, whereas the keeper and, ultimately, the threat of harsh penalties. of the blanket is punished for failing to cover him. One failed in his duty (bu dang 不當; shi qi shi 失其事), the 將軍受命，君必先謀於廟，行令于廷，君身以斧鉞授 other acted outside his remit, meddling with the obliga- 將曰：『左、右、中軍皆有分職，若踰分而上請者 tions of a fellow official (qin guan 侵官; yue guan 越 死。軍無二令，二令者誅。留令者誅。失令者誅。』 官; yue qi zhi 越其職).57 In that story, as here, the guid- 將軍告曰：『出國門之外，期日中，設營表，置轅 門，期之，如過時則坐法。』將軍入營，則閉門清 ing principle is that officials cannot, for whatever reason, 道，有敢行者誅，有敢高言者誅，有敢不從令者誅。 be allowed to diverge even in the slightest from their When the general receives his commission, the ruler will duties, even if the outcome is positive. The stress lies, in not fail first to lay plans in the ancestral temple, and when all cases, on demonstrative displays of power in order to the orders are proclaimed across the courtyard, the ruler forestall future infractions. personally hands over the axe [of command] to the gen- Whilst the previous regulations from Wei Liao zi con- eral, saying: “The three armies—left, right, and centre— cern post factum bookkeeping of merits and demerits, all have their assignments. Whoever transgresses his another passage from the same book plunges its reader assignment and makes pleas to superiors shall die. There into the midst of battle. It describes how soldiers should are no secondary orders in these armies; whoever issues be coaxed into advancing towards the enemy by threats secondary orders shall be executed. Whoever stalls a com- of punishment. mand shall be executed; whoever misses one shall be executed.” 鼓行交鬬，則前行進為犯難，後行退為辱眾。踰五行 The general announces: “After leaving the gate of the 而前進者有賞，踰五行而後者有誅，所以知進退先 capital, I shall establish the time of midday, set up a gno- 後，吏卒之功也。故曰：『鼓之前如雷霆，動如風 mon for the camp and erect the main portal. If given 雨，莫敢當其前，莫敢躡其後。』言有經也。 a fixed date, whoever misses it shall be dealt with accord- If the drums have been sounded to advance and [the ing to the law.” troops] are about to join in battle, it counts as defying After the general has entered the camp, he immediately hardship to advance ahead of the battle lines, whilst it has the gate shut and the paths swept. If anyone dares counts as humiliation of the troops to fall behind. Who- walk around, he shall be executed. If anyone dares raise ever advances more than five rows ahead of the line will his voice, he shall be executed. If anyone dares disregard get rewards; whoever falls back by more than five rows orders, he shall be executed.59 will be executed. The officers’ achievement lies in having the wherewithal to remain aware of who is advancing and These rules and practices buttress a rigorous order who is backing out, who is ahead and who is behind. with an irrefragable chain of command to create disci- Hence it is said: “Being given the drum signal, they will pline in the sense of a set of immediate, automated proceed like claps of thunder, their movements like a gust responses to specific orders or situations. With his ruler’s or deluge. No one will dare oppose them at the front; no backing, the general deploys his authority to punish in order to enforce absolute obedience and punctuality, down to the control of individuals’ movements and

58 Wei Liao zi, juan 4, ch. 17: “Jing zu ling” 經卒令, 84 (original 56 Wei Liao zi , juan 2, ch. 8: “Wu yi”, 79–80 (original pagination: pagination: 2a). 5b–6a). 59 Wei Liao zi, juan 4, ch. 19: “Jiang ling” 將令, 84 (original 57 Han Fei zi 7, “Er bing” 二丙, 114. pagination: 3b). 96 OLIVER WEINGARTEN vocalisations even off the battlefield. The steps of those Sometimes, capital punishment served to enforce par- who defy regulations can be traced along the carefully ticular orders, as the historiographic record shows. When, swept footpaths of the encampment so they may be held during a campaign against Han and Zhao in 260 BCE, liable; making noise counts as an infraction grave enough Bai Qi 白起 is put in charge of the Qin armies, his to incur punishment. Arguably, these rules impose an appointment is a secret, and “it was ordered that whoever all-encompassing discipline which exceeds the more dared leak that the Lord of Wu’an [i.e., Bai Qi] was in immediate demands of combat readiness and impress on command be decapitated.” (令軍中有敢泄武安君將者 each soldier’s mind the inescapable reality of unquestion- 斬)61 The Zhao general Li Mu 李牧, commander of the able submission, even with regard to seemingly inconse- northern border regions, adopted a long-term defensive quential acts. More than the post factum accounting and strategy towards Xiongnu incursions and barred his real-time tracking of military merits previously discussed, troops from skirmishing on pain of death.62 such a system of minute surveillance, coupled with the Another historical narrative illustrates the use of ever-present threat of execution, is designed to foster instantaneous punishment to quell potentially disruptive a mindset of dutiful compliance on all matters, big or small, criticism. Concomitantly, it reflects the instrumental and rather than exploit an innate tendency towards psychologi- flexible character of punitive measures. In a campaign cal self-interest during or immediately before combat. against Qin, the Zhao general Zhao She 趙奢deliberately A broader notion of military training as, on the one tarries in a fortified camp, feigning timidity. After Zhao hand, a form of discipline backed up by positive and neg- She has duped an enemy spy into believing that he plans ative incentives and, on the other, a method which sys- to stay put for the time being, he swiftly ushers his troops tematically impacts on specific body parts, corporeal into a superior tactical position and defeats Qin. During practices, and habits is hinted at in a passage from Guanzi the period of inactivity, Zhao She passes the order that 管子. whoever questions his strategy shall be executed. Indeed, one of the men demands that a city nearby should be 五教：一曰教其目以形色之旗。二曰教其身以號令之 數。三曰教其足以進退之度，四曰教其手以長短之 rescued when Qin troops close in on it, and Zhao swiftly 63 利。五曰教其心以賞罰之誠。五教各習，而士負以勇 puts him to death (li zhan zhi 立斬之). Yet once the 矣。 troops have sprung into action, criticism no longer threat- The five kinds of instruction: First, instruct their eyes with ens to undermine Zhao’s authority who no longer bothers flags of particular shapes and colours. Second, instruct to silence disagreement. An officer, Xu Li 許歷, submits their bodies with such methods as signals and commands. that Zhao gather the troops in a particular location, offer- Third, instruct their feet with the proper measures for ing on his own accord to undergo capital punishment, advance and retreat. Fourth, instruct their hands in the since the order to this effect has not been rescinded: “Let sharpness of [weapons] long and short. Fifth, instruct their me submit to the executioner’s axe!” (請就鈇質之誅) hearts in the faithfulness of rewards and punishments. But with the throwaway remark “Let’s wait for orders in Once each of these five types of instruction has become [the Zhao capital] Handan” (胥後令邯鄲), Zhao follows routine, the soldiers will rely on them for their courage.60 his advice instead of disciplining him. Later, rather than Each kind of exercise targets a particular organ or being punished, Xu Li receives a promotion.64 body part; each serves a certain function: communica- In these cases, capital punishment is a deterrent help- tion, manoeuvring on the battlefield, fighting, and moti- ing to protect strategic decisions from interference by vation. The exercises are presented as interlocking parts subordinates. Off the battlefield, commanders threaten of a comprehensive programme—the five kinds—which their soldiers with execution, and actually kill them, to in their totality buoy up the soldiers’ spirits. More pro- accomplish their long-term plans. One would, in fact, nouncedly than in the Wei Liao zi, rewards and punish- expect such deterrence to work best when soldiers can ments are here integrated into a systematic toolkit for weigh the costs and benefits of their decisions in advance training, discipline, and tactics. Incentives are used to rather than having to make snap decisions in the heat of target the mind, appealing both to its emotional and battle. Pace Han Fei’s insistence on universal selfishness, rational aspect. Inspiring a feeling of trust in the correct Xu Li’s example suggests that not everyone who has the apportioning of rewards and punishments is, at the same chance to ponder the consequences of their actions will time, an appeal to self-interest; it creates certainty that choose self-interest over any other, competing good. what has been promised or threatened will in fact be enacted—the calculating heart once more, but this time after having undergone a careful process of conditioning. 61 Shiji 73.2334. 62 Shiji 81.2449. 63 Shiji 81.2445. 60 Guanzi 17, “Bing fa” 兵法, 310–20. 64 Shiji 81.2445–46. THE LIMITS OF COERCION: REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS IN EARLY CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT 97

Self-sacrifice for the sake of others remains a real emotions, compensate for the ineffectuality of threats in possibility. the face of death in ways that mere manipulation of self- Punishment in the course of fighting also occured as, ish impulses cannot. Importantly, the military leader sets again, the historiographic record illustrates. Executions to work on both positive and negative sentiments. can serve as last-ditch attempt to reimpose discipline on It is fitting, then, to find, upon revisiting the historio- troops in flight. During an armed encounter in the civil graphic record, that Sima Rangju, the general who sets war preceding the founding of the Han, Liu Bang’s 劉邦 a trap for his ruler’s favourite in order to assert his (?–195 BCE; r. 202–195) followers, generals Han Xin authority, long before this demonstration of ruthlessness 韓信 and Zhang Er 張耳, lure enemy troops under the received praise from Yan Ying for combining two com- banner of the old state of Zhao into a reckless pursuit. plementary qualities: “Even though Rangju is one of the In the meantime, a troop of mounted soldiers captures the commoner offspring of the Tian family, he is a man who vacated Zhao camp and displays Han flags. Unable can draw the hosts of soldiers close to him with his cul- to make further headway, the Zhao troops try to return to tivated attitude and strike awe into the enemy with his their base, only to be greeted by enemy standards. “The martial spirit. I wish Your Majesty would put him to the troops then fell into disorder, running for their lives, and test.” 穰苴雖田氏庶孽，然其人文能附眾，武能威 even though the Zhao commander executed [some of] 敵，願君試之。68 In a military leader a capacity for vio- them, he was unable to stop them.” (兵遂亂，遁走，趙 lence should combine with more humane attributes, an 將雖斬之，不能禁也。) The Zhao army is beaten, their ideal also voiced by military writers such as Sunzi, as leader killed.65 will be shown below. Whilst Yan assumes, however, that Very often, the carrot-and-stick approach only leaves Sima Rangju’s violence will find external targets, in soldiers with a choice between two kinds of terror, as a highly symbolic act reminiscent of Sun Wu’s applica- Huainan zi notes.66 This points to a fundamental tension tion of terror, Rangju first directs his aggression at at the heart of this approach to discipline when applied a self-created internal opponent. But regardless, the fact in military contexts: Retribution holds no threat and remains that the commander should cultivate both aspects remuneration no promise if death is a certainty. Occa- of his persona, the sympathetic as well as the awe-inspir- sionally, military writers acknowledge that there is no ing one. universal efficacy to either, that each is subject to spe- In a similar vein, the military chapter of Huainan zi cific limitations and apt to serve certain purposes, but not strikes a balance between positive emotional motivation others. and discipline inculcated by fear: 田忌曰：「賞罰者，兵之急者邪（耶）？」孫子曰： 故民誠從其令，雖少無畏；民不從令，雖眾為寡。故 「非。夫賞者，所以喜眾，令士忘死也。罰者，所以 下不親上，其心不用；卒不畏將，其形不戰。守有必 正亂，令民畏上也。可以益勝，非其急者也。」 固，而攻有必勝，不待交兵接刃，而存亡之機固以形 Tian Ji asked: “Are rewards and punishments the most 矣。 urgent of military matters?” Master Sun replied: “No. Hence, if the people sincerely follow [the general’s] Rewards are means to let the hosts of soldiers rejoice and orders, they will be without fear, even if outnumbered. make officers oblivious of death. Punishments are means If they do not follow his orders, they will be few, even if to rectify disorder and let commoners fear their superiors. there is a host of them. Hence, if subordinates do not feel They can be used to amplify victory, but they are not the affection for superiors, their hearts will not be in it. most urgent matters.”67 If soldiers do not fear their generals, their bodies will not do battle. Some kinds of defence are secure without fail, Instead of demonstrating the impact of punishments, and some kinds of attack unfailingly lead to victory. The as the Sun Wu anecdote does, Master Sun’s reply expli- trigger of survival and perdition has naturally formed even cates the psychological effects of punishments and before weapons are crossed and blades meet.69 delimits their respective scope of application. Punish- ment puts paid to indiscipline by instilling fear. But it Blunt terror forms a crucial element in strategies to does not set positive incentives; only rewards can do so. compel obedience, but military writings suggest multiple These appeal, on the present conception, less to the cal- varied routes to optimising the efficacy of negative incen- culating heart than to a particular kind of emotional dis- tives. These encompass the ruler’s inscrutable authority, position—the capacity for elation. This understanding which leaves subjects suspended in a constant state of reflects a—at this point not fully elaborated—awareness incertitude; the use of punishments as signals communi- that the military leader can, through the manipulation of cating the commander’s power and fairmindedness; the deliberate manipulation of and adjustment to the troops’ 65 Shiji 92.2616. 66 Huainan zi 13, “Fan lun” 氾論, 1447. 68 Shiji 64.2157. 67 Sun Bin bingfa, ch. *“Wei wang wen” 威王問, 27. 69 Huainan zi 15, 1584. 98 OLIVER WEINGARTEN state of mind; and the establishment of a transparent sys- The right combination of coercion and incentives tem of incentives on the basis of which future returns to alone will compel soldiers to resist their urge to avoid current actions can be reliably calculated. The texts dis- death; it being an anthropological constant, according to cussed suggest means which can be brought to bear under many authors, that man “hates death” (wu si 惡死), differing circumstances. Frequently, the application of a phrase turned on its head to result in a manifest absurd- threat and encouragement is carefully balanced in these ity in the quote above. The spatial metaphor of display- suggestions. While there is some “unquestionable effi- ing rewards in front of the troops whilst punishments cacy” to “terror”, as Galvany puts it, ancient military await at the rear suggests that the former exert a gravita- thinkers acknowledged that terror should be inflicted in tional pull and the latter a repulsive force, in line with the appropriate doses and under suitable circumstances to initial notion that death is hateful to all. unfold its full disciplinary potential. The Liu tao sets down a comprehensive approach to motivating troops by carefully manipulating their state of mind and calibrating incentives. Rewards in military texts 戰必以義者，所以勵眾勝敵也；尊爵重賞者，所以勸 用命也；嚴刑重罰者，所以進 (罷) [疲] 怠也；一喜一 Rewards for military success are a common theme, 怒，一予一奪，一文一武，一徐一疾者，所以調和三 and by no means in military texts alone. Xunzi 荀子, for 軍、制一臣下也。 instance, stresses the joys and benefits of victory accru- Battles have to be conducted according to what is appo- ing to everyone, from the ruler down to each single com- site; this is how to motivate troops and overcome the moner.70 Yet military texts show a keen awareness of the enemy. By raising the esteem for noble ranks and giving motley motivational impulses which drive soldiers to greater weight to rewards one encourages obedience. fight. Some of these are grounded in passions, whilst oth- Making corporal and other punishments more severe is ers follow considerations of self-interest. A fragment of a means to spur on the exhausted and apathetic. The way Sima fa 司馬法 lists a number of reasons why people to adjust and create concord among the Three Armies and to control and unify subjects and subordinates is to be at risk their lives: love, anger, the threat of authority, 71 times joyful and at times angry, to give here and take a sense of duty, and profit. away there, to be sometimes cultured and sometimes mar- By contrast, two couplets in San lüe 三略 aphoristi- tial, to be laggardly at one moment and swift the next.74 cally state that officers can only be attracted by material incentives. Depending on the soldiers’ current state, means of motivational and emotional manipulation are chosen 軍無財 ，士不來 。軍無賞 ，士 [*dzə̂] [*mrə̂k] [*lhaŋɁ] from sets of polar opposites, based on what is “apposite” 不往 [*waŋɁ]。 (yi 義). “Pleasing” the troops may work under some con- To an army without means / soldiers will not come. To an army without rewards / officers will not flock.72 ditions, whilst “infuriating” them is more useful under others. The same holds for “giving” and “taking away”, The principles behind the successful manipulation of the use of cultural refinement and martial spirit, “lag- self-interest in the teeth of the soldiers’ fear for life and gardness” and “swiftness”. Rewards and punishments limb are concisely summed up in Wei Liao zi. will generally coax soldiers into “heeding commands” (yong ming 用命), but only punishments will spur on 民非樂死而惡生也，號令明，法制審，故能使之前。 明賞於前，決罰於後，是以發能中利，動則有功。 soldiers devoid of strength. Whilst the circumstances to It is not the case that the people rejoice in dying and hate which these means of manipulation and control are life. It is because signals and orders are clear and there is adjusted are not spelled out, their variability is certainly careful scrutiny into the discipline prescribed by the law meant to respond to shifting contexts, suggesting that that one can make them advance. By making rewards efficient military leadership cannot consist in routinised illustrious in front of them and punishments certain at the application of a fixed set of mechanisms derived from rear, they can aim for what is beneficial when dispatched assumptions about an unchanging human nature. and, once set in march, acquire merits.73 In a simile attributed to Taigong, the Liu tao postu- lates the irresistible attraction of rewards and, at the same time, casts a revealing light on their instrumental func- tion from the perspective of those in power. 70 Xunzi 16, “Qiang guo” 彊國, 295. 71 Sima fa 4, juan xia: “Yan wei” 嚴位, 1b–2a. 72 San lüe, juan shang: “Shang lüe” 上略, 93 (original pagination: 5b). 73 Wei Liao zi, juan 1, ch. 3: “Zhi tan” 制談, 73–74 (original 74 Liu tao, juan 3: “Long tao”, ch. 27: “Qi bing” 奇兵, 25 (orig- pagination: 3b–4a). inal pagination: 11b). THE LIMITS OF COERCION: REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS IN EARLY CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT 99

太公曰：緡微餌明 [*mraŋ]，小魚食之；緡 (綢) [調] instinctive impulse to protect their lives. “It is”, after all, 餌香 [*haŋ]，中魚食之；緡隆餌豐 [*phuŋ]，大魚食 “not the case that the people rejoice in dying and hate 之。夫魚食其餌，乃牽於緡 [*mrənᴬ]；人食其祿，乃 life”, as Wei Liao zi reminds us.77 But the San lüe hints 服于君 。故以餌取魚，魚可殺 ；以祿取 [*kun] [*srât] at a further psychological aspect. 人，人可竭 [*gat]；以家取國，國可拔 [*brât]。以國 取天下，天下可畢。 Unlike such writings as Han Fei zi and Shang jun shu, Taigong said: “If the fishing line is thin and the bait obvi- which typically refer to both the carrot and the stick ous, small fish will bite. If the fishing line is well-adjusted though tend to place greater emphasis on the latter, the and the bait fragrant, middle-sized fish will bite. If the two closely related texts in Liu tao and San lüe speak of fishing line is strong and the bait opulent, big fish will rewards only. Capable officers are rare and exacting in bite. If fish swallow the bait, they become entangled in the their demands, as San lüe notes elsewhere: “To an army line. If men consume their emoluments, they are subjected without means / soldiers will not come”.78 The ruler by their ruler. needs to entice them with circumspection and treat his Hence, catch a fish with the help of a bait, and the fish can elusive quarry with unstinting attentiveness, otherwise be killed. Catch a man with the help of emoluments, and they will not deign to stay. There is no question of threat- the man can be depleted. Try to get hold of a state with ening these sought-after specialists with the harshness of the help of a house, and the state can be seized. Try to get hold of the realm with the help of a state, and the realm disciplinary statutes, as one might in the case of com- can be netted.”75 moners. They have to be met with graceful sincerity and courteous munificence. Far from hiding the exploitative motivation behind While likely to attract capable officers, the dispensa- such reasoning, in a striking juxtaposition Liu tao pre- tion of rewards can engender undesirable side-effects. sents the battle death of officers in parallel to the case of The promise of advantages panders to people’s self-­ fish hooked and slaughtered. Emoluments are the entice- interest. The appropriateness of such practices is rarely ment which ruthlessly ensnares officers in a submissive questioned within the worldview of Shang jun shu or relationship from which they will not escape until they Han Fei zi, which treat cases of altruism or moral stead- are drained of their energy or dispossessed of their life. fastness as, at best, statistical aberrations. But leadership The judgement required here is not so much one informed which single-mindedly stresses incentivisation by by shifting circumstances but, instead, one which targets rewards risks to become morally dubious. Reaching as different kinds of talent. far back as the mythical beginnings of human society, the A close parallel in San lüe, after employing exactly San lüe explains: the same initial simile, continues in a different mode by 夫三皇無言，而化流四海，故天下無所歸功。帝者， highlighting the importance of considerate treatment in 體天則地，有言有令，而天下太平：君臣讓功，四海 winning over officers. 化行，百姓不知其所以然，故使臣不待禮賞，有功， 故禮者，士之所歸。賞者，士之所死 [*siɁ]。招其所 美而無害。 歸，示其所死 [*siɁ]，則所求者至 [*tits]。 Without any words, the moral transformation of the Three 故禮而後悔 [*hmə̂h] 者，士不止 [*təɁ]，賞而後悔 August Ones spread through the land within the Four [*hmə̂h] 者，士不使 [*srəh]。禮賞不倦，則士爭死。 Seas, hence people in the realm had nowhere to turn to for Hence, courtesy is what officers turn to. Rewards are what merits. officers die for. Hold up what they turn to and show them The Thearchs embodied Heaven and followed the earth. what they will die for, and there they are, the ones you are From them came words and commands, and there was seeking. universal peace across the realm. Rulers and ministers Hence, officers will not stay with someone who regrets his yielded their merits to each other, moral transformation courtesy; they will not be commanded by someone who prevailed throughout the land within the Four Seas, and regrets rewarding them. But if you are untiring about the Hundred Clans had no inkling how this came about. courtesy and rewards, officers will vie to die.76 Thus, there was no expectation of rewards or ceremonial treatment among ministers tasked with duties; if they Like Liu tao, San lüe does not mince its words. obtained merits, they were good and caused no harm.79 Rewards are “what officers die for”, and that is precisely what they are supposed to do. As in Liu tao, this inti- The subsequent account clarifies that there are alto- mates a process of shrewd manipulation which lures men gether four kinds of rule, in descending order of their into service almost despite themselves, against the moral worth: by the August Ones, by thearchs, kings (wang 王), and hegemons (ba 霸). Only the lowest kind

75 Liu tao, juan 1: “Wen tao”, ch. 1: “Wen shi” 文師, 11 (original pagination: 2a). 77 Wei Liao zi 3; see above. 76 San lüe, juan shang: “Shang lüe”, 93–94 (original pagination: 78 San lüe, “Shang lüe”; see above. 5b–6a). 79 San lüe, juan zhong: “Zhong lüe”, 95 (original pagination: 1a). 100 OLIVER WEINGARTEN of rule is built on rewards as incentives. When the of what is right will not die for the sake of someone lack- thearchs “tasked ministers with duties, they did not rely ing humaneness. A knowledgeable man will not lay plans 82 on rituals and rewards” (使臣不待禮賞), but the much for the sake of a benighted ruler. later and morally less exalted hegemons “tasked officers Pace some other military and political writings such with duties by deploying rewards”. If these “were dimin- as Han Fei zi—and contrary also to San lüe and Liu tao’s 使士以賞 ished, officers would not follow orders” ( […] comparison of officers to fish lured by bait—this state- 賞虧則士不用命 80 ). The spread of such a style of gov- ment denies that rewards serve as a universal incentive. ernment symptomatises a relative moral decline which Certain kinds of person do not place much value on per- already sets in with the thearchs’ “words” and “com- sonal gain; they are unimpressed by material tempta- mands”. Neither was needed under the ideal government tions. Even the seeming anthropological constant that of the sages of yore. There was likewise no place for everyone will seek to preserve their life knows excep- merits, as the perfect moral order formed all by itself. tions, as Mencius eloquently argues in a famous passage With the notion of merit incrementally gaining hold on valuing “dutifulness” (yi 義) more highly than life.83 in political life, the concept of honour also rose to prom- Likewise, for intelligent advisers—and who would want inence. At first, officials were not possessive about the any others—it is pointless to support an obtuse prince advantages which accrued from being honoured—“rulers who does not listen, or fails to understand. There are two and ministers yielded their merits to each other”—but potential implications. before long the expectation of reciprocity crept in, to First, the ruler or general must uphold certain values crowd out the natural, altruistic understanding that ser- in order to convince men of high moral standards to risk vice with no expectation of requital is called for. Under their lives for him. If monetary enticement does not auto- the hegemons, the political order became pervaded matically succeed, this entails further consequences. by selfishness and the ruler’s authority, accordingly, Whereas some men disregard rewards out of personal precarious. conviction, others might do so for yet different reasons 霸者制士以權，結士以信，使士以賞：信衰則士疏， of their own—for instance because they cherish their life 賞虧則士不用命。 more than any reward, as Yang Zhu 楊朱 supposedly The hegemons used power to control their officers. They did.84 The entire system of material incentives begins to formed ties with them on the basis of trust and tasked look shaky once one allows for motivations other than them with duties by deploying rewards. If trust declined, those dictated by the calculating heart. The outcomes of the officers became estranged. If rewards were dimin- 81 political actions then become much less predictable. ished, the officers would not follow orders. Second, the remarks about the knowledgeable man At this historical stage, officers refused to take on hint at consequences of a more general relevance. A ruler tasks without compensation. A contractual exchange can conceivably behave more humanely to obtain the relationship had replaced the spontaneous moral equilib- support of men with strong moral convictions. But could rium which could be relied on to hold under the August he become less “benighted” (an 闇), if such is his natural Ones. Only at this point did qualities like trustworthiness disposition? Aside from the general questions this raises acquire significance—but so did power. From now on, about how to secure a polity against the hazards of lead- 85 rulership needed to be propped up by a moral and admin- ership by incompetent sovereigns, this passage hints at istrative scaffolding and, most detrimentally, by the the limitations inherent in systems of political and mili- fickle sense of loyalty which the anticipation of rewards tary control which are based on a single set of incentives nurtures. without factoring in the diversity of motivations. Some The ethos of service might have been corroded by general moral decline, as San lüe asserts, but it was like- 82 wise crucially affected by each official’s moral character. San lüe, juan zhong: “Zhong lüe”, 96 (original pagination: 2a). 83 Mengzi 6A.10, 252–55. Han Fei zi recognises the existence of Not every man was alike, so all candidates for office men whose strong sense of morality qualifies them as upright advisers could not be successfully approached in the same way. but also places them outside the disciplinary mechanisms of rewards and punishments, which makes them potentially dangerous, as they are 使義士不以財。故義者不為不仁者死。智者不為闇主 beyond the grasp of monarchic power (see above). But to Han Fei’s 謀。 mind, such men are extremely rare. An officer with a sense of what is right cannot be put to 84 See Graham 1989, 53–64. service with the help of riches. Hence, a man with a sense 85 Several scholars identify inept sovereigns as a major problem addressed in Han Fei zi. Pines 2013, 69, explains that for Han Fei “the major threat [to the state] comes from within: namely from the ruler’s 80 San lüe, juan zhong: “Zhong lüe”, 95 (original pagination: 1b). own inadequacy” and argues that the law was meant to provide stability 81 San lüe, juan zhong: “Zhong lüe”, 95 (original pagination: in the face of overwhelmingly mediocre rulers (ibid., 78). See also 1a–b). Graziani 2015, 161–63. THE LIMITS OF COERCION: REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS IN EARLY CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT 101 military writers were acutely aware of this, as the follow- whoever is abandoned by his hosts will perish, his great- ing discussion shows. ness notwithstanding” (眾之所助，雖弱必強；眾之所 去，雖大必亡).87 犯上者尊，貪鄙者富，雖有聖主不能致其治。犯上者 In more concrete terms, military success depends on 誅，貪鄙者拘，則化行而眾惡消。 清白之士不可以爵祿得。節義之士不可以刑威脅。故 measures adapted to particular situations and applied at 明君求賢，必觀其所以而致焉。致清白之士，修其 different levels of social organisation. Executions used to 禮；致節義之士，修其道。然後士可致而名可保。 stem the flood of deserters, such as those referred to ear- Even with a sage ruler in charge, one cannot perfect gov- lier on, represent a frantic attempt to restore discipline in ernment as long as those who defy their superiors are the heat of battle—they are at best a stopgap measure. As respected and the low and grasping prosper. If those defy- part of an alternative long-term strategy, rulers and mil- ing their superiors are executed and the low and grasping itary leaders should better attune their entire populations apprehended, moral transformation will prevail and the to warfare as an ordinary fact of life. According to Shang myriad evils be dispelled. jun shu, this can be achieved in a state which comprehen- Immaculate officers cannot be obtained with the help of sively subordinates politics to military objectives and noble ranks and emoluments. Disciplined officers with a sense of what is right cannot be pressurised by means of valorises martial exploits, until subjects are conditioned authority and punishments. Thus, on his quest for capable not to question the paramount importance of warfare. men a prince will not fail to investigate the means apt to Wuzi, by contrast, promotes an alternative, more con- attract them. To attract immaculate officers, cultivate the structive approach to instilling martial values in the pop- appropriate etiquette; to attract disciplined officers with ulation at large. a sense of what is right, cultivate the appropriate princi- ples. Only then is it possible to attract officers and pre- 武侯問曰：「嚴刑明賞，足以勝乎？」起對曰：「嚴 serve one’s reputation.86 明之事，臣不能悉。雖然，非所恃也。夫發號布令而 人樂聞，興師動眾而人樂戰，交兵接刃而人樂死。此 As long as the recalcitrant and avaricious go unchal- 三者，人主之所恃也。」武侯曰：「致之奈何？」對 lenged, the political order is at risk, regardless of the 曰：「君舉有功而進饗之，無功而勵之。」於是武侯 ruler’s personal capacities. But if punishments are meted 設坐廟廷為三行饗士大夫。上功坐前行，餚席兼重 器、上牢。次功坐中行，餚席器差減。無功坐後行， out to keep disruptive elements in check, moral transfor- 餚席無重器。饗畢而出，又頒賜有功者父母妻子於廟 mation (hua 化) will spread and evil subside. Such is the 門外，亦以功為差。有死事之家，歲被 [~使?] 使者勞 negative side of political action, aimed to suppress threats 賜其父母，著不忘於心。行之三年，秦人興師，臨於 to order. 西河，魏士聞之，不待吏令，介冑而奮擊之者以萬 Constructive advice comes in the form of the claim 數。 that certain kinds of officials are liable to respond posi- Marquis Wu [of Wei] asked: “Do strict punishments and tively to unexpected, non-standard incentives. Rewards conspicuous rewards suffice to obtain victory?” Qi and punishments influence the selfish, the low and grasp- replied: “Such matters as strictness and conspicuity I fail ing, and those defying superiors. But rewards and pun- to penetrate. Yet, they are not to be relied on. When peo- ishments are ineffectual in dealing with men who adhere ple hear with exultation that orders are given out and com- to a divergent set of values—for example a code of con- mands passed on; when they go into battle with exultation after the troops have been raised and the hosts set in duct based on “dutifulness”, like the one advocated by motion; when they die with exultation once weapons are Mencius. As elsewhere in San lüe, rewards and punish- crossed and blades clash—these are the three things on ments are discounted as apt means of control for just any which the ruler relies.” type of individual. The incorruptible will not react to Marquis Wu asked: “How to bring this about?” Qi offers of rewards; nor will men with a strong sense of replied: “Your Majesty may select meritorious men, pro- morality submit to threats. Such candidates for office mote and feast them, and encourage those without merit.” must be attracted by alternative means: ritual and the And so Marquis Wu had three rows of seats arranged in right principles. the court of the ancestral temple to feast officers and gran- dees. Those of highest merit were seated in the first row, with mats, viands, and weighty vessels as well as with mutton, pork, and beef from the highest offerings. Those The social nexus of warfare of secondary merit were seated in the middle row, with mats and viands, but vessels of reduced rank. Those with- As military writers did not fail to stress, the troops’ out merit were seated in the last row, with viands and support is pivotal in battle: “Whoever enjoys the support mats, but without weighty vessels. When the feast was of his hosts will become strong despite any weaknesses; over and the participants departed, bestowals on the

86 San lüe, juan xia: “Xia lüe” 下略, 98 (original pagination: 3a). 87 Huainan zi 15, “Bing lüe”, 1545. 102 OLIVER WEINGARTEN

parents, wives, and children of meritorious men were pub- contexts as recorded in some early historiographic licised outside the temple gate, and these, too, were graded speeches.90 according to merit. To the families of the fallen, messen- In what may be one of the richest and most subtle gers were sent each year to confer rewards on the parents statements from ancient China on the manifold factors at in consolation and to make it clear that remembrances work in the mobilisation of troops, Wei Liao zi begins by were to be upheld. After this had been carried out for three years, Qin raised bringing the relationship between commander and sol- an army and threatened Xihe. When the soldiers of Wei diers centre stage. heard this, tens of thousands of them donned their armours 未有不信其心而能得其力者也，未有不得其力而能致 and helmets and furiously attacked Qin without awaiting 其死戰者也。 88 their officers’ orders. There has never been [a general] who managed to obtain Somewhat paradoxically, Master Wu at first declines his troops’ best efforts without making them trustful in their hearts; there has never been [a general] who man- to comment on strict punishments and conspicuous aged to induce his men to fight to their death without rewards, only to end up advocating the latter, and just the obtaining their best efforts.91 latter. The rhetorical volte-face keeps at bay the mecha- nistic binary of rewards and punishments promoted by Trust is an indispensable precondition for the sol- the likes of Shang Yang and Han Fei. Victory is not diers’ unfettered self-exertion—and potential self-­ mainly a matter of cowing troops into submission; com- sacrifice—in the service of their leader. In addition to pared to fear alone, people’s joyful anticipation of war this attitudinal bond, a host of other influences shape the unleashes a much greater momentum. Such is nurtured soldiers’ behaviour, as the same chapter argues at great by a carefully graded system of honours, expressed length. through the symbolism of sacrificial feasting and official 古者率民必先禮信而後爵祿，先廉恥而後刑罰，先親 commemorations rather than remuneration based on the 愛而後律其身。 meticulous bookkeeping advocated elsewhere. To be 故戰者 (心) [必] 本乎率身以勵眾士，如心之使四肢 sure, the contributions of the meritorious are repaid and 也。志不勵則士不死節，士不死節則眾不戰。勵士之 the losses of the bereft solemnly acknowledged, but com- 道，民之生不可不厚也。爵列之等，死喪之親，民之 pensation comes not so much in the form of lucre as in 所營，不可不顯也。必也因民所生而制之，因民所營 the guise of honorific treatment. 而顯之，田祿之實，飲食之親，鄉里相勸，死喪相 One of the late Guanzi chapters records a comparable, 救，兵役相從，此民之所勵也。 though less elaborate scheme. It has a monetary compo- 使什伍如親戚，卒伯如朋友。止如堵牆，動如風雨， nent as well. On one occasion, Master Guan distributes 車不結轍，士不旋踵，此本戰之道也。 the entire annual land tax among officers who promise When leading the people in the olden times, one would always put ritual propriety and trustworthiness first and valorous acts in future wars, such as capturing enemy give noble ranks and emoluments secondary considera- military leaders. At the same time, Master Guan decrees tion. One would put honesty and a sense of shame first that certain forms of ritual treatment should be extended and give fines and corporal punishments secondary con- to officers. Furthermore, he bestows ritual wine and meat sideration. One would put affection and care first and on their families. As a result, it is stated, fathers instructed would make it a secondary consideration to discipline the their sons, older brother their younger brothers, and person. wives their husbands, saying: “Could one, despite such Hence, fighting in battle is inevitably based on leadership generous ritual treatment, possibly return home if one through personal example in order to motivate the host of fails to fall in the battle line?” (見禮若此其厚，而不死 soldiers, in the same way that the heart commands the 列陳，可以反於鄉乎？)89 Monetary rewards play an ini- four limbs. If their determination is not bolstered by moti- vation, soldiers will not die to maintain discipline, and if tial role in creating obligations on the officers’ part, but they do not, the hosts of troops will not do battle. The the ultimate incentive to risk one’s life results from emo- principle of motivating soldiers lies in one’s unflagging tional pressure within the family to honour ritual bonds respect for people’s livelihood. And one may never fail to that transcend considerations of material self-interest. exalt what people are striving for such as the gradations Such schemes betray a greater awareness of the vari- of noble ranks or the affection accompanying the mourn- ous psychological possibilities to nudge people towards ing of the dead. It is imperative to govern people by rely- valour and self-sacrifice than is, for example, reflected in ing on what they live by; to rely on what they strive for mere invocations of virtue and beneficence in military and exalt it. The fruits of fields and emoluments, the

90 See, e.g., Zuozhuan, Cheng 16.5 [575 BCE]: Durrant et al., tr., 2016, 828–29. 88 Wuzi, ch. 6: “Li shi” 勵士, juan xia, 5a–b. 91 Wei Liao zi, juan 1, ch. 4: “Zhan wei” 戰威, 75 (original pagi- 89 Guanzi 81, “Qing zhong yi” 輕重乙, 1456–57. nation: 6a–b). THE LIMITS OF COERCION: REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS IN EARLY CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT 103

affections of commensality, mutual encouragement in the another and, finally, fighting, killing, and perhaps dying neighbourhoods and villages, reciprocal support in death side by side, with one another. There can be little doubt, and mourning, mutual accompaniment in military service, therefore, that the capacity of such a group to endure sus- this is where people’s motivation lies. See to it that those tained and savage close-quarters combat was, in every in the decads and pentads are like kin; that soldiers and way, exceptional.94 petty officers are like friends. They will stand like a wall and move like a thunderstorm. The tracks of their chariots There is some cross-cultural and contemporary, schol- will not come to a sudden halt, and the soldiers will not arly support for the Wei Liao zi’s recommendations.95 turn on their heels. This is how to lay the groundwork for Moreover, these recommendations tap into a conception battle.92 of human nature fundamentally different from the ones in Han Fei zi and Shang jun shu. They are, in many Affection and care assume priority over discipline; respects, more in line with commonly observable fea- the leader’s personal example and his ability to offer pos- tures of human behaviour and their roots in sociability itive motivation has greater force than threat and coer- and mutual solidarity rather than self-interest.96 cion. This position is grounded in a view of warfare as Han Fei zi encourages the ruler to treat his subjects part of a wider social nexus and of sociability as an as isolated individuals who will each rationally choose anthropological constant shaping military as much as any the course of action most beneficial to themselves. Wei other human activity. Viable ways to motivate troops Liao zi, however, makes a case for humans as beings have to be in tune with people’s natural inclinations, with a predominantly social orientation, whose behaviour which comprise concerns for one’s “livelihood” as well is deeply influenced by affective ties into which they nat- as a quest for prestige and the cherishing of communal urally enter with members of their own community. bonds. People’s existence depends on material founda- Motivations based on self-interest and material advan- tions—“the fruits of fields and emoluments”—but does tages are not lightly dismissed; there is still a place for not derive its meaning exclusively from them. Like compensation in the form of noble ranks and payments. everyone else, men drafted into the army spend their But what makes soldiers “stand like a wall” and impel civilian lives as members of the communities in which themselves frontwards “like a thunderstorm” in the heat they have settled, celebrate together and feast each other, of battle is, ultimately, not the lure of lucre but, instead, form emotional attachments, and give succour to their such sentiments as friendship and affection of the kind fellow humans in times of crisis and suffering. Living one feels for one’s kin. and dying together, those invested in the same commu- nities nurture bonds of solidarity amongst each other which, in battle, are ideally transmuted into strength, The good commander: fearlessness and, hence, overwhelming force directed at winning hearts and minds the enemy. Pace Mark Edward Lewis, who concluded that the military writers advised the commander “to Though rarely elaborated on the same level of detail obliterate the senses and minds of his troops”, denying as in Wei Liao zi, comparable insights into the multiplic- them “any independent volition or courage”, these pas- ity of factors impacting on the troops’ willingness to sages suggest a conception of warfare according to which fight are also aired elsewhere in military texts. In such soldiers act out of positive emotions and motivations.93 discussions, power and hierarchies are deemphasised, Some of the social bonds to which Wei Liao zi draws whereas bonds between the commander and his men are attention correspond closely to factors which, according stressed. Sunzi cautions that punishments make troops to Jason Crowley, made Athenian hoplites formidable unruly unless they have already formed an emotional fighting forces. Hoplites depended for their success, even attachment to their commander. their very survival, on an ability to maintain formation and stolidly face the nerve-wrecking dangers of hand-to- hand combat. In a passage strikingly reminiscent of the Wei Liao zi’s insights, Crowley explains that

they formed a natural, indeed an organic, primary group 94 Crowley 2012, 68–69. consisting of pre-affiliated individuals who shared a com- 95 See Sanft 2014b on the neighbourhood units formed under mon social identity, who mobilised together and cam- Shang Yang’s administrative system. paigned together, assisting one another, supervising one 96 The literature on scenarios for the evolution of human coopera- tion, altruism, and morality is vast and complicated. Suffice it here to note Wilson 2015, Tomasello 2016, and Wrangham 2019, which make 92 Wei Liao zi, juan 1, ch. 4: “Zhan wei”, 75 (original pagination: plausible suggestions as to how evolutionary processes could have led 6b–7a). to the uniquely human ability to cooperate with non-kin members and 93 Lewis 1990, 106. adhere to behavioural principles which are not self-serving. 104 OLIVER WEINGARTEN

卒未親附而罰之，則不服，不服則難用。卒已親附而 order—a moral failure rather than a legal misdemeanour, 罰不行，則不可用。故令之以文，齊之以武，是謂必 which places an additional burden on the conscience of 取。 the wrongdoer. The need for discipline does not fall If soldiers are punished before they have grown attached away in a military system organised along seemingly to you, they will not prove submissive; and, unless sub- missive, they will be difficult to deploy. If, when the sol- more humane lines than one purely resting on rewards diers have become attached to you, punishments are not and punishments. On the contrary, discipline gains in enforced, they cannot be deployed. efficiency as it is not solely externally enforced but Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first instance partly self-imposed. with a cultivated attitude, but disciplined by means of Huainan zi offers further variations on the theme of martial prowess. This is called: seizing [the enemy] with- fictitious kinship and affectionate bonds, discouraging out fail.97 attacks on enemy armies which form such close-knit groups. The central notion of “affective”—in essence, “kin-­ like”—“attachment” (qin fu 親附) has emotional conno- 上視下如子，則下視上如父；上視下如弟，則下視上 tations. Only after these positive sentiments have taken 如兄。上視下如子，則必王四海；下視上如父，則必 root can the commander safely confront the troops with 正天下。上親下如弟，則不難為之死；下視上如兄， his threatening, “martial” side. Yet, even then his martial 則不難為之亡。是故父子兄弟之寇，不可與鬬者，積 aspect has to be tempered with a complementary expres- 恩先施也。 sion of “culture” or “civility”. As will be remembered, [If] superiors view inferiors as sons, / inferiors will view superiors as fathers. / If superiors view inferiors as this combination of qualities was already praised by younger brothers[,]/ inferiors will view superiors as older Yanzi in the general Sima Rangju. brothers. / If superiors view inferiors as sons, they will Whereas kinship metaphors are not particularly sali- surely be king over the Four Seas; / if inferiors view supe- ent in this passage—qin 親 was perhaps not perceived so riors as their fathers, they will surely rectify the world. / strongly in this sense—the Sunzi employs them consist- If superiors are intimate with inferiors as with younger ently to express how profound the emotional bonds and brothers, / then they will not [find it] difficult to die for moral obligations are that hold between commanders and [their superiors]. / If inferiors see their superiors as older the rank and file. brothers, then they will not [find it] difficult to perish [for their inferiors]. / For this reason, one cannot fight with 視卒如嬰兒，故可與之赴深谿；視卒如愛子，故可與 opponents who are [as close as] fathers, sons, older broth- 之俱死。厚而不能使，愛而不能令，亂而不能治，譬 ers, and younger brothers because of the goodwill accu- 若驕子，不可用也。 mulated over previous generations.99 Regard your soldiers as toddlers, and they will follow you into the deepest valleys; look upon them as your own Here, as before, the suggested treatment of the troops beloved sons, and they will stand by you even unto death. serves to magnify their striking power. None of this is If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your about humaneness as an aim in and of itself; we are still authority felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your dealing with a text promoting military success, not moral commands; and incapable, moreover, of quelling disor- awareness. But despite the instrumental character of the der: then your soldiers are like overbearing children; they 98 advice Sunzi and Huainan zi offer, it is—like the passage cannot be deployed. from Wei Liao zi previously discussed—informed by an By treating soldiers like helpless toddlers or a favour- appreciation of the significance emotional bonds hold in ite son, that is, by lavishing attention, care, and affection battlefield situations. These texts add a further psycho- on them, they can be coaxed to plunge themselves into logical and anthropological dimension to the question of the gravest dangers and lay down their lives. Demonstra- motivation which works such as Han Fei zi and Shang tions of affection nurture a deep attachment and, thus, jun shu lack. a sense of obligation difficult to ignore even in the face In Liu tao, Taigong offers a comprehensive assess- of mortal danger. Once the fictitious father-son relation- ment of a capable general’s characteristics, which ship is established, indiscipline must appear not so much comprise qualities such as humanity, courage, and as rule-breaking, to be dealt with according to imper- intelligence. sonal regulations, however strict, but more like the way- 將不仁，則三軍不親；將不勇，則三軍不銳；將不 wardness of an “overbearing” child upending the natural 智，則三軍大疑；將不明，則三軍大傾；將不精微， 則三軍失其機；將不常戒，則三軍失其備；將不強 力，則三軍失其職。故將者、人之司命，三軍與之俱 97 Sunzi 9, “Xing jun” 行軍, 103; tr. modified from Giles 1910, 97–98. 98 Sunzi 10, “Di xing”, 227–228; tr. modified from Giles 1910, 110–11. 99 Huainan zi 15, “Bing lüe”, 1608; tr. Meyer 2012, 127–28. THE LIMITS OF COERCION: REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS IN EARLY CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT 105

治，與之俱亂。得賢將者，兵強國昌；不得賢將者， captured by the two handles of rewards and punishments. 兵弱國亡。 It encompasses positive emotions such as the general’s If the general is not humane, the Three Armies will not be sense of care and empathy as well as the resulting (kin- close to him in affection. If the general is not brave, the like) affection. Three Armies will not be keen. If the general is not clever, the Three Armies will feel deep uncertainty. If the general The military chapter of the Shuoyuan likewise high- is not perspicacious, the Three Armies will suffer severe lights the critical importance of affective bonds: defeats. If the general is not meticulous, the Three Armies 春秋記國家存亡，以察來世。雖有廣土眾民，堅甲利 will miss opportunities. If the general is not constantly 兵，威猛之將，士卒不親附，不可以戰勝取功。晉侯 cautious, then the Three Armies will fail to be prepared. 獲於韓；楚子玉得臣敗於城濮；蔡不待敵而眾潰。故 If the general is not strong and forceful, the Three Armies 語曰：「文王不能使不附之民；先軫不能戰不教之 will not attend to their tasks. 卒； 造父王良不能以弊車不作之馬，趨疾而致遠；羿 Thus, the general acts as the Overseer of the Lifespan, and 逄蒙不能以枉矢弱弓，射遠中微；故強弱成敗之要， the Three Armies are bound up with him as to whether 在乎附士卒，教習之而已。」 they will maintain good order or fall into disarray. He who The Spring and Autumn Annals record the survival and obtains a capable general will have strong troops and a perdition of states and houses in order to enquire into flourishing state. Who fails to obtain a capable general 100 future generations. Even with far-flung lands and multitu- will have a weak army, and his state will perish. dinous people, sturdy armours and sharp weapons, and The troops’ performance is inextricably bound up with fierce, awe-inspiring generals, there is no way to come off victorious in battle or obtain merits as long as with the general’s personal qualities. Many of these officers and soldiers feel no emotional attachment. represent kinds of cogitation, perception, and personal The marquis of Jin was captured in Han.101 Ziyu—that is, disposition. This holds for “perspicacity” (ming 明), Dechen—was defeated in Chengpu.102 The hosts of Cai “meticulousness” (jing wei 精微), and “caution” (jie scattered before the arrival of the enemy.103 Hence, a say- 戒), on which strategic planning and tactical evaluation ing has it that “King Wen could not command a people depend. Other factors influence the mental and emotional not attached to him. Xian Zhen could not lead untrained states of the troops in a more general manner. Cited in troops into battle.104 With a shoddy cart and torpid nags, the most prominent position, there is humaneness, which even Zaofu and Wang Liang would not have been able to elicits in soldiers an emotional attachment to their leader. speed off to faraway places. With a weak bow and crooked The general’s personal courage (yong 勇) determines the arrows, even Yi and Peng Meng could not have hit a tiny target in the distance.”105 Hence, the crux of strength and troops’ fighting spirit. It depends on his “cleverness” success simply lies in whether one nurtures attachment in 智 (zhi ) whether the army will face the vagaries of enemy soldiers and officers, and whether one trains and instructs contact with the firm resolve which trust inspires. Lastly, them.106 only a “strong and forceful” (qiang li 彊力) general will prevent his men from slipping into slackness. According to San lüe, the general’s conduct correlates Such qualities are noteworthy for their broader psy- closely with his troops’ success, and his capacity to chological influence on the troops rather than their empathise plays a crucial role in it. immediate tactical or strategic effects. Ideally, then, the 良將之統軍也，恕己而治人， 推惠施恩，士力日新。 general combines intelligence and perceptiveness with 戰如風發，攻如河決，故其眾可望而不可當，可下而 a personality apt to help the troops mentally attune to the 不可勝。以身先人，故其兵為天下雄。 battlefield situation. On this view, military victory In keeping his troops together, a fine general will make depends on more than strategic skills combined with himself empathetic before imposing order on others; he a technocratic implementation of certain political, legal, will promote clemency and spread munificence, so his and military measures derived from first principles. It is predicated on the general’s personal qualities and the 101 In a battle against Jin, Qin troops captured the duke of Jin; see flexible calibration of influences beyond the binary of Zuozhuan, Xi 15 [645 BCE]), 351–65. rewards and punishments, which are, in some sense, 102 The battle of Chengpu (at the time located on Wei 衛 territory, incompatible with them. Be it deliberately or unwittingly, in Shandong) in which Jin decisively defeated Chu was in 632 BCE. through his example an effective leader will modulate For the events, see Zuozhuan, Xi 28, 458–67. 103 This probably refers to an attack by Duke Huan of Qi on Cai in the troops’ sentiments and thus shape their responses 656 BCE. See Zuozhuan, Xi 4, 289–93. to the unsettling experience of enemy contact. As in other 104 Xian Zhen 先軫 was a Jin grandee who, under Duke Wen, suc- instances discussed throughout, such formative influence cessfully led the Middle Army of Jin against Chu at the battle Chengpu. on the soldiers’ mental states cannot be conceptually After Wen’s death, he successfully advised Duke Xiang on how to fight back a Qin invasion at Zheng. Qin was defeated at Xiao 崤. 105 Peng Meng learned archery from Yi, envied his teacher’s skills, 100 Liu tao, juan 3: “Long tao”, ch. 27: “Qi bing”, 26 (original and killed him. See Mengzi 4B.24, 180–83. pagination: 12a). 106 Shuoyuan 15, “Zhi wu” 指武, 369. 106 OLIVER WEINGARTEN

soldiers’ strength will daily renew itself. They will battle 先下步，名曰力將。將不身服力，無以知士卒之勞 like gales unleashed and attack like a river bursting its 苦。軍皆定次，將乃就舍；炊者皆熟，將乃就食；軍 dykes. Hence, one may behold such hosts, but they cannot 不舉火，將亦不舉，名曰止欲將。將不身服止欲，無 be stopped; one may surrender to them, but they cannot 以知士卒之饑飽。將與士卒共寒暑、勞苦、饑飽，故 be defeated. [The fine general] comes first among all oth- 三軍之眾，聞鼓聲則喜，聞金聲則怒。高城深池，矢 ers, hence his troops dominate the realm.107 石繁下，士爭先登；白刃始合，士爭先赴。士非好死 而樂傷也，為其將知寒暑、饑飽之審，而見勞苦之明 As the text explains by falling back on a term typi- 也。 cally associated with the Confucian tradition, the good A general who does not don furs during the winter, does general attunes himself to the mental states of others (shu not carry a fan during the summer, and does not unfurl ji 恕己) and thus imposes discipline on his troops. Their a canopy when it rains is called a general who follows strength, in turn, is nurtured by his generous attitude etiquette. A general who does not personally submit to towards them, whereas punishments go unmentioned and etiquette will be ignorant of the cold and heat his officers and soldiers experience. A general who will take the first rewards are, at best, alluded to. Like the preceding pas- steps when emerging at a narrow defile or stronghold, or sages, this one, too, does not advocate harshness in the coming up against mud, is designated a strong general. treatment of troops but, on the contrary, stresses the close A general who will not offer up his entire strength will be bond between them and their benevolent, compassionate ignorant of the exhaustion and suffering of his officers commanders. and soldiers. Far from engaging only in abstract discussions, some If a general will only proceed to his quarters after the military writings provide concrete advice on how to nur- entire army has settled in at the encampment; if he only ture such affective bonds.108 In some cases, historical proceeds to eat after all food has been cooked; if he will illustrations exemplify these measures. In a passage not kindle a fire so long as the troops do not do so either, which resonates with the San lüe’s concept of “making he is called a general who suppresses his appetites. A gen- eral who does not personally submit to the suppression of oneself empathetic”, the Liu tao records a cautionary his appetites will not know when his officers and soldiers speech the ruler supposedly held during the appointment are hungry or sated. If a general shares heat and cold, ceremony of a military commander and in which he exhaustion and suffering, hunger and satiety, the hosts of would call upon the latter to respect his men and share the Three Armies will consequently be exulted upon hear- their hardship. ing the rolling of the drums and infuriated upon hearing the sound of the gongs. Facing towering ramparts and 勿以三軍為眾而輕敵，勿以受命為重而必死，勿以身 abysmal moats, with arrows coming down in droves, 貴而賤人，勿以獨見而違眾，勿以辯說為必然也。士 the officers will vie to be the first to take them. And the 未坐勿坐，士未食勿食，寒暑必同。如此，士眾必盡 moment the shiny blades have been joined, the officers 死力。 will vie to rush towards them first. This is not because You should not underestimate the enemy because the officers love death and exult in injury, but because of the Three Armies [you command] are multitudinous. You general’s in-depth experience with heat and cold, hunger should not consider death inevitable because you find the and satiety, and because of the clarity with which he per- conferral of this command such a grave matter. You ceives exhaustion and suffering.110 should not demean others because of your own noble sta- tus. You should not act against the hosts of soldiers The general engages in a choreographed performance because of your own solitary viewpoint. You should not of self-abnegation and self-abandonment to the adversi- consider all persuasive talk inevitably true. ties and hazards of military life. He exposes himself to Do not sit down as long as your soldiers have not been discomfort, controlling his appetitive behaviours, and seated. Do not eat before your soldiers have eaten. Always suffer the same heat or cold as they. puts up demonstrations of strength and physical risk-­ If you act in this manner, officers and the hosts of soldiers taking at a high potential cost to himself. Such actions will will exert themselves to their deaths.109 forestall potential doubts about his commitment to his men and his mission. They foster an affective attachment In the same vein, but more systematically, the Liu tao to him on the soldiers’ part, sustained by a recognition of sets forth a number of ways for the military leader to the general’s willingness to undergo the same kinds of experience as well as express empathy with his troops. hardship as his troops and of his ability to fairly assess 將冬不服裘，夏不操扇，雨不張蓋，名曰禮將。將不 their exertions based on similar personal experiences. 身服禮，無以知士卒之寒暑。出隘塞，犯泥塗，將必 An implicit distinction is at play between the emo- tional impulses soldiers are subject to under changing conditions. In the heat of battle, their sentiments for the 107 San lüe, juan shang: “Shang lüe”, 93 (original pagination: 4a). 108 See already briefly Lewis 1990, 105. 109 Liu tao, juan 3: “Long tao”, ch. 21: “Li jiang”, 22 (original 110 Liu tao, juan 3: “Long tao”, ch. 23: “Li jun” 厲軍 (original pagination: 5b). pagination: 7a–b). THE LIMITS OF COERCION: REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS IN EARLY CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT 107 general will let them rejoice in the prospect of fighting, The performative character of these motivational so much so that the command to retreat will infuriate strategies is unmistakable—the general needs to be seen them (聞鼓聲則喜，聞金聲則怒). But, at the same to be doing some of the same things as his soldiers. This time, it is obvious that, at a remove from the battlefield performative aspect becomes more salient in the wily and in a more reflective mood, they will not be keen to manipulations set out below. risk life and limb (士非好死而樂傷也). The general’s 夫將帥者，必與士卒同滋味而共安危，敵乃可加：故 demonstrations of courage and resilience nudge the men 兵有全勝，敵有全因 [*Ɂin; ~湮: *Ɂin]。昔者，良將之 to abandon their individual long-term interests under the 用兵，有饋簞醪者，使投諸河，與士卒同流而飲。夫 impact of overwhelming but strongly context-dependent 一簞之醪，不能味一河之水，而三軍之士，思為致死 emotional impulses. 者，以滋味之及己也。 Such ploys to curry favour with the troops are dis- The military leader has to taste the same flavours as his cussed multiple times in the extant military corpus. Both officers and soldiers and share their moments of safety the military chapter of Huainan zi and the Wei Liao zi and danger. Only then can he impose himself on the contain variations on this theme,111 and so does San lüe: enemy. Hence, [his] troops will attain a comprehensive victory, whilst the enemy will experience comprehensive 軍井未達，將不言渴。軍幕未辦，將不言倦。軍竈灶 defeat. 未炊，將不言飢。冬不服裘，夏不操扇，雨不張蓋， When fine generals of old were deploying their troops and 是謂將禮。 someone presented ale to them, they would toss it into the 與之安，與之危，故其眾可合而不可離，可用而不可 river and drink from the same stream together with their 疲，以其恩素蓄，謀素合也。故曰：蓄恩不倦，以一 officers and soldiers. A single portion [?] of ale cannot 取萬。 flavour the water of an entire river, yet because the fla- The general does not mention his thirst as long as the vour was passed on to them, the officers of the Three wells for the troops have not been bored. He does not Armies had their minds set upon going to their death for mention his fatigue as long as the tents for the troops have [the general’s] sake.114 not been pitched. He does not mention his hunger as long as the fire in the hearths has not been kindled. During the Here, the general is not just temporarily foregoing the winter he does not don furs. In summer, he does not carry pleasures of food and drink; he ostentatiously discards a fan. When it is raining, he does not unfurl a canopy. the sources of such enjoyment while enacting a fiction of This is called the etiquette for a general. communal sharing. A general who eats only after his Be with them in safety, be with them in danger, so the men have received their rations may do no more than hosts of soldiers may be united and cannot be dispersed; defer his gratification—all manner of delicacies might be they may be deployed but cannot be exhausted.112 This is awaiting him in his tent, after all. Hence the ideal gen- because [the general’s] generosity has been fostered all the time, and his plans have been appropriate all the time. eral, by publicly destroying the cates he receives, signals Hence, it says: Foster generosity without letting up, and credibly—at a cost to himself—that he is not merely put- with a single man you can capture ten thousand.113 ting on a display; that he is, in an important respect, no different from his men; that he does not take any particu- While the keen insights of the Wei Liao zi into the lar comfort for granted; and that he will freely share at larger social context of warfare and the way it is suffused least some of the benefits accruing to him from his with communal bonds forged in civilian life are absent status. from this passage, a close match exists in the description of how the ideal general suppresses his appetites and par- takes in the troops’ hardships. Given the recurrence in Narratives of bonding other writings of some pertinent motifs—the fan, the can- and shared hardship opy, but also the wells and hearths—one may suspect that these ploys to influence the soldiers’ mood eventu- Some of the principles and stratagems set out in the ally turned into widely recognised stratagems, knowledge passages previously cited are illustrated in historical nar- of which was passed on among military experts as part ratives. Among these, comparatively early sources appear of their trade. to describe more restrained efforts at creating emotional bonds. The Zuozhuan records that, in reaction to one of his grandees’ remarks during a campaign that many 111 Huainan zi 15, “Bing lüe”, 1609, translation in Meyer 2012, 127–29; Wei Liao zi, juan 1, ch. 4: “Zhan wei”, 75 (original pagina- “among the troops are cold”, the king of Chu “went on tion: 7b). a circuit of inspection among the three armies, consoling 112 Note the parallel in Wuzi, juan shang, ch. 3: “Zhi bing” 治兵, and encouraging all the soldiers. The officers of the three 6b. 113 San lüe, juan shang: “Shang lüe”, 92 (original pagination: 3a–b). 114 San lüe, juan shang: “Shang lüe”, 92 (original pagination: 3a). 108 OLIVER WEINGARTEN armies all felt as if they were clothed in garments padded officers who failed in their conduct to set a “personal with silk.”115 Two anecdotes in Lüshi chunqiu convey example or show concern for their men” “drew enraged the idea that kindness shown to commoners by their rul- comments”, whereas the Prussian king Frederick II ers might, in the long run, be repaid through valorous (1712–1786), despite his contention that soldiers should acts in battle.116 Another anecdote, in Hanshi waizhuan, fear their officers more than the enemy, was praised as makes a similar point.117 It is important to note, though, “our sage king” by his soldiers and “said to have shared that these stories do not depict deliberate ploys to entice the hardships of his troops, occasionally even sleeping on subjects into more risky behaviour or self-sacrifice. the bare ground.”121 These examples are about unforeseen, albeit unsurpris- Sima Qian outlines two contrasting styles of military ing, fruits of monarchical kindness. This distinguishes leadership, comparing Li Guang 李廣 with Cheng Bushi the stories from some of the strategic ploys described in 程不識. Both men were appointed guards commanders the following. in the capital after Emperor Wu’s accession, and each In Lienü zhuan 列女傳, one female protagonist relates was previously in charge of a military settlement in the how King Goujian 勾踐 of Yue 越 (ca. 520–465 BCE; border regions. Li did not stringently enforce discipline. r. 496–465) roused the fighting spirit of his troops on He did not have his troops march in strict formation, did a campaign against Wu by doing exactly what the San not maintain order when setting up camp, and allowed lüe recommends in the abstract. When someone presents his soldiers to be idle in the barracks, so they could relax. ale to him, he pours it into a river so the troops down- He did not order his men to go on regular patrols to stream can drink from it as well. Upon receiving a bag secure the perimeter. Furthermore, he cut down on writ- of dried grain, he hands it out to the soldiers. Even ten documentation in his headquarters. Yet, he took care though the soldiers cannot truly enjoy these gifts, because to watch out for dangers approaching from afar and thus they are too diluted or divided into vanishingly small never met with any harm. portions, they fight much harder for their king.118 Cheng Bushi was in every respect the opposite. He Whilst Lienü zhuan is a compilation from the late first maintained strict order, sent out regular patrols, forced his century BCE and thus postdates many of the sources pre- clerks to wrestle with documents until the early hours, viously cited, a brief allusion in Lüshi chunqiu to King and denied his soldiers any rest. Yet, he never met with Goujian’s habit of pouring wine into streams in order to harm either.122 Cheng Bushi commented on this, saying: share it with his people confirms that stories of a similar 「李廣軍極簡易，然虜卒犯之，無以禁也；而其士卒 kind already circulated in the mid third century BCE. 亦佚樂，咸樂為之死。我軍雖煩擾，然虜亦不得犯 More specifically, Lüshi chunqiu contextualises this habit 我。」是時漢邊郡李廣、程不識皆為名將，然匈奴畏 within Goujian’s legendary phase of ostentatious self-­ 李廣之略，士卒亦多樂從李廣而苦程不識。 abasement, asceticism, and suffering after his state’s “Li Guang’s camps have an extremely simple organisa- defeat against Wu, by which he eventually regained his tion, but if bandits were suddenly to confront him, he people’s trust and avenged himself on his old enemy.119 could not stop them. Yet his officers and soldiers are The story about Goujian may thus have originated as part relaxed and happy nonetheless, and they are all happy to of a particular body of historical legends. But a speech die for him. In my camp things are more bothersome, but attributed to Master Yan, which contrasts the attitude of the bandits will not get the chance to fall upon us.” Duke Zhuang 莊 of Qi (r. 553–548 BCE), who “delighted At the time, both Li and Cheng were generals of high repute in the border commanderies, but the Xiongnu in warfare, enduring hunger and thirst, heat and cold with 景 feared Li Guang’s stratagems, and most of the officers and his knights”, with that of his successor, Duke Jing soldiers felt happy to serve under Li Guang, but hard done (r. 547–490 BCE), who did his best to “avoid hunger and by under Cheng Bushi.123 thirst, heat and cold”, suggests that comparable narra- tives, or at least similar behavioural traits, might have Later in the biography, Sima Qian offers a general been attributed to other rulers as well.120 European mili- assessment of Li’s character, elaborating also on his atti- tary history provides parallel examples. Some old-regime tude towards his troops: 廣廉，得賞賜輒分其麾下，飲食與士共之。終廣之 115 Zuozhuan, Xuan 12 [597 BCE], 748–49; tr. from Durrant et al., 身，為二千石四十餘年，家無餘財，終不言家產 tr., 2016, 665. 事。[…] 廣之將兵，乏絕之處，見水，士卒不盡飲， 116 Lüshi chunqiu 8.5, 464–65. 117 Hanshi waizhuan 7, 628; cf. Shuoyuan 6, 125–27. 118 Lienü zhuan 1.10; tr. in Behnke Kinney 2014, 17. 119 Lüshi chunqiu 9.2, “Shun min” 順民, 485; tr. in Knoblock and 121 Berkovich 2017, 207; on Frederick’s remarks about fear, see 1, Riegel 2000, 211. On the legends surrounding King Goujian in its most 4; for more discussions on concern for the troops, see 208–10. ancient and more recent incarnations, see Cohen 2009. 122 Shiji 109.2869–70. 120 Yanzi chunqiu 4.15, 264; see tr. in Milburn 2016, 288. 123 Shiji 109.2870. THE LIMITS OF COERCION: REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS IN EARLY CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT 109

廣不近水，士卒不盡食，廣不嘗食。寬緩不苛，士以 deliberately created a narrative which enacts the ploys 此愛樂為用。 outlined in general terms in military writings. Guang was principled. When he received rewards, he In a different narrative, the Shiji states about Sima immediately distributed them among his subordinates, and Rangju that, on a campaign against Jin and Yan, he per- he shared food and drink with his officers. At the end of his life, he had been an official at the rank of 2,000 bush- sonally looked after sick soldiers as soon as the troops els for over forty years, but there were no valuables left had set up camp (士卒次舍井竈飲食問疾醫藥，身自拊 in his home. Never did he discuss family property. […] 循之). He also shared his provisions equitably with his His way of leading his troops was thus: In places where men (悉取將軍之資糧享士卒，身與士卒平分糧食) they were cut off and lacked supplies, if someone spotted and only marshalled his troops in fighting order (le bing water, he would not approach it before all the officers and 勒兵) after a delay of three days, having granted the soldiers had had something to drink, and he would not fatigued and ill a dispensation from active service. How- taste any food before all the officers and soldiers had ever, “the sick soldiers all begged to march on, vying eaten. He was lenient rather than exacting, and the officers with each other in their efforts to set out and rush into hence felt affection for him and were happy to be deployed battle on his behalf.” (病者皆求行，爭奮出為之赴戰。) by him.124 When the troops from Jin and Yan heard about this, they In this general assessment of Li Guang’s skills and instantly took flight, and Rangju was able to recover Qi character, he is credited with the same kind of behaviour territory which had been lost earlier.127 which is recommended in the abstract by some military Likewise, Wang Jian 王翦, a general in the service of texts as a means to humour the troops. the First Emperor who brought down several of the last According to the Shuoyuan, the impact of such moti- surviving regional states of the pre-imperial era and died vational strategies is so forceful that enemy troops desist under the reign of the Second Emperor, built a close rela- upon learning that their opponents are employing them. tionship with his troops by demonstrating that he cared for them, offering them comfort and eating with them, an 晉智伯伐鄭，齊田恒救之，有登 [~簦] 蓋必身立焉， important communal experience. 車徒有不進者必令助之。壘合而後敢處，井竈成而後 敢食。智伯曰：「吾聞田恒新得國而愛其民，內同其 王翦日休士洗沐，而善飲食撫循之，親與士卒同食。 財，外同其勤勞，治軍若此，其得眾也，不可待也。」 久之，王翦使人問軍中戲乎？對曰：「方投石超距。 乃去之耳。 」於是王翦曰：「士卒可用矣。」 The earl of Zhi in Jin attacked Zheng, and Tian Heng of Wang Jian allowed his men to rest and bathe daily, Qi approached to save it. When a canopy was set up, he improved food and drink and looked after them, and took was standing by it in person. If a chariot or foot soldiers his meals together with them. After a while, Wang Jian could not make it any further, he would invariably order sent someone to enquire whether they were playing games someone to give support. Only when the fortifications among the troops. The answer was: “Just now they are were completed did he dare to retreat to his dwelling-­ throwing stones, one trying to throw further than the place; only when the hearths and wells were completed other.” At that point, Wang Jian said: “The soldiers can did he dare to eat. now be deployed!”128 The earl of Zhi said: “I heard that Tian Heng has only now obtained the capital and shows consideration for his The final flourish—Wang Jian deducing his men’s people. Within, he shares his wealth, and outside he shares readiness to fight from their playfulness—reveals the the hardship. Maintaining the order of his troops in this psychological rationale of his actions and of such ploys manner, he will have such a grip on his hosts of men that more generally. It is likewise said that the Han general 125 he cannot be confronted.” And he simply retreated. Li Ling 李陵 (fl. ca. 100–74 BCE), like his grandfather Li Guang, shared choice morsels with his troops and thus In the present case, Liu Xiang might have put a par- 129 ticular spin on a narrative recounted differently in the roused their fighting spirit, while Li Mu, the Zhao gen- eral tasked with repelling the Xiongnu, “had several Zuozhuan to turn it into evidence for a belief in the effi- 130 cacy of virtuous conduct.126 In doing so, he may have oxen slaughtered for his officers every day”.

named in a children’s ditty in the preceding, thematically similar 124 Shiji 109.2872 Shuoyuan episode on Tian Dan (see below). This could be accounted 125 Shuoyuan, ch. 15: “Zhi wu”, 372. for by the fact that both Shuoyuan passages are set in or around Qi and 126 Zuozhuan, Ai 27 [468 BCE], 1733–34, records the same events, involve members of the Tian / Chen clan. But the overall impression is but without the stress on Tian Heng’s [= Chen Chengzi 陳成子] con- that Liu Xiang reworked the Zuozhuan entry. duct. There are some shared elements such as Tian Heng’s considerate 127 Shiji 64.2158. attitude towards his troops. He is also depicted as putting on a “rain 128 Shiji 73.2341. coat” (zhi 製), which may constitute a loose semantic link to deng gai 129 See Durrant et al. 2016, 25 and 132n25, with a reference to Shiji 登 [~簦] 蓋 in the Shuoyuan, provided this is correctly interpreted as 109.2872 for the allusion to Li Guang. ‘umbrella’ or ‘canopy’. Zuozhuan mentions Tongqiu 桐丘, a place also 130 Shiji 81.2449. 110 OLIVER WEINGARTEN

These motivational strategies serve military ration- She’s approval for his military ambitions. On the con- ales, but they exude a flair of benignity that makes it trary, considering him ignorant of the gravity of warfare difficult to dismiss them out of hand as cynical manipu- and morally unfit, both of his parents hoped he would lation. An anecdote about Wu Qi, however, indicates never be named general. a darker, insidious side to such seemingly caring atti- 及括將行，其母上書言於王曰：「括不可使將。」王 tudes. Wu personally sucked the puss out of one of his 曰：「何以？」對曰：「始妾事其父，時為將，身所 soldiers’ boils—an extreme form of self-abasement to 奉飯飲而進食者以十數，所友者以百數，大王及宗室 win the rank and file’s loyalty. But the story also high- 所賞賜者盡以予軍吏士大夫，受命之日，不問家事。 lights the utilitarian goals of the general’s gesture. Hear- 今括一旦為將，東向而朝，軍吏無敢仰視之者，王所 ing what has happened, the soldier’s mother is disconso- 賜金帛，歸藏於家，而日視便利田宅可買者買之。王 late: “Wu Qi sucked his father’s wound, who then died. 以為何如其父？父子異心，願王勿遣。」王曰：「母 Now the son will also die. This is why I am now crying.” 置之，吾已決矣。」括母因曰：「王終遣之，即有如 (吳起吮其父之創而父死，今是子又將死也，今吾是 不稱，妾得無隨坐乎？」王許諾。 以泣。)131 The act of excessive care, with the resulting When Kuo was about to set out [to Changping to fight bond of gratefulness and obligation, will not end well for Qin], his mother appealed to the king: “Kuo cannot be appointed general!” The king asked: “Why?” She the beneficent. This brief episode, like the Liu tao’s rec- replied: “When this woman began to serve his father, his ommendations for luring capable officers into making the father had just become a general. There were dozens of ultimate sacrifice, confronts head-on the conundrum that men to whom he would offer food, personally balancing military success depends on the ability to make people their rice and drink on his hands, and there were hundreds enthusiastically act against their own best interest. But whom he befriended. Whatever the king or the royal this can hardly be achieved by the carrot and the stick house bestowed on him he passed on in its entirety to the alone. The reaction by the mother of Wu Qi’s inferior military officials, the officers and grandees, and from the reflects how efficient affective manipulation can be in day when he received his commission onwards, he would this regard. pay no heed to the affairs of his own house. Now, should Tian Dan 田單, a general of Qi portrayed as a con- Kuo become general, he will face eastwards and hold audiences, and none among the military officials will dare summate strategist and master of psychological war- 132 raise his head to look at him. Royal gifts of silk and gold fare, supposedly also shared food and subjected him- will find their way to the storage rooms of his house, and self to similar physical exertions as his men, but he went he will look out for conveniently located fields and man- even further than that. sions for sale, which he will then purchase. In what 田單知士卒之可用，乃身操版插，與士卒分功，妻妾 respect does Your Majesty believe he resembles his 編於行伍之閒，盡散飲食饗士。 father? Father and son are of different minds! I wish Your Majesty would not send him.” The king said: “Leave it, When Tian Dan knew that the troops could be deployed, old woman. I have decided.” Thus Kuo’s mother asked: he personally wielded spades and planks of timber to par- “If Your Majesty is sending him after all, will You grant take in the troops’ labours. He enlisted his wife and con- to me that I shall not be found guilty by association, even cubines in the military units, and he distributed his entire if something untoward happens?” The king agreed.134 stock of food and drink to feast the officers.133 Unsurprisingly, after this prelude, Zhao Kuo’s army By not only throwing himself into the war effort but is routed, he himself is killed and, even more catastroph- also mobilising women under his control, Tian Dan sig- ically, the Zhao capital almost falls to the enemy. Whilst nalled his own unconditional commitment and that of his this may be little more than an anecdotally embroidered entire house, including its least martial and most vulner- rationalisation of a disastrous defeat, the causality con- able members. Here, as in Wu Qi’s case, the sense of strued between Kuo’s personality and his failure is Machiavellian scheming becomes palpable. revealing as to ideals of military leadership. How indispensable psychological aspects of warfare In his mother’s view, Kuo is selfish and imperious, were deemed to be at the time is reflected by the poign- a trait all the more conspicuous in light of the compar- ant fate of Zhao Kuo 趙括, son of the famous general ison with his self-effacing, public-spirited father. The She 奢 from the state of Zhao. Brought up on strategy willingness to engage in self-abasement, or at least to and capable of outdebating even his battle-hardened deemphasise status hierarchies, is presented as a cru- father on points of military theory, Kuo never received cial quality in a military leader. Zhao She personally serves other men their food, treating them as equals, 131 Han Fei zi 32, “Wai chu shuo zuo shang” 外储說左上, 734; and shows himself conspicuously indifferent towards cf. Shiji 65.2166. 132 See the ruses described in Shiji 82.2454. 133 Shiji 82.2455. 134 Shiji 81.2447. THE LIMITS OF COERCION: REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS IN EARLY CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT 111 his own interests or those of his family. Betraying an incapable! If you can justify yourself, so be it. If not, you attitude reminiscent of Li Guang who, after a distin- die.”135 guished career, died without leaving any worldly pos- In response, Zhu argues that rulers of the past had sessions to speak of, Zhao She does not care much for used the very same troops successfully, except in the material advantages, dividing whatever gifts he case of Duke Hui, who “had abandoned himself to receives among his subordinates, as Li Guang report- female beauty, turned violent and arrogant and became edly did as well. infatuated with jade-like maidens” (淫色暴慢，身好玉 By contrast, according to his mother’s testimony Kuo 女). Battle success, Zhu avers, hinges on the command- would emphatically highlight status and power dispari- er’s personal qualities, and Zhao Jianzi accepts his ties and strike fear into his subordinates. His army’s advice. defeat and his own demise are, on this understanding, immediate consequences of Kuo’s inability to adapt to 簡子乃去犀蔽屏櫓而立於矢石之所及，一鼓而士畢乘 his men’s psychological needs. Whilst most of the histor- 之。 ical episodes and military writings cited stress the power After that, Jianzi abandoned the screens and shields from of motivational strategies and the resulting affective rhinoceros hide, and he stood upright in places within the reach of arrows and stone missiles. Upon a single drum- bonds to augment military efficiency, the lesson sug- 136 gested by Zhao Kuo’s end is even more fundamental: beat, all of the soldiers climbed up [the city walls]. A refusal to make concessions to the psychological needs Jianzi’s demonstration of personal courage has a stun- of the soldiers will end in unmitigated disaster. From this ning effect on the men, as the conclusion points out: perspective, then, emotional bonds are no mere optional flourish to be added according to taste or occasion. They 戰鬬之上，枹鼓方用，賞不加厚，罰不加重，一言而 are a vital ingredient of military leadership. 士皆樂為其上死。 At the beginning of the battle, when the drums had just been rolled, all the soldiers were happy to die for their superior because of a single word, yet the rewards had not Narratives of self-exposure been increased, nor had punishments been made more severe.137 A narrative which tells of an attack on the capital of Wei 衛 under the command of Zhao Jianzi 趙簡子 dram- The troops throw themselves into battle not because, atises the crucial impact of the general’s willingness to compared to before, they anticipate payback of greater expose himself to danger, a motivational ploy only theo- munificence or harshness respectively, depending on rised, but not illustrated in anecdotes, by the military their performance. Even in the absence of novel incen- writers. The episode is further noteworthy because tives, the men risk their lives for their commander. Jian- a rebuttal in Han Fei zi lays bare the fundamental disa- zi’s willingness to share the dangers facing common greement between Han Fei’s conception of leadership soldiers engenders at least respect, if not an affective and psychologically more nuanced approaches which bond. Even though the episode is elliptical regarding the factor in variegated emotional responses to leaders by precise motivational mechanism, some of the military those who are being led. writings discussed above suggest precisely such bonding experiences. 及戰，且遠立，又居於犀蔽屏櫓之下，鼓之而士不 Considering more fundamental psychological mecha- 起，簡子投桴而歎曰：「鳴呼！士之速弊一若此乎？ nisms, one may, furthermore, assume that proof of cour- 」行人燭過免冑橫戈而進曰：「亦有君不能耳，士何 弊之有？」簡子艴然作色曰：「寡人之無使，而身自 age through exposure to danger reduces the risk of being 將是眾也，子親謂寡人之無能，有說則可，無說則 perceived as a free-rider, one who benefits from the 138 死。」 achievements of a community without contributing. At the time of battle, [Zhao Jianzi] stood far off in the The pervasive urge to expel free-riders from the fold distance and, furthermore, he stayed behind screens and makes the suspicion of cowardice so devastating to many shields made from rhinoceros hide. When he sounded the soldiers that they would rather face additional physical drum for the soldiers [to advance], they did not rise, and risks than suffer social death among their comrades.139 Jianzi cast aside the drum sticks, sighing: “Alas! Do all A military leader who insulates himself from the hazards soldiers lose their vigour so quickly?” The messenger Zhu Guo took off his helmet, presented his lance and stepped forward, saying: “Sometimes, quite simply, the 135 Lüshi chunqiu, ch. 23.1: “Gui zhi” 貴直, 1542. ruler is incapable! Why should the soldiers be lacking in 136 Lüshi chunqiu, ch. 23.1: “Gui zhi”, 1543. vigour?” With a furious expression, Jianzi exclaimed: 137 Lüshi chunqiu, ch. 23.1: “Gui zhi”, 1543. “Although I refrained from delegating the task and per- 138 See Tomasello 2016, ch. 3. sonally lead these hosts, you claim to my face that I am 139 Berkovich 2017, 195–96, 219–25, esp. 225 on “social death”. 112 OLIVER WEINGARTEN of fighting whilst reaping the greatest benefits from his 田單為齊上將軍，興師十萬，將以攻翟，往見魯仲連 men’s victory sets himself up as a particularly egregious 子。仲連子曰：「將軍之攻翟，必不能下矣！」田將 example of a free-rider. Self-exposure to risk pre-empts 軍曰：「單以五里之城，十里之郭，復齊之國，何為 攻翟不能下？」去上車不與言。決攻翟，三月而不能 any resentment on this account. 下，齊嬰兒謠之曰：「大冠如箕，長劍拄頤，攻翟不 The episode above reflects an understanding of what 能下，壘於梧丘。」於是田將軍恐駭，往見仲連子 makes troops fight that calls into doubt ideas about mil- 曰：「先生何以知單之攻翟不能下也？」仲連子曰： itary motivation which focus narrowly on rewards and 「夫將軍在即墨之時，坐則織蕢，立則杖臿為士卒倡 punishments. A direct reaction to the Jianzi story in Han 曰：『宗廟亡矣，魂魄喪矣，歸何黨矣。』故將有死 Fei zi highlights the difference. Han Fei zi reproduces 之心，士卒無生之氣。今將軍東有掖邑之封，西有淄 the same plot, in a more concise version, and formulates 上之寶，金銀黃 [~橫] 帶，馳騁乎淄澠之間，是以樂 a counterargument. Zhu Guo’s advice, Han Fei objects, 生而惡死也。」田將軍明日結髮，徑立矢石之所，乃 is useless. First, Zhu Guo states that the same troops may 引枹而鼓之，翟人下之。故將軍者，士之心也，士者 be used successfully in some cases and ineffectually in 將之枝體也，心猶與則枝體不用，田將軍之謂乎！ others, but fails to account for the difference. Second, When Tian Dan became First General of the state of Qi, he raised an army of one hundred thousand men in order Han Fei asserts that Jianzi should never have given up to attack Di and went to see Master Lu Zhonglian. Master his protected position. In a further attempt to undermine Zhonglian said: “There is no way you will conquer it with trust in the bond between parents and children—recall your attack.” General Tian asked: “I restored the capital the portrayal of parents as filicidal egoists—Han Fei of Qi based on a [town surrounded by a] wall of five li claims that only a small number of pious sons will ever and outer fortifications of ten li.141 Why should I fail to risk their lives for a parent in distress. It is, in Han’s conquer Di with my attack?” He left, getting on his char- view, misguided to believe that entire groups could be iot without another word for Zhonglian, and decided to reliably induced to act for the sake of their ruler like such attack Di. In the course of three months he failed to con- exceptionally devoted offspring. Third, joy about rewards quer it, and children in Qi made this ditty about him: and fear of punishment are universal. Therefore, soldiers “A cap big like a sieve, / a sword long enough to rest his cheek on. / But unable to conquer Di, / he is holed up in should be motivated through a sensible calibration of Wuqiu.” positive and negative incentives; only that will work for General Tian then became scared and went to see Master large collectives. Putting forward a probabilistic argu- Zhonglian, asking him: “How did you know I would fail ment, Han Fei avers that military leaders should not rely to conquer Di with my attack?” Master Zhonglian replied: on methods which apply only in one among a hundred “In Jimo, you were weaving hampers when seated and cases. They should exploit universal human dispositions, leaning on a shovel when standing, singing for the officers and the most stable disposition to fall back on is, Han and soldiers: ‘Our temples—gone. / Our ghosts—undone. affirms, people’s selfishness.140 The carrot-and-stick / Place to return to—none.’ And so, with their commander approach alone promises reliable control, since only intent to die, the officers and soldiers felt no urge to live a small fraction of individuals will ever have their actions on. But nowadays you have the domain of Yiyi in the east and, in the west, the treasures on the banks of the River dictated to them by the normative force of emotional Zi.142 Sporting belts of gold and silver, you dash about bonds and moral obligations. The rest do what is best for between Zi and Min. For that reason, you enjoy life and them. despise death.” The two renderings of the Zhao Jianzi episode high- The next day, General Tian bound up his hair, stood light emblematically the contrast between two contrary upright in a place where arrows and missiles were falling, visions of military leadership which are, ultimately, then lifted the sticks and rolled the drum, and the people based on irreconcilable understandings of human nature. of Di surrendered to him. Therefore, the general is the In Han Fei’s view, self-interest reigns supreme and other heart of his officers, and the officers are the general’s limbs. If the heart is filled with doubt, the limbs are use- considerations will only impinge on people’s actions in 143 the rarest of cases. According to Lüshi chunqiu, the right less. This refers to General Tian indeed! kinds of sentiments can even make people disregard their The narrative diverges subtly from the Jianzi episode very survival. while adding a few further aspects to the core motif. Tian Not only did Han Fei see fit to dispute the lessons of Dan’s increasing fondness for the good life, which the Jianzi episode, but its central motif is also repeated in a different episode included both in the Zhanguo ce and the Shuoyuan. 141 This refers to the restoration of Qi after the Yan invasion. See below, on the town of Jimo. 142 This is not entirely clear but may refer to treasures Tian Dan is storing in a mansion in the capital. 143 Shuoyuan 15, “Zhi wu”, 371. For the same story with some 140 Han Fei zi 37, “Nan er” 難二, 890. variations see also Zhanguo ce, juan 13: “Qi liu” 齊六, 690. THE LIMITS OF COERCION: REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS IN EARLY CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT 113 weakens his troops’ resolve, is a less salient sign of his would not hesitate to lay down his life. One of the ritual risk averseness than Jianzi’s shields from rhinoceros outlines even goes so far as to suggest that the general be hide. When Tian demonstrates his readiness to die, the symbolically turned into a dead man upon receiving his enemy has already surrendered, before the soldiers can orders. prove their fearlessness in combat; premature capitula- Probably the earliest detailed statement on such ritu- tion being, by now, likewise a familiar trope. The crucial als is found at the very end of the military chapter in issue is the general’s readiness to share the dangers of Huainan zi.144 The passage outlines the ceremonies by fighting, and Tian Dan’s conspicuous gesture—a close which the ruler conferred the command over an army on parallel to the Jianzi story—is sufficiently likely to fuel the general at the outset of a campaign and, upon its con- his soldiers’ fighting spirit for the enemy to avoid battle clusion, released him from his duties.145 The ritual acts altogether. Liu Xiang, who edited the story into his work, in which the general is involved carry two distinct mean- evidently found its lessons worth heeding; a sign of the ings, both related to the liminal nature of the ceremonies continuing interest in positive motivation as a comple- bookending the campaign. ment to the disciplinary force of punishment. Before setting out, the general receives the power of Compared to the Jianzi anecdote, the narrative touches command from his ruler in the ancestral temple. On this upon additional themes theoretically explored in other occasion, he is ritually treated like a dead man. His nails writings. Tian Dan shares in his men’s perils and in the are cut, he is clad in funerary garb and, like a corpse, he burdens of their day-to-day labours. He weaves hampers leaves the temple through a north-facing opening in the to construct earthworks and takes part in the building temple wall, the “inauspicious gate” (爪鬋，設明衣 effort. The historical setting, of little significance in the 也，鑿凶門而出).146 As Marcel Granet has noted, these Jianzi anecdote, is relevant, too. With Jimo, Tian Dan preparations signal the general’s readiness to die.147 Like defended one of the last remaining Qi strongholds still self-exposure to danger in combat, they supposedly have resisting an attack by the northern neighbour Yan, which a devastating effect on the enemy’s morale. had brought Qi to the brink of perdition. Motivation is 乘將軍車，載旌旗斧鉞，累若不勝。其臨敵決戰，不 nurtured among Tian Dan’s men by the realisation that 顧必死，無有二心。 […] 如此，則智者為之慮，勇者 fighting offers the only escape from certain death, a fact 為之鬥，氣厲青雲，疾如馳騖，是故兵未交接而敵人 which Tian dramatically impresses on them with his 恐懼。 song. Liu Xiang thus combines two motifs in this narra- [The general] mounts the commander’s chariot and arrays tive—the sharing of hardship and the invigorating effect the banners and axes, tied as if not [yet] victorious. On of mortal danger—which the military literature discusses meeting the enemy and committing to battle, he pays no in the abstract. On the level of individual characterisa- heed to certain death; / he does not have two minds / […] tion, Tian Dan himself appears here as shrewd manipu- If he is like this, the clever will plan for him; / the brave lator of his men’s fighting spirit, a portrayal entirely in will fight for him; / their qi will scrape the azure clouds; line with other episodes which narrate his elaborate ruses / they will be swift as galloping [steeds]. Thus before weapons have clashed the enemy is terrified.148 to ensnare the enemy. Very likely, Liu Xiang picked him as protagonist for this reason. At the conclusion of the campaign, the general carries out rituals of exculpation and purification which address two distinct kinds of guilt. He formally lays down the The general as a dead man: commission which the ruler initially conferred on him Severing emotional bonds when he handed over the axe of command, addressing and forgetting the self the general with the words: “From here up to Heaven is controlled by [you,] the commander. […] From here Some military writers considered it crucial for a gen- eral’s success that, rather than relying on the two levers 144 Huainan zi 15, 1624; tr. in Meyer 2012, 137–40. Cf. the of rewards and punishments alone, he should build emo- remarks in Zuozhuan, Min 2.7, 269–71: 帥師者，受命於廟，受脤於 tional bonds with his soldiers, inter alia by signalling his 社 “One who leads troops receives his orders in the Ancestral Temple willingness to give his life in combat. In a manner which and receives sacrificial meat at the altar of the earth.” (Tr. Durrant et al., tr., 2016, 245). may be thought to complement the creation of affective 145 On these rituals, and military rituals more generally, see Lewis bonds by adding an almost mystical component of 1990, 23. spiritual self-cultivation, a few prescriptive, and likely 146 On the meaning of these acts see the original commentary, most idealising outlines of military ritual speak of a gradual likely by Xu Shen 許慎 (ca. 55–ca. 149 CE), in Huainan zi, ch. 15, 1625nn3–5. severing of ties between the general and his family as 147 See Granet 1960, 274–275. well as the broader setting of his everyday life once 148 Huainan zi, ch. 15, 1624; translation from Meyer 2012, he embarked on a campaign. This was to ensure that he 138–39. 114 OLIVER WEINGARTEN down to the Abyss is controlled by [you,] the com- will be made and afterward there will be no further mander.” (從此上至天者，將軍制之。 […] 從此下至 harm.”154 淵者，將軍制之。)149 Such unfettered power, prefig- The Shuoyuan gives an account of the commissioning ured in other comments on the commander’s near-­ ritual which is recognisably similar but sets some distinc- absolute sovereignty during campaigns, comes uncom- tive accents, most obviously by omitting the funerary fortably close to a temporary usurpation of monarchic symbolism which features so strikingly in Huainan zi. status, which is why a speech in the Zuozhuan explains 將帥受命者，將帥入，軍吏畢入，皆北面再拜稽首受 that “the ruler’s successor may not lead troops”. If, as 命。天子南面而授之鉞，東行，西面而揖之，示弗御 a military leader, he continues to heed his father’s orders, 也。故受命而出忘其國，即戎忘其家，聞枹鼓之聲， he will lose his authority. But if he insists on his inde- 唯恐不勝忘其身，故必死。必死不如樂死，樂死不如 pendence, he will be “unfilial”.150 For the field com- 甘死，甘死不如義死，義死不如視死如歸，此之謂 mander, treason and ineffectuality are close neighbours, 也。故一人必死，十人弗能待也；十人必死，百人弗 with little space for successful manoeuvring in between. 能待也；百人必死，千人不能待也；千人必死，萬人 And so, through the rite ending a campaign, the general 弗能待也；萬人必死，橫行乎天下，令行禁止，王者 acknowledges his guilt for his quasi usurpation of power 之師也。 to the ruler (qing zui yu jun 請罪於君), who routinely The commander receiving his commission: The com- forgives him.151 mander enters [the temple], and so do the military officers, to the last man. They all face northwards and twice bow This is followed by a period of self-purification. The their heads to the ground in obeisance to accept the com- general “withdraws” and, robed in “fasting garb” (zhai mission. The Son of Heaven faces south and hands over fu 齋服), he “remains secluded”; he lives at a distance the ceremonial axe, proceeds to the eastern side and from his regular residence and only “returns to his dwell- makes obeisance towards the west, evincing that he will ing” (fan she 反舍) after a certain time, the duration of not take charge [of the campaign]. which depends on the scope of his victory. A “great vic- Thus, when setting out after receiving his commission, tory” demands three years of seclusion, a “middling [the commander] becomes oblivious of the capital; when victory” two, and a “lesser” one a single year.152 In this entering combat, he becomes oblivious of his house; and way, the general cleanses himself of his symbolic status upon hearing the rolling of the battle drums, his greatest as a deceased, but also washes off guilt and ritual pollu- worry is that he will not master his resistance to becoming oblivious of himself, so that he may deem death tion, which weigh all the heavier on him the more ineluctable. severely he has harmed the enemy. But rather than find dying ineluctable, one should rejoice To soften warfare’s portentous, psychologically in it; rather than rejoice in it, one should savour its sweet- unsettling association with death and violence, the pas- ness; rather than savour its sweetness, one should con- sage concludes with a claim which reassuringly upholds sider dying the done thing; rather than consider it the done the morality of military action and conveniently legiti- thing, one should view it like a homecoming. That is what mises material gains made in the process. Any doubt that this means. the war may not have been just is allayed: “That against Thus, if a single man considers death ineluctable, one which the military was used was surely a kingdom with- hundred men will be unable to confront him. If ten men out the Way.”153 It is for this reason that one need not consider death ineluctable, one hundred men will be una- ble to confront them. If one hundred men consider death fear any backlash or heavenly punishment and may enjoy ineluctable, one thousand men will be unable to confront the spoils, carefree. “Thus one can triumph in battle them. If one thousand men consider death ineluctable, ten without retribution, / take territory without returning it; / thousand men will be unable to confront them. If ten thou- the people will not suffer illness; / the commander will sand men consider death ineluctable and rove all over the not die early; / the five grains will flourish; / the winds realm, taking orders and heeding bans, those would be the and rains will be seasonable; / the battle is won without; troops of a true King.155 / the good fortune is born within. / Thus one’s reputation As in Huainan zi, the first part of this passage sketches out the commissioning ritual and clarifies the role of the military commander vis-à-vis his ruler. The handover of 149 Huainan zi, ch. 15, 1624; translation from Meyer 2012, the ceremonial axe and the Son of Heaven’s vacation 137–38. of the pinnacle of power symbolise the general’s assump- 150 Zuozhuan, Min 2.7, 269–71; tr. Durrant et al., tr., 2016, 245. 151 Recall Ōba 2017 on the general’s authority to decide over life tion of absolute sovereignty in commanding his desig- and death and Andrew Meyer’s comparison of the commander to nated troops for the duration of the campaign. Gaining a “pro tempore king”; see above. Lewis 1990, 26, discusses rituals conducted upon the return of an army. 152 Huainan zi, ch. 15, 1624; see Meyer 2012, 139. 154 Tr. Meyer 2012, 139–40. 153 Tr. Meyer 2012, 139. 155 Shuoyuan 15, “Zhi wu”, 370–71. THE LIMITS OF COERCION: REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS IN EARLY CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT 115 sovereignty goes hand in hand with the severing of per- On the day the general receives his commission, he for- sonal obligations and attachments. This ritual act may be gets his house. When he arranges his armies and sets up understood as a first step along the route by which the camp in the wilderness, he forgets his parents. When he takes up the sticks and rolls the drums, he forgets general, with increasing distance from the capital, allows 157 his everyday experiences to fall into oblivion as he pro- himself. gresses towards the battlefield. The process culminates in In the same vein as Shuoyuan, this pushes deliberate the moment of combat, at which point the general is anx- forgetting one step further than the other texts, towards ious to break free from his very sense of self, the more complete oblivion of the general’s own self, a mental readily to accept death without hesitation. state which—here as in Shuoyuan—is perhaps not coin- This is followed by a contemplation of the military cidentally accompanied by drumming, which can help to man’s attitude towards death. Greeting it with positive usher in a form of meditative trance. feelings is better than merely accepting its inevitability, Providing further corroboration of the intertwined but preferable even to this is to view death as a natural relationship between historical narratives and more the- destination, the location where, in line with the immanent oretical writings, some historiographic records likewise order of things, one is ultimately fated to reside and hint at the stages of forgetting and thus at the relevance which one greets neither with enthusiasm nor trepidation. to military practice of the concept, though perhaps not of These observations form an implicit comment on the the idealising ritual context within which Huainan zi and steps of forgetting. They open up the prospect of embrac- Shuoyuan introduce it. It will be remembered that the old ing death as a predestined alternative to one’s quotidian general Zhao She, according to his wife, “from the day surroundings, including one’s place of residence as well when he received his commission onwards would pay no as familial and socio-political ties. heed to the affairs of his own house.”158 Revisiting the Transcending concerns about life and death is, from trope of meditative self-oblivion, Sima Rangju remarked this perspective, a panacea for attaining victory. Whoever on the duties of the general: regards dying as homecoming will unloosen sufficient strength to defeat the tenfold number of enemies, and an 將受命之日則忘其家，臨軍約束則忘其親，援枹鼓之 army of ten thousand, properly disciplined, will have no 急則忘其身。 match in the entire realm. Fearlessness makes fearsome; On the day he receives his commission, a general forgets his household. When he presides over the troops to swear there being no longer any reservations about throwing the oath, he forgets his parents. And at the urgent moment oneself into the fight. when he takes up the drum sticks to signal an advance, he Along an arc ranging from the commissioning ritual forgets himself.159 to the moment when the host of soldiers hands the realm to the true King, the Shuoyuan traces the process by The general’s severing of emotional ties and the which the general, comprehensively empowered upon abnegation of his own personal existence facilitate and assumption of command, sets free the inherent strength complement the deep mutual attachment he is, according of his troops by virtue of his own carefully calibrated to other writings, supposed to form with his men. By attitude towards death. blotting out the memory of his quotidian existence, the Brief echoes in other texts suggest that such ideas cir- general liberates himself from mental entanglements culated widely. The general’s stages of forgetting are which would otherwise make him think twice about sac- alluded to in another description of the commissioning rificing his life. Though less eye-catching than acts of ritual, found in a dialogue from Kong congzi 孔叢子: bravery in full view of the troops, the impact of the steps of forgetting on an army’s fighting power are described 古者大將受命而出，則忘其國；即戎帥陣，則忘其 in a similar manner. The general’s willingness to die, 家。 cultivated in a purely personal way but, according to In ancient times, when the general received his commis- Huainan zi, broadcast through the symbolism of funer- sion and and set out, he would forget his state. When he goes to battle, leading the troops, he forgets his house.156 ary ritual, unlooses irresistible powers in his soldiers. This is a vision of “warfare […] as a matter of the A decontextualised passage from Wei Liao zi focuses mind”, though not one based on the “potency of texts” entirely on the process of forgetting: so much as on spiritual powers.160 將受命之日，忘其家，張軍宿野忘其親，援枹而鼓忘 157 其身。 Wei Liao zi, juan 2, ch. 8: “Wu yi”, 79 (original pagination: 5b). 158 Shiji 81.2447. 159 Shiji 64.2157. 160 Lewis 1990, 103, on the “true warrior” as “the man who under- stood the principles or techniques of war and could apply them in bat- 156 Kong congzi, ch. 20: “Wen jun li” 問軍禮, 421. tle.” Italics in the original. 116 OLIVER WEINGARTEN

Whatever the actual efficacy of such mind games was, contrasts starkly with the bleak anti-parental rhetoric of as so often before in the military works discussed in this the Han Fei zi, which does not concede any positive role article, it is not the straightforward manipulation of the to emotional impulses, a fundamental difference of view- calculating heart by pulling the levers of power which points likewise reflected in Han Fei’s rebuttal of the supposedly determines victory and defeat. What is at Zhao Jianzi anecdote. So it is no mere coincidence that work is, instead, the visceral impact of emotions which Han Fei’s objections to Zhao’s actions cast doubt on the have little to do with the lure of material rewards or the close bonds between parents and children as well. restraining effects of punishment, but carry those affected Regardless of whether they are cited to stress or deny the by them beyond considerations of personal advantage merits of emotions, the supreme intimacy of parental towards a joyful abnegation of their very existence. bonds makes them the litmus test to which both sides in this debate take recourse. Affective responses can also be triggered by symbolic Conclusion behaviour; this is why military thinkers considered it crucial. This view comes to the fore in the interconnected The effects, uses, and shortcomings of positive and discussions of performative gestures signalling a willing- negative incentives are treated with some nuance in mil- ness on the part of the general to downplay status dispar- itary writings, which frequently bespeak a considerable ities, to offer comfort on the one hand and share danger appreciation of the complexity of human motivations. In and hardship on the other. The ritual transformation of addressing disciplinary issues, military texts highlight the the commander into a symbolic corpse in Huainan zi and importance of punishments. They recommend punish- Shuoyuan takes the last point to a new extreme. Here, ment to help control information flow, silence criticism, especially in the graded stages of forgetting, external stop deserters in their tracks, sow apprehension towards symbolism merges with internal, mental discipline, cul- superiors, and assert the commander’s authority as well minating in the moment of self-oblivion to the hypnotic as impartiality. One passage suggests that the ever-pres- rolling of the drum. ent threat of punishment will surround the general with The sources introducing these ritual and mental prac- an aura of mystique. On some testimony, the goal of pun- tices are prescriptive and idealising in nature, but histo- ishment is not so much deterrence with regard to specific riographic records suggest that some commanders might actions as the creation of a diffuse sense of fear. Soldiers, indeed have employed such leadership strategies. Whilst so the reasoning goes, will only fight if they dread their it would be easy to dismiss reports to this effect as own officers more than the enemy. This reflects, if unfounded rehearsals of common tropes, the distribution unwittingly, an understanding that combat is for common of the motif across both theoretical and historiographic soldiers a thoroughly negative, fearsome, and repulsive writings indicates that some generals made deliberate use experience, in which they will only engage under duress. of such ploys to enhance their men’s fealty and rouse Historically, this has probably not always been true.161 their fighting spirit. The military history of better-­ Nor are material incentives the only motivation in documented periods such as the European ancien régime addition to punishments which can compel soldiers to suggests that commanders across times and cultures fight. Passages in the military writings which transcend would have easily recognised the usefulness of symbolic the punitive paradigm implicitly acknowledge this. gestures of this kind. Whilst large parts of the military corpus agree with Han Remarkable as the military texts’ insights are if com- Fei zi and Shang jun shu in their general acceptance of pared to the political thought promoted in Han Fei zi and the carrot-and-stick approach, some military writings Shang jun shu, what is absent is no less noteworthy. The affirm the role of positive sentiments and constructive military theorists never consider any overarching sense social relationships in military organisation and combat of solidarity. Even passages which evince greater sophis- performance. Honorific titles and official recognition, tication than is characteristic for the carrot-and-stick including for instance the assurance to uphold the com- approach never claim that it would be sweet and proper memoration of the dead, form a system of non-material to die for one’s country. A few writings acknowledge the incentives outlined in Wuzi. Supposedly kin-like senti- significance of emotional attachments within closely ments between leaders and the rank and file—sometimes intertwined communities with acute perceptiveness. Wei explicitly compared to the relationship between fathers Liao zi and Wuzi elaborate on the topic in some detail. and sons—feature prominently in several writings as pre- But there is little evidence that military thinkers deemed condition for victory. The stress on kinship symbolism relationships beyond the local level relevant for combat performance, or considered to utilise them for other pur- poses. 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