70-26,361
SEELS, Barbara Ann B illings, 1940- CONCEPTS AND COMMUNICATION.
The Ohio State U niversity, Ph.D., 1970 Education, theory and practice
University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan
© 1971
Barbara Ann B illin g s Seels
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED CONCEPTS AND COMMUNICATION
DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University
By
H i U ' l Barbara:Billings Seels
******
The Ohio State University 1970
Approved by
\dviser School of Education ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am grateful to those whose discerning questions forced me to present the data with greater clarity and precision: Dr. Edgar
Dale, Dr. Daniel Stuffelbeam, Dr. Robert Wagner.
1 1 VITA
February 18, 1940. . . Bom - Syracuse, New York
1969 ...... Student, U niversity of B r isto l, England
1961 ...... A.B., Bucknell University, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania
1962 ...... Research Assistant, Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York
1963 ...... M.S., Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York
1963 ...... Instructor, Clarion State College, Clarion, Pennsylvania
1964 ...... Research Assistant, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
1965-1967 ...... Research Assistant, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio
1969 ...... Director of Educational Resources, McGuffey School D istrict, Claysville, Pennsylvania
PUBLICATIONS
Bradford, James and Seels, Barbara. "Center of Adventure." Columbus: The Ohio State University, 1966. (Film)
Dale, Edgar and Seels, Barbara. "Readability and Reading, An Annotated Bibliography." Newark: International Reading Association, 1966.
D ale, Edgar and S eels, Barbara. "Ten Important References on Read ability." Elementary English (December, 1966).
Seels, Barbara. "How Can Students be Good Actors?" Educational Screen and Audiovisual Guide, 45 (July, 1966), 32-33.
FIELDS OF STUDY
Major Field: Communications
Studies in Communications. Professor Edgar Dale
Studies in Motion Pictures. Professor Robert Wagner
Studies in Educational Research. Professor Daniel Stuffelbeam
111 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...... i i
VITA...... i i i
LIST OF TABLES...... ix
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS...... x
Chapter
I . INTRODUCTION ...... 1
Objectives and Scope of the Study ...... 1
Assumptions of the Study ...... 2
Methodology of This Study ...... 3
Organizational Plan for This Report...... 3
Background o f the Problem ...... 5
I I . THE MEANING OF CONCEPT...... 12
Interpretations from Psychology ...... 14
Interpretations from Philosophy ...... 17
A Definition of "Concept" ...... 25
Response Discriminatory Symbolized The Definition
Glossary of Conceptual Communication Terminology . . . 30
I I I . THE CHARACTERISTICS OF CONCEPTS...... 33
The Dimensions of Concepts ...... 33
IV Chapter Page
Variable C haracteristics ...... 34
The Forms of Concepts ...... 35
M odalities Models Definitions Classifications Multi-form Concepts
The Effects of Concepts ...... 43
Primary E ffects of Concepts Secondary Effects of Concepts
The Content of Concepts ...... 50
The Characteristics of Content The Continua for Content The Theoretical Level of Content The Experiential and Logical Content The Kinds o f Logical Content
The Type o f Concept Learning ...... 55
Forms of Concept Learning Concept Learning Tasks Methods of Concept Learning
Conceptual Style ...... 65
Conceptual Ability Category Width and Differentiation Cognitive Structure Research Directions
Amount and Application of Conceptualization ...... 71
Retention Transfer
IV. THE PROCESS OF CONCEPTUALIZATION...... 88
The Role of Recoding ...... 88
Nerve Pathways Excitation and Inhibition Phenomenon
The Role of the Reticular Formation ...... 104 Chapter Page
The Reticular Activating System Brain Wave Patterns
The Role of Symbolic Responses ...... 115
The Role of Stored Responses ...... ' 120
The Role of Individual Differences ...... 127
The Role of Media D e sig n ...... 137
V. CURRICULUM DESIGN...... 140
Providing Experiences ...... 141
Guidance in Conceptualization ...... 142
Critical Thinking The Development of C reativity Vocabulary Development Conceptual Analysis
Issues in Curriculum ...... 147
Discovery v. Reception Learning Facts V. Skills v. Ideas
Recent Curriculum Projects ...... 155
SMSG SCIS Science—A Process Approach BSCS CHEM CBA PSSC
VI. AUDIOVISUAL DESIGN...... 169
I . Cuing Factors ...... 170
S e t...... 170
D irections Pretraining Pretesting Nature of the Learning Task
Cuing...... 17 5
Familiarization
VI Chapter Page
A v a ila b ility o f Cues Presentation Order Perceptual Principles Channel U tiliza tio n Compelling Stimuli Abstraction Prompting
II. Stimulus Factors ...... 196
The Medium...... 19’6
The Cone of Experience The Hot-Cold Continuum
The Content ...... 209
Instances in Content Attributes of Instances Amount o f Content Approach to Content Treatment Structuring Editing
III. Response Factors ...... 242
Rate of Responding ...... 242
Pacing Rate o f Development Task Size
Type o f Response ...... 247
Type of Strategy Type of Activity Type of Practice
Feedback to Response ...... 271
Amount and Type o f Feedback Ratio and Timing of Feedback Postfeedback Interval
VII. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONCEPTUALIZER...... 282
Age Differences...... 283
Mental Development Jean Piaget's Work Jerome Kagan’s Work
v i i Chapter Page
Harvey, Hunt and Schroder's Work The Growth of Intellectual Abilities Verbal and Nonverbal Development Aging
Sex Differences ...... 305
Personality Differences ...... 312
Conceptual Systems P ersonality Types Authorita rianism Introversion-Extraversion Mental Disturbance
Ability Differences...... 326
Mentally Retarded Culturally Deprived Middle Class Rural/Suburban/Urban Primitive/Modem P hysically Handicapped Gifted Creative
V III. GUIDELINES FOR STUDY AND PRAGTICE...... 350
Basic Research on the Communication of Concepts. . • . 350
The Study of Interacting Factors ...... 354
D irections for Research on the Communication
of Concepts ...... 362
Guidelines for Practice ...... 363
Issues in the Communication of Concepts...... 366
A New Paradigm for Study and P ra ctice ...... 367
APPENDIX. Tests for the Characteristics of Conceptualizing. . . 370
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 375
V l l l LIST OF TABLES
T a b le Page
1. The Characteristics Attributed to Concepts by Different Theoretical Approaches ...... • • 15
2. A Comparison o f T heoretical Approaches ...... 17
3. The Position of Modern Philosophers on the Nature of a "Concept" ...... 21
4. A Comparison o f Reception and Discovery Learning A pproaches ...... 152
5. Topic Classification of Biological Concepts ...... 164
6. A Comparison o f Media C h aracteristics ...... 206
7. S trategies for Responding to Conjunctive Concept Attainment T asks ...... 251
8. S trategies for Responding to D isjunctive Concept Attainment T asks ...... 253
9. Learning Conditions and Appropriate Response Activity* * • 265
10. A Comparison o f Practice Conditions and E ffe c ts ...... 270
11* Piaget's Theory of Mental Development ...... 284
12. D efin ition s and Examples of Training Conditions ...... 317
13. Poles of Conceptual System at Each Stage ...... 318
14. Interaction between Training Conditions and Stages of Development ...... 319
15. Conceptual Characteristics of Learners of Different Types of A bilities ...... 348
16. Characteristics Which Interact in the Communication of Concepts ...... 355
17. A Taxonomy of Characteristics Which Interact in the Communication of Concepts ...... 356
IX LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure Page
1. Relations o f the D ifferent Meanings o f "Abstract" and "Abstraction" Used on Experiments ...... 13
2. The. E ffects of C oncepts ...... 44
3. The Successive Effects of Concepts as Stimuli, Cues, Associations and Responses ...... 46
4. Types of Concepts ...... 51
5. Types of Content ...... 51
6. Types of Ambiguous Concepts ...... 52
7. Contributors to the Type o f Concept Learning ...... 58
8. Stimulus and Response Generalization- . » ...... 59
9. Secondary Generalization ...... 59
10. The Lobes o f the Brain ...... 91
11. The Direction of Association Fibers in the Cortex .... 92
12. The Direction of Projection Fibers in the Cortex ...... 92
13. Cut Away of the Commissural Fibers in the Cortex ...... 92
14. The Eyes and the Visual Projection System ...... 94
15. The Arrangement o f S triate C ells ...... 95
16. The Sensory Pool ...... 106
17. Brain Wave Patterns Indicative of Mental States ...... 109
18. Speech Areas ...... 117
19. Association Areas ...... 118
20. The Development of the Cortex ...... 128
21. The Creative Analysis Approach ...... 145
X Figure Page
22. A Process Hierarchy: Using Space/Time Relationships ...... 159
23. Topic Classification Dimensions—Classroom Interaction Analysis ...... 162
24. The Cone of Experience ...... 197
25. Difficulty as a Function of Number of Relevant and Irrelevant Attributes ...... 214
26. Example of Relevancy and Redundancy of Attributes .... 217
27. Relative Effect on Learning of Increasing Attributes of Different Types ...... 218
28. Successive Presentation Situations ...... 220
29. Desirable Successive Presentation Conditions ...... 221
30. Keys to Basic Arrangements and Space D ivision ...... 240
31. Cyclical and Saccadic Nature of Progressive Social Development ...... 296
32. The Development of General Learning Ability as Shown by Three In telligen ce Tests ...... 301
33. The Relationship between Categories of Characteristics in the Communication of Concepts ...... 361
XI "The civilization of the symbol,
replacing that of the image,
is only just the beginning."
—George Mathieus,
Travel Poster Artist
for Air France
X I 1 CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Ob.iectives and Scope of the Study
This study begins with the premise that the variable character
istics of concepts formed are influenced by the way in which a concept
is communicated. It aims to find support for this premise and to de
velop instructional implications when such support is found.
The characteristics of the communication might be called inde
pendent variables, the characteristics of the learner, intervening
variables and the characteristics of the concept formed, dependent
variables. From what is known of the interaction of these variables,
principles for the design of messages are developed.
The objectives of this study are to answer the following questions:
1. What is the nature of a concept?
2. What are the important theoretical issues related to the
communication of concepts?
3. What characteristics do concepts have, and to what extent
are these characteristics dependent on variables in the
communication o f concepts?
4. What available empirical findings help us understand the
processes involved in the communication of concepts? 2
5. What curriculum approaches for developing conceptual
ability have been tried and with what success?
6. How is success in the communication of concepts related
to differences in media, materials, methods, learners?
7. What instruments and methods are available for studying
th e communication o f concepts?
8. What gu id elin es can the teacher use for the communication
of concepts?
To reach these objectives the report surveys the variable char
acteristics of the conceptual process, of the communication process,
and of the learner. The study does not aim to present an exhaustive
survey of literature on concept formation. Rather it concentrates on
literature that has direct relevance for the communication of concepts.
In other words, although the study discusses the theoretical issues
involved in stimulus generalization, the writer does not cite research
studies on stimulus generalization unless the study can be interpreted as having significant meaning for the communication of concepts.
Assumptions of the Study
1. It is assumed that the analytical ability of the investiga tor w ill vary depending on the topic under investigation. When the analysis is necessarily limited by the ability of the investigator, the investigator w ill present as mpch of the data as possible.
2. Time limitations make it impossible to go to the original source for all the findings to be considered. It is assumed that it is acceptable to delegate some of the critical review of literature to previous reputable and credible reviewers. Methodology of This Study
This study uses ex post facto procedures. It also uses theory
construction techniques such as definition, model building and postu
late derivation. The methodology can be described as historical-
theoretical.
The source material consists mainly of articles from learned
and semi-learned journals and of relevant books. Traditional tech
niques of library research are employed in analyzing this literature.
Journals of abstracts, bibliographies and works known to the writer
are the starting point, along with indexes. The works cited in these
indexes contain bibliographies which lead to additional material. This
snowballing continues until the returns become so slight that it is un
profitable to continue.
The primary object of the search is to locate a ll published
reports dealing with the communication of concepts. Evaluations of
the success of the various curriculum approaches are requested from
those involved in the application of the approaches. The evaluations
of curriculum approaches solicited are presented in Chapter V,
"Curriculum Design." The writer notes whenever the information given
is opinion, and not documented research, and tries to separate the em
pirical from the nonempirical.
Organizational Plan for This Report
The report is organized in chapters which respond to the ques tions listed as objectives on pages 1-2.
The first chapter explains the study. 4
The second chapter addresses itself to question one, What is the
nature of a concept? The second chapter deals with terminology problems.
In it the question of the meaning of "concept" is discussed and a glos
sary of terms related to the communication of concepts as used in this
report is presented. Chapter II also considers question two, What are
the important theoretical issues related to the communication of
concepts?
The third chapter addresses itself to the question. What char
acteristics do concepts have, and to what extent are these characteris
tics dependent on variables in the communication of concepts? Subsumed
under this question are the topics of amount and use of conceptualiza
tion (retention and transfer).
Chapter IV asks. What empirical findings help us understand
the processes involved in the communication of concepts? Chapter IV
discusses the internal processes during which conceptualization can be
influenced. The neurophysiology of conceptualization, the effects of
motivation and attention, and the processes of imagery and verbaliza tio n w ill be studied in Chapter IV.
In Chapters V and VI theory and research on curriculum design and on audiovisual communications design are presented. Chapters V and VI explain how the characteristics of concepts can be influenced by the design and external transmission of messages. Chapter V de scribes, What curriculum approaches for developing conceptual ability have been tried and with what success? Chater VI explains how success in the communication of concepts is related to differences in media, materials and methods. 5
Chapter VII explains how success in the communication of con
cepts is related to differences in learners. The chapter acquaints the
reader with the learning characteristics of different types of concep-
tualizers. The types of conceptualizers are organized according to age,
sex, and personality differences and according to ability differences
due to biological or environmental development.
Chapter VIII answers questions seven and eight. Chapter VIII
ou tlin es the methods available for studying the communication of con
cepts. Chapter VIII also suggests guidelines that the teacher can fol
low for the communication of concepts. The guidelines w ill be given in
the form of questions to ask about a conceptual communication situation.
A paradigm of the interaction between the types of variables in the com
munication of concepts is presented in Chapter VIII. A taxonomy of
characteristics which interact in the communication of concepts is in
cluded in Chapter VIII. This chapter also briefly summarizes chrono
logical developments in the study of conceptual communication and sug
gests methods for future study in this area.
Next, a list of tests for the characteristics of concepts is
presented as an appendix. Finally, a bibliography of references used
for this report is presented.
Background o f th e Problem
Previous reviews of literature have concentrated on one of the
eight questions listed on pages 1-2. None of the previous reviews has tried analysis and synthesis of the answers to all eight questions.
Anatol Pikas tries to answer questions one and two. He tries to identify the nature of a concept and the important theoretical 6
issues related to the communication of concepts. In his book,
Abstraction and Concept Formation, Pikas compares d efin itio n s of terms
related to concept formation and traces the major lines of research:
research on abstraction and concept formation, research on stimulus
generalization, research on concept formation and negative transfer,
research on concept attainment, research on symbol formation. (Pikas,
1966)
Most of the studies that Pikas reviews are from the field of
experimental learning psychology. The subtitle of the book is "An
Interpretive Investigation into a Group of Psychological Frames of
Reference." Pikas discusses (l) the difficulties in using the term
abstraction, (2) the dimensions of concepts and (3) varying abilities
of conceptualizers. Pikas does not try to relate his conclusions or
the conclusions of research to principles of communications design.
Abstraction and Concept Formation c la r ifie s the research on
concept formation but not completely. Perhaps one reason that the
book is not entirely successful is that it needs a topic to help re
late the various schools of research. The construct "abstraction" does not seem to have been adequate for relating the various schools.
Another reason is that Pikas encounters so many problems of terminology that the book lacks readability. Pikas emphasizes the importance of a process he calls recoding, which is related to memory storage.
Textbooks in audiovisual education deal with question three.
What characteristics do concepts have and to what extent are these characteristics dependent on variables in the communication of con cepts? 7
A 1937 p u b lication . V isualizing the Curriculum, uses a continuum
of concrete to abstract experiences to explain the development of gen
eralizations. The authors of Visualizing the Curriculum, C. F. Hoban,
C. F. Hoban, J r ., and Samuel B. Zisman sta te ( l ) th at mental develop
ment occurs through wide and varied differentiation of concrete material,
and (2) that differentiated concrete responses are integrated into a
type of response known as abstraction and generalization. (Hoban, Hoban,
and Zisman, 1937, pp. 16-25) According to Hoban, Hoban, and Zisman,
concepts which are well integrated in a learner's cognitive structure
are a function of the suitability of the way in which the concept is
communicated to the learn er's previous experience.
In 1946 Edgar Dale introduced a textbook on using materials for
teaching. His t e x t , Audio-Visual Methods in Teaching, stressed the need
to use materials to build concepts. (Dale, 1946) Audio-Visual Methods
in Teaching presented the cone of experience to explain how type of
material was related to type of experience and level of conceptual development.
Succeeding textbooks in the audiovisual field , such as A-V
In stru ction ; M aterials and Methods (Brown, Lewis and Harcleroad, 1964) and Audiovisual Materials: Their Nature and Uses (Wittich and Schuller,
1967), also suggest that materials have value for building concepts.
Unfortunately, however, the audiovisual education textbooks do not give the teacher adequate guidance in how to encourage concept formation.
Empirical findings about the concept formation process have not been formulated into principles useful for the teacher.
Bernard Berelson and Gary Steiner try to answer question four.
What available empirical findings help us to understand the processes 8
involved in the communication o f concepts? Berelson and Steiner present
principles of learning related to the communication of concepts in Human
Behavior. (Berelson and Steiner, 1964) The principles are presented in
separate chapters on "Learning and Thinking," "Mass Communication," and
"Attitudes and Beliefs." There is no chapter on audiovisual design.
Although Human Behavior gives useable, understandable principles, its
list of principles is incomplete. For example, the effects of verbali zation on concept formation are not cited. Human Behavior does not ex plore theoretical issues. The reader of Human Behavior must formulate any relation sh ip s which e x ist between the prin cip les o f concept forma tion and types of personality.
Question five is . What curriculum approaches for developing conceptual ability have been tried and with what success? Question five has not been adequately answered by previous reviews of litera tu re.
A summary of findings on concept learning has been produced under a contract with the Office of Education by H. Klausmeier.
(Klausmeier, 1964) The summary relates the results of and theory be hind experiments conducted in order to determine the strategies and the related cognitive processes that individuals use in attaining con-
f. '■ cepts. Included in the summary are experiments conducted by J . Bruner,
H. Klausmeier, G. Miller, S. Ericksen and J. Byers. The success of the various strategies is related only slightly to type of personality and use of media. The report concentrates on relating learning strategy to type of concept to be formed. Klausmeier's report is not an answer to question five because learning strategies are not made comparable with curriculum strategies. 9
Question six asks, How is success in the communication of con
cepts related to differences in media, materials, methods and learners?
A. A. Lumsdaine relates the findings of psychology to audiovisual commu
nications in a review of research given in The Handbook of Research on
Teaching. (Gage, 1963) His chapter is entitled "Instructional Material
and Methods o f Teaching." Lumsdaine summarizes the p rincip les o f learn
ing found to be most relevant for audiovisual communication design. He
cites the audiovisual studies that have evaluated an application of these principles. Lumsdaine’s chapter, however, is concerned with com
munication for learning in general, not with the findings on communica tion for the specific type of learning, concept learning.
The study. Human Conceptual Behavior by Lyle Bourne J r ., ex plores the field of conceptual behavior research, especially recent research on the learning of relevant and irrelevant attributes. Un fortunately, Bourne does not try to develop guidelines for media design from his survey of laboratory research. (Bourne, 1966)
The book. Conceptual Systems and Personality Organization, presents the theory that d ifferen t methods o f conceptual communication have different effects with different personality types. Harvey, Hunt and Schroder analyze the research on childhood training and relate it to the type of conceptual structure an individual develops. They say that conceptual structure is a typical way of seeing or reacting to ideas. It is a personality characteristic. The authors suggest the best ways for communicating with each type o f conceptual structure.
(Harvey, Hunt and Schroder, 1961)
While there are reviews of litera tu re which respond to one or more of the questions given on pages 1-2 of this report, there are no 10
previous studies which try to answer all the questions on pages 1-2.
Nor do any of the previous studies attempt to develop a primitive sys
tem for analyzing and synthesizing the diverse information presented
in response to the questions on pages 1-2. Moreover, none of the re
views of literature correlates the findings of several areas in order
to suggest guidelines for teachers and curriculum or materials de
signers .
In summary, research related to the communication of concepts
has been done in the areas of experimental psychology, social psy
chology, sociology, anthropology, linguistics, education, communica
tion, biochemistry, and neurophysiology. The findings which have re
sulted have not been useful to teachers for these reasons:
1. The findings in each area have not been integrated with
the findings in other areas: nor has basic research been
coordinated with applied research.
2. The meaning of "concept” is not clear. Because the term
"concept" lacks precision, there is a problem of termi
nology. I t is d if f ic u lt to communicate findings about
concepts because one must continually explain the
meaning of words such as image, gen eralization , symbol,
concept.
3. The findings have not been adequately collected, organ
ized and disseminated.
What is needed is a critical review of related literature in many fields to derive useful principles about conceptual communication.
The theoretical issues need to be clarified so that researchers. 11
curriculum s p e c ia lists and teachers are aware of the questions which
should be considered.
There is a need for study from a point of view of a generalist
familiar with the fields of education, communication and psychology.
Such a study should analyze and synthesize the responses to the ques
tions on pages 1-2. This report is designed to fu lfill these needs.
This study was designed to benefit from the previous studies
and to overcome th eir lim ita tio n s- The study draws on the references
by A. Pikas, B. Berelson and G- Steiner, H. Klausmeier, A. A.
Lumsdaine, Lyle Bourne J r., and by 0. Harvey, D. Hunt and H- Schroder-
The study also draws on audiovisual textbooks. This report uses the
concept of communication for concept formation to relate the theory and findings culled from a survey of these references. The study is designed to overcome the limitations of these previous reviews of literature by being (1) more complete, (2) more readable, and (3) more systematically applicable. CHAPTER II
THE MEANING OF CONCEPT
The writer started with the question, What does "concept” mean?
because this was basic to any understanding of the communication of
concepts. The problem was to conceptualize "concept." One conceptu
alizes by identifying the attributes which characterize a thing or an
idea. Attempts to do this soon revealed that the attributes of con
cept seemed to f a l l into two cla sses: variant and invariant or de
fining and non-defining.
In order to define "concept" by analyzing defining and non
defining attributes, it is necessary to consider an attribute in a
particular manifestation. For example, form may vary from concept
to concept. The concept may take the form of a definition, a classi
fication, a model or a visual image. The attribute form, however,
may also be defining or essential. A "concept" must have a form. If we accept the fact that a characteristic may always be present in a
concept yet may differ from concept to concept, the terms variable and definitive become more acceptable. An attribute of a concept may be defining and invariant in one sense and variable in another. A concept always functions as response, yet as a response its function can vary.
It can serve as a cue, as an implicit association or as an overt re sponse. In each case it is a conceptual response, but the nature of the conceptual response varies. The point of this discussion of
12 13
variant and invariant attributes of concepts is that various concepts
may be defined differentially in terms of a common set of dimensions.
Confusion over the meaning of concept has compounded over the
years. Pikas has represented diagrammatically the different meanings
of "abstract"abstraction" and "conceptual” used in experiments over
the years.
-primary and perceptual secondary and conceptual-
(abstrahere) ^^generalizing abstraction'/ The p io ("to take away") "concept neer use "isolating abstraction" forming" function o f the terms
The com "theoretical" mon sense (e.g. "abstract words") use (a lso in research)
V The use during "discrimination" "symbolical" "conceptual" the la s t few decades "structural"
Fig. 1— Relations of the different meanings of "abstract" and "abstraction," used in experiments. (Pikas, 1966, p. 112, Figure 3)
Further confusion resulted when some researchers equated con
ceptual with non-representational or non-realistic experience while others required realistic experience for concept formation. (Allen,
1964) This researcher set out to discover the inconsistencies and consistencies of definitions of "concept." It was believed that the consistencies between definitions might lead to the definitive charac teristics of "concept." The definition of concept used in this study 14 was based in part on a comparison of the various theoretical interpre tations of concept and by a survey of the usage of "concept" in research experiments and in textbooks.
Interpretations from Psychology
Two tables were prepared by this writer to help the reader see more clearly and concisely the characteristics attributed to concepts by the different schools of psychology. The tables help visualize the sim ilarities between definitions (which suggest the definitive charac teristics of "concept") and the dissimilarities between definitions
(which suggest variable characteristics of "concept").
The definitive characteristics of a concept indicated by the comparison of psychological approaches include a response which is learned 5 which is discrim inatory, which mediates learning and which is often given some representative form. 15
TABLE 1
THE CHARACTERISTICS ATTRIBUTED TO CONCEPTS BY DIFFERENT THEORETICAL APPROACHES
D efin ition Characteristics of the Approach o f Concept Process of Conceptualization
STRUCTURALISM A conscious Conscious association with stim association uli (words) by means of ideas, feelings, sensations, images
FUNCTIONALISM A learned Motivated by need to adjust to discrimination environment; S-R bond formed physiologically; related to capacity
DYNAMIC A subcon Persisting personal modes of PSYCHOLOGY sciou sly reaction determine nature of determined adaption by conceptualization; response can be formed from a sin gle experience (traumatically) but need not be; influenced by in teraction between personality and environment
GESTALT A structured Consciously organized according PSYCHOLOGY perception to patterns or laws of percep which tion; formation of a cognitive mediates map for perceiving; insight use ful in restructuring; construc tion of a conceptual foundation for perception
BEHAVIORISM A conditioned S-R chained response; discrimi response nation of stimuli and differen- tiation of response required; establishment of habits, reflexes 16
TABLE 1—Continued
D efinition Characteristics of the Approach o f Concept Process of Conceptualization
VERBAL A categorical Formation o f an im p licit asso- LEARNING response ciational response that has to have meaning, such as a cate gory name; involves differentia tion and association of re sponse; frequency of responding affects meaning; generalization required; rote learning can lead to meaning
DEVELOPMENTAL An expressive Formed by operations; individual PSYCHOLOGY response differences in mental development expressed in level of abstraction of concept formed
MEDIATION A mediated Representation o f meaning and PSYCHOLOGY response several mediating associations which provide meanings (word and meaning); connotative and denotative meaning associated with a word; gradual generaliza tion; intervening variables im portant; emotional reactions can influence without practice
PROBLEM A set for General principle for responding; SOLVING responding sets, strategies, hypotheses mediate problem solvin g, complex discrimination learning; innate and developed concepts mediate concept formation 17
TABLE 2
A COMPARISON OF THEORETICAL APPROACHES
D efin ition Characteristics Attributed to Approach of Concept the Process of Conceptualization
POINTS ON A type of Associative; discriminatory; WHICH THERE response learned; mediational, represent IS MUCH ative; affected by individual AGREEMENT differences; motivated
POINTS ON What type Amount of generalization re WHICH THERE of response quired; amount of conscious IS MUCH DIS association; complexity of dis AGREEMENT crimination; how motivated; type of learning involved; de termined by personality, con ditioning or previous learning; mode of representation—cogni tiv e map, word and meaning, hypotheses, abstraction, per ception, implicit or explicit association
Interpretations from Philosophy
Some of the consequences flowing from the more recent philo
sophical beliefs about the nature of concepts were considered. One of
the potent ideas produced by modern philosophical analyses is the im
portance of symbolic transformation for conceptual thinking. As de
scribed by Susan Langer, symbolic transformation refers to a basic human need—"a natural activity, a high form of nervous response,
characteristic of man among the animals.” (Langer, 1951, p. v iii)
This theory of the essentially transformational nature of human under standing demands th at the study o f symbol and meaning be the starting point rather than the concluding point of philosophy. Langer further describes symbolic transformation as recognition of the use of symbols 18
to attain as well as to organize beliefs* Symbolic transformation means that form and content are continually changing as the symbolic modes of thought change * Among symbolic modes o f thought Langer includes speech,
imagery, ritual, music. The symbolic transformation of experiences makes the mind more analogous to a transformer than to a transmitter.
The brain
. . . is actively translating experiences into symbolism in ful fillment of a basic need to do so. It carries on a constant process of ideation. Ideas are undoubtedly made out of impressions—out of sense messages from the special organs of perception, and vague visceral reports o f fe e lin g . The law by which they are made, however, is not a law of direct combination. Any attempt to use such prin ciples as association by contiguity or similarity soon runs into sheer unintelligible complication and artifice. Ideation proceeds by a more potent principle of symbolization. The material fur nished by the senses is constantly wrought into symbols, which are our elementary ideas* Some of these ideas can be combined and manipulated in the manner we call "reasoning.” Others do not lend themselves to this use, but are naturally telescoped into dreams, or vapor off in conscious fantasy; and a vast number of them build the most typical and fundamental edifice of the human mind— religion. (Langer, 1951, p. 46)
Symbolic transformation is important to the study of conceptualization because:
A concept i s a ll th at a symbol rea lly conveys. But ju st as quickly as the concept is symbolized to us, our own imagination dresses it up in a private, personal conception, which we can d istin gu ish from the communicable public concept only by a process of abstraction. Whenever we deal with a concept we must have some particular presentation of it, through which we grasp it. What we actually have "in mind ;" is always universalium in re. When we express this universalium we use another symbol to exhibit it, and still another res will embody it for the mind that sees through our symbol and apprehends the concept in its own way. (Langer, 1951, p. 70)
By this Langer means that we have commonly agreed on denotations of a concept expressed in words or other symbols and that we also have pri vate connotative meanings for that symbol which are stored in our minds 19 as the other symbols (such as images) associated with that word. Fur thermore ,
No symbol is exempt from the office of logical formulation, of conceptualizing what it conveys; however simple its import, or however great, this import is a meaning, and therefore an ele ment for understanding. (Langer, 1951, p. 90)
The power of the theory of symbolic transformation is that it accounts for the many forms of concepts and for the abstractions which occur during the process of conceptualization. Because man can transform sense data in to symbols and symbols into other symbols which he can manipulate, he has superior powers of conceptualization.
Kenneth Boulding also b eliev es that symbolic transformation plays an important role in thinking. He believes that the image is a symbol which expresses a concept. Boulding thinks that the image is a model—one of the ways availab le to us for conceptualizing the world.
He speaks of public and private images and maintains that the human image can be public in a way that the image o f the lower animal can never be. Language helps us to share images—to make them public.
The following passage illustrates Boulding's interest in the relationship of the symbolic process to consciousness and intelligence.
Obviously, the problems of consciousness and the role it plays in con ceptual communication are important and are often ignored.
One fin a l question o f great in ter e st which must also go un answered is the relationship of the symbolic image to conscious ness, especially to self-consciousness. The lower animals have awareness. The image of dogs and monkeys, for instance, probably includes some differentiation between sleeping and waking condi tions. It may be doubted whether any animal apart from man has what could properly be called self-consciousness, that is, an image of its image, [italics mine.] Consciousness, however, is a b a fflin g and impenetrable mystery. The most that we can say about it is that it is intimately connected with the symbolic process and that it is profoundly affected by disturbances of the symbolic process. 20
We cannot even conceive of ourselves, however, as building a machine or a construction with consciousness. I t i s easy to build stimulus-response machines. It is even possible to build, as W. R. Ashby has done, something like a learning machine, a machine that is capable of conditioned r eflex e s. We can build machines to do elaborate calculations or even to play chess. We can build machines with memory, that is , with stored informa tio n . have not succeeded in building the sim plest machine with a conscious image, [italics mine.] When we do that we w ill, in a very real sense, have created a new form of intelligence. (Boulding, 1961, pp. 45-46)
Boulding would say that symbolic form and level of consciousness could
be variable characteristics of concepts.
Langer and Boulding believe that a concept is a symbolic trans
formation. Other modern philosophers who speculate about the nature of
concepts include S. Komer (Korner, 1955), H. H. Price (Price, 1953),
p. Geach (Geach, 1957) and J . Yolton (Yolton, 1962). A tab le comparing their positions follows on page 21. The titles of their books are given on the tab le below th eir names. Table 3 was developed by th is w riter.
Symbolic transformation was one potent idea contributed by philosophy. Another potent idea develops from a philosophy of the subjective nature of concepts. The subjective nature of a concept follows from the realization that the ability to behave or act on something mentally, while not necessarily unique to a person, differs from person to person. Thus a concept is determined subjectively.
Geach describes the subjective nature of concept.
A concept, as I am using the term, is subjective—it is a mental capacity belonging to a particular person. . . . The subjective nature of concepts does not however imply that it is improper to speak of two people as "having the same concept;" conformably to my explanation of the term "concept," this w ill mean that they have the same mental capacity, i.e . can do essen tially the same things. Thus, if each of two men has mastered the intelligent use of the negative construction in his own language, we may say that they have the same mental capacity. TABLE 3
THE POSITION OF MODERN PHILOSOPHERS ON THE NATURE OF A "CONCEPT"
Example o f Characteristics Concept "Rabbit" Valuable D e fin itio n A ttributed as Defined by Implications Philosopher of "Concept" to "Concept" Philosopher of Position Criticisms and Position
H. H. P rice Mental Formed from Ability to rec Study capac 1. Does not concern itself cap acity recurrent ognize small i t i e s fo r enough with the role conscious Thinking fo r recog features of furry animal abstractions ness plays in concept formation. and n itio n experience; w ith lo n g , 2. Dispositions are hard to Experience learned dis pointed ears, study, especially dispositions p o sitio n ; stub nose and for abstraction. abstraction t a i l as a 3. I f tr u e , why does concept member o f th e formation not occur from con- class labeled tin g u ity and s im ila r ity more rabbit often than it does? 4. Is a concept never a be havior, but always a disposi tion to a behavior? 5. How is more complex con cept formation explained? p . Geach Innate Formed through Ability to at Study in- 1. How can changes in expe- mental innate concept tach to label nate and rience be explained without a Mental cap acity -forming power "rabbit" at individual theory of abstraction being A cts fo r acting on ex tributes from c a p a c itie s employed at some point? changing perience; con personal expe for chang- 2. Abstraction can take forms experience cepts are not rience such as ing expe- other than discriminating re- a result of easily fright rience current features, for example, abstracting ened 5 pleasantly visualizing, labeling. (d i scri minating) warm and s o ft TABLE 3—Continued
Example o f Characteristics Concept "Rabbit" Valuable Definition Attributed as Defined by Implications Philosopher of "Concept" to "Concept" Philosopher of Position Criticisms and Position
recurrent 3. If concept forming power features; they is innate much of it must be are subjectively developed through learning; determined as a Geach does not exp lain ade result of fit quately how this learning tin g o n e's o ccu rs. available con cep ts to experience
J • Yolton Unique Formed by a s A "rabbit" is a Study units 1. This theory doesn't ex mental sociating units small animal o f meaning plain the process of concept Thinking e n t it ie s of meaning with w ith long form ation. and (which are symbols; a pointed ears. 2. Other philosophers have P erceivin g d is t in c t concept is a In my experience said that a concept is an from semantic unit it is nocturnal. image, a word, an idea be im ages, used to ex Its body can ap cause an image, for example, w ords, plain expe pear to be com incorporates both symbol and id e a s) r ie n c e . No pact or it can meaning. Can Yolton's dis m atter how be extended when tinction between image or abstract the leaping. I can word and a concept be main concept is; its remember i t s tain ed ? meaning must be trem bling when based on held. All of experience. these associa tions combine to form my con tsD cept of "rabbit.” t o TABLE 3—Continued
Example o f Characteristics Concept "Rabbit" Valuable Definition Attributed as Defined by Implications Philosopher of "Concept" to "Concept" Philosopher of Position Criticisms and Position
S . Korner E ntity All concepts A rabbit is Study dif- 1. Often, logic, perceptual d is tin c t have a logical mammal. ferences experience and imagination are Conceptual from i t s or experiential among con- equally important in the forma- Thinking; lo g ic a l b a s is . (How cep ts and t io n o f a concept, A L ogical and expe e v e r , both conceptual 2. Is separating a concept Inquiry r ie n t ia l lo g ic and ex bases from its logical or experien base p erien ce must tia l basis a worthwhile play a part distinction? in any con cept forma tion.) Dif ferent types of concepts are formed from imagina t io n and sense p ercep tion than are formed from lo g ic a l reason in g•
to CO 24
the same concept, they both have the concept of negation. There are of course all degrees of transition between cases where we should say unhesitatingly "they have different words, but they use them in th e same way; they have the same concept", and, where we should rather say "it's not just a verbal difference; they have different concepts". (Geach, 1957, pp. 13-14)
In The Conduct o f Inquiry the philosopher Abraham Kaplan de
scribes the subjective nature of concepts by distinguishing between a
conception and a concept. According to Kaplan a conception is an in
dividual's capacity for a symbolized, discriminatory response. A con
cept differs in that it is a group's capacity for a symbolized, dis
criminatory response. Kaplan's position can be represented diagram
matically as follows:
Conception C Conception A
Group Conception or Concept Conception B
Although he differentiates between the group and individual
functions of a concept, Kaplan does not limit the subjective nature
of a concept to individual conceptions. The group's concept he says, is very subjective. The cultural context and the nature of the group determine the nature of the concept.
Kaplan also speaks of "the paradox of conceptualization." By this he means that
The proper concepts are needed to formulate good theory, but we need a good theory to arrive at proper concepts. . . . As knowl edge of a particular subject matter grows, our conception of that subject-matter changes; as our concepts become more fitting, we learn more and more. Like all existential dilemmas in science. 25
of which this is an instance, the paradox is resolved by a process of approximation: the better our concepts, the better the theory we can formulate with them, and in turn, the better the concepts available for the next, improved theory. (Kaplan, 1964, pp. 53, 54)
The "paradox of conceptualization" theory helps explain why the cul
tural context of a group's concept makes a concept subjective.
In his work on the affective domain of educational objectives
David Krathwohl proposes the conceptualization of a value as an affec tive objective. To conceptualize a value a subject identifies charac teristics he admires. Once a value is conceptualized an individual can judge "how the value relates to those he already holds or to new ones that he is coming to hold." (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964, p. 183)
This view of conceptualization contrasts with the view of con ceptualization presented in the Taxonomy of Educational Objectives,
Handbook I: The Cognitive Domain. (Bloom, et a l., 1956) Krathwohl's
(a ffec tiv e domain) view of conceptualization emphasizes the subjective function of abstractions. In the cognitive domain concepts may enable one to know, comprehend, apply, analyze or synthesize generalizations which are objectively known.
The potent idea which develops from philosophical ideas such as the subjectivity of concepts and other ideas of mental capacities is the idea of individual and group differences in conceptualization.
The concept o f individual and group differences allows one to explain how concepts mediate learning.
A D efinition o f "Concept"
After reviewing the underlying theoretical issues and the usage of "concept," the writer proceeded to develop a definition of 26
concept for this report. The object was to develop a concise definition
which would distinguish a concept from a "non-concept.” To do this it
was necessary to determine the essence of the concept.
The characteristics chosen as essential were the capacity for
responding, the capacity for discriminating and the capacity for sym
bolizing. These characteristics were chosen because they incorporated
the many definitive characteristics found in the survey of literature.
The case for the choice of each of the characteristics if presented
next.
Response
The first characteristic that seems to be agreed on is that a
concept is a capacity to make a response. The writer bases this con clusion on certain assumptions. First, that a concept which acts as a stimulus is also a response. Secondly, that associating,is a response just as mediating an overt response with covert associations is a re sponse. Thus, even when a concept functions as a stimulus, cue or as sociation, it is functioning also as a response.
Another reason for saying response characteristics are essen tia l for conceptualization is that whenever one defines concept, inter nal thought behavior is implied. In defining concept one must imply the behavior or processes of recall or retention. Since such behavior may be considered a response, a concept is always characterized by response behavior. However, any products of thought could be charac terized as responses. More essential characteristics must be specified before a concise definition of "concept" is developed. 27
Discriminatory
The writer has concluded that generalization is a form of dis
crimination learning. (See Kleinmuntz, 1967, p. 39) Many processes are
subsumed under the word "discriminatory," for example, abstraction,
generalization, sensing. It is impossible to discriminate without
having abstracted from a generalization by differentiating or general
ized from an abstraction by seeing sim ilarities. Because similarity
implies a relationship between two or more things, before simi
larities can be seen differences must be seen—two things must be seen.
Even i f the two things are exact rep licas of each other they must be
perceived as different entities. Thus, they must be discriminated be
tween on the basis of separate entities. The writer proposes, there
fore, that the basis of all conceptualization is discriminatory behavior
whether it be generalization, abstraction, structuring, association or
sensing. A structure that forms an abstraction, an abstraction that
forms a generalization, a generalization that forms a structure—all
are still discriminatory responses. Differentiation is a preprequisite
for integration, for all conceptual behavior.
Why did the writer choose the word "discriminatory" over the word "abstracted?" Abstraction has too often come to mean the opposite of generalization to be suitable in a concise definition. It would not necessarily subsume the processes of generalization, structuring, in ference. Discriminatory is defined as "making distinctions, discrimi nating." Discriminating is defined as "differentiating; analytical."
Discrimination is necessary for a response to be manipulable, retrievable, useable. A response that is discriminatory can have these 28
characteristics besides being behavioral in nature: (l) comparative
meaning, (2) manipulability.
But a concept cannot be characterized as simply a discrimina tory response. If it could be, a concept would be simply a discrimi nation and could be adequately researched in the field of discrimina tion learning. It might be argued, further, that saying a concept is a discriminatory response does not say much because discriminatory re
sponses are basic to many types of learning. (See Handler and Kessen,
1959, p. 158 for discussion of position that the elementary discrimi natory reaction is the fundamental operation of all science.) There must be another c h a r a cter istic , or ch a r a cter istic s, by which concepts can be distinguished. What else must be present for a concept to exist? This question brings us to the other characteristic consid ered essential: symbolized.
Symbolized
The third essential characteristic has been described in the definitions of concept in many ways—as symbol, as memory trace or structure, as coding. This writer has designated the characteristic as symbolized because (as with discriminatory) this term seems to sub sume the various terms used in the definitions to describe giving form or representation to an idea.
The characteristic of symbolization makes learning possible.
This is because when symbolized a discriminatory response has two additional characteristics: stability and communicability. Symboli zation is a characteristic stressed in the theories of symbolic trans formation (Susan Langer) and of recoding (Anatol Pikas), as well as in media theory. 29
That which a ll adequate conceptions of an ob.ject must have in common, is the concept of the ob.ject. The same concept is embodied in a multitude of conceptions. It is a form that ap pears in all versions of thought or imagery that can connote the object in question, a form clothed in different integuments of sensation for every different mind. Probably no two people see anything alike. Their sense organs differ, their attention and imagery and feelings differ so that they cannot be supposed to have identical impressions. But if their respective concep tions of a thing (or event, or person, etc.) embody the same concept, they w ill understand each other.
The power of understanding symbols, i.e . of regarding every thing about a sense-datum is irrelevant except a certain form that it embodies, is the most characteristic mental trait of mankind. It issues in an unconscious, spontaneous process of abstraction, which goes on all the time in the human mind: a process of recognizing the concept in any configuration given to experience, and forming a conception accordingly. . • • (Langer, 1951, p. 70)
Symbolizing can be explained as the coding or the relating
of signs according to rules, as is the giving of form or representation to rules for relating experience. Concepts may be symbolized in the
form of images, words or emotions.
Whenever a symbol operates, there i s a meaning; and con versely, different classes of experience—say reason, intuition, appreciation—correspond to different types of symbolic media tion. (Langer, 1951, p. 90)
Symbols can take both d iscu rsive (language) and presentational (sense data) forms. (Langer, 1951, pp. 86, 87)
Stability is required for more complex manipulation of discrim inatory responses. Symbolization gives discriminatory responses sta bility or "staying power." Symbolizing provides stability by enabling one to store (and retrieve), temporarily or longer, a discriminatory response. Without symbolization discrimination remains too fleeting to serve the purposes of conceptualization. 30
Capacity
Capacity is defined as the power of receiving or containing, or
as availability. In this case it refers to the power to receive, con
tain or make available a response, a discrimination and a symbolization.
A concept is held until it is needed. Even when not active as a re
sponse, the capability for a conceptual response once gained, continues.
The Definition
A concept can be defined concisely as the capacity to make a
symbolized, discriminatory response.
Glossary of Conceptual Communication Terminology
The reader is referred to Ely et _al., 1963, and to Kimble,
1961, pp. 477-85, for other glossaries of relevant terms. Travers,
1967, has also collected some relevant terms into a short glossary on concept learning. (Travers, 1967, pp. 199-201) Some of the terms used in this glossary which will be left undefined include: stimulus, representation, send, receive, sense, separate, relate, combine, de sign, shape, structure, differentiate, producing continua. Such terms are used with th eir common'language meanings and are le f t undefined.to avoid circularity.
ABSTRACTING: the separating o f sig n s.
ASSOCIATING: the relatin g of sign s.
AUDIOVISUAL DESIGN: theory and practice concerned with the design
and use of messages which control the learning process. (Ely
et ^ ., 1963)
CAPACITY: power of receiving or containing, availability. 31
COMMUNICATION: producing meaning by sending and receiving messages.
CONCEPT: the capacity to make a symbolized, discriminatory response.
CONCEPT LEARNING: a change in the store of symbolized, discriminatory
responses available for communication, the process of achieving
this change.
CONCEPTUAL: pertaining to concepts or to the forming of concepts.
CONCEPTUAL COMMUNICATION: the sending o f messages pertaining to con
cepts or to the forming of concepts; the process of creating
meaning for a concept. (The nature o f a concept can be expected
to be affected by variation s in the process of creating meaning
for i t . )
CONCEPTUALIZER DIFFERENCES: individual d ifferen ces among learners.
CURRICULUM APPROACH: organized plan for affecting the learning of
concepts.
DECODING: the coding of a message for meaning. (See Encoding)
DEFINITIVE CHARACTERISTICS: ch aracteristics required by a basic
and stable definition of concept; which although they vary from
concept to concept are essential to a concept.
DIMENSIONS OF CONCEPTS: continuums o f correlative concepts which
describe variable characteristics of concepts.
DISCRIMINATORY: noting or observing a difference; differentiating.
EFFECTS OF CONCEPT: consequences o f using a concept.
ENCODING: the coding of a message for transmission. (See Decoding)
FORM: shape, structure and physical appearance or manifestation of
a representation.
FUNCTIONS: purposes served.
GENERALIZING: the combining of signs; assigning meanings; synthesizing. 32
IMAGE; internal representation of sense data.
MEANING: response to a message; the meaning of a message is the change
which it produces in an image. (Boulding, 1961, p. 7)
MESSAGE: one or more signs that have been coded and transmitted.
RESPONSE: anything that is done as a result of receiving a message.
(Berio, 1960)
SIGN: any stimulus th at can be sensed; i t d iffe r s from a symbol in
that it is the message, not the representation of the message.
STORAGE: meaning which has been coded and which can provide internal
feedback. Storage can be temporary or permanent.
SYMBOL: representation of a message.
SYMBOLIZING: selecting and interrelating signs for the purposes of
representation; giving a definite shape, form, coding.
TYPES OF CONCEPTS: the categories that concepts separate into for
purposes of reference, identification, and description.
VARIABLE CHARACTERISTICS: ch a ra cteristics which change from concept
to concept; described by dimensions on which concepts vary.
VERBALIZATION: representation in words. CHAPTER III
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF CONCEPTS
The Dimensions of Concepts
The most important characteristics of concepts which the com municator, whether learner, teacher, media or curriculum designer, can influence are expressed by these twenty-five dimensions:
FORM:
1. Nonverbal Verbal
2. Visual Audio
3. Realistic Symbolic
FUNCTION;
4. Cue Association
5. Private Public
6. Dysfunctional Functional
CONTENT:
7. Singular General
8. Concrete Abstract
9. Simple Complex
10. S tatic Dynamic
11. Construct (theoretical level) Major Concept
*”Construct: a concept which represents relationships among things and/or events and their properties." (Marx, 1967, p. 41) Major Concept: concepts basic to an understanding of a field. (See p. 53)
33 34
12. Experiential Basis ______Logical Basis (See p. 54)
LEARNING:
13. Stimulus Generalization ______Response Generalization
14. Trial and Error ______Insight
15. Formation ______Attainment
16. Rote ______Meaningful
17 . Reception ______Discovery
STYLE:
18. Rigid ______F lexib le
19. Field Dependent______Independent
20. Narrow ______Wide Span
21. Undifferentiated ______Differentiated
22. Disorganized______Organized
AMOUNT AND APPLICATION:
23. Short Term Memory ______Long Term Memory
24. Immediate R ecall ______Delayed Recall
25. Interference______Facilitation
Each of the preceding dimensions is discussed in detail in the text of this chapter.
Variable Characteristics
As noted above, the categories of dimensions which concepts can vary on are the variable characteristics of concepts—form, function, content, learning, style, and amount or application. Variable charac t e r is t ic s are the ways in which concepts d iffe r from each other. Con cepts differ not only in form, in function, in content, in type of learning used, in style, but also in the degree to which they are 35
retained and in the extent to which they transfer.
The Forms of Concepts
One would expect form to be related to symbolizing and symbolic
transformation. The writer shall use "form" to mean the shape, struc
ture and physical appearance or manifestation of a concept. The defi
nitional requirement that a concept be symbolized does not specify in
what way a concept should be symbolized.*
M odalities
One way in which form can change is in modality. Modality re
fers to the type of sense data received, such as vision, hearing,
sm ell, ta s te , warmth, coolness, pain and pressure. Imaginai concepts
can appear as audio images, visual images or as kinesthetic images.
Sim ilarly, verbal forms of concepts can assume audio or visu al
or audiovisual forms. Furthermore, they can assume these forms in ter
nally or externally. This means that verbal concepts can take the
form of audio imagery, visual imagery, printed or spoken words. James
Archer has commented on the step from pre-verbalized coding to verbal
ized coding.
The computer sim ulation and mathematical model approach may give us some magical moments of understanding, but I suspect that the programs and models w ill have to sense when the "big step" from pre-verbalization to verbalization takes place and apply the new variables appropriately. I am suggesting that there may be a gradual development of attending to stim uli, selection of information, formulation of hypothesis, testing of these hypotheses, identification of relevant and irrelevant
*Further discussion of the difference between form and content can be found on pages 32-33 of An Introduction to Symbolic Logic. (Langer, 1967) 3 6
information, elimination of redundant relevant information and a gradual but final "firming up" of a verbal statement of the concepts. Perhaps some of these steps are S-R associations with little mediation but I think it is more probable that each step has associated internalized verbalizations. . . . (Melton, 1964, p. 240)
K. Start and A. Richardson have studied the use of different
modalities. In the past one of the key questions relating to form of
concepts was stated as: "What sense modality does the subject find
it best to operate in?" Start and Richardson applied factor analysis
to tests on preferred modality. The tests relied on introspection as
is usual in such tests. The test used was the Sutcliffe Imagery Bat
tery which is based on the Betts Imagery Inventory. (Start and Richard
son, November, 1964) Results implied that the preferred use of one
modality is due more to habit than to any innate individual abilities
or preferences. The only innate differences seem to be between good
and poor imagers, not between visualizers and verbalizers. If the
habit of verbalizing is reinforced more than the habit of visualizing
then th at mode becomes easier for the individual to use.
Imagery forms of concepts can also be seen as taking another
type of form. Imaginai concepts can be as two or as three dimensional.
A three dimensional form would tend to be more r e a lis tic and a two
dimensional form to"be more symbolic.
The writer believes that the differences due to form may be
made clearer on levels other than kinetic, verbal or pictorial. -
More specific forms are: models or analogies, definitions or state ments or equivalence, classifications or groupings of associated things. Theoretically, a concept could take these forms kinetically as well as verbally or pictorially. For example, concepts can be sub vocal speech as well as verbal imagery or audible speech. We can 3 7
express the concept o f cup with a model which takes the form o f a p ic
ture of a cup, or the word "cup" or the sensation of lifting an object.
Mod els
Models are analogies, representations or likenesses of events,
structures or concepts. Models are similes and metaphors. They can
con sist o f a sin g le symbol or many symbols or no symbols. Models can
be mathematical, pictorial, verbal, graphic, etc. They can exist only
in one's head, or they can be constructed in a form for the external
world.
There are several basic kinds of models. Alphonse Chapanis
lists as a start two basic kinds of models: replica models and sym
bolic models. (Marx, 1963, pp. 104-29) Globes are replica models.
They give a pictorial representation. To a certain extent they look
like the thing being modeled.
Symbolic models are intangible in the sense that they make use of ideas, concepts and abstract symbols to represent the objects being modeled. . . . The model does not look at all like the real thing. . . . As should be apparent, mathematical models form a subclass of symbolic models. . . . Models may, o f course, be mixed, that i s , combine both replica and symbolic features. As a model of the earth, a globe is a replica model to the extent that it is spherical in shape and that the land and water masses are correctly scaled on the surface of the model. But a globe contains symbolic features because, for example, color codes are used to represent the depths of the oceans and the heights of the land masses. (Marx, 1963, p. 110)
A concept taking the form of a model, then, can be realistically and symbolically represented or just symbolically represented.
What functions can be served by concepts in the form o f models? Chapanis says that models can help us learn complex sk ills, can provide a framework for experiments, can help us predict when 38
experiments are im possible, can a s s is t in design and can amuse. (Marx,
1963, p. 113)
There are dangers in using concepts in model form although con
cepts in model form can serve many useful functions. Like other con
cepts, models invite overgeneralization. One tends to forget that the
model only represents and does not equate the object. There are parts
or aspects th at the model does not show. Another danger is th at the
models may be incorrect representations. Models establish thought
directions and if the directions or aspects given by the model are
wrong the thinking which follow s can be wrong. Chemistry models may
be highly exact, but they still depict chemical energy bonds (e.g.,
symbol for carbon double bond, C = C), physically (e.g., ).
The model could lead one into thinking incorrectly that chemical
bonds could be seen when a chemical compound is examined with a
microscope.
Definitions
Definitions or equivalence statements often take the form of
operational constructs or logical propositions. They can be verbal
in form, as they usually are, or they can be pictorial. The impor
tant difference between models of concepts and definitions of concepts
is that definitions generally have a 1:1 denotative relationship with
what they describe. However, the d efin itio n may also contain le s s in
formation than the concept because definition excludes connotations.
In any event, definitions imply equivalence; models imply representa tion or analogy. The form which is most desirable depends on the use to be made of the concept. 39
What are the purposes for giving concepts definitional form?
Handler and Kessen have suggested these purposes:
1. Definitions can help provide better usage by specifying
rules for using vague terms.
2. Definitions can introduce words. For example, definitions
can introduce vernacular words into science, by specifying
rules of usage.
3. Definitions can clarify relationships between concepts.
(Handler and Kessen, 1959, pp. 89, 90)
Several kinds of definition can be identified. Different kinds of definition include nominal and real definitions. Nominal defini tions stipulate new names for classes described with other words. Nomi nal definitions often employ common language terms; however, they can be used scientifically. The more scientific and theoretical real defi nitions state essential characteristics, abstract qualities or constit uent properties of a concept.*
Partial definitions can be of a nominal or real nature. A par t i a l d efin itio n might help id en tify an example of a concept, but would not eliminate non-examples of a concept adequately. Types of partial definitions include operational definitions, indicators, reduction sen tences. (Hempel, 1952; Wallach, 1958; Handler and Kessen, 1959)
*Nominal d efin itio n s have "generally been considered to con sist of definitions of convention or stipulation; new terms or words are stipulated to stand for an alternate linguistic expression. Real definitions on the other hand include all those definitional proce dures in which a word is defined in terms of some essential character istic abstract quality, or 'real' constituent of the defined expres sion." (Handler and Kessen, 1959, pp. 90, 91) 40
A reduction sentence specifies meaning only for cases that
satisfy antecedent and consequent conditions that elicit a behavior.
Reduction sentence definitions are often used for dispositional terms
such as "hungry" and "angry." An important advantage of reduction
sentence definitions is that they give an openness that is needed in
many d e fin itio n s. An example of a reduction sentence might be, "If
another male mouse is placed in a cage of a mouse (x), then x is ag
gressive if and only if x shows hostility by harrassment of that
mouse."
Albert Upton and Richard Samson have classified definitions
in a d ifferen t way. (Upton and Samson, 1961, pp. 173-80) They assert
that "there are seven basic kinds of definitions which may be used
separately or in combination":
SYNONYM ANTONYM EXEMPLIFICATION COMPARISON CLASSIFICATION STRUCTURE ANALYSIS OPERATION ANALYSIS
A synonym usually employs an ambiguous symbol which has to be used in
context in order to define. An antonym provides definitions by
dichotomous classifications. Exemplification is defining by example.
Comparison i s lik e exem plification except that each example offered i s
accompanied by a statement of how i t d iffe r s from the referent o f the
word being defined. Definition by classification uses terms of
species and genus. Definition by structure analysis associates names
for parts with names for other parts and with a name the whole. .
Definition by operation analysis is used whenever the words to be de
fined are the names of operations or of elements of operations. An 41
operation is a structure changing for a purpose in time and space.
Operational concepts include names for operations, stages, changing
structures, changing parts, phases, junctures, functions and purposes.
Classifications
The writer w ill use "classification” differently than Upton and
Samson use the term. As used in this study "classification" refers to a form of concept distinct from definitions. Instead, "classification" is used to describe groupings of associated things.
Classifications often take the shape of lists of categories or categorical outlines. Thus, cow, pig and horse are Related to animal verbally or pictorially in that they are grouped together mentally— whether verbally, pictorially or just in terms of awareness. Research is needed on the sorting factors that affect such categorization.
Classification structures differ from models in that they are not used as analogies or representations; they differ from definitions in that they are not equivalence statements. The function of classification structures is to give an ordering for memory purposes. Another func tion is to show relationshipsi
Upton and Samson declare that genera (classes of things), species (subclasses of things), specimens (particular things), and qualities (properties) are useful for classification and structuring.
Sorting factors are terms which indicate similarities or dif ferences among specimens. Vertical sorting factors are names of class qualities and indicate the sim ilarities between the speci mens of classes. Horizontal sorting factors are words indicating th e respects in which species of genera d if fe r . (Upton and Samson, 1961, p. 55)
For example, green vegetables could be a vertical sorting factor. In this case green could be a horizontal sorting factor. 42
Upton and Samson also present a range sorting factor such as
the word "Appearance." A range sorting factor indicates how a number
of classes on more than one level are different from each other. It
is a factor on a more general level. Upton and Samson also note that
we can have working or uncompleted classifications and collected or
completed classifications.
Examples of c la ss ific a tio n s of concepts can be seen, in the
writer's opinion, in taxonomies, diagrams, tree diagrams, outlines,
lists, grids, paradigms and other categorical outlines. Images could
be classifications, as could pictorial representations. This is be
cause images and pictures often group associated attributes into a cate
gorical representation or they group the members of class. The image
o f a group of chipmunks, mice and sq u irrels i s a c la ss ific a tio n form o f
the concept rodent. Similarly the image or picture of several animals
is a classification or grouping of associates with the concept "animal."
Classifications are possibly, in this writer's opinion, the most impor tant form concepts can take because they allow for the ordering neces sary for long term retention and for transfer.
Continua are another classification form for concepts. Con tinua involve the placing of correlative concepts, such as antonyms, on a type of scale, such as a semantic differential scale. Continuums serve as indicators of the relative evaluation of a concept in compari son with other concepts.
Multi-form Concepts
The recent trend has been toward the position that concepts can change forms or can assume several forms such as r e a lis t ic v isu a l image 43 and audible verbal definition. Concepts can, therefore, be said to be "multi-form" meaning that they are available in several forms. Thus,
Langer proposes the term "symbolic transformation." (Langer, 1951, p.
48) Boulding writes of a concept as an image taking many forms.
(Boulding, 1961, pp. 6, 7) And, Pikas proposes recoding of memory traces as a way of explaining concept formation. (Pikas, 1966, p. 215)
The Effects of Concepts
The e ffe c ts of a concept can be described as the purposes which the conceptual process accomplishes. Secondary results or effects de pend on primary results or effects. Secondary effects are consequences of the primary effects attained.
With the primary effects of concepts the writer includes such activities as associating, cuing, responding. With the secondary ef fe c ts o f concepts the w riter includes a c tiv itie s such as r e c a ll, pub lic communication, rehearsal, storage, learning, stereotyping, overgen eralization. The writer has developed Figure 2 to illustrate the rela tionship between the primary and secondary effects of concepts.
It is possible to determine by the content, form, objectives, and treatment of a message the effects that the concept formed as a result of that message will serve. The use of definitions or equiva lence statements, for example, can result in a concept which identi fies for recall. The effect of such a concept is to cue. 44
Primary associating, cuing. E ffects respond ing^^^^
Private Public Secondary Communication: Communication: E ffects r e c a ll. stereotyping, reh earsal, language storage. / mass communi learning, / cation overgeneralization / interpersonal ^ / communication E ffects
Advantageous Disadvantageous
Fig* 2*—The Effects of Concepts
Primary E ffects of Concepts
The primary e ffe c ts o f concepts have been enumerated in common language terms as identifying; as representing; as selecting or per ceiving; as constructing or organizing; as unifying, fusing or synthe sizing. Psychologists have classified these functions under the labels of cuing, associating, and responding.
H. H. Kendler says that those who see concepts as associations are primarily members of the S-R associationistic school, those who see concepts functioning primarily as cues are mediationists, and those who see concepts functioning as responses belong to the problem-solving school of research on concept formation. The association effect point of view describes concepts as associations between dissimilar stimuli and common responses. The response effect school says that the point of view that concepts are acquired implicit responses which serve as cues for behavior is oversimplified. "They argue that something like 45
'ideas' or 'p rin cip les' or 'stra teg ies' are needed in addition to what
is referred to as S-R associations." (Melton, 1964, p. 229) Kendler
suggests that "If the vast potentialities of S-R language resulting
from chaining and mediated generalization of verbal behavior are con
sidered then what some prefer to call 'principles' or 'ideas' or
'strategies' can be, although need not be, expressed in terms of cues
arising from chains o f S-R association s."
D. E. Berlyne has proposed a way to relate concepts as cues
(stimuli) or mediators to chains of thought. His position is still one of concepts functioning as mediators, but he relates transforma tional or strategy concepts to stimulus or cue concepts. (Berlyne,
1965)
Berlyne says there are two types of concepts or mediators that occur in chains of thought situational concepts and transformational concepts. The former represent aspects of a situation, the latter rep resent operations. (Klausmeier and Harris, 1966, p. 86)
The traditional behaviorist account depicts a train of thought as a sequence of implicit responses corresponding to successive events or stimulus situations. Each response produces its feed back stimulus to bring on the next response, so that we can rep resent the process as So_Vl_^=l_V2-^=2—> ••• * We shall call each of these responses representing an external stimulus situation a situational response, and we shall call the feedback stimulus that it produces a situational stimulus. . . . Our proposal is that, between each pair of successive situa tional responses . . . , another symbolic response should be in troduced to represent a transformation. . . . We shall call this intervening symbolic response a transformational response. It
*The sequence represents an original stimulus (Sq) which leads to a succession of some finite number (n) of responses (r) producing feedback which acts as stimuli (s). 46
also w ill have its feedback stimulus, the transformational: stimulus, and we shall use the notation . . • to stand for a transformational thought comprising the two together.
Our conception of a transformational chain. as we shall call a train of thought built up of alternating situational and trans formational thoughts, pays heed to Selz's arguments, reminding us of the role of patterning. Each situational response is deter mined jointly by the immediately preceding transformational thought and situational stimulus. If a preceding situational thought had been followed by another transformational thought, or if the same transformational thought had started out from a different situational thought, the subsequent situational thought would have taken a different form. (Berlyne, 1965, pp. 114, 115)
Berlyne sees transformations as operations. Representations of the
stimulus are results of transformations. Both the transformational
response and the transformational stimulus could be concepts.
It is apparent to the writer and to Kendler that the effects
of concepts as associations, cues and responses could be placed on a
chronological continuum. Thus, concepts as cue(s) as associations
...as responses would be one way of integrating the effects of concepts.
The w riter would lik e to combine th is approach and Berlyne's approach
to chains of thought. The writer proposes from this synthesis of
ideas, that there is a transformational circuit as follows:
S cues (Implicit Associations) cues R,
Fig. 3.—The successive effects of concepts as stimuli, cues, associations and responses.
This writer's position, as diagramed above, is that stimuli cue the
implicit associative responses which, in turn, cue new responses.
Thus, the sight of a new catalog may cue the response "catalog."
The response "catalog" may be associated with source of information.
The concept of catalog as a source of information may cue the response 47
of reading. Both catalog and source of information are operating as
cues, associations and responses.
Secondary Effects of Concepts
The secondary effects of concepts may be classified as types
of public or private communication and as functions which have advan
tageous effects or disadvantageous effects. The kinds of private com
munication possible include recall, retention and overt or covert re
h earsal. Public communication can f u l f i l l the function o f mass com
munication or of interpersonal communication. The advantageous ef
fects of concepts provide for economy, simplicity and specificity in
storage and provide for direction-recognition in learning. The disad
vantageous effects of concepts arise from overgeneralization, rigidity
fixed meaning, stereotype and prejudice.
Bruner and h is associates have concisely enumerated fiv e e f
fects of conceptualization in A Study of Thinking. Bruner and his
associates asked the question, "What does the act of rendering things
equivalent achieve for the organism?" (Bruner, 1956, p. 11) They answer their question as follows:
. . . the organism reduces the complexity of its environment . . . categorizing is the means by which the objects of the world about us are identified. . . . a category based on a set of defining attributes reduces the necessity for constant learning. . . . the direction it provides for ordering and relating classes of events.* (Bruner et a l., 1956, pp. 12, 13)
*When one orders events one r e la te s them through cause and e f fect or superordinate and subordinate relationships. 48
Bruner's position is based on his theory that the organism is striving
to minimize "cognitive strain." "Cognitive strain" has been defined
as:
. . . the amount of "tension associated with the cognitive task of concept learning. The "tension" created is a func tion of the memory load inherent in a given strategy. (Travers, et a l., 1967, pp. 200, 201)
One danger is that concepts w ill come to have rigidly fixed
meanings. (Weiss, et a l., 1963) An effective illustration of this is
given by James Deese—only recently have many biologist's realized
that species are not well separated classes into which animals easily
fa ll, that species are instead convenient, often overlapping, classes
with continuous gradiation between them. (Deese, 1958, p. 291)
Another danger is overgeneralization. (Harvey, Hunt, Schroder,
1961, p. 17) Calvin Hall explains overgeneralization and the danger
of faulty conceptualization very well.
It is very easy to make the false assumption that because dis similar things are alike in some respects they are also alike in other respects . . . the very existence of woman as a class means that other generalized responses to women as a distinctive category are easily formed. It is generalized that women are this or women are that, when, in fact, there is no justification for such generalizations. . . . If there were no distinguishable class of people called Negroes, then no faulty concepts (preju dices) could be formed. (Hall, 1960, p. 242)
Such fa lse concepts formed on overgeneralization could be considered as resulting from an inability to discriminate. (Weiss, et a l., 1963)
The danger of concept formation when overgeneralization occurs is, then, the hindering of fine distinctions. S. I . Hayakawa has written eloquently on this problem. He feels that when a person's or a society's reactions become so highly fixated that they cannot be changed no matter how greatly the circumstances change, that person 49
or society is in trouble. Hayakawa labels this problem one of "insuffi
cient capacity for differentiated behavior." He lays some of the blame
for the problem at the feet of advertising and of mass communication.
Both these agencies hammer away at the production of a set of reactions
to symbols.
Hayakawa pleads for people to be on the lookout for differences
as much as they are for sim ilarities. He states that it's about time
schools started teaching how not to respond with a discrimination as
well as how to respond with a generalization. Hayakawa borrows the
term "identification reaction" from Alfred Korzybski to describe such
semantic malfunctioning as believing all cases that fall under a class
label to be in all ways alike.
Hayakawa says that it is time for teachers to sharpen percep
tion of the difference between symbol and thing symbolized, between
label and product. As a device for doing this he presents Korzybski's
idea of adding index numbers to a ll terms according to the formula;
A^ is not Ag. In other words, cow^ is not cowg. Indexing, he thinks
can reduce our tendency to "wild and woolly generalization." It can reduce our tendency to dangerous or dysfunctional use of concepts.
(Hayakawa, 1963, pp. 1-28)
The writer theorizes that two of the important effects of pri vate communication are retention and recall. Some types of recall or retention are forced, free, modified free, immediate, delayed, short term, long term. Another effect of private communication is rehearsal.
One of the effects of public communication functions of concep tualization is the establishment of common meanings for signs and sym bols. Another effect is the passing of information or ideas through 50
the use of these points of commonality. Related to this effect is an
other effect, the verifying of interpretation. Such verifying leads to
consideration of a concept's other aspects and eventually can lead to
changing the concept. Public communication is a basis for considering
concepts—for finding out what price they w ill bring in the marketplace
o f ideas.
The Content of Concepts
The Characteristics of Content
The writer w ill use "types of content" to describe the categories
which concepts seem to separate into for purposes of reference, identifi
cation or description. Types of concepts include, for example, abstract
concepts, subject matter concepts, and conjunctive concepts. The differ
ing characteristics of content result from continua on which content
varies, from the theoretical level of concepts, from the subject matter
content of concepts, from the experiential and logical bases for concept
formation and from the kinds of logic used to organize the content.
Since communicators can influence the characteristics of content, it is to be expected that they can determine the types of concepts formed.
The Continua for Content
The continua which can be used to evaluate the characteristics of content are: singular-general, concrete-abstract, simple-complex, static-dynamic, correlative-generic. Wundt laid the foundation for dis tinguishing between concepts according to their relative abstractness or concreteness. C linicians such as K. G oldstein, developed th is approach into concepts differentiated by the level of performance required to do this task. (Pikas, 1966, p. 74) Thus we have the four types of concepts shown in Figure 4 which was developed by the w riter. 51
Simple Complex
Concrete Simple-Concrete Complex-Concrete e .g . Dog e .g . Animal
Abstract Simple-Abstract Complex-Abstract e.g. Canines e.g. Phyllum
Fig. 4.—Types of Concepts
Singular or specific concepts are compared with general or
class concepts. Concrete concepts are compared with abstract con
cep ts. These types of content can combine into the types of concepts
shown in Figure 5, which was developed by the writer.
Concrete Abstract
Singular Singular Concrete Singular Abstract e.g. a dog-Rover e.g. Oligarchy
Generic Concrete Generic Abstract e .g . Dog e.g . Government
Fig. 5.—Types of Content
The difference between a simple and a complex task usually was
the number of details that were given or that subjects were required
to copy. James Anderson, for example, labeled concepts as simple or
complex depending on the number of details given in the drawing repre
senting a content statement. (Anderson, 1966)
R. W. Zaslow introduces another concept type. This is the dynamic concept. Zaslow compares the dynamic concept with the
Aristotelian class concepts, which tend to be rigid with well defined 52
boundaries. (Zaslow, 1961) The dynamic concept is a concept that under
goes transformation, that has vague, fluid boundaries, that is more am
biguous. This characteristic of content can be represented by the con
tinuum static-dynam ic and by a continuum o f am b igu ity-sp ecificity of
meaning. (Messick and Ross, 1962, p. 134) The type of concepts result
ing from dynamic content i s shown in Figure 6 .—Types of Ambiguous Con
cepts. Figure 6 was developed by the writer.
S ta tic Dynamic
Ambiguity Ambiguous-static Ambiguous-dynamic e .g . Work e.g. Success
Specificity Specific-static Specific-dynamic e .g . Eggs e.g. Nutrition
Fig. 6.—Types of Ambiguous Concepts
The Theoretical Level of Content
Another way to classify concepts is by their scientific pur
pose or theoretical level. By this I mean the relative generality of
a type of theoretical concept in comparison with other types of theo
retical concepts. Basic or major concepts, laws, and scientific con
structs are types of theoretical concepts.
Joseph Novak proposes a taxonomy o f conceptual le v e ls .
(Klausmeier and Harris, 1966, p. 241) What Novak would call a major
concept would be at the highest le v e l o f the sca le . He would include
concepts such as market in economics and evolution in biology at this highest level. These "major concepts" of Novak are similar to what others have spoken of as "basic concepts." Thus sociology has such 53
basic or major concepts as culture, group, role, status, authority,
function, race and bureaucracy. The narrower categories used in sci
entific fields are subdivisions or refinements of basic concepts.
(Chinoy, 1954)
Laws are thus less general than basic or major concepts. Con
structs are, however, less general than laws. A construct is a type of theoretical concept often used in science. Constructs are univer sal terms which characterize properties and relations. (Handler and
Kessen, 1959, p. 19) In literature, art and practical affairs con stru cts can have surplus meaning th at they cannot in science. (Marx,
1963, p. 11) The th eo r e tic a l le v e ls o f concepts can be diagramed as follow s:
Major Concept
Laws
Constructs
The Experiential and Logical Content
Two main types of content have been proposed on the basis of differences in the concept formation process. The writer proposes th at they be c a lle d . exp erien tial and lo g ic a l. "Experiential" meaning concepts derived from experience without the use of imch logic in their construction. Such concepts would primarily serve equivalence func tions. "Logical" w ill mean those concepts which are constructed by using much overt or planned logic or inference. Experiential concepts might be 54
seen as concepts more simply accepted or created than are logical con
cepts . Logical concepts, presumably, are also derived from experience just as experiential concepts are. Presumably too, logic as well as
experience must play a part in the formation of both types of content.
It is the extent to which the conceptual analysis depends on logic and
on experience which distinguishes the two.
Such types of concepts have been proposed by Kurt Koffka,
Stephan Komer, Robert Gagne and Jerome Bruner, D. E. Berlyne and
R. W. Deeper. Koffka was one of the earliest to make the distinction.
He distinguished between simple concepts derived from the data of ex perience and concepts constructed by scientists. As an example of the former he gives color and acromatic color. As an example of the lat ter he gives a concept that relates experiences such as threshold (of light so can see colors).
In 1951, R. W. Deeper spoke of inductive, deductive and inven tive concept formation. According to Deeper, inductive concept forma tion is similar to experiential concept formation. It consists of recognizing common or related features among a wealth of perceptual materials. Deductive concept formation seems to be, in Deeper's ap praisal, similar to logical concept formation and the production of discursive thought.
Danger describes discursive thought as rational judgment.
(Danger, 1951, p. 90) Discursive thought is thought which proceeds by the use of logic. It consists of formulations which are given in a verbalized, rather than a sensory form and flow as in presentational thought. Discursive thought produces logical content; presentational thought produces experiential content. Pikas raises the interesting 55
question of the amount of consciousness required for logical or deduc
tive concept formation. (Pikas, 1966, pp. 59-60)
The Kinds o f Logical Content
Jerome Bruner's c la ssific a tio n o f conjunctive, disjunctive and rela tio n a l concepts i s w ell known. I t should be remembered th at Bruner believes these types of concepts to be the result of different choices of strategies for concept formation.
In an a r tic le which appeared in A pril, 1960, E. B. Hunt and
C. I. Hovland describes the types as follows: A conjunctive concept is one in which all the instances possess characteristics which have features in common such as a and b, a and b and c , e tc .
A disju nctive concept i s one in which a ll instances have one or another feature. In other words, a stormy day can occur either when it is raining or when it is snowing or when it is windy.
A relational concept is one in which the common properties are sets of relationships in other than common specific elements.
(Hunt and Hovland, 1960) (See pp. 251-54 of this report.)
The Type o f Concept Learning
Concepts should be differentiated on the basis of the type of learning involved. James Holland has questioned the practice of de scribing experimental results as if they apply to all types of concept formation; when in fact, they can characterize some types of concept formation only. It is wrong, says Holland, to accept the results of traditional concept formation experiments calling for simple verbal identification of a class of objects as indicative of the complex con ceptual thought of adults. Similarly, it is hard to imagine that Lyle 56
Bourne's experiments which require identifying by verbalizing the at
tributes and rules associated with a concept, are analogous to early
concept learning in the child.
There seems to be general agreement that while there are dif
ferent forms of concept learning, there is a distinguishable type of
learning which can be called concept learning.
Concept learning was defined ea rlier as a change in conceptuali
zation or a change in symbolized discriminatory responses available for communication. A central issue for any definition of concept learning is whether or not verbalization is necessary for concept learning. Re search conducted by Kenneth Smoke has shown th at "one may have a con cept and yet be quite unable to give an accurate verbal formulation of i t ." (Schwahn and Harris, 1961, p. 142) Susan Langer, Kenneth Boulding and others dispute the position that verbal labeling is necessary for conceptualization. This writer has presented a definition of concept and of concept learning which does not mandate verbalization. Symboli zation does not necessarily have to be expressed with a verbalization.
After surveying the literature, the writer concluded further that concept learning was always a type of discrimination learning and was often a type of problem-solving learning. As a type of discrimina tion learning or problem solving learning, concept learning could assume various means for generalization and solution including stimulus, re sponse, or semantic generalization and trial and error, sudden reor ganization or gradual analysis so lu tio n s. (Schwahn and H arris, 1961, pp. 51, 52)
The reader is probably wondering what reason can be given for classifying generalization as a type of discrimination learning. The 57
writer believes that generalization is the result of more than a failure
to discriminate. With Clark Hull and E. J. Gibson she argues that while
there is a primitive stimulus generalization which is the result of
failure to discriminate, there is also another type of stimulus general
ization which results from synthesizing of discriminations. This lat
ter form of generalization involves an ability to consider similarities
and differences in order to form a category. (Pikas, 1966, pp. 161, 162)
This position is somewhat contrary to the intriguing position
of Edwin Martin. (Kleinmuntz, 1967, pp. 39, 48, 58-59, 65) Martin's position corresponds with the theory that discrimination is an influ ence which restricts, not includes, generalization.
Martin, who believes concept formation to be a discrimination process, emphasizes the role of inhibition in stimulus control of con cept formation. Generalization, to Martin, is always a case of a failure to discriminate. In order for discrimination to occur a cer tain amount of inhibition is necessary according to his theory. For a discrimination to be elaborated further inhibition is necessary. Martin makes these statements on the basis of his interpretation of relation ships among reaction time, discrimination learning and inhibition as shown by research.
I t might be said th at an organism "has a concept" when in making one response he must simultaneously inhibit a particular set of other responses. . . . A concept is a set of mutually induced response tendencies. (Kleinmuntz, 1967, pp. 39, 48, 58-59, 65)
To Martin concept formation is a form of discrimination learning. What
Martin is saying is that there is a continuum from generalization to discrimination to concept formation. One progresses along the con tinuum as the number of different stimuli involved increases. The 58
mechanism which allows one to progress from generalization to discrim i
nation to concept formation is inhibition.
The type of concept learning cannot be described simply be
cause it depends not only on the form of learning but also on the
learning task and method. The type of concept learning can, for
example, be response generalization by gradual analysis on a concept
assimilation task presented as reception learning. Figure 7 was de
veloped by th e w riter to summarize the contributors to the type of
concept learning. A more detailed explanation of the forms, tasks
and methods of concept learning follows Figure 7.
Stimulus Generalization Discrimination L. Response Generalization Mediated G eneralization Forms o f Concept Learning Trial and Error L. Problem Solving L. Sudden Reorganization General Analysis
C. Identification Concept C. Acquisition Learning C. Formation Type of Tasks C. Attainment Concept C. Utilization Learning C. Assimilation
Methods Rote L. of Meaningful L. Key: Concept Reception L. C. = Concept Learning Discovery L. L. = Learning
F ig. 7 . —Contributors to the Type o f Concept Learning 59
Forms o f Concept Learning
The ways in which concept learning can vary as discrimination
learning include stimulus generalization, response generalization, and
semantic generalization.
Primary stimulus generalization occurs when a single response
is associated with two stimuli• A variation of this is response gen
eralization wl m the reverse takes place. Primary stimulus generaliza tio n and response generalization could be diagramed as follow s:
stimulus generalization Sr
response generalization
Fig. 8.—Stimulus and Response Generalization
Stimuli 1 and 2 are alike in some ways yet different. Responses 1 and
2 are alike in some ways yet different.
Hull's representation of secondary generalization became the basis of mediation theories.
Fig. 9.—Secondary Generalization
Semantic generalization is a type of mediated generalization.
Semantic generalization is generalization which occurs on the b asis o f the meaning of stim u li. A subject conditioned to
*S: stimulus; r: implicit response; s: muscular reaction; R: Behavioral Response. 60
respond to the word BARN, for example, may show a tendency to make the same response to other words with rural connotation, for example, TRACTOR. But the response does not occur to non- rural words such as PAPER. In generalization of this sort the suggestion is that the response requires some intervening ac tivity on the part of the subject. (Kimble, 1961, p. 360)
One approach to explaining the relationship of problem solving
to concept learning has been to call concept learning a form of problem
so lv in g . Concept learning i s seen by Earl Hunt as a form of problem
solving because the subject must solve conceptual tasks such as devel
oping rules for identification. (Kleinmuntz, 1967, p. 77) A second
approach has been to view concept formation as a unique form of learn
ing which is basic to problem solving. (Kleinmuntz, 1967, p. 107)
Robert Gagne's enumeration of the types of learning as including con
cept learning and problem solving typifies this view, as does the
• position of John B. Carroll who believes problem solving to be the
manipulation of concepts. (Carroll, 1964)
Types o f conceptual tasks which require problem solving learn
ing include classification tasks, probability tasks, learning by trial
and error and insight problems. (Davis, 1966)
One of the questions raised by research on concept learning
and problem solving is whether there is ever unlearned insightful con
ceptual behavior. Generally, research has found no evidence for un
learned insightful behavior. (Kimble, 1961, p. 386)
Concept Learning Tasks
Differences between concept learning tasks are evident when
one compares the research schools of concept learning. Each school
i s associated prim arily with one term for concept learning. Each such term is indicative of a type of concept learning task. The most 61
important distinction is between concept formation tasks and concept
attainment tasks. Concept formation tasks require no previous concep
tual knowledge. Concept attainment tasks presuppose knowledge of
strategies for concept formation which can be brought to bear on the
problem and of certain attributes which may be relevant.
At th is point i t would be wise to d istin gu ish between the many
terms for types of concept learning.
Concept id e n tific a tio n , for example, i s used by the informa
tion theory or mathematical models school of research. This school
includes Lyle Bourne and Leo Postman. The phrase "concept identifica
tion" derives from the nature of the experimental task, which is
usually to sort the presented dimensions into a concept which is
verified for correctness by feedback from the experimenter. Since
the concept is presented within the task, conceptualization is more
a matter of selecting of relevant aspects and disregarding irrelevant
ones.
Concept identification has been analyzed into three steps:
(l) discovery of relevant dimensions, and (2) learning of correct
responses. (Kleinmuntz, 1967, p. 154) There is a question about
whether concept identification is a type of concept learning. This
writer feels that it is at the least a reinforcement of concept learn
ing. As such it is concept learning.
Concept acq u isition has been discussed by David Ausubel and
Howard Kendler. (Klausmeier and Harris, 1966; Pikas, 1966) Concept
acquisition implies concept formation from the beginning of abstrac tion and generalization through concept attainment. David Ausubel
sta te s that concepts can be acquired by eith er discovery methods as 62
in concept formation or reception methods as in concept assimilation.
Obviously, the meaning of concept acquisition as compared with the other
terms is not very clear. The phrase is often simply used as a synonym
for the other terms. As long as the moment of concept acquisition is
shrouded in obscurity the meaning of the term "concept acquisition" will not be clear.
Concept formation is the term used by the traditional research ers in conceptual communication. These researchers have a concern for associations, stimuli, and responses. Howard Kendler's definition of concept would be the one most acceptable to th is group; "Concept for mation is taken to imply the acquisition or utilization, or both, of common response to dissimilar stimuli." (1961) (Pikas, 1966, p. 117)
The research on generalization has often been in the concept formation tr a d itio n .
Concept attainment is associated with the work o f Jerome Bruner and Earl Hunt, with the hypothesis testing and decision making (compu ter simulation) schools of research. Concept attainment focuses on conceptualization after basic concepts and conceptual abilities and experiences have been acquired.
Bruner and his associates have described the difference be tween concept formation and concept attainment. Essentially, they say that concept formation is a process of invention and concept attain ment a process of discovery. By this, Bruner means that before a class concept can be attained, it must be first formed or proposed and secondly, the attributes and rules which distinguish this concept must be discovered, tested and used to classify exemplars and non-exemplars of the concept. 63
Concept utilization is used by verbal learning researchers.
Rote verbal learning tasks, such as paired associate lists, elicit re
sponses which are conceptual or categorical in nature. Usually, the
phrase is used when two or more stimuli come to elicit the same re
sponse implicitly or explicitly. (Klausmeier and Harris, 1966, p. 51)
Concept assimilation has been discussed by David Ausubel as
reception learning. In concept assimilation the subject reaches the
concept by deducing from material presented. It is also sometimes used synonymously with concept attainment. For concept assimilation to occur a concept must be deducted from experience and incorporated into, related with, the cognitive structure.
Concept learning tasks include, then, selecting relevant di mensions when they are presented; acquiring or inventing a common response to dissimilar stimuli; hypothesizing, testing and using rules and attributes which define a concept; associating verbal labels with stimuli and interrelating concepts with other concepts. Concepts can be invented, applied, identified, described, reinforced, labeled, or interrelated during concept learning.
Methods o f Concept Learning
It is possible for a learner to approach the various concept learning tasks through rote or meaningful learning methods, through reception or discovery learning methods- The approach chosen often depends on the way in which the concept learning problem is presented by a teacher. The means for concept learning can combine into rote reception learning, rote discovery learning, meaningful reception learning or meaningful discovery learning. 64
R. Metzger has studied that portion of the types of learning
continuum where rote learning and concept formation are presumed to
overlap.
Rote (paired-associate) learning is here defined as the type of learning in which S is required to associate a single response with a single stimulus, i.e., there is a one-to-one correspond ence between stimulus and response. The term concept formation is here restrictively defined as that type of learning where S is required to associate the same response to different stimuli, i.e., two or more stimuli are attached to the same response. In the design of this study a rote learning condition can be transformed into a concept formation condition in two ways: (a) by increasing the number of stimuli but keeping the number of response alternatives constant; and (b) by decreasing the number of response alternatives and keeping the number of stimuli constant. (Metzger, 1958, pp. 226, 227)
Reception learning requires the learner only to internalize
or incorporate material that is presented to him. Little, if any, dis
covery on his part is required. Discovery learning can range along a
continuum from guided to pure discovery depending on the strategy used
or on the size of the inferential step. Discovery learning can be
very easy or very difficult. The chief characteristic of discovery
learning is that the principal content of what is to be learned is
not given to the learner.
Meaningful learning involves more than mere memorization. It
must synthesize concepts with other internalized concepts in full aware
ness of the relationships between them. The learner must reorganize his
cognitive structure in order to accept a concept meaningfully.
Ausubel believes that concept learning can take place under both
reception and discovery learning conditions and that both reception and
discovery learning can each be rote or meaningful depending on the con ditions under which the learning occurs. However, Ausubel points out 65
that only concept assimilation (and not concept formation) can take
place under reception learning.
Conceptual Style
Conceptual style may be defined as habitual ways of responding
conceptually. (Messick and Ross, 1962, p. 199) Conceptual style can
be changed by train in g. Conceptual sty le can influence the character
istics of concepts formed. Three aspects of conceptual style are con
ceptual ability, category width and differentiation and cognitive
stru ctu re.
Conceptual Ability
Concept formation i s dependent on the a b ility o f the concep- tualizer. Differences in ability lie in the areas of perception, of
experience in concept formation, and of the store of available concepts.
Buryi Payne has said that "The amount of perceived organization depends upon the observer’s choice of a descriptive language or on his percep tual ability." (Payne, 1966) D. Haygood has explored the effects of
redundant auditory and visual information in a concept formation task.
(Haygood, 1965) His research showed that one problem conceptualizers face is a lack of experience in forming and identifying compound audio visual concepts. George Handler and William Kessen analyze the evi dence for and characteristics of inductive generalization. In doing so, they note the importance of the experience of the generalizer, of his store of concepts. "Certainly a major characteristic of induction is its dependence on the experience of the generalizer." (Handler and
Kessen, 1959, p. 198) 66
Category Width and Differentiation
Riley W. Gardner and Robert A. Schoen have studied "Differen
tia tio n and Abstraction in Concept Formation*" (Gardner and Schoen,
1962) Gardner and Schoen used sorting tests, category width tests,
check lists of words and tests of capacity to abstract. Their three
studies also gathered data on preferred level of abstraction. The
studies were designed to show any relationship between preferred level
of abstraction, ability to abstract, category width and conceptual dif
ferentiation.* Gardner and Schoen assumed that spontaneous level of
abstraction and capacity for abstraction are distinguishable dimen
sions of concept formation. They assumed further that both category
width tests and free sorting tests demonstrate conceptual differentia
tio n .
Category width tests asked subjects to define, directly or in
directly the limits of a category along a single dimension* The
farther apart the limits the wider the conceptual span* For example,
subjects are asked to define the average width o f windows from eight
choices* From the eight choices subjects select a value that repre
sents the widest width of a window and a value that represents the
narrowest width of a window. For scoring point values were assigned
to the four deviations from the mean in each direction. A subject who
*Conceptual differentiation: the degree of differentiation spontaneously imposed on heterogeneous arrays o f objects and events when required to categorize these objects and events (number of groups formed) and the range of attributes attributed to a group (category w id th ). Category width: an aspect of conceptual differentiation as sessed by having the subject define the lim its of a category along a single dimension. (Gardner and Schoen, 1968, pp. 2 , 4) 67
selected deviations of -1 and +4 would receive a category width of 3-
Conceptual d ifferen tia tio n was also measured by te s t s which re
quired dividing disparate objects and events into groups each of which
represents a different "basis of pertinence." Subjects were free to
select reasons for grouping from an all but infinite variety of pos
sible reasons. This test calls for seeing patterns of relationships.
The more groups constructed the greater the conceptual differentiation.
For example, subjects are asked to group an array of objects and events.
Following their grouping, they are asked to define each group. The
scorer then compared the definitions given with the groupings. Some
times two reasons for grouping were given in one definition. In this
case, one group was scored if the items in the group overlapped. If
the items clearly divided into sporting goods and entertainment two
groups were scored. If items were left over each was scored as a
separate group. A group indicating a subcategorization (e.g. to o ls —
some for children and some for adults) was scored as two groups.
The major findings o f Gardner and Schoen's three studies were
(1) the dimension conceptual differentiation is demonstrable by cate gory width tests as well as free sorting tests; (2) preferred level of abstraction is apparent in a variety of situations over a brief period of time but fluctuates considerably over longer periods of time; (3) conceptual differentiation,preferred level of abstraction and capacity to abstract are distinguishable and independent dimensions of cogni tive style; and (4) conceptual differentiation and preferred level of abstraction are not related to level of intelligence.
R. W. Zaslow has studied conceptual level and concept span dif ferences among different age groups and among different normal and 68 brain-injured groups. (Zaslow, 1961) He found that concept levels were covariant with the levels of intelligence. (Pikas, 1966, pp. 54-79)
The highest conceptual level required the most judgment because it in volved more ambiguous r e la tio n s. A narrow concept span was in te r preted as synonymous with r ig id ity .
Cognitive Structure
Cognitive structure can be defined as patterns or organiza tions of concepts that the learner has internalized. The better or ganized the cognitive structure the more likely concepts are to be meaningful.
Research Directions
In a Terman-Merrill Memorial Lecture Wayne Holtzman traced the development of research on conceptual style.
Three main streams of experimental work, though starting out independently with different constructs, are now beginning to move closer togeth er. The longest continuous program o f re search in this field is the work of Herman Witkin and his col leagues (1954). . . . After extensive studies of a number of related tasks, Witkin and his colleagues concluded that people vary consistently in their ability to make a correct judgment or to separate the figure from the ground when conflicting cues are present in the perceptual field. Those who were unable to resist the conflicting context he called field dependent individuals. Field dependency revealed itself in a wide variety of perceptual and cognitive tasks and had some interesting personality corre lates as well. People who were markedly field dependent appeared to be more passive, less analytical, and less highly differenti ated in ego functioning than those who were not field dependent. More recently, Witkin (1962) has broadened his concept of field dependence by encompassing it within the rather general concept of psychological differentiation- Since his recent work grows out of developmental studies with children, it is particu larly relevant to the approaches undertaken by others working on cognitive style and personality development. A second stream of experimental activity involving cognitive sty le i s the work o f R iley Gardner and others at the Menninger Foundation (1960, 1962). In several dozen studies over the past ten y ea rs, Gardner and h is colleagues have te n ta tiv e ly id en tified 69
six fairly independent dimensions that have emerged in repeated factor-analysis studies. One of Gardner's six dimensions, field articulation, is essen tially the same as Witkin's field dependence. A second dimension, called leveling-sharpening, gets at the tendency to perceive a series of stimuli as similar even though there is gradual shift in the stimuli. The third of Gardner's dimensions, formerly called equivalence range, is now called conceptual differentiation. . . . The greater the number of groups that he (the subject) constructs, the higher his score on conceptual differentiation. . . . Gardner's fourth cognitive control of principle concerns the extensiveness of scanning or the amount of shifting of attention when trying to size up a stimulus. . . . The fifth dimension, called tolerance for unrealistic experiences, was postulated by Klein, Gardner, and Schlesinger (1962) to account for a common factor running through tests in volving the illu s io n of apparent movement, reversib le fig u res, and mode of approach to Rorschach inkblots. The last of Gardner's cognitive style dimensions is called constri cted-flexible control. . . . A third stream of experimental work dealing with cognitive style variables is best represented by recent studies of Jerome Kagan and his colleagues. While Witkin and Gardner have stressed perceptual tasks, Kagan has concentrated mostly on conceptual ac tivities, particularly in children. . . . The three conceptual styles in Kagan's test are analytic- descriptive , relational, and inferential-categorical. (Brim, et a l., 1966)
There are other aspects of conceptual style, such as attention span and motivation. (Messick and Ross, 1962, pp. 171-218) It is not feasible to consider all such variables in detail here. Many have shown that categorizing style is related to nonintellectual factors, such as motivation. Motivational and concept formation theory, can, in fact, be used to explain attitude development.
This trend towards underlying unity of psychological processes is shown in many approaches to cognitive processes today. (Harper, et a l., 1964) Michael Wallach argues for a multi-dimensional approach to the study of style aspects, such as analytical-global cognitive func tioning. Thus, several stylistic measures are taken for each research ta sk . A task might, therefore, be measured according to field 70 dependence, cognitive functioning, scanning, leveling, sharpening, in
stead of according to just one of these measures. (Messick and Ross,
1962, p. 211)
Known techniques for studying conceptual style, such as simu lation of decision-making situations, could be used more extensively in the study of individual d ifferen ces in conceptualization. Lee Shulman, for example, has reported the development and use of these new indica tors of seeking styles of individuals:
1. the number of pieces of material attended to,
2. the number of problems reacted to,
3. the number of categories of information brought to bear
on the problem,
4. time spent in solving,
5. competency as measured by quality of the end product,
6. a ratio of material processed to time spent, and
7. a ratio of categories of information used to materials
processed.
Personality and aptitude scores were used with these indicators in research on decision making styles. Such indicators or similar indi cators might be adapted for research on cognitive mode. (Shulman,
1965) Riley Gardner has already used the amount of stimulus informa tion which a subject demands before committing himself to a response as an index of scanning behavior relevant to style of attending.
(Messick and Ross, 1962, p . 192) 71
Amount and Application of Conceptualization
Retention
Retention or the amount of conceptualization which remains
available after learning can be influenced by the educators through
presentations. As was just mentioned, a conceptualizer's memory
characteristics can limit the amount of conceptualization. Process
ing rates and memory sizes must be taken into account. The communi
cator can consider the size and span o f a learn er's memory and can
avoid interfering with learning by overtaxing them. More directly
relevant to retention are the areas of long and short term memory.
Short term memory holds anything that is being attended to or any thing that is being fixated, that is transferred to long term memory.
One of the important questions in this area is "To what extent is the human a serial processor of information?" His limited short term memory capacity suggests that he is a serial (successive, not simul taneous) processor to a great extent. Long term memory can contain an infinite number of bits of information. Short term memory for an adult is usually limited to seven bits of information. (Miller, 1956)
When the contents of memory are undergoing active complex, processing, the capacity of short term memory storage seems to be closer to two b its or chunks o f information.
The short-term memory is very small indeed. Under some condi tions, especially, it seems, when the contents are not being processed in any complex way, i t appears to hold the famous seven chunks. Where the contents are undergoing active processes, its capacity seems closer to two. By recoding in put material from many "small" chunks to fewer "large" chunks, its apparent capacity can be increased almost indefinitely. However, a symbol structure only becomes a chunk by being fixated in long-term memory (a process called in some con texts "familiarization!'). (Klausmeier, 1967, p. 245) 72
James Deese has noted that the ease with which items can be
clustered into categories w ill affect the amount that can be retained
and recalled. (Deese, 1958, p. 245) If items do not cluster easily
into seven or less categories or bits of information, then short-term
retention w ill probably be impossible because the amount of informa
tio n to be coded w ill exceed the immediate memory span.
One indicator of the chunking or clustering potential of mate
rial is redundancy. Redundancy can be defined as the ratio of the
amount of message used to the amount of information given. (Carroll,
1964, p. 56) The higher the ratio the greater the redundancy. Re
dundancy can be achieved by exact or varied repetition.
Redundancy has been described as a ch aracteristic o f highly
organized m aterial by James Deese. He sta te s that higher redundancy tends to produce better retention principally because of the smaller number of things to be learned. (Deese, 1956, p. 242) The writer feels that while redundancy is characteristic of material which is more likely to be retained, it is not necessarily a characteristic of organization. The effects of redundancy on retention may be due more to practice than to organization. This possibility needs to be considered. Furthermore, the concept of bit of information needs much more d e fin itio n . A message can be about one theme and yet i t need not be redundant if it is very complex. As it is now used "number of bits" usually refers to the number of chunks of information into which a message can be reduced.
David Ausubel comments that stability of concepts is probably due more to the anchorability of concepts in the cognitive structure than it is due to clustering or less material to be retained. By 73 anchorability he means their relevance to other concepts which are re tained in the cognitive structure and their capacity to integrate these other concepts. (Ausubel, 1968, pp. 148, 149) The writer wonders if
Ausubel is not describing a type of clustering when he speaks of the integrative capacity of concepts. The ideas of retention being due to less material or presentation organization and to greater anchorability or internal organization are not mutually exclusive. They may simply refer to different varieties of redundancies.
Ausubel also documents the superiority of meaningful learning over rote learning for retention. By meaningful learning he means learning that relates material to the existing cognitive structure as the learning process progresses. (Ausubel, 1968, p. 113)
What do these conclusions about retention suggest for educa tional communications, especially for communication for conceptual learning? First, the findings emphasize the need for organization of content. Organization is a key factor in remembering. The findings in d icate th at communicators would be wise to find ways to schematize content for the learner so that it could be clustered. The following ways to schematize content for the learner are suggested by this w riter:
1. grids summarizing variables
2. continua expressing range
3. sentences stating key points
4. diagrams showing relationships
5. flow charts visualizing processes
6. o u tlin es summarizing dominant and subordinate
relationships 74
7. introductory passages which give a relevant conceptual
framework for organizing details ,
A communicator actu ally should help to recode content more concisely
for memory.
It is David P. Ausubel who suggests that advance organizers would be very u seful for helping learners recode for reten tion . Ad
vance organizers are described by Ausubel as introductory materials that are maximally clear, stable, inclusive, explanatory, and integra tive. They are concepts at a high level of generality. Ausubel de
fin e s organizers as "appropriate and relevant subsuming concepts."
Organizers, then, are introductory passages which "serve as an ideological framework for organizing the particular substantive body of more detailed ideas, facts, and relationships in the learning passage." The introductory passage must contain background material which is presented "at a much higher level of abstraction, generality and inclusiveness" than the learning passage. It should be designed to serve as a focus for relating the material to be learned to the existing cognitive structure. (Ausubel, 1960, pp. 267, 268)
For example, as an advance organizer for a 2500 word passage on the metallurgical properties of plain carbon steel, Ausubel uses a
500 word introductory passage on the major sim ilarities and differences between metals and their alloys, their respective advantages and limi tations, and the reasons for making and using alloys. The information in this introductory passage is general, not specific. A passage on the historical evolution of methods used in the production of iron and steel would not be useful as an advance organizer for learning the metallurgical properties of plain carbon steel. This is because it 75
would contain no conceptual material that could serve as an organizing
framework for d e ta ils on the m etallurgical properties of plain carbon
s t e e l. Yet, the h isto r ic a l approach i s the tra d itio n a l introductory
approach used in textbooks. (Ausubel, 1960, pp. 268, 269)
Another example of an advance organizer used by Ausubel is an
expository organizer for a passage on endocrinology. The 500 word in
troductory passage described the different kinds of uniformity and
variability prevailing among the primary and secondary sex character
istics. This was an organizer for a 1400 word passage concerned with
the specific hormonal factors initiating and regulating pubescence.
The introductory and first learning passages were followed by another
learning passage. This second learning passage was 1600 words and
considered pathological variations in pubescence and their treatment.
An example of a nonorganizing introduction for these two learning
passages would be an introductory passage dealing with uniformity and
variability among different cultures in behavioral aspects of pubes
cence. (Ausubel and Fitzgerald, 1962, p. 245)
Advance organizers can make content more meaningful. The
meaningfulness of content seems to be associated with the ability of
content to be organized internally. Meaningfulness, then, is impor tant to organization for retention.
In conjunction with organization and with practice, the find ings suggest the value of incorporating redundancy. The reader should keep in mind though that varied repetition is more attention-holding than exact repetition. Redundancy through variety would then be the most d esirab le form o f redundancy. I t would be wise to remember that if there is zero redundancy in language, there is no verbal context 76
effect. In that case, one must perceive every sound accurately in order
to comprehend. Since such perfect perception is u n likely to occur be
cause of noise factors, zero redundancy would make speech a highly in
adequate communication system. (Krech and C rutchfield, 1967, p. 469)
The e ffe c ts o f practice ind icate that the communicator can also control
stimulus and response conditions leading to overlearning* such as imme
diate and delayed review.
Another relevant finding here is that certain cues are more
readily retained. ( Lynch, 1966) For example, in reading the le tte r s
at either end and in the middle of a word are more easily retained
than letters in the second or fourth position. In a study by A. A.
Lumsdaine, memory was superior when the picture instead of a word was
used in a cue position. (Lumsdaine, 1949) Neil Miller notes the need
for additional research to determine the forgetting curves for visual
memory and to analyze the factors affecting these curves- (Miller,
1957, p. 107)
The role of visual media, such as motion pictures is thus sig
nificant in communicating for retention of conceptual learning. This
is a logical assumption in the light of findings about retention.
Clearly, films can prevent ambiguity and confusion, which hamper re
ten tion . They can organize content and pace i t s d eliv ery . They can
vary redundant content through animation, close-ups, sound. They can
be shown again for review. They can be used to guide and pace prac tice. All these elements enhance retention-
*"Overleaming: n. learning in which practice proceeds beyond the point where the act can ju st be performed with the required degree of excellence. There is no implication that the practice has been car ried to injudicious lengths." (English and English, 1958, p. 366) 77
In summary, communicators can control retention of concepts to
some extent by considering the factors of size and span of memory, of
long and short term memory. Furthermore, audiovisual communication can
affect retention by the use of visual as well as verbal, by the use of
redundancy and by schematization and other methods of organization and
practice. The three key ideas for communicators in the area of reten
tion are clarity of organization, nature of practice, and cuing for re
coding. Organization encompasses meaningfulness, redundancy, schemati
zation, chunking, or clustering the amount of content. Practice encom
passes redundancy, delayed and immediate review, overlearning, the
nature of examples, and the speed of learning. Cuing for recoding
encompasses using visual cues and positioning cues.
Transfer
The extent to which conceptualization, once learned, is em
ployed can be influenced by the instructional materials specialist.
This subject is dealt with in the literature on transfer. "Transfer"
refers to the effect of previous learning on subsequent learning. If transfer can vary in amount and in negative and positive application, then conceptualization can vary similarly. The educator can influence the use of concepts by influencing transfer.
Positive transfer is transfer that facilitates learning. Nega tive transfer is transfer that interferes with learning. An example of negative transfer would be when the learning of the shaking or stirring methods for mixing liquids prevents one from trying a more efficient technique for mixing such as pouring through a special porous device. 78
An example of positive transfer would be when the learning sk ill
such as typing on a manual typewriter, makes it easier to learn another
sk ill, such as typing on an electric typewriter.
After a review of the literature, the research data on how to produce positive transfer seems to fall into these categories:
1. influencing the similarity of stimuli,
2. influencing discrimination of features,
3. influencing patterns of responding,
4. influencing understanding of relationships.
Clark Hull studied the efficiency of transfer when identical elements were emphasized by the use of color. In his experiment, Hull found that mildly drawing attention to common elements helped concept formation. However, it helped slightly less in a normal learning sit uation than it did in a laboratory learning situation. In the labora tory situation, the efficiency of the process was progressively in creased by drawing attention to common elements, but when the subject tried to transfer his learning to normal experiences, there was a slight decrease in learning efficiency.
Since the number of elements which are identical can vary from all to none, from absolute identity to absolute difference, the degree of similarity between situations may vary. (Noble, 1957) R. R. Bush and F. Hosteller have developed an index of similarity to measure the likelihood of generalization between two situations due to similarity.
(Bush and Hosteller, 1951) Bush and Hosteller infer the degree of sim ila rity by comparing response data. They assume th at what trans fers is similar. James Deese comments critically on the contribution 79
of Bush and Hosteller to an explanation of transfer due to generaliza
tion on the basis of stimulus similarity.
Bush and Hosteller (1951) do suggest an index of similarity between stimuli, but they are unable to provide any way of rationally relating this index to the physical characteristics, such as size, distance, and intensity, that we use in measuring stimuli. Thus they are unable to suggest an exact mathematical statement of the principle of stimulus generalization.
Stimulus predifferentiation, another factor in transfer, refers
to preliminary practice in distinguishing between the stimuli involved
in the learning task. The phrase refers to training for transfer of
discrimination or perceptual judgment. For example, if successful
learning from a photography lesson taught to elementary school stu
dents requires that a student recognize when a flashbulb has not ex
ploded as planned, stimulus predifferentiation training may require
the student to practice giving different responses to new and used
flashbulbs. The success of stimulus predifferentiation appears to be
related to the amount of training. There seems to be a minimum number
of trials for attaining stimulus predifferentiation and a maximum num
ber of trials beyond which no more positive transfer effects can be
produced. (Grose and Bimey, 1963, p. 87) Successful transfer achieved
by stimulus predifferentiation has been attributed to acquired distinc tiveness of cues, increased meaningfulness, attention to cues and re
duction in response generalization. None of these reasons are supported by adequate experimental evidence. Another reason for successful trans
fer due to stimulus predifferentiation is schema learning. According to this theory, a schema is learned by stimulus predifferentiation. By schema I mean a model for organizing data. Around th is schema
*Schema: "a number o f ideas or concepts combined into a coherent plan or outline, a plan or model that displays the essential or important relations between concepts." (English and English, 1958, p. 478) 80
variations may be organized and learned.
F. Attneave hypothesizes that in the course of pretraining, the
subject learns three things about a class of stimuli. These three class
parameters combine to form the schema to which individual stim uli are
later related. The parameters are that which the members of the class
have most in common, that which the members of the class are most
likely to differ on and how much the members of the class may differ
from one another. This princip le has been demonstrated in experimental
research which required the subject to practice drawing a prototype be
fore a transfer task was presented. (Grose and Bimey, 1963, pp. 98-99)
There is another approach to explaining transfer which involves
a factor relatin g to patterns of responding. This approach concen
tra tes on the whole learning situ a tio n rather than on the components of
the learning situations. This is the approach of those who believe that what is learned and transferred is a general set for learning. As
early as 1908, Charles H. Judd asserted that it was not the subject but rather the training for generalization that was important in transfer.
(Judd, 1908)
The idea of a general learning set which transferred was fin a lly presented by Harry F. Harlow. While Harlow recognizes that learning set research is an instance of transfer of training, he be lieves that it is also more than transfer of training. Learning sets enable one to transfer patterns of responding to distinctively dif ferent problems. Unlike transfer of training (to similar problems) which can occur as a result of training on a single problem, learning sets are established by experience with many different problems.
Learning set tran sfer a p p lies, th erefo re, to more complex problems. 81
It is a special type of transfer. According to Harlow, an animal grad
ually proceeds from trial-and-error to insightful learning. It is this
insightful learning which allows for transfer of a learning set.
James Knowlton comments on Harlow's p o sitio n . Knowlton agrees
that learning set phenomena are a special type of transfer. He agrees
that they cannot be written off as being like any other case of trans
fer of training because transfer due to learning set requires consider
able training and training on a wide variety of problems. (Knowlton,
1964, pp. 5.4-5.12) It is safe to conclude that the transfer of con
cept learning can be due to the learning of learning s e ts .
Knowlton reacts unfavorably to a few of Harlow's p oin ts. He
criticizes Harlow's position as follows:
Harlow (1959) expresses the view that concept formation is learning-set learning; that an animal must have had a history of having solved similar problems if it solves a particular prob lem "insightfully." In Hebb's (1949) view, though, there are not clearly justifiable criteria for labeling one kind of learning "insightful," and other kinds, "not insightful." Rather, it seems more defensible to speak o f degree o f in sig h t. I f one has no clear basis for speaking of differing degrees of similarity between a present problem and problems previously solved, Harlow's view may be valid, even necessary; but it is a view that seems to generally be valid to be provocative. There is a question, too, about the notion of "concept formation." Speaking of concept formation only in passing, Harlow says this: "Broad stimulus generalization, which is what we call concept formation, was obtained only after exten sive training on a wide range of problems of a class. ..." (1959, p. 511). It seems to me that "broad stimulus generaliza tion" is quite precisely what concept formation is not. (Knowlton, 1964, pp. 5.11-5.12)
In making th is la s t statement Knowlton is equating broad stimu lus generalization with primary stimulus generalization. In Knowlton's theoretical system, primary stimulus generalization represents no cate gories and has high immediacy of a ttrib u tes. Primary stimulus general ization is limited to physiognomic perception. Secondary stimulus 82
generalization, on the other hand, allows for both perceptual and con
ceptual categorizing. Perceptual categorizing has high immediacy of
attributes. Conceptual categorizing has low immediacy of attributes.
The concept "red" i s a perceptual category resu ltin g from secondary
generalization. The concept "animal" is a conceptual category result
ing from secondary generalization. Secondary stimulus generalization
in Knowlton's theoretical system is not, therefore, broad stimulus
generalization. Secondary stimulus generalization involves discrimi
nating criterial attributes. (Knowlton, 1964, pp. 5.24-5.26)
F in a lly , the G estalt approach includes a theory o f tran sfer.
(Kohler, 1947) As does Harlow, this approach gives insight a central
place in transfer. Gestaltists concentrate on the relations within the
whole situation. Identical elements are not necessary, but an under
standing of relationships is.
Gestalt psychologists believe "that parts of a whole may be
compared with parts of another whole in terms only of their role or
function in these wholes." Furthermore, the properties of a whole (a gestalt) are not derived from the sum of its parts; although thé parts
of a whole derive their properties from the whole. For example, the qualities of a B Flat cannot be separated from the qualities of a melody. Learning is believed to be a combination of separate responses to a combination of separate stimuli. As such it proceeds by reorgani zation, not accretion. According to Gestalt theory, there are condi tions favorable to the experience of wholeness. Such a condition is proximity or closeness of components in time or space. Such conditions are favorable to the perception of relationships of parts to the whole.
(English and English, 1958, p. 225) 83
Gestalt psychology, then, finds transfer dependent on recogni
tion of sim ilarities between wholes. This means transfer depends on the appropriateness of the application of the relationships in one sit
uation to another situation. While behaviorists tend to see percep tion as influencing conceptualization, Gestaltists tend to see concep tualization as influencing perception. Transfer, thus, holds a more
central position in the learning theory of the Gestaltists than in the learning theory of the behaviorists. (Wallace, 1965, pp. 237-38)
Lyle Bourne Jr. reviews the findings on transfer as they re late to performance of a conceptual task. (Bourne, 1966, pp. 98-105)
Experiments on conditioning have generally found that the stronger the original learning is made by reinforcement the less likely the subject i s to change h is response. D. A. Grant and h is co-workers, however, have found the opposite to be true with the more complex categorical behavior of conceptual learning. As a result of their experiments.
Grant and his co-workers concluded that the stronger the original con ceptual learning, the more rapid was the change to a new solution when the experiment required such a change. Grant attributed this to a greater ability to discriminate developed by strong original learning.
If it is true that the greater the degree of learning, the more likely it is that positive, not negative, transfer will occur in com plex categorical learning, then the motion picture may have special value for transfer. For the visual image of a motion picture may be not necessarily so specific as we have thought. A film may provide many sp e c ific images which provide meaning for more general images.
Perhaps audiovisual materials can furnish the depth and degree of learning required for broad transfer without developing the rigidity 84
which interferes with learning. Bourne notes that using a variety of
examples in media is useful only so long as the training on multiple
problems is of a high enough degree to allow for positive transfer.
When a number of examples is used for training, sufficient practice
should be given on examples to produce a high degree of learning,
otherwise, transfer may not occur despite breadth of experience.
What happens if a student is given some pretraining in compo
nents of a task, such as some vocabulary concepts integral to a con
cept learning task? If appropriate cues (component cues) are learned
during pretraining, then, learning of the concept w ill be facilitated.
Media designs can provide for pretraining in component cues by using
instructor guides to film s, te le v isio n programs and other media; by
giving pretests; by introducing concepts which w ill be used during the
presentation. It has been hypothesized that such pretraining is effec
tive because it allows the correct cues to become dominant. The media
specialist's problem is to select the correct cues for pretraining—to
select those words and images that are most important for understanding
the message.
Another factor reviewed by Bourne is the success of different
types of problem shifts. Conceptualizing which requires a subject to
change his basis for categorizing from one dimension to another is
called a nonreversal shift. If categorizing is changed but the same
dimension is used for sorting, the shift is called reversal. In
other words, in a reversal shift the categorizing is done on the di
mension color both before and after the shift; although the specific
color association may have changed. If the change requires sorting on the dimension of shape instead of color, the shift is nonreversal. A 85
reversal shift might require associating red with a negative response and green with a positive response, instead of red with positive and green with negative as was originally done.
The findings suggest that adults find it easier to shift pri marily on the basis of internal verbal manipulations than on the basis of a new physical dimension for sorting. They find it easier to simply do the opposite than to do something very different. Conversely, chil dren may find problems which provide a change in a physical dimension as a basis for conceptualization more likely to facilitate learning than problems which provide only the verbal rule "do the converse" as a basis for categorizing.
Besides support for the role verbal ability plays in the ease of shifting, there are indications from research that the number of response categories affects the relative difficulty of reversal and nonreversal s h ifts and th at any transfer from eith er reversal or non reversal shifts may be negative. We need to know why it may be nega tive. We need to know whether a consideration of shifts is important when developing a concept that needs to be transferred. For when the goal is transfer of a concept, it may be important to avoid learning by the use of shifts.
Perhaps practice in transferring learning from shifts of both types is necessary before shifts can successfully transfer. Even if this is the case, it may not be feasible to train children to use re versal shifts for conceptualizing or for transferring learning at too early an age.
Finally, Bourne proposes that the factor of pre-established set can affect transfer of training. Pre-establishing set by 86
preliminary experience with words associated with relevant stimulus
attributes facilitates performance more than pre-establishing set with
irrelevant or neutral stimulus attribute words does. Moreover, the
degree of positive transfer due to pre-establishing set with relevant
attributes increased as problem complexity increased.
The guidelines suggested by Stephens, Bourne and the classic
research on transfer which are most applicable and important for media
design might be summarized as follows:
1. Bring out the feature to be transferred by pretraining or
pre-establishing s e t . The more complex the problem the
more helpful this procedure is likely to be.
2. Arrange for overlearning or a s u ffic ie n tly high degree of
learning. This is especially important when many varied
examples are used; otherwise breadth of experience may
simply confuse.
3. Provide a variety of experience which presents a sufficient
number of problems to ensure the learning of a general
so lu tio n .
4. Provide for practice in applying solutions to other
fields. Help students understand how concepts may be
related to other situations.
5. Emphasize the sim ilarity between tasks when you want
positive transfer to occur.
The complexity of the learning problems confronting the teacher, the number of students a teacher must help, and the limited time a teacher has available for preparing materials all suggest that it may be futile to expect teachers to effectively apply learning principles 87
without the help of the media specialist* We need curricular packages
which have sound learning principles as their organizational base. The
media specialist's job is to prepare materials based on principles sub
stantiated by research evidence. The teacher's job is to use materials
according to principles substantiated by research evidence.
Both the teacher and the media specialist can thus influence the
characteristics of the communication. Both the teacher and the media
specialist can, therefore, determine the characteristics of concepts
formed.
The ch aracteristics of concepts which can be influenced by the
characteristics of the communication include form, effect, content, type
of learning, style, amount and application. In Chapter VIII on page 356,
Table 17, "A Taxonomy of Characteristics Which Interact in Conceptual
Communication," the reader w ill find a summary of the variable charac teristics of concepts discussed in this chapter.
The Appendix presented on pages 370-73 lists and annotates tests which can be used for research on the characteristics o f concepts- /
CHAPTER IV
THE PROCESS OF CONCEPTUALIZATION
What happens during concept formation? What processes are in
volved in conceptualization? We must be able to answer these questions
before we can know when and how conceptualization can be influenced by
the instructional message or by the conceptualizer. This chapter w ill
be concerned with the internal processes which can be influenced by ex
ternal transmission.
While we do not understand exactly what happens to the brain
during conceptualization, there are many important questions about in
ternal processes which we can begin to answer. We know how the commu
nications systems of the body interact during concept formation. We
know further what characteristics of the original perception affect the
recoding process. We know what role the reticular formation plays in
concept formation. We understand the importance of the symbolic re
sponses of imagery or verbalization for concept formation. We know
something of what happens to symbolic responses that are stored by the
learner. We have findings about individual differences in concept
formation which suggest guidelines for influencing the processes of
imagery and verbalization.
The Role of Recoding
Recoding means a change in the representation of a message.
The processes of conceptualization involve recoding from the first
8 8 89
step in perception through the last step in transmission* In recoding,
symbolism, or representation of messages, is required. If symbols were
not used there would be no means for manipulating the messages as a ll
the data sensed about stimuli cannot be handled by the nervous system
at the spinal cord and brain level. Some reduction or compression must
occur.
Nerve Pathways
The reason that symbolization must occur is that the number of
pathways available for information transmission changes as the message
travels to and from the brain. An exploration of nerve fibers avail
able at different points of processing could yield valuable research.
It is possible that the explanation for abstraction, generalization,
and symbolization may lie in the different number of pathways available
at different times because of the varied types of nerve cells and
fibers used by the nervous system.
Perhaps we must abstract because fewer pathways become avail
able. Conversely, perhaps we generalize because more pathways become
available for transmission to and from certain fibers. Because we must
abstract and generalize, we symbolize or represent. Because we symbol
iz e we can store messages.
We know little about how recoding occurs. We do know that the
RNA (ribonucleic acid) molecule used for the synthesis of protein by
nerve cells seems to be necessary for cell memory. We know further
that the structure of RNA makes possible immense variability in forma tion of these "memory traces" (if they are such). (Asimov, 1963,
p . 339) 90
If this great variability is possible, then some explanation
for recoding may lie in this variability, just as some explanation for
it may lie in the number of pathways available. Since 90 per cent of
all the nerves in the body are in the cerebral cortex of the brain, it
is likely that the number of available pathways is much greater in the
brain than elsewhere. This may mean that recoding occurs primarily in
the brain,but we don't know for sure.
The convolutions or gyri of the cortex that form the surface
of the cerebral hemispheres give the brain some of the appearance of a
shelled walnut. The convolutions give the brain surface much more
area and probably have something to do with intelligence. The convolu
tions probably allow for more nerve cells and pathways. Man’s
cerebral cortex surface is more complex and convoluted than other
animals. (Wilson, 1964, p. 36)
We know that in general the nerve fibers of the cortex seem to
become fewer as they go to the lower part of the brain and towards the
center. They feed in to a few nerves which connect with the spinal
cord. This arrangement of nerve fibers could be likened to the ar
rangement of the strings of a parachute. Moreover, we know that there
are fibers which connect the different areas in the different lobes of
the brain. The cerebral cortex is divided by fissures into lobes. The
lobes are labeled in Figure 10 on the following page. The function
most associated with each lobe is given. The lobes seem to serve a
multiplicity of purposes, however.
Connecting these lobes are projection fibers, association
fibers and commissural fibers. Projection fibers run from above down ward. They form the parachute strings. Association fibers run from the 91
Sensation
Reasoning '
Vision
Memory
Fig. 10.—The lobes of the brain. (Taylor, 1965, p. 204)
front and back of the same side of the brain. The commissural fibers
connect the right and left sides of the cerebrum. Such a complicated
system of integrated fibers allows for more complex thought. It also
allows for more mistakes to be made than simpler forms of animal life
usually make. (Langer, 1951) The system is illustrated in Figures 11,
12, and 13, on the following page. Although we know that these fibers
exist and serve to connect different parts of the brain, we do not
fully understand how they work to produce interrelationships. Our knowledge about the association and commissural fibers is especially
inadequate. We do know that there is "crosstalk” between nerve fibers.
We also know that learning increases the number of connections between cells, not the number of cells. (Pfeiffer, 1955, pp. 9, 38) 92
Fig. 11.—The direction of association fibers in the cortex.
Motor Tract Sensory Tract
Visual Tract Auditory Tract
Cerebellum
Fig. 12.—The direction of projection fibers in the cortex.
Fig. 13.—Cut away of the commissural fibers in the cortex.
(Figures 11, 12, and 13 are based on information and drawings given in Taylor, 1965, p. 201 and Kimber et a l., 1966, pp. 266, 273, 279) 93
There is some knowledge about the cell structure of the brain
and about the visual fibers which may help explain how recoding occurs.
The visual system illustrates well the continuous recoding that occurs
during internal message transmission. The eye contains rod cells which
are altered chemically by light rays. The chemical reaction causes a
discharge of nerve impulses in the nerve cells with which the rods are
connected. (Taylor, 1965, p. 243) Finally, impulses emerge in the
form of repetitive discharges in the fibers of the optic nerve.
It must be emphasized, however, that the optic nerve impulses do not mirror exactly the excitation of the sensory cells by light. Complex interactions within the retina serve to enhance certain responses and to suppress others. Furthermore it is a fact that each eye contains more than a hundred tim es as many sensory c e lls as optic nerve fibers. Thus it would appear that much of the in tegrative action of the visual system has already occurred within the retina before the brain has had a chance to act. ("Vision," McGraw H ill, 1966, p. 335)
We know th at the fib ers from both eyes meet at the optic chiasma. At that point half of the fibers from each side cross over to the other side. From the optica chiasma, then, the fibers travel to the side of the brain opposite the point of origination. It is in teresting to speculate about the function of the fibers which don't cross over. Do they play an integrative role? Do they help match the impulses on both sides of the brain? Or do they just serve as a pre cautionary measure against one function of the brain being too localized?
Duplicate messages are often transmitted to different parts of the brain. This enables one to overcome damage to one part of the brain by learning to use another part of the brain instead. This par tial crossing over of fibers is duplicated in many other parts of the nervous system. The function of crossover and partial crossover needs 94
study. An understanding of them may help us to better understand the
recoding process.
From the optica chiasma the fib ers tra v el via the optic nerves
to the occipital cortex areas. The route described so far can be rep
resented as follows:
Optic Chiasma
Eye,
Optic Nerves
Occipital Cortex
Fig. 14.—The eyes and the visual projection system. (McGraw H ill, 1966, p. 335)
The first place the visual signals reach in the occipital lobe is
Brodmann's Area Four. This is a str ia te area. I t i s called str ia te because its cells are arranged as parallel streaks or rows. When en larged this area looks like Figure 15, page 95.
In the visual projection area there seems to be a spatial rep resentation of the retinal impulses. This appears to be a point for point correspondence, each point of which represents a point on the retina and therefore a point in visual space as seen by the eye. The retinal maps from each side of the brain can merge. Just how this oc curs is not completely understood. Although the coding of Brodmann's 95
. “ i r \
vT.A y: W:;;:ÆP
Fig. 1 5 .—The Arrangement of S tria te C ells (Gregory, 1966, frontispiece) 96
Area Four seems to correspond clo sely with the coding of the r e tin a ,
some selection and rearrangement of information takes place.
Two American psychologists D. H. Hubei and T. N. Wiesel studied
the activity of single cells in the visual area of the cat's brain.
Their findings suggest that there are analyzing mechanisms in the brain
for selectin g certain features. They found that some c e lls would fir e
impulses only when a bar of light was presented at a certain angle or
when light movement was presented in a certain direction. Different
c e lls responded to d ifferen t angles and movements. While there is a
closely corresponding representation of the original coding, the man
ner of coding is probably not the same. The selective firing of dif
ferent cells w ill probably not produce a brain picture. At least not
one like the mental pictures we usually think of. Retinal patterns are
represented by coded combinations o f c e ll a c tiv ity . Hubei and Wiesel are now trying to discover the code. (Gregory, 1966, pp. 68-71)
(Scientific American, 1966, pp. 274-78)
From the visual projection area, Brodmann's Area Four, the message travels to areas deeper within the brain and to areas more toward the edges of the occipital lobes. These are the regions which are next to the central str ia te area and which surround i t . They in clude the p eristria te area (Brodmann's Area Eighteen) and the para- s tr ia te area (Brodmann's Area Nineteen) which appear ju st beside the central striate area. Areas Eighteen and Nineteen are called the prestriate areas. Stimulation of these surrounding regions in man also gives visual sensations, but instead of the flashes of light corresponding to a change in the position of a light, these areas give more elaborate visual sensations. The light may become a 97
floating balloon in a brilliant sky. Further away from the visual
projection center stimulation may elicit visual memories, even ones of
complete scenes.
Hubei and Wiesel found th at c e lls deeper in the visu a l areas
of the brain would respond to more generalized ch aracteristics such as
a general instead of a more specific direction of movement or angle, and would respond to these ch aracteristics no matter what part of the retina was stimulated by the light. (Gregory, 1966, pp. 68-69)
The peripheral visual areas, Brodmann’s Areas Eighteen and
Nineteen, seem to function as interpreters of patterns. The peri striate area (area eighteen) seems to serve as a storer of previous discrimination and learning. Injuries to Area Eighteen can produce agnosia, loss of the ability to recognize seen obj ects. Animals with lesions in Area Nineteen seem to lose the effects of previous discrimi nation learning. Ability to visualize remembered objects is impaired.
(Berlyne, 1965, p. 133)
The stimulation of the areas surrounding the central striate area seems to produce elaborate sensations; yet the nerve connections within these surrounding areas do not seem to be as elaborate as the nerve connections between the retina and the central striate area or between the striate and peristriate areas. Nor are the nerve connec tions as elaborate as those within the central striate area. Conse quently, when a message is transmitted within the prestriate areas another recoding seems to be required because there are fewer fibers leading to some parts of the prestriate areas than there are to other parts. 98
What happens is that the farther away from the central striate
area that the message is transmitted, the more generalized the cell re
sponse becomes. In other words, the same cell w ill be activated by
many different messages and can in turn activate many different mes
sages.
D. E. Berlyne, a psychologist of the associationist school,
explains the effects of the arrangement of fibers.
There are fibers conducting excitation from the striate to the prestriate areas, but, once these are reached , point-by point correspondence with the retina is lost. Fibers go from one point in Area 17 to widely scattered points in Area 18, and points from different parts of Area 17 converge on the same point in Area 18. This is precisely the kind of arrangement that we should expect if structures in Area 18 had the task of sifting information coming in through the eyes, so that one cen te r in Area 18 responded to features th at might be found in stimulus patterns impinging on different sectors of the retina or to relations between properties of stimuli reaching different sectors of the retina. The same sort of dispersion and conver gence appears in the arrangement of fibers conveying excitation from Area 18 to Area 19 and from there to other parts o f the cortex.
Areas 18 and 19 receive fibers from other parts of the cor tex, as well as from the brain stem. Through such fibers, con ditioned responses can, no doubt, be evoked in the prestriate areas in the absence of the corresponding external stimuli. There conditioned cerebral responses w ill, of course, be able to serve as covert symbolic responses of a kind that we should classify as imagery. Although the investigations that we have been discussing have all concentrated on vision, there is every reason to be lieve that information originating in other modalities goes through analogous processing. (Berlyne, 1965, pp. 133, 134)
R. M. W. Travers notes that there are more rather than fewer fibers as the message approaches the higher levels of the nervous sys tem. (Travers, 1967, p. 136) He suggests that this proliferation per mits wide diffusion of information in contrast to the compression pro duced by the fewer fibers between areas which have just been discussed.
The information which can be diffused widely i s sensory information. 99
Evidence for this wide diffusion of information as it leaves the pre
striate areas may be found in the different cell structures common in
each layer of the cortex. It may also be found in the great number of
association, commissural and projection fibers which connect various
parts of the brain. The cell layers of the cerebral cortex include
layers of densely packed fibers and layers with fibers sparsely
placed. The message passes through such layers on its way to other
lobes and areas of the brain and on its way to the spinal cord. Both
elaboration and abstraction of information take place after the visual message leaves the visual areas. The more densely fibered cell layers are likely to be the agents for separating information into smaller bits, whereas the layers of fewer fibers are likely to contain cells which allow for more generalized responding.
After leaving the visual area a message can travel via asso ciation fibers to the gray matter of the cortex, then can travel through these cell layers as it is sent to the projection fibers which connect with the spinal cord. The process of transmission from percep tion to motor response is thus one of continuous recoding. For recoding occurs at a l l le v e ls much,like the old game of Ghost where one person starts a story and the others pass the story on as they hear it whis pered to them.
What meaning does a ll this internal recoding have for the audio visual communications expert, for the teacher, for the curriculum specialist? For one thing it means we should expect some abstraction
(separating of ideas) and some further generalization (combining of ideas) to take place even if the message is already abstract and gen eral. This implies a need for checking the student's conceptual 100
recoding by requiring a response. It implies further that ways for
separating ideas and combining ideas may be useful if offered in the
original message.
Robert Travers describes the recoding process as coding-encom-
pressing-storing-reconstructing-reproducing. (Travers, 1967, p. 136)
The compressing involves a reduction of redundancy. The incomplete
image can be expanded to completeness by f il lin g in d e ta ils according
to a code. The in stru ction al communicator should endeavor to under
stand the codes used by a learner for filling in images which have had
their redundancy reduced.
E xcitation and Inhibition Phenomenon
There is another area in recoding which has significance for
the instructional media specialist. This is the area of excitation
and inhibition phenomena which affect recoding. The importance of in
hibition phenomena to recoding for concept formation is supported by
L. L. Thustone's belief that the ability to abstract depends on inhibi
tion. (McKeller, 1957, pp. 103-105)
Excitation phenomena include stimulus area, intensity effects,
and time of exposure effects. Inhibition phenomena include habituation
effects, mutual inhibition and rebound effects. Each of these phenomena
suggests procedures which w ill improve recoding. Increased area and time of exposure can f a c ilit a t e recoding. Mutual in h ib ition can cause
a sharpening of contrast and inhibition of transmission. Stimulus intensity can increase excitation.
As the intensity of the stimulus increases, the intensity of the response increases. This principle can be qualified further by 101
describing the relative rates of increase. As the intensity of the
stimulus increases, the intensity of the stimulus coding increases but
at a slower rate than the physical stimulus does. Furthermore, if a
change in physical in ten sity is too sm all, i t cannot be detected. So
if one wants to make the stimulus appear three times as bright, one
may need to increase the intensity of the stimulus nine times. This
is a law of psychophysics known as Fechner’s Law. (Teitelbaum, 1967,
p. 45) An interesting but unanswered question is . When does overinten
sity tend to cause inhibition?
Another psychophysical law which applies to excitation and in te n sity is R icco's law of sp a tia l summation. This law says th at at any given duration, the greater the area of the stimulus, the easier the stimulus is to perceive. The effect of the stimulus summates over the area, thus—sp a tia l summation. Beyond a certain s iz e , however, th is law of excitation does not hold. This is because mutual in h ib itio n , which w ill be explained shortly occurs.
The effects of exposure time increases on stimulus coding are given in the Bunsen-Roscoe Law o f Temporal Summation. This law sta tes that at any given intensity, the longer the visual stimulus endures, the easier it is to see. Thus, the intensity is inversely proportional to stimulus duration for exposures lasting up to .1 second- The effect of a stimulus, then, summates over time. The limitation of the effect to exposures of up to .01 second means that this law could be useful to the film maker and other media specialists, but probably not to the classroom teacher. The classroom teacher must work with larger units of time. (Teitelbaum, 1967, pp. 16, 23-25, 45-46) 102
J . Bruner, R. D* Busiek and A. L. Mintum (1952) studied the
effect of verbal labels and their exposure time on the drawing of
figures to approximate the subject's concept of a label. They failed
to find a decrease in effect of the label with increasing exposure
time. This suggests that under labeling conditions subjects are not
influenced by the effect of exposure time. D. T. Herman, R. H. Lawless
and R. W. Marshall (1957), however, showed that variation in exposure
times influences the effect of verbal labeling. They used longer expo
sure tim es than Bruner and h is a sso cia tes. They found th at when a
stimulus was exposed for one or two seconds, the effect of the verbal
label is greater than when the stimulus is exposed for five seconds.
(Postman, 1964, pp. 453, 454)
These studies suggest that further research is needed on the
effects of increasing the time of stimulus exposure. Research is needed especially in the areas of time limits for effective excitation and of the interaction of labeling with time effects. We need to dis
cover the amounts of exposure time that have optimal effects on coding.
There appear to be different minimal and maximal exposure duration times for verbal labels and for nonverbal forms.
Another important finding for communications designers is that there is a phenomenon called mutual in h ib ition which a ffe c ts coding.
Mutual inhibition occurs because receptor cells interact. As a conse quence the firing of each cell is affected to some degree by the ac tivity of neighboring cells. When two adjacent receptors, such as two receptors of the eye, are stimulated at the same time, each discharges fewer impulses than when it receives the same amount of light by it self. The inhibition of each cell is given by the sum of the 103
inhibitory effects from all other cells. When some areas of a visual
stimulus are intensely lit and some areas are dimly lit, mutual inhibi
tion can cause an exaggeration of these differences* As a result con
trast is heightened, and the stimulus coding is distorted. This occurs
because the more strongly illuminated regions inhibit neighboring re
gions more than do dimly illuminated regions. The further apart the
contrasting areas of the stimulus are, the less distorted the coding w ill be by mutual inhibition. If we wish to sharpen contrast in mes
sages, it is probable that increasing the likelihood of unequal mutual
inhibition w ill help. Thus, border contrast can help emphasize a bright center. However, it can also help distort a learner's percep tion. The least likelihood of distortion would occur in a picture which uses gradual changes in contrast. (Scientific American, 1966, pp. 212—14)
The rebound phenomenon i s excessive a c tiv ity a fter a release from in h ib itio n . I f the dim receptors inhibited by mutual in h ibition are released by removing the bright stimulus, the dim receptors will fire excessively for a while. The implications of this phenomenon for communications designers are that if a bright area of the stimulus is removed, concentration w ill be focused on the remaining dim areas for a while. Introducing other stimuli too soon could cause response com petition or interference with learning. Research is needed on the speed with which mutual inhibition can be affected when substituting one bright area for another. Can this be done quickly enough to pre vent the rebound effect? (Teitelbaum, 1967, p. 27)
Habituation effects are the result of adaption to sustained stimuli. We need to resolve the habituation effects-redundancy 104
criteria dilemma. At what point does redundancy start interfering with
learning efficiency by causing habituation? Habituation refers to the
effect of decreased sensitivity due to the repetitiveness of the signal.
Habituation does not necessarily mean that there is no longer
any sensitivity to the signal. It simply means that neurophysiological
mechanisms act to suppress th e signal p a r tia lly , i f not com pletely,
after one becomes used to a signal. A certain amount of accommodation,
or adaptation, always takes place when a receptor cell is exposed to a sustained stimulus. (Scientific American, 1966, p. 208)
The implication of this inhibition phenomenon which is impor tant for communications design is that to continuously command the attention necessary for efficient learning, the monotony which results in habituation must be avoided. Varied repetition, or repetition with novelty, is one means of avoiding monotony yet including redundancy.
Another implication is that a signal which one hopes w ill remain in consciousness but not command full attention can be maintained at a lower level by continuing that signal after habituation. If the stim ulus is converted through conditioning into a signal of biological importance (such as a signal associated with food), habituation may be avoided. (Hilgard and Bower, 1966, p. 443)
The Role of the Reticular Formation
The in h ib itio n and excitation phenomenon just described oper ate primarily at the level of the sense receptor cells. There is a secondary mechanism which controls in h ib ition and fa c ilita tio n more generally. This is the reticular formation which controls a mental set for inhibition or facilitation of nerve impulse transmission. 105
The reticular formation is a system of nerve cells extending
from the base of the brain to the forebrain. (Foulkes, 1966, p. 253)
The reticu la r formation i s the brain's mechanism for the control of attention. It is composed of an intricate system of interlacing nerve
cells and nerve fibers which go in all directions.
There is extensive branching of cells in the reticular forma tion. (Scientific American, 1966, p. 238) This system of nerve fibers forms the central core of the brain stem and extends from the upper part of the spinal cord to the thalamus and hypothalamus, which com prise the diencephalon portion of the brain. Through this tiny (no bigger than your little finger), centralized nerve network pass mes sages going from the ascending sensory tracts (nerve bundles) spinal cord to the brain and messages going from the brain to the nerves in the descending tracts of the spinal cord. Moreover, messages go from some sense organ systems directly to the reticular formation and from there they are passed to the brain. Messages from the brain also travel directly back to the sense organs such as the eye or ear via the reticular formation. The reticular formation has been called the "central pool" for sensory impulses. (Krech and Crutchfield, 1958, p. 171)
The reticu lar formation i s divided in to an upper and a lower area. This division gives it a shape much like an hourglass except that the top bulb of the glass is longer than the bottom bulb. The upper area seems to be used for facilitating the conduction of nerve impulses and the lower area for inhibiting the conduction of nerve impulses. 106
The Reticular Activating System
Because the reticular formation seems to function as an atten
tion activating mechanism it has been named the reticular activating
system (RAS). (S c ie n tific American, 1966, pp. 233, 236) This a c ti
vating system is represented in Figure 16.
Key:
ascending or descending paths of nerve impulses (only a few o f these paths are shown)
reticular formation
Mass of projection %Tibers for diffusing
Impulses.-t=3- Facilitatofi
Inhibitor -----
Sensory Impulses
Fig. 16.—The Sensory Pool
(Based on drawings and information presented in Scientific American, 1966, pp. 236, 342; Kimber, et a l . , 1966, p. 278; and Krech and Crutchfield, 1958, p. 171.) 107
To the conceptual communications expert the RAS (reticular
activating system) should be seen as a means for focusing attention,
for establishing a mental state which facilitates learning.
What happens in this system is that incoming sensory signals
are diverted to the reticular formation. The RAS then arouses the
brain to attentiveness by sending out impulses so that the entire cor
tex is sprayed with general signals. Because it has been awakened the
brain can "hear" the sp e cific sensory sig n a l. However, the RAS lea m s
to be selective to stimuli. It learns to discriminate between those
that are important to attend to and those that are unimportant. Con
sequently, instead of arousing the brain the RAS may inhibit the sig
nals and leave the cortex unaroused or only slightly aroused. The
cortex sends descending motor and sensory impulses through the RAS
which regulates these impulses, again by facilitating or inhibiting
them, so that a controlled response occurs. The RAS is responsible
for maintaining muscle tone and for sensitizing muscles.
The RAS is stimulated by impulses from the cortex, as well as
by sensory impulses. In fact, it is the RAS which integrates the spe
cific sensory signal's effect on the cortex with the state of wakeful
ness so that an alert state results. The alert state (that brain wave
pattern between the relaxed and excited state patterns) seems to depend
on the interplay between the cortex and the RAS. For unless the RAS
stimulates the cortex, the brain cannot function. The signals may be transmitted to the brain, but they cannot be "heard." Yet when the
RAS functions without cortical impulses, consciousness is not possible.
A person can remain awake, but he is helpless. He cannot carry on higher mental processes without both the RAS and the cortex functioning. 108
An injured reticular formation w ill cause a person to lapse into coma
and eventually die. (Scientific American, 1966, pp. 232-38)
Brain Wave Patterns
The brain runs on tiny electrical currents produced by chemical
reactions. The voltages change with different states of mind, like con
centration or relaxation. An electroencephalograph (EEC) can measure
these changes. A study conducted by C. A. Stewart and I . MacFarlane
Smith in d icates that although far from being adequate at the moment,
the use of the electroencephalograph may, in time, provide a suitably
objective method of assessing the strength of imagery. (Stewart and
MacFarlane Smith, 1959)
We know that the alpha pattern shown by an EEC indicates that
the reticular formation has aroused the brain but signals to and from
the cortex have not yet been transmitted. This alpha wave pattern is
synchronous (impulse transmission occurs at an even rhythm) and is pro
duced by waves that occur at a rate of about ten per second. When the waves occur at a faster desynchronized rate, we have beta rhythms char
acteristic of mental or motor activity. When the waves occur at a
slower and desynchronized rate we have the delta rhythms characteris tic of sleep. The deeper the troughs between the waves the deeper the
sleep . The fa ster the frequency with which the waves occur the more
excited the mental state is.
These brain wave patterns can be visualized as follows: 109
EXCITED
ALERT (THINKING) (BETA WAVE)
RELAXED (ATTENTIVE) (ALPHA WAVE)
DROWSY
ASLEEP (DELTA WAVE)
Fig. 17.—Brain Wave Patterns Indicative of Mental States
(Based on drawings and information presented in Wilson, 1964, p. 174; Krech and Crutchfield, 1958, p. 485; Taylor,'1965, p. 216; and Jasper and Shagass, 1941, pp. 373-88.)
The reader w ill observe that thinking depresses the alpha wave.
This makes sense when you remember that the alpha wave represents the
spontaneous and synchronized discharge of thousands of cortical cells.
The wave w ill be maximally regular and amplified when the cortex is
free from neural signals originating externally. External neural im pulses disturb or desynchronize the rhythm of the resting brain. The 110
depression of the signal is probably due to the activation of some cells
and the inhibition of others. Because attention would be focused it ac
crues that more inhibition than excitation would have to occur. (Krech
and C rutchfield, 1958 , p. 486)
Dr. Jan Berkhout of the University of Southern California Brain
Research Institute has been interested in the brain wave patterns asso
ciated with different types of thinking. His experimental work has
been on brain electricity and perception. Dr. Berkhout started with the hypothesis that brain waves are characteristic of levels of alert ness or awareness ranging from coma to hyperactivity. He believes that whatever success he has had in predicting behavior is based on assessing minute changes in these levels as the subject is exposed to various stimuli and changes in experimental conditions.
For example, an EEC w ill be taken as a subject selects which of six circles is different from the other circles. This is a percep tual, visual discrimination—at the most a concept identification task.
It is not a concept formation task. It does not, therefore, consti tute an evaluation of the inductively or deductively formed elements of thought as they relate to brain activity patterns.
Dr. Berkhout's insights stop entirely at the level of percep tion (and by extension, recognition), and are not necessarily appli cable to the complex processes of concept formation. Nevertheless,
Berkhout's brain wave pattern analyses are a powerful tool for pre dicting patterns of conceptual behavior.
Experiments using the technique have already indicated that an aroused (alert) EEC pattern is a prerequisite for correct symbol matching. Berkhout speculates th at symbol matching requires I l l
perception of symbolic or structural characteristics not just brightness
discrimination. Symbol matching necessitates an aroused organization of
neural responses in order for correct performance to occur. Memory of a
patterned stimulus seems to be incompatible with much delta activity
shown in the EEG. It is incompatible with much delta activity because
external neural impulses desynchronize the rhythm of the brain waves
and depress the brain wave. The depression of the brain wave is prob
ably due to the activation of some cells and the inhibition of others.
Memory of a patterned stimulus would necessitate much inhibition and
concentration. Concentration produces an aroused organization of neural responses incompatible with the freely associative thought patterns (dreaming) of delta brain waves. Delta activity does not seem to interfere with simple discrimination responses. (Berkhout,
Adey and Campeau, 1969)
Dr. Berkhout has commented in a le tte r to th is w riter that if his studies imply anything at all about the communication of con cepts, they indicate:
Most communications are attempted when the recipient is less than optimally organized to receive them, and that the con cepts subsequently formed are equally less than optimally or ganized, albeit firmly learned. (Berkhout, April 24, 1969)
If Berkhout's conclusions are correct, we may be able to start to analyze how we establish mental states suitable for conceptualiza tion. At the University of California Medical Center, Dr. Joe Kamiya is teaching subjects to control their own brain waves. A light and a tone get larger as a subject’s particular brain wave pattern gets larger. The tone intensity and light intensity get smaller as the brain wave pattern gets smaller. The subject is directed to try to find ways to control h is brain wave pattern. By using lig h t and 112
tone signals as feedback, the subject leams how alpha waves "feel."
Dr. Kamiya says that i t takes from one to twenty t r ia ls to
teach someone to produce alpha waves on demand. One subject reported
that she produced alpha waves by relaxing, clearing her mind of images
and pretending she is "leaning on a lever." The harder she leans, the
more alpha waves she gets. She turns the alpha wave off by thinking of a concrete image lik e a door knob. (Towers, 1967, p. 7; Kamiya, 1968;
S p ilker, Kamiya, Callaway and Yeager, 1969) Because Dr. Jan
Berkhout's research suggests beta not alpha waves are necessary for conceptualization to occur, Kamiya's research suggests that concrete imagery may be necessary for conceptual thoughts beyond the simple recognition stage. The alpha pattern changes when attention is di rected to a specific pattern of interest (Taylor, 1965, p. 216), just as it seems to change when learning is occurring.
H. Masper and C. Shagass (1941) (in a conditioned response experiment done at McGill University) demonstrated that the alpha pattern changes during learning. (Krech and Crutchfield, 1958, p. 487)
A fter several sound stim uli were presented and brain wave taken, a lig h t stim ulus was presented. For a few seconds the sound and lig h t stimuli overlapped. The brain waves were recoded from the occipital
(visual) area of the brain only. Because of this the sound stimuli at first produced no change in the alpha pattern. However, after the lig h t stim u li was introduced the subj ect learned to expect a lig h t wave to follow. As a result changes in the alpha pattern occurred with the sound stim u li too.
One key unanswered question is : How does the RAS s e le c t what to facilitate and what to inhibit? There are probably several answers 113
to the question of why the RAS arouses instead of inhibits attention.
Experimental evidence suggests that an alert brain wave pattern (block
ing of alpha or relaxed wave pattern, continuing BEG desynchronization)
is maintained when novelty, surprisingness, incongruity or complexity
are present in the stimulus. (Berlyne, 1965, p. 252)
When we ask why the reticular formation arouses the brain for
some stimuli and not for others, we also raise the question of the re
lation of motivation to the RAS. Does the RAS respond to motivation?
Does it create a motivated state? Does it both respond to motivation
and create motivation?
Motivation is a concept constructed to describe specific
facets of human behavior. Is it the psychological correlate of the
physiological concept of the reticular formation? The answer is still
not clear. Possibly impulses from the cortex keep the RAS "primed" so
that the nerve pathways for certain stimuli are open before the stim
uli are transmitted. It is possible that when motivation is present
transmission of a message is facilitated by the RAS and when motiva
tion is not present the transmission is inhibited by the RAS.
Berlyne thinks that while directed thinking can be initiated
and guided by other basic motivations—such as reinforcements like
rewards and incentives, directions from external stimuli and drive
for activity—it is also dependent on an exploratory behavior moti vated by conceptual conflict. Berlyne further believes that most,
if not a ll, instances of novelty affecting human adults involve con
flict. To Berlyne conceptual conflict is conflict between incom patible symbolic responses such as beliefs, attitudes, thoughts and ideas. Such conflict will exist when one response pattern is 114
associated with the inhibition of the other. Some common types of con
ceptual conflict identified by Berlyne are doubt, perplexity, contradic
tion, conceptual (attribute) incongruity, confusion, irrelevance. He
identifies several ways of relieving conceptual conflict: disequaliza-
tion, of competing responses’ strength, swamping of one response by in
troduction of new responses, conciliation or reduction of degree of
incompatibility and suppression of thought.
Several similar theories of motivation have been offered. L.
Festinger has presented the theory of "cognitive dissonance." R. P.
Abelson and M. J . Rosenberg have developed a theory of "cognitive
imbalance." (Berlyne, 1965, pp. 19, 236-75) Conceptual conflict, cog
nitive dissonance, cognitive imbalance, epistemic curiosity—all these
terms describe a kind of cognitive drive used to explain the motivation
of thought. While cognitive drive* may not explain every cause of in
teraction between motivation and the RAS, it probably explains much of
i t .
Another fertile area for research is that of the effect of air
pollutants on the RAS and consequently on learning. Do pollutants such
as carbon monoxide, ozone and lead interfere with brain functioning by
impairing the functioning of the thalamus, the reticular formation or
the hypothalamus? Do they change the brain wave patterns? Research
done in Cincinnati by the National Air Pollution Control Administration
*Cognitive drive is a need for resolving conceptual conflict or conceptual curiosity. Conceptual conflict is conflict between in compatible symbolic response patterns (beliefs, attitudes, ideas). Conceptual curiosity is produced by conceptual conflict or by lack of knowledge and understanding. It is expressed in a desire to add new symbolic response patterns to one’s store of concepts. (Berlyne, 1965, p. 255) 115
has found that carbon monoxide can present the proper processing of
sensory information by keeping information from getting through.
(Environmental Science and Technology, 1968, pp. 731-33)
The Role of Symbolic Responses
A major research problem in the area of conceptual communica
tion is the question of the genesis of symbolic responses. We know
something of the physiological correlates of thought. We know that
mental phenomena such as images and words are used in thought. What
we do not understand is exactly how the nerve impulses which are
transmitted come to be translated into symbolic responses, such as
words and images.
Internal processing is carried on by means of symbolic re
sponses. These symbolic responses are always images. An image is
an internal representation of sense data. As images they may be
verbalizations or visualizations, or they may take other forms. What
ever form they take, they must take the form of muscular activity at
some point in recoding.
The neurophysiology of imagery is revealed by studies of muscle tension, brain wave patterns and seeing. As noted earlier in th is chapter, r etin a l patterns seem to be represented by coded combi nations of cell activity. (Gregory, 1966, pp. 70-71) It is not un reasonable to speculate that other sense receptors send information which is recorded according to other coded combinations of cell a c tiv ity .
Two kinds of muscular activity seem to be related to thinking and the production of images. These are an increase in general 116
muscular tension which involves the whole body and an increase in the
localized muscular tension related to the imaginai content. Some degree
of general tension is always present during thinking. £• Jacobsen
(1938) demonstrated this by recording the muscle tension of subjects
when they were relaxed and when they were thinking. When completely
relaxed with minimal muscle tension, subjects did not fall asleep, but
their imagery and thinking processes dwindled and disappeared. Brain
wave pattern stud ies substantiate th is .
Jacobsen also studied localized muscle tension. He found that the content of the image was reflected in the specific pattern of mus
cular tensions. If a person imagines he is pumping a tire, the muscles
of his arm show a rhythmic pattern. When a person imagines looking at a skyscraper, the activity-pattern of the muscles that move the eye is practically identical with the pattern for looking upward. Research by W. A. Shaw (1940) has found that the more vividly an image is ex perienced , the greater is the localized muscular tension in the related muscle area. The activity of the muscle of the arm was found to in crease as imagined weight increased. These studies of muscular tension used the oscillograph to measure muscular a c tiv ity .
The physiological correlates of verbal imagery as in speech symbols are found in different brain areas.
The basis of language is a series of memory pictures. The mind must know and reca ll the names of things in order to men tio n them; i t must have seen or heard things in order to de scribe them and to have learned the words to express these ideas. Even this is not enough- All these factors must work together under the influence of the center for articulate speech which . . . is in close connection with those for the larynx, tongue and muscles of the face. Injury to these areas results in some form of inability to speak (aphasia), to write (agraphia), or to understand spoken words (word deafness) or w ritten words (word blindness). It i s customary, th erefore. 117
to distinguish two types of aphasia, i.e ., motor and sensory. By motor aphasia is meant the condition of those who are unable to speak although there is no paralysis of the muscles of artic ulation. By sensory aphasia is meant the condition of those who are unable to understand written, printed, or spoken symbols of words, although the sense of vision and that of hearing are un impaired . These centers are really memory centers, and aphasia is due to lo ss o f memory of words, meaning o f words seen or heard or formation of letters. (Kimber et a l., 1966, pp. 272, 273)
The areas ju st described can be mapped as follow s :
Choice of Words Used in Expression of Thought
Motor Speech Broca's Area (one—on left side only
Choice of Thoughts to be Expressed
Fig. 1 8 .—Speech Areas
(Based on drawings presented by Kimber ^ al*, 1966, p. 272; Taylor, 1965, p. 205; McNaught and Callender, 1965, p. 206.)
There are probably several areas serving each type of imagery, just as there are several areas serving verbal imagery.
To solve the riddle of the physiological processes correlated with speech and other forms of verbal imagery we must know far more than we do about the association areas. These areas are made up of association fibers which connect motor and sensory areas. These areas seem to function in sensory and motor elaboration, in elaboration of 118
conscious thought (reasoning and problem solving), in visual and audi
tory recollections and in perceptual judgment. The association areas are
represented in Figure 19 by the white areas.
Posterior Association Areas Anterior Association Areas
Temporal Lobe, Memory A ssociation
Fig. 19.—Association Areas
(Based on drawings presented by Krech and Crutchfield, 1958, p. 498; Kimber et a l., 1966, pp. 273, 273; and Taylor, 1965, p. 205.)
As higher animals such as man evolve, their body increasingly
develops areas with specialized functions. The greater size of the
association areas in man's brain is one evidence of this. The asso
cia tio n s areas surrounding the motor and sensory areas seem to be 119
more developed in animals capable of acquiring habits and conditioned
reflexes. While few definite functions have been localized for the
association areas, it is thought that these areas are plastic and
reg iste r th e e ffe c ts of individual experience. (Kimber et a l . , 1966,
p. 273) Researchers in human physiology continue to debate over the
extent to which specificity of function exists in the association
areas•
While all imagery allows for abstraction, for coding and
shuttling of messages, verbal imagery can serve different functions than can nonverbal imagery. Nonverbal imagery is any imagery not rep
resented in the form of words or subvocal speech. Generally, nonver bal imagery serves thought that is freely associative, intended only for private consumption or memory and which is more concrete (more closely related to sense experiences) than verbal thought. Verbal imagery serves logical thought (reasoning). Verbal imagery is often less concrete (less closely related to sense experience) than nonverbal imagery. Verbal imagery is often intended for public consumption or at least for a rehearsal of a message for public consumption.
Harriet Podell describes such functional differences as differ ences in learning set. Verbal imagery is more likely to occur with an intentional set. Nonverbal imagery is more likely to occur with an in cidental or nonintentional set. (Podell, 1958, 1963) It should be re membered that words can be freely associated too. Whereas the purpose of verbal-logical thought is convergent, "problem-solvingly" creative, the purpose of associative-imaginal thought is divergent, suggestively creative. By associating nonverbal imagery with verbal labels, the thinker is better able to manipulate his imagery. 120
It can be speculated that verbal and nonverbal imagery are in
tegrated somehow by brain functioning, just as speech is integrated.
Activation of localized muscular tension and cell activity in some
areas, such as the eye and visual areas may cause activity in related
muscular areas, such as the ear and hearing areas, and may also acti
vate cells in the motor speech and face areas and in the memory pat
tern area of the temporal lobe according to a code. Seeing "green"
can thus be associated with hearing green and later with pronouncing
green in establishing its meaning. (Hess, 1964, p. 23) The problem of
research is to find ways to study the interaction of these areas. The
role of symbolic, imaginai responses seems to be to generate meaning
or responses to messages as well as to code information for transmis
sion or storage.
The Role of Stored Responses
We may speculate that the anterior and posterior association areas function as integrators of sensory and motor responses because fibers in these areas elaborate motor or sensory responses with other motor and sensory responses. Another association area functions as a storer of past associations. This is the temporal lobe at the base of the cerebral cortex. Injuries to this lobe cause various kinds of memory disturbance.
Again we don’t know yet how this area functions in conjunction with the other association areas and the motor and sensory areas.
Neurologists are sure though that it functions as a long term storer of experience, or at least of verbal imagery. The other association areas probably are utilized as short term storers of experience. If 121
the temporal lobe of the brain is removed long term, not short term,
memory seems to be affected. (Scientific American, 1966, pp. 119, 126)
We know that memory changes occur in nerve cells (and possibly
in other cells) throughout the body not just in the cells of the brain.
Research findings seem to point to the conclusion that a bit of infor
mation when received by a nerve cell can cause changes in the RNA
(ribonucleic acid) molecule of the neutron. One evidence of these
changes is that the concentration of RNA in neural cells increases when they are repetitively stimulated. If these changes are dupli
cated when another b it o f information is received, the c e ll remembers.
The number o f d ifferen t changes possible is astronomically immense.
Each different arrangement produces a different RNA molecule, capable
of synthesizing a distinct protein molecule. (Hilgard and Bower, 1966, pp. 464-65)
I t is th is d is tin c t RNA/protein combination which seems to be matched when a c e ll remembers. The concentration of RNA in neural cells increases when they are repetitively stimulated. Experiments on worms have indicated that RNA causes transfer to occur. (Hilgard and Bower, 1966, pp. 465-67) RNA occurs in other cells of the body but only the nerve cells seem to use RNA mainly for memory. Other cells use RNA in growing or in producing protein-rich secretions.
(Asimov, 1963, p. 339) The RNA/protein synthesis may cause a change in the molecules of the nerve and bulbs, sim ilar to the change caused by the production of antibodies.
But, the nature o f any structural change which occurs as a result of memory is still hypothetical. Some evidence indicates that another sort of change occurs at the synapse in the nerve endings or 122
nerve bulbs• These nerve bulbs seem to grow twigs or new fibers•
Sometimes these tw ig s, o ff the endings, d ie . They may or may not be
replaced with new twigs. Perhaps the RNA changes are also related to
growth in the nerve cell. Perhaps they influence the growth of twig
lik e fib ers from nerve endings. Whatever the cause, somehow, i t is
theorized, a nerve fiber comes to sprout new twigs near its termina
tion and thus comes to increase its effective contact with another
cell. The neurons of older people have been found to branch more ex
tensively than those of young people.
One reason offered for the poor memory of some old people for
recent events is the inability of their nerves to grow more twigs or
to accommodate more connections. If this is so, perhaps we can pre
vent th is with drugs, perhaps by using drugs which a ffe c t RNA/protein
synthesis. Another hypothesis which has been offered to explain
structural change related to memory is the theory of continuous ac
tivity or recirculating of the memory trace. The continuous activity
or dynamic theory o f the memory trace asks whether memory i s dependent
on some continuing activity instead of on some structural alteration
left behind as a static residue.
A dynamic memory trace i s not as p lau sible an explanation as
a static trace because when memory is stopped by shock or freezing it
doesn't seem to disappear. Another problem is that recirculating
nerve loops would consume much metabolic energy. Furthermore, memo
r ies would have to share loops because there are more memories than there would be loops available. (Scientific American, 1966, pp. 126-31)
Seme recirculating or dynamic activity may be necessary for fixating memory traces, however. This possibility raises the question of 123
whether the nature of the structural change for long-term memory is
different from that for short-term memory.
What is short-term memory and how is it related to long-term
memory? Short-term memory is temporary. When the experience giving
rise to the cell activity stops, the activity and the memory die.
Short term storage is limited by forgetting due to competition from
other responses and to spontaneous decay. Because short-term memory
is so susceptible to decay and long-term memory is not, investigators
suspect that d ifferen t mechanisms are involved. Exactly how short term memories become fixated in long-term memory is not known. Some
clues are given by the factors which have been found to affect memory.
Time factors have been found to be very important in short term retention and in learning. Some time elapses between the time a memory trace origin ates and the time i t becomes learned or fixated in long-term memory. The process of fixing continues for at least an hour. (Scientific American, 1966, pp. 119-26) The reason it takes time to fix a memory trace may be that impulses must circulate over their pathways many times before leaving behind an enduring memory trace. Some support for this position comes from experiments which found the long-term memory unlike short-term memory, was r ela tiv ely unaffected by electric shock, incisions and brain cooling. Youthful or repeated experiences seem to be most firmly fixed. These are the experiences least apt to disappear from memory during senility.
Another factor is the characteristics of the experience to be remembered. Vivid experiences are retained lon gest. (S c ie n tific
American, 1966, p. 126) Familiar experiences are retained more easily. 124
This may be one reason why sensory deprivation limits intelligence.
Some emotional experiences may be inhibited or blocked from memory.
Forgetting and coding are two related factors which affect the
storage of symbolic responses. Some period of forgetting seems to be
necessary for retention. Perhaps this is because cluttering detail
must be forgotten . Rapid forgettin g can be ascribed to short-term
memory and increasing r e c a ll to long-term memory. Coding appears to be one reason for the increase in recall associated with long term retention. Coding is necessary because there are storage limitations.
Ralph Gerard notes that:
Guesses have been made as to how many items may be accumu lated in memory over a lifetim e. Some tests of perception sug gest that each tenth of a second is a single "frame" of expe rience for the human brain. In that tenth of a second it can receive perhaps a thousand units of information, called bits. In seventy years, not allowing for any reception during sleep, some fifteen trillion bits might pour into the brain and per haps be stored there. Since this number is more than one thousand times larger than the total of nerve cells, the prob lem of storage is not exactly simple. (Scientific American, 1966, p. 126)
If a memory pattern is transmitted redundantly, as is suspected, this storage problem is compounded. Coding solves the problem by in creasing storage capacity. Groups of words used to represent larger numbers o f images could give space for many more item s. The number of chunks in the message has been found to be a factor in recall. When the number of word pairs presented for memorization is increased long term memory is diminished more than short-term memory. (Scientific
American, 1966, pp. 126-31, 141-46)
One way of coding for memory is with a cognitive map. Animals which remember with a cognitive map, instead of a conditioned reflex, are more adaptable. Cognitive map is used here to mean the learning of 125
expected spatial relationships» Another way to code is by labeling with
words. In reproducing coded material memory has been found to be recon
structive rather than reduplicative. This means that memory changes
form. The effects of verbal labels on memory for form have been studied.
D. T. Herman, R. H. Lawless and R. W. Marshall (1957) found that labels have more influence if subjects are not told they will be expected to draw the figure. When subjects expect to have to draw the figure they neglect verbal labels and concentrate on form aspects.
Another finding is that the more recently applied the label the greater the influence it is likely to have. After a period of time, however, that label exerts less and less influence while earlier asso ciations exert more and more influence. Thus the giving of a label results in the subject reproducing a figure which is an average of the associations he has had with the label and figure.
L. Postman (1954) notes that the poorer the memory skills the subject enters with, the greater the extent to which he is likely to depend on habitual associations when producing a figu re. Postman in vestigated the way the learning of a code for memory affected memory.
He found subjects who learned the code from which the stimulus pairs were constructed remembered the pairs better than control subjects only after a five week interval. Until then the code learning group's performance was inferior. The implication is that the memory of a specific figure is forgotten more rapidly than the memory of the code.
Hence the code comes to determine the nature of the reproduction more and more and as time passes. (Postman, 1964,.pp. 402-65)
Knowledge of the electro-chem ical nature o f memory promises to lead to d iscoveries of how drugs can improve memory. Already we know 126
that some nervous system stimulants may improve long-term memory by more
than one-third. (Blochman, 1969) Other drugs can restore short-term
memory and improve the memory of the very old. In the future educa
tional designers may be able to improve memory skills of poor learners
with drugs when retention of the subject matter is essential. The need
to be cautious in adopting such measures is indicated by the finding
that drugs have unknown side effects. Dr. Bernard Agranoff found that
th e drug pyromycin can erase long-term memory. (Towers, 1967, p. 3;
Blochman, 1969)
Dr. Samuel Bogoch of Boston has even suggested th at i f some
forms of sugar proteins can be synthetically duplicated, it may be
possible to build many more switches into one brain. From research
on pigeons Dr. Bogoch found th at brain sugars increase ninefold during
the first ten minutes of training. Much of this increase is related
to the increase in alertness; however, some of it is closely associated with learning. Months after their training, these protein sugars asso
ciated with learning increase. The better the learner the pigeon is, the greater the residue of these proteins in the brain. (McBroom, 1968)
Granting that symbolic responses are stored, what is the func tion of these stored responses? What role do they play in conceptuali zation? In the first place, because they are stored, they furnish in tern a l stim uli which can be matched with incoming stim uli or other stored responses, in fact which can be used for thought even when sen sory deprivation occurs. Stored symbolic responses can thus verify, change, provide or create meaning. In the second place, some stored responses are learned responses. As such they can be reused without re-experiencing. In the third place, as noted on page 124, short-term 127
retention of stored responses allows for forgettin g which seems to be
necessary for long term recall. Finally, stored symbolic responses
are codings of codings; as such they increase the capacity for thought.
We w ill next explore some of the implications of the recoding,
reticular and storage processes for the media designer.
The Role of Individual Differences
There are individual differences in internal processing due to
maturity, to imaginai ability and to the quality of learning. These
differences are important because differences in internal processing
influence the characteristics of the conceptualization.
The newborn infant has an immature cortex. Although at birth
the cortex has all the neural cells it w ill ever have, changes in
these cells occur as the body grows. These changes include changes
in size and composition of nerve cells and in the length and state of
development of nerve fibers. The changes occur at different rates for
different areas of the cortex. The parts of the brain mature and func
tion at different rates as shown in Figure 20, p. 128. The motor and
sensory areas mature f ir s t ; the association areas mature la s t. In
Figure 20, the darker the shading the earlier the area matures. The
unshaded areas are the la s t to mature.
The alpha rhythm also develops gradually. (This is the rhythm that indicates an attentive, wakeful state.) For the first three
months there appears to be no uniform pattern. The frequency is slow until the age of one year when it reaches about six per second. The adult rhythm of ten per second frequency is not reached until age ten or twelve. Not only is the cortex of the neonate undeveloped, the 128
Motor Central Fissure Somesthetic- Sensory
Visual
Auditory
Fig. 20.—The development of the cqrtex. (Krech and Crutchfield, 1958, p. 592)
lack of an alpha pattern suggests that his cortical cells may not con duct impulses at all. If an infant's "stupidity" is due to this lack
of growth no amount of training w ill enable him to do certain things.
Does this mean that general experiencing w ill not help the child's men tal development? The evidence says no. What it means is that certain complex learning abilities cannot be developed until the cortex matures. (Krech and Crutchfield, 1958, pp. 593, 594)
In the light of this information, Jean Piaget's observation that children didn't seem to possess or use imagery until age two is interesting. Piaget makes much of his observation that until the middle of the second year, the child shows no signs of possessing imagery and remains unable to cope with situations in which imagery would be h e lp fu l. An example would be knowing where to look for an 129
object which has disappeared behind a screen. To Piaget images are im
plicit symbolic responses in nonverbal form. Piaget thus lim its images
to nonverbal responses. Furthermore, by his method of testing for
imagery, he limits imagery to visual imagery.
According to the definitions used in this report and the find
ings on the maturation of the cortex, the child should be capable of kinesthetic imagery, at least, by the age of one year. The child may not be able to make intelligent verbal or speech responses until the association areas of his cortex mature. Nevertheless, the child is capable of symbolic responses in the form of kinetic imagery at an early age and in the form of visual and aural imagery soon after.
Another interesting finding is that the child seems more likely to have eidetic images than the adult. Eidetic images are particularly vivid, realistic, and detailed images. The "eidetiker" will say that he sees the image; yet he knows the object is not before him. E. R.
Jaensch (1930) tried unsuccessfully to show that eidetic imagery is related to endocrine con stitu tion . (Murphy, 1949, p. 435; Krech and
Crutchfield, 1958, p. 367)
In the writer's opinion, one possible explanation for the greater prevalence of eidetic imagery among children could be that the adult has had to store many more symbolic responses. He has, therefore, developed more abstract coding. This may make it harder for him to decode memory images with extensive concrete detail.
A promising procedure for studying eidetic imagery could be a computer record of brain waves used to diagnose visual activity.
The method is promising because unlike introspective reports it can be used well with babies and children. 130
The method was developed to diagnose vision problems by re
searchers at the Naval Electronics Laboratory Center in San Diego.
There i s a change in e le c tr ic a l energy, in the range of two to th ree-
millionths of a volt, created by the brain when the subject being
tested sees an object in a sharp or a blurred manner. The brain wave
recordings show these differences. Research is now needed to estab
lish whether such differences can be recorded when imagery but not the
object is present. (Pearson, 1968 , p. 16)
Internal processing limitations are due not only to maturity; there can also be imaginai differences due to personality, to level
of intelligence or to practice in imagery. Leo Radaker has studied the visual imagery of mentally retarded children. He found that al though these children had poor imagery when originally tested, as a result of training in visual imagery there was an improvement of imagery in a ll sen ses. This improvement occurred after only two sessio n s. Moreover, the improvement in imagery transferred to word learning and helped improve sp e llin g . The only exceptions to general improvement were in the learning o f more abstract words and imagery.
Radaker's research suggests that practice in imaging w ill increase a b ility to create images and w ill help learners recognize words as long as th eir meaning is not too abstract. (Radaker, 1961)
K. Start and A. Richardson (1964) have studied the relation ship between the ability to produce imagery and the ability to learn from mental practice. The characteristics of imagers studied were v iv id n ess, modality and autonomy. Start and Richardson found that vivid autonomous imagery was a handicap in the learning of physical skills. However, neither vividness or controllability of imagery was 131
able to separately predict performance scores for physical skills
learned by mental practice. The controllability of imagery seems to
be the more significant variable and the interaction of it with vivid
ness seems to be most inform ative. By autonomous imagery, they meant
imagery which does not easily yield to other imagery. This is imagery
which is harder for the imager to control. It becomes autonomous in
relation to the imager. Emotionally related to prejudicial imagery
often becomes autonomous. As a resu lt of th eir in v estig a tio n s, Start
and Richardson feel that controllability of imagery may be part of a
general ability to ignore extraneous vivid imagery. (Start and Richard
son, 1964) Start and Richardson based their work on the prior investi
gation of Rosemary Gordon into "stereotypy of Imagery and Belief as an
Ego Defense" (1962).
Gordon studied the relationship between controllability of
imagery and the rigidity with which beliefs are held. First she tried to establish whether subjects could alter imagery. To do this she re quired them to picture one image and then directed them to picture another image. Her test for autonomy of imagery measures the ease with which subjects can change th eir imagery. She found that a b ility at manipulating imagery was related to the formation of stereotypes.
Those with the most control over their imagery—those who could change images most easily—were found, not unexpectedly, to be less likely to adopt stereotyped or prejudicial beliefs. Those with the most autono mous imagery were also those most likely to hold stereotyped beliefs.
(Gordon, 1962)
Esther Shaw’s doctoral dissertation aimed to determine how modality was related to occupation and tried to identify some other 132
imaginai factors influencing verbal expression. Her method of col
lecting data involved introspective reports and is, therefore, open to
criticism.*
Nevertheless, Shaw's conclusions present areas for further re
search. Shaw found that an in d ivid u al's imagery can be described as
more or less verbal or visual, as flexible (many habited) or inflexible
(bound to one form), as more or le ss flu e n t. The measure for fluency
of imagery is similar to the construct "controllability" of imagery.
Shaw also found that imagery differs in amount of detail, clearness
and completeness of picture. These variables are linked with the
measure of "vividness" which i s used today. She found that concrete
imagery increased the reaction time preceding verbal reports of imagery
in response to a word. It seemed to retard verbal expression. Shaw
concluded further that vagueness of preceding imagery can cause poor thinking and that the type of imagery used will influence the style of expression. For example, too much abstract imagery without a concrete basis will impair the writing of literature. (Shaw, 1908)
One group of investigators has been trying to establish a re lationship between electroencephalograms or "brain wave patterns" and mental traits. A person's brain waves do show individuality and are con sisten t from day to day. Alpha frequency has not been found to
^Subjects report by introspection the associations which come to mind when presented with a stimulus. One asset of this method is that it allows one to study internal phenomenon and processes. Another asset is that it is a relatively easy and inexpensive method. The weaknesses of the method are many. Responses depend on the verbal skill of the reporter. Time limitations may prevent detailed reports. The process of reporting may add meaning when there is none. On the other hand, there is always the danger of the interpreter missing the significance of the reports. Furthermore, it is hard to interpret subjective reports objectively. 133
correlate with adult intelligence,but some relationships with person
ality have been indicated. Unfortunately these latter findings are not
adequately reported to be verifiable or acceptable. They indicate that
passive individuals had high alpha indices. Frustrated, hostile, ag
gressive women had mixed or irregular records. Women with strong mas
culine or maternal drives had low alpha indices.
W. G. Walter and his co-worker (1953) have found differences
based on the way a person's EEC record changes with stimulation.
Walter states that some persons show no alpha rhythm at anytime. These
persons turned out to be people who thought by means of visual imagery.
Persons who tended toward auditory or kinesthetic rather than visual
imagery were found to be of an opposite type. In these persons alpha
rhythm persists even when the eyes are open. In addition, researchers have found alpha, beta or theta waves predominate in some persons.
(Tyler, 1956, pp. 434-36) If relationships between brain wave patterns,
imagery and personality can be found they may allow us to speculate about and study the role of the reticular formation in influencing con ceptual style.
Another interesting issue is whether some people are lacking in amount of imagery and if so, the influence of this lack on their conceptual ability. Research on dreaming has found that even people who claim to be nondreamers experience the imaginai activity called dreaming during sleep. They don't remember their dreams because they fell into a deep sleep early and finished dreaming long before awakening or because they have personalities which tend to repress dreams or because they are persons without much self-awareness (sub jectivity, interest in analyzing oneself). 134
That self-la b eled nondreamers do dream has been documented by
EEC pattern records. (Foulkes, 1966, pp. 46-60) This finding suggests
that much imagery during sleep may be present but be unreported. It
suggests too that introspective imaginai reports reflect personality
characteristics to a greater extent than we realize. Perhaps some per
sonalities are more repressive and therefore report less imagery than
they actually experience. All persons may be repressive of imagery to
some extent when reporting it because they know they do not have time
to report all their imagery before it disappears unless they limit it.
E. W. Taylor reports that flow of response in word fluency
tasks and flow of response in ideational fluency are not the same
basic process. "Word fluency (W) is defined as a facility in producing
single, isolated words that contain one or more formal restrictions without reference to the meaning of the words. Ideational fluency (F)
is described as a facility of expressing ideas by the use of words and their meanings." (Taylor, 1947, p. 239) By formal restrictions on words Taylor means, for example, directions calling for words ending with certain letters or including certain prefixes or suffixes. Taylor concludes that fluency is complex and includes at le a st two or three factors. (As a third factor he suggests verbal versatility or variety in verbal expression.) We must, therefore, be careful not to assume that our data on imagery are ever complete.
There is another finding on internal processing which is rele vant to individual differences. This is the frequently replicated finding that one can know a concept without being able to verbalize it.
Conversely, one can verbalize a concept without really understanding it. (Bourne, 1966, p. 22; Gage, 1963, p. 888) 135
Gertrude Hendrix of the University of Illinois says that pre mature verbalization can destroy conceptualization- Hendrix’s work has been done in the teaching of mathematics to children. As a result of her observations she concluded that two distinct, subverbal processes were necessary for concept formation. There seems to be a generaliza tion flash followed by a different kind of flash revealed in transfer behavior. This second flash of awareness or eureka experience is necessary for forming a concept that transfers.
Hendrix believes that discovery learning (learning by conscious generalization) yields more transfer than reception learning or induc tive learning. She believes further that it is "the intermediate flash of unverbalized awareness that actually accounts for the transfer power."
Important as symbolic formulation must be for verification and organization of knowledge, it is not the key to transfer. That key is a sub-verbal, internal process—something which must hap pen to the new organism before i t has any new knowledge to verbalize. (Hendrix, 1947, p. 200)
David p. Ausubel sharply disagrees with her.
. . . language plays an important role in verbalizing or encoding into sentences, the new intuitive or subverbal product (concept or proposition) that emerges from the transform ational operations involved in thinking. Verbalizing subverbal ideas (expressing them verbally in prepositional form as opposed to the later act of naming them) is a refining process that results in their be coming more sharply delineated. It is therefore a serious mis take to believe that the entire substance of an idea, as well as all of its transfer power, inheres in its subverbal form, as Hendrix asserts (1950). The old philosophical notion that ver balization "merely mirrors thought" or clothes it in outer gar ments" is charmingly poetic but has little psychological utility or explanatory value today. By means of its significant refining functions, verbalization adds a great deal both to the meaning and transferability of the products of thought, and thus must be considered an integral part of the process of thinking. (Ausubel, 1968 , p. 82) 136
This writer believes that the conflict between the positions of
Ausubel and Hendrix is due to the subject matter and subjects used in
Hendrix's experiments. Gertrude Hendrix's observations and experiments were concerned with the formation of mathematical concepts. She used
children as subjects. Unverbalized awareness seems to be particularly
important in children's formation of mathematical concepts. Children typically have difficulty verbalizing a concept because of their inade quate verbal abilities. Mathematics is a unique field because it deals primarily with a nonverbal language that makes elaborate use of cryptic symbols to summarize concepts. The symbols are p recisely de fined and the concepts they express are usually related to problem solvin g.
A good mathematics teacher could lead a bright student through a problem to its solution without verbalizing the concepts involved.
Conversely, he could not lead the student through the problem with only verbal expressions of the concept. In contrast to mathematics, concepts in social studies must be explained verbally before an under standing of vocabulary can be reached. Social studies teachers would not be hindered as much by lack of a chalkboard as mathematics teachers.
Joseph Lee Wolfe studied the "Effects of Verbalization and
Pretraining on Concept Attainment by Children in Two Mediation Cate gories." As a result of his experiment he concluded that overt verbalization facilitates concept attainment. He found that overt verbalization facilitated most when pretraining which pre-establishes a mediating response occurs. When no pretraining occurred the 137
facilitating effects of overt verbalization were weaker. (Wolfe, 1967,
pp. 19, 20, 25)
A key factor in determining whether the concept is both verbal
ized and understood during internal processing seems to be the moment
at which an attempt to verbalize is made. If one tries to put the con
cept into verbal form internally and to express this verbalization ex
ternally before the concept has been completely formed and fixated in
memory, the attempt can destroy the recently formed concept. If the
verbalization is incomplete or incorrect, it is premature and detri
mental. (Swartz, 1948) A pre-experimental request to verbalize dif
ferences has also been found to be detrimental to concept formation.
(Rommetveit and Kvale, 1965) The length of the verbalization can de
termine the complexity of the stimulus object or the difficulty of the
perceptual task. (Glanzer, 1962; Glanzer and Clark, 1964) Presumably,
then, an individual's tendency to reflect and verbalize covertly before
responding would produce differences in internal processing. These
differences would be reflected in the completeness or quality of the
conceptualization.
There are good reasons to believe that individuals differ in
their learning capabilities at least partly because of differences in
experience. We know that animals from a stimulating environment de velop larger cortical areas. We also know that animals with a slightly
larger cortex leam maze problems faster than animals with slimmer c o r tic a l areas. (Hilgard and Bower, 1966, p. 464)
The Role o f Media Design
This chapter has reported findings on the role that each of the following plays in the process of conceptualization: recoding. 138 the reticular formation, symbolic responses, stored responses and in dividual differences. The findings reported indicate the role that media design can assume in influencing the process of conceptualization.
These implications of the findings for media design are presented below in the form of general principles for influencing the process of con ceptualization. More specific principles will be presented in
Chapter VI, "Audiovisual Design."
1. It seems to be necessary for a learner to achieve an alert,
attentive state before learning can occur. The presenta
tion must motivate if the learner is not already motivated.
(The area of subliminal learning is relatively unexplored.)
(Lewis, 1968)
2. Conceptual conflict (dissonance) can motivate learning.
(Berlyne, 1965, p. 273) Types of conceptual conflict in
clude doubt ; perplexity, confusion, incongruity, contradic
tion. A presentation which offers ways to resolve concep
tual conflict is likely to be attended to.
3. It may be impossible for some conceptual learning to take
place u n til imaginai a b ility i s improved. The communicator
must sometimes develop the internal processes before the
external design can be effective. Or he must design a
presentation to take differences in internal processing
ability into account.
4. One way of improving memory skills is by teaching a code
for abstracting the relevant aspects of a stimulus. 139
5. The communicator must understand the codes a learner uses
for filin g so th at he can correct them i f necessary in the
presentation and feedback»
6. Since the learner cannot usually remember the perception in
complete d e ta il, the communicator can try to influence what
is abstracted. He can do this by pretraining, by cuing, by
the use of advance organizers, by the use of schema.
7. The strength, area and exposure time of the original
stimulus can a ffe c t recoding.
8. A picture which has gradual changes in contrast w ill be
less likely to cause distortion in recoding than a picture
with abrupt strong contrasts.
9. Habituation effects can be avoided if varying repetition
is created by introducing novelty. CHAPTER V
CURRICULUM DESIGN
There are two main ways in which the internal process of con
ceptualization, in an instructional setting, can be controlled exter
nally. These are curriculum design and audiovisual design. Curriculum
design can be defined as p rofession al planning for the content and ap
proach of teaching-learning units and for their place in the school
program. Audiovisual design refers to planning for ways to communi
cate teaching-learning units. Audiovisual design could also be called
curriculum communication.
If we accept these definitions, we establish the concerns of
curriculum design on a more general level, and the concerns of audio visual design on a level of specific application. (The purpose of audiovisual design is to realize the theoretical ideas of curriculum design.) In actuality, however, curriculum design must include audio visual design and vice versa. For example, the national science cur riculum projects incorporated audiovisual design right from the early stages of planning.
Audiovisual design factors w ill be discussed in detail in
Chapter VI. In this chapter the writer w ill deal with curriculum design as it influences conceptualization. The chapter w ill deal first with the role of the curriculum in providing the experiences basic to conceptualization. Next we w ill consider the attempts to
140 141
build guidance in concept formation skills into the curriculum. Lastly,
we w ill consider the various recent approaches to curriculum design and
how they influence concept learning.
Providing Experiences
By controlling to some extent a student's experiences, curricu
lum design can a ffect the basis for conceptualization. We know, for
example, that culturally deprived students need a curriculum that pro
vides for more concrete experience than they may have had at home or
in their circumscribed community life. Their conceptual ability may
be limited until they have such experience. The curriculum, then, has
an important role in determining a student's readiness for conceptuali
zation. Not only is curriculum design a factor in making conceptuali
zation possible and meaningful, curriculum design can order experiences
so that conceptualization i s easier and more memorable. For example, the recent curriculum projects try to order experiences so that obser vations resulting from these experiences can lead to a generalized conclusion.
Besides providing new and ordered experiences, the curriculum can help by providing rich experiences. Rich or vivid experiences are more lik e ly to be remembered. Edgar Dale has described some character istics of rich experiences which can lead to conceptualization:
1. The senses must be strongly involved. 2. There is a quality of novelty. 3. A marked emotional tone may be present. 4. A rich experience is often the culmination or fulfillment of other experiences. 5. A rich experience carries with it a sense of personal achieve ment. 6. One rich experience can generate a new experience. (Dale, 1969, p. 72) 142
We need more research on the characteristics of rich experiences.
When is a highly dramatic experience more useful than a less dramatic
one? When is novelty a necessary characteristic? How do differences
in children's needs determine what experiences w ill be rich ones for them?
Guidance in Conceptualization
Another way in which curriculum design can influence concept formation is by providing for guidance in conceptualization. Many of the recent curriculum approaches have guidance in scientific concep tualization as one of their aims. We need more evaluative studies of the "learning to leam" aspects of curriculum approaches. More impor tant, we should permeate our curriculum approaches with vocabulary development, classification and categorization, schema, logical thought and challenges to the imagination, because all of these stimulate con ceptualization. Methods of developing conceptual abilities include developing critical thinking ability, creativity training, vocabulary development and the analysis of concepts.
Critical Thinking
Hilda Taba suggests that the study of thinking is basic to all subjects. Taba emphasizes the potential of the skill of thinking as a way of integrating conceptual learning in many subjects. According to
Taba,
Discriminating thinking, like discriminating taste, is best de veloped by comparison. If thinking were stressed in the various subjects and the differences in the processes of interpretation and application according to context were made conscious, com parative training in thinking would become a matter of course. Students would experience variations in the rigor and the 143
precision of thinking and would leam discrimination in the use of data, generalizations, and principles according to the de grees of their universality. A comparison of the process of proof in geometry and in an article on politics would add greatly to the understanding of what logical proof is all about. (Taba, 1962, pp. 212, 218-20)
A person who cannot see the fallacies in his own and others conceptual
izin g is at a disadvantage in learning. I t i s hard for him to be
s e le c t iv e .
The Development o f C reativity
This is education for divergent, fluent, imaginative thinking.
Dr. E. Paul Torrance has developed many exercises to encourage crea
tivity. One of the techniques Dr. Torrance uses often is to present
the child with varied materials and ask him to produce something.
Clearly, this represents a form of conceptualization. Other sugges
tions are to let the child explore and take risks, to supply creative
toys and kits, to encourage initiative, to take him places, to laugh with him but not at him. (Gibbs, 1967) Because concept formation under
lies all creative thought, the curriculum which provides for creativity training is encouraging concept formation.
Vocabulary Development
At th e Ohio State U niversity, Edgar Dale and Joseph O'Rourke have done extensive work on vocabulary development with programmed in struction. They try to extend a child's vocabulary by giving him the basic concepts o f ro o ts, p refixes and su ffix es which he can combine into new concepts or use to analyze new verbal concepts when they are presented.
The movement to expose the child to much concrete experience early is an attempt to provide a sound basis for vocabulary development. 144
The more words a person learns the better his conceptual development
providing he understands the meaning of the words. Explicit provision
for vocabulary development through the curriculum is a way to increase
conceptual knowledge.
Conceptual Analysis
Conceptual analysis is the act of breaking a problem down into
the concept or concepts it involves. It is the ability to identify the
major considerations or ideas which enter into a problem. One approach
to conceptual analysis is creative analysis. This approach combines
creativity training, vocabulary development and conceptual analysis.
It instructs the student to identify the rules and attributes which
can be used to construct concepts.
The creative analysis approach is presented by Albert Upton and
Richard Samson in th e ir book of the same name subtitled "The Graded
Exercises in Analysis." The book deals with types of analysis—
classification, structure, operation—and with qualification, signs,
analogies, definitions, problem-solving, semantic growth. In each
case it lists the types of sorting factors which apply. For example,
it enumerates sensory qualifications, sorting factors for classifica tions and the basic kinds of definition. A sample exercise from
Creative Analysis is reproduced in Figure 21.
Figure 21 shows sorting factors. Sorting factors are terms which indicate sim ilarities or differences among specimens. Vertical
sorting factors indicate similarities. Horizontal sorting factors
indicate differences. In Figure 21 color is both a horizontal and vertical sorting factor. 145
Fruit
*Red Fruit *Yellow Fruit *Blue Fruit (*Color)
Strawberries Bananas Blueberries Tomatoes Others Others Others
Fig. 2 1 .—The creative analysis approach (Upton and Samson, 1961, p. 55)
Another plan for the analysis of concepts has been presented
by John Wilson in Thinking with Concepts. This is a plan for identi
fying a conceptual question that a problem hinges on.
As an example, Wilson uses the problem of resolving the con
ceptual question, "Ought punishment to be retributive?" Notice that
the problem was not phrased as the factual question, "Is punishment
as it is used not retributive?" or the value question, "Do you think that punishment as it is used now is a good thing?" Instead the prob
lem i s analyzed to be one of the meaning or interpretation o f a term
or idea. To follow Wilson's problem solving procedure for this con
ceptual question, one would first determine the common meaning of retribution.
After comparing three or more cases (model, contrary, border lin e , related , invented, so cia l context) of the concept "punishment" as presently applied, the analyzer concludes that punishment entails retribution. He therefore finds that the conceptual question under examination is logically questionable because his analysis shows that the meaning of punishment includes retrib ution . He decides to re examine the conceptual question. 146
After rejecting many alternative questions of concept—such as,
"Is punishment only retributive?" and "What is the purpose of retribu
tion?"—he decides that there is a need for a more neutral question not
involving concepts like punishment and retribution since they are conno-
tative of each other. It would serve society better to ask the concep
tual question, "How shall we treat our criminals?" He formulates a
brief essay stating the results of his critical analysis and responses
to this essay. (Wilson, 1963, pp. 20, 94-105)
Some ways in which concepts can be analyzed are suggested by
B. Othanel Smith's list of modes of input used by teachers in present
ing concepts.
From a study of behavioral situations in which concepts are being taught, it is possible to identify the following modes of input: A teacher: —cites one or more characteristics of the referent class, —cites a set of characteristics sufficient to identify something as an instance of the class, —cites a class of which the referent is a subclass, —describes a referent as a subclass of a given class, —compares the referent to something e ls e , —tells what the referent is not, —tells the opposite of the referent, —tells the difference between the referent and something e ls e , —notes the sim ilarities or differences between two or more instances of the referent class, —cites an instance of the referent, —cites something that is not an instance of the referent c la s s , —tells how an instance may be produced, or —gives evidence that a suggested instance is in fact an in stan ce. A person who is prepared to teach understands the structure of concepts as well as these input operations. (Smith, 1969, p. 57)
Learners could be taught to analyze a concept according to Smith's list.
If a learner could cite the referents, attributes and classifications called for in the preceding lis t, he would have completed an analysis of the concept. 147
Issues in Curriculum
Discovery v. Reception Learning
All learning is in some way a discovery. It has been suggested
that the difference between some of the recent curriculum approaches
lies in the relative difficulty or ease of discovering what is to be
learned. Thus reception learning and discovery learning would be
placed at the extremes of the continuum; while guided discovery would
occupy the middle position:
Discovery Learning z^uided Discovery :>Reception Learning
The implication is that the difference between approaches depends on
the size of the inferential leap.
Although it is true that some discovery is easy, other discovery
can be very difficult; the writer does not believe that the difference
between approaches lies here. The writer believes that the discovery
in reception learning can be very easy or very difficult. Even content
presented very completely with the points to be learned emphasized can
be difficult for some learners to comprehend. Similarly, discovery
learning can occur e a sily from a flash o f in sigh t or can be d iffic u lt to the point of impossible. The difference lies rather in the strategy presented. Discovery learning might be said to have more of a "scaven ger hunt" or "egg hunt" strategy. Guided discovery uses more of a
"treasure hunt" strategy. Reception learning is more like a rebus game in which one must break the code to find the meaning.
When recent curriculum projects speak of their discovery learning approach, they are really discussing a guided discovery 148
approach. By guided discovery, the writer means that the activities of
the learner haye been organized to lead him to a certain discovery.
A critique of the discovery and reception learning approaches
has been drawn up by Davis Ausubel (Ausubel, 1958, pp. 467-504).
Ausubel challenges those who accept discovery learning too quickly,
too uncritically and too exclusively. He first instructs us that those
who offer the success of recent curriculum projects as evidence for the
greater worth of discovery learning are in error. The recent curricu
lum projects are often not as much discovery learning as they are ver
bal reception learning.
His principal example is the UICSM (University of Illinois Com
mittee on School Mathematics) project. He states that UICSM provides
for limited discovery learning (discovery generalizations) from the be
ginning, but even this token discovery learning disappears by the end
of the program. The project actually uses programmed verbal expression
as the dominant approach. As for the contention th at the UICSM approach
is evidence for the value of the discovery method with high school stu
dents, Ausubel says that the students entered with a poor elementary
school foundation in mathematics which the UICSM program compensates
for. According to Ausubel this proves nothing except that we may not
have used discovery learning early enough to make the more desirable
because more efficient reception learning feasible. The recent curricu
lum approaches are more characterized by guided discovery, a cross be
tween reception and discovery learning, he concludes.
Ausubel next instructs the reader to avoid assuming that it is the variable of discovery learning which has led to the success of the p rojects. The programs also involved equally lik e ly causal factors 149
such as the inductive approach, careful sequential programming, large
investments of time, materials and talent, the "Hawthorne effect,"
p r e c ise , unambiguous presentation of content, provision for concrete
experience and requiring systematic verbal formulation of basic prin
ciples- While all the preceding factors are useful in concept develop
ment, Ausubel feels that it is likely the last mentioned factor which
plays a more important part than discovery learning. In the writer's
opinion, providing for a better experiential base is probably also a
more important variable than discovery.
Finally, Ausubel tries to bring us to the realization that the
relative lack of success of reception learning may not be due to any
inherent limitation of the reception approach but rather to the rote,
unparticipatory way in which it has been used.
According to Ausubel the advantages of reception learning are
its efficiency, its preciseness, its suitability for unsophistocated
learners, for learners with limited ability or high ability and its
suitability for complex and unfamiliar learning materials. Further
more, there is evidence that informing learners of useful previous
learning seems to increase transfer.
The disadvantages of reception learning, he notes, are the
tendency of some teachers to use the approach for rote learning, to
be insufficiently concerned with developing meaning. To help the
learner internalize or incorporate the material, David Ausubel advo
cates the use of organizers in reception learning.* Organizers are
*Another recommended method for helping learners to relate the new material to their cognitive structure is giving an overview and a quick review. One means of using the overview effectively is the SQ3R Method of studying. The steps in the Survey Q3R Method are (1) survey, (2) question, (3) read, (4) recite. (Robinson, 1961, pp. 29, 30) 150
introductory materials that help the learner to relate his learning to
what he already knows. (Ausubel, 1968, pp. 148, 149; see also pages
74-75 of this report)
Guided discovery, Ausubel notes, is not new. It is a variation
o f the Socratic method • Its advantages are that i t seems to be supe
rior for the science student with average ability. Moreover, it seems
to be suited for developing new and simple ideas from familiar mate
rials. It is also suitable for elementary pupils because they do not
have an adequate backlog of experience to draw on in concept formation.
It develops desirable attitudes towards scientific inquiry and learning
skills. It can easily enhance confidence (as could reception learning).
One of the disadvantages of the guided discovery approach is
that students can end up rotely memorizing specific types of problems
instead of rotely memorizing formulas as is done in much traditional
reception learning. (Ausubel does not approve of rote learning of
either types of problems or formulas. He believes that to be meaning
fully learned problems and formulas must be integrated with the learn
er’s cognitive structure.) Moreover, ^nboratory work doesn’t neces
sarily lead to understanding.
Research on th e guided discovery approach i s inadequate too
for the reason mentioned on pages 148-49—significant variables, such as investment of time and material, are not taken into account. Research favors the general superiority of guided discovery over reception or discovery learning, however. According to Ausubel, the guided dis covery method seems to be the most efficient means of learning. Unlike discovery learning it is not unreasonably time consuming or costly.
Guided discovery seems to be more likely than reception learning to 151
lead to concepts integrated with the learner's cognitive structure.
When compared with reception learning or discovery learning, guided
discovery was generally found to produce superior learning. If it
did not produce superior learning, there were no significant differ
ences. Guided discovery did not produce less learning than reception
learning or guided discovery.
The discovery approach is successful when the learning task is
one which i s short and easy and one which i s to be developed from fa
miliar materials. It is useful for the early unsophisticated stages
of abstract learning, for testing the meaningfulness of knowledge, for teaching learning sk ills, for increasing the meaningfulness of exposi tory learning and for enhancing motivation and transfer.
As with other types of learning teachers can misuse the dis covery approach. Teachers too often accept ability to verbalize as the criterion of discovery. Nor is problem solving any guarantee of meaningful discovery.
Even though the discovery method is useful for the early stages of abstract thinking, it can lead learners astray. Children and often unsophisticated adults are subjective and tend to jump to conclusions, to overgeneralize or consider only one aspect. This method is not suitable for every task or child. Difficult and unfamiliar tasks
Ausubel finds unsuited for the discovery approach. He does not feel that every child can be made a critical or creative thinker.
The greatest disadvantage of this approach is that it is costly and time consuming.
Ausubel misses the opportunity to urge research on children who experience a mixture of approaches. This last criticism is important 152
because children probably need experience with various approaches in
curriculum design.
The advantages and disadvantages of reception and discovery
learning are charted in Table 4. This table was developed by this
w riter.
TABLE 4
A COMPARISON OF RECEPTION AND DISCOVERY LEARNING APPROACHES
Suitable for
Type o f Type of Type o f Learning Learner Task Material Advantages Disadvantages
Discovery Sophis- Short, Familiar M otivates, C ostly, Learning tica ted Easy T ransfers, Time consum Tests in g. meaning Tendency to fu lln ess . jump to con clusions , overgeneral iz e . A b ility to verbalize can be wrongly accepted as a criterion of success.
Guided Average, Develop- Familiar E ffic ie n t, Can confuse, Discovery Elemen- ing new Develops Can lead to tary. ideas learning rote memori s k i l l s , zation. Builds confidence.
Reception Unsophis- Complex Unfamiliar Efficient, Tends to be Learning ticated, P recise, used rotely. Poor. T ransfers, Confusing if Builds poorly confidence. organized• 153
Facts V. Skills v. Ideas
Another area of dispute has been over whether curriculums
should concentrate on transmitting facts or on developing skills or
ideas. Traditionally, the emphasis has been on transmitting facts.
Recently, however, approaches which concentrate on developing sk ills
in inquiry or on developing basic ideas have been more in favor. Among such recent approaches are the process approach, the fundamental ideas approach, the unifying principles or themes approach and the structure of a discipline approach- It is believed that in a world where facts are revised continually, the learning of general principles and of learning skills will be more useful- Furthermore, even if facts never change, memorizing of facts is short term learning because it is not woven into a web of relationship s -
The process approach emphasizes the development of sk ills rather than the learning of specific subject matter- It is the processes of study in a discipline that are considered most important to leam , not the facts unearthed by the discipline. (Haney, 1966, pp.
3, 4) Actually, it is not a matter of learning either the skills or the facts- Rather, it is a matter of more emphasis on learning the skills- The process approach curriculum is usually laboratory-oriented-
Often, the discovery learning method is employed extensively- "Funda mental ideas," "unifying principles or themes" and "the structure of a discipline" all describe similar approaches-
Hilda Taba speaks of basic ideas "which represent the fundamentals of a subject or a discipline-" These basic ideas are also described as focusing ideas or the knowledge that all students should master- These ideas should have a central role- Every aspect of the 154
curriculum "—content, experiences, and materials—should be organized
to support the development of these ideas." (Taba, 1962, p. 354)
Geotropism and survival of the fittest are examples of fundamental
id eas.
An example of a unifying theme used by the Earth Science Cur
riculum Project is "science as inquiry." Another is "adaptation to
environmental change." An example o f a unifying theme used by the
Biological Sciences Curriculum Study is "change of living things
through time: evolution." Another is "genetic continuity of life."
Such themes are developed at a ll grade levels and through many topics.
(Haney, 1966, pp. 4, 5) "Unifying principles or themes" can often be
considered to be synonymous with "fundamental ideas."
Jerome Bruner has developed and propounded the idea of using
the structure of a discipline to organize a curriculum. Bruner
states that "Grasping the structure of a subject is understanding it
in a way that permits many other things to be related to it meaning
fully. To leam structure, in short, is to leam how things are re
lated." (Bmner, 1960, p. 7) Structure as Bruner describes it is
synonymous with fundamental ideas and unifying themes. Bruner empha
sizes that the structure varies with the discipline. The disciplines
of science are based on a structure of laws explaining cause and ef
fect. In mathematics the structure is one of fundamental operations
such as commutation, association. In language the structure is grammar.
But, how do the discovery v. reception leaming controversy and the facts v. skills v. ideas controversy relate to conceptual develop ment? The importance o f these two issu es lie s in the emphasis of re cent curriculum approaches on: 155
1. Providing an adequate background of experience for concept
formation,
2. Developing concepts and conceptual ability, not just fac
tual knowledge.
Understanding these two issues helps us understand how recent curricu
lum approaches can improve conceptual development.
Recent Curriculum Proj ects
Each of the recent curriculum projects incorporates one or more
of the just-described approaches. Descriptions of several of these
p rojects w ill c la rify how recent curriculum projects combine some form
of discovery leaming with reception leaming and with an emphasis on
the stmcture of the discipline or unifying principles. Many of the
projects emphasize teaching the students to conceptualize. Evalua tions of the success of the curriculum projects based on research have been solicited for presentation here. The sources for the conclusions about each project were articles fumished by the project upon request.
When a conclusion is based on experimental research, this is indicated and the source given.
SMSG
The University of Illinois School Arithmetic Project sponsors a School Mathematics Study Group (SMSG) (1958-) for developing mathe matics curriculums. The symbolism of frame arithmetic has been used by the project to help students discover patterns. The value of the frames is visual. Frame arithmetic is really a way of abstracting or o f giving a model, scheme or organizer. The SMSG approach is one o f 1 5 6
guided discovery. The strategy is usually to pose puzzles for students
to solve.
Examples of frames posing an arithm etic puzzles follow . These
frames illustrate the commutative property:
3 + 0 = 8 + □
6 x Q = 9 x Q
(See UICSM* Project Staff, 1967, pp. 119-24, for a detailed explanation
o f frame arithm etic.)
Research indicates that students in SMSG classes do just as
well on standard tests of mathematical skills as do students in conven
tional courses. At the same time, the SMSG students are exposed to and
seem to leam something about a number of concepts not available in con
ventional courses. It should be noted however that the research was
conducted with above average pupils because the SMSG program is gen
erally used with above average pupils. (School Mathematics Study Group,
1963)
SOIS
The SOIS (Science Curriculum Improvement Study) (1963-) tries to foster logical thinking and basic concept formation in science. A guided discovery method is used. Materials used led to increased ver balization after observation. They also led to increased discriminatory
University of Illinois Committee on School Mathematics. 157
and classification skills. The program is used with elementary school
children. According to the SCIS, "A science curriculum should there
fore be judged both on the opportunities it affords pupils for having
stimulating experiences and on the conceptual hierarchy [my italics]
that these experiences nourish."
"The development that takes place in the absence of such in
struction is haphazard and leads to many invalid generalizations that
are serious obstacles to later learning." The SCIS program teaches
different level abstractions in ascending order. Conceptions of mat
ter are taught before conceptions of interaction which are taught be
fore conceptions of energy. The program also uses different levels
of involvement from reception leaming to discovery learning.
According to teachers' reports, the Science Curriculum Im
provement Study program does improve the vocabulary of disadvantaged
children, foster logical thinking and basic concept formation in sci
ence and lead to observation followed by increased verbalization.
Teachers a lso commented, "The children are more discrim inating in th eir
observation than before. They more easily identify, compare and clas sify." (Science Curriculum Improvement Study, 1967, p. 4)
Science—A Process Approach
Science—A Process Approach is an experimental curriculum de veloped (1963-1967) under the auspices of the AAAS (American Associa tio n for the Advancement o f Science) Commission of Science Education.
The project uses experimental laboratory exercises to develop scien tific skills such as observing, constructing questions, constructing hypotheses, identifying manipulated variables, constructing operational 158
definitions, constructing tests of hypotheses, demonstrating a test,
collecting data, displaying data, interpreting data, modifying
hypotheses•
This approach is one of guided discovery. It uses activities
with experiments to develop discovery skills. Students are expected to
acquire competency in classifying, communicating, inferring, measuring,
using number relationships, observing, predicting and using space/time
relationships.
The project has developed instruments to help a teacher decide
where to begin instruction in any given year and with a particular group
of children. These instruments are process hierarchies. "Each process
hierarchy consists of a description of one or more terminal behaviors
and a collection of behaviors which have been established as being sub
ordinate to the terminal behaviors." Information has been collected
on which behaviors learners of a certain age with a specified amount
of experience in th is program acquire.
A sample of a process hierarchy instrument is reproduced in
Figure 22. The reader w ill note that as a learner moves up the hierarchy of behaviors showing use of space/time relationships he is required to perform progressively more difficult tasks of identifica tion, application and discrimination.
Field testing data collected so far indicate that the curricu lum is about equally successful with advantaged, middle income and dis advantaged families. The students have been found to acquire the de sired competencies from the curriculum. Furthermore, "Evaluation data clearly show that pupils who start their experience with Science —A
Process Approach in Parts F ive, S ix , or Seven are at a d istin c t Distinguishing number of distinguishing time re days ol famil'ur events, quired to perform using a calendar. familiar activities in terms of intervals.____
Identifying and naming Demonstraling that mo re Distinguishing between and common two-dimensional than one object may he naming the directors up stages that are compo folded in more than one and down, forward and back, nents of common three- way to produce matching left and right with respect dicnensional shapes. halves* to objects.______
Constructing spatial Identifying and naming Ufinoiisimting sym Idealilying and naming Identifying and naming arrangements of sub matching parts insym metry by I olding. movements of one's own the day of the week. jects from pictures metrical halves. body in the directions and diagrams.______up, down, forward and back, le ft, and right.
Identifying and naming Id»*n1i lying and naming Identifying objects as common three-dimensional common two-d i mensi ono1 moving or not moving. shapes: cone, cylinder, shapes, triangle, spheres, cube, and circle, square, ellipse p_v rami d. and rectangle.______
fig. 22.—A Process Hierarchy: I'sing Space/Time Kelationships (American Association for the Advancement of Science, dune, 1967)
M k / \ VO 160
disadvantage when compared with pupils who have had the program in
ea rlier years." (American Association for the Advancement o f Science,
June, 1967; November, 1967)
BSCS
The BSCS (Biological Sciences Curriculum Study) makes three
different approaches available- It also has versions for different
student levels. The BSCS program (1958-) is inquiry or laboratory
oriented. The approach is one of guided discovery. The student is
given practice in analyzing data, in drawing conclusions, in seeking
relationships from generalizations and in finding his own answers. The
objective is to teach science as a way of thinking. The BSCS put
greater stress on laboratory work and on understanding basic general
izations than did traditional programs.
The BSCS program makes use of many m aterials including a pam
phlet series, single topic films, laboratory blocks, technique films,
textbooks, and programmed instruction. It uses open-ended materials
which emphasize basic concepts.
Since the BSCS programs are essentially inquiry and laboratory oriented, the objectives of the BSCS program may be subverted by the use of supplementary films of an informational nature. It is for this reason that the BSCS developed its Single Topic Film series. These films are specifically designed to evoke inquiry and p articip ation from the student. They present data from which the student is asked to form and evaluate hypotheses. The Single Topic Films may be used to reinforce the underlying BSCS theme that science is a process of inquiry. (Biological Sciences Curriculum Study, August, 1967, p. 10)
One BSCS film series includes eighteen, four-minute laboratory technique films available in 16 mm. sound film or 8 mm. silent film loops. Another BSCS film series includes 20 super 8 mm. loops (four- minute silent) on ecology and behavior. A third series includes 161
twenty, four-minute film loops on molecular biology, bacteriology and
physiology. The former series is available from Thone Films; the latter
two series from Harcourt, Brace and World, Houghton M ifflin , or Rand
McNally.
For advanced students there is a booklet of research problems
to tackle. For the academically unsuccessful student there is a pro
gram called Biological Science: Patterns and Processes. Biological
Science: Patterns and Processes differs from the other BSCS textbooks
in that it develops each topic in smaller steps. Moreover, great care
is taken to tie each step to the preceding step. The Patterns and
Processes version also allows for even more active student participa
tion as a part of the leaming situation than do the other BSCS inquiry
oriented textbooks.
Studies comparing BSCS and tra d itio n a l biology courses have re
vealed no significant differences in achievement gains between the two
groups. (Biological Sciences Curriculum Study, August, 1967, p. 21)
There is some evidence, however, th at students using the most advanced
form of BSCS, the blue version, developed greater critical thinking
a b ility from BSCS than from tra d itio n a l courses.
There has been some evidence that teacher style affects the resu lts of using the BSCS program. This was reported in a study en tit le d "Teacher Variation in Concept Presentation in BSCS Curriculum
Program" by J . J. Gallagher. (Biological Sciences Curriculum Study,
January, 1967) Gallagher studied six biology teachers using the blue version of BSCS and their students. All the teachers were instructing in suburban communities, and a ll had some training in using BSCS. To standardize his study procedures, Gallagher used a classification 162
system developed earlier in collaboration with others- The system
Gallagher has described is visualized in Figure 23-
Generalization
Concept
Data ExplanatiolSw Evaluation^ Justification CONTENT Evaluation- Matching SKILLS Expansioi
Fig. 23-—Topic classification dimensions—classroom interaction a n a l y s i s . (B io lo g ica l Sciences Curriculum Study, January, 1967, p. 10)
The dichotomous dimension of content/skills refers to teaching objectives. The data, concept, generalization dimension refers to the level of conceptualization. The dimension of expansion-activity re fers to style, to how information is being presented.
. . . the focus of a topic in a class session can be on Description, or the defining or describing of aspects of a concept or event; on Expansion, which would lead the group off to other lines .of thinking or encourage new associations; ...... on Explanation, which would focus on reasoned argument through sequential deductive steps of thinking; or Evaluation- Justification , which reveals an attempt to make a decision and then explain the reasons for the judgment; or Evaluation- Matching ) which depends upon the presence of previously 163
established criteria for judgment and attempts to match events or circumstances to those criteria.
This style of classification system is further illustrated in Table 5
on the following page.
Results revealed a wide diversity of style and emphasis among
instructors; although a ll were using the same BSCS version, Gallagher
concluded:
It is likely that the long range instructional goals of cur riculum innovators w ill not be finally reached until they ex plicitly train teachers in techniques for analyzing their own instructional strategies as well as training them in their sub ject area fields. (Biological Sciences Curriculum Study, January, 1967, pp. 10-18)
The predominate reason for the diversity of style and emphasis among instructors seemed to be that the instructors' interests and in terpretations varied. An instructor interested in preparing future scientists may emphasize the laboratory aspect of the science curricu lum even in the instruction period. An instructor interested in bio chemistry may spend an unusual length of time on that aspect of the course.
CHEM
CHEM Study (Chemical Education Material Study) (1958-) went further than most other curriculum studies and developed films for teacher training as well as student training. Teacher training films for CHEM help clarify the concepts that teachers are using to organize the students' course of study.
Much of the time and effort formerly spent on five questions for the preparation of oxygen or three chemical properties of hydro gen chloride are now devoted to the study of unifying principles, concepts of thermodynamics, equilibrium, reaction rate, chemical TABLE 5
TOPIC CLASSIFICATION OF BIOLOGICAL CONCEPTS
Description (0) Expansion ( e ) Explanation (X) Evaluation (V)
Generalization The system of What would happen Show how th e s y s Does this repre photosynthesis• if the system of tem of photosyn sent an adequate photosynthesis thesis explains statement for ceased function the change in photosynthesis? ing? leaves from COg+HgO ------^ brown t o green. [CHgO] + Og
Concept The definition Contrast the How do we know th a t Do you believe of a hetero- autotroph and the oxygen from it was essen tr o p h . the heterotroph. photosynthesis tial that auto comes from water? trophs devel oped?
Data What colors do Comparing th e Describe in se Was our experi you see in the black V. white quence the experi ment a su ccess? spectroscope? cloths, their ment by C alvin. ability to ab sorb light.
Source: Biological Sciences Curriculum Study, January 1967, p. 11.
ON 165
periodicity, and chemical bonding are explored in greater depth than ever before at this level. (Strong and Pimentel, January, 1964, p. 25)
CBA
The CBA (Chemical Bond Approach Project) (1957-) uses a guided
discovery approach. Observations and concepts are differentiated in
the interpretation of laboratory data. The goals of study under the
CBA program are questioning and principle identification. A textbook
developed by the CBA Project, Chemical Systems and the laboratory
guide Investigating Chemical Systems, develop a central theme to or
ganize and tie together the several areas of chemistry. The theme is
chemical bonds. Chemical reactions are viewed as breaking the old
chemical bonds and forming new ones. Other inseparable major themes are energy, random arrangement, random motion and reaction kinetics.
Examples of these continuing themes are:
1. the observation of change in chemical systems,
2. The interpretation of chemical change as structural
change,
3. The concept of energy as an aid to interpreting changes.
Concepts and models for interpreting facts and observations obtained in experimental work are emphasized with the aim of encouraging stu dents to establish sound correlations between concepts and observa tio n s. The CBA approach t r ie s to use a new, freer approach to experi mentation to develop new levels of understanding. It tries to chal lenge students to think, not to memorize.
The program is intended for high school students. After re viewing some of the materials the writer feels that they are well suited only to students with above average science and mathematics 166 backgrounds or above average ability. This conclusion is based more on the difficulty of the laboratory exercises than on the difficulty of the textbook. According to the project directors, the materials have been written so that a student without a high school course in physics or three years of mathematics can profit from them. (Strong, 1964; Neidig,
Teates, Zom, 1966; Chemical Bond Approach Project, n.d.. First Issue)
The CBA approach has produced d ifferences in preferences for learning style• Ronald Marks investigated these preferences using a procedure much like that developed by Robert W. Heath for evaluating the PSSC course. (To obtain information on Heath’s instrument for com paring cognitive preferences write to Robert W• Heath, Head of Research and Development, Educational Testing Service, Berkeley, California.)
Heath believes that the conceptual style a student exhibits when a problem solving situation arises w ill be dependent largely on the na ture of the curriculum presented to him. Marks reported:
The four cognitive preferences chosen for comparison in this study were (l) memory or recall of chemical facts, (2) practical application, (3) critical questioning of information, and (4) identification of fundamental principle. These four cognitive preferences were chosen because the "memory" and "practical ap plication" preferences were closely related to the goals of in struction in the traditional course and the "questioning" and "principle" preferences were closely related to the goals of the CBA course of study.
The analyses show that, after having completed a year of chemis try in the respective curricula, the CBA group had a significantly stronger preference for the fundamental principle and critical questioning options to the test items. When achievement test scores were related to the cognitive preferences of students by means of analysis of variance, it was found that neither the ACS Co-operative Examination nor the CBA Final Examination were criteria from which to forecast the cog nitive preferences of these students. Thus, the hypothesis that the cognitive preferences as expressed by students could be re lated to achievement was rejected . . . . However, the CBA group had a significantly higher mean on the achievement test than did 167
the control group on the same test • • • also . . • the mental ability of the CBA group was greater than that of the control group. (Marks, 1967)
Marks also reports that the CBA group showed a preference for
interpretation and analysis. The control group showed a preference
for memorization and recall. The conclusion is that the inquiry ap
proach is at least as effective as the traditional approach. It
is even more effective than the traditional approach in encouraging
problem solvin g.
PSSC
The PSSC (Physical Science Study Committee) program (1956-) presents the unifying principles of physics. The learner follows ver bal guidelines to find out how these unifying principles relate to the ideas developed by the field. The laboratory provides the experience which is the basis for discovery. There is reception learning about the history and structure of physics. The course tries to concentrate on fewer topics than conventional courses so that the understanding of physics developed can be deeper. It encourages the student to try to apply the ideas of physics to new problems. It is intended to be part of the general education of the student, rather than specific prepara tion for the further study of physics. (Physical Science Study Commit t e e , 1962)
The PSSC physics program i s designed to show students some of the structure of physics and how it was discovered and under stood by human beings. The program concentrates on fewer fa cts than are usually included in an elementary physics course. Understanding these facts is emphasized; memorization is not. (Physical Sciences Study Committee, n.d., pp. 1-4) 168
Evaluation of PSSC programs and materials has been complicated
because the PSSC curriculum content was not as broad as that of the
conventional physics course.
This chapter has explained how curriculum design can and has
influenced conceptualization. Recent curriculum projects have influ
enced conceptualization by emphasizing learning to conceptualize and
by emphasizing how concepts relate to a few major concepts in a f ie ld •
Consequently, the recent curriculum projects have contributed a con
cern for relating concepts to a conceptual structure as they are
learned. The recent curriculum projects have also contributed methods
for so doing. The theme common to a ll the current curriculum projects
is conceptual structure. This means developing concepts that are or ganized to have meaning in relation to other learning.
This chapter discusses the conceptual structure of a course, its interpretation by a teacher and its incorporation into the concep tual structure of a learner. The "structure of a subject" means the general ideas which explain many sp e c ific phenomenon. The structure of a subj ect explains how things are related. "Tropism" is a general idea which explains how organisms relate to their environment. (Taba,
1962, p. 176) A teacher's interpretation of the structure of a sub ject influences what ideas are emphasized in learning situations. As a consequence the learner is more likely to incorporate some ideas into his conceptual structure than he is others. CHAPTER VI
AUDIOVISUAL DESIGN
This chapter considers factors in audiovisual design and their
effects in concept building. Throughout this chapter, the writer under
lines guidelines for specific decisions in the audiovisual field which
can be inferred from the data reviewed.
The chapter is divided into three parts: I. Stimulus Factors;
II. Cuing Factors; and III. Response Factors. These three parts will be subdivided into sections as follows:
I . Cuing Factors
A. Set
1. Directions
2. Pretraining
3. Pretesting
4. The Nature of the Learning Task
B. Cuing
1. Familiarization
2. Availability of Cues
3. Presentation Order
4. Perceptual Principles
5. Channel U tiliza tio n
6. Compelling Stimuli
169 170
7. Abstraction
8• Prompting
II. Stimulus Factors
A. The Medium
B. The Content
1. Instances in Content
2. Attributes of Instances
3. Amount of Content
4. Approach to Content
a. Treatment
b. Structuring
c. Editing
III. Response Factors
A. Rate of Response
B. Type of Response
C. Feedback to Response
The design factors discussed in each section will be listed at the
beginning of the section.
I . Cuing Factors
Set
Factors: Directions, Pretraining, Pretesting, Nature of the Learning
Task
D irections
The establishing of set by the initial directions given the learner has been researched by Harriet Pod ell in her work on problem solving behavior. Podell defines three kinds of set: intentional. 171
incidental and aesthetic. Aesthetic set is intuitive as is incidental
set. Intuitive behavior is, in this case, relatively passive behavior.
Intentional set involves more active behavior. When a specific strategy
for thought is established by directions; then an intentional set has
been established. In incidental set concepts are arrived at more on
the basis of free association. The instructions which Podell used to
establish intentional and incidental sets for concept formation are
reproduced below.
INTENTIONAL
In this test booklet, you will see pictures of a certain type of flag. All the flags of this type have certain features in common. In other words, they are alike in some way though not in others. Try to find out how they are alike: try to notice the things which are in all the flags you see and which you would guess are in a ll fla g s of th is type. • . .
INCIDENTAL
In this booklet, you will see pictures of a certain type of flag. Though they are alike in some ways, try to notice how well you like each one and how well you like this type of flag generally. For each flag, decide whether you like it very very much, very much, medium, or don’t lik e i t . . . . I^ e ll, 1963)
After giving th ese d irectio n s, Podell measured concept formation which took place under both of these conditions. She found that the uninten tional (incidental) set subjects mentioned fewer common features and more variable features than the intentional set subjects. Furthermore, unlike the intentional set subjects, the unintentional set subjects showed no evidence of a tendency to remember either common or variable features. One way of establishing a set for concept learning is, therefore, by using directions to develop an intentional set.
Other aspects of using directions to establish a set for con cept learning have been investigated by J. Bruner, D. Kalish, D. Lynch 172
and C. Frederick. Jerome Bruner and h is associates have found th at the
technique of telling subjects which dimensions are free to vary is
facilitating. It has the effect of decreasing the number of irrelevant
dimensions attended to. (Bruner, et a l., 1956) In a study of Concept
Attainment as a Function of Monetary In cen tives, Competition, and
In stru ction s, Patricia Kalish found that in stru ction s designed to help the subject recognize that there was a concept to be attained facili tated concept attainment. (Kalish, 1966)
Other studies in which instructions variables have been manipu lated confirm their facilitating effect. Daniel Lynch concluded on the basis of his research that instructions designed to help students rec ognize that there was a concept to be attained, and also the nature of the concept, facilitated concept identification significantly better than did instructions designed only to acquaint students with the stimulus material. (Lynch, 1966)
Wayne C. Frederick studied The Effects of Instructions, Concept
Complexity, Method of P resentation, and Order o f Concepts upon £ Concept
Attainment Task. In his experiment Frederick used four sets of instruc tors. The instructions differed as follows :
1. Tape recorded instruction s to a figu rai board which re
quired forming concepts from shapes—about 400 words long,
quite complex, efficient. '■
2. Tape recorded instructions to an educational psychology
board which required forming concepts from terms—about
300 words lon g, complex, very e ffic ie n t.
3. Written instruction s to a figu rai board which required
forming concepts from shapes—about 1250 words long. 173
easier but less efficient than the tape recorded instruc
tio n s.
4. Written instructions to an educational psychology board
which required framing concepts from terms—about 380
words long, the simplest set of instructions, inefficient.
The taped instructions took an average of about four minutes
less time than the written instructions. Furthermore, the time sub jects needed to comprehend the written instructions varied. No effect of instructions was significant at or beyond the .05 level. From this lack of difference, Frederick concluded that hearing the instructions is at least as effective as reading a similar set of instructions, and in this case, results in a saving of experimentation time. (Frederick,
1965, pp. 14, 21-24)
Pretraining
By pretraining the writer means providing enough practice in the skills of concept learning so that a set to use these skills is developed. This learning of a common pattern of responding as a re sult of training is an instance of transfer of the concept of "concep tualizing." The success of pretraining depends on the degree of learning obtained. Since this is true there is also the danger that the set learned will become a habit which later interferes with learn in g.
P retesting
It is important that the learner establish a set for requiring meaningfulness in concept building. Pretesting can be a way to estab lish a set for meaningful concept learning. Questions which make 174
obvious the need for understanding why not just what could be used. For
example, a pretest for a problem on art analysis and appreciation might
use the question: "What are the characteristics of Van Gogh's style of
painting?" To establish a more meaningful learning set, the question
might be: "Why did Van Gogh use bold swirling and thrusting brush
strokes at different angles to paint trees, grass and clouds?" The
phrasing of the questions used in pretesting can be important. They
should be of sufficient generality to stimulate attention. Questions
which call for yes or no, true or false answers w ill probably not be
satisfactory. A pretest question which asks the student to give con
crete examples of a principle can establish a set for more meaningful
learn in g.
Nature o f the Learning Task
When a learning problem is obviously one of conceptual rather than skill learning a set for concept learning can be triggered in re
sponse to the nature of the task. In such a case, the task could be
called a cue that elicits a concept learning set. If it is immediately apparent that the task is to classify, then a concept learning set can be established if pretraining in concept learning has occurred.
It is important that the learner manifests a meaningful learning set and that the learning task itself be potentially meaningful to the learner. If the learner means to internalize the learning rotely the results w ill be as inadequate as they will be if the learning task it self consists of purely arbitrary associations. David Ausubel de scribes this dual need as the necessity for both a meaningful learning set and a potentially meaningful learning task. (Klausmeier and Harris,
1966, pp. 158, 159) 175
In his study of the influence of set on the learning and reten
tion of concepts, Homer Reed experimented with the nature of the task
established by instructions and the learning of concepts. Reed con
cluded that:
1. Subjects instructed to learn names and their meanings
search more frequently for logical relationships than do
those instructed to leam names only. A set to leam
names and th eir meanings y ield s a much larger number of
logical concepts than does a set to leam names only.
2. Furthermore, concepts logically formed are learned more
quickly and better remembered than those illogically
formed. A set to leam meanings as well as names yields
a much higher rate of learning and degree of retention
than a set to leam names only.
(Reed , 1946, p. 86)
The key element in using set to promote concept learning, seems to be, then, establishing a set for meaningfulness. A set for meaning fulness may be established by directions, by pretraining, by pretesting or by the nature of the task. A set for meaningful leaming will not lead to meaningful concept building unless the task is potentially meaningful.
Cuing
Factors: Familiarization, Availability of Cues, Presentation Order
(Simultaneous or Successive), Perceptual Principles, Channel
Utilization, Compelling Stimuli (Color, Novelty, Conrast,
Size, Placement, Attention-Directing Devices), Abstraction,
Prompting 176
Cuing is a stimulus factor using to control response. A certain
association between the cue and the response must be formed for the task
to be mastered. A cue must not be equated with the stimulus. It can be just an aspect of the stimulus. A bull in a ring is a stimulus to a
bullfighter. The bull's horns are an aspect of that stimulus. The horns are a cue. The bullfighter's response depends on the proximity
and the position of the horns.
Familiarization
Familiarization is pretraining not in a general leaming atti tude but rather in specifics that are important to attend to. Cuing by familiarization means cuing by recognition that a cue is important to attend to.
A. A. Lumsdaine (Gage, 1963, pp. 641, 642) b elieves that most of the research on familiarization is irrelevant because (l) it com pares the value of familiarization activity with no familiarization activity instead of with other forms of activity, such as repeated presentation, and (2) because it does not deal with specific cue fac tors involved in familiarization. An exception is this experiment by
J. J. Wulf, F. D. Sheffield and Doris G. Kraeling (1954).
One kind of familiarization required training subjects to attend to important features of all mechanical parts before any assembly training; the other familiarization procedure (which took less time) involved pointing to the same important features o f each part ju st before the assembly of each part was shown. . . . The results support the conclusion that (l) a procedure which directs the learner's attention to important features will facilitate training in the manipulation of complex task elements in which only some features are important and also that (2) such familiarization is more effective if given in the context of, and just prior to, training in the utilization of each task ele ment than if given as a completely separate, prior procedure. (Gage, 1963, p. 642) 177
We may conclude that familiarization w ill facilitate leaming more if
given in small portions at relevant moments during the task.
Availability of Cues
Availability of cues means whether the material presented in
the pretraining or presentation is left so that the learner can refer
to it. Textbooks furnish a high availability of cues because important
points are noted and can be checked throughout the task. James Inglis
has studied "Sensory Deprivation and Cognitive Disorder." He found
that if both sensory support and storage capacity are denied, the be
havioral disruption is much greater than otherwise. (Inglis, 1965)
L. Bourne, S. G oldstein, and W. Link found that the major e ffe c t of
stimulus availability in concept leaming was the reduction of memory
errors. (Boume, Goldstein and Link, 1964) The important guideline
which can be derived i s that i f the cues which must be presented are
more than can be handled by th e learn er's immediate memory span, pro
vision should be made to make the cues available for handy reference.
Presentation Order
The terms "sequencing," "order effect" and "simultaneous and
successive presentation" are used nearly synonymously. To this list
of terms, William Allen and Stuart Cooney have added "linear" and
"nonlinear presentation." (Allen and Cooney, 1964) In simultaneous
presentation all the cues are available at once. In successive pre
sentation only some of the cues are made available at each step in
learning.
R. M. W. Travers sees a third possibility. This is a combi nation of successive and simultaneous presentation in which the whole 178
display is presented at once with the experimenter or teacher pointing
to various exemplars and asking whether or not they are correct.
Travers comments that the strategy for responding adopted by the
learner depends to some extent on the presentation order. (Travers,
1967, p. 206) It is dangerous to draw any sweeping conclusions about
the superiority of any presentation order because there are so many
factors which could complicate the success of this order. Some of the
complicating factors which need investigation in conjunction with
presentation order are age, sex, cognitive style, availability of
cues, media, number of channels utilized, ability differences, na
ture of the task, number of relevant and irrelevant cues, type of
content. Nadelbaum, for example, has found th at drawings required
fewer prompts per concept when presented successively; whereas with
models fewer prompts are required when presentation is simultaneous.
(Nadelbaum, 1957)
The case for simultaneous presentation is that availability
of previous stimuli reduces the memory load and thus avoids confusion
and reduces the possibility of errors. J . Bruner, J. Goodnow and G.
Austin compared the results of problem solving when the complete
stimulus array was present and when the subject was forced to solve
problems using only what could be retained of the array in his memory.
The "Completely in the head" problem solvers did much worse. They, however, did their best when they avoided a scanning strategy and
chose instead a focusing strategy which concentrated on retaining a few, often redundant, cues. (See p. 255)
Jerome Bruner has also presented evidence to show that leaming from a simultaneous presentation is more efficient when the instances 179
are ordered in some way. Mammals should be grouped separately from rep
tiles. The crucial factor seems to be to make the ordering clearly
visible. (Bruner, et , 1956)
It has been further suggested that the success of simultaneous
presentation depends on limiting the number of cues presented simulta
neously. Lyle Boume Jr. (1964) varied the number of stimuli which
were exposed on any trial. The number of stimuli presented at once
varied from zero to te n . He found that o v er-a ll performance improved
as the number exposed increased from zero through five. The improve
ment was greatest in problems with a large number of relevant attrib
utes. (Boume, 1966, p. 83)
Time is also a factor. For the simultaneous presentation to
be effective a longer presentation interval is necessary. (Cross and
Duncan, 1963; Boume, Goldstein and Link, 1964) Boume has found, nevertheless, that stimulus displays wherein all the information is
embodied in a sin g le compact figure resu lt in fa ster problem solving than do those which distribute the same information across a set of discrete figures.
The case for successive presentation is that sequencing helps to select and reinforce relevant cues and helps to facilitate discrimi nation, especially between similar stimuli. E. Z. Rothkopf (1958) found that when stimuli are similar they should be maximally separated not clustered by simultaneous or successive presentation during practice.
R. Gagne (1950), however, found successive presentation, not simulta neous and not maximally separated presentation, of similar stimuli to be most effective. (Gage, 1963, p. 648) The disparity between their results may be explained by the stimuli used. Gagne used nonsense 180
syllables and figures in a paired-associate leaming task. Rothkopf
used Morse code signals and their alphabetic or numeric equivalents
in a discrimination leaming experiment. Neither Gagne or Rothkopf
found simultaneous presentation to be e ffic ie n t for leam ing to d is tinguish between similar stimuli•
Nancy Smuckler has compared the two methods o f presentation as they affect concept leaming in second graders. She found that al though the successive method was more effective than the simultaneous for in i t ia l acq u isitio n , both methods were equally e ffe ctiv e for re tention and transfer. The task in this experiment was to leam to identify a trapezoid. Several geometric shapes were employed.
H. B. Reed (1950) investigated the influence of presentation method on retention. The simultaneous method resulted in better reten tion than did the successive presentation of stimuli. The task in
Reed's experiment was to leam different series of stimulus words.
The series used were of several lengths. (Smuckler, 1967, pp. 10,
19-20)
Early indications are, then, that the most effective presenta tion order for leaming may depend on other factors such as type of concept leaming and complexity. In general, we may conclude that the most effective presentation order depends on the similarity of cues, the complexity of the task, the amount of information to be retained.
One dilemma posed is that complex problems are lik e ly to have much in formation to be retained. This means that both simultaneous and suc cessive presentations could be helpful. The writer believes that be cause media should make discrimination and memory easier, we may find 181 that both presentation orders are often called for within one presenta tio n .
Perceptual Principles
Another aspect of designing for effective cuing is utilization of perceptual principles. Although, the subject is too extensive to consider in detail in this study, the audiovisual specialists should be aware that it is important to understand basic findings on perception.
Some of these findings are available in the September-October,
1962 issu e of Audiovisual Communication Review, "Perception Theory and
AV Education" edited by Kenneth Norberg. (Norberg, 1962) Others are presented in "Perceptual Principles and Audiovisual Practices" by
Malcolm Fleming. This a r tic le appeared in the Spring 1964 issue of
Audiovisual Communication Review. (Fleming, 1964)
Malcolm Fleming starts with the proposition:
Objects or events that are close together in space or time or resemble each other tend to be apprehended as parts of a common stru ctu re.
He interprets this perceptual principle as meaning we cannot keep the elements we have selected to attend to apart "as separate and equal perceptions; rather, we are busy organizing them into meaningful whole or structures that we might call ideas or concepts." Relating his in terpretation to educational media design he restates the proposition as follows:
Objects, events, or ideas that need to be associated in order to facilitate the learning of a concept should be so fitted into the structure of the medium as to occur close together in time, and/or close together within the space of a particu lar picture, and/or portrayed in such a way as to accentuate their relevant sim ilarities. (Fleming, 1964, pp. 76, 85) 182
He is saying that one perceptual principle to be considered is that
proximity and similarity can lead to association*
Channel U tiliza tio n
Channels are the sense modalities by which the characteristics
of concepts are perceived* The effectiveness of a channel depends on
the amount and type of information to be transmitted• Channels can
help discrimination and can supply redundancies which reinforce. While
the utilization of channels to the central nervous system is not as
critical as how the information is handled by the receiver, correct
u tiliz a tio n o f channels can maximize transm ission.
Some important questions about channels as they relate to
cuing are:
1. When is one channel superior for cuing?
2. When are multichannel presentations superior to cuing?
3. What conditions influence the effect of channel utiliza
tion on cuing?
The answers to these questions and other conclusions about channel utilization gleaned from the writer's survey of the literature follow.
Only a few conclusions are presented because the w riter did not find additional conclusions substantiated well enough to be acceptable.
1. The superiority of one channel over others depends on the
learner's experience, on the nature of the information and
on the use to be made of the information. To present ex
treme examples—it is clear that if the information deals
with the speaking of a foreign language, the auditory
channel is probably b etter. Music is usually better
learned when presented auditorially. A deaf learner 183
finds visual presentation better. The use of a single
channel emphasizes the characteristics of that channel.
For example, the use of silent film emphasizes the visual
characteristics of a scene.
2. Regardless of the channel or channels chosen, the effective
ness of cuing as related to channel utilization depends on
the extent to which the central nervous system capacity of
the learner is taxed. Overtaxing can lead to interference
and confusion (equivalence and error) and undertaxing can
lead to boredom and less than maximal learning. The effec
tiveness of channel utilization depends on the amount and
form of information sent and on the capacity of the learner
more than it does on the type or number of channels used.
3. The more highly organized and meaningful the stimulus mate
rial, the more effectively channels are utilized. The more
redundancy there is in the information channels, the larger
the amount o f transm ission which can be channeled e ffe c
tively. But the more redundancy there is the longer it
w ill take to transmit the information. And, the longer
it takes to transmit the information, the more likely the
learner i s to become confused due to the overtaxing of
h is memory.
4. When more information than can be handled is channeled,
selectivity and filtering occurs as well as errors and
equivocation. Equivocation is the tendency of the re
ceiver to blur inputs. 184
5. The evidence suggests that in general, if used properly,
the audiovisual channel may be the more effective means
of communication than either the audio or visual channel-
With complex information a combination of audio and visual
can help discrimination thus keeping the presentation
clea r.
(Hsia, 1968; Gage, 1968)
Wayne Severin critiques the work of R. M- W. Travers, W. F.
Day and B. R. Beach, C. F- Hoban and E. B. Van Ormer and several other
researchers on multiple channel transmission of information- Severin
is perceptive enough to see that there is more complexity to the trans
mission of cues than has been studied.
R. C. Travers concluded from h is research on nonsense s y lla
b les th at two channel communication of redundant information was not
more efficient than one channel communication. In his experiments
Travers compared the effects of the audio, the visual and the audio visual modes of presentation. The subjects were given a tape recorded presentation of nonsense syllables or common words, a filmstrip presen tation of nonsense syllables or common words and a sound filmstrip presentation of nonsense syllables or common words. (Travers, 1967, pp. 107-109)
Observing that Travers’ conclusions apply specifically to simple redundancy situations, Severin stresses the need to compare the operation and e ffe c ts of cue summation and stimulus generalization in single and multichannel transmission when a variety of redundant and nonredundant situ a tio n s is used. (The cue summation princip le predicts that learning is increased as the number of available cues or stimuli 185
is increased.) (American Education Research Association, 1968, p.
121)
On the basis of his survey and critique Severin makes the fol
lowing predictions about the utilization of single-channel communica tion as compared with multi-channel communication. His predictions
are quoted below.
a. Multichannel communications which combine words with related or relevant illustrations will provide the greatest gain be cause of the summation of cues between the channels. b. Multichannel communications which combine words in two chan nels (words aurally and visually in print) w ill not result in significantly greater gain than single-channel communica tions since the added channel does not provide additional cues. c. Multichannel communications which contain unrelated cues in two channels w ill cause interference between channels and result in less information gain than if one channel were presented alone. d. Single-channel communications w ill be superior to condition c (above), equal to condition b, and inferior to condition a. The efficiency of single-channel communications when compar ing various channels w ill depend upon the complexity of the material presented for a given audience, as already discussed. (Severin, 1967, pp. 241-44)
These predictions now need to be tested by research. We par ticularly need research on how the competent filmmaker can use the two channels to the best advantage. The competent filmmaker sometimes pre cedes video with audio and sometimes he follows audio with video. He can thus use the channel which gives the best transition or the most dynamic effect. (Spottiswood, 1963) Even when both channels are used, the competent filmmaker tries to use them complementarily, not just redundantly.
Compelling Stimuli
Because the success of a cue depends upon its commanding atten tion, techniques for making aspects of stimuli more compelling are a 186
factor in cuing. Among the means for making stimuli more compelling
are color, oral explanation (voiced emphases), novelty, contrast, size,
placement and attention-directing devices such as arrows, underlining,
labeling, motion.
Novelty is the presence of an unfamiliar element. It has been
accepted practice of advertisers to design presentations with elements
of novelty because these seem to motivate attention and help organize
retention. Although widely used, this practice is not well researched.
D. E. Berlyne (1951, 1957) carried out experiments on changing the
stimulus. The effects of prior experience were controlled by familiar
izing the subjects with the stimuli to be used including the one to be
changed. His experiments showed that stimulus change increased attention. His findings are consistent with the principle that habitua tion decreases attention. Berlyne says it is important to understand th at w hile novelty can a rise from how a stimulus compares with the stimulus which immediately preceded it , it also depends on whether similar stimuli have been encountered previously. Surprise or the realization that a "known" stimulus has further information to offer can be the result of either of these conditions. Both reactions are phenomena indicative of increased attention. (Berlyne, 1965, pp. 249-51)
Using elements of contrast is another principle accepted in ad vertising. H. Nixon (1937) reports that "laboratory tests" found strong probability that the contrasting areas will be attended to first.
Examples o f d ifferen t ways to achieve contrast are ( l ) contrasting a white background with masses of black or heavy black lin e s , (2) spots of color against white or another color, (3) placing stimulus material in such a way that it is framed by a substantial area of white space. 187
(4) using white against black, (5) bordering with a contrasting color,
(6) crossing heavy lines or having them converge, (7) using unusual
angles, (S) using unusual types of lettering or positions for lettering.
(Travers, 1967, pp. 230-34)
Color as a cuing factor can be expected to follow the principle
that stimulus intensity can affect attention (see pages 100-104).
Bolder or more intense colors often seem to advance and dominate a
v isu a l. This can be changed by the element of contrast. In a boldly
colored field a small pastel area may be the element which commands the
most atten tion . A. A. Lumsdaine notes th at the general value o f color
for increasing leaming through attractiveness or strikingness has been
overrated. (Gage, 1963)
Additional light is shed on color as a cuing factor by research
on the old problem of which of the conceptual categories—shape, color, number—is the easiest to use for conceptualization. Heidbreder's
(1946-1949) in vestigation o f the dominance of concepts as objects of preference for categorization found that color dominates over object outlines. In her investigation Heidbreder used the categories: ob jects, forms, colors, numbers. For colors she used a few very distinc tiv e intense hues. This color dominance could be expected to change as colors became muddier and o u tlin es remained strong.
Color does not seem to be, in general, as satisfactory a cue for classification as is meaning. W. A. Bousfield, J. Esterson and
Q. A. Whitmarch examined recall of twenty-five color slides that could be organized by color or conceptually by meanings, i.e ., classes such as birds, fruits, etc. Both college and grade school subjects grouped 188
their responses more frequently by conceptual meaning than by color.
(B ou sfield , Esterson and Whitmarch, 1956)
Research on film learning and on associative code learning has
shown a color presentation to be no more helpful than a black and white
presentation. (Crannel, 1964) When color is essential to cuing the
discrimination as in the required color for a signal flag, it is, of
course, advisable to use color. The designer should be careful to use
color to attract attention to relevant stimuli.
Color can aid or hinder discrimination. When color becomes
d istr a c tin g , reduces contrast or adds unwarranted complexity, i t
hinders discrimination.
A major problem in drawing final conclusions about the value
of color for cuing is the lack of research on using color in specific
ways. Most of the research on color has concentrated on comparing
color with black and white. This research has found that although
there seem to be no (or insignificant) learning differences due to
using color instead of black and white, color is preferred by most
learners. Older children prefer soft colors, younger children, bril
liant colors. Research is needed most on the findings of A. W.
VanderMeer (1952, 1954) th at color was slig h tly b etter for delayed
retention. It seemed to reduce the rate of forgetting. (Travers,
1967, pp. 38-48)
Labeling is an attention-directing device. Daniel Lynch
researched concept identification as a function of the frequency
*Complexity can be a desirable factor in learning. I t can be a challenge to some. See pages 113-14, 223. 189
with which a subject has encountered a given label. In his experiment
Lynch took his high frequency labels from one-syllable nouns occurring
in Part IV of £• L. Thorndike's Teacher’s Word Book of 30,000 Words
(Thorndike and Lorge, 1944). Low frequency labels were nonsense words
o f triad-consonant combinations taken from a l i s t compiled by Under
wood and Schulz (Underwood and Schulz, 1960, p. 319). For example,
under the slide presenting the concept "one or circle" would appear
HAND or XgF.
High frequency labels seem to facilitate concept learning when
there is no previous training on the concept. Conversely, low fre
quency labels facilitate concept learning when prior training on the
concept has occurred• Lynch speculates that after the learner has had
experience with a task the high frequency labels serve as a distractor.
(Lynch, 1966, pp. 3, 7-8, 12-13)
Another atten tion directing device is movement. Diagrams seem to be more easily understood on television when movements are added.
A major study on other attention-directing devices was con ducted by A. W. VanderMeer and H. E. Thome. (VanderMeer and Thome,
1964) VanderMeer and Thome investigated means of improving cuing in filmstrips. The changes which produced significant differences in more than one of VanderMeer and Thome's experiments include greater iconicity, left to right reading arrangement, adding arrows or making arrows more prominent, addition of symbols such as dates, changes in captions, especially capitalization and underlining.
Iconicity means more concrete representation. A more realis tic , less abstractly symbolic representation is substituted when greater iconicity is used. The results suggest that among the most 190
useful methods for making stimuli more compelling are the attention-
directing devices of arrows, underlining and capitalization»
VanderMeer and Thome’s study should be replicated with other
media and also extended* Different attention-directing devices should
be especially suited to different media.
Abstraction
The abstraction factor in cuing means the amount of abstract
ness which is desirable for effective cuing. Abstractness refers to
the amount of realism or concreteness in a cue. It can also refer to
the generality or specificity of cues. Often the abstractness of cuing
is seen as measured on a pictorial-verbal dichotomy. The question is,
’’How abstract should the cue be?”
The dilemma posed by the necessity of deciding on how abstract
a cue should be resu lts from a c o n flic t between the need to maximize
tran sfer and the need to focus learn in g. The need for transfer sug
gests that it is desirable to teach students in situations as similar
as possible to ones in which they w ill be expected to use their
learning habits. This reason is given for choosing realistic cues which are less abstract than other cues. (Realism in a photograph is
s till an abstraction.) On the other hand, realism can present so many irrelevant cues that more abstraction or focusing is desirable to maximize learning. This c o n flic t can be resolved by using both realistic and abstract cues.
When the dilemma posed by these conflicting principles ap pears to be acute, one way out should be to use the various at tention-focusing devices during the early stages of learning, and then after the student has learned to identify and respond to the relevant cues, gradually change the presentation in the direction of realism, eventually putting in all the distractions 191
and variations that he is likely to encounter in the real-life situation. ^Italics mine.] Similarly, when trying to build up a general concept, it might be desirable to fade from one con crete example to the abstract representation, and then to a different concrete example, continuing the process until the main dimensions of variability were covered. It can be seen that in many cases it w ill be easier to accomplish this by motion pictures than by any other technique. (Miller, 1957, p. 84)
Both realism and abstraction are needed in learning if error is to be avoided. A study on learning about the heart from drawings of more and less abstractness shows that learning was more efficient from the more abstract drawings. (Dwyer, 1967) Nevertheless, we would not expect a heart surgeon to operate without having seen more than a drawing of the heart. A map eliminates distractions but is of little value if not tied in with earlier, concrete experiences. A map is valuable if it can be "read" but confusing or meaningless if the sym bols lack a concrete referent in the mind of the reader.
When the learning to be cued is conceptual learning, the factor of abstraction holds special interest.
Often the actual object or piece of equipment may be too specific. We are interested in teaching a response which will generalize to a whole class of objects or situations. This generalization can be facilitated by using techniques, such as caricature and diagramatic sim plifications, to empha size the cues that are common to all members of the class, and to minimize or omit the cues that differ. (Miller, 1957, pp. 83-84)
One should not equate realism only with meaningfulness because ab stractness can also increase meaningfulness especially in concept learning.
In order to be retrievable from the human memory bank detailed material must be both abstracted and placed in a structured pattern.
Detailed material is conserved in memory by the use of simplified ways of representing it. These simplified 192
representations have what may be called a "regenerative char acter." A good example in long-term memory can be found in science. A scientist does not try to remember the distances traversed by falling bodies in different gravitational fields over different periods of time. What he carries in memory in stead is a formula that permits him with varying degrees of ac curacy to regenerate the details on which the more easily re membered formula is based. Sim ilarly, as Bruner points out, one does not remember exactly what Marlow, the commentator in Lord Jim, said about the chief protagonist's plight, but rather, simply that he was the dispassionate onlooker, the man who tried to under stand without judging what had led Lord Jim into the straits in which he found himself. (Cahners and Lagerman, September-October, 1964, pp. 18, 19)
When abstract cues are too difficult for the learner it is
not necessarily because they lack concreteness. Rather it is often
because they are hard to discriminate or because they have symbolic
meaning. In fact, abstract cues often have some concreteness, at
le a st enough for id e n tific a tio n . The problem i s explained by James
Deese.
Therefore, argues Baum, it is not necessary to say that an abstract concept is more difficult simply because it has less perceptual thing-guality about it (as Heidbreder seems to imply), but rather because an abstract concept is generally embodied in specific instances that are less easy to discrimi nate from those of other concepts. Thus a child has less dif fic u lty learning the concept of "tree" than th at of "weed," because trees are more discriminable from other growing th in gs. (Deese, 1958, p. 295)
Toshibuma Taba studied the effects which cues at different levels of abstraction have on concept formation. He also studied the interaction of set for abstraction and level of abstractness in cues. (Taba, 1964, pp. 446-47) In order to find out at which moment of the concept forming process these cues at different levels of ab straction operate as effective stim uli, Taba prepared cues comprised of letters, of an abridged picture, of a color photograph. Using these cues as stimulus variables he investigated their relative 193
effectiveness with third, fifth, seventh and ninth grade students. The
concept learning task was paired associate learning. The sketches and
color photographs were more effective than the letter presentation,
particularly with the lower grades.
In another experiment objects were presented by means of the
three types of cues. Objects presented by photographs and pictures
are found to be c la ssifie d by th eir function, color or form; whereas
objects presented as verbalization by letters were classified most
often by the type of objects they were. For example, pictures and
photographs of a baseball would be c la ssified as showing a round ob
ject, as showing a white object or as showing an object for throwing.
The word "baseball" would be classified as a term for a type of ball.
In the third experiment, Taba wanted to leam how sets for
different types of abstraction interacted with cues at different
levels of abstraction. Subjects were first made to establish a set $ to abstract functions, or attributes or genus. After this preliminary
establishment of set, the subjects were made to form another set for
abstraction by being exposed to a presentation and test situation which used as cues: drawings, photographs or letters. What Taba was in terested in knowing was what types of sets would be easy to
change with a type of cue. Would a set for genus persist in the face of concrete and visual cues?
Taba described his interest as being in the factor of per sisten ce of cue in the abstraction process. He found that a set to abstract the functions and attrib u tes of objects was hard to change in the case of concrete and visual presentation (drawings and photo graphs). It changed more easily with the letter presentation. The 194
set for abstracting genus was hard to change with a letter presentation
but easy to change with a concrete and visual presentation.
What meaning do Taba's findings have for th e media designer?
They suggest f ir s t th at the type of concept to be formed should in
fluence the type of cue used. Verbal cues seem to be best suited for
older learners and for developing concepts of types within categories.
V isual and concrete cues seem to be more suited for young learners and
for concepts of function and of attributes. The set for genus does
not persist well when concrete and visual cues are presented. It per
sists better when letter cues are used. A set for attributes or func
tions persists with concrete and visual cues and changes easily with
letter cues. For example, letter cues seem most suited to the learning
of genus concepts. Drawings and photographs seem most suited to the
learning of attributes and functional concepts.
Prompting
Prompting is accomplished by adding cues designed specifically
to induce immediate responses. In programmed instruction the prompting
cues usually added are constructed so that they make the correct re
sponse more lik e ly . Prompting cues can take the form o f questions,
models for imitation and directions for practice.
An effective method of prompting for learning of lengthy se quential tasks is the implosion technique. With this technique a model for imitation or task representation is filmed. The film treat ment is to display the parts, followed by a rapid succession of
"stills" of each part placed in its appropriate place in the assembly, so that the parts appear to "jump into place" in sequence. In pro viding models for imitation, slow motion photography has been found 195
to be more effective than normal speed photography. Films are more
effective than s till pictures for prompting motor skill response prac
tice. This conclusion is the result of an experiment on learning to
tie knots. With other tasks still pictures might prove to be the more
e ffe c tiv e medium. Animation has also been found to make prompting in
films and transparency demonstrations more effective. (Gage, 1963,
pp. 629-31)
In general, prompting without overt practice has been found to be the most su ccessfu l approach to learning because there is le s s
interference caused by delay. The nature of the learning task will qualify this conclusion. There is a need for overt practice in some ta sk s, such as motor s k ills . Even in motor s k i l l ta sk s, however, some prompting of covert responses before overt responses seems to be helpful.
Another important finding is that incomplete prompting is more e ffe c tiv e than complete prompting. Complete prompting would be prompting on every trial. Incomplete prompting on learning from a
"textbook with tape recording" lesson in French might give several visible and audible models of French pronunciation and direct the student to imitate the pronunciation. At other points in the lesson the student might be instructed by the book without audible prompting and eventually given the task of writing a sentence using the words previously pronounced.
Another means of incomplete prompting in this situation is to direct the learner to repeat the response several times without prompting. Incomplete prompting could also be prompting by hints as to the correct answer on only three-fourths of the trials in the 196 programmed instruction lesson. Vanishing is a technique of prompting developed in research on programmed instruction design. Vanishing in volves the "fading out" or reduction of cue supports as the learning progresses. The value of vanishing has not been established by evi dence.
The important guidelines on prompting which can be formulated are to prompt covert practice even if overt practice is necessary and not to prompt every response. (Gage, 1963, pp. 624-31)
II. Stimulus Factors
The Medium
Factors: Forms o f. Unique C haracteristics o f. Type o f Experience Pro
vided, Limitations of. Utilization Problems
The w riter uses the word "media" with the meaning o f any de vices used for message transmission including aids such as bulletin boards, and systems such as television. Guidelines for the choice of media identify the characteristics which a medium contributes to con ceptual communication and present this information so that different media can be compared. Two attempts to give guidelines for choice o f media are Edgar Dale's cone of experience and Marshall McLuhan's hot- cool continuum.
The Cone of Experience
Dale's cone of experience is reproduced in Figure 24 on the following page. The cone of experience is based on the idea that media can be classified on a concrete-abstract dimension. Although the cone is a useful ordering device, it has limitations which should be kept in mind. First, there is no pure medium. Each medium employs other media. 197
Abstract A
Verbal Symbols
Visual Symbols
Recording and Radio Still Pictures
Motion Pictures
T elevision
Exhibits
Field Trips
Demonstrations
Dramatized Experiences
Contrived Experiences
Direct, Purposeful Experience
Concrete
Fig. 24.—The Cone of Experience (Dale, 1946) 198
Television uses s till pictures and film. Motion pictures use drama
tized experiences. Visual symbols are used in exhibits. Television
uses demonstrations. Because media are not pure, it is to be ex
pected that media w ill often offer both abstract and concrete expe
riences .
Secondly, it should be kept in mind that the concrete-abstract
continuum applies only to a limited extent. Demonstrations can be
either abstract or concrete depending on whether the subject is mathe
matics or home economics. Visual symbols can be either or both ab
stract and concrete.
Third, the cone im plies a continuum of a more complete to a more selective experiencing. However, a student can make a direct, purposeful experience more selective by concentrating on one aspect.
Conversely, a motion picture experience through photography can am plify and add several realistic aspects so that the experience is more complete and realistic than any direct experience might have been. In some ways, a war film is a more complete experience than combat duty might be. The camera can permit you to w itness more than you can or dinarily see. Time lapse photography can extend the senses. Media can extend the sen ses.
Fourthly, the cone, because it was originally published in
1946, leaves out many new media such as overhead projection and pro grammed in stru ctio n s. I t i s tru e, however, th at such media would be difficult to classify on a concrete-abstract continuum because they can include so many other media. Both overhead projection and pro grammed instruction can use photographic skills; both can use visual and verbal symbols. 199
F ifth , a major problem i s the equation o f concrete experiences
with realistic experiences and of abstract experiences with symbolic ex
periences implied by the cone. As mentioned, concrete experiences can
be symbolic and abstract experiences can be realistic. A film can
present a very generalized or abstract interpretation of a type of
personality very concretely and realistically. That characterization
is an interpretation which is both concrete and symbolic. A demonstra
tion of inertia can be a representation of an abstract principle as well
as a representation o f a r e a lis tic phenomenon. Abstract experiences oc
cur with media on all levels of the cone. Similarly, a portrait photo
graph is a r e a lis tic visu a l symbol which can represent a type o f person
—an abstraction.
A sixth problem is that the cone does not present characteris t i c s of media which can provide a b asis for choice o f media other than the type of conceptual experience contributed. In the cone all general categories of experience are placed at different levels. At the base are rich, personal sensory experiences, at the apex are the highly ab stract symbolic experiences. The cone also proceeds from the more di rect to the more indirect experiences. The cone, therefore, indicates level of abstractness, amount of direct involvement, type and amount of symbolism. It does not indicate characteristics such as the refer- ability of different media, such as the availability of past cues with print media, or many of the unique advantages and limitations of d if ferent media which are important considerations in conceptual communi cation.
There are reasons other than type of experience for choice of media. With the advent of programmed instruction education began to 200
incorporate many media experiences within one learning experience. This
integration of film clips, textbook reading, simulated experiences such
as laboratory experiences and charts, for example, makes simply classi
fying the type of (abstract or concrete) experience associated with a
media helpful but inadequate. We are trying to provide a variety of
experiences. The need is to know which types of concrete experiences
are most suitable and which types of abstract experiences are most
su ita b le.
Finally, the cone suggests that direct experiences are experi
ences which are experienced without intervening description and that
indirect experiences are more vicariously experienced. This is a dif
ficult distinction to maintain because only direct experience can be
said to be completely free from intervening description which makes
them vicarious. All of the other levels of experience could be clas
sified as vicarious and often as equally vicarious. The direct-
indirect dimension of the cone is therefore hard to maintain.
In conclusion, it should be noted that the cone is not without
its value. It clarifies the type of experience usually provided by each medium. It suggests the abstractness of symbolism and its rela tion to media. The more symbolism in the media the more abstract the experience seems to be. The cone is especially valuable for empha sizing the need for abstract media experiences to be reinforced by more concrete experiences and vice versa.
The cone is relevant to current theories of curriculum design.
Its progression follows closely the discovery learning, guided dis covery learning, reception learning continuum. Contrived experiences 201
are simulated experiences such as laboratory experiences and thus could
be called guided discovery.
The cone also follows closely the enactive (action), iconic
(image), symbolic (word) categories of Jerome Bruner. According to
Bruner, the course of cognitive growth proceeds from enactive through
iconic to symbolic so learning experiences should proceed similarly
from abstract to concrete to abstract. All children need to leam to
make transitions between these different forms of representation.
(Bruner, 1964)
The Hot-Cold Continuum
Marshall McLuhan has attempted a classification of media char
acteristics, especially of the characteristics of television, in
Understanding Media. (McLuhan, 1964) He speaks of a hot-cool con
tinuum on which media can be located. By cool medium he means a
medium that has low definition and contrast. Definition is the sharp
ness (the resolution) of the image transmitted. Contrast refers to the extremes o f tone which can be grouped by the media. The more ex treme the tones which can be grouped th e greater the contrast. A medium which is cool invites the audience to fill in the image. It transmits best the personality of those who allow the audience to fill
in their image. Those whose personality is too strongly explicit are no longer interesting. In fact, because they are using a cool medium hotly, their message seems more exaggerated than it would on a hot medium because it contrasts sharply with cooler messages. McLuhan describes television today as a cool medium. Radio today is a hot medium. I t extends speech, a cool medium. 202
He says, however, that the hot or cool effect of a medium is
dependent on the way in which a culture uses a medium, not just on the
content presented or on the inherent characteristics of the medium.
In the highly visual cultures that constitute the Western world, the stepping up o f the auditory component had complex resu lts for the other senses and other media. Everybody is fam iliar with the strong effects of the sound track on the movies. The radio was added, as it were, to the moving picture. An auditory image of high resolution or high definition was introduced. It became necessary to step up the intensity of the visual image as well. One casualty of th is event was Charlie Chaplin. His complex mask was made up of components in low resolution or d efin itio n . When the visu al component was in te n sifie d , h is mask dissolved . In the same way the sound track destroyed Russian film art. The Russian film form also depended upon low visu a l resolu tion . It never recovered from the electric sound track. The sound track, in a word, is "hot" because it offers an auditory image of high resolu tion , and th is is what con stitu tes a "hot" medium. By con trast, a "cool" medium is one in which the sense in question is offered in low definition or low resolution. An instance of this is handwriting as compared with printing or telephone as compared with radio or television as compared with movies or photographs. When the image is of low resolu tion , a ll o f the other senses rally to strengthen it, creating an effect of much participation and involvement. (McLuhan, AVCR, Summer, 1964, pp. 136, 135)
It is McLuhan’s thesis that the medium is the message. By
this he means that the media gives the message its characteristics.
The relevance of McLuhan's thesis for instructional design is that the medium chosen needs to be suitable for the subject matter and needs to be used suitably. The characteristics of the media will give the concepts communicated hot or cool characteristics. When the medium is used unsuitably, for example, when a cool medium is used in a hot manner, the communication may be distorted and may be unfavorably received.
McLuhan's hot-cold or le v e l of d efin itio n continuum i s useful for suggesting characteristics of media. His analysis of the broad cast media and their impact is particularly provocative. Perhaps cool 203
media are more suited to education or general conceptualizing and hot
media are more suited to training or more specific learning. It is
doubtful that such a distinction could be maintained consistently, but
its general applicability deserves researching.
Although McLuhan's ideas are provocative, it is difficult to
apply the hot-cool continuum for reasons similar to the reasons that
it is difficult to apply the cone of experience. Again, the way a
medium is used, as well as the nature of the medium can determine the
relative hotness or coolness of a medium. The image transmission of
radio can be poor enough to be cool even in today's cu ltu res. How
does one categorize the film made for movies and now shown on televi
sion? The medium is cool yes, but the original design was for a hot
medium. Does this mean the message is warmer than that of a film made
for television. It is difficult to say because the message is more than th e medium.
McLuhan is only partially right. The message is also the sub ject matter, the receiver's mood, the treatment, the images used and many other factors. The message consists of design and external trans mission characteristics which give it certain systematic (technological, environments, educational), sensory (reproduction, distribution), sym bolic (verbal, nonverbal), and temporal (sequence, rate) properties.
A message also consists of internal manipulation and response characteristics which give it certain other systematic (learning, growth), sensory (modality), symbolic (imagery and verbalization) and temporal (recall, attention, anticipation) properties.
Another problem with McLuhan's work is that the characteris tics are not sufficiently concise to make them very useful to the 204
message designer. The message designer must infer them from his reading
of McLuhan and make his own concise notes from his reading before he can
proceed to apply the characteristics.
The writer believes that the most important considerations when
choosing media should be the type of experience provided , the unique
characteristics of a medium and the relative practicality of a medium.
The designer needs to consider the advantages and limitations of a
medium and the suitability of various forms of that medium. It should
be remembered that all media experiences are symbolic, realistic, ab
stract and private to some extent. Nevertheless, some are more purely abstract and symbolic; others are more realistic. Some experiences are exclusive to an individual while other experiences are shared with a group. Some experiences originate with the individual. These are the more direct experiences. Others originate with an interpreter or
"translator." These are more vicarious experiences. Using somewhat arbitrary categorization criteria, then, the type of experience pro vided can be verbal, visual or multichannel abstract or concrete, private or shared, direct or vicarious. The answers to questions such as the following can indicate the types of experience which should be provided:
1. Does the student need a visual, audio or audiovisual
concept?
2. Should the concept formed be a personal discovery?
3. Will the concept have concrete meaning for the student?
The type of experience provided should be responsive to students' con ceptual needs. 205
By unique characteristics the writer means the attribute or
a ttrib u tes which make th is medium's most d istin ct contribution to edu
cation. This characteristic is inseparable from the medium. There are
some characteristics of a medium which make it difficult to accomplish
a certain goal. In Table 6, these characteristics are shown as the
limitations of the medium.
The theories of McLuhan and Dale and of the writer are incor
porated in Table 6, which charts the comparative characteristics of
media concisely. The reader may use the chart as a basis for choosing
the most appropriate media and forms. It should be remembered that a
medium need not provide the type of experience listed. The experience
listed is the type of experience most easily presented through this
media.
Table 6 may be criticized on many of the grounds on which Dale's
cone of experience and McLuhan's hot-cool continuum have been criti
cized. Table 6 does, however, add specific characteristics of media
not present in D ale's and McLuhan's guidelines for comparing media.
How does choosing a medium by distinguishing between media
characteristics apply to conceptual communication? The answer is that th e type of meaning of a concept may depend on the type of experience
(abstract and concrete) it is associated with. Furthermore, the sym b o lic form of the concept can be determined by the medium chosen. For
example, radio w ill communicate verbal information in audio form. More over, the various media can contribute unique q u a lities to concepts such as ordering or grouping, coding, lack of motion, continuity, editing of reality, intimacy, immediacy, involvement in environment, emotional in teraction. Finally, one medium may often be inadequate for accomplishing TABLE 6
A COMPARISON OF MEDIA CHARACTERISTICS
Unique Medium D escrip tion Forms Characteristic(s) Type(s) of Advantage(s) Limitation(s)
D irect learning by laboratory and responsible m u lti more lik e ly tim e con E x p e r i e n c e doing and by field experi involvement with channel; to transfer suming , not contact with ments , j o b s, environment concrete; to real life e a s ily r e environment field trips d ir e c t s itu a tio n s produced
Drama interpreta puppet shows, acto r and audio, physical reproduca- tio n o f sociodrama, audience v is u a l, or proxim ity b i l i t y a ctio n psychodrama, interaction audiovisual; which leads lim ited rea d in g s, concrete; to emotional pantom ine, v ic a rio u s involvement p agean t, plays, shows
Television transmission videotape. small group audio immediacy, low defini o f vid eo and l i v e , intim acy v is u a l; d ir e c t tio n and audio over closed cir concrete; address sm all great d is c u it , v ic a rio u s screen at tan ce in str u c presen t; t io n a l , co st educational, commercial
Motion a ctio n 8 mm, 16 mm, continuity , audio can rev ea l a t p resen t P ictu res recorded 35 mm. Super 8 , illusion of v is u a l; what is not development on film cinemascope, motion, time concrete; o rd in a rily tim e e tc . fo r p ro- Todd A -0, and place v ic a rio u s perceived ; preven ts je c tio n educational, relationships immediacy; too co st o\ TABLE 6—Continued
Unique Medium D escrip tion Forms Characteristic(s) Type(s) of Advantage(s) Limitation(s)
documentary, can abstract k in esco p e, yet maintain theatrical, r e a lit y film -lo o p , c a r tr id g e , anim ation, single concept or open-end
S t i l l p ic t o r ia l overhead lack of motion; v is u a l; suspended in lack of audio P ictu res p resen ta transparencies, highly evocative abstract; tim e fo r tio n s illustrations, for individual v ic a rio u s stu d y, a r w ithout opaque, rested motion projections, motion (excep t flat pictures, fo r po 35 mm slid es, larization ; lantern slides, overlay) film strips, photographs
Radio tran sm is netw ork, immediacy audio; person to fast and un- sio n o f two way, a b stra ct; person retrievable sound over te le p h o n e , v ic a rio u s intim acy seq u en tia l d ista n ce telegrap h presentation
Recordings sound plastic disc, audio audio; e d itin g lack o f reproduc magnetic tape, f i d e l i t y a b stra ct ; p o s s ib ili v is u a l tio n which magnetized v ic a rio u s t i e s can be s t e e l w ire ND stored 3 TABLE 6—Continued
Unique Medium Description Forms Characteristic(s) Type(s) of Advantage(s) Limitation(s)
D isplay arrangement e x h ib it s , grouping that v is u a l; referability space Boards of material chalkboard, relates elements a b stra ct; which pre magnetic board, v ic a rio u s sen ts th e fe ltb o a r d , same message bulletin board, design con hook and eye tin u o u sly board , study d isp la y
Graphics su ccin ct sk e tc h e s, coding that visual; a llow s one req u ires and c lea r cartoons, clarifies, abstract; to handle a ability in presentation diagram s, condenses— vicarious great deal interpretation o f id eas p o s te r s , provides of informa — one must through graphs (line, cond ensed t io n in an know: how to combination bar, circle), m odels, organized or read a bar or o f words, charts form u las, m eaningful line graph, pictures and (organization paradigm s, manner the distor drawings stream, line, g rid s tion caused flow ) by different animated methods o f ca rto o n s, map projec maps t i o n , th e sym bols used in cartoons
Printed c a r e fu lly programmed w ritten v isu a l; in d iv id u a l abstractness Materials constructed instruction, language a b stra ct; study verb al book, v ic a rio u s m aterials tex tb o o k , to reproduced workbook, § for reading worksheets, flash cards 209
a ll of the needs of a particular conceptual communication situation.
When th is occurs Table 6 can suggest what media w ill complement each
oth er.
The Content
Factors: Instances in Content, Attributes of Instances, Amount of
Content, Approach to Content
One of the reasons that it is impossible to equate the media with the message is that content variables also determine the charac teristics of a conceptual communication. The content of a message is the body of meanings that are transmitted by the symbols used in the message. The theme of the message may be called the primary content.
Secondary content presents the minor ideas or themes. It is important that the secondary content not tend to distort or weaken the primary content but clea rly support the primary content. (Our American H erit age, May, 1963, pp. 7-10) The materials designer must select and ar range the symbols and signs that will be conveyed to the learner. The material selected is the content. The way in which the material is ar ranged can determine what content is primary and what content is secondary. Content variables which can offer guidelines for influ encing the characteristics of a communication are; instances (positive and negative), attributes (relevant and irrelevant), amount of content
(simplification and complexity), approach used (treatment and struc tu rin g) .
Instances in Content
Instances d iffe r from attrib u tes by being embodiments of a whole concept, not Just of part of a concept. Instances are examples used to 210
illustrate what the concept is or is not. James Deese has defined posi
tive and negative instances as follows:
Positive examples are instances of the concept and include the essential characteristics- Negative examples are instances of what the concept is not and may lack one or more of the neces sary characteristics. (Deese, 1958, p. 295)
The aspects of instances used which are significant for the media spe
cialist are the ratio of positive to negative instances, the order in
which positive and negative instances are presented and the number of
instances used.
Laboratory research reports that using only positive instances
is the quickest and most successful approach, except when disjunctive
concepts are to be formed.* Using a combination of negative and posi
tive instances was found to be almost as effective as using positive
instances only. Using negative instances was the least successful ap
proach except when the concepts to be formed were disjunctive. In
that case, it proved to be the best approach.
Reasons offered for the general superiority of the positive
instances only approach were (l) because this approach is well suited to the type of concept most commonly formed, the conjunctive concept,*
(2) because students have had less practice in negative concept forma tion, (3) because positive instances present more pertinent information than negative instances and (4) because the defining attributes are
*Disjunctive concepts may be defined by one or more of several a ttr ib u te s. Sometimes one set o f signs serves as a cue and sometimes another set of signs serves as a cue. For example, a "walk" occurs either when four balls have been pitched or when a pitched ball strikes a b atter. Conjunctive concepts are defined by a combination of attributes which must always be present. For example, in order to be a registered voter one must be over twenty-one years of age and a citizen of the United States. 211
discriminated for the learner in the case of all positive instances (in
all negative instances they must be discriminated by the learner). None
of these reasons has been definitely established to be a cause of the
success of the positive instances only approach.
Because real life situations seldom present a positive in
stance only approach, further research is needed before this approach
can be advocated. Research is still needed to compare the effective
ness of the positive instances only approach and the combination of
negative and positive instances approach in producing learning which
transfers to real life situations. (Blout, et , 1967 , p. 37) The
superiority of the negative and positive instances approach when trans
fer instead of acquisition is the criterion has already been docu
mented by laboratory research by A. Masilela (1964) and by V.
Freibergs and E. Tulving (1961).
Nancy Smuckier (1967), however, reported her laboratory re
search indicated that tran sfer as w ell as acq u isition improved as the number of positive instances used increased to 100 per cent. The con
flict between study findings might be due to Smuckler's use of second graders as subjects while the previous researchers used college stu dents. (Smuckler, 1967, pp. 19-21)
Negative instances are examples of what the concept is not.
They are "non-examples." A fifth grader is a negative instance of a registered voter. Negative instances seem to be most e ffe c tiv e when subjects have training in using negative instances for concept forma tion, when a ll negative examples are presented simultaneously and when negative examples are distinctly different from positive examples, yet related to each other. When the set of possible defining attributes 212
is large as it often is in disjunctive concepts, negative instances can
serve to define the larger set of stimuli and to teach students to rec
ognize errors. Although all negative instances is the least successful
approach with concepts other than disjunctive concepts, many people are
able to leam to identify a concept from all negative instances*
So far evidence indicates that increasing the number of posi tive instances facilitates performance more than does increasing the length of time spent learning from fewer instances. (Bourne, 1966, pp. 54-56, 115, 116; Travers, 1967, pp. 203-204) Research has also shown that the point of diminishing returns, that is the point beyond which adding further positive instances did not facilitate learning significantly, depends on the difficulty of the material and the in te llig e n c e of the learner. (M iller, 1957, p. 96) Concept acquisition is also affected by the degree to which positive instances of the con cept occur contiguously. (Klausmeier and Harris, 1966, p. 41) This means that the closer together in time or space the positive examples are presented the greater the likelihood of concept acquisition.
The data suggest, in sum, that generally a designer of media presentations w ill facilitate learning and transfer most when he includes both negative and positive instances (examples), when 50 per cent or more of the instances he uses are positive and when he uses negative instances effectively. Presenting positive instances con tiguously at some point in the presentation w ill help concept acquisi tion. The poorer the learner and the more difficult the material the more positive instances that should be used. Enough positive instances should always be used so that the concept is more than "gone over lig h t ly ." A d ifferen t approach i s best when disju nctive concepts are 213
to be communicated. Using all negative examples is the best means of
presenting disjunctive concepts. Negative examples which are distinctly
different from positive examples but related to each other should be
presented simultaneously in groups» Students should be given practice
in forming disjunctive concepts from negative examples»
For example, ideally, a presentation intended to develop the
conjunctive concept of what constitutes a balanced diet for adults
should use instances as follows:
1. Daily menus which include exactly two servings of grain
foods, two or more servings of protein-rich foods, four
or more servings of vegetables and fruits (rich in Vitamin
A and C) and an adequate amount of dairy food should be
presented successively or simultaneously*
2. Some negative instances should be presented simultaneously
as groups of menus unacceptable for the same reason.
3. At least 50 per cent of the instances used should be ac
ceptable menus.
4. Enough p o sitiv e instances (acceptable menus) should be
presented to ensure over-learning.
Attributes of Instances
Dimensions have values which are called the attributes of a concept. Attributes could also be called the defining and non-defining characteristics of a concept. Defining characteristics are called rele vant attributes. Non-defining characteristics can be ignored in con cept formation and therefore are called irrelevant attributes. For example, a stimulus might be a red triangle on a white background; yet 214
the concept to be attained might be triangle in which case the dimension
shape would be relevant and the dimension color irrelevant.
The factors which determine the effect of attributes are (1) the
number of relevant attributes presented, (2) the number of irrelevant
attributes presented, (3) the intra- and interdimensional variability
o f the a ttrib u te s, (4) the redundancy of th e dimensions, (5) the s a l i
ence or obviousness of the attributes presented, (6) the subject's
ability systematically to eliminate irrelevant attributes.
The more attributes that a stimulus has (whether relevant, ir
relevant or both) the more difficult a concept is to master. This is
probably due to the increasing memory load and to the complication of
discrimination and identification of attributes. As a result of his
research on the concept attainment, Wayne Frederick plotted task dif
ficulty as a function of number of relevant and irrelevant attributes
(see Figure 25).
5 / /
CO 4 CO 4 / 4 Irr e l X 3 Irrel 3 Rel / c t 3 S 3 / X / / c ^ ^ 2 Rel • r t •H
2 § 2 / •H X H
1
II I 0 1 2 3 4 5 (a) # of Relevant (b) # of Irrelevant
Fig. 25.—Difficulty as a function of number of relevant and irrelevant attributes. (Frederick, 1965, p. 16, Figure 4) 215
As you can see more difference is made by adding relevant information
than by adding irrelevant information. The reason for this is probably
that irrelevant information is quickly discarded. Frederick comments
that more research is needed before this effect and its cause will be
acceptably demonstrated. Early research by E. J. Archer, L. E. Bourne
Jr. and P. G. Brown (1955) indicates that while adding irrelevant dimen
sions slows learning of both verbal and nonverbal concepts, increasing
the number of irrelevant dimensions does not have as much effect on
verbal concepts as on nonverbal concepts.
So far we have been talking about interdimensional stimulus
variability, "that is stimulus complexity manipulated in terms of the
number of different dimensions on which patterns vary." Attributes
may also have intradimensional variability. For example, stimuli for the concept rectangle could differ in position, size and color of rec tan gle presented. This would be interdim ensional v a r ia b ility . I f the
stimuli also varied in the shape of the rectangle, such as square or
oblong they would have intradimensional variability.
Intradimensional variability refers to the number of different patterns each dimension is permitted to assume. For example, does the dimension of the color blue vary in three or four shades of blue. And, how many kinds of triangles represent the dimension triangular shape.
Both relevant and irrelevant dimensions can take on intradimensional variability; only irrelevant attributes would take on interdimensional variability.
W. F. Battig and L. E. Bourne Jr. explored intradimensional stimulus variability in 1961 and observed a significant decline in performance with increases in either intra- or interdimensional 216
variability. (Battig and Bourne, 1961) The correctness of their finding
is plausible since as the number of different stimulus patterns increase,
the task should become more difficult because the memory load increases.*
As the variation between stimuli increases in any way, concept forma
tion becomes more difficult. Nevertheless, the factor of intradimen
sional variability does not seem to be nearly as critical as increasing
the number of irrelevant dimensions. For "performance got worse as the
number of irrelevant dimensions increased, regardless of the amount of
intradimensional variability."
While variability in attributes hinders learning, redundancy in
attributes can, if properly used, make learning easier. This is not
surprising when one considers that discrimination initially proceeds
from a base o f redundancy. Redundancy i s by nature "groupable";
whereas variability is antithetical to grouping. Furthermore, re
dundancy reduces the amount of information that must be considered.
When it is used in research on attributes in concept learning problems
"redundancy" refers to a sp ecial type o f rep etitio n . When i t refers to
relevant or irrelevant attrib u tes "redundancy" means that the presence
o f one dimension w ill allow the learner to assume that another dimen
sion is present.
If the stimuli used are either large and yellow or small and
red, then the attribute size is redundant. In other words if one saw
only part of the stimulus, one would still know the size because of
its color. Research on attributes has identified two types of
*The writer has dealt with the concept of memory burden several times. The importance of memory burden cannot be overemphasized. (See p p . 124, 191-92, 251-52) 217
redundancy: relevant and irrelevan t. I f a redundancy can be used as a
basis for identifying a positive example, it is relevant. If it cannot,
it is irrelevant.
Assume that you are trying to identify instances of the concept
"banana" (or to form the concept "banana") from the group o f stim uli
shown in Figure 26. The stimuli shown are photographs of apples and
bananas. Some of the photographs are close-ups which show life-size
fruit. Others are medium shots which show fruit smaller than life-
s iz e .
Concept: Banana
Stimuli: | | yellow
I H i red
» Attributes According to Type
Relevant Irrelevant
Redundant elongated spherical shape shape
yellowness redness
Non-redundant size position
number 1
Fig. 26.—Example of the relevancy and redundancy of attributes. 218
On the stimuli shown yellowness and elongated are redundant be
cause whenever one appears the other appears. Thus in any given in
stance either both redness and spherical shape are present as attrib
utes or neither is present as an attribute. Size is non-redundant
because the attribute life-size cannot be predicted from any other at tribute such as shape, color, position or number. Size can be a rele vant a ttrib u te for identifying an actual banana. A learner who did not realize that size was important could mistake a wax bean for a banana or a cherry for an apple. Position and number are not helpful for identifying "bananas." They are irrelevant attributes. In another group of stimuli the attribute number might be relevant and the attrib ute size redundant. Figure 26 was developed by the writer.
Learning is influenced by the amount and type of redundancy presented in attributes. The interaction of relevancy, redundancy and number of attributes presented is shown in Figure 27 which was devel oped by th e w riter.
Relevant Irrelevant
w ill will interfere facilitate the least Redundant (1) (2 )
will interfere will interfere the most Non-redundant (4) (3)
Fig. 27.—Relative effect on learning of increasing attributes of different types. 219
If an increase in attributes presented is unavoidable because
the concept or stimulus involved is complex, the least desirable type
increase is (4). The most desirable type of increase is (l). And,
(2) is the second most desirable type of increase.
By comparing Figure 26 with Figure 27, the reader w ill be able
to understand what specific effects adding attributes or changing the
way in which attributes are used will have on learning to identify in
stances o f the concept "banana." For example, in what way would
learning change if the photographs all presented life-size fruit.
Learning would be f a c ilit a t e d . What would be the e ffe c t o f making
one apple yellow? All apples yellow? Making one apple yellow would
increase the non-redundant irrelevancies. Learning would be hindered.
Making a ll the apples yellow would increase the redundant irrelevan
cies and decrease the redundant relevant attributes. Making all the
apples yellow would make learning more difficult. S till, learning
the concept banana would be easier with all yellow apples than with
one yellow apple.
To give another example, suppose a teacher is using overhead transparencies to present each letter of the alphabet successively.
Would making each transparency a different color aid discrimination
or hinder learning? Because color is an irrelevant attribute the use
of a variety of colors would hinder learning.
Why would a person deliberately add redundant irrelevancy to a film or another form of presentation? If adding irrelevancies in terferes with learning why add them at all? A combination of negative and positive instances has already been recommended for increasing transfer. One cannot add negative instances without adding irrelevant 220
attributes. Sometimes irrelevant attributes cannot be eliminated from
positive instances because of presentation variables. Size may be ir
relevant but the depiction presented must assume some s iz e . It appears
that it is possible to offset the detrimental effects of large amounts
of irrelevant information by making irrelevant information redundant
and by including redundant relevant information. (Bourne, 1966, pp.
54-60, 115-16; Klausmeier and Harris, 1966, pp. 40-41; Travers, 1967,
pp. 202-206)
M. H. Dentambel and L. M. Stolurow discovered that (l) displays
should be sequenced so th at when a relevant component changes from
display to display, the irrelevant component remains the same; (2) when
the relevant component does not change, the irrelevant component should
change. The writer had diagramed this conclusion in Figure 28.
Relevant Component Irrelevant Component
Situation 1 Changes Should not change
Situation 2 Does not change Should change
Fig. 28.—Successive Presentation Situations
For example, if a filmstrip is intended to teach the shape and appearance of cacti plants the illustration used should show either
(l) different types of cacti in the same setting or (2) the same type of ca cti in d ifferen t s e ttin g s . Figure 29, which was developed by the writer, illustrates two desirable successive presentation condi tio n s . 221
Film strip on Cacti (Situation l)
Film strip on Cacti (Situation 2)
Fig. 29.—Desirable Successive Presentation Conditions
Besides the factor of attribute redundancy, there is the factor
of concept salience to be considered in making decisions about media
presentation. Concept salience is the obviousness of a concept's dimen
sions. It is the probability that one dimension of a stimulus will be
responded to rather than another. Obviousness depends on the dominance
of the attribute, on cuing factors and on learner variables. (Frederick,
1965, pp. 6, 18) Findings suggest that form is a more salient dimension
for men than for women. Size seems to be a more salient dimension for women than for men. One possible explanation offered for this finding is that women do not have the same labeling ability with respect to shape as do men. (Travers, 1967, p. 205)
Findings on the effects of the obviousness of attributes are not surprising.
. . . Archer (1962) found that when the relevant information was obvious, the subject had an easier time learning the concept and when the irrelevant information was obvious the task was more difficult. A further finding was that when the relevant 222
information was not obvious, it took significantly more time and errors to learn the concept, but when the irrelevant in formation was not obvious there was less of an inhibitory effect. (Travers, 1967, p. 205)
G. Davis, M. Manske and A- Train have studied the detrimental
effects of increasing the number of available response alternatives.
They found that "the e ffe c ts of th is variable can be greatly reduced by a systematic elimination of the various irrelevant alternatives."
(Davis, Manske and Train, 1967, p. 9) This study is pertinent because it suggests that training in systematic elimination of irrelevancies may reduce the effects of irrelevancies. The study now needs to be replicated with a task requiring elimination of irrelevant attributes instead of irrelevant response alternatives and with pretraining in systematic concept attainment procedures.
What important principles for selecting the stimulus attrib utes or characteristics to be incorporated in a message design can be culled and inferred from the findings just reviewed?
1. The fewer and the less variable the attributes (relevant
or irrelevant) presented, the more a message is likely to
facilitate learning. For example, suppose a teacher in
tends to help students leam the phases of a moon by
putting on the chalkboard next to today's date, a drawing
of the phase of the moon on that day. Should she use a
different colored chalk for each phase or not? She should
not because she would be making color a non-redundant ir
relevant attribute.
2. Try to define concepts to be learned with attributes that
are particularly salient (obvious) to the learner. Try to 223
present relevant attributes in an attention-attracting way.
The more relevant attributes are made to predominate the
more learning will be facilitated. Similarly, the less
distracting the irrelevant attributes are, the greater
learning will be.
Amount of Content
Guidelines for judging the amount of content to include in a
presentation can be formulated from findings on the effects of redun
dancy and complexity.
I t has already been established th at the amount o f redundancy
in a presentation, whether of attributes or instances, is an important determiner of the success of a presentation. This fact raises more
questions than there are answers. How do you optimize redundancy? Is
repeating stimuli as effective as using attribute redundancy? How much redundancy i s advisable with d ifferen t amounts of stimulus complexity?
What are the means for introducing redundancy?
We need studies which show the variables involved in optimiz ing the amount of information presented. We already have some answers.
Redundancy that is helpful to discrimination and reinforcement is de sirable. (See p. 188) Superfluous redundancy is undesirable because i t consumes presentation tim e. Studies of attrib u tes and instances which have been cited suggest that while simplification is desirable, it should not be made at the expense of redundant information. The more complex the concept or the stimulus, the more important it is to include some redundancy.
Complication can be useful, too. For example, if a presenta tion is too simple, the learner may not perceive that there is anything 224 to be learned by attending or may over-estimate his knowledge, assume he understands, and stops attending. Experimenters such as W. I.
Welker and D. E- Berlyne have found that subjects w ill choose the more complex and varied stimulus when given a choice between a simple and a more complex (but not exaggeratedly complex) stim ulus. In h is research Berlyne hypothesized six aspects of complexity: irregu larity of arrangement, amount of material, heterogeneity of elements, irregularity of shape, incongruity, and juxtaposition. (Berlyne,
1958) W. Dember (1957) has noted that complex stim uli may be useful as rewards in learning.
We know that complexity, redundancy, and simplification needs cannot be separated from variables such as a b ility , age, presentation methods, and salien ce le v e l. For example, redundancy needs can be determined by readability.
The big issue is the optimal information processing capacity of the learner. How do we determine what is optimal for motivating and what is optimal for clarity? How do we determine the amount of irrelevant content optimal for transfer? How do we determine the amount of relevant information optimal for concept identification?
There is a principle that with every action (force acting on an object) there is an equal and opposite reaction (force exerted by the object). This principle can be demonstrated with few irrele vancies by suspending several steel balls in a row. When the first steel ball is swung against the second ball the force exerted pushes the third ball which in turn pushes the fourth ball. When the first and second ball are swung together against the third ball, the greater force exerted causes the third and fourth balls to move as a unit. 225
Thus greater force i s seen to move more weight.
The same p rin cip le can be demonstrated using a real l i f e situ a
tion full of irrelevancies. Irrelevancies are the unpredictable as
p ects of the situ a tio n . One example would be driver education film s
which show what happens in accidents when the car is going thirty-five
miles an hour and when it is going seventy miles an hour. The pic
tures of the accidents would introduce more irrelevancy than the steel
balls would. How does the designer of a physics presentation know
when to use the example with many of irrelevancies? The designer must
consider the lea rn er’s background and a b ility . He must also consider the long term application of the learning as well as the immediate
learning effects. A learner who cannot identify the problem when it is presented in a situation full of irrelevancies may not be able to apply his immediate learning later. We have not yet determined how we can reconcile the factors involved in optimization of amount of content.
One way in which redundancy can be introduced is by presenting messages in two media, not necessarily at the same time. For example, the film Rasputin and the Empress could be used in conjunction with the book Lenin by David Shub. Redundancy may also be introduced by vary ing examples of the application of principles. The principle of action-reaction can be illustrated with the swinging steel balls, with pictures of collisions, with pictures of water being displaced by objects, with pictures of men shoveling dirt and of large earth moving equipment shoveling much more d ir t .
A. A. Lumsdaine, R. L. Sulzer and F. F. Kopstein (1961) ob served the effect of adding different numbers of redundant examples 226
to film s o f micrometer reading. They found that the more examples used
the more effective the film. The increase in film effectiveness oc
curred with all levels of student ability. The less able students
needed more examples to reach a certain minimal level of accomplish
ment than did the brighter students. Brighter students profited the
most by the increase in number of examples used. The brighter students
"did not need as much rep etition to reach a minimum le v e l of perform
ance, but they were better able to profit from a reasonable amount of
further repetition, especially on difficult material." In their ex periment, Lumsdaine, Sulzer and Kopstein did not try to discover when boredom set in. (Gage, 1963, p. 644)
In another study using films on micrometer reading, J. H.
Kanner and A. H. McLure (1956) compared the e ffe c ts of adding id e n ti cal repetitions (four examples seen twice) with effects of adding varied repetition (eight different examples). Varied repetition is redundancy; so Kanner and McClure were comparing rep etition with re dundancy. The results showed a significant but small difference favoring redundancy. This difference occurred only for the more able students and only after a week had elapsed since training. A second and sim ilar experiment by Kanner and McClure produced no sig n ifica n t differences at all.
B. Rimland (1955) tested the effects of redundancy and repeti tion on the learning of a specific motor skill. In his experiment two identical repetitions were more effective than redundancy. (Gage, 1963, pp. 644-45) J. L. Hayman Jr. and J . T. Johnson Jr. reported research ^ on "Exact vs. Varied Repetition in Television." Their research compared with the learning of Spanish under differing conditions of 227
presentation and practice. One condition was a single viewing of a
television presentation with no practice, another condition was a single
viewing with teacher directed practice (varied repetition—redundancy).
A third condition was repeated viewings without practice. There was
also a condition of repeated viewings with practice. Exact repetition
significantly increased learning when there was no provision for prac tice (redundancy). It was not as effective as practice (redundancy), however. As a result of their research, Hayman and Johnson conclude that " s k illfu lly presented" redundancy i s more e ffectiv e than rep eti tio n .
Exact repetition in educational television is therefore, a potent variable, but it is not as potent as a skillfully presented varied repetition. The key to this statement is the words " s k illfu lly presented." Not a l l variations are better than exact repetition, and for each particular set of circumstances, effective variations must be determined through research. (Hayman and Johnson, 1963, p. 102)
There is evidence that there is a point beyond which exact repetition ceases to be effective. Two repetitions of a film seem to be as effective as three repetitions. More than three repetitions of a film can decrease learning. (Gage, 1963, p. 644) The nature of the content and the previous knowledge of the learner can invalidate these conclusions.
On the basis of research findings, we may conclude the fol lowing : Simplification, although desirable, should not be made at the expense of repetition or redundancy. Redundancy is more effective than repetition. More than three repetitions is generally undesirable.
Redundancy may be introduced by direct practice, by review, by pre senting material through more than one medium, by using different examples of the same principle. Some variety and complication is 228
desirable for motivation. Too much information may unnecessarily com
plicate learning with the result that the student may refuse to accept
the challenge or may become confused.
Approach to Content
Treatment
The“approach to content is revealed in the treatment and struc- \ turing of content. Approach is used here to mean the manner in which
content is handled. It includes the point of view taken, the method
for organizing the material, the means used to show relationships.
Approach is thus a composite of treatment, structuring and editing.
A film that is factual, satirical, thematic and dynamically edited
(montage cutting) d iffe r s in approach from a film which is dramatic,
chronological and uses continuity cutting. The former film might use
a social commentary approach and the latter film a story approach. The
success of either film may depend on how suitable the approach is for
the subject matter and for the learner.
A treatment is "a brief written outline of a proposed cinematic
(or other) rendition of a story." (Ely, et a l., 1963) The type of treatment used provides the point of view with which the content is handled. Some types of treatment are informational, emotional, dranatic, documentary, realistic, humorous, theatrical, educational, satirical,
open-ended, ambiguous. (Our American H eritage, May, 1963, p. 17)
It is impossible to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of dif ferent types of approaches using the data now available. In fact, it w ill be difficult to draw clear conclusions until the types of treat ment are better defined. 229
Two types of treatment which have been compared in research are
the th ea trica l or dramatic treatment and the "straight forward" exposi
tory or educational treatm ent. M. A- May and A. A. Lumsdaine (1958)
compared a narrated version of a film with a dialogue version of that
film . The amounts learned from the two film s were not sig n ifica n tly
different. Nevertheless, younger students (fifth grade) expressed
more interest in the dialogue story form. Generally, viewers found
that the live-dialogue form stimulated more interest in the subject
matter of the film.
May and Lumsdaine have warned that in terest in a film i s not
the same thing as interest in the subject matter of the film. Nor
does the amount of interest in a film necessarily directly relate to
the amount learned from i t . In a 1958 study Lumsdaine and F. D.
Sheffield reported no significant differences in effectiveness between theatrically dramatic and educational films. (Gage, 1963, p. 653)
The author suggests that difference in effectiveness may depend on how well each treatment is suited to the subject and on how well each treatment is done. The writer believes that it is an oversimplifica tion to simply compare dramatic v. educational treatment. (Miller,
1957, p. 108)
Humorless and humorous treatments have been compared by C. J .
McIntyre (1954). McIntyre used three films which had identical con tent but which were presented with three different treatments. One film achieved a humorous treatment through the use of production tech niques (sound e ffe c t s , commentary, speeded motion, ju xtap osition , re verse motion, trick photography). A second film used print titles to give cues concerning the main topics to be covered. This second film 230
was humorless. The third film was a conventional educational film using
a humorless narration and no print titles. Subjects were 426 Army
trainees. The printed title (humorless) version was more effective
(p = .05). The humorous and conventional (humorless) educational
treatments were equally effective. (Travers, 1967, pp. 49-50; Gage,
1963, p. 633) One explanation for these results may be that while
humor may draw a tten tio n , i t may draw i t away from the task. The re
sults suggest that the extra time and cost that must be invested in
order to produce a theatrical treatment should be carefully weighed.
The theatrical treatment does not seem on the basis of this study to
be justifiable as a way of increasing learning. A weakness of studies
such as th is is that the resu lts depend on how w ell each treatment was
done and on the suitability of the content for the treatment. The re
sults are probably also related to the amount of interest the learner
started with and the mood of the learner.
Further explanation of the evaluative criterion "how well the treatment is done" is needed. M Approach to the Evaluation of In
structional Materials developed by the Los Angeles County School Dis trict gives some suggestions for making such a judgment. This booklet asks first, how the content material presented relates to the film's purpose. Then it asks, whether the material is properly documented.
It asks whether verbal statements present overgeneralizations. Finally, it asks what the strong and weak areas of the content and treatment are.
(Our American H eritage, May, 1963, p. 17)
Another type of treatment is the emotional treatment intended to produce anxiety. This treatment is an attempt to increase learning by increasing motivation. Motivation is presumed stimulated by 231
m aterials th at are anxiety-producing. For example, S- Feshbach and
I. L. Janis (1951) stimulated anxiety before a film on the care of the
teeth by showing close up shots of decaying teeth and gums. Contrary
to expectations, the greatest anxiety produced led to the least learn
ing. This was hypothesized as due to need to reduce the anxiety drive
by not paying attention or thinking about teeth at all. A little
anxiety, however, was effective in stimulating learning. It seemed to
stimulate attention without being aversive. In another study on the
emotional treatment, H. H. Kendler, Tracy S. Kendler, A. H. Desiderate
and J . 0. Cook (1953) found th at heightening anxiety produced no s ig
nificant differences in learning. (Gage, 1963, p. 654) It has been
hypothesized by Neal Miller, C. I . Hovland, J. L. Janis and H. H.
Kelly that these no significant difference findings are due to a need
to escape from the fear used for m otivation. I f the communicator does
not point out very clearly desirable ways of avoiding the danger, the
audience will find undesirable ways, such as not attending, belittling,
forgetting. (Miller, 1957, p. 69)
A. Sweetland and L. Childs-Quay (1958) investigated the effect
of emotion on concept attainment. Neutral and emotionally-toned
stimuli were tested on groups classified as emotionally adjusted and
emotionally maladjusted. The emotionality of the stimuli impeded con
cept attainment in both groups. The maladjusted group took longer to leam the emotionally-toned concepts than the neutral concepts.
Another category of treatments could include the ambiguous presentation and the open-ended presentation. Ambiguous treatments leave the learner with a feeling of doubtfulness or uncertainty as to th e ir meaning. An ambiguous figure i s capable of e lic itin g several 232
responses. The learner usually switches back and forth among the pos
sib le responses. As he becomes satiated with one response he transfers
his attention to another response. Because this switching of responses
is fatiguing and requires sensitivity to weak signals, ambiguity is un
likely to be successful when the learner is not functioning at peak ef
ficiency. (Travers, 1967, p. 232) In mediating learning, ambiguity can
lead to very creative conceptualizing, and it can lead to referent con
fu sion . In referent confusion the treatment is intended to promote
something specific, however, ambiguity leads the learner to assign a
d ifferen t meaning than was intended by the treatm ent. In contrast,
ambiguity which leans to creative conceptualizing has good effects.
It can stimulate thinking on complex problems which are not easily
solved. Most value judgments must be made on the basis of conflicting
information. Ambiguity can be useful for providing practice in inter
preting the type of situations one meets in real life.
Carl Ketcham and Robert Heath (1963) researched film s which
use visuals that did not embody the material presented by the sound track. They found th at film s which use ambiguous images with an edu
cational sound track can be e ffe c tiv e . In fa c t, they produced better learning in some cases than film s with unambiguous images which clearly represented the material given in the narration. Because they used a
film on the poet Wordsworth for this study, the authors suggest that certain subjects, such as poetry, call for ambiguity. (Ketcham and
Heath, 1963)
Structuring
The writer defines organization as the way in which the rela tionships between aspects of content are made clear and content is 233
formed into a whole. The importance of organization is supported by
research on the effects which occur when organization is enhanced•
W. J. Parson, N. Rose and J. £• Podell (1955) have found, for
example, that rest pauses can improve learning. They suggest that
rest pauses between sequences can help structure or organize content.
G. J. Margolius, F. D. Sheffield and N. Maccoby (1957) hypothesized
that the value of rest pauses for structuring would be relative to the
extent to which the rest pauses were used at natural breakpoints and
to the extent to which a task was inherently well organized. It is
interesting that when rest breaks used at natural pause points were
compared with artificial pause points, the researchers found no sig
nificant differences. They attributed this finding to the fact that
the task was inherently well organized since it clearly broke into
•separate sequences in chronological order even without the enhancement
of rest pauses.
J. Miller and S. Levine (1952) tried structuring by major sub
titles only, by very complete subtitling and by using subtitles or
breaks. No significant differences were found and Miller and Levine
hypothesized that this was because the film was inherently well struc
tured. D. S. Northrup found significant differences in a later study
(1952). He found that film versions using structuring organizational
outlines were found more effective than similar films lacking these
aids to education. (Gage, 1963, pp. 646-47)
Titles and rest pauses are means of organizing imposed on
more basic types of subject matter organization. Other means of adding organization to the basic types of organization are: chapters,
frames, subdivisions, headings, summaries, models, analogies, grouping. 234
ordering visually (see p. 179). Some of the basic types of organiza
tion are: chronological (historical), step by step (sequential), order
of importance, thematic, inductive, deductive, descriptive, narrative,
flashback, cause-effect, effect-cause, argumentative (weak to strong
points or vice-versa), analytic (whole to part), synthetic (part to
whole), mathetic (last to initial step returning to solution between
steps), practical (principle to application), theoretical (phenomenon
to theory), direction of effort (English to Spanish, Spanish to
English), problem solving, character development, branching, ruling
(rule to example), egrule (example to rule).
Lou Burmeister has compared the effects of the inductive and
deductive methods of organization when used to teach selected word
analysis generalizations to disabled readers in eighth and ninth
grades. No significant differences were found. (Burmeister, 1966, p. 31) Milton Pella and Robert Ziegler investigated the use of
analogous mechanical models as organizational aids for teaching theoretical science concepts in elementary school. The analogous models helped the children successfully form concepts about such theoretical areas as the particle nature of matter. The models seemed to help move the concept from the logical operations stage to the con crete operations stage for the child. (Pella and Ziegler, 1967, p. 46)
J . J . Wulff and L. M. Stolurow (1957, 1961) found c la ss organ ization was more effective for discrimination learning than item or ganization.
Two forms of organization were used in sequencing the in struction. A series of training cards was used to teach the code for rivets. "Class organization" displays showed all the items in relation to one class of differentiating cues, e.g., rivet-head silhouettes or rivet-head markings that indicated 235
diameter. "Item organization" displays gave the same information, but with all features about a given item presented at one time, e.g., a sin gle riv et with each of the four coded characteristics depicted. By presenting many different individual rivets, one at a time, the application of the code was illustrated and taught. (Gage, 1963, p. 647)
Editing
Because media can edit to cross time and space boundaries,
media are uniquely suited for showing relationships. The way in which
relationships are shown can give meaning. Two elements placed con
tigu ou sly can assume an associative relation sh ip . I f they can be re
lated in some way, meaning is added to the content. At a panel dis
cussion following the Ohio State University Motion Picture Department's
first public showing of a series of films on communication (June, 1967)
Ralph T yler, the curriculum and measurement s p e c ia lis t , commented th a t,
media, because of their ability to juxtapose, have great value for de
veloping generalizations, for showing the applicability of generaliza tions and for helping to relate concrete things.
How are ways of showing relationship s related to the approach used? What ways do media have for showing relationships? What types of relation sh ip s can be shown? What are the e ffe c ts o f various ways o f showing relationships?
Media can transmit these kinds of relationships:
1. comparison and contrast, e.g., a chart showing the average
heights of children at different ages;
2. action and reaction, e.g., a film has a shot of a woman
crying following a shot of a man shouting at her; 236
3. time order (past, present, future), e.g., a television
show uses a flashback technique to indicate that something
happened in the past;
4. conflict, e.g., a scene of gay prosperity is followed by a
scene of abject poverty;
5. concrete-abstract, e.g., an overhead transparency o f the
heart uses an overlay to show the sections of the heart and
the direction of the flow of blood or a film showing the
pyramids being built has a narration giving a law of'
physics explaining their design;
6. connection or association, e.g., an advertising message can
show someone emerging more beautiful a fter the use o f a cos
metic;
7. dominant-subordinate, e.g., a picture emphasizes some de
ta ils and de-emphasizes others through the use of sharp and
soft focus.
Some of the means for showing the preceding types of relationships in clude: montage ed itin g , continuity ed itin g , camera angle and d istan ce, framing (composition) and focusing, captions, narrations, opticals
(superimposition, dissolves, wipes, split screen, fades), camera move ment, lighting, sound mixing, grouping elements.
J . M. L. Peters has explained that the usefulness of a film's means for showing relationships depends on the viewer's knowledge of the film language. A viewer must be able to establish the relations between two or more objects in a separate picture, to analyze his view ing point, to put himself in the place of somebody else, to "decenter" himself continually, to fill up the gaps be'tween pictures, to foresee 237
what w ill happen or a n ticip a te, to remember what has happened already,
and to make time leaps. (Peters, 1961, p. 34)
This qualification applies to other media. Just as one must
leam to read in order to comprehend the relationships present in a
textbook, one must leam to respond to specific ways of presenting re
lationships in other media. One must leam the syntax, the conven
tional meanings. A three or four year old child cannot understand a
television spot presenting family conversation while the camera pans
from the lefto v ers on a dining tab le in America to an emancipated boy
in India sitting on the ground and eating rice. The child does not
understand the film syntax. He does not understand one type of com
parison and contrast relationship which can be shown in films. As a
result the child may misinterpret and ask why the Indian boy is eating
alone.
The reader should not equate the languages (ways of showing
relation sh ip s) o f the various media. As Calvin Pryluck sa y s, "Film i s
one kind o f coding mechanism. Language is another." (Pryluck, 1969,
p. 47) The structure of a film or a poster is not the structure of a
sentence. A picture of a chair is more specific than the word "chair."
Structurally, it seems that the abstraction of a word tends to be specified by syntax and the specificity of a shot tends to be generalized by juxtaposition in editing. (Pryluck, 1969, p. 48)
Jay Ruby suggests that we persist in using verbal language
when the language of another medium would serve b etter. As an example
Ruby cites anthropology. Because the observations of the anthropolo
gists lose some of their scientific value when they are translated into words. Ruby believes anthropologists should turn more to visual note books. According to Ruby decisions in anthropological filmmaking must 238 be based on anthropological relevance not on suitability for verbal translation. (Ruby, 1969, pp. 69, 70)
One th eo rist who compares film liter a cy with v isu a l liter a cy is Sergei Eisenstein. He sees in hieroglyphics the idea of film editing. He expands this idea to include the particularly filmic concept of juxtaposition creating conflict which leads to new con cepts .
Eisenstein discusses at length the role of film in showing re lationships. Many of his ideas hold true for other media. Eisenstein says that, "I confronted him with my viewpoint on montage as a colli sion. A view that from the collision of two given factors arises a concept." Eisenstein speaks of montage as conflict-juxtaposition.
Montage, he says can be used to show relationships because it allows one to establish mood and ideas by changing the rhythm, continuity and sound-visual connotations. He continues by describing the types of conflict relationships possible within shots and between shots.
These are the "cinematographic" conflicts within the frame: Conflict of graphic directions. (Lines—either static or dynamic) Conflict of scales. Conflict of volumes. Conflict of masses. (Volumes filled with various intensities of light.) Conflict of depths. And the following conflicts, requiring only one further impulse of intensification before flying into antagonistic pairs of pieces: Close shots and long shots. Pieces of graphically varied directions. Pieces resolved in volume, with pieces resolved in area. Pieces of darkness and pieces of lightness. And, la s t ly , there are such unexpected c o n flic ts as: Conflicts between an object and its dimension—and conflicts between an event and its duration. These may sound strange but both are familiar to us. The first is accomplished by an optically distorted lens, and the second by stop-motion or slow-motion. (Eisenstein, 1957, pp. 39, 55) 239
There is also the conflict of meaning. In this writer's
opinion the presenting of a thesis and an antithesis which create a
synthesis is media's most potent means for showing relationships. This
is because the conflict can make a statement which can give rise to a
need for a new concept. A photograph of an electric freezer in an
Eskimo village can, when used with a photograph of dressed walrus meat
melting in the midnight sun and some narration can create the concept th at warmth due to the duration sun's rays can e x ist even in a very
cold climate. The conflict of an obviously cold environment and a need for a freezer created a need for a new concept—a concept of warmth in a far northern climate.
A presentation which uses a montage of c o n flic ts approach to showing relationships w ill be more suited to creating concepts than a continuity approach. The continuity approach is more suited to re vealing cause and effect bases for concepts. The means for showing relation sh ip s can contribute rhythm (which se ts mood), tim e of occur rence and duration, and point of view to the approach to content. Some of the mood or point of view relationships which it is possible to cre ate by composition are shown in Figure 30: Keys to Basic Arrangements and Space Division. Quietness, activity, formality or nonconformity can be projected from composition because i t shows relation sh ip s.
The approach to content used is a composite of the effects of treatment, organization and means for showing relationships. The type of treatment selected should be suitable for the conceptual topic, for the concept learning objectives and for the learner. One purpose of organization is to establish what is primary content and what is sec ondary content. Another purpose is to help the learner group concrete 240
______-to ______BASIC ARRANGEMENTS AND SPACE DIVISION
A CIRCULAR ARRANGEMENT MAY BE CENTERED OR MOVED TO ONE SIDE FOR ADDED INTEREST.
A TRIANGULAR COMPDSITION IS EFFECTIVE WHEN IT IS USED ALONE OR IN COMBINATION.
AN "S" TYPE OF GROUPING HAS A SOOTHING QUALITY. INTERESTING VARIATIONS ARE POSSIBLE.
ANOTHER "QUIET" ARRANGEMENT IS BASED ON THE LETTER'!". TRY IT IN REPETITION.
SPACE DIVIDED HORIZONTALLY IS STATIC, BUT THE SAME DI VISION IS DYNAMIC WHEN SLANTED.
ALL OVER" ARRANGEMENTS MAY BE REGULAR OR IRREGULAR.
TRY COMBINATIONS
FIGURE 30
(Michigan Curriculum Committee on Instructional Materials, 241
elements into more general concepts. Rest pauses and other means of
subdividing content are helpful for organizing content. Content should
also be given some basic type of logical organization.
By using different means for showing relationships the designer
can establish mood, rhythm, time and point of view dimensions for a
presentation. The mood and point of view established w ill influence the connotations and the value associated with a concept.
The concept of violence, for example, is treated differently in the film Easy Rider than it is in the film The Molly McGuires. Easy
Rider is a film about bigoted, small town Southern men who bludgeon and shoot hippies as they ride through on their motorcycles. The Molly
McGuires i s a film about the suffering of the miners in 1876 due to their working conditions. The Molly McGuires was an organization of miners that protested these conditions through acts of violence.
Violence in Easy Rider derives from fear o f what is d iffe re n t. Violence in The Molly McGuires derives from a ju st cause. Violence in Easy Rider is primarily an act of oppression. Violence in The Molly McGuires is prim arily a reaction to oppression. Violence may assume a necessary connotation of greater value after one has seen The Molly McGuires»
Violence may assume an ir r a tio n a l, valu eless connotation after one has seen Easy Rider.
Finally, by presenting conflict media can generate new concepts.
A picture o f an eight year old child operating data processing equipment conflicts with our expectations. The picture can start us thinking of teaching data processing to young children. The picture can generate concepts of data processing education in schools. 242
III. Response Factors
The purpose of this chapter is to delineate the design factors
which influence concept learning. Part I of this chapter describes cu
ing factors, such as set and familiarization. Part II dealt with stimu
lus factors including the medium and the content. Part III w ill con
sider response factors, including the rate and type of response and
feedback to response.
'■ Rate o f Responding
Factors: Pacing, Rate of Development, Task Size
The rate of responding depends on whether the instruction is being given to a group, a pair or an individual, on whether it is being self-paced or machine paced and on the size of step or rate of develop ment used in the presentation. Pacing and rate of development are terms used to describe the rate at which new material is introduced and new responses called for. (Ausubel, 1968, p. 327; Miller, 1957, p. 96)
Pacing
If the student reads and responds at his own rate, the method is self-pacing. If the materials are presented to a group, the time allowed for presentation and responding has to be standardized and the resulting method i s group-pacing. Sometimes mechanical devices con trol pace by moving on to the next item irrespective of the student's behavior; the resu ltin g method is machine pacing. Group and machine pacing can be called uniform pacing as compared with the individual pacing or self-pacing. Variations in the types of pacing are possible. 243
James G- Ramsey has investigated the relative efficiency with
which pairs and individuals attain concepts. Ramsey found that pairs
attain concepts more efficiently than individuals. He offers the ten
tative explanation that the joint memory capacity of a pair is superior
to individual memory capacity. Ramsey cautions that other research in
dicates that those who work individually though performing less well
in itially than members of pairs, perform better subsequently than do
members o f p airs. (Ramsey, 1966) I t may be that for concept learning,
pair or small group pacing is superior to self or large group pacing.
Using programmed instruction in algebra concepts presented by
slide projectors, Charles Frye showed that group pacing of programmed
in stru ction could be e ffectiv e with homogeneous groups. (Frye, 1963)
From research on televised programmed instruction in science concepts
George L. Cropper and Gerard C. Kress, Jr. compared the effic ie n c y of fast and slow fixed pacing used in group settings. Cropper proceeds from the conclusion that, "It has been shown that self-pacing can be nonadaptive . . . and that, under some circumstances, instruction can be more effective when it is fixed-paced rather than self-paced."
(Cropper and Kress, 1965, p. 181) Trying to establish the circum stances under which group paced instruction can be e ffe c tiv e , they find that the learner's characteristic speed of working, achievement and intelligence level should be used as indicators of the type of pacing desirable. They are unable to substantiate any more specific conclusions about the interaction of these variables and pacing.
The limited experimental evidence so far available indicates no general superiority of self-pacing procedures. (Ausubel, 1968, p. 325) L. J. Briggs (1961), however, found that self-pacing was the 244
more effective method for superior students learning how to assemble a
thirty-part ignition distributor. L. J. Briggs, D. Plashinski and D. L.
Jones (1955) found that it takes time to adjust to an externally paced
procedure. (Gage, 1963, pp. 626-27) Their results gain support from
research on reading developed by machine pacing. This research indi
cates that students can be taught to accelerate learning.
In addition to training and learner variables, practice and
cognitive strain seem to rela te to pacing. A. A. Lumsdaine reports
that adequate time for practice must be allowed. (Gage, 1963, p. 612)
One of the steps learners take to avoid cognitive strain is adapting a
strategy which is slow, cautious and certain to produce results.
(Travers, 1967, pp. 200-201)
Rate control through pacing or rate of development may be
achieved in many ways. Edward Fry enumerates some of the ways of
controlling pacing.
There are several parts of the learning cycle where rate con trol may be exercised. For example, the time lapse between presentation of the frame and the response is controlled by the student, even though some machines maintain control of time be tween frames. . . . Machines may control the to t a l S-S time (frame to frame), the R-S time (time between student's response and next stimulus, the S-R time or latency (time allowed for a student to respond) and may vary any or a ll such factors according to a number of previously determined conditions. (Fry, 1963, pp. 164-65)
Rate of Development
Among the ways in which rate of development can be controlled are: rate of speaking, amount of pausing for emphasis or observation, amount of oral or visual redundancy, and repetition within a presenta tio n . 245
Rate of development has been shown to affect learning from
films. (Miller, 1957, p. 96) The effect of rate of development as con
trolled by narration was investigated by W. J. McGuire (1955, 1961)
among oth ers. McGuire found th at i f the rate of development was f a s t ,
covert responding was more effective. If the rate of development was
slow, learning from overt and covert responding did not differ signifi
cantly. McGuire's subjects had the task of learning to name mechanical
parts displayed and labeled in six presentation trials. Presentations
lasted two seconds for each part at the fast rate and four seconds at the slow rate. All subjects were allowed the same time for practice trials. Overt responses required subjects to write the names of the parts. Covert responses required subjects only to name the parts men tally. (Gage, 1963, p. 618)
Task Size
Besides varying pacing and rate of development, the communica tor can influence the rate of responding by varying task size. There is usually a response chain that must be formed from smaller task units.
The response chain forms the size of the task required for a completed successful performance. G. Davis, M. Manske and A. Train studied the effect of increasing the length of the required response chain. The length of the problem-solving response chain was defined as the number of switches which must be used for problem solution. In other words, response chain referred to the number of minimally required responses.
The length of the response chain was found to affect performance on an overt trial and error form of the task and on an implicit "insightful" form of the task. This effect is recognized as due to the increased difficulty associated with longer response chains. Davis and his 246
associates speculate that the ability to solve longer response chains
should be related to age. The implication is that younger learners
need to respond more frequently because they have difficulty with long
response chains.
Because response chains are often too long to be successfully
handled as a whole unit, control of rate of development by size of step
is often introduced. Susan Markle notes that the size of step is not
necessarily related to the size of the response. Size of step refers
to the difficulty of the average stimulus-response unit that must be
performed before moving onto the next stim ulus-response u n it. (E ly,
et a l., 1963) (While size of step can determine pacing, it is not
n ecessarily synonymous with i t . Size of step refers to d iffic u lty
of response units while pacing refers to the speed at which new mate
rial is introduced.)
Research on size of step indicates that up to a point decreas
ing step size (by increasing the number of steps) helps decrease er
rors. However, it should be remembered that the more steps used (thus,
the smaller the step size) the more time is consumed in learning even
though fewer errors occur. On the basis of their research, N* Maccoby
and F. D. Sheffield (1961) recommend small step size for initial learn
ing with progressively lengthening of steps as subjects acquire ease in
performing. David Ausubel notes that smaller steps are less necessary when used with potentially meaningful material and a branching type of
feedback.
Much more important for difficulty of meaningful learning and retention than length of task itself would be the logical struc ture, the lucidity and the sequentiality of the material. The optimal size of task that the learner could conveniently manage 247
in a given t r ia l would also depend upon such considerations as age, cognitive maturity, subject-matter sophistication, intel ligence and motivation. (Ausubel, 1968, p. 327)
As an alternative to increasing the number of steps when material is
difficult, it is also possible to achieve effective learning by de
creasing response practice and increasing repetition of content.
Where are we then? Who is to make judgment about the desirable
rate of responding? The teacher? The materials designer? The stu
dent? The materials designer cannot avoid assuming this responsi
bility even though the teacher or student may also participate in making these judgments- To make judgments about the most desirable
rate for responding, message designers must discover the size of the
functional units which can be u tiliz e d for concept b u ild in g. The smaller the functional unit the slower the development should be.
(Miller, 1957, pp. 91-92) A lesson on the concept of compound in terest needs to develop more slowly for a learner who has not yet learned the meaning of "compound" or "interest" than it does for the learner who already knows the meaning of these words- There is the danger, though, that a slow rate of development w ill produce a more boring presentation.
Type o f Response
Factors: Type of Strategy, Type of Activity, Type of Practice
Responses can be classified according to the type of strategy, a c tiv ity or practice employed. For example, a learner can respond with a scanning strategy (see page 255) which y ield s a verbal id e n ti fication (overt response) given during a presentation (practice by participation). Strategies can be conjunctive or disjunctive, selec tion or reception, focusing or scanning types- Response mode, the 248
type of activity involved, may be overt, covert or implicit. The cate
gory practice includes forms of participation, imitation and review.
Type of Strategy
A conceptual strategy is a pattern for responding. It is an
unconsciously or consciously adopted plan for attacking a concept
learning task. Our present theory and knowledge on response strate
g ie s comes mostly from the work of Jerome Bruner and h is a sso cia tes.
Bruner’s work has been done on concept attainment problems. Typically,
these problems would present a learner with an array of exemplars
which could be classified as negative or positive instances of the
concept. The subject is given the problem of identifying the attrib
utes which define the concept presented by the positive instance.
Bruner studies the sequential pattern of responding to this task by
observing sorting behavior and by obtaining written and verbal re
ports from the learner on hypotheses formed and tested. He is inter
ested not in "acts at a moment" but rather in "the sequentially co herent nature of problem solving." (Bruner, et a l., 1956, pp. 124,
135-38, 155) He manipulates the working conditions by changing the
concept to be obtained, the order for presenting instances, the na ture of the stimuli used and the memory load imposed (see pages 47-48).
Bruner varies when and how often a person leams whether an instance i s p o sitiv e or not. In th eir experiments Bruner and h is colleagues vary the information (instances) available and the feedback, (ibid..
*Implicit responding refers to the learner's reaction when specific responses are not cued. Covert responding refers to the cuing of specific internal reactions. Overt responding refers to the cuing of specific externally expressed reactions. (Gage, 1963, p. 617) 2 4 9
pp. 60-80) One experiment may present several negative and positive in
stances at once. Another experiment may present a positive instance fol
lowed by a negative instance. In some experiments correction (feedback)
i s readily a v a ila b le. In some experiments i t i s not. Bruner t r ie s ob
serving the behavior of different types of learners under similar con
d itio n s.
The conclusions which may be drawn from this research are as
yet of limited practical value. Because most of the research has been
done under the simplified conditions of the laboratory, any generaliza
tions made from the research studies are not necessarily valid. The
number of relevant defining attributes in real situations are usually
more numerous and less easily discriminable. The laboratory situa
tions also reduce the mediating processes which enter into concept
learning, such as coding and storage. The laboratory situations do
not place as much demand on coding and storage as do actual learning
situations. In Bruner’s experiments, moreover, the concept is identi
fied for the subject and the problem is to identify the attributes
which define this concept. The concept is to be attained, not formed.
At this point the reader might well ask why strategies are
being considered a response factor which a medium presentation can
use to influence concept learning. Wouldn't it be more appropriate to consider strategies as internal processes to be influenced? The answer is that media presentations can cue the strategy adopted. Set, availability of stimuli, presentation order, amount of content and rate of responding can all be designed to ensure that the learner chooses an appropriate strategy. 250
In order to understand the findings on strategy and the impli
cations that these findings have for audiovisual communications, the
reader needs to become at least superficially acquainted with some of
the concepts used in the study and reporting of strategies. Differ
ences between types of strategies, as sketched by Bruner, are compli
cated and difficult to explain briefly. Tables 7 and 8 on pages 251
to 254) attempt to depict the differences between types concisely.
These tables were developed by the writer.
Although the tables w ill not answer all questions about dif
ferences between types, they present enough information to allow the
reader to understand the findings and implications which w ill be set
forth later. The general distinctions between strategies will be delineated after the reader becomes acquainted with the nature of the various strategies through the tables.
A more extensive explanation would be too lengthy for this report. The reader may feel that the information is not presented in sufficient detail. The writer suggests that the theory of Bruner and his associates is so complicated that it cannot be presented simply and briefly yet adequately. The reader w ill have to consult
A Study of Thinking by J . Bruner, J . Goodnow and G. Austin before fully understanding the subject of strategies in concept attainment.
A person can attain a concept through a reception or selec tion strategy. In a selection strategy the subject is free to choose the order in which he tests instances. In a reception strategy the subject's major freedom is in the hypotheses he chooses to test. He must take the instances in the order predetermined by the experimenter. 251
TABLE 7
STRATEGIES FOR RESPONDING TO CONJUNpTIVE CONCEPT* ATTAINMENT TASKS
Type o f Strategy Description Value
Conservative Testing each attribute Puts the least strain Focusing of a positive instance on memory. This is the to see whether changing most e ffic ie n t strategy ( focusing it prevents the in for attaining conjunc selectio n stance from being p osi tiv e concepts. Guaran stra teg y ) t iv e . tees gaining some, al though not a ll, infor mation from each step. This strategy makes l i t t l e demand on memory.
Focus Testing more than one Solution may be very Gambling attribute of a positive fast, very slow or in instance at a time. between. This strategy (focusing involves more risk- selectio n taking or gambling. strategy)
Simultaneous Several hypotheses are Makes the greatest de Scanning applied to each in mand on memory. In stance each time. volves the greatest (scanning Using deduction one risk of choosing nega selectio n esta b lish es which tiv e instances which strategy) hypotheses are contain minimal infor ten ab le. mation. Deduction process is exacting. One of strategies least likely to be used.
Successive A single hypothesis is The best strategv for Scanning tested at a time. In going through a list stances containing the o f hypotheses. Cogni (scanning attribute hypothesized tive strain is relieved selectio n to define the concept at the expense of in strategy) are tested to see creasing the risk of whether they are posi choosing uninformative, tive instances. redundant instances for te s tin g . Time consum ing. Useful when the 252
TABLE 7—Continued
Type of Strategy Description Value
concept to be attained is difficult or when it seems probable that the hypothesis is correct.
Whole One uses a positive Cognitive strain is instance i^ toto as reduced because the ( focusing one’s hypothesis. Then hypothesis is modified reception one takes as his next at each step to incor strategy) hypothesis only what is porate the information common to the original gained. Requires less hypothesis and any alert concentration positive instance. than part strategy. (Identifies many at Maximizes information tributes then whittles and reduces strain. them down as additional Best strategy for instances are presented.) reception learning.
Part Begins with part of A compromise between first positive instance successive scanning (scanning as an hypothesis. When and simultaneous reception this hypothesis fails scanning. Causes strategv) to be confirmed by some cognitive strain. Re subsequent instance, quires alert concen the person changes it tration. One of by referring back to - strategies least all instances pre likely to be used. viously tested. A com pletely new hypothesis is then chosen for testing. (Selects few attributes and then adds or subtracts a t tributes as needed.)
*Conjunctive concepts are defined by a combination of attributes which must always be present; e.g., an apple is always spherical and shiny. 253
TABLE 8
STRATEGIES FOR RESPONDING TO DISJUNCTIVE CONCEPT’* ATTAINMENT TASKS
Type of Strategy Description Value
Negative Starting with a negative Most efficient strategv Focusing instance the subject for forming disjunctive tries changing its at concepts. Depends on (focusing tributes one at a time. the use of one or more disjunctive If the attribute he negative instances. strategv) substitutes changes Makes good use of in the instance to posi formation contained in tive, he assumes that in sta n ces. it is a defining a ttr ib u te .
Multiple Subject chooses card Appropriate for dis Negative until he has identified junctive concepts but two or more negative less efficient than (focusing instances. In the negative focusing disjunctive process of doing this strategy. Indirect strategy) he w ill usually iden te s tin g . Can be tify one or more posi excellent, adequate tive instances. He or m isleading. De then takes those val pends on the use of ues that are common to one or more negative the negative instances in sta n ces. and uses their opposite as features of the cor rect concept.
Common Consists of collating Can be correct by Element a ll the features common chance but not very Strategies to the positive in o ften . Common elements stances one has encoun may also be irrelevant. (scanning tered and proposing Inappropriate for dis disjunctive these features as a junctive concepts. strategy) hypothesis about the correct concept.
Ma j ority Subject builds hypothe Used when no element is E ffects ses out of those attrib common to a ll positive ute values that appear in sta n ces. Worst of the (scanning in a majority of the strategies inappropriate disjunctive positive instances en for disjunctive concept strategy) countered . attainment. 254
TABLE 8—Continued
Type of Strategy Description Value
P ositive Subject compares a An ideal conjunctive Anchoring negative and a positive strategy. Inappro instance and adopts as priate for disjunctive ( focusing his hypothesis two concept attainment. disjunctive values of a positive Although not as error strategy) instance that distin prone as common ele guish i t from a nega ment strategies. tive instance. Sub Gambling type of nega ject assumes that a tive focusing. Error positive instance is is that each distin positive because it guishing characteris contains both values tic is not necessarily defining the concept. a defining character i s t i c .
Source: Bruner, et a l., 1956, pp. 47, 82-89, 130-33, 160-71.
*A disjunctive concept may be defined by one or more of several attrib utes; e.g., an apple may be spherical and yellow or spherical and red.
The benefit of selection strategies is that the order called for can maximize information available and minimize the cognitive strain Qsee page 48), the risk of failure and the time necessary for solution. Re ception strategies are likely to be required by a lack of control over events in real life. Bruner describes a reception strategist as a clinician who diagnosis and tests and a selection strategist as an experimentalist who hypothesizes and tests. (Ibid., p. 126)
Reception or selection strategies are also described as con junctive strategies. A conjunctive strategy tries to define the joint presence of attributes. By starting with positive instances the con junctive strategy, whether the selection or reception type, seeks to establish what combination of attributes is necessary to the concept. 255
The disjunctive concept requires a different strategy. It requires a
strategy which tries to define by identifying the several attributes which can define the concept although not jointly present. Disjunctive strategies are strategies which utilize negative instances to identify relevant attributes. Their method is to start with a negative in stance. This contrasts with the attempts to find common elements for positive instances which characterize conjunctive strategies. Some disjunctive strategies employ conjunctive methods. Such strategies are inappropriate.
Both disjunctive and conjunctive strategies may be categorized as being scanning or focusing strategies. A focusing strategy leads to identification of relevant attributes through systematic elimina tion of irrelevant ones. A scanning strategy puts more of a load on memory. Whereas the focuser must remember h is hypothesis, the scanner must recall past instances. The focuser proceeds from attributes to form a hypothesis. The scanner checks an hypothesis against attributes of instances. A scanning strategy leads to identification of relevant attributes through instances which confirm or infirm the hypothesis.
Some conjunctive strategies are more effective than others.
The same can be said of reception strategies, of selection strategies, of disjunctive strategies, of focusing strategies or of scanning strategies.
Having briefly explained important terms, the writer w ill pro ceed to report what is known about strategies.
1. The greater the memory demands of a strategy, the more
likely it is that that strategy will be discarded in favor of
another strategy. This means that the more complex the concept 256
learning problem, the more likely scanning strategies are to be
discarded. For example, a problem which requires the identifica
tion of a concept from a large universe of positive and negative
instances which are not arrayed in an orderly fashion is complex.
A scanning strategy does not offer enough cognitive economy to
warrant its use. A focusing strategy will impose less strain on
memory and w ill maximize the amount of information gained from
each instance tested. (Ibid., pp. 88, 95)
2. If the problem is to be solved on the basis of a presenta
tio n o f only a few instances then a bold, risky strategy is war
ranted. However, if there is great likelihood that instances en
countered w ill be positive, a more risky strategy is warranted.
( Ib id . , p. 124)
3. If thematic rather than abstract materials are used the
learner may have difficulty in selecting the correct strategy.
This is because of "persistence forecasting." This means that the
learner tends to fall back on familiar hypothesis as a basis for
grouping. Furthermore, he is more likely to hang onto his hypothe
ses in the face of contradictory evidence. He tends to evaluate the usefulness of cues in terms of past experience. This error may
lead him into a successive scanning strategy even when there is a more appropriate strategy. (Ibid., pp. 110-11, 237)
4. A selection strategy is likely to yield the most informa tion to involve the least cognitive strain, to offer the most con trol over the degree of risk taken. (Ibid., p. 82)
5. When reception strategies are necessitated, far more people prefer to start with a whole strategy than do with a part strategy. 257
People are consistent from problem to problem in their initial
choice of part or whole strategy. (Ibid., p. 153)
6. Proceeding at their own pace without time pressure wholists
and partists do equally well on reception strategy problems. Under
time pressure wholists do much better. This suggests that time
pressure has a much more deleterious effect on scanning strategies
than it does on focusing strategies. (Ibid., p. 174)
7. Subjects tend to use conjunctive strategies even when they
are inappropriate. They tend to use only positive instances as a
basis for forming hypotheses. If the first two instances encoun
tered are similar negative instances, the likelihood of using an
appropriate disjunctive strategy is increased. (Ibid., pp. 168-77)
8. When using a reception strategy, the better learner starts with the whole strategy and avoids persistence forecasting. (See
No. 3)
. . . the better than average learner is one who starts with a hypothesis which uses most or all of the stimulus attributes. Further, he changes his hypothesis at the appropriate time; that is, after it has led him to make an incorrect category response. Finally, the changes he makes are by and large simpler, more systematic, and more consistent [italics mine] with available information than are the changes of the poorer problem solver. (Bourne, 1966, p. 49)
In efficien t learners made more complex changes.
9. The id eal strategy depends on the d iffic u lty of the problem
(which changes as information is gained from testing instances), on the time and instances available for testing, on the memory capacity of the solver, and on the likelihood of encountering positive in stances. (Bruner, et a l., 1956, pp. 124, 238, 240)
10. There are several kinds of systematic errors which commonly interfere with effective use of strategies. One type of error is 258
using an inappropriate strategy, possibly because of persistence
forecasting. (See No. 3) Another type of error is not learning as
much as one should when one t e s t s an instance according to the
strategy selected . Jerome Bruner c a lls th is behavior lazy
testing. (Ibid., pp. 238-39)
11. Although note taking should reduce memory load, it has
not been found to benefit significantly the learner who uses a
part strategy in reception learning. This finding is the result
of laboratory experimentation. (Ibid., p. 154)
12. The most e ffe c tiv e stra teg ies seem to be conservative
focusing, negative focusing, successive scanning and the whole
strategy, (ibid., pp. 83-180) In an experiment requiring the
identification of the attributes of concepts, Solis Kates and
Lee Yudin found th at the most e ffic ie n t performance was in the
simultaneous condition which kept all instances in sight. (See
pp. 177-81) The most interesting finding of the Kates and Yudin
experiment was that a focus strategy is more effective for concept
identification than a successive presentation order. In the suc
cessive condition each instance was removed before the next in
stance was exposed. In the focus condition, the focus instance
was exposed with each succeeding instance. (Kates and Yudin, 1964)
What implications do these findings on strategies offer for audiovisual communication design?
1. When the concept to be attained is disjunctive, present
two similar negative instances initially.
2. Whenever possible a presentation should allow the learner
to select the order in which instances w ill be presented. 259
One way of doing this is by using a simultaneous presenta
tion. (In a simultaneous presentation all the instances
are displayed at the same time.)
3. Generally, audiovisual presentations cue a reception
strategy because instances are presented in a predeter
mined order. When conjunctive concepts are to be formed
designers should encourage the best reception strategy,
which is the wholist strategy, or should be concerned with
helping the learner overcome the disadvantages of the
partiSt strategy. This means directing the learner to
use the first positive instances in toto as his initial
hypothesis. The learner should then, be directed to look
for common elements between instances. If a partist
strategy is necessitated, ma&e past instances available.
If cuing partist strategy during reception learning,
avoid time limits which pressure.
4. Cue the ideal strategy by pretraining, by directions, by
order and type of instances.
5. Learners could be taught to assume the appropriate strategy
when told the type of concept to be formed and the learning
con d ition s. They can be taught to avoid persistence
forecasting.
Type o f A ctivity
The type of activity used for responding can be overt, covert, or implicit. Implicit responding is the learner's reaction to reading, viewing, hearing a presentation when specific responses are not cued. 260
Covert and overt responding are evoked by questions, gaps or directions
included in the presentation. A. A. Lumsdaine explains the difference
as follows;
In ordinary reading, listening to a lecture, or watching a film, responses are implicit rather than being explicitly evoked by specific questions or gaps which the student is directed to fill in. Experiments dealing with stimulus factors calculated to influence unidentified implicit or perceptual responses are described in a later section. . . . Explicit responding on cue need not, however, be overt (e.g., written or oral) but can be performed covertly or mentally. In this chapter, the term "covert response" is used to designate response acts which, un like implicit responding to a text or lecture, are deliberately made as explicit answers to a question or other express invita tion for response, but which are not performed overtly. Such responses may serve as active symbolic practice but afford a less clear basis for differential feedback to the student from an instructional program or teacher (and vice versa) than do overt responses. (Gage, 1963, p. 617)
Overt responding may take the form of constructed responses or overt verbalization of a concept. Covert responding may take the form of mental practice or covert verbalization of a concept.
The available research on these modes of response is limited for several reasons. First, most of the research has simply compared covert and overt responding under equivalent conditions. It has not asked the question, "What mode of response is best under what condi tions?" Such an a ll or none approach may have yielded no sig n ifica n t differences without really exploring the actual differences which did occur under varying conditions.
Second, it is difficult to check the effects of covert and im plicit responding. It is easier to associate results with overt re sponding. In fact, in order to check covert responding one must infer from some more removed type of overt response, such as test results, which may not clearly indicate covert learning. The resulting tendency 261
has been to emphasize overt responding. Because there are more findings
on overt responding, overt responding may seem to assume more relative
importance than it should•
Third, variables which determine the effectiveness of overt
responding have not been adequately researched or controlled in re
search . These variables include frequency of overt response and type
of overt response. Findings of no significant difference might be due
to lack o f control o f such variab les.
F in a lly , researchers have not been concerned enough with making
the responses meaningful. No matter what the mode of response, learn
ing w ill be lessened if the response is not made meaningful. Experi
ments which require only feeding back rote responses do not validly
test meaningful learning. Results of no significant difference may be
due simply to the rote nature of the learning. Perhaps implicit re
sponses are better for meaningful learning. The success of implicit
responses should be inferable from learning resulting from just reading
or observing.
Some of the gains in reading due to overt responding have been
attributed to implicit anticipatory response during reading. Implicit
anticipatory response means that the student is likely to anticipate
what is coming, usually because the material is repeated or redundant,
and consequently engages in ’’recitation" during reading. This means
that findings that overt responding helps reading may be due as much
to implicit response as to overt response. (Gage, 1963, p. 614)
Although generally research comparing overt and covert respond
ing has produced no significant differences, there are some findings which can help delineate situations where a certain type of response 262
activity is more appropriate. The important variables for determining
whether a type of response activity is appropriate are time, motivation
and difficulty.
C ritics o f the need for immediate reinforcement say that the
evidence is against B. F. Skinner's assertion that overt responding is
best because it provides immediate reinforcement. In fact, overt re
sponding may introduce a delay that interferes with learning. J. 0.
Cook and M. E. Spitzer (i960) concluded that overt practice interfered
with both the learning of the response term and with connecting it to
its proper stimulus.
Whether or not an overt response becomes d eb ilita tin g ly in ter
fering may depend on the presentation media. E. Robert Spake and
Douglas D. Sjogren found that written responses to programs f a c i l i
tated learning when programmed textbooks were used. However, when
students were asked to actively operate rudimentary teaching machines when making overt responses, overt responding became debilitative.
(Cook and S p itzer, 1964) It is lik e ly that the teaching machine overt
response required more time delay and thus produced more interference, a c r it ic a l factor in remembering. The value of overt responding is probably due to i t s providing a response amenable to correction. Overt responding can make feedback easier.
Any b en efits due to presenting responses more amenable to cor rection are offset by the greater learning.time involved in overt re sponding. It becomes necessary to establish when the time consuming process of overt responding is warranted by special reinforcement needs. W. J. McGuire (1955, 1961) found that when responses to two second presentations were compared with responses to four second 263
presentations, covert responding was significantly better than overt
responding when the two second presentation was used. At the slower
rate of presentation there was no significant difference between overt
and covert responding. (Gage ,1963, p. 618) C. I . Hovland, A. A.
Lumsdaine and F. D. Sheffield (1949) found th at overt recitin g of
letter-word combinations helped students leam a phonetic alphabet.
(Hovland, Lumsdaine and Sheffield, 1949) This finding may be ex
plained by a comment from David Ausubel;
In the first place, it is self-evident that overtness of re sponse facilitates perceptual-motor learning in instances where the overtly practiced response itself is one of the objects of learning (that is, part of the learning task). But where the overt response (for example, writing, pressing a lever) is al ready a w ell-estab lish ed component of the learner's response repertory and constitutes merely a nonspecific means of re sponding to test questions, it is obvious that the response- acquisition advantage of overtness is irrelevant and that overt responses are more time-consuming and less efficient than their covert counterparts. (Ausubel, 1968, p. 298)
Another explanation might be that the requiring of overt re sponses stimulated attention and motivation. Overt responding does seem to maintain interest better, especially when motivation isn't high or material is difficult. Covert responding, on the other hand, may be most successful when students are highly motivated. (Miller,
1957, pp. 95, 96) Evidence indicates that overt responding is more effective for helping the less motivated, slow students leam d iffi cult material than it is for helping the more motivated, bright stu dents leam easy material. R. A. Goldbeck (1960) determined that at the easy level of difficulty, the overt response group performed less well than the covert response group. At the intermediate level of difficulty, however, it performed better than implicit response or covert response groups. 264
The success of overt or covert responding depends on how well
responses are programmed. J. G. Holland (i960) found that overt re sponding was better than covert responding only when the response blanks represented the most relevant responses and only when the stu dent was cued w ell enough for the correct response to be read ily a v a il able. When multiple choice and overt responses have been used with retarded children, offering two choices rather than three produces better learning. (Gage, 1963, pp. 617-19) Experimenters have reported difficulty in keeping subjects at mental practice for longer than five minutes at a tim e. (Travers, 1967, pp. 70-71) Showing demonstration films during periods of mental practice seems to extend the period during which learners w ill practice mentally beyond five minutes.
This conclusion is based on an experiment by Harby in which the sub jects were male college physical education students. (Harby, 1952)
Overt responding can have the advantages of providing a detailed record of student responses which is readily available for diagnosis.
This detailed record of student progress can make program revision easier. (Fry, 1963, p. 150)
The conclusions on when each type of response activity is ap propriate are summarized in Table 9. The research on implicit re sponding does not yet provide a sufficient basis for drawing conclu sions .
Overt responding is warranted only if the concept to be learned is totally unfamiliar or difficult, if motivation is low or if the rate of presentation is slow. 265
TABLE 9
LEARNING CONDITIONS AND APPROPRIATE RESPONSE ACTIVITY
Appropriate Response Activity
Variables Overt Covert
Motivation Low High
Level of D iffic u lty High Low
Presentation Time Slow Fast
Response T otally P a rtia lly Units unfamiliar fam iliar
The means provided for responding must not cause a delay in responding that interferes with learning. A teaching machine that delays responding because a hand movement is called for may inter fere with concept learning.
Type of Practice
Practice refers to a learner’s involvement in doing something to reinforce learning. In order to improve learning the learner per forms the task presented or he covertly rehearses a response. He thus practices material presented. He is exercising his conceptual learning in order to strengthen it. Practice strengthens conceptual learning because it increases the stability and clarity of the new meanings and skills. It strengthens because it sensitizes the learner to potential meanings and to difficulties in learning. Practice can motivate be cause it can involve the learner. Types of practice are differentiated by the way in which they are distributed, by their frequency and by the 266
means used for responding. (Ausubel, 1968, pp. 274-75) Three important
considerations for incorporating practice in a message design are;
1. proper techniques for practice response,
2. proper timing of practice responses, and
3. proper amount of practice responses.
Practice responses may be made before, during and after a presentation. Anticipatory responses are elicited, by instructions or
suggestions, before learning. This type of practice can be introduced into a presentation by requiring students to imagine the correct re sponse and then to correct their errors after a presentation of the concept performance. (M iller, 1957, p. 94) Responses made during a presentation are participation responses. Participation responses can utilize overt or covert student activity. Post-presentation practice can occur immediately or can be delayed. Anticipatory, participation and post-presentation practice responses are classifiable according to the technique used for responding or for eliciting the response. Pos sible techniques include mental practice, overt recitation, motor re sponse, imitation, overt or covert answers to inserted questions, re capitulation, notetaking, test taking, review.
Uncued anticipatory responses can be totally incorrect. It is best, therefore, to ward off such responses by allowing no time for such responses. One way to do this is with a simultaneous presentation. (A simultaneous presentation makes all the cues avail able at once. See pages 177-81.) This conclusion means that the presenter must move to his points quickly enough to prevent students from going off on a tangent. Two corollaries to this conclusion are that it is important to establish set and that it is important to call 267
for cued responses soon enough to prevent uncued anticipatory responses.
The conclusion is suggested by a study by F. F. Kopstein and S. M.
Roshal (1955, 1961). (Gage, 1963, p. 625)
Findings on the value of specific participation and post
presentation techniques are equivocal. Results seem to be too in ter
woven with timing and amount of practice factors to be adequately in
terpretable. Any significant differences or lack of significant dif
ferences may result from increased exposure to content, to practice or
to increased motivation due to involvement.
The value of inserted questions for improving film learning
has not been proven. M. A. May studied the effects of inserted ques
tions on learning from films. Although gains in learning were re
ported the levels of significance for the differences found were not
reported. (May, 1947) Research on the value of inserted questions for
improving learning from other media is needed.
The value of notetaking is doubtful. Notetaking as an adjunct to normal film learning has indicated that, despite the aid to recall which it provides, notetaking interferes with learning too much to be helpful. Research is needed to determine whether notetaking with dif
ficult material presented slowly enough to minimize interference can help learning. Many research studies have shown overt and covert verbalization of responses to be effective participation techniques.
Care must be taken, however, to use covert and overt responses as rec ommended on page 264. (Travers, 1967, pp. 61-79) Research has also shown that recitation, as a participation or post-presentation tech nique, is more effective for rote learning than for meaningful learning and retention. (Ausubel, 1968, p. 296) Another fertile area for 268
research is a study of the response techniques most appropriate for
each of the different types of concept learning (rote, meaningful,
discovery, reception, concept identification, concept attainment,
concept formation—see pages 55-58).
A technique may be suitable but ineffective if responses are
not timed properly. A delayed practice response is evoked a consider
able time after the disappearance of its stimulus. An immediate prac
tice response follows directly after the stimulus is presented without
allowing intervening stimuli to interfere. For example, if the task is
to tie a square knot a delayed (massed) practice response would occur
after a film on knot-tying was finished;an immediate (distributed) practice response would occur at intervals throughout the film.
Distributed (immediate) practice is generally more effective than delayed practice. Distributed practice is especially suitable for long, difficult or rote tasks. It is also the superior method for long term retention of meaningful concepts. Younger and less able learners find distributed (immediate) practice much easier to leam from than delayed practice. For example, a younger or less able learner would find it easier to leam how to add numbers in two places if they prac ticed on problems during the presentation instead of only after the presentation.
When a warm-up period or a long period of concentrated effort is required before responding, delayed practice may offer advantages.
(Ausubel, 1968, pp. 291-95)
It seems reasonable that one should not ask the student to start practicing u n til he has enough background and orientation so th at he w ill be likely to practice the correct rather than the incor rect responses. We would expect th is stage to be reached at d if ferent times, depending on the difficulty of the material. 269
Although a study by the Commonwealth Office of Education (1950) concluded that it was best to hold a discussion immediately after the first showing, reinforcing the learning and retarding the rate of forgetting, in dealing with more complex material, it might be better to start the practice after the second show ing, when the students are more orientated and better able to perform correct responses- (Miller, 1957, p- 95)
Researchers need to establish whether delayed practice can aid in the
learning of complex concepts which are difficult to divide into seg
ments for distributed practice- The learning of complex concepts by
delayed (massed) practice is suitable only for older, more able learn
ers -
In a Miller-Levine experiment on the use of review as a prac
tice response the conditions for massed review of a presentation create
the conditions for spaced (delayed) practice- Conversely, the condi
tions for spaced review of a presentation create the conditions for
massed (immediate) practice- The condition of massed review (spaced-
delayed practice) presents a review of each section which is separated
from its initial presentation by intervening material- In the condition
of spaced review (massed-immediate practice) review of each section fo l
lows immediately its initial practice- (See Table 10, page 270)
Miller and Levine found that the delayed covert practice re
sponses caused by mass review produced the most learning. When an
active participation type of review was substituted for the passive
(slides with tape narration) review there was no significant differ ence in learning under immediate or delayed practice conditions-
(Miller and Levine, 1952) The results suggest that reception learning of concepts (concept assimilation) w ill be more effective when practice is given through a review which is delayed to the end of the presenta tion instead of dispersed throughout the presentation- When more 270
active responding is warranted (see page 264) immediate practice of
parts of the task may be effectively distributed throughout the
presentation. One area which has not yet been researched is the com
bined use of active and passive practice.
The results of the Miller-Levine experiments and other experi
ments on p ractice variables and e ffe c ts are summarized by th is writer
in Table 10.
TABLE 10
A COMPARISON OF PRACTICE CONDITIONS AND EFFECTS
Immediate Long Term Condition Revi ew Practice Retention Retention
I . (passive Spaced Massed Inferior Superior response) (throughout (immediate, presentation) distributed)
I I . (passive Massed Spaced Superior Inferior response) (at end of (delayed, presentation) massed)
III. (active Spaced Massed n.s.d .* Superior response) (throughout (immediate, presentation) distributed)
IV. (active Massed Spaced n .s.d .* Inferior response) (a t end of (delayed, presentation) massed)
*No Significant Difference,
So far research evidence indicates that short and widely spaced
practice (or review) sessions are best for concept learning as long as the practice is not so widely spaced as to allow too much forgetting,
or to fragment the task excessively. Because this conclusion is 271
derived from a small body of experimental research done with motor
learning and principle learning as well as with rote and meaningful
concept learning, it can be applied only tentatively to conceptual
communication.
Feedback to Response
Factors: Amount and Type of Feedback, Ratio and Timing of Feedback,
Postfeedback Interval
Responses to responses are called feedback. Feedback can serve
to reinforce and can add information to the stimulus. Feedback comes
from those signals which indicate something about the correctness of
individual responses. Feedback, while contingent upon the student's response, is not synonymous with reinforcement. It is one among many means for reinforcement. Furthermore, feedback may reinforce a re sponse, or it may lead to the extinction of a response. The condi tions under which feedback takes place vary in the amount and type of information presented, the ratio and timing of feedback and the post feedback interval.
Amount and Type of Feedback
Feedback which produces neither learning to repeat the response nor learning to avoid the response does not reinforce. When reinforce ment does not occur a response can weaken until extinction occurs.
Reinforcement can be described as a strengthening of a response.
There are two types of reinforcement which can occur: negative and positive. In negative reinforcement, the response is simply indicated to be wrong and in positive reinforcement the right response is given.
Positive reinforcement trains a subject to make a response by rewarding 272
or confirming (or correcting) his response. "Negative reinforcement"
describes "a way of training a subject not to make a response by giving
him a dissatisfying or punishing or tension-increasing stimulus."
(English and English, 1958, p. 453) Negative reinforcement leads to
an escape response.
The message designer should ask whether the feedback provided
actually reinforces. If it does, he should ask whether it reinforces
with success or failure, with reward or punishment. Negative rein
forcement, such as punishment, is likely to be disruptive of learning,
inhibiting further trial and error. It is not, therefore, as desir
able as no reinforcement or as simple correction of errors. (Bruner,
1966, pp. 207-10)
Negative reinforcement has been found to be effective in pre
venting recurrence of errors for a while. After a time lapse, how
ever, the negative reinforcement w ill no longer retard the undesir
able behavior, and it may recur unless some relearning has been pro vided as an effective substitute. (Fry, 1963, p. 160) Feedback which does not reinforce is more desirable than feedback which rein
forces negatively but is not as desirable as feedback which rein forces positively. It is better to reward (or correct) the right response or to give no feedback to a response than to punish a wrong response.
D ifferent forms o f knowledge of resu lts can be id en tified depending on the completeness of the informative feedback and on the extent to which the learner can control the instructional sequence by h is response. These various forms of knowledge of resu lts are called complete feedback (correction of response), incomplete or 273
partial feedback (confirmation of extinction of response), differential
feedback (i.e., branching programing) and invariant feedback (i.e.,
linear programing). In a complete (correction) type of feedback, the
learner is shown the correct answers. In a partial (confirmation)
type o f feedback, the learner is only given a right-^wrong in d ication .
Research findings report that complete feedback or correction
is the most effective means for using knowledge of results. It is
probable that the greater success of complete feedback is due to its
enabling learning to be more efficient because information is more
quickly and easily available. L. Bourne Jr. and R. B. Pendleton
(1958) found the superiority of complete feedback constant over
three levels of complexity. (Bourne, 1966, pp. 64-66) D. N. Michael
and N. Maccoby's (1961) research on knowledge of results found com
plete knowledge of results superior to no knowledge of results.
They attribute this finding to the reinforcing properties
of complete knowledge of results to the opportunity it provides for
correction of errors and for an additional implicit-practice trial.
Research done by Briggs alone (1961) also resulted in showing the correct answers producing more successful learning than a simple right-wrong indicator.
The other forms that knowledge of results takes are differen t i a l feedback and invariant feedback. Branching programs use d iffe r ential feedback because feedback given depends on the response made.
With invariant feedback, such as in linear programing, the feedback remains the same no matter what the response. Knowledge o f resu lts in a motor skill can sometimes be called differential feedback be cause the feedback can be adapted to the learner's response by the 274
learner's interpretation of his own errors. Differential feedback can also mean providing for self-correction as compared with teacher-
correction. The relative effectiveness of each method depends on the type of learning and on the extent to which learner's responses need individual consideration and feedback. (Gage, 1963, pp. 619-20)
To be most e ffe ctiv e knowledge of resu lts should be sp e c ific .
Knowledge of r esu lts has been effe ctiv e as a reward when applied sys tematically. B. F. Skinner has suggested that the mere manipulation of a teaching machine or some participation with the media of presenta tion may be a reward. (Fry, 1963, pp. 157-60)
Ratio and Timing o f Feedback
Reinforcement by feedback can be presented according to dif ferent types of reinforcement schedules. C. B. Ferster and B. F.
Skinner proposed these categories for reinforcement ratios:
1. Fixed ratio reinforcement—administered regularly after so
many t r i a l s , e.g., a reward after every five successful
t r ia ls ;
2. variable ratio reinforcement—administered irregularly but
on an average of every so many tria ls, e.g., after three
trials, after seven trials, after four trials, after one
trial, after five trials or an average of every four trials;
3. fixed interval reinforcement—administered after a set pe
riod of time, e.g., every five minutes;
4. variable interval reinforcement—administered irregularly
but on an average of a certain period of time, e.g., a fter
one minute, after ninety seconds, after two minutes, after 275
150 seconds or on an average of every 105 seconds*
(Ferster and Skinner, 1957)
They applied these categories in research on animal learning
rewarded by food p e lle t s . In th e ir experiment variable ratio rein
forcement proved more effective than fixed ratio reinforcement. This
was because when fixed ratio or intervals were used there was a tendency
to slack off immediately after reinforcement. With fixed reinforcement
schedules the subject could anticipate the timing of rewards. Further
more, when a subject accustomed to reinforcement on a fixed schedule is
not reinforced on schedule, the subject quickly fails to respond.
Lyle Bourne has probed ra tio s o f feedback by studying prob
ability of informative feedback. Research on probability of informa
tive feedback was conducted by omitting feedback on some trials irres
pective of the correctness of the subject's response. Bourne and
R. B. Pendleton (1958) found that om itting feedback strongly in ter
feres with concept attainment. Bourne proposes that this is due to
lack of feedback allowing neutral stimuli to interfere because the
subject can't decide what to respond to. When feedback is omitted
on a certain percentage of trials (e.g., 30 per cent of trials), the
subject adds stimuli to his memory load because he does not leam which
of the stimuli to ignore. These distractors cause a disproportionate increase in the number of trials needed to attain the concept. If re inforcement is omitted on 10 per cent of fifty trials, more than five additional trials w ill be needed for the subject to perform correctly.
If it is omitted on 20 per cent of fifty trials more than 10 addi tional trials w ill be needed. (Bourne, 1966, pp. 66-69) 276
Ferster and Skinner's conclusion conflicts with the work of
Lyle Bourne. The question which arises from this conflict is whether
reinforcement on every trial while increasing initial learning will
lead the learner to demand reinforcement even after learning has been
acquired. In the absence of continued feedback w ill the learner re
fuse to retain concepts.
Immediacy of reinforcement is another ratio and timing condi
tion of feedback. Immediacy of reinforcement refers to the time be
tween the subject's response on any trial and the presentation of feed
back. Reinforcement can be described in this case as immediate or
delayed. There are two reasons why immediate reinforcement has been
thought to be better. First, the longer the delay the more the sub
ject must rely on memory of the stimulus and the less information he
is liable to have retained about it. Secondly, the longer the delay
the more likely there is to be interference which may prove especially
harmful because the correct response hasn't been strengthened.
Using human subjects Robert Hayes tested the effects of "Imme
diate Learning Reinforcement" on motor learning. His subjects used
simulators to leam to drive. Partial knowledge of results was pro
vided by red lig h ts which indicated errors. Immediate reinforcement
by the lights increased learning. Students thus reinforced made fewer
errors in practice driving than students taking a conventional driver
education course. (Hayes, 1966) G. W. Angell (1949) determined that
immediate knowledge of quiz results was significantly more effective
than delayed knowledge of results. In Angell's experiment delayed
knowledge of results occurred a day or two after the test (in the next recitation section meeting). (Angell, 1949) 277
Experiments on lower animals have found that the effect of the
longer delay is deleterious when the animal is engaged in other activi
ties during that delay. Lyle Bourne Jr. and C- V. Bunderson (1963)
investigated delay of informative feedback using human subjects. Their
experimental task was a concept identification problem. They found
that delay of feedback had no deleterious effect. They assumed that
this was due to the largest delay being only eight seconds and to the
fact of no interpolated activity. (Bourne, 1966, p. 71)
The writer thinks that there is probably a critical limit to the delay in terval—a point beyond which delay in terferes even though no activity is interpolated. This point probably varies according to the memory capacity and motivation of the learner. In any event, the safest procedure seems to be to present feedback as soon as possible.
When there is a delay before feedback, non-relevant activity should not be allowed to occur during this period.
Postfeedback Interval
A 1957 experiment conducted by Lyle Bourne Jr. revealed a variable which confounded the e ffe c ts of delay of feedback. This vari able was the postfeedback interval. This variable should not be con fused with delay of informative feedback, which is delayed reinforce ment. Postfeedback interval seems to be a more important determiner o f learning than immediacy of reinforcement. Postfeedback in terval is the time interval separating informative feedback and the presentation of the next stimulus. If the first stimulus is represented as S^, the response as R, the feedback as F and the next stimulus to be presented as S2 , we have 278
Si > R < -
Post Feedback Interval
In 1963 Lyle Bourne J r . and C. V. Bunderson replicated Bourne’s
1957 experiment on delay in terv a ls. Bourne and Bunderson discovered
that learning did not seem to take place immediately and automatically
as a function of reinforcement. This is not surprising in view of the
evidence that some forgetting and an interval of at least an hour is
necessary for retention.* This time Bourne tried to keep the postfeed
back interval variable effects independently of the delay of informa
tive feedback interval variable effects. He found that increasing the
postfeedback interval helped learning. The facilitating effect of ex
tending the postfeedback interval increases in magnitude with task com
plexity . The more complex the concept learning problem, the longer
the interval from feedback to presentation of the next stimulus should
b e.
In Bourne's 1963 experiment no activity was interpolated during
the postfeedback interval. The data indicated that the subjects used
the time for some task relevant activity such as rehearsal, hypothesis-
revision, memorization or otherwise processing information received
from the feedback. (Bourne, 1966, pp. 70-72)
As with delay of informative feedback, there seems to be an
optimum length for postfeedback interval. This is the length of time beyond which the delay no longer facilitates learning or beyond which delay starts interfering with learning. Allowing time for too much
*See p. 124. Also Ausubel, 1968, pp. 98-109 279
forgetting from one trial to the next can have a detrimental effect on
learning. In 1967 Bourne collaborated with David H. Dodd, Donald E.
Guy and Donald R. Justensen on an experiment on optimal duration times
for postfeedback intervals. Observing the effects of intervals of one
through tw enty-five seconds they found an in terval beyond which per
formance worsened and up to which performance improved. This optimal
in terv a l was around nine seconds for problems with one irrelevant
dimension. For more complex problems, problems with five irrelevant
dimensions, the optimal interval time was seventeen seconds.
When the long interval was used on only part of the trials,
it did not appear to make any reliable difference whether the long
interval was limited to correct or incorrect response trials. Learn
ing of complex problems was best when all trials had long postfeedback
intervals. In their conclusions the authors propose a ceiling effect
theory.
Having some (approximately f i f t y per cen t, conditions I and III) is nearly as facilitative as having all (Condition IV) long intervals under the performance conditions used here. There is then the possibility of a ceiling effect, which might be explored by varying the percentage of long inter vals (randomly assigned to trials, irrespective of S's re sponse) across conditions in these problems. On the basis o f current d ata, performance would be expected to improve directly and monotonically with this percentage up to some optimum. (Bourne, et a l . , February, 1967, p. 8)
In designing a presentation for concept learning the media
specialist is advised to use feedback in these ways. Reinforce the
right answer or correct the answer by giving the complete right
answer. Reinforce by feedback frequently. If delay of feedback is warranted, allow as little task irrelevant activity to interpolate
as possible. If the problem is complex extend the interval between 280
feedback and presentation of the next stimulus. Don't remove the dis
play before the learner has time to process the information received
from the feedback.
Before ending this chapter the writer would like to stress that
although the many curriculum design and audiovisual design factors have
been analyzed separately, they seldom have independent influence- Be
sides interacting with learner variables they interact with each other.
With a specific educational goal, a certain presentation order may be
advisable only if suited to the ideal response strategy and to the num ber of instances to be presented. If there are too many instances to be presented concisely simultaneously then a successive presentation is in order. This presentation order may be ineffective if a scanning strategy is used. Therefore, it is advisable to cue a more desirable strategy. This hypothetical design problem reveals why it is necessary to make design decisions intendependently.
The conclusion given on page 86 bears reiterating as a conclu sion to this chapter. The complexity of the learning problems con fronting the teacher, the number of students a teacher must help, and the limited time a teacher has available for preparing materials all suggest that it may be futile to expect teachers to effectively apply learning principles without the help of the media specialist. We need curricular packages which have sound learning principles as their or ganizational base. The media specialist's job is to prepare materials based on principles substantiated by research evidence. The teacher's job is to use materials according to principles substantiated by re search evidence. Both the teacher and the media specialist can thus 281 influence the characteristics of the communication. Both the teacher and the media specialist can, therefore, determine the characteristics of the concepts formed. CHAPTER VII
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONCEPTUALIZER
We know that learners vary or can be categorized according to
age or maturity, sex, personality and ability- We also know something
about the conceptualizing patterns of different types of learners-
Consequently, we can forecast methods of conceptual communication
suitable for different types of learners- An authoritarian person
a lit y cannot handle or produce ambiguous concepts as other learners
can- A message designer should allow for factors such as low toler
ance to ambiguity- Consequently, for some learners ambiguous content
may be inadvisable-
For each learner the characteristics of several types of learners are relevant- A learner is not just a preschooler- A learner may be male, preschool and deaf- Or a learner may be adult, authoritarian, and culturally deprived-
In this chapter learners are categorized according to age, sex, personality and ability differences- It should be recognized that there is some unavoidable overlapping between categories which the writer ignores- For example, sex differences could be related to back ground or cu ltu ral differences- Age differences could be related to ability differences as could sex differences- Nevertheless, since much research has been done on sex differences and on age differences and
2 8 2 283
since these factors are distinguished from, as well as associated with
the other factors, they are considered separately.
The writer reminds the reader about the earlier discussion of
design factors, conceptual processes and the characteristics of con
cepts. Learner differences are influenced by each of these. A cul
turally deprived learner cannot produce imagery and verbalization as
can an enriched student.
Age Differences
The effects of age on concept formation seem to fa ll, at
present, into these categories: (l) changes which accompany the men
tal development of the child as he progresses into adulthood, and (2)
changes which accompany the aging o f adults.
Mental Development
Jean Piaget's Work
Jean Piaget pioneered the study of the conceptual development of the child. All of Piaget's theorizing about the development of in telligence pivots around the structure or the organization of thought.
He refers to structure as organizational properties of intelligence, or organizations created through functioning (manners of responding) and inferable from the content of thought (the uninterpreted be havioral data—guesses, estimates, perceptions).
The writer has developed Table 11 to show Piaget's periods, subperiods, stages and substages. This table is based on the writings of J . H. Flavell and Lee Cronbach. (Flavell, 1963; Cronbach, 1963) 284
TABLE 11
PIAGET'S THEORY OF MENTAL DEVELOPMENT
Conceptual Periods Subperiods Stages Substages Development
Sensory (0-1 mos.) 5 substages- Acquiring Motor (1-4 mos.) prehension sen sori (0-2 y r s .) (4-8 mos.) motor (8-12 mos.) control (12-18 mos.) (18 months-)
Concrete Preopera- Beginning Extraction Operations tio n a l representa of concepts (2-11 yrs.) tio n a l from (2-4) thought experience
Represen Simple repre In tu itiv e tation s sentations use o f (2-7) (4-5 1/2) or concepts in tu itio n s
Articulated In tu itiv e representa use o f tions (5 1/2 - concepts 7) or in- • tu itio n s
Concrete Concrete operations opera (7-11) tio n a l thought
Formal Mastering Operations formal (11-15 yrs.) operations
Granting Piaget his due, let us consider the criticism that has been made of his work and the findings of studies which have repli cated his work. First, a critique of Piaget starting with his methods of research. Piaget believed that the only way to get at the heart of 285
a child's cognitive structure to describe it as it really is, was to make careful observations of ongoing task behavior in response to a
stimulus ; sometimes with experimenter intervention and sometimes without experimenter intervention. His experiments are conducted usually as either an observer only or as experimenter determinant in which he poses simple questions to clarify a child's answers. There are dangers and difficulties associated with this clinical method:
1. Even the h igh ly sk illed interview er must always guard
against temptations to lead and to suggest.
2. There is always the danger of missing the significance
of important behavior.
3. There are evaluation pitfalls. One should not try to
either overestimate or to underestimate the child's
intellectual level through incautious interpretations.
4. One must be able to identify those structural charac
teristics which many children of the same age possess
and which can thereby define a meaningful stage or level.
Piaget is also a developmental psychologist and as such uses longitudinal studies. The dangers of time effects and allowing con founding variables, such as environmental factors, to confuse the experimenter are associated with the longitudinal method. Further more, Piaget often based his data on observations made with only a few children—in many cases his own children, who had been used as subjects many times before and thus might have exhibited practice e f f e c t s .
Moreover, in presenting his data Piaget often makes it d iffi cult for the reader because: 286
1. The primary data in the form of behavior protocols
are presented in the text of his study.
2. The primary data are preceded, followed and accompanied
by a great deal o f commentary.
3. He seldom gives information such as tested intelligence,
socioeconomic background, number of children performing,
e t c ., which i s usually provided in most reports in the
field of child psychology.
One might also say that Piaget has a tendency to overgeneralize
on the basis of experimental tasks as well as on the basis of the num
ber of subjects tested. Most of his experiments were concerned with mathematics, physics or logic; yet he generalizes his observations to apply to all thought. And, often the experiments deal with a few selected concepts in each of those areas; yet he often generalizes his observations to all mathematical or physical or logical thought.
There is a far higher ratio of discussion, analysis and interpreta tion to the amount of data presented than is usual.
Because Piaget is primarily concerned with developing a theoretical system to describe the changes in thought patterns, he becomes more concerned with general principles than specific laws.
Piaget's work is more oriented toward description and explanation of the developmental change than to making predictions. Since his descriptions are mainly explanatory rather than predictive, his theories could also be characterized as "loose" rather than "tight" in their specification of content meaning.
I f Piaget had done the major part of h is work la te r in th is century he might not have produced data which i s so separated from 287
other research streams. His tendency to think, produce and write in
r e la tiv e iso la tio n from others' works is probably both a strength and
a weakness. Since the field needed a pioneer and a theoretical system
to start testing, it was probably to Piaget's advantage not to head
the scattered, specific research findings available.
However, h is work might have more meaning i f i t had been cor
related with research on child training patterns, on ability differ
ences, on maturation and on measurement of child development.
P ia g et's works show a strong b e lie f in the power of careful reasoning to decide among possible interpretations. While this is true, care
ful reasoning should also be checked by further experimental evidence.
Hence the need to replicate and add to many of Piaget's experiments.
Careful reasoning should lead to choosing the best alternatives for testing, but it does not obviate the need for testing. Probably be cause of time and other limitations, many of Piaget's theoretical formulations are based on careful reasoning of alternatives only, without further experimentation. It should be noted, however, that his perceptual studies were designed and presented much more com pletely than his intelligence studies.
A second major criticism of Piaget is that he did not take sim ilarities among children and adults or the differences among chil dren of similar ages sufficiently into account. Piaget's categories or stages are presented too rigidly. His writings seem to have a pen chant for symmetry and neatness of classification. As a result his divisions between children's and adult thought and between the levels of thought seem too arbitrary. Piaget notes that there is much over lapping among stages and variability among individuals, but he does 288
not emphasize such qualifications strongly enough to prevent his cate
gorization from seeming too arbitrary.
Piaget implies that logical thought dominates the adult but not
the child. He implies that intuitive associational thought dominates
the child and not the adult. It has been found that associational
processes dominate in adults unless intentional (deductive) set is
established. In other words, associative processes w ill dominate when
adults do not deliberately attempt to form concepts, and deductive
processes w ill dominate when they do. Evidence suggests that associa
tive processes, as compared with deductive processes, are primary among
young children and older children who have a limited memory or atten
tion span. Evidence also supports the conclusion that children of
superior intelligence attain concepts by testing hypotheses while chil
dren of average intelligence attain concepts on a more rote basis.
(Amster, 1965) The maturity and ability of the child affects the pro
gression and presence of stages. A very young child often uses logic
in a match-non-match way and even in a deductive way. Furthermore, according to Kenneth L ovell,
We are s till at a loss to understand why some pupils who have clearly developed first- and second-order operational schemas*
*A schema, according to Piaget is similar to a concept. It is the motor equivalent of a concept. A schema must be (l) an organized totality, (2) a behavior sequence, (3) a cognitive structure likely to repeat itself. A first order schema is an elementary grouping which has characteristics (l), (2) and (3). Only mathematical concepts which can be derived from contact with r e a lity are f ir s t order schema. F irst order schema include the logical operations of adding, subtracting, measuring, equating. Second order shcema are v isu a lly reached at eleven years of age. Second order schema involve more complex rela tio n sh ip s. Examples of second order schema are proportion mathe matics and heat in physics. Second order schema depend on f ir s t order schema being detached from their concrete contexts and manipulated. (Klausmeier and Harris, 1966, pp. 213-16; Flavell, 1963, pp. 52-55) 289
find great difficulty in forming mathematical concepts. Far from a ll pupils who are backward in mathematics are intellec tually dull, emotionally disturbed, or have had a pucity of relevant experience. (Klausmeier and Harris, 1966, pp. 220-21)
That the very young child is never capable of some true social
maturity or awareness is also debatable. The idea of true social ma
turity is not developed sufficiently enough by Piaget to allow this
question to be answered. The writer feels further that the child can
distinguish play from reality earlier and more often than Piaget sug
g e sts.
A third major criticism of P iaget's work i s that i t depends so
much on the correctness of his assumptions about logic and structure.
Piaget's view is one of holism. He interprets everything in terms of
its organization as a total system. His writings show a continual
moving back and forth between experimental findings and philosophical
problems•
Of a ll the criticism s th is third criticism i s the one most cru
c ia l to the study o f communication o f concepts. I t ra ises the question
of whether the differences Piaget discovered are due to language prob
lems rather than inability in logical formulation of a problem. If
this is so, then many concept learning differences associated with age
could be overcome by language development.
A fourth criticism is that Piaget begs the question of the
cause of conceptual development differences associated with age. His
answer that such differences are caused by growth of logical ability
leaves us with another question. This question is to what extent in
ability in logical formulation is culturally caused or the result of maturation? Piaget says, "both," without clarifying the relationship 290
between these two causal factors. Jerome Kagan explains why Piaget's
theoretical structure is as of yet inadequate for explaining the con
ceptual changes associated with age.
The noteworthy flaw in Piaget's prodigious output is the absence of any set of theoretical statements that accounts for how or why a child passes from one stage of operations to another. A second void is the absence of a systematic description of the nature of the conceptual structures the child possesses at any one stage in development. What is the hierarchical organization of concepts at age six in contrast to age two or twelve? (Klausmeier and Harris, 1966, pp. 98, 113-14)
A fifth criticism could be made of Piaget's equating logical thought with abstract thought. Does not the preoperational child who concentrates on one aspect of an object abstact? Since not all con cepts are at the same level of abstraction, it is possible that a level of concrete conceptual thought could be equated with abstract thought just as, or even more, correctly as could logical thought.
Finally, a sixth criticism could be made of Piaget's emphasis on sensory responses made during infancy. This emphasis is placed by the label Piaget gave the first eighteen months—the sensory-motor stage. A motor-sensory label gives motor behavior, not perception, the primary place in this stage of child behavior. A sensory-motor stage gives perception, not motor behavior, such as grasping or crawling, the primary place in this stage of behavior. It is perhaps more a motor- senory stage. Until our means for testing sensory responses at earlier ages are better developed and our findings are more extensive Piaget's sensory-motor label can at the most be accepted only tentatively.
(Klausmeier and Harris, 1966, pp. 106-107)
Before we conclude our consideration of Piaget let us acknowledge some findings of studies which have replicated his work. Generally, the 291
conclusion of the studies which have replicated Piaget's work agree with
Piaget's progressive passing through stages but find more variability than Piaget suggests.
Piaget reported that abstract responses to mass first appeared at age 11-12. According to Piaget, the criterion of an abstract con ception of mass is the child's judgment of its conservation, its same ness despite perceptual change. P. Elkind replicated Piaget's work and confirmed his finding on a child's understanding of conservation of mass and weight but not of volume. Elkind's study extended Piaget's experiments further to junior and senior high school students (12-18 years) and found that age, sex and intelligence influence the attain ment of an abstract concept. (Elkind, 1961)
In a classic study, P. G. Dodwell tried to do a more thorough investigation of Piaget's work on numerical concept development.
Dodwell's results confirmed the behavior Piaget had associated with his stages but found the stages did not necessarily occur in Piaget's sequence and that the stages were not necessarily as distinct from other stages as Piaget indicated. (Dodwell, I960)
Henry Van Engen and Leslie Steffe studied "First Grade
Children's Concept of Addition of Natural Numbers" and found a sig nificant relationship between intelligence and ability to abstract the concept of addition of whole number from the physical situation.
This and other findings were interpreted as follows:
Two possible interpretations of the results were offered, the more logically acceptable being that children at the first grade level have not abstracted the concept of addition from physical situations but have memorized the addition tasks. (Van Engen and S te ffe , 1966, p. ix ) 292
In a study on "The Performance of First Grade Children in
Four Levels o f Conservation on Numerousness and Three IQ Croups
When Solving Arithmetic Addition Problems" Leslie Steffe manipulated
and observed the effects of four levels of thought, of three ability
groups in each level of thought, or explanation of transformation
versus no explanation and of the presence of physical and visual
aids in an arithmetic addition task. He found that explanations and
physical and visual aids helped such problem solving. (Steffe,
1966)
Some of Piaget's work on the development of imagery has been tested further by Barbara Boe. Piaget theorizes that the child de
velops mental imagery in order to be able to represent space. Boe
interprets this theory to mean that there must be imagery involved in hypothetically sectioning a solid figure and reproducing a concrete representation of it. She conjectures that if such mental imagery is developed, it is realistic to suppose that a multiple choice response test would result in a higher response score than a drawing response test. The results of her experiment on "Secondary School Pupils'
Perception of the Plane Sections of Selected Solid Figures" showed this was not the case.
She interprets this finding to mean that mental imagery may not be as developed for this age as Piaget would imply. (Boe, 1966, p. 30) Furthermore, performance showed no sig n ifica n t improvement through all grade levels. This suggests that the development of operational thought does not proceed as naturally with maturation as Piaget tries to persuade us. 293
Jerome Kagan's Work
In an article entitled "A Developmental Approach to Conceptual
Growth" Jerome Kagan tries to identify (1) the conceptual units asso
ciated with developmental stages and (2) the reasons that conceptual
structures change with experience. Kagan describes the conceptual
units and processes associated with each age up to age ten. He de
scribes how conceptual development is influenced by attention vari
ab les.
Kagan's theory is important because it attempts to relate in tellectual development to more than the concrete-abstract continuum or the progressive development of logical thought. Kagan views a child's intellectual performance as the results of the interaction of elemen tary skills in labeling and rules of transformation and of attention determinants, such as motives, standards and sources of anxiety. He theorizes, that a child has difficulty progressing to certain stages because of genetic, school, and home factors.
Here are some of Kagan's thoughts on the characteristics of stages of conceptual development.
The first 12-18 months are characterized by growth of per ceptual schema. The first schema to develop are related to those stimuli that have natural attention-getting qualities (such as high contrast and movement) and those that have been associated with reward (primarily food and tactile contact). Rate of growth in schema is related in part to variability of input from the human beings who are sources of reward. . . . Learning to perceive, attend, focus and assimilate a stimulus to a schema, as well as attending to violations of that stimu lus, are the major cognitive developments in this first stage of human growth. The second period of cognitive growth is marked by the on set of expressive language and a rapid increase in capacity for comprehension of speech which occurs usually between 13 and 18 months. The most important development during this time is the growth of a labeling vocabulary. The child acquires a s e t of symbols that allows him to categorize and conceptualize aspects 294
of his environment. Responses are attached, in turn, to these categories. There are also some basic rules of organization, so-called transformation rules, that are being established and these tend to describe a functional-relationship basis between objects, in contrast to an analytic or categorical basis. . . . Empirical investigations of preschool children and their cate gorizations of people and events confirm the prediction that good-bad, male-female, large-small, and adult-child are four fundamental conceptual dimensions the preschool child uses in organization of this world. The early school years are witness to a flowering and crys tallization of the basic cognitive structure of the child. Al though the growth of a labeling vocabulary continues to be im portant, it now assumes secondary significance alongside the now rapid growth of two other basic conceptual processes.. One in volves the growth of rules for transformations and the second the growth of the habit of evaluation- (Klausmeier and Harris, 1966, pp. 102-11)
Harvey, Hunt and Schroder's Work
According to 0. Harvey, D- Hunt and H. Schroder there are four stages of conceptual development, each stage representing a further progression along the concept-abstract thought continuum.
The stages are described as follows.
1. Unilateral Dependence (external control)
Conceptual systems in the first stage are characterized by external control, by the acceptance of externally de rived concepts or schemata not built up through experience with the actual stim uli, and by the absolutistic nature of such concepts . . . thinking is more concrete ("this is the way it is because it is"); behavior associated with this stage is characterized by a greater immediacy, by greater sensitivity to lim its, to what is right and wrong, to what is tolerated and not tolerated , and by greater sub missiveness to external control.
2. Negative Independence (negativism)
Second stage concepts represent a d ifferen tia tio n from external forces, but such concepts are not highly articu lated. However, they are the foundations on which informa tional and independent standards can develop and represent the initial form of internal control. 295
3. Conditional Dependence and Mutuality (mutuality)
. . . The progression is from externally derived structure (first stage) through resistance to external control (second stage) and, if this can be achieved, to a more empirical ap proach in the third stage. Group functioning in the third stage is characterized by cooperation instead of submission and by competition rather than dominance and opposition. During this stage, mutuality, obtaining sa tisfa c tio n from pleasing o th ers, and empathy re place unilateral functioning and concern with dominance and power. A new basis for relating to people is established. No doubt the advent of language has much to do with this initial progression to third stage functioning. In child development functioning more typical of the transition from the second to the third stage and of the third stage is modal at ages three, seven and eight, and again perhaps at fourteen and fifteen. We would expect an association between speech problems and increasing difficul ties in developmental transition to the third stage.
4. Interdependence (independence)
In the fourth stage mutuality and autonomy are in te grated so that neither interferes with the other and yet both are important. We refer to this integration as posi tive interdependence. The nature of subject-object linkages at this level is abstract, interdependent, and informational. . . . The most general characteristic of such abstract func tioning is resistance to stress. Concrete functioning may be categorized by more decisiveness, but it breaks down more rapidly under stress.
(Harvey, Hunt and Schroder, 1961, pp. 94, 98, 101-104, 106-109)
This progressive conceptual development has been represented diagrammatically by Harvey, Hunt and Schroder in Figure 30 on the following page.
The Growth of Intellectual Abilities
Our knowledge of the growth o f in te llig e n c e i s dependent on the validity of our testing devices. The stability of test scores indicates the validity of the generalization that there is increasing differentiation and integration of intellectual abilities with age. 296
Stages of Conceptual Development* F irst Fourth Stage Second Third Stage External Stage Stage In ter- Cycle Age Negativism Mutuality dependence
1 1/2
2 1/2 Infancy 3 3 1/2-4 1/2
Childhood
it * III 11 Late 12 - 14 Childhood 15 - 16
*Based on an interpretation of the normative observations taken at the Gesell Institute (llg and Ames, 1955). **This part of the graph is hypothetical to show the expected progression to more abstract functioning in the third cycle.
■\ Fig. 31.—Cyclical and saccadic nature of progressive social development. (Harvey, Hunt and Schroder, 1961, p. 96)
Intelligence testing also indicates that there is an initial (infancy and preschool stage), an intermediate stage (preschool to adolescence) and a la te r stage. Because measurement of the in i t ia l stage has largely been of sensorimotor development that stage has seemed unrelated to the intermediate stage which has been measured by tests of various corre lated cognitive activities and to the later stage which has been measured by the differentiation of various intellectual abilities. 297
Findings on the developmental rate of specific conceptual task
relevant abilities are of interest. Simple rote memory develops before
general intelligence, vocabulary or arithmetic ability. More meaning
ful and analytic types of memory develop relatively late. Vocabulary
and language ability develop sooner than reasoning abilities. (Ausubel,
1968, pp. 233-35)
Howard and Tracy Kendler (1956) asked, When does the child
reach the age of reason? As a consequence they designed a study pri
marily to determine whether children three to four years old would be
capable of inferential behavior. Using a simple and direct procedure
they found that nursery school children could do inferential reasoning.
They a lso found th at order of presentation affected the likelihood of
inferential behavior occurring. N. R. F. Maier (1936) used a more com plex problem and found nursery school children could not do inferential reasoning. (Dececco, 1963, pp. 271-76) Evidence supports the hypothe sis that deductive processes are used more as the child grows older.
Evidence also supports changes in methods of grouping asso ciated with age. Subordinate grouping increased from ages 6-19 while complexive grouping decreased. Subordinate grouping was preceded by grouping according to heaps. Heaps are groupings on the basis of ar bitrary structure. Subordinate groups are groupings on the basis of a rule which accounts for a ll members o f a s e t. Complexes are group ings on the basis of a rule that does not account uniformly for all members of a set. Types of features used for classifying also changed. The tendency to categorize on perceptual bases (6-9 years) declines while categorizing on the basis of function increases.
(Amster, 1965) 298
Verbal and Nonverbal Development
Some of the changes in nonverbal development parallel language
development. Helga Eng has included a chapter on children's drawings
as an expression of their mental development in The Psychology of
Children’s Drawings. According to Eng there is a wide parallelism
th at can be proved to e x ist between the ch ild 's drawings and h is
speech, his formation of concepts and his thinking. For example,
when children are at the babbling stage they are also at the scrib
bling stage. In both cases they are concerned with the whole rather
than the part. Imagination can make connections for the child be
tween the scribbles and words babbled, especially in the later stages
of scribbling. Furthermore, as a child learns speech by imitation,
self-expression, repetition and new language acquisitions, so he leams
drawing by imitation of mental pictures or objects, by presenting his
own version of perception, by learning ways of representing and prac
ticing them. As a child grows, his drawings become more complex just
as h is speech does. He becomes aware o f perspective drawing, r e a lis tic
color, highlights and shading. A child's early drawings although weak
in some ways testify to an imagination which is active and lively.
Similarly, a child's early speech although crude testifies to ongoing active verbal concept formation just as his drawings testify to on going active nonverbal concept formation. (Eng, 1954) Verbal and non verbal development between grades three, four and eight was compared by Norman Eagle using the Lorge-Thomdike intelligence tests. The es timated nonverbal changes were found to be more than three times as great as estimated verbal changes. (Eagle, 1966) 299
Lack of language development may be due to lack of concept
formation, rather than lack of concept formation being due to lack of
language development. More likely the two are interdependent. In a
study of "Expectancy and Perception of an Ambiguous Figure in Pre
school Children" J . Reese and LeRoy Ford Jr. found some perceptual
development to be hampered by lack of concept formation. Six nursery
children were shown pictures of either animals or human faces and were
required to name them. The subjects were then asked to state their
expectancy about the next picture before it was named. The subjects
were then shown a rat-man ambiguous p ictu re. The resu lts showed that
the subjects more often got a stronger set and percept with the animal
p ictu re. Human set was harder to estab lish in young children than
animal set and once established mediated concepts less well. The
fin din gs suggest that the d eficiency in mediation found in young c h il
dren may be a characteristic of early stages of concept formation,
rather than of early stages of child development. (Reese and Ford,
1962)
Striking changes in word associations have been found to be
concomitant with age. Jean Berko discovered that as age increased there was more matching of words with word class (noun, pronoun,
etc.) and less matching of the word with word meaning. The extent to which this phenomenon is due to education is not known. Doris
Entwisle studied word association s of young children. She found that one word calls forth several phrases or images. She also found that words were associated more by grammatical function than by meaning as children grew older. (Entwisle, 1966) On the basis of this and other 300
research, the writer postulates that conceptual language development
progresses from concrete to functional to abstract usage.
Aging
The study of aging deals with developmental trends after adult
maturity has been reached. It is important to understand that conclu
sions about the aging process do not necessarily imply any inherently
natural progression or irrevocable state. Furthermore, there is a
wide variability among people of the same age group. Changes in in
telligence which are associated with age can be due to cultural role
expectations, to education or lack of it, to environmental situations,
or to biological-physical changes, and to research errors.
General in te llig e n c e as measured by in tellig en ce te s t s seems to decline steadily but slightly with aging until about fifty years
and then to decline more sharply. (See Figure 32, page 301)
Relative superiority within a group and between groups is maintained, however. A person of superior intelligence w ill remain superior, although there is intellectual decline compared to his or her earlier level. C. C. Miles and W. R. Miles (1932) found that the d eclin e measured could depend on the type o f t e s t administered. There was greater decline and decline showed at an earlier age when speed tests were used. There have been some contradictory studies which found an increase in in te llig e n c e associated with aging. These in creases have been attributed to continuing education. (Tyler, 1956, pp. 340-50)
Generally learning abilities hold up well. Older subjects do seem to leam a little less readily and the deficit increases with 301
100 Wechsler Full Scale
80
Otis
U) oS u CO 40
20
20 Age
Fig. 32.—The development of general learning ability as shown by three intelligence tests. (Dickinson, 1969, p. 55)
age. Older groups tend to show exaggerated tendencies towards the very types of mistakes that are troublesome for people in general.
Modifying a pattern is what becomes difficult. The greatest deficit in learning ability due to aging is likely to be ability to adapt read ily to change. However, as David Ausubel points out, while the individual does not continue to grow as rapidly in his ability to solve novel problems, he extends his knowledge about and ability in ,302
solving old problems. Ausubel describes the latter as an increase in
horizontal intelligence and the former as an increase in vertical intel
ligence. According to Ausubel, intelligence testing has primarily meas
ured increases in vertical intelligence. (Ausubel, 1968, pp. 231-33) The
consensus is that age does not prevent learning.
In making decisions about conceptual communication objectives and
methods i t i s important to know which sp ecial a b ilit ie s seem to decline
with age. Contrary to common opinion motor skills are not the earliest
to mature and the quickest to d eclin e. They hold up w ell u n til advanced
age as does judgment. It is visual perception which matures early and
is the first to decline. Other sensory and perceptual skills also tend
to decline early, such as deafness to high pitches, less sensitivity to
touch, to taste, smell, pain. However, there is generally no signifi
cant decline in these perceptual abilities before the fifties. While
motor s k ills hold up w ell u n til through middle age, there i s a change
in the methods by which task s are done. The idea seems to be that by
changing to a different procedure it is possible to maintain a complex
skill even when perceptual abilities decline. Increased efficiency
from reorganization compensates for decreased perceptual efficiency.
Whereas vocabulary and reading a b ilit ie s tend to remain con
stant or increase with aging, nonverbal abilities such as numbers and
reasoning decline with age. Memory decrement before advanced age de pends on the subject matter and the extent to which it is used. Re
sults with the Wechsler-Bellevue test showed the least age decrement to occur on the information test and the most on the Digit Symbol t e s t . 303
In "Learning in Adulthood : the Role of Intelligence" Nancy
Bayley considers what kinds of intellectual abilities show growth into
adulthood? And, how are these related to concept learning? What are
the implications for the teaching of concepts to adults? (Klausmeier
and Harris, 1966, p. 117) Bayley reports on the examination of intel
ligence in adults by L. M. Terman (a study she also worked on) and by
herself in the Berkley Growth Study.
It is hard to generalize Terman's findings to the general pop
ulation because his subjects were gifted people and their spouses. It
is also hard to generalize Terman's findings to general intelligence trends because his testing was almost entirely of verbal abilities.
Terman defined intelligence as the ability to carry on abstract thinking. He devised a test for adults called the Concept Mastery Test.
Because his conclusions are based on scores on this test one could cor r ec tly assume that he equates abstract thinking processes with high le v e l concepts. The Concept Mastery Test includes the subtests of synonyms, antonyms and analogies. Although both are highly verbal, the former requires word knowledge, the latter relatively more reasoning. There was more increase on the synonym-antonym scale than on the subtest that required more reasoning, less rote verbal knowledge.
Terman's study was a follow-up of his study of gifted children.
The former gifted children and their spouses were used as subjects.
The study included ages 20-50 years. While all scores showed increases, there was a tendency for the greatest increase to occur in the males and for the least to occur in the older groups of the wives of gifted males.
Terman's study indicates that ability to leam (at least in verbal areas increases with age (at least to fifty) in people of superior intelligence. 304
The Berkley Growth Study was designed to compensate for some
of the shortcomings of the Terman study. Its population was more rep
resentative of the general population, and its several subtests in
cluded nonverbal and verbal abilities. There were research difficul
tie s, however, which could not be overcome. The study was longitudinal
and therefore subject to attrition and confounding environmental fac
tors. Practice effects of repeated testing could not be controlled.
The mean education for the fifty-eight longitudinally followed cases
was 15.5 years. The mean education of the group of fathers of the
sample originally chosen was 13.7 years. Attrition seemed to change
the nature of the sample little.
The Berkley Growth Study used the Wechsler-Bellevue Test of
Adult Intelligence (W-B) and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
(WAIS). These are called the Wechsler Scales of Intelligence. Adults
were studied to the age of thirty-six years. Generally, it appeared
that the intellectual potential of subjects for continued learning is
unimpaired through thirty-six years and, it was hypothesized, probably
beyond to at le a st f if t y years or longer.
The study's conclusion was based on findings that generally
intelligence scores remained stable. Scores on verbal subtests in
creased. Other exceptions were that there was a slight decline in
female performance on most nonverbal tests after age twenty-six and that arithmetic and digit span scores declined in both males and fe males after age twenty-six. (Digit span is a subtest of recall from memory.) With males there was an improvement in scores on block de sign tests and a decline in scores on picture competition. Generally, however, males maintained stable scores on nonverbal tests. The 305
verbal test of similarities (as it had in other studies) showed no in
crease but remained stable. Bayley notes that the Berkley Growth Study
and other research studies have indicated that the continued ability
to leam seems to depend not just on intelligence and aging but also
on motivation, drive, ample time and opportunity factors in learning.
To summarize: for older adults message designers may need to
reorganize lessons on complex sk ills so that common mistakes are avoided
and to use presentation methods that do not cause time pressures. Extra
care in explanation and reinforcement should be given in nonverbal skills learning. Continuing education helps prevent decline in concep tual ability. Conceptual development probably becomes more dependent on verbal presentation after aging occurs.
Sex Differences
The results of research on sex differences in general cognitive ability have proved to be so insignificant and so inconsistent from one test situation to another that they are of little use. Another reason for their relative worthlessness is the great variability found within each sex. There are too many exceptions to allow one to generalize easily about the intellectual characteristics of either sex. The more generalizable differences seem to lie in the area of emotions, apti tudes and attitudes. Even in these areas it is as yet impossible to pinpoint the causes of any differences. The exact extent to which the differences are biological, cultural, educational or experiential in origin is not known. Cultural and other experiential factors seem to contribute most to any sex d ifferen ces. 306
It would be h elpful for determining the extent to which sex
differences are culturally caused if another extensive investigation
like the L- M. Terman and the C. C. Miles study of 1936 was conducted.
This study administered a battery of tests with items designed to
measure m asculinity or fem ininity as defined by our culture. Data
were gathered from many occupational, age and educational level
groups. The battery consisted of tests on Word Association, Inkblot
Association, Information, Emotional and Ethical Attitudes, Interests,
Opinions and Introvertive Response. If this study were replicated
today and extended to include tests of specific cognitive abilities
the results could be compared with the findings of the 1936 Terman
and Miles study and the Dorthea McCarthy studies on language develop
ment. The effects of culture could be revealed by changes over time.
Biologically caused sex differences which influence cognitive
achievement include the tendency of girls and boys to mature at dif
ferent rates and the greater vital capacity of males. Because girls
mature sooner their linguistic abilities may have had a better chance
to develop so that by the time a girl enters school she has an advan
tage over a boy. Her maturity may also make it easier for a girl to
adjust to a school atmosphere. While the development acceleration of
girls has been proven, the intellectual acceleration of girls is still
only inferred by analogy with physical development.
The average male weighs about 5 per cent more than the average
female at birth and about 20 per cent more at age twenty. He is about
1 to 2 per cent taller than the female at birth and about 10 per cent taller at age twenty. From early infancy he exhibits more vigorousness and restlessness. He seems to be able to inhale and exhale a much 307
greater volume of a ir from h is lungs. (The amount of a ir that can be
inhaled and exhaled is called vital capacity. Vital capacity is an im
portant factor in sustained energy output.) In early childhood the
average vital capacity of boys exceeds that of girls by about 70 per
cent, by adulthood the male excess is about 35 per cent.
The ratio between body weight and vital capacity is called the
vital index. At all ages the vital index of boys is greater than that
of girls. Even in proportion to his size, the average male consumes
more fuel and produces more energy than the female. The greater vital
capacity of males may increase the likelihood of their manipulating
and coming across a variety of mechanical objects. This may indirectly
facilitate the development of clearer mechanical concepts. Aggressive ness and dominance may also be fostered by th e ir greater v it a l capacity.
This may lead to greater achievement and control by males.
The specific cognitive aptitudes attributed to each sex by our western culture seem to result from rearing boys and girls in different subcultures. Boys and girls receive differential treatment in many ways. Whatever the cause—biological or cultural or both—the cogni tive differences between the sexes can be sketched as follows.
Females excel in verbal fluency. While females have an early superiority in verbal reasoning and verbal fluency, they do not neces sarily surpass males in knowledge of discrete word meanings. When word knowledge tests are controlled for sex differences, no significant dif ferences are found. The language ability of boys is more variable.
This is primarily due to increased incidence of language disturbance among boys. About four to six times more boys than girls are af flicted by stuttering. ("Stuttering,” World Book Encyclopedia, 1969, p. 744) 308
Support for environment as well as maturational causes of sex
differences in language ability comes from studies which show the only
child or first child to have superior verbal ability regardless of sex.
Amount of conversational contact with adults seems to be a very impor
tant factor in the development of verbal ability. In England, boys
surpass girls on vocabulary tests. Negro boys in this country sur
pass Negro girls on vocabulary tests. This is further evidence for
the roles of experience and cultural expectation in language develop
ment.
Girls excel in school achievement but not in nonschool achieve
ment. In a follow-up of the Stanford Gifted Child Study two-thirds of
the women with IQ's of 170 or above were housewives or office workers.
Most of the women who have achieved prominence have done so through
their position as wives, mothers or daughters. (Bird and Briller,
1968)
The women who achieve the most intellectually in nonschool en vironments have many masculine characteristics. Females excel in memory, esp ecia lly in lo g ic a l memory and in memory for d e ta ils . Women
seem to have a much more vivid mental imagery than men in every sense modality. When tasks require accuracy, manual dexterity, frequent shifts if attention, or rapid perception of details, women are superior performers.
They show superior clerical aptitude. On the Minnesota Cleri cal Test, for example, women were far superior to men in checking simi larities or differences in lists of names and numbers. This difference was significant from fifth grade through twelfth grade. The reason for this superiority on this and other clerical tests is that the tests are 309
speed tests. Women excel in perceptual speed when categorizing and dif
ferentiating is required. Girls excel in categorizing ability on non
speed tests too but only until the sixth grade. (Ausubel, 1968, p. 242)
Girls tend to set their aspirations lower no matter what their
ability. They also revise their aspirations downward more quickly when told of inadequate achievement. Men are less apt to accept more realis tic aspirations in the event of failure.
Women are mainly interested in occupations dealing with people's welfare. Women tend to be more impulsive. Women do not have as many vision defects as men. (Anastasi, 1958, pp. 47 0-92)
One other characteristic of women is their field dependence.
This means they find it harder to disregard the perceptual field and environment. The environment controls their response more. They are less able to find embedded figures in confusing contexts for example.
Despite their ability to perceive details they use a more global, scanning, non-analysis approach to problem solving. They find it hard to resist irrelevant cues. (Ross and Messick, 1962, pp. 201-202)
Eckhard H. Hess (1965) has used records of pupil size and eye movement in reaction to pictures to study sex differences in inter ests. He found men paid more attention to the whole picture and women concentrated more on special areas in the picture. Women showed more interest in people and men in buildings and the general environment.
Women were interested in facial features and foreground objects. Men were interested in d e ta ils of clothing and equipment in background fea tu res.
While g ir ls are very dependent on environment, boys seem to be dependent very much on emotional climate. Different child rearing 310
patterns can produce different emotional climates and thus can lead to
cognitive differences. Boys with positively evaluating, equalitarian,
affectionate mothers tend to have high intelligence quotients. The in
te llig e n c e quotients of g ir ls do not seem to be as related to emotional
climate as much as are boys’-(Klausmeier and Harris, 1966, pp. 130-33)
There are other sex differences attributable to males. Males
seem to be b etter able to restructure a problem. They can solve prob
lems by approaching it in different ways—by reconstructing the prob
lem. There is some evidence that superior ability in restructuring is
a matter of attitude. As such, it is susceptible to training. (Tyler,
1956, p. 253) While males excel at some types of problem solving,
females may be able to handle better the less structured problem
solving situation. This is an especially good area for research.
In more abstract conceptual thinking such as scien ce, mathe
matics and history, men seem to excel. Perhaps abstract thinking is
made more difficult for females by her more vivid, concrete, people
not object-oriented imagery. Men find it easier to form concepts which
have visually expressed form characteristics as defining attributes.
Males fractionate more when visually analyzing a stimulus. (Bruner,
1966, pp. 11-12) A boy breaks the stimulus up into more parts and thus
comes to associate more characteristics with a concept he has formed.
Males have a significantly greater average category width. (Crane,
1965, pp. 44, 45) This means a boy has a greater probability of asso
ciating a correct concept when presented with only a fraction of a
stimulus. It also means a boy is likely to have more flexibility in hypothesis formation and testing. Males also excel in tasks which 311
require large body movements and in tasks which require spatial orienta
tion. They are more object than people oriented.
When the effects of sex differences on concept attainment have
been studied directly, findings have revealed no significant differences
in overall ability. (Van Engen and Steffe, 1966) There are some differ
ences due to the kind of concept being attained•
A study by Wayne Frederick revealed no significant differences
in average speed of concept attainment. However, in attaining the con
cept women did make fewer card choices and did react more to the dif
ferences between the training concepts. The results of Frederick's
experiment suggest that females have more difficulty in attaining a form concept when they must represent it figurally instead of ver bally. (Frederick, 1965, pp. 14-15)
What are the implications of sex differences in concept attain ment for conceptual communication design? None of the implications is substantiated well enough to be offered as a principle. Nevertheless, these nine implications are preferred as starting points for further research.
1. Perhaps the comparative rarity of specialization of in
terests in women until recently has contributed to their
inability to maintain their lead in achievement. Women
should be encouraged to take a deep interest in a few
special areas of conceptualizing. (Tyler, 1956, p. 260)
2. Perhaps the environment should be very free of irrelevant
cues when girls initially leam a concept.
3. Girls should be trained in restructuring a conceptual
problem. 312
4. Boys w ill probably develop concepts better in a warm,
equalitarian emotional climate.
5. Girls handle form concepts best probably when the con
cepts are given verbal labels.
6. It may be helpful to give young boys special opportunities
for adult conversation and young girls special opportunity
for outdoor play and object-oriented conversation.
7. Males may need sp ecial help in verbal s k ills . Females
may need special help in spatial manipulation of concepts.
8. Allowances probably should be made for boys needing to
proceed at a slower rate on manual dexterity and perceptual
tasks and girls needing to proceed more slowly on tasks re
quiring large, continuous outputs of energy. Boys should
probably be allowed more time when forming concepts. Girls
should probably be allowed more time when collecting expe
rience.
9. Girls may need special training in "fractionating"—
analyzing a mathematical or mechanical concept into many
component a ttrib u tes.
Such information may be most helpful, not for maintaining sex differ ences, but rather for enabling us to take them into account, so that both sexes have an equal chance at all kinds of concept attainment.
Personality Differences
So far the only personality types to have had extensive re search done on their concept formation processes are the extreme types, authoritarian and schizophrenic. The more extreme personality types 313
are easier to id en tify and measure because th eir syndromes of charac
teristics seem to be more consistently and completely present and con
sequently, yield le s s ambiguous measurements. (English and English,
1958, p. 384)
For the purpose of this study "personality" shall refer to pat
terns of physical, affective and cognitive traits which determine be
havior tendencies—probable reactions or responses. One might ask how
the construct "personality" differs from the construct "cognitive struc
ture." The terms are nearly synonymous being distinguished primarily
by the nature of the research and theory supporting each construct. The
emphasis of personality is on emotional tendencies—on emotional causes
and effects. The emphasis of cognitive structure is on habitual organi
zational tendencies—on cognitive causes and effects. This study will
not consider abilities separately from personality traits as is cus
tomary. Cognitive abilities will be related to personality traits and
discussed as cognitive style.
Conceptual Systems
0. J. Harvey, D. E. Hunt and M. M. Schroder prepared a massive historical survey and theoretical study in which they attempted to in tegrate cognitive and dynamic th eories of development. They examined diverse areas such as child development, attitude change, psychopathology and personality measurement. They tried to relate research findings on child training to research findings on adult personality, especially in the cognitive structure area. Some of their theoretical system has al ready been described on pages 294-95, 296 under the top ic Mental Devel opment . In brief, they postulated that there were three conceptual 314
systems or stages which have to be passed through before maturity or
conceptual System IV is reached.
A conceptual system in our view is a schema that provides the basis by which the individual relates to the environmental events he experiences. It describes, in part, how he will per ceive and experience these events. (Harvey, Hunt and Schroder, 1961, pp. 244-45)
Thinking at the level of any of the systems. I, II, III, or IV, can
assume one o f two forms depending on what dimensions predominates.
Problems such as threat produced by increased pressure can prevent transition from one stage to the next.
I f the w riter were to recommend any one book as supplementary
reading on conceptual communication, it would be Harvey, Hunt and
Schroder’s book on Conceptual Systems and Personality Organization.
Their theory is constructed in great detail. Their theoretical system warrants further testing to determine if it holds up as well practi cally as it does theoretically. Until this further testing is done, their ideas can be presented as suggestive and provocative but not as established truths.
It is important to realize though that Harvey, Hunt and Schroder did test some of their theory. Furthermore, they note when their theo ries have not been tested experimentally. (Ibid., p. 264) System I was not tested as extensively as were Systems II, III and IV. There was more previous research available on System I (authoritarian personality studies) than on the other systems.
The present dimensional structure and its method of derivation are quite different from Eysenck's which was developed by factor analysis of psychiatric ratings and other standard measures. We have proceeded on the basis of theory, observation and experimen tation, viewing factorial and other statistical approaches as means for testing derived hypotheses. (Ibid•, p. 324) 315
The aspect of their theory which is of most interest for this
study is presented in Chapter Ten, "Modifications of Conceptual Systems:
Education and Psychological Therapy." The chapter describes the impli
cations of their theories for conceptual modification by education.
The general aim of the progression from Systems I to IV is to
produce a conceptual structure less vulnerable to harmful internal and
external influences. This means that the general aim of modification
by education is to produce a more abstract conceptual structure.
Harvey, Hunt and Schroder characterize this abstract conceptual struc
ture with creativity, stress, tolerance, flexibility cr adaptability.
They hypothesize that personalities which have excessive closedness* have a chance to progress to more abstract conceptual systems through
education.
The authors state that in order for structural change to occur, there must be openness to progression. When one desires to reduce ex treme closedness special procedures are recommended.
Two general principles apply. First the procedure cannot deviate too far from the conceptual baseline of the structure of the per son. Second, the determinants of the current structure provide the logical basis for selecting appropriate procedures. One must know how the structure developed in order to know how to change i t . (Ib id . , p. 335)
As examples Harvey, Hunt and Schroder give these suggestions.
To reduce System I closedness one can create a simpler le s s ambiguous environment as is done when schizophrenic patients are hospitalized.
In Stage II closedness can be the result of perceived threat from
*"Openness-closedness refers to the receptivity of the system to external events or varied interpretations of the situation. Com plete closedness would mean the inaccessibility .to external impinge ments; i f one's concepts were completely closed they would be impossible to refute." (Harvey, Hunt and Schroder, 1961, pp. 76, 82) 316
pressures towards imposed control or toward dependency. Therefore,
progression is fostered when adult control is more minimized in favor
of self or group control. Casual friendliness may encourage progres
sion from Stage I I .
Because Stage III closedness is more abstract than Stage II
closed n ess, verbal methods may be more effectiv e for encouraging pro
gression than they would have been in Stage II. Thus, in-depth dis
cussion may be more helpful.
The factor most important to the success of a procedure with
each system is called a system's area of sensitivity. System I is
sensitized to react negatively to ambiguity. System II is sensitized
to react negatively to imposition of restriction. System III is sen
sitized to react positively to source attractiveness. System IV is
sensitized to react positively to source competence (information poten tia l). Thus System I personalities tend to make overgeneralized re
sponses in concept formation. System II personalities would, in
forming concepts, sort on the basis of restrictio n s imposed by the stim ulus. In System III concept formation would be influenced by normative evaluations of concepts. System IV personalities would sort on the basis of information potential. (Ibid., pp. 263-64)
Thus i f in Stage II the communication i s made to seem le ss potentially restrictive the behavior is less likely to be restriction of the message. Similarly, if the learner is in Stage III and the source is made attractive, then the learner behavior is more likely to accept the message. If the learner is in Stage IV and the source's competence is stressed, the learner is more likely to accept informa tion presented. 317
The authors note four training conditions and their interaction with the conceptual stages or levels. Because the conditions were de duced from child studies, they are defined more in terms of parental be havior in the home than teacher behavior. Similar conditions could be
expected in the school. Classroom climates and training conditions can vary in consistency, in dogmatism, in freedom allowed.
The training conditions are defined in Table 12, which is taken from Conceptual Systems and Personality Organization.
TABLE 12
DEFINITIONS AND EXAMPLES OF TRAINING CONDITIONS
Condition
R eliable Unreliable P rotective Informational U nilateral U nilateral Interdependent Interdependent
D efin ition Arbitrary, In con sist Encourages sub Encourages sub but con ent con jects to ex ject to explore s is t e n t. t r o l. Ex plore environ environment. im position cessiv ely ment, but Reflects infor of source- high goals. guides ex mational conse defined In d iffer ploration . quences to sub- standards ence and Source an j e c t . Subj ect or abso n e g le c t. tic ip a te s reacts to conse lu te c r i fa ilu r e. quences of own terion . behavior.
Examples Overdomina Parental Some forms of Intrinsic eval tion; auto rejection; maternal over uation (Ausubel, cratic parental protection 1952). Some train in g; n e g le c t. training that forms of demo bureau Overly emphasize cratic training. cra tic high de "getting along Autotelic activi role mands with others" t i e s (Anderson tr a in in g . based on and avoiding and Moore, (Merton, impulsive fa ilu r e. 1959). 1940) or chang ing standards.
Source: Ibid., p. 133. 318
The varying effects of the different training conditions are
given as amount of openness to Poles A-F. Poles A-F are the opposing
poles of the conceptual system at each stage. (Table 13)
TABLE 13
POLES OF CONCEPTUAL SYSTEM AT EACH STAGE
Stages Poles
I. A. External control
B. Opposition to external control
II. C. Negative independence
D. Dependency on others
III. E. Mutuality
F. Autonomy
Source: Ibid., pp. 116-17
The interaction between training conditions and conceptual stages has the hypothesized consequences for concept development shown in Table 14 on the following page. To use Table 14 the communications designer could decide what conceptual stage the learner was at and then check on the effects of a proposed training condition on that stage.
If the student seems more interested in his independence than in consid ering information it is likely he is at Stage II of conceptual develop ment. If so, he will flourish under protective interdependent or in formational interdependent training conditions and fail under unreli able unilateral training conditions. TABLE 14
INTERACTION BETWEEN TRAINING CONDITIONS AND STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT
Training Conditions
Stage R elia b le U n reliab le P ro tectiv e Informational or Level U n ila tera l U n ila te r a l Interdepend ent Interd epend ent
F ir s t Openness to Pole A and Openness to Pole B and Openness to Pole A and Openness to Pole A Stage closedness to Pole B. increasing closedness Pole B. Plus Stage III and P ole B. Plus Arrestation at Stage I to Pole A. tendencies in Pole A. Stage IV tendencies.
Level I Openness to Pole B and Integration of modi Integration of T ransi closedness to Pole A fied Pole A and Pole B. Pole A and P ole B. tio n increasing.
Second Failure to integrate Emergence of Stage II Emergence of Stage Stage P ole A and Pole B- concepts. Increasing II con cep ts. Open Closedness to Pole A relative openness to ness to Pole C and and to P ole D. Ar P ole D. Pole D. Stage IV restation to Stage II. ten d en cies
L evel II Openness to Pole D and Integration of Pole T ransi closedness to Pole C C and P ole D• tio n increasing •
Third Failure to integrate Emergence of Stage Stage Pole C and Pole D. III concepts. Closedness to Pole C Openness to Pole E and Pole F . A rresta and P ole F. tion at Stage III. CO (-■ so TABLE 14— Continued
Training Conditions
stage Reliable Unreliable Protective Informational or Level U n ila tera l U n ila tera l Interd epend ent Interd epend ent
Level III Integration of T ransi P ole E and Pole tio n F.
Fourth Emergence of Stage Stage IV con cep ts .
Source: Ibid., p- 134.
CO to o 321
The problem with Harvey, Hunt and Schroder's theoretical system
is that it is one dimensional. Conceptual development is seen only in
terms of the abstract-concrete continuum. Furthermore, in their system,
concreteness seems to mean rigid and authoritarian.
Personality Types
Authoritarianism
A few personality types have now generated considerable amounts
of research on conceptualization. Foremost among these well-researched
personality types is the authoritarian personality. The classic re
search in this area was done by T. W. Adomo. (Adomo, 1950) Adorno
identified the authoritarian personality as,
( l ) r ig id ity , the intolerance o f ambiguity, and the dogmatism of attitude, (2) a greater tendency toward anti-introceptive orientations as opposed to reflective insight, (3) the anti- scientific attitudes based on a relative inability of question rules, dogma, or principles, and (4) an anti-democratic ideology. (Harvey, Hunt and Schroder, 1961, p. 176)
Adomo constructed an F scale (prefascism) to measure authoritarianism.
Harvey, Hunt and Schroder classify the authoritarian personality as ar
restation at System I functioning. (Harvey, Hunt and Schroder, 1961, pp. 211-18) David Reisman describes an extern ally-con trolled , conform
ing personality as tradition-directed.
Authoritarian p erso n a lities seem to accept messages most
readily from institutionally derived high status sources. The concep tualization of such personalities is characterized by categorical judg ments which are too black and white, too rigid, too either/or. The authoritarian personality tends also to be more highly anxious. 322
Zoitan p. Dienes designed an experimental study of the connec
tion between the cognitive and orectic (appetitive) aspects of person
ality. Dienes' findings are in line with other findings about the
authoritarian's personality. He found that the more stereotyped a per
son's personality is, the more that person thinks in concrete and un-
creative terms. Furthermore, the less intelligent subjects showed more tendency to stereotypy.
Dienes also suggests ways of measuring how people organize con
cepts and the rigidity or flexibility with which they hold these organ izations of concepts. (Dienes, 1965, pp. 9-10) A large number of con cepts usually means that an individual is flexible enough to organize his concepts in many ways. Concepts which are organized into smaller regions are usually more rigid and produce a point of view that is harder to shift.
Ruth Gordon's study of the controllability of imagery (see page 131) resulted in a significant relationship between controlla bility of imagery and the rigidity with which beliefs are held. The less a person was able to control his imagery the more rigid a thinker he tended to be. For example, upon being presented with a stimulus and asked to produce as many associations to it as possible, the more rigid thinker stopped after giving one or a few associations. They could not associate fluently. (Gordon, 1962)
A subject's performance in a task of restricted association may be highly task-specific, however. Evidence of this is provided by P.
Hofstaetler, J. O'Connor and A. Suzieddis' study of "Sequences of Re stricted Associative Responses and Their Personality Correlates."
(H ofstaetler, O'Connor and Suzieddis, 1957) This study found no 323
relationship between number of associations produced in a limited amount
of time and temperamental characteristics or performance characteristics
as measured by Thurstone's factors V and W. Gordon's task was to pro
duce associates to names for common stereotypes. It may be, therefore,
that controllability of imagery is related to authoritarianism only
when known stereotypes are involved.
It would be helpful if there were more research on the relation
ship between student dogmatism and the success o f various in stru ction al
approaches- Harvey, Hunt and Schroder suggest that for the authoritar
ian personality learning w ill be likely to occur only in situations with
a high degree of structure and clearly prescribed rules of behavior.
Int roversi on-Extraversi on
Zolton Dienes also tried to find out if there was any relation
ship between introversion-extraversion and cognitive style. His re
sults were equivocal. Introversion correlated positively with anxiety,
cohesion (connectedness of stories) and general intelligence in boys
but only with cohesion in girls. Anxiety seems to play a different
role in a girl's personality. In girls anxiety is more connected with
conformity. (Dienes, 1965, pp. 62-63) Extraversion correlated with
conformity in boys.
The writer believes there is a need for more research on any relationship between the factors of introversion-extraversion, of im- pulsively-reflectivity and of conceptual system- Is an introverted personality likely to be reflective, and if so is he likely to be a mature thinker? Will an introverted personality who is impulsive be likely to be compulsively independent? Questions such as the foregoing 324
need to be asked experimentally. The need for such research is under
scored by the finding that authoritarian personalities avoid introspec
tion and by the hypothesis that impulsive thinking is associated with
less involvement in intellectual mastery than reflective thinking.
(Bruner, 1966, p. 10)
Mental Disturbance
D. Moriarty and L. Kates state that researchers of schizo
phrenia, however, divided on other issues,
. . . agree that schizophrenia is a reaction to severe inter personal disturbance in infancy and early childhood with a re sulting sensibility to interpersonal stimuli, particularly to stimuli that threaten personal security. (Moriarty and Kates, 1962, p. 355)
Schizophrenic conceptualization is characterized by being
1. Unrealistic—a lack of integration of private concepts
with reality, an inhibition of the checking of concepts
with reality, with outside sources;
2. Private—no agreement with others on meaning can be
reached, so cia l communication becomes d if f ic u lt ;
3. Overgeneralized—overinclusion of meanings associated
with a concept, inclusion of incorrect objects in a con
ceptual category;
4. Open—the more open a concept is the more abstract it is
and the fewer the attributes that are used to define it;
thus the concept becomes private, not public. (Pikas,
1966, p. 71)
5. Rigid—incapable of shifting from a thought pattern.
The schizophrenic is more dependent on interpersonal communi cation than is normal. He finds social concepts difficult to attain 325
or retain, perhaps because they are threatening. They might touch on
sensitive areas. All of these characteristics of schizophrenia may be
summed up as a lack of differentiation, especially of reality and un
r e a lity .
Harvey, Hunt and Schroder offer the opinion that although ex
treme System II functioning is often considered the form of mental
disturbance that is most dangerous for society, extreme System I func
tioning may be a more dangerous form of mental disturbance. Witness
Nazism and other forms of intolerance as contrasted with the aggres
sion, hostility or rebellion of delinquents. The former accepts or
promotes external control to such an extent that it becomes a more
general organizational influence than the System II behavior which
often rejects external control entirely.
Because the classic Goldstein studies in this area found that
schizophrenics had narrow concepts characterized by over-exclusion of
objects from a conceptual category, the thought of schizophrenics was
originally believed to be characterized by extreme concreteness.
(G oldstein and Scheerer, 1941) Later research by N. Cameron advanced
the theory that impairment was greatest in social concepts so that
there was not necessarily a general deterioration of abstract ability.
Cameron further challenged K. Goldstein’s theory of over-exclusion.
(Pikas, 1956, pp. 69-74) Cameron found schizophrenia more character
ized by over-inclusion. L. J. Chapman clarified the issue somewhat.
He found th at i f brain-damaged p atien ts were considered separately
from schizophrenic patients, brain-damaged patients gave evidence of
over-exclusion and schizophrenic patients, of over-inclusion. Chapman
could separate these two types of disturbance because schizophrenia 326
could now be identified by the social disarticulation characteristic
(in general, impairment of social concepts only). Thus, it was de
cided that rigidity was not synonymous with concreteness.
In schizophrenia there is rigidity of more abstract thought.
Yet schizophrenic thought is not characterized by concreteness or
over-exclusion but rather by openness (abstraction) and over
inclusion (overgeneralization).
The rigidity of schizophrenia is thus related to systematic
training which allows for no dissent. The rigidity of brain-damaged
thought is thought to be due to a biological inability to function
at a higher conceptual level.
Ability Differences
Types of learners classified according to ability differences include the mentally retarded, the culturally deprived, the physically handicapped, the gifted, the creative, the middle class, the rural, the suburban, the urban, the modem, the primitive. In this sec tio n the ch a ra cteristics of each of th ese types which are most impor tant for conceptual communication w ill be related to the training methods which experience has shown to be most e ffe c tiv e with that type. Because each person belongs to national, geographical and socioeconomic groups as well as to other groups, it is clear that a person can be categorized by more than one ability type.
Mentally Retarded
One of the important issues in educating the mentally retarded i s suggested by fin din gs which seem to have co n flictin g im plications.
The cognitive abilities of mentally retarded children who are kept in 327
the simpler institutionalized environment deteriorate. More stimulating
environments and education seem to cause improvement in mentally re
tarded children. On the other hand, Samuel Kirk and G. Orville Johnson
state that the usual classroom environment is too stimulating to allow
mentally retarded children to concentrate. (Kirk and Johnson, 1951)
Teachers are urged to dress plainly and simplify methods and surround
ings. It is hard to judge Kirk and Johnson's conclusions because there
are confounding factors such as amount of attention given and the com
plexity or simplicity of lessons. It would not be surprising if there
were optimal conditions or amounts of complexity or simplicity for the
mentally retarded just as there are for normal learners. Moreover,
different mentally retarded learners w ill probably differ in the amount
of complexity they are able to tolerate in their learning environment.
Mentally retarded pupils are often hyperactive and very dis- tractible. They have poor imaginai, verbal and memory ability. (See page 130) They can enjoy monotonous ta sk s. (Kirk and Johnson, 1951)
Teachers of the mentally retarded have been advised to enforce their conventions and rules very consistently; to be more concerned with patterning, than with motivating; to avoid talking too much by engaging students in "doing" activities; to structure learning by topical activities which are easy to remember; to avoid discovery learning which requires mental leap s. Rote learning methods are rec ommended. Abstract content and creative learning activities are not recommended.
Some mentally retarded children are not able to place things in sequence. They need to leam to do activities step by step. The 328
mathetic* approach to programmed instruction has been found to help
mentally retarded learners place activities in sequence. Labels and
marks can help mentally retarded learners recognize parts. Games and
play can help the mentally retarded child improve his coordination.
It is difficult for them to do abstract thinking, to general
ize, to form concepts. Nevertheless, the retarded can form and
verbalize concepts; although they have more difficulty than normal or
schizophrenic students in shifting from one correct concept to another.
According to Kirk and Johnson, when the mentally retarded are to be
taken on field trips, special controls are recommended. Students can
be schooled in advance to stop and look every six steps. With the
mentally retarded, too great a change in a scene can cause wildly
overreacting emotions that are difficult to handle.
The most important aspect of conceptual communication with the
mentally retarded seems to be confidence. They need to have confidence
in their own ability to leam. Teachers need to have confidence that they can leam some things when the correct approach is used. (National
Institutes of Health, 1968, pp. 14-17)
The writer thinks that conclusions that the mentally retarded are incapable of attaining abstract concepts or of being creative need further research. It may be that under the right learning conditions the mentally retarded can show some constructive creativity and can
*The mathetic approach is designed to keep motivation contin ually before the student. The program starts with the event to be achieved—the motivating event. The program then proceeds to the steps immediately preceding the final event. Then the program re views these steps and the final event. By this means the program eventually reaches the in itial steps. A mathetic program proceeds from the final event to the first steps. There is review throughout the program. The motivation is kept before the student. 329
attain some abstract concepts* This reaction is prompted by Leon
Radaker's findings on the imagery of the mentally retarded. (Radaker,
1961) Radaker found the imaginai ability of the mentally retarded to
be poor. Consequently, he tried pretraining the mentally retarded in
imagery before he attempted to teach them spelling. The pretraining
helped their learning. It may be that pretraining in creativity or
generalizing could help some of the mentally retarded leam.
The perceptual image received by the mentally retarded i s d if
ferent from that received by normal children. Retarded children with
perceptual disturbances may be unable to recognize the whole and may
see only a part of it. Normal children see figures against ground—
see parts related to whole. Retarded children may see only a part
and not recognize the whole* (Thresher, 1962) Because they have dif
ficulty in copying as well as in perception of the whole perhaps due
to confused brain perception, the mentally retarded need extra oppor
tunity to practice copying and concept identification.
Culturally Deprived
I Cultural deprivation seems to be a cause of mental retardation,
especially when coupled with environmentally caused emotional disturb
ances and biologically caused low intellectual ability. Among learners
of marginal (close to retardation) intelligence more members of the
lower or culturally deprived classes develop mental retardation than
do members of the upper classes. Culturally deprived learners have many characteristics in common with mentally retarded learners. Cul turally deprived learners characteristically have poor verbal ability including fewer concepts, poor usage and sentence structure and a 330
smaller vocabulary, especially in relational words like conjunctions*
They are used to sparse, emotional, authoritarian conversation; thus,
th e ir language background i s more " restricted." A child from a more
enriched background w ill ch a ra cteristica lly use a more "elaborated"
language. (Smith, 1966, pp. 427-41)
Because objects are not as readily available to the culturally
deprived, th e ir imaginai background i s also often poor or at lea st d if
ferent. Research is needed on the extent to which the imagery of the
culturally deprived is poor or simply different. The culturally de
prived are very anxious in a school environment. Their concentration
spans are short. They are more responsive to the prospects of imme
diate than delayed gratification. The culturally deprived have a
greater need for security.
The teaching methods most e ffe c tiv e with the cu ltu ra lly de prived are not surprising. They seem to need cultural enrichment; activity, not lectures; short lessons; training in learning skills; tangible rewards and incentives; guided discovery or structured learn ing; immediate reinforcement; a warm, accepting atmosphere; praise and friendship and help in developing a self-concept (a feeling of self- id e n tity ) .
One of the issues which needs investigating is the extent to which the cumulative effects of cultural deprivation can be reversed.
Another relevant issue is whether there are critical periods for learning certain things. If so, to what extent are these periods determined biologically, and to what extent can they be determined by educational preparation or readiness? Another issue is the means by which cognitive drive can be u tiliz ed most su ccessfu lly for 331
culturally deprived learners. How can the aggressiveness and violent
imaginations characteristic of many of the urban culturally deprived
be directed into constructive, perhaps creative, channels?
The culturally deprived need compensatory education in concept
formation which means very detailed instruction in areas where th eir
background i s poor. We should not forget th at most learners are cu l
turally deprived in some areas. Even middle class learners can have
poor backgrounds for learning. Boys are often culturally deprived in
some areas and girls in others. (Klausmeier and Harris, 1966, pp. 189-
206; Robison and Mukerji, 1965; Taba and Elkins, 1966)
Middle Class
Social class differences in child rearing, values, interests and attitudes influence the conceptual needs and abilities of middle class children, as well as those of the more culturally deprived chil dren. Middle class children consistently score higher on intelligence tests than do lower class children. Much of this difference may be due to a middle class verbal bias built into intelligence tests. Middle class children have less difficulty with verbal problems than do lower class children.
While lower class children need security most, middle class children are most concerned with advancement and success. Middle class learners are likely to be better adjusted. They show strong artistic and literary interests, have more social poise, security and confidence in themselves and others and report fewer fears and anxieties. (Anastasi, 1958, p. 512) 332
Middle cla ss parents demand more conformity. They are more
likely to stifle creativity. On the other hand, the middle classes en
courage education and intellectual development. The middle class child
is likely to be reared in a warm, child centered home and to leam to
value interpersonal relationships. He is sometimes sheltered from re
sponsibility, or overprotected.
Because middle class children are studious, value education,
and trust adults they adjust well to schools. However findings on the
middle class suggest that there is wide variability within it. Because
independence is given later, middle class children may be more immature, more inhibited, less aware and more conforming. This suggests that the school’s job is to give special encouragement to creative, independent thought and experience with the values of other classes.
The average middle class child wants to be given work, but does not want to be challenged to the extent th at the g ifted child does.
This is probably because the average middle class child values success and has more fear of failure than does the gifted child.
Rllral/Suburban/Urban
Rural, suburban and urban cultures produce a b ility differences just as socioeconomic classes do. Rural cultures can produce a kind of deprivation in terms of conceptual sophistication; whereas urban depri vation may be more in terms of verbal and imaginai abilities. This is because rural cultures are more homogeneous and iso la te d . In some areas, such as Appalachia, rural cultures produce both types of cul tural deprivation—verbal ability and cultural sophistication.
The middle class child has also been described as lacking sop h istication because he is often isolated in a homogeneous group 333
and overprotected. However, because his parents are more likely than
the rural child's to be educated, the middle class child is less likely
to be conceptually unsophisticated or naive than is the rural child.
By a lack of sophistication this writer means a certain lack of
"cosmopolitanism" or a narrowness of view. The urban child is more
likely to come in contact with many different viewpoints and is there
fore, more likely to develop a tolerance for ambiguity. While the ur
ban deprived need compensatory education in verbal skills and the sub
urban children need to be encouraged in independent concept develop
ment, the rural child often needs both a compensatory education in
verbal skills and an education which encourages independent thought.
As with other isolated groups there often tends to be an age
decrement in intellectual development in rural areas. In other words, the intelligence quotient of rural children and adults often declines with age. (Anastasi, 1958, pp. 524-31) The detrimental effects of poor educational environments become cumulative. The more isolated the group, the more likely there w ill be a decrement and the larger the decrement is likely to be. Generally, rural children score lower on in tellig en ce te s ts than do urban and suburban children.
Rural subjects work more slowly in experiments unless prompted to hurry. Prosperous farm areas produce higher scores on intelligence tests than the poorer rural areas. This intelligence quotient differ ential might be due to the urban, middle class verbal bias of tests, to a less stimulating environment or to differences in the educational system, such as required teacher preparation. (Ibid., p. 533) This is supported by the finding that rural schools in Great Britain do not generally produce students with inferior educations. (Ibid., p. 527) 334
The British education system is able to maintain a more consistent
quality of education even in rural areas. In Great Britain, the oppo
site is likely to be true, deprivation is most likely to be related to
urban areas. A factor which needs investigation is the extent to which
deprivation is related to urban or rural areas in other countries.
Primitive/Modem
The developmental levels in the acquisition of motor and cog
nitive skills seem to be surprisingly uniform in hierarchy across cul
tures. The age or time of these developments does not hold across
cultures. The intellectual or conceptual potential of learners does
not seem to differ from culture to culture. (Beaglehole, 1967) Be
cause of different socialization processes, however, conceptual ability
does differ from culture to culture. The differences seem to divide
into differences associated with primitive cultures and with more
tech n ologically advanced or modem cultu res.
The conceptual learning and abilities of primitive and modem
cultures contrast in the following ways, beaming in a primitive cul
ture tends to be by rote, to be continuous and to be object-centered
(fairly direct symbolic learning, sign learning), beaming in a modem
culture tends to be based more on reasoning, to be more discontinuous
and to be abstract symbol-centered (fairly indirect symbolic learning,
leaming from symbols interpreted by other symbols).
By discontinuous leaming is meant the necessity to switch
from one form o f behavior to another with l i t t l e preparation. In modem societies there is sharp separation of the mature from the immature personality. This produces discontinuities. Some of the 335
d isco n tin u ities in the American culture which produce conceptual con
flict are (l) between one's family and the wider world, (2) between
generations, (3) between play and work, (4) between submissiveness and
assertiveness, (5) between childhood self-control and adult indulgence,
(6) between education and occupation. (Kneller, 1965, pp. 95-114) In
primitive societies the transition to mature independence is more
gradual and continuous. It proceeds regularly by small degrees.
Conceptualization in a primitive society is more concrete,
simpler and more homogeneous. Conceptualization in a modem society,
on the other hand, i s more abstract, more complex and more heteroge neous. A modem society must tolerate more differences and ambigui ties. Therefore, conceptual change is rapid. In a primitive society today conceptual change occurs very slowly. Early in the history of man this was not true. The concepts taught in a primitive society are stable (Aristotelian classifications). The concepts developed in a modem so ciety are dynamic (flu id , changing). This means th at a highly technological, modem society needs education to develop flexible, adaptable conceptualizers. (Kneller, 1965, pp. 67-94)
Another difference between primitive and modern conceptual development is that the primitive society proceeds by family instruc tion. The modem society proceeds by formal instruction through many institutional organizations.
In a primitive culture the leamer develops the concepts society decides are needed. The learner in a modem society has more leeway to determine what he will leam. In a modem society a leamer is supposed to determine the conceptual areas he wishes to pursue. 336
The differentiations made by primitive cultures are different
from those made by modernized conceptualizers. There are not necessarily
fewer differentiations in a primitive society though- If something is
differentiated a great deal in a culture, that thing is probably very
important in that culture. A study of the vocabulary of a culture will
reveal the concepts important in that culture.
P h ysically Handicapped
The physically handicapped learner may be deaf, blind, mute,
cerebral p a lsie d , crippled or otherwise handicapped. Whatever the case, he is characterized by a limited ability in some area of communication
for which he must compensate. In the case of the crippled or cerebral palsied leamer, the main effects are likely to occur in the limited ability to gather experience by motion. Since experience is the basis for concept formation, this means that such learners w ill need help to associate meanings with concepts- In the case of deaf, blind or mute learners, some areas of symbolic communication ability limit their concept formation. Such learners w ill need professional help to de velop alternative means of communicating symbolically, such as lip reading, sign language or braille.
Physically handicapped learners are often cut off from normal social communication. They may need guidance in developing abstract social concept, such as democracy. Another area of importance for the physically handicapped is the development of a self-concept. Special attention should be given to helping them discover (l) their abilities and lim itations, (2) the roles they can play in society and (3) how to develop self-confidence. 337
Students who have been blind since birth or early childhood can
be expected to have poor imagery at best, especially in hard to describe
visual areas, such as colors. A concentrated effort should be made to help the blind develop some form of imaginai ability and to help the deaf develop some verbal ability. Physically handicapped students w ill also need special help in vocabulary including help in leaming both the symbol and some concrete associations that give the symbols meaning.
Words without simple concrete meaning, such as conjunctions, w ill need special attention. Hans Furth suggests that we need to develop non verbal sign language for the deaf when young so that they have visual units to use like syllables. He thinks we could teach logical thought to the deaf by the use of symbolic logic. (Furth, 1966)
In sum, the education of the physically handicapped needs to be especially concerned with conceptual communication including the pro vision of an experiential basis for concept formation, training in imaginai or verbal ability, developing a vocabulary, developing social concepts. The most important area for these learners is to develop a symbolic communication a b ility th at w ill help them extend, communicate, check their experience.
Some, although not much, research has been done by using media to communicate with the p h ysically handicapped. Filmed courses in lip reading have been developed and used with some success via television or cartridge projectors. (Broberg, 1968)* In the lip reading courses
*The huge program of captioned films for the deaf is described in "Captioned Films for the Deaf," American Annals of the D eaf, 110 (January, 1965), 323; "Films with Meaning for the Deaf: Captioned Films Branch, U. S. O ffice of Education," American Education, 1 (March, 1965), 23. 338
it has been found helpful to use a slow rate of development and to use
dark lipstick to define the lip's outline well as it changes. Jack
Birch and Ross Stuckless have researched the use of programmed instruc
tion with the deaf. (Birch and Stuckless, 1963) They compared the
learning of correct grammar for written compositions under conditions
of single programmed instruction presentation (conventional treatment)
or a repeated programmed instruction presentation and of inductive or
deductive programming. No sig n ifica n t differences were found due to
inductive or deductive programming. No sig n ifica n t differences due to
single or repeated presentations were reflected in mean scores on gram
mar and composition tests. Nevertheless, those who experienced re
peated presentations seemed to exhibit greater skill in the use of grammar.
The retentive abilities of the handicapped need study. How are the schema which they can employ different? Must the ability to schematize be specially developed with the handicapped? Does the blind person's dependence on sound and the sequential nature of sound have implications for the short term memory ability of the deaf? (Conrad and Rush, 1965) How do the memory abilities of deaf and blind stu dents compare?
Gifted
There are several important questions related to the character istics of the gifted. How much is the gifted learner's experience in independent study due to his being given this type of learning expe rience? How much is it due to his taking the initiative in learning?
To what extent is his giftedness due to his emotional adjustment? To what extent is his emotional adjustment due to his giftedness? Is he 339
bored in school? To what extent is boredom lik e ly to hold back the
gifted child's achievement in school? Did he develop his ability in
spatial manipulation? If so, how? How is ability in spatial manipu
lation related to abstract conceptual ability? How can gifted students
be defined? All gifted students cannot be described as creative- Can
all creative students be described as gifted?
The writer believes the term gifted should be used to mean one
who has superior conceptual ability in general or in certain areas, one
who has a very high store of concepts and one who is capable of inde
pendent learning to a superior degree. What are the implications for
education or the communication of concepts?
First, such a learner can work effectively on abstract concepts,
on conceptual problems requiring the use of verbal logic. He can work
well in less structured learning situations. He can do problem solving
requiring spatial manipulation. He can assume leadership roles. Such
a learner needs to be challenged. He needs to be allowed freedom since
he can often work in a certain area beyond the depth of other students
of the teacher. Although high-socioeconomic level correlates highly with gifted ability, it should not be considered a defining require
ment.
Herbert Hoffman studied concept formation with subnormal, aver age and superior adolescents. He found a positively correlated rela tionship between conceptual ability and intelligence. (Hoffman, 1955)
In spite of the nonverbal nature of the conceptual problems, the sub jects' scores on the conceptual tests correlated higher with verbal than with nonverbal Wechsler scores. The concepts studied were size, symmetry, depth, thickness, acuteness and solidity. . 340
L- M. Terman's follow-up studies showed that while giftedness
makes high adult achievement likely it does not guarantee it. The most
interesting result was that the most successful adults could not be
predicted from the test scores of these gifted children. (Tyler, 1956,
pp. 403-404)
C. C. Miles tabulated teachers' ratings of gifted and average
children on various personality traits. (Miles, 1954) Miles concluded
that gifted children differed largely in their desire to know, origi
nality and general intelligence; slightly in leadership, desire to
excel, conscientiousness, common sense and perseverance; insignifi
cantly in fondness for groups, freedom from van ity, sympathy and popu
larity. It should be remembered that although intelligence quotients
as well as teacher judgments were used to select the subjects, the
selection, sample and procedures could have biased the results.
Gifted children read much more and c o lle c t much more. They
have a better basis for concept formation. They have more interest
in science. Again, we do not know how much of this is attributable
to their usually enriched environment and how much to their innate
in t e r e s t.
The very high intelligence learners have been studied sepa
rately. In such individuals, according to L. S. Hollingworth,
creativity and originality are likely to be evident even in early
childhood. (Hollingworth, 1942) Hollingworth further pointed out
■ that there were more problems of adjustment in the very high intel
ligence learners. 341
Creative
As Horace and Ava English define creativity, the essential
characteristic is bringing into being a new product—not necessarily new to others but new to the creator. We don't adequately understand the nature of creativity, but we are able to describe it. We can say that creativity is a type of motivation, that it is integrating, that it is conceptualization, that it is personality expression.
There is a need to debate and state various forms of creativity.
As there are different types of giftedness, there should be different types of creativity. If conceptualizing is always creating, is creating always conceptualizing? Even if it is there it is probably a type of c re a tiv ity which can be called conceptual c r e a tiv ity . (As compared with motor or aesthetic creativity.) It is probable that the nature of conceptual creativity varies from field to field but that it always involves symbolizing.
We can learn about creativity from the characteristics of those who have creative ability and from the conditions under which they ex hibit such ability. Studies of highly creative individuals have been conducted by the Institute of Personality Research and Assessment at the University of California Berkeley Campus.
Taher Razik has surveyed studies on creativity for characteris tics of creative people. Razik's list and the Berkeley list have in common: openness to experience, independence, cognitive flexibility, creative energy and a commitment to creativity. (Razik, 1966) 342
J . B. Guilford* has divided research on creativity into the
areas of creative potential and creative performance. In the area of
measuring creative potential he concludes from factor analytic studies
that there are three categories of characteristics associated with
creativity: fluency, flexibility and elaboration. There are different
forms and functions which each of these ch aracteristics assumes. There
is ideational, associational or expressional fluency. There is flexi
bility with class ideas (classifications) and with meanings (reinter
pretations for problem solving purposes).
Fluency is the basis for divergent production; flexibility for
originality, ingenuity, inventiveness. "Elaboration is a facility for
adding a variety of details to information that has already been pro
duced." (J. p. Guilford in Razik, 1966, p. 188) What does Guilford's list of characteristics have in common with the Razik or Berkeley lists?
The common characteristics are cognitive flexibility, creative energy and commitment to c re a tiv ity .
It would seem, then, that the highly creative person is very concerned with conceptualization as well as with creativity. The cre ative conceptualizer is likely to produce a concept that is original, general, theoretical (relevant to a system of explanation) and intui tive rather than explicitly rational.
What is the relationship of intelligence to creativity? For the highly creative a certain high level of intelligence is needed.
S till even the mentally retarded can be creative in some areas, such
*J . p. Guilford, "Measurement and Creativity," in Razik, 1966, pp. 186 —8 9. 343
as art. Nevertheless, there seems to be a certain minimal intelligence
level necessary for creative conceptualizing. The feebleminded are not
creative conceptually.
Michael Wallach and Nathan Kogan took "A New Look at the
C reativity-In telligen ce D istin c tio n .” (Wallach and Kogan, 1965) Fol
lowing experimentation their results suggested the following. High
intelligence-low creativity persons tend to be conservative and aca
demically competitive. Low intelligence and creativity persons tend
to be anxious. High intelligence-high creativity persons tend to be
most adaptable. High creativity-low in tellig en ce persons tend to fe e l
inferior and flourish best in a noncompetitive situation.
J. W. Getzels and P. W. Jackson (1962) showed that creative
ability and high IQ are not necessarily one and the same. They found that children of high IQ differed significantly from children of creative
ability in respect to personal values, career goals, creative produc tivity and family background.
What are the implications of the characteristics of creative a b ility for education and p articularly for conceptual communication? A certain level of generality and originality is needed in order to solve the learning tasks chosen for presentation. Independent study is likely to be very successful with this type of learner. Educators need to learn to recognize and to value creative conceptualizing.
Torrance* lists these teacher skills for developing creativity.
1. Recognize and acknowledge potentialities by signs such as the following :
*Paul E. Torrance, "Nature of Creative Talents," in Razik, 1966, pp. 168-73. 344
Intense absorption in listening, observing, doing. Intense animation and physical involvement. Challenging ideas of authorities. Checking many sources of inform ation. Taking a close look at things. Eagerly telling others about one's discoveries. Continuing a creative activity after the scheduled time for quitting. Showing relationships among apparently unrelated ideas. Following through on ideas set in motion. Manifesting curiosity, wanting to know, digging deeper. Guessing or predicting outcomes and then testing them. Honestly and intensely searching for the truth. Resisting distractions. Losing awareness of time. Penetrating observations and questions. Seeking alternatives and exploring new possibilities. (Razik, 1966, p. 171)
2. Be respectful of questions and ideas.
3. Ask provocative questions.
4. Recognize and value originality.
5. Develop elaboration ability.
6. Have periods of unevaluated practice and experimentation.
7. Develop creative readers (active, not passive; sensitive to problems and possibilities).
8. Help students develop skill in predicting behavior.
9. Provide guided, planned experiences.
10. Cultivate attitudes and skills of searching for truth with methods of research.
11. Try to improve s k ills in creative problem solvin g.
While Torrance emphasizes the role of the teacher in training students for creative conceptualizing, others emphasize the roles of media in guiding a student to be creative. In "Programed Instruction and Creativity" Richard S. Crutchfield and Martin V. Covington try to show how programmed instruction can avoid or minimize its potentially detrimental effect ori creativity. (Razik, 1966, pp. 179-85) 345
To do th is programmed instruction must avoid fostering too much
homogeneity, being too structured, making learning too effortless and
spoonfed, being too authoritative. Programmed materials for the train
ing of creativity should be designed so as to give the individual re
peated practice in making creative responses to creative tasks. Pro
grams should present problems that involve insight and discovery, as
well as reformulating and generating ideas. The sequencing of the ma
t e r ia ls should become even more demanding. A lternative forms and se
quences of the program should be provided in order to accommodate d if
ferent cognitive styles. Some students may find, under some conditions,, their learning most facilitated when they are allowed to pick the se quence of their assignments. Other students, under some conditions, w ill find learning most facilitated when assignments are presented in a prearranged order. The size of step for creative programmed instruc tion needs to contain more complex materials and to allow for more re flection. Programs need to offer open-ended questions (questions re quiring no particular response in order to be answered correctly).
As Crutchfield and Covington suggest, the most difficult method ological problem in programming for creativity is how to provide appro priate feedback or confirmation of responses. A great many different answers should be possible. A kind of creative feedback must be pro vided. Perhaps such feedback should be in the nature of suggestions.
Kinds o f creative feedback need to be developed.
What can we conclude are some of the research and measurement needs in the area of conceptual creativity? Harvey, Hunt and
Schroder's conceptual stages as they relate to creative ability should 346
be explored. Is it necessary for one to reach the most abstract state
of functioning, interdependence, in order to be highly creative?
Eugene Gaier has said that creativity is most likely to occur
in individuals who are impulsive, dominating and characterized by a
lack of deliberation, self-control and restraint. (Razik, 1966, p. 192)
The writer believes that this conclusion needs further research. The
lack of inhibition of creative individuals should not be automatically
equated with lack of restraint or self-control. This area of research
could be called the relationship of creativity to conceptual style.
A third area for research is that of cultural influence on
creativity. What effects does our educational system have on cre
ativity? What different modes can creativity take within a culture
or between cultures. Children in India perform better on verbal than
on figurative tests of creativity. Yet children in Western Samoa,
Negro children in Georgia and lower class children in Pittsburgh per form better on figurative than on verbal tests of creativity. In the
United States girls are superior to boys in verbal creating and in
India the reverse is true. (Razik, 1966, p. 169) Why? What are the cultural influences that nurture highly creative conceptualizing?
How can crea tiv ity te s t s broad enough to have cultu ral v a lid ity be developed and utilized?
A fourth area for research is ways of training and fostering creativity. Is creativity inhibited by some children when they are in a competitive environment? Are we utilizing our national poten tia l for conceptual creativity? What roles does conceptual creativity play in our society? What w ill be its role in the future? How do literary and scientific methods of creative problem solving differ? 347
What are the specific effects of different media and techniques of com
munication on conceptual creativity? How can television be used to
foster creativity? Does television restrain creativity?
A fifth area is how creative individuals use accepted postulates.
Do they ignore accepted postulates? Do they transform them? Are they
motivated by the desire to form new postulates? How highly are ac
cepted postulates valued by the highly creative? Under what conditions
do the highly creative conceptualizers accept postulates? How do they
form postulates, especially classification postulates and other postu
lates which define concepts?
A sixth area is the relative powers of discrimination of those with high creative ability. How do the highly creative perceive stim uli?
A seventh area i s the use of crea tiv ity measurements as predic tors of success in adult occupations and in school subjects. Can cre ativity measurements be used more in aptitude tests?
The ability differences most relevant to conceptual communica tion are summarized in Table 15, which was developed by the writer. 348
TABLE 15
CONCEPTUAL CHARACTERISTICS OF LEARNERS OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF ABILITY
A b ility Conceptual Recommended Group Characteristics Teaching Procedures
Mentally 1. The abstract is dif 1. Attempt only simple Retarded f ic u lt . forms of abstract so cial concepts. 2. Poor verbal and 2. Pretrain. imaginai ability. 3. Poor retentive 3. Use ea sily remembered a b ility . topical units; pattern; provide extra practice. 4. Find conceptual leaps 4. Structure learning; or large stimulus proceed by small steps. changes confusing.
C ulturally 1. Restricted language. 1. Use simple language. Deprived 2. Poor vocabulary. 2. Enrich experience. 3. Poor self identity. 3. Help develop self- concept . 4. Short verbal attention 4. Use learning by doing span. a c tiv itie s accompanied by simple and brief language.
Middle 1 . Conforming concepts 1. Expose them to value of Class valued. concepts from other m ilieus. 2. Studious. 2 . Challenge. 3. Elaborated language. 3. Use reception learning as well as guided dis covery.
Urban 1. Unfamiliar with rural 1. Base concept formation concepts. on urban experiences. 2. Often deprived. 2. Compensatory education in verbal abilities. 3. Ethnic subcommunities e x ist.
Suburban 1. Limited l i f e experience. 1. Broaden experience. 2. Education oriented. 2. Encourage crea tiv ity . 3. Heterogeneous groups. 349
TABLE 15—Continued
A b ility Conceptual Recommended Group Characteristics Teaching Procedures
Rural 1. Unfamiliar with many 1. Compensatory education. urban phenomenon. 2. Often products of author 2. Help develop tolerance itarian atmospheres. for ambiguity,-for dif ferent points of view. 3. Homogeneous groups.
Prim itive 1. May be unacquainted with 1. Develop pictorial film, pictorial language. lite r a c y . 2. Physical (concrete) con 2. Help develop symbolic, cepts important. technological concepts from concrete concepts.
Modem 1. Verbal culture. 1. Develop verbal concepts. 2. Abstract culture. 2. Relate abstract to concrete.
Physically 1. Substitutes for impaired 1. Help develop substi Handicapped sense. tute concepts, vocabu la ry . 2. Lack o f so cia l communica 2. Develop social concepts tio n can lead to lack of by exposing to social social concepts. situations and giving guidance.
Gifted 1. Abstract ability. 1. Teach abstract concepts. 2. Verbal, logical ability. 2. Can teach with much symbolism. 3. Experienced in inde 3. Less structured, open- pendent learning. ended. 4. Ability to manipulate 4. Teach a r t is t ic and spatial concepts. mathematical concepts. 5. Often from enriched 5. Challenge backgrounds.
Creative 1. In terest in complex 1. Introduce complexity. concepts. 2. Need freedom. 2. Unstructured. 3. Tolerance for ambiguity. 3. Teach dynamic concepts. 4. Imaginative. 4. Provide opportunities for wide-range of be haviors and approaches. CHAPTER VIII
GUIDELINES FOR STUDY AND PRACTICE
Basic Research on the Communication of Concepts
The beginnings of research on conceptualization occurred in the
last quarter of the last century and the first quarter of this century.
The research paradigm used at that time could be called an association
paradigm. The typical research task was for the subject to report by
introspection the associations which came to mind when presented with
a stimulus. Variations on this paradigm included statistical tabula
tions of associations and observation of physiological responses to
stim uli. Early researchers were trying to identify what thought con
sisted of: sensations, images or ideas.
Developments in the measurement of in tellig en ce paralleled the
contributions of the early and later paradigms for experimental re
search in conceptual communication. Our understanding of cognitive
functioning comes from the use o f both these to o ls: the measurement
of intelligence and experimental research with conceptual tasks. The
developments in testing which were most relevant to the study of con
ceptual communication were the te stin g of general in te llig e n c e , the testing of specific abilities and factor analysis.
A. Binet and L. M. Terman influenced the field by establishing that changes in intelligence could be measured. Their concept of
350 351
intelligence included imaginai or verbal knowledge indicative of con
ceptualizing ability. Correlated indicators of intelligence, such as
vocabulary testing, became important indicators of conceptual ability.
The second experimental research paradigm to gain general ac
ceptance in the study of conceptualizing has been called the reception
paradigm. (Bourne, 1966) With this method the experimenter guides the
information presented. The learner's mind functions as a relatively passive receiver of this information. The steps which constitute the
reception experiment in concept learning are in order:
1. The subject is given instructions to categorize stimuli.
2. The stimulus dimensions are sometimes described.
3. The subject identifies a stimulus as a negative or posi
tive instance, or he sorts the stimuli into categories
representing so many concepts.
4. The subject may be required to leam labels for catego
r ie s .
5. Feedback is given as to the correctness of the subject's
categorizing of instances.
6. The presentation of stimuli is usually successive. Each
stimulus is followed by a response and feedback. A varia
tion is to tell the subject what category the instance
falls in and to require a hypothesis about the factors
for sorting.
7. This process continues until the correct hypothesis is
reached or until the subject gives ten or twenty correct
categorical responses. 352
The reception paradigm, developed by C. L- Hull, has been used
for research on concept learning from 1920 to today. It is still being
used. Its concept of "concept" is "common response to dissimilar
stimuli." Its favorite subject matter for the laboratory situation
includes geometric figures and nonsense syllables.
The most recent research paradigm to gain wide acceptance in the study of concept learning is the selection paradigm. With this
paradigm the subject can control the information presented, be more
active mentally. The subject selects the strategy to be followed in
learning. The steps followed in most selection paradigm experiments are in order:
1. The subject is given instructions to categorize or to de
velop hypotheses which explain categorizing.
2. Simultaneous presentation may be used.
3. An instance designated as positive is presented.
4. The subject tries to guess the concept. He establishes
a hypothesis.
5. If he is wrong, he selects another instance.
6. He is told whether the instance he has selected is posi
tive or negative.
7. He revises his hypothesis to take the information he has
just received into account.
8. This process of selection, feedback and hypothesis revi
sion continues until a solution is reached.
The selectio n paradigm was developed by J . Bruner. Bruner varies this paradigm by manipulating the factors of time elements in presentation, of stimulus availability, of presentation order 353
(simultaneous and successive), of task requirements and of number of
dimensions or examples used.
The association paradigm in concept research was a simple
stimulus-response paradigm. It gave way to the reception paradigm
which involved learning common tra its—discovering common elements.
The reception paradigm was followed by the selection paradigm. With
the selectio n paradigm one could determine whether the subject was
using any systematic plan of attack for learning a code. (Pikas,
1966) In some cases the subject in the selectio n paradigm could in
vent a code.
Recent developments in measurement have led research on con
ceptual communications to take new directions. B. S. Bloom and others
developed The Taxonomy of Educational O bjectives: Cognitive Domain.
The taxonomy sketched the difference between knowledge, comprehension
and application of concepts. Howard Stoker at Florida State Univer
s it y has developed te s ts to measure ob jectives in the cognitive domain.
(Bloom, 1956; Cox and Unko, 1967; Kropp and Stoker, 1966)
Another recently developed measurement technique which has led to new forms of research is the semantic differential technique devel
oped by Charles Osgood and his associates. The semantic differential technique has revived the use of the association paradigm.
Impetus has been added by the adoption of tools such as the
computer, the electroencephalograph and devices to measure visual re sponse.
The mediating function of imagery in the conceptual processes, unlike th a t of language or gesture and posture, is not amenable to d irect observational methods o f study. . . . Although far from being adequate at the moment, the use of the electroencephalograph 354
may, in time, provide a suitably objective method of assessing the strength of imagery. (Wallace, 1965, p. 236)
Computer simulation techniques have been adopted to study con
cept attainment. Studies on the authoritarian personality and on
imagery have combined with studies on attitude formation and crystal
lization to start research on clusters of concepts as they influence
conceptual style.
The Study of Interacting Factors
The study of the communication of concepts should continue to
attempt to integrate diverse areas of psychology and communications.
Basic research findings will not yield practical principles until inter action between factors is clarified. The factors which interact are shown in Table 16.
A more complete listing of the interacting factors which re search should study is given in Table 17, page 356, A Taxonomy of
Characteristics Which Interact in the Communication of Concepts. The taxonomy presented in Table 17 is the main result of this study. The classification summarizes concisely the information and issues pre sented throughout th is report. The taxonomy provides a to o l for analyzing the variables in a conceptual learning situation. 355
TABLE 16
CHARACTERISTICS WHICH INTERACT IN THE COMMUNICATION OF CONCEPTS
Internal Learner Concept Curriculum Presentation Processing
Age Form Experiences Set Recoding
Sex Function Training in Cuing R eticular conceptual formation ization
Personality Content Approach Content Symbolic responses
A b ility Learning Response Storage
Structure
Retention
Transfer 356
TABLE 17
A TAXONOMY OF CHARACTERISTICS WHICH INTERACT IN THE COMMUNICATION OF CONCEPTS
I. The Characteristics of Concepts
A. D efin itiv e C haracteristics 1. A Capacity 2. A Symbol 3. A Discrimination 4. A Response
B. Variable Characteristics 1 . Form a) Models b) Definitions c) Classifications (1) Taxonomies (2) Diagrams (3) Outlines (4) L ists (5) Grids (6) Continua d) Modality (1) Audio (2) Visual (3) Kinesthetic e) Dimension(s) (1) One (2) Two (3) Three 2. Effect a) Primary (1) Cuing (2) Associating (3) Responding b) Secondary (1) Public (2) Private (3) Advantageous (4) Disadvantageous 3. Content a) Abstractness b) Generality c) Complexity d) Fluidity e) Subject better f) Theoretical Level g) Experiential h) Logical 357
TABLE 17—Continued
4. Learning a ) Forms of (1) Generalization (a) Stimulus (b) Response (c ) Mediated (2) Problem Solving (a) T rial and Error (b) Sudden Reorganization (c) Gradual Analysis b) Task of (1) Identification (2) Acquisition (3) Formation (4) Attainment (5) Utilization (6) Assimilation c) Methods of (1) Rote (2) Meaningful (3) Reception (4) Discovery 5. Style a) Conceptual Ability b) Category Width c) Conceptual Differentiation d) Cognitive Structure 6. Amount and Application a) Retention (1) Clarity of Organization (2) Nature of Practice (3) Cuing for Recoding b) R ecall (1) Immediate (2) Delayed c) Transfer (1) Negative (2) Positive
II. The Characteristics of Internal Processing A. Nervous System Transmission 1 . Receptor Pathway 2. E ffector Pathway
B. Recoding 1. Excitation of Fibers 2. Inhibition of Impulses
C. R eticular A ctivating System 1. Inhibition of Attention 2. Arousal of Attention 358
TABLE 17—Continued
D. Symbolic Responses 1. Imagery a) Visual (1) Nonverbal (2 ) Verbal b) Auditory (1) Nonverbal (2 ) Verbal c) T a ctile d) Olfactory e) Kinesthetic 2. Verbalization
E. Storing Symbolic Responses 1. Short Term Memory 2. Long Term Memory
III. The Characteristics of External Transmission A. Curriculum Design 1. Providing Experiences a) New b) Ordered c) Rich 2. The Development of Creativity a) Critical Thinking b) Creativity Training c) vocabulary Development d) Conceptual Analysis 3. Approach a) Discovery Learning b) Guided Discovery c) Reception Learning d) A Process Approach e) Fundamental Ideas f) Unifying Principles or Themes g) The Structure of a Discipline
B. Audiovisual Design 1. Cuing Factors a) Establishing Set (1) Directions (2) Pretraining (3) Pretesting (4) Nature of the Task b) Cuing (1) Familiarization (2) Availability of Cues (3) Presentation Order (a) Simultaneous (b) Successive 359
TABLE 17—Continued
(4) Perceptual Principles (a) Proximity Leads to Association (b) Sim ilarity Leads to Association (5) Channel U tilization (a) Audio (b) Visual (c) Audiovisual (6) Compelling Stimuli (a) Color (b) Novelty (c) Contrast (d) Size (e) Placement (f) Attention-Directing Devices (7) Abstraction (a) Amount of Realism (b) Amount of Generality 2. Stimulus Factors a) Choice of Media (1) Forms (2) Unique C haracteristics (3) Type(s) of Experience (4) Advantages (5) Limitations (6) Utilization b) Content (1) Instances (a) Ratio of Positive to Negative (b) Order of P ositive and Negative (c) Number Used (2) Attributes (a) Number of Relevant (b) Number of Irrelevant (c) Intradimensional Variability (d) Interdimensional Variability (e ) Redundancy o f Dimensions (f) Attribute Salience (g) Ability to Systematically Eliminate Irrelevant Attributes (3) Amount (a) Complexity (b) Simplification (c) Repetition (d) Redundancy (4) Approach (a) Treatment (b) Structuring (c) Editing 3. Response Factors a) Rate o f Responding 360
TABLE 17—Continued
(1) Pacing (a) S e lf (b) Group (c ) Machine (2) Rate of Development b) Type o f Response (1 ) Type o f Strategy (a) Selection (b) Reception (c) Focusing (d) Scanning (2) Type o f A ctivity (a) Overt (b) Covert (c) Implicit (3) Type o f Practice (a) Participation (b) Mental Practice (c ) Spaced, Delayed (d) D istributed , Immediate c) Feedback to Response (1 ) Amount and Type (a) Confirmation (b) Correction (c) Negative (d) Positive (2) Ratio and Timing (a) Fixed Ratio (b) Variable Ratio (c ) Immediate (d) Delayed (3) Postfeedback Interval
IV. The Characteristics of Learners A. Age D ifferences 1. Mental Development 2 . Aging
B. Sex D ifferences 1. Cultural 2. Emotional 3. Developmenta1 4. Perceptual
C. Personality Differences 1. Conceptual Systems 2. Personality Types a) Authoritarianism b) Introversion-Extraversion c) Schizophrenia 361
TABLE 17—Continued
3. Personality Dispositions a) Anxiety b) Objectivity c) Work Habits
D* Ability Differences 1. Mental Retardation 2. Cultural Deprivation 3. Middle Class 4. Rural/Suburban/Urban 5. Primitive/Modem 6. P h ysically Handicapped a) Deafness b) Blindness c) Muteness d) Cerebral Palsied e) Crippled 7. Giftedness 8. Creativity
The nature of the concept to be communicated and of the learner
w ill influence how a concept i s communicated. How a concept i s commu
nicated influences how it is processed internally. How a concept is
processed internally influences the nature of the concept formed.
This relationship is represented in Figure 33.
Learner Concept
External Transmission
V Internal Processing
Concept
Fig. 33.—The relationship between categories of characteris tics in the communication of concepts. 362
D irections for Research on the Communication
of Concepts
As a result of her exploration the writer has uncovered some
themes which pose underlying questions for research* The question,
"Is abstraction a continuum?" is a key issue* (P ik a s, 1966, p. 85;
Harvey, Hunt and Schroder, 1961, p. 27) The issue is whether abstract
conceptualizing is only an extension of concrete functioning or whether
it is so qualitatively different that it is discontinuous with concrete
functioning* This question is important because if abstraction in con
cept formation is discontinuous then the emphasis on creating meaning
with experience may be misplaced•
A second theme which is a major research problem i s the nature
of a concept * This writer believes that until "concept" comes to have
a meaning o f a complex of images i t w ill not be a highly valued profes
sional construct* If "concept" comes to have a meaning more synonymous with image as Kenneth Boulding interprets image, i t s meaning w ill be
more testable, less variable, more specific* Whether this comes to
pass or not, the construct "concept" will have to be better defined
(and this definition will have to be generally accepted) before re
search can proceed satisfactorily.
Another problem area which research must tack le is the under
standing of internal symbolic processes: imagery and verbalization*
It would be very helpful to understand how different types of imagery
(kinesthetic, visual, etc*) work together internally to abstract and generalize* 363
The area of personal style of conceptualizing and cognitive
structure is a fourth important research problem. The first step in
solving this problem is to continue discovering the variables involved
in cognitive structure and style.
Finally, communications research needs to pay more attention to
influencing conceptual responses. Research on motor and other behavioral
responses cannot simply be extrapolated and used to explain conceptual behavior. We need communications research on conceptual problems. Large
scale studies of interacting factors representing each category of
characteristic—learner, internal processing, concept, external trans mission—should be undertaken.
Guidelines for Practice
The premise on which this study is based is that the character i s t i c s of communication w ill a ffec t the ch aracteristics o f the concept formed. The ways in which the concept formed would be influenced were assumed to depend on how the external and internal ch aracteristics of communication interact with the characteristics of the learner. The writer believes that adequate support for the validity of these assump tions has been presented in the preceding chapters.
We have reached a stage where findings are beginning to je ll— to combine together to form an area o f conceptual communications. Al though findings are beginning to fit together and have integrated meaning, we are not yet able to sufficiently substantiate principles for the communication of concepts. In lie u o f presenting such prin ciples, the writer can present steps and questions for students. 364 teachers, media and curriculum specialists to use in prepaving their designs for concept learning.
Steps to follow are in order:
1. Enumerate the factors that interact in the specific design
situation with which you are concerned. To do this use The
Taxonomy of C haracteristics Which Interact in the Communica
tion of Concepts (Table 17, p. 356).
2. Design a study program, lesson, presentation or curriculum
taking the interaction of factors (as shown in Figure 33,
The Relationship between Categories of Characteristics of the
Communication of Concepts, p. 361) into account.
3. Use the following checklist of questions to judge the validity
of your design (a brief example of the application of the
question to a specific design situation is given):
a. What are the specific symbolized, discriminatory re
sponses I wish to communicate?
e.g. It is necessary to understand the concept of em
pathy. This includes the concepts of role playing,
vicarious experiencing and sympathy.
b. What variable characteristics of the concepts to be commu
nicated do I wish to determine?
e.g. The concept "empathy" should be very general yet very
concrete.
c. How much conceptualization is required for successful
application?
e.g. It is necessary that the concept empathy transfer to
real life interpersonal relations. It is necessary
that the concept be retained permanently. 365
d. Will the conceptualizer be motivated? If so, how?
e.g. The conceptualizer may be motivated by praise for
achievement and by seeing the usefulness of the con
cept "empathy."
e. What w ill be the role of imagery; of verbalization in the
process of conceptualization?
e.g. Pictorial imagery is needed to give concreteness
which is necessary if this concept is to be applied.
Verbalization is needed to label the concept so that
it can be discussed and the learning of it evaluated.
f . When w ill I try to influence conceptualization—at what
stages in internal processing?
e.g. Try to influence conceptualization at the stage of
visual, tactile or kinesthetic imagery.
g . Is there a sp e c ific curriculum approach which is most
lik e ly to be helpful?
e.g. Provide rich experience that helps a learner value
empathizing. (See pp. 141, 142) h . What audiovisual design factors are most important to
manipulate? How shall I establish set? Cue? Incorporate
content? What responses should I require?
e.g. It is important to use both negative and positive
examples so that concept learning will transfer. i . What are the characteristics of the learner who must do
the conceptualizing? Does the learner's age, sex, per
sonality or ability suggest certain conceptual limitations
which should be considered? 366
e.g. The learner is dogmatic. Present the case for
empathizing in a sim ple, unambiguous way. Reasons
for empathizing can be given in terms of institu
tional recommendations, such as church principles,
hospital or professional procedures. The learner
should be given extra help in overcoming prejudice—
in controlling imagery. (See pages 130-31)
j . Bearing in mind the characteristics of the learner and of
the conceptual processing needed, to what extent do the
characteristics of the design I have devised produce the
desired characteristics of the concept specified? Is there
consistency between the characteristics of the learner,
process, message and product?
e.g. Attitude films may be too open ended and general to
be effective with the planned type of learner,
k. What are the characteristics of the conceptualization re
sulting from the communication? Can the design be eval
uated as successful or as in need of revision?
e.g. Role playing and films from institutional sources
are apt to be su ccessfu l, but many broad and rich
experiences w ill be needed to reinforce the learning
of the concept "empathy" enough so th at i t w ill
transfer to many diverse situations.
Issues in the Communication o f Concepts
One of the main issues in applying research findings to the communication of concepts is the extent to which a designer would 367
capitalize on learner characteristics and the extent to which he should
try to broaden or change these characteristics= When does adapting to
such characteristics degenerate into detrimental catering. When is it necessary catering? When should an introverted personality be given a presentation designed for encouraging extraversion even if it is more difficult for him to adjust to than a presentation designed for an in troverted personality?
Another main issu e i s what variable ch aracteristics can be de veloped at varied age levels. With what learner characteristics?
Under what conditions? Can a mentally retarded learner develop a con cept at a higher theoretical level if presented as simplified rote reception learning?
A New Paradigm for Study and Practice
The new paradigm for finding research areas and for considera tions in practice which has been presented by this study is a list of four questions which reveal factors to be considered. The questions, which were the basis for the chapters into which this report was divided, are reiterated below.
1. What are the conceptual needs and limitations of the
learner?
2. What are the characteristics of the concept which it is
important to influence?
3. What internal processes should be influenced in order to
control the characteristics of the concept finally
d eveloped ? 368
4. What means of curriculum design or audiovisual design would
be useful?
Earlier in this chapter the need for studying interacting fac to rs in th e communication o f concepts was stressed . This paradigm pro vides for the study of interacting factors. APPENDIX APPENDIX
TESTS FOR THE CHARACTERISTICS OF CONCEPTUALIZING
This list includes projective tests, nonprojective personality tests, intelligence tests, association tests and other indices, scales and inventories.
Association Adjustment Inventory (Bruce) Measures aspects of mental health important in conceptualizing such as rigidity, depression, objectivity; uses adaptation of Kent-Rosanoff word lis t.
The Behavioral Complexity Test (Alexander) Measures complexity of response categories, highest category attained, symbolization, emotional expression.
Behavior-Sorting Test (Gardner and Schoen) Measures categorizing.
Betts Imagery Inventory Measures modality and vividness.
Category-Width Scale (Pettigrew) Measures category width.
Check L ists (Gardner and Schoen) Measures identification of attributes. '
Cognitive Preference Test: High School Chemistry (Marks) Measures preference for memory of specific facts, critical ques tioning, practical application, fundamental principle.
Concept Formation Test (Krasanin and Hanfmann) Measures concept learning.
Consequences (Christensen, Merrifield and Guilford) Measures originality and ideational fluency.
Draw a Person Quality Scale (Wagner and Schubert) Measures level of intelligence functioning.
370 371
Evaluation Modality Test (Engelmann) Measures realism , individualism , moralism*
Fantasy Scale (Page and Epstein) Measures daydream content; th is in d icates imaginai tendencies.
Eels Child Behavior Scales Measures vocabulary.
Figure Reasoning Test: A Nonverbal Intelligence Test (Daniels) Measures ability to manipulate nonverbal symbols logically.
Find the Fourth Word Test (Lehtovaara and Koskenniemi) Measures intelligence according to abstract functioning.
Goldstein-Scheerer Tests of Abstract and Concrete Thinking Measures sorting of colors, objects, forms; measures level of performance in terms of complexity, concreteness, simplicity and abstractness.
Gordon Test for Autonomy of Imagery Measures controllability.
Gottschaldt Test Measures ability to relate new pattern to memory pattern.
Grazzi's Block Sustitution Test Measures simple-complex and concrete-abstract dimensions of concepts.
Holtzman Inkblot Technique Measures definiteness for form perceived, abstractiveness of content, quality of verbalization.
The IES Test: Impulses, Ego, Superego (D'ombrose and Slobin) Picture Completion Test included in this test measures conception of outside world.
Kent-Rosanoff Free Association Test Measures meaning; uses word l i s t to gather association s which can be compared with the associations of other subjects.
Lorge-Thomdike Intelligence Tests Measures verbal and nonverbal intelligence and intelligence changes.
Machorer Draw a Person Test Measures form and content o f concept.
Memory for Designs Test (Graham and Kendall) Measures r ec a ll as indicator of brain damage. 372
Narrow-Mindedness Test (Rokeach) Measures authoritarian tendencies in conceptualizing.
Object-Sorting Test (Clayton and Jackson) Measures conceptual d ifferen tia tio n .
Person Perception Tests (Gardner and Schoen) Measures perception of sim ilarities and differences.
Photo-Sorting Test (Gardner and Schoen) Measures categorizing.
Pictorial Study of Values: Pictorial Allport-Vernon Measures a e sth e tic , economic, p o lit ic a l, r e lig io u s, s o c ia l, theoretical values and strength of liking things in general; these values influence the characteristics of concepts.
Pressey Classification and Verifying Tests Measures categorizing a b ility .
Proverbs Test (Dureman and Salde) Measures understanding o f symbolic or abstract meaning.
Proverbs Test (D. Gorham) Measures verbal comprehension, particularly in the area of abstraction, measures level of abstract functioning.
Rapaport Modification of the Goldstein-Gelb-Weig Object-Sorting Test Measures conceptual level and conceptual area or the publicness- privateness and openness-closedness with which a concept is held.
Robbins Speech Sound Discrimination and Verbal Imagery Type Test Measures auditory verbal imagery and visual verbal imagery.
Rorschach Index of Repressive Style Measures indications of repressive functioning such as vagueness, impersonality, unelaborated interpretations, lack of integration, poor flow of ideas.
Self Valuation Test (Liggett) Measures self-co n cep t.
Semantic D ifferential Tests (Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum) Measures meaning.
Social Comprehension Questionnaire (Higgins) Measures a ttitu d e.
Sp atial Comprehension Schedule (Pflaum) Measures symmetry, motion, inadequacy. 373
Structured-Objective Rorschach Test (Stone) Measures elaboration, s p e c if ic ity , movement, self-r efe r en ce s, preliminary process thinking, abstract-symbolism, associational flow.
Subsumed A bilities Test (Sanders and Bruce) Measures recognition, abstraction, conceptualization.
Sutcliffe Imagery Battery Measures modality and vividness.
Symbol Elaboration Test (Krout, Tabin) Measures meaning associated with symbols.
Test of Behavioral Rigidity (Schaie) Measures motor-cognitive rigidity and personality-perceptual rigidity, psychomotor speed.
Thurstone Primary Mental Abilities Battery: Controlled Association Test (Sim ilar Words) Measures conceptual knowledge.
The Visual-Verbal Test: A Measure of Conceptual Thinking (Feldman and Drasgow) Measures conceptualization of schizophrenic subjects.
Vocabulary and Poems Test (Saarinen) Measures abstract thinking.
Wechsler-Bellevue IQ Test: Similarities Subtest Measures capacity for abstraction.
Which Word to be Omitted Test (Taylor and McNemar) Measures intelligence according to abstract functioning.
Wisconsin Card-Sorting Test (WCST) Measures concept attainment-
For a more extensive bibliography of rigidity tests see McNemar, 1954. For an annotated l i s t o f t e s t s u sefu l for research on opinions see Opinions and Personality (Smith, Bruner and White, 1956). Sources of information on the testing and research of verbal concepts are listed by Edgar Dale and Taher Razik in Bibliography of Vocabulary Studies. (Dale and Razik, 1963)
(Buros, 1959) (Buros, 1961) (McNemar, 1954) (Smith, Bruner and White, 1956) (Rosanoff, 1938) (Start and Richardson, 1964) (Levine and Spivack, 1964) (Pikas, 1965) Dale and Razik, 1963) (Marks, 1967) BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY
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