AN ANALYSIS OF FACTORS IN THE ---- RUSSIAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

By Rev . Paul OtBrien, S. C. J.

A Theaia submitted to the Pacultyot the Graduate Sohool, Marquette University, in Partial Fulfillment ot the Re­ quirements tor the Degree of Master of Arts .. ·

Milwauke., Wisconsin ay, 1948 O(Jl:ltents

n.:.1"\9 ~ l1:'efQoe ••••• ~4o ...... jO ...... ', ...... " ...... 1

lhapter I

'A'he Hist,orioal Ba ok~round , . 'l'he Husstan Intel116eIl1a~:ta ...... ~ ....., ••• ,...... 6 The i. r:l t:tngs ot ilJ.exander He r zen ••, ' • .,., ... it ...... , ..... a ,ahernyehevs1:cl nnd his ldeas, l?ete"r LavrOV ...... jO ..... 10 Bel:1:n.sky end Ba ~~unl n .... I. ;0 '••••••••• ;0 ....., ...... 11 Tt:;.aohev and Plekhanov f theori ate or revolution ... II •• la tater Russian Ll terature • •••••• '••••• ' ••••' ...... " .la rxinm (lna lta influence ...... 16 'he Poll tioal. Phaae 11 at'O'noal Qb j eO' tl 'ICS of '1'ea r i ,slG..., it •••' ...... 20 The l:leoembl'i,sts ...... ,.... 23 'rhe re:tr!n of' Mi ollOlu.s II ...... 26

Chapter II

'J.1he lnf,luenoe of .Pe).'~ona11 ties p - l

The T·ger Nl chalas II ...... '. '...... II! II! ...... 34 The ..c;mp l,,~ s 9 end Has put111 • •, ••••• , ...... '" • "'. "' ••• "' .. . 39 cn1n •• • '. "". •• Ie !•• •• • " ••• 0 • ~ ••••• • .•• Ct ...... , . 44 '.i:rotsk y ...... ' .,Ii. II ••••••• :0 •••• ;0 .. '" '" w' .... '" '" '. '.... '" ••• ",. 47

Ohapter III

The Influ ~ nl3e_ of the fiar

The ~. ar and 1 ts effeots •••••• '" ...... 5., 1sta1:;es i ntbe \'lo r e ttort and the! r effeot. "' •••• 5 he Vlar years of Ni aholas II ...... '0., ••• "' ••• • 57 he lIar and i ts effcot on Huss1an eoonolay ...... 59 The f all of the uonorohy ••••••••••••••••••••••••• G2 Chapter IV Pase The Soviets Strussl. for Power The origino! the Soviet ••.••••••••••• . ••••• . ..••••••• 68 The Sovlets'polley toward the Provisional Government •• 71 The polioiesof the ProvIsional Government •••••••.••• • 72 The Government and the Soviets struggle for control ot the Petrograd garrison •.• • " ••.•.•••• . • . • • ••.• . •.•.• 77 Economi0 factors durIng the administration ot the Pro.. visional Govel"nment •••••••••••.•••.••••.•••.• .•••• . •.• 79 Lenin and Trotsky return to Russia •••. ••• ••• • • .. ••.•.• 80 The Kornilov afta1r ••••••.• . •••••••• . ••., . • • . . • • • • . • • •• 84 Bolshevik control ot the Petrograd Soviet •• •••..•• . .•• 86 The events ot October 1917 and the tall ot theProvls- tonal Government •••••••••••••••.•• . ••••••.•• .• ••••• · .. .. 87

Conclusion •••••••••••••.• . ••••••.••••••••.•••••..••. . • 89 Annotated Bibliography.... • • . •• . • • • • • •• .' •••., ...... 95 1

Preface

The present paper is pr1mIU"11y conoerned with the elements at work, within the RUssian r evolutionary mo vement, which brought about the collapse of the Romanov dy.nasty, and the fao­ tors whi ch led t o the acquisition of power by the present Sovi­ et regime . The i nterest which attends t he trends in modern worl d events in which the Soviet Government plays such an im- ~ portant role, has been reflected in a corresponding interest In the history of' Russ1a o The present theme has been selected a.s a. subjeot of research beoause of its timeliness . It forms t he historical antecedent f or many of the event s of worl d- wide im­ portance which ha ve their origin i n the Soviet Union's pursuit of its ob jectives and wl11, it 1s hoped, contribute something to the understanding of the present by a study of the past. The Husst s n Revolution of 1917 and its background has heen the sub ject ,of .an abundance of writ ings, a factor which pre­ sents the historical investigator wi th problems of compressi­ b1l1ty and selectlvlty of an unusual natur e. That t he subject of the HU9sian Revolution should interest so many writers 1s not unusual wh en, viewing it in t he present light of histor1cal perspective, 1t stands out as the most fundamental social up­ heaval of mod err') times . Apar t from historians, write r s on world polItIcs , economists. sociologists, sta tesmen, and philo­ sopher s have all viewed the event from their particul a.r fields of int erest and have reoorded their impressions. The problem faCing the 1nvestigator in this subject 01.' arriving at obJeotlve truth 1s not eas,., for, added to the inherent dIfficulties of the main problem, are the complexIti es arising from oppos ing 2

subjective viewpoInts among various writers . In an art icle evaluating the bIbliography on the HU 88ian Revolution proper, Professor Ke.rpovl ch points out some diffi­ cult ies whlch the investIgator should have in mind . F1rst of all, he says, the field is crowded with an abundance of per­ sonal memoi rs masquerading as his tory. Seoondly, such origi­ nal documents as are now extant are 1n the hands of a govern­ ment whioh 1s not amiss to using them for propaganda purposes. 'Thirdly, the writings of many of the revolutionary leaders have to be used with caution because they have been used by their authors as a means of politi cal pamphleteering . The writer goes on to evalua te some works with whi oh he 1s personal ly ac­ quainted but does not, by any means, attempt to cover the en­ tire field , 1

1 M. M. Karpovich, "The RUssian Revolution of 1917", The Journ­ al of Modern H1story, 1930, 21258-280.

In undertaking the present paper I will endeavor to limit the use of numerous direot Quotations believing t hat, in the empl oyment of t he narrative style, reader interest is increased. Howeve r , 80me wi ll necessarily have to be included to i llustrate or suppor t particular statement s, or because t he pertinency of the remark is such that the idea is best oonveyed in the lang­ uage of the orig1na1 writer. The ava1labi1ity of source mater­ ial w111 alao be taken into oonsideration in the use of quota­ t ions . The general 'plan of the thesis will be best' developed if the causal relationships ar e kept within the groups in whioh 3

men find themselves assooiated in modern socIety: the politi­ cal, social, and eoonomi c. Some overlapping will occur be­ cause these factors nre so interrelated as not to be always oapable of sharp distinction. The writer w1l1 endeavour to give some attention to those intangibles which so often elude the historian such as the temper of the people, group psychology, etc., but which play such vital roles in t he history of na­ tions. It 1s the belief of the writer that the Russian Revo­ lution throws new lIght on Russi an history. To understand the soclal upheaval of 1917 one must become acquainted not only with the Tsarist regime but even more with t he Russian Revolu­ tionary movement. While the events of 1917 represent a complete break wlth the past, they do, on the other hand, present a se­ quel to the previous history of the r evoluti onary movement. Proper historical perspeotive will best be served 11' previous

developments ar e g1ven t~elr share of attention proportionate to their relative 1mportance. Each of the following chapters

could be elab o~ ted upon and made a special study. For the sake of historical interest, it has been deemed more advisable to array 1n general all the components rather than to treat isolated phases 1n detail . The dating of the Julian calendar, which was i n force in Russia during the time period covered by the present paper will be kept. Conversion to the Gregorian Calendar can be made by adding thirteen days . For the sake of uniformity, a single spelling of Ru s sian names has been maintai ned even though , SOUrces contain vari a t1ons . The writer wishes t o acknowledge with gratitude the numer- 4

OUB suggestions and comments prof f ered by t he professor ial staff of the history department at Marquette. Likewise, a

~im1.lar debt of gratitude 1$ due to lIbrar i a ns and others who want beyond the ordinary obli ga tions of their offi ce i n their coope ration.

'. 5

Chapter I

The Historical Background

A neoessary prelude to the understanding of the sign1f1 .. oant historioal events which took place in Russ1a in 1917 re­ quires a study of earlier events together wIth an exposItion of the'ir causal relationship with the broade,r aspecta of the revolutionary movement as a whole. lienee, this i nitial sur­ vey chapter will consider two aspects of the Russian revolu­ tionary movement. The fIrst part w111 highlight the influenoe of ideas, under which I shall 1nolude the writings whioh had the greatest infiuence on the movement., Seoondly, I shall t reat of the polItical aspeots of the struggle against Teardom. This tr.eatment represents, not an exhaustive ooverage of every faotor, but a 8urvey of the more remote oauses which are ohro­ nolog1cally antecedent to the proximate causes whioh are treat­ ed in later ohapters. Supplement1ng this, 1t will be neoessary to inclUde oertain other 'aspeotswhieh l1e outside this range but whioh l'orm part, of the baokground, 8uch, for example, aa Russia's peouliar histor10al development. The l'aot that ldeas, expressed through the vooal or writ­ ten medium, have and had a potent influenoe on sooial movements is quite obvious. Tli.. precede and glve form and direotion to oonor ete actions. In the Russian revolutionary movement, the serv1ce rendered by wr1ters, praotically all of whom lived dur- 1ng the n1neteenth oentury, bears a striking resemblanoe to the Influenoe exercised by Voltalre, Rousseau, Condorcet, and others 6

on the Frenoh Revolution. In Russia, most or the literary efforts originated from, and oirculated within, that special class whioh we know as the intelligentsia. This t erm is used to designate that social oaste, which had m.embers from differ­ ent economio layers of the populati on, and whose manners, cus­ toms, and mutual int erest in soclal problems, made it a dls­ t1nct group within the RUssian population. 1

1 Nicholas Berdyaev, The Origirl of Russian Communism, 17.

Russian lIterature was subjeoted to oensorship since the time of the French Revolution. The repressive measures varied in their IntensIty and applioation at dIfferent times due to t he fact that it was adapted to ind'1vidual questi ons as they came up w1 thout being tied to set .rules . The censorship was directed at flrst against liberalism in politics and l lat er on, it stressed a more l'igid oontrol over the socialist and revolu­ tionary writings. 2

2 Bernard Pares, Russia and Reform, 262 .

The censorship control extended, not only to newspapers, but to reading material in libraries. The free lIbraries for the use of the upper olasses were encouraged to make available certain wor~a for their readers~ other libraries, partioular­ ly the local onea, reoeived lists of prohibited works. 3

3 Paul J4ilyoukov, Russia and its Orls1a.202. 7

A large meaaure of inf l uenqe on the Russian intelligent­ sia oame through German philosophy. O.1'1'101.al11, the Hegelian syst em was oonsidered to be a consel'vatlve doctr1ne and conse... quently passed the Russian embargo. Apart from its content t his system led to pernicious results beoause it encouraged abstract theori.z1ng and reason1ng in place of practioal poli- tics. With referenoe to sooialism ofa utopian character, Rappoport affirms t hat it too slipped over the frontier with .. out being sU8pected beoause it looked forwaro, not to a revo­ l ution, but to the l iberat10n of humanity t hrough a moral and spI r itual resurr ection. 4

4 Angelo S. Rappoport I "The Philosophlo Basis of the Russian Revolutlon,~ EdinbUrg Review, June 1917, 225:113-133.

The outstanding oharacteristic of this :sooial oaste known as the intelligentsi a was its uncritical acoeptance of West ern i deas together with a oer ta1n unhealthy dogmatism. There exis­ ted an idolatrous attitude to science itself without distinc­ t ion between fact and hypothesis. What was theory 1n the West became a Bort of revelation among the intelligentsia. In this way the intelligentsia lived through Salnt Simoniam, Fourier­

IsDl .• Hegellaniam, Materiali sm, and Marx.1 am. Another charaoter­ istic of the Russian soeial reformer and writer was h1e wi lling­ ness to sutte.r tor h1s ideas. Too, the Russian spir1t seemed ever r eady to switch ove.r t he current ot religious e.nergy to non-relig1ou8 Objects, to the r elative and partial sphere of 8cience and soola1 11fe. 5

5 N1colas Berdyaev, op. olt., 19. 8

One of the prominent forerunners of .t he Russian revolu­ tionary movement was Alexander Horsen, born in Mo scow 1n 1812 . Hie oareer 18 marked by the usual prison t erms; and after the death of .h1 s father in 1847 he obtained permissi on to l eave Russia to whioh he never returned. :Se was a devoted friend of

Proudhon, and an ardent WesternizeI' 8S distinguished from many of his Russian companions who were Slavophils, advooates of the sohool of thought whieh sought Russian salvation i n the return to t he pr.... Petrlne period of distinot Russian oult ure. Upon his arrival in London HerBon deoided to oonoentrate h1a time, energy, and f ortune on the work of acqu~int l ng Europe with Russian despotism and serfdom, and a180 t o aot as an ex­ t.rnal ag.nt on Russia in the hope ot awaking the country to its possibilities. He publiahed The Polar Star and The Bell which penetrated into Rus s1a and evon numbered tho Tsar Alex­ ander himself amongst its readera. Herzen's interesting pol i .. tieal theor1e. a r e oontained in his M.moirs which appeared 1n

b.en bo.rne out by t he subsequent course of .vent. 1n the Revo­ lution. He po1nted out the divergent extremities characterls, - tic of hi. people 1n their absoluteness in good or evi l; 1n their foroeful affirmation of their rights as in thei r pase1.ve obedienoe. 9

He claimed that' a constitutional monarchy, would never appeal to the soul ot Russia, and that liberal polItics would appear to that same soul as a travesty of democratic rights of the people's sovereignty. In view of the autocratio and soc1al­ ist totalitarianism whioh have controlled the destinies of Russia his observations were quite aoourate. And one must al- so note, as. Berdyaev points out, that the lIberal tpadltlon in RussIa has always been weak, and that RUssia never had a poli­ tical 1lb.eralism ",i th moral authority or whioh gave inspiration. 6

! Ni oolas Berdyaev, op~ cit., 37 .

Herzen inspired the students who had been expelled from t he unIversities for their radioal ideas to go t o the people and arouse them from their lethargio aooeptanoe ot conditions. In this way he exerted a profound Influe.noe on a whole generation of revolutionaries and gave the initial impetus to the! narod or "to the people"- ,movement which took practioal form some years later. Herzen's influence began to wane after 1863. A new generatIon was growing up in RUssIa whloh regarded He.rzent s program as too moderate. 7

7 William Henry Chamberlain, The Russian Revolution 1917-1921, 1:23. ..

Fe ter Lavrov, who was born in 1823, crystallIzed the soctal aspirations ot the intel ~ 1gentsta in his work Lettres Hlstoriques. ~

His main theme was the physioal, mental, and mora1~~velopment- or the ind1vidua1 and t he realIzation ot truth and justice t hrough proper soclal organization. Lavrov, l1ke He rzen. add~s ..d ".Ili..' 10 himself to the upper classes whom he urged to stir up the masses to fight exploitation with the purpose of bring ing a­ bout a new social order. 6

6 Angelo S. Rappaport, OPe cit., 119.

Another important economist and writer of this period was Tshernyshevakl. Be attributed great importance to the system of communal property. He believed that the organized masses should control the goyernment, and 1n order to pave the way for such a reform a movement from below, a conspiraoy, a revo~t was necessary. After his arrest he managed to inoorporate his ideas 1n a novel entitled What is to Be Done?, a work whioh veil­ ed his ideas in suoh a way as to pass censorship. The peouliar Russian agrarian economy was , in 'l'shernyshevski's opinion, ad­ mirably suited for the introduction of pure collectiviSM eith- er all at once or after allowing a short interval for the trans­ fer of private property. His ideas in this respect followed the Marxian pattern, but they lacked the integral outlook of t~ latter and were written before the era of the Russian 1ndustri- al proletariat. In the opinion of Rappoport:- "Tshernyshevski's ideas of sooiali8m and his propositions for the solution of the peasant question beoame the starting-point of all the .rev­ olutionary programm.es promulgated from the Sixties onward." 9

9 Angelo S. Rappoport, Ope cit., 119.

It. peouliar oharacteristic of' th.-.n1neteenth oentury -Ruu1an 11 wr1tera 1s their advocacy of v10lent overthrow of power for the .eour1ng of soclal rights. A foremost advocate of this , prooedure was Belinsky, the lIterary crItic. lloved by an apparent, 8inoere sympathy f or mankind's soolal evils, he thought that they oould only be removed by a major 80cial op... erat10n 1nvolv1ng much bloodshed. In this respect he is one 10 of the progenitors of Bolshevik revolut1onary tech~lque.

10 Nicolas Berd7aev, op. 0111., 44.

Radicalism reached its greatest extreme in the anaroh... ist Bakunin, the vIsionary who was aflame wIth revolutlonar,y ideas. He propagated a simple oreed of destruction 1n whioh the state, re11gion, and family and all the institutions oon­ neoted with them must be annihIlated it humanity was to be free. Ue tormulated a program 1n 1868 whioh he addressed to the "Unlonot Socialist Democracy" and wh10h oontains the tollo.ing objeotives: "The Union declares 1tself atheistio. It desires the tinal and oomplete destruotion of olasses, the po11t10al, economio andsoc1al equality of indi­ viduals ot both sexes;- 1t desires that land, tools of labor and oapital ot any k1nd should beoome the oollective property of all society and be utilized on17 by workers." 11

11 Quoted 111'1 William Chamberlain, Ope cit., 24.

Although tbe Id t,::~ UiY of the above program with the objeo...

Uves of Marxian Sooialism is read.11y apparent, Bakunln wa~ not alwaye in agreement with Marx. The 51avophil tendenoies of the 12

tomer, kept t he two menaomewhat apart. a.kunin's philosophy of destruction impressed Ru ssian students who were beginning to attend Swiss universities. It was through these students and oertain devoted propag~tors like Neohaev t hat the most radioal ot all doo't:rlnalre programs penetrated i nto Russla. 12

12 ~.

Among the political and revolutionary theorists of the ninetheenth century 1n Russia were Tkachev and Plekhanov, names that have reached a oertain prominenoe 1n the revolutionary movement beoause of their direot 1nfluenoe on subsequent events. Tkaohev edited a paper f rom abroad and theorized extenslvely on the oour se whi oh a revolu,tionary movement in Russia woul d take . He made the pert1nent observation" so we l l realized by Lenin, that the absence of a highly dev,eloped, 'bourgeois,cap­ italist sooiety would greatly enhance the possibilities of a suocessful 800 i .U.t revolution. Tkachev advocated the violent seizure of power by a revolut10nary minor ity acoompanied by terrorist aotiviti e s ~ga ln s t the authoritles, a program that found practioal app11cation under the skilled direction of

Len1n. , Plekhanov, one of the founders of t h~ Marxian menshe­ vlk faotion, was opposed to this program a8 a dangerous prece­ dent which ••• 11kely bo provoke a reaat10n and set baok the revolutionary cause. JU s idea was to awal t t he oonventional. evolutIonary development of an industrial proletar1at and then prooeed by polItical means. 13

13 Nicolas Berdyaev, op . cit. , 82-83. 13

No account of the record of, Ideas and. their effect on t;he developmenb of the revolutiona.ry movement would be com­ plete without weighing the influences of nineteenth eentury Russian literature. This literaturewhieh enshrines the names of Pushkln, Gogol , Tolstoi and Dostoyevsky, t o me~tl o n the main contr1butors, had a wide followlng whlch extended peyond national borders . Born of an inherent s1'lpath;y tor Bufrering manklnd it was differentiated by its prophetic characterr a feeling of' impending catastrophe ran through it, intermingled wlthdire prediotions. It found its main t heme in aooia1 con­ ditions, but unlike t he treatises whioh the revolutionary ele­ ment produced, there waa a religioull theme instead of' the ma­ teria11sm 80 eV'ide,nt among the writers on sooia1 questions. RUssian wr1ters in t he field of literature alao felt the repressi ve hand of the Tsar" s government. Both Pushkln and Dostoyevaky served, prison terms in ex11e f or their idea ••

Opinion. differ with regard to Tolatoi. Rappoport clai~ that his ideas were "quite harmless" ana that the Government ava1led itaelf of' his teaching or pasa1veresistance and submbaion for i ta own purposea. 14 u' Angelo.s. Rappoport, Pioneera of" the Revolution, 1 42. i

On the other hand, a,n anti-Bolshevik aooialiat like Bunakov claims that, "The fault and the responsibility of Lenin are In­ significant 1n comparison with that or the giant Tobtoi, that pure repre.entative of Russian oUlture'* 15 14

15 Quoted 1n: ~The Literary Progenitors o£ t~e Bolshevik Revo­ lutlon," "p'ortnlghtll Review, Jan. 1919.66:49~50. (no auth­ or given)

A,lymer Jlaude, the biographer of Tolsto!, lIupports tbe opinion of Bunakev, but asserts that the .fault does not rest wlth 'relatol but with ths governing classes who ignored bis appeals and warn1ngs. "He warned men of the wrath to come , and must not be held responsible .for the fact that the op. pressed maSles hearkened to h1s voioe (to the ex­ - tent, at least, of realIzing their wrongs) while the rulers rema1ned deaf or lndlf£erent to his ap­ peals." 16

16 ~., 50.

Tol.toi's oondemnations are master£ully presented and his sln­ eerity 18 unquestioned. While not asaooiated direot1y ' with any partioular revolutionary group, hill writings had a tremen­ dous 1nfluence. His home, eaye Hunter, was the meet1ng p1aoe tor "a oontinuous stream of utopians, rebels and cranks who passes 1n and out of his doors." 17

17 Robert Hunter. Revolution. Why. When. How, 16.

In this perllonal oontaot Telsto! stimulated men to action. He was no bellever 1n a self-acting evolutIon, but urged men t oo be up and doing In order to efreot 8001al ohanges. The artistry of DOlltoyevsky oontrasts wlth the intelleotu­ alism of Tolstol. Dostoyevsley expressed the revolutionary 80ul;: he .toresaw the RU 8aie.n revolut10n and dl$olosed the ideas wh10h governed it. He wanted a revolut1on with God to overthrow 15

human injustioe and tt'led in his own way to reoonoile Ortho­ dox Chrls~ianity and a Christianized Sooialism. IUs theme was man 1n relation to human problems. Bot h these 'geniuses could only thrive in an atmosphere that was moving townrd revolution. With the scalpel of words t hey uncovered the Russian soul and probed Its wounds. More remarkable in predictions concernIng the course RUssi an history would tnke was the Intereati.ng writer Kon­ stantine Leontyev. He tore saw the communist revolution in greater detail and olearness than Doetoyevsky . e f oretol d that the revolution would not be l1beral but oommunist; that the liberal radioal intelligentl1a would be overthrown, and that in_the turmoil there would be tyranny and that human rights and freedom would .suffer. He saw RUssian oommuniaM attraoting the peoples of the East and going on to annihI­ late the bourgeois worl d of the Weat.

The apooalyptio mood wa.s oarr1ed on by another writer, Vladimir 8Qlovev, who saw the end of an historical epooh 1n the reIgn of' Antichrist. The signifioant role of nineteenth oentury RU8sian lit- erature was to emphas ize the hi~torloal faot of the w1de gulf between rulers and ruled. 'i'her e was no literary derense of Tsardom. Soclal remedies were sought in aome form of 'oolleo­ tivist orgo.nlzat10n of the a.ctivities of men. The reeling of suspense and i mpending disaster pointed to a major s ocial up- heaval--to a revolution. 18

18 Nioolas Berdyaev, Ope oft., 108-109 • 18

Inasmuch as the s.uecessful , phase of. t he 1917 Revolut10n was aooom.plished in the n:ame of totalItarian Mapxlsl11 ; with such modifications as the 1"evo1utionary aownen of Lenin intro­ duced to f1t the Russian seene, we now turn our attention to this major influence. RUssian sooialist thought up untIl 'this ti:ne lacked the 1ntegral outlook which Marxlsm supplied. There was emphasis at one t1me on the le.nd program of the peasants. at another on the political control problem, at another on theoretical speculation concerning the manner of accomplish- ing a revolutionary program. Marxis,m integl'$ted all these prob­ lems and due to its western baokground placed the requisite. emphasis On the working olass proletarlat--a faotor whioh was just coming to the foreground in Russia due to the late devel­ opment or capital1st industry_ In addItion, Marxism, ennneis.... ted a philosophy of 11fe which w,as capable of absorbIng re­ ligious enthusiasm. Historioally. communism is the offspring or radical reae­ tion to those specifio nineteenth century developments which combined tooreate momentous so01al problema, viz . .• the I ndus­ trial Revolution and liberal economies . Marx's so01al oon .. seiousness was awakened by the problems generat ed by these hbtorioal movements while serving as editor of the Rheinisohe Zeituns. a radical newspaper gI ven to attf\okl on the Prusslan

Government. H18801utl on~ arrived at under the influence of

Proudhon t the Frenoh sooialist, was the applloaUon 'of the Hegelian dialeotio, within 'the framework of' Marx' a own materi­ alism, to the' econom1.o and so01al problems of' life. 19 17

19 Ohal"les J. McFadden, The Philosophy ot OommunIsm, 19-20.

We now come to what i& more apropol to the theme of this paper, the oommunist program of r evolution., Marx predicated the ba&18 ot so01al eVils on the prIvate ownership of the means ot production. As a re8ult of this, socI ety Is divi­ ded into two c1asse8, the oppressors and the oppr essed who carry on a oontinuous struggle resulting in a merciless sup­ pression of the working olass. I t 18 this lociety that Com­ munism frankly admits it 1. out to destroY', together with all the socIal counterparts of bourgeois livIng such as rellg10n, the state, non-olau moralIty .nd the' not10n of prIvate own­ ershIp. The inevItabIlity of revolution ha8 ita basis In the Marxian dlalectio applied to the .nature ot present soolety with its internal struggle Which wIll 1.8ue In a new 80clal form. The inevltablU.ty ot the revolution w111 1'esu1t 1'N>m the fact that the present mode ot production is in violent opposition to the present manner in which the fruits of pro­ duction are approprIated by ~en. 20

20 Ibid., 146.

Although the revolution. Is inev1table, men must b%'lng It to a head by attacking t~eold order and strIv1ng for the new .80c1a1 order. The Ma.r.xian revolution willd1ffe·r from all others of a bourgeois nature byeas.t1ng out all exploiting cla8ses and plao1ng in authority representatives of the work- 18

ing class. There 1s to be no substitution of one exploiting group in place of another. If violence 1s necessary, and it wll1 be, for t he exploiters will not give up easily, then violence is to be employed. Marx ascribed the failure of the Paris Commune to the fact that it stopped half way with its "dreams of establishing supreme justice" in the country and that "instead of annihIl ati ng its enemies, it endeavored to exerc'1se moral 1nf1uence on them.1t The adaptation by Marx ot the Paris Commune gave to Communism its f i rst real revolution­ ary traditio~ . By its vigorous and a1moat successful attack on the centralized state authority, the Commune became, in Marx's mind, the classical model for a working-class revolu. tion. 21

21 ~ . , 152; Arthur Rosenberg, H18t9ry of Bolshevism, 18 .

The immediate purpose of revolution is t ,o establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. The revolution 1s the ini­ tial phase; it serves the purpose of acqUiring power. The dictatorship tollows to oonso1idate the gain and to crush whatever bourge01s opposit10n may arise and ultimately to work for the complete victory of loci.118m. The proletarian or new state now beoomes an instrume~t for the dictatorship ot the exploited majority over an exploiting minority. Thus in brief outline we have the philosophy and the plan of operation which ultimately suc.~in the Russian Revolu­ tion of 1917. In the history of the oommunist movement we 19

must keep in mind that historioally Marxism 1s German radi­ cal aocialism. Its applioation to the Russian aoene was not

immediately conoeived by Ma~x who looked forward to t he es- . tabl1ahment ot integral sooialism in a highly industrialized state but not 1n Russia, wblch had a large agrarian popula­ tion. Here the afreota ot the Induat:rial Revolution made theIr appearanoe later than in other European oountries. With reterenoe to the writings of Marx, 1t muat be said that the greatest influenoe did not oome trom hls pandeu-oua nas Kapltal but rather from hls articles, braohures# and especially from the short inoendiary Manifesto, whioh he oomposed i n oonjuno­ tion with Engela. The influenoe of Engels 1s veY'1 closely

allle~ with that of Marx, whose oomplement he was. TheIr

minds and thoughts were 80 olosely interrelated that one may

be ~aid to reflect the mind ot' the other. , Thus in- the field ot ideas ws have a oomposite pioture ot the main 1nfluenoes whioh oontributed to bringing about tne events of 1917 in Russia. The Russian Revolution nas many pointsot similarity wIth otner major soolal upneavals; it

aleo has its distinot character which sets it apart ~om any other revolut1on. It must not be supposed that the men and their wrltlngs that we have desoribed had ,a wIde oiroulation or Influenoe among the ma.l!lea ot the people, a .fact that was precluded by the high illiteraoy rate . The influenoe was ex­ ercised among the dominant minority-- the group in whioh the ster!.l1ty of ideas waa t ransformed into the reality of action. We shall now prooede to examine another sphere of influenoe-- 20

the political. The historical ambition of Tsaroom was to aooomplish the three major objectIves promulgated by Byzantine Chr1stianlty, viz., unity in deity, unity in sovereignty, and unity 1n ter­ ri tory. In the fifteenth oe.ntury, under Ivan III, the In1 tial work of territorial unifioation was aocomplished and Mongol domination was terminated. In oro.er that there might be one seat of empire in Russla,the great republios of Novogorod, Pskov, and Vlatka lost their Uberties and went to 8well the possessions ot Moscow. In 1547, RUs sia had basic unIty in terri tory, sover.e1gnty, and de! ty under Ivan IV who assumed the title ot Tsar. 22

22 Edmund Noble, The RUssian Revolt, 98.

The triune objective of Taardom was sub.equently reaf... firmed 1n a report to the T.sar 1ssued 1n 18:5:5 by Count Ouva­ rov, a pert1nent extract from which 1e quotsd.: "Autooracy 1s the ohlef condltlon of the poli­ tioal ex1stenoe ot Russla. The Ruedan giant :rest. on it, aa on the cornerstone of its greatness. And besIde .• these 1a,0 nat10nal principles (-orthodoxy and autocraoy) there 1. a third not less 1mportant: that of natlonallty.ft 2:5

2:5 Quoted Inl Paul Milyoukcv, Opt olt., 182.

Hlstorlcally, tbe clalm to ilutooratio rulewh1ch has bee~

so strenuo.l,. upheld by the Tsars is a reflection ot the Byzan­ tine ldea ot a theccratic imperium. It was handed down through

the Mu.oovite rulers on an uncertain and w~ver1ng legal founda- 21

tion and, with t he berr1 tor!al expansl0.n of Moscow, was ex­ tended to the conquered terrftories. Durl~ the re1gn of Peter the Great, autocraoy was reoast Into the mold of bureau­ cratic absolutlsm. During the reign of Catherlne t he Great, Montesquleu ,gave a phil osophical just1flcation to the oialma of .autooracy on the grounds that no other form of government was possible due to the broad extent10n of Russian territory,24

24 Paul MHyoukov, op . clt. , 160, 169, 170.

Thus we have the orlg1n of t,he poll t1cal form whIch caused the later nlneteenth century conf110t with the Tsars. The move In the direot1on of autocraoy and un1ty oreated d1s­ plaoements 1n the polit1oa1 rlghts of the peopl~ wIth oonse­ quent soolal and eoonom10 disabilltles. This situation formed t;he ro()t cause of the struggle between Taardom and Its poli­ tloallyd1spossessed people "Men tlnally culminated in the Revolution of 1917. The Revolution is none the les8 the out- oome of many foroes, at times accentuated, then ohecked, but whlch establlsha recognizable trend beglnnlng with the Decem­ brist revolt in 1825. 25

25 E.J. Dl110n,"The RU8sian Upheaval," Portnightly Revlew, May, 1917, 107;728.

The addedterrltoria1 acquis1tion, of the T'sara, whioh oontinued throughout subsequent oenturles after basl0 unity ~ been established by Ivan IV, strained to the utmost the toroes 22

that were applied to mainta1n unified sover eignty over a unified territory_ The preoccupation with this maj or prolt- 1em of political control was one of the reasona which led Peter the Great to import from Western Europe the complex

atructure 01' the bureaucratic mach1ne, which was never ad~ just ed to native conditions, and whose only efficienoy lay in its repressive power . The problem remained wi th Peter's 8uccessor.,. whb had to extend unremi tUng efforts to pre­ vent the enormous structure from falling back into its com­ ponent parts and this policy resulted in a relentless auto.. cracy. The problem of un1fied control over a unif ied t erri­ to.ry created a lack of equIlIbrium between the growth of the empire and internal development. Soolal and polltical or,:" ganization had to wait until the whole of the vast pla1n was brought under the rule of one Tsar. This 1. one ot the baaic causes wby Rusala was "late"· on the historioal timetable of Europe, and it explain. in part too, theacoentuated accumu­ lation of soclal and economic problema. It explains the atrange anachronism ot feudal remnants running into the twen­ tieth oentury. 26

26 L. S. Friedland, "The Background ot the Revolution", The Dial, May 17, 1917, 621429-430.

Some ot the pecul1arit1e1l ot'Ru8s1a·. historical develop­ ment which bear a particular relationship to the revolutlonal"1

movement have been quite accurately surveyed by no le88 a per~ .onage than Trotaky. The alow tempo ot developnent with re'· lulting economio baokwardness and primitiveness of aoc1al torms has been the .table feature of Russian history. The 23

1'1gors ot olimate, broad expanse of plains , Aslatio migra.. t ions are some of the factors whioh condit1oned this course of Russian development". In western Christendom, sooial de­ velopment progressed through the pe$-santry and then fromthls olass there evolved the burghers, craftsmen and merchants. In Russia, the parallel development formed a mixture of tra­ der s, C osl ~ck~ frontiersmen and pioneers . In the eoonomio sphere, RUe aia skipped over the epooh of craft guilds. Rus­ slan economy and industry were largely an adaptation of wes­ t ern achievements l:osertedlnto the relative backwardness ot an agrarian eoonomy " Bowevor, the rate of industrial prog­ ress in Russia has made sizable gains within ahort apaces of time whereas comparatlveprogrees .1n the West has been meas­ ured 1n decadee. The doubling of industrial output between 1905 and 1914 1s a oase in point. Theae factiors explain the rapid and late rise of an industrial proletariat without past tradItions and who, whe n .they met up with the oppressions of Tsardolll, were 1nc11ned to be hospit!lble to the boldest oon­ elusions of revolutionary thought. 27

27 Leon Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution, 1:3, 9, 11.

While Russian history has the usual quotaot wars and re­ volta inoident to 1t. early h.1atorioal development. (this haa ita historioal duplioation in any oountry' following an expan­ aionlst pol1oy) the first Russi an revolutionary movement, 11'1 the modern sense ot the word, was that of the Decembrlat re­ volt in 1826. It represents an h1storioal link with the tvents of 1917 . The Deoembrist revolt ot 1825, the event. of bloody 24

Sunday In 1905, can best be represented .as battering-rod attempts made against the fortress of Tsardom, each one of whioh left the struoture somewhat weaker for the final fall in 1917. These earlier attempts lacked 8ucceu because they lacked the concurrence of the ensemble of faotors which have

to meet tor a .sucoessful r evolution. These elements, $0 well described by Robert Hunter 1n his Revolution, WhY. When, How, require among other' things proper timing and leadership. The Decembrist revolt was .initiated by officers of the aristooratic 01as8, whose hopes based on Alexander I were frustrated by the latt er's reversal of form 1n the matter of liberal political tendencies. The offioers' oontaot with the Itberal and democratic ideas of the West during the napoleon­ ic wars was an incentive for the attempt to force their In. troduction into the realm of monarchist totalitarianism. The incipient revolt was quelled with much bloodshed; five of the leader s were hanged; and the others were sent to the mines, sometimes referre.d to as the dry guillotine of Tsardom. 28

28 A. S. Rappoport, "The Philosophic BaSis ••• ", 226 tl13-l33.

While the Deoembriat revolt was o rushed. 1t was not al­ together unsuocessful. From December, 1825, the .forces 1n the field of Ideas, whioh we have previously desoribed, took on an added impetus and a spirit of determination. The ab­ solutist tendenoies of Alexander I started a new curr ent 1n what mayllow be termed the revolutionary movement. The move- 25

ment wicdened and deepened. From being ~n affair of a mere ooterie,. i.t began to penetl'ate al l cla88es of t he intelli­ gentsia and took on the external organization of parties and movement.. It brought Liberal, Nlhi11st, s oclalist, and Te rrorist tendenc1es into the arena again8t the forces of the Tsars. 29

29 Edmund, ' Nob. 1 e, OPe o1t.,' 1' 93.

The internal strUggle gOing on in Russi a at this t1me between Tsardom and revolutionary elements followed a vari­ able pattern. The demands for retoN. oppoaed the prel'oga­ tlvea ofautoora'tio gove:rttlllent inconstant clashes. Terror- 1st act1v1t7 was toll owed by rigId repre.aive measures. One of the Tsarist stratagems used by the political pollce was the use of the agent provacateur. Individuals posing as revolutionary leader a, whIle 11'1 reality they were secret po- 110e agenta, would organIze sooiet.iee of workers whi oh they would urge on to aotlve demonstrations i n order to provoke the hardest repressive measure. under whioh the movement would be eradlcated. The actiona of individUal. beoame hid­ den 11'1 the colleotivity , and the corrupt syatem of prO VO CQ­ tion ended 10. oatastrophe. 30

30 O.E. Beohhoter, tt'Pwo Cause. Oelebre. of the RU88ian Revolu­ t lonu , The Nineteenth Century and After, April 1919, 85179B.

Contemporaneous w1th the r1ae at soclallsm ~nd its ag1- 26

tation agai n~ t the Tsarist government t~ere began to take shape a new class in Russla--the worker.. Having no poll­ tical allianoe, they drifted into various socialist group­ lngs so that the labor movement andlooialism were for all praotical purposes identical. The worker s in RU8sia, pri­ marily an agricultural atate, tormed, until the years pre­ ceding the Revolut ion, a relatively small traction of the population. In 1861 it 1. estimated that about 520,000 serfs attached to the land were liberated. In 1878 the Working Allianoe ot Southern Russia marked the firs t and timid debut ot the Russian working cla.s lnto politioal life. In 1883 Blagolev founded at Petrograd the first socialist working group whioh became affiliated with t he Liberation of the Workera, the latter peing the repre .. entatives ot the Marx­ i.t aocialist f action founded by Plekhanov and other revolu­ tionists in Swltzerland. The tamine of 1891 ,welled the rank. \ ot the peasanta who had migrated to the villagel. 31

31 Etienne Antonelll, La Rusde Bol.hevi.te~ 28.

The immediate identificati on ot practically the entire labor movement with socialilt and revolutionary movements is a pe­ euliar .Rus .. ian phenomenon, and is an important factor in ac­ counting for the relative ease with whioh the BolsheVIk fac­ tion attained oontrol in 1917.

With the acee.slon to power of Richolas ~I in 1894, libe.. al Ru.s!a awaited with earneat hope. the promulgaticn of con­ stitutional reform.. They had not long to wait fo~ a pronounoe­ ment on the policy t he new, and last, Tsar intended to tollow. 27

In a speech given on the occasion of hi~ accession Nioholas a.ffirmed: "Let it be known to all that I, devoting all my strength to the 800d o.f my people, wl11 maintain the prinw clple of autocracy as firmly and steadfastly as dld my late father. tt 32

32 Quoted In: James Mavor, The Russian RevolHtlon, 33.

The enunclation o~~ thl. princlple meant the continuation of the struggle whioh had gone on during the preceding reigns.' Only now Niohola. had to f aoe more f ormldable elements. Orga­ nized partIes under capable leadership began t o funotlon more effectlvely. Propaganda mediums were multipl1ed. In the oitiea the working men were . drawn lnto the Soola1 Democrat

Party, founded by Pl .khano~ And others in 1898. The Soolal- 1st Revolutionary Party, suooe.80rs to the Wl11 of the People movement, at·tpaoted and was the pa11ying, point tor the pea.- ants because of ita emphasis on the land question. Many or the Zematvoa personnel, representing the only elect ed ofticial­ dom in Ru.sla, were drawn into the Soolaltst Revol~tlonl.t group becaus. ot the fanatioal represaion exercised by the no­ torious -Plebve. Thus a naturally con.ervatl "e landowning. group w&a alienated from the regime by t.he aotlvlty ot one of lts mlnistere. 33

33 .John Spargo ... Bolehevte., 18.

lIeanwhile the war between the government and organlzed terror!. • m continued, bringing m1nor conoeasiona on tl1e part 28

ot the government but leaving the tundal.l1ental issues un­ touohed. The weakened structure or Taardom was beg1nning to show the errects of the corrosives whioh were eating away

1ta foundations--oorroslves .supplied by the press~ llterature, the teohnioal schools and universities, the Zematvos, the In­ stitution of trlal by j'ury, the prote.slorial and working 01as8 groups,. and the !!lon-RussIan nationals and non-oonformist re ..

11~10u. group.. These .slow working elements lert to them­ .elves would in time have toppled or radioally ohangedthe governmental struoture, but other elements were at work whioh would hasten the proceas or an ultimate downralL 34

34 E. J. Dillon, OR. olt., 728.

In November, 1904" the Government had to faoe the demand for reforma 18sued by the meeting ot the leaders ot the Zemst­ vo. at St. Petersburg. The meet1!!lg Itselt, organized 1n de­ fianceet a government order and oal11ng tor a meeting ot people' a repre. • entatlvea for the purpose' q1" setting up a con­ at1tutional governme,nt, was a revolutionary act. It was met by an ambiguous anawer by the ~sar who prOmised a number ot oonoesliens. Meanwhile a ,series of strike. were in progre. • s, which d1sturbed the Government, and whioh were put down In the usual 'l'sarist fash10n w1th the a1d ot provooatlve agents uti11zed to trap revolutionary leaders. The unpopular lapan•• e war with 1ts tales ot oorruption, m1.atNatment ot soldiera, negleot of the wounded, and d1s.8- troua defeats discredited the monarcby and gave the impetus

to more open demands for reform.. The war . may be looked upon, 29

as one of tne last phases of the Tsaris~ program of expan­ sionism and territorial unification. Disagreement over war policy caused the dismIssal of Count Wi tte, one of the very few competent mini.ters in the Tsarls Government. Japan .tarted the war without any formal declaration, and, accord­ ing to Soloveytchik, in the light of t'he.,More recent incidents at Pearl Harbor, SIngapore, and the staggering early defeats inflicted by the Japanese in the late war, some revision of j udgment. on Russials failure in 1905 .eem to be f orthcoming. 35

35 George Soloveytchik, RU8sia in Perspective, 144.

During the earlyyearl of the twentieth century the Rus­

sian revolutionary movement had taken on a n~w aspect with the rise of industry. The workers in the cities entered the arena agaInst the government and took the initiative in expressing demands for refol'Dl. The uprising or, .. s some term it, the Revolution of 1905, waa inaugurated under theIr auspices. The eventl of Bloody Sunday (January 9, 1905) form a prelude to t he successtul venture of Pebruary, 1917. The program of reform sponsored by Father Gapon oalled for a constItutional government and listed measures whioh were oalculated to pro­ oure eoonomio and aocial relief for the workers. The objec­ tives of the reform program were set forth in a widely cir­ oulated dooument, remarkable for its tone of moderation and the e •• ential justioe and urgency of its requests. I t could well have served as a basia for the politioal and social re. form of Russia. When the guns of the soldiers dispersed the peaceful, marchIng throng they gave an impetus to the revo- 30 .

lutionary movement that was subsequently to prove very costly to the Tsar and his government . Although the uprising of Bloody Sunday failed of its 1m­ mediate objectives, it did. however, broaden the scope of pop­ ular unrest. Strikes continued on a larger scale. Profes­ sional revolutionists dreamed of far more sweeping aocial ohanges. The middle -class l1berals looked for .. conatitutlon­ al regime on the model of Western Eu rope. The worker thought of higher wages while the pe.. sant eyed the broad acres of his neighboring l~ndlord. The common man had his idyllic concep­ tion of the fatherhood of the Tsar rudely shattered. 36

36 William Chamberla1n, op. cit., 49-50.

The pressure of events, during the trying years rrom 1904 to 1907, found the Tsar and hi. adv1ser. trying to ..meliorate the desperate s1tuation. A. Igreater degree of religlous liberty waa granted, and prov1sions were made for .. ne. representative body, the Imperial Duma. The disabling restriotions that en­ c.ompasaed the funotioning of this body need only be enumerated here to underst.. nd the limited extent of the concession. It had a greatly restr10ted legisl.. tive po.er .hich made it little more th.. n .. deliberative body. The Imperi.. l Oouncil .... recon­ stituted, with half of the appointments coming from the 18ar himselt. This upper body had equ.. l right. with the Duma. The Tsar reserved to himself t ,he power to call .. nd dissolve the Duma at will. The undemocratio character ot the electoral de- 31

cree 01' June 16, 1907, disfranchised three~rourths of the , peasants and the workers of all the cities save Odessa, Riga,

St. Petersburg, M08COW, and Klev. 37

37 Etienne Antonelli , Ope oit., 25.

The upri.ing of 1905 brought no net gainl in the allevi­ ation of the problems that faced the people. After ,the reao­ tionary measures whioh began in 1907 the great country quiet­ ed down almost oompletely. This was not because the tasks 6f the revolutionary movement had been completed, but because the country was exhausted ~om the battle with the regime.

The moderate demands 01' the Duma Ihowed the entire country op­ posed to the Tsar. The Government could effectively counter­ poise the efforts of the people because of the powerful po ... lice machinery, and because the blind devotion of the noble officer claas in the army waa a reserve element held in check against a major outbreak. 38 '

38 A. J • .sack, "Factors In tne Ruaslan Revolution". OUrren.t Hhton. lI. Y. Timel, lune, 1917, 6 Pt. I, 476.

'the intervening years between 1905 and the outbreak of the first World War were marked by concesslona granted by the Tsar under pressure of an internal crisi s, followed by a syst.ma- tic aggressiveness against ~he use of th•• e concessiona to gain political and social rightl. The Government, exerclling authority through a harlh bureauoracy which utilized the pow­ er of the poliee arm, fought all oppoaitional el ements with the result that the Tsar'. Government alIenated practIcally 3~

every sooial strata of the population. Even many of t he land­ owners, who ordinarily are aligned po11t1cally with the t hron~, were forced into t he opposition camp because of the att1tude taken on the part of the Gove rnmen~t toward t he ZemfltVQs. Mean­ while the aggressive revolutionary movement was somewhat tem­

pered by 1nternal dissenaionl by the f11ght abroad of many of the leaders and the arr est and impr1sonment of large numbers ot po11tioal prisoners. A sucoession of good crops and eoono­ mic prosperity eased aomewhat the external oauses of unre8t with the result that more moderate soc1al andpolitioal views gained ground. 39

39 James Mavor, Ope cit., 31.

Juat prior to the outbreak of the World War the Tsar's Governmerit had to faoe a riew resurgence or difficult1es. A strike of 400,000 workers at St. Petersburg, agitating tor po11t1cal reform, required the barr1cading of the streets ot the city. The more moderate element. 1n the Duma became more determined and abandoned their temporary adhesion to the Tsar, jo1ning now with the Socialists whom they feared earlier. In July, 1914, -the Government faced a united front of the pro­ gressive element. of the country, led as in 1905, by the fight­ ing vanguard of the revolutionary worker. of the cap1tal. The forces ot the revolut1on and the aristooracy were again. lining up for the resumpt10n of the battle when a far more form1dable oontest appeared in the offlng--the World War. What course 33

the Revolutionary movement would have t~k en had not the war Inter;v:ened 1. a matter of conjecture. but the war dId stop the movement temporarily as the nation rallied around the Tsar as the symbol of nat10nal un1ty 1n the faoe of an exter­ nal foe. 40

40 A. J. Saok, o"p.olt.; 476. 34

Chapter II

The I~tluence of Personaiitles

The World War brought a host at new faotors into the compllcated lnternal situation whioh ex1sted 1n Russ1a 1n 1914. Before ,tre.,ting of them 1n a special chapter, it haa been deemed advisable to ·give aome analysis of the more domi­ nant personallt!es, the product of whoae activIty or omia­ alons gave SUDstanoe to and shaped the cour.e of history at this critical juncture. ThIs treatment is 1n no sense meant as a complete biographioal coverage nor does 1t 1nclude all those who played an important part.. Ita aim Is' limIted: to brlng 1n I1ne those a.speat. of the character of some of the peraons and thelr aotivity, whlch had a direct bearing on the Revolution. The '1's.r, Nioholas II, waa the torp1d center around whO11 11 revolved the host ot contending elementa, wh1cb erupted from the ~ocial unrest, and whIch tbe EUropean war lnten.l .. tled and determlned the ultimate pha.ae. at qualIfications tor the rule of the 1I'orld'a largest contiguous empire (popu­ lation aa given in 2nd. Generaleenaus, 1909, 160.8 mIllIons) he 81;1owed no traoe. Hla Indlv1dual qualities could be summed up In a oertaln acoumulation of ornamental aooomplishments, personal graoe and vague, good Intention.. Be Was a devoted father and busband. The last Tsar waa .. weak-willed man whose character derecta seemed to have beoome accentuated as the crl- 81. In hl. government gr.w. ma great.at derect was a hablt 35 of in.congruoua vaoillation. He would undo one day what he had half aocomplished the previous day. Hia opinions were often at varianoe with the grounds alleged to support them. Be often pursued objectives w1th methods that were obviously calculated to dereat their aocomplishment. Thus, While per­ haps ainoerely proolaiming his love for peace, he rorced the country into the war with Japan, and while urging the vigor­ oua proseouti on of the campaIgn, he pursued measures whlch rendered dereat a certainty. Nioholas II was very jealous of the influenoe of his ministers. Frequently he would seek their 'advice only to oollaborate w1th incompetent persons against his own self-appointed advisers. Ue seldom trusted

"11)" publ10 man and frequently mistrusted himself. No act of his own evidenced stateamanllke qualltie.. Hi. own incompe­ tency was made more obvious by bis failure to utl1ize such statesmanlIke wisdom a. RUssian soolety a1'forded,. Nioholas only made a bad situatIon worse by taking upon himael1', along wlth the 01vl1 rule, the supreme command of the army-- a task that proved too much for the far more oapable Peter the Great. The result was, that torn between milItary affairs and those relat1ng to the oi,,11 administration the Emperor found him­ self unable to attend properly to either. 1

1 E. J. DIllon, op.cl,t., 730; Gleb Botkin, The Real Romanovs, 125.

In hia dealings with the aI'my' the Tear pursued a course ot action whloh atienated that body: trom hil support. Nleho- 11.. must have been aware thata. revolution in the twentieth century 1. a.lm08b an impossibIlity without the co-operation 36 or at least the oonnivanoe of the al"JtlY, .,.et he malntained an attitude of aloofnes8 that was greatly Naented. In the orlais of 1905 h. obstinately refused to deal .1th the liber­ al leaders, nor did he appeal to Gount Witte UntIl it was al­ most too late. And after oonfiding the situation to that minister, he secretly treated with Witte'. rivals for the purpose ot changing it. It .asno aurprI.s. then, that when the monarchy tell no single inflUential public body oame to its support. 2

2 E. J. Dillon, op.clt., 732.

In an 1nterestl11g studywhioh brings out a new oau.alre­ lationshlp 1n the genes1. and 8uooess of revolution wlth reter­ ence to monarchles, Dr. Melamed brings out Bome signi fioant faot.. Oomparing the PersIan, Portugue.e, TurkIsh; and Chl .. neae revolutions .Ith the RuasIan, he note. that they all had one thIng In oommo.n--the degeneraoy of the rulers whioh t ,ound Ita e:xpre. •• ,.on 1n their physioal, mental and moral inferior­ ity. Melamed olaims that this factor brIngs up a new drivlng foroe in the development of the stat e and In polltioal revo­ lutions . The cau.sal relationships of accumulated raolal and biologlcal momenta are faotors .hioh up to reoently have not been taken Into consideration In theIr connection.ith revolu... tlonary mov~ent8. 3

3 Dr. S. M. Melamed, ~Anth~opologloal Causea of the Russian Revolution," The Ruaaiap Revi •• , July 1917, 3,45-49.

The explanation for thls unlform weakness, .hioh appeare pe~iodlcal11 1n the hiatory of ruler., 11ee 1n the praotioe 37

ot the close intermarrlage and Inbreedl~g prevalent among royalty. This practIce must in the end, 11ke everf oth.r inbreeding, weaken the vitality of the dynasty and oause ita . I ruin by produoing inferior 1nd1 vidual .• who, in any cas.. suo­ oeed to power by reason of inheritanoe. After a dynasty haa ruled over a oountry for 300 or 400 years" it 1s not only physiologIcally but alao morally exhauated. The stuarts, the Capeta, the Braganzas, the Manohul, the Homanova followed this 01'011'1. Th. weakness of Oharles ! and Louis XV! 1s well known. The English monarohy made luf.fioient adjustmenta 1n the "GlorIous Revolution" ot 1688 to avoid a SUbsequent orl­ slae 'l'he long reIgn of the Hapaburgs was du. to th. fact that it symbo11zed and personified the unity of the state whioh promptly resolved itself into national units when the monarohy was overthrown. It may a180 be mentioned that it was the Tsarte influence as a unifying agent in the faoe of the ori81s ot war that prolonged his reign. It is also .. fact thtlt the very cris18 of war a coentuated h1s weakness and brought to the f ore defecta that otherwlse could have remained generally hIdden beh1nd the veil of oourt 11fe.. It 1s Melamed'. opinion that supermen do not make revolution but rather the rever.e 1. true; it 1. the inferior man who i. responsible for it. The superman It he appears 1n time ot erbls wl11 rather undo it a8 happened In the oas. of Napoleon. DRuie Implies wl11 power," say. Melamed: "and thoae rulers who are lacking In will pow a!' beoause ot Interiot-ity, not only stimulate revolutIon but pro­ voke it." 4 38

4 n.!!. . 4g.

The relevancy 01' these conclusions and tbeir application to the last Tsar need. no elaborate comment. It we add to them the factors of environment and education we have the ad- ded. complexes that went to make up the personality and explain t he activity of N1cholas II. Perhaps the Tsar's own ana):ys1e of h1a l1re 1s one of the most penetrating and enlighten1ng.

",I have all my l1re on17 done what I was told to do, II he once confided to a man who envied his destiny_ '1'0 this factor, N1cholas ascribed hIs assumpt10n of the throne, his marriage, h1 s wars, his efforts at peaoe making. Anet' we might add, his abdication at the request of the milItary leaders. 5

5 William Gerhardi, The Romanovs, 4.

The prinoiple ,of monarchioal aosolutl.m which underlay the '1'sar1st conoept or government had as its primary objectIve the maintainanoe and transter intact of autooratic power. With rererence to Linooln's dlctWD of government of the people, by the people an.d tor the people, !sarism was government of, by, ,- and for the autocracy. There was no corrective med1um avail- able, as in a democracy, in the form of a ballot to counteraot oorruption or incompetency. I t is true 'that in Russia many m.en of htunbleorlg1n rose to high governmental rank, but they still had to tunction wlt hi,n the e)t1ating framework of auto­ cratic ·government. Any concesslona in favor ' of tho people 39

.ere always measured In relation to th,fJlr effect on the pow ... er p08itlon of the monarohy. These oonoessions, no matter how just or needful, involved b1tter struggle on the part of their advocates otten at the cost or their personal liberty or 11fe. The autooratio 'rears seemed never to have unde.rstood the primary tenet at the ra1son d'etre at all oivil govern­ ment--the promotion of the oommon welfare of all the people. In the last analysis It was the negleot of this prlnolple that caused the ohain or Tsarist rule to snap in the person of one of ita .eake.t 11nks--Nicholas' ll. A. point of view , that ls admirable summed up by Ethan Colton: "Revolution overtook and destroyed the 1nrper­ lal regime 1n Rus.ia because that regime was too little oonoerned with the well ...boi)1.ng of the mas s­ e. ot It. sUbjeots. A reoord of failure. genera­ tlon by g~meratlon lett the old order ,,1 th 11 ttle justification tor Ita existenoe, and with fewer frienda tor its support. The strains of the Wo rld War raoked the weakened structure to ruin." 6

6 Ethan Colton, Four Pattern. at Revolution, 1.

Another personality whose influenoe over the i ll-fated Tsar exercised an 1nd4:reot but none the less potent erreot on theoour.e or events .1.8 the Tsar1na. Intimately oonneoted with her name 1. her all.oelation wlth the notorlous charlatan Raaput1n. Arte;r deducting the dramatlc and legendary elementa ooncerning 'bhe.e two personalitles, enough val,ld historical evldenoe remains, supported by the OOpiOU8 letters of the Empress, to trace out an amazing taotual account of the last day. at Tsardom. 40

Rasputin, the Siberian peasant, ha~ no canonical statu8 in the Orthodox Church elther by way ot orders or membership

in a monastio e.tablishMentl although he did reside 1n one tor a time. lie was one of those selt.appointed nholyft men who wandered about among the people, proclaiming a direot oommi ssion from God, a typical example ot extravagant and un­ licenced individualism not uncommon in the Orthodox Ohurch. He obtained among the peasants a reputation for wonderful spiritual powers. Subsequent contaot with Bishop Fectan, rector ot the Tleological AoaSiemy of St. pe~.r8bu~g , enabled Rasputin to enter the oirele of the Montenegrin Duches. and the Grand Duke Nic;holas . whence he obta1,n,'d hl. introduotion to the Palace at Tsarkoe 1n 1907. 7

'7 ot. Sl.r aernal"d Pare., Introduction to the Letters ot th. '!harib.a to the Tsar,. XV.

The Empress, A.le~andra was a woman whose religious nature inclined her to .. vague sort of mysticism. Having given birth to four chaPDl1ng 'daughters, she waealways obsessed by the thought that the only male hell" to the throne 'was aftlicted by the haemiphl110 ailment, a sickness transmitted through the temal. line and at'teating only the maleoftspring. The erfect of the ailment is that the slightest aocident may set up in­ ternal bleeding tor whloh there 1s no known cure. R.. sput1n{. influenoe came to the fore in 1912, when the Tsarevich rtll on a gunwale of a boat he was entering. The bruise set up in­ ternal .br.edlng and his lite was deapaired ot. The Empr ••• 41

then orde!'ed a telegram to be sent to R~sputlnl who replied: "The illness 1s not fatal; don't let the dootors worry him.," From the time of' the reception of' 'the telegram the boy rapid­ ly recovered. On thls and another ocoatlon Raaputln's advi ce ooincided with improvement in the boy's oondition. The Em­ press began to look upon Raeputln as a "man of God." From t his oontaot arose the malign influenoe whiob the oharlatan exercised over the nervous, Mystical temperament of the Em­ press and through her over the Tsar. No amount of faotual evldencecomlng from po11ce investIgation. responll1ble mem­ bers of the Duma, and members of the royal famlly conoerning the dissolute character of Rasputin. whoae name itself meana "dissolute" could break up the unwholesome alliance whioh worked such havoc for Rusda. The extent and interfer enoe of Hasputin's influence covered a w1de field. Resettled at various times and in var­ ious ways the admInistration of the food 3upplYJ conferred re­ peatedly with the minister of rlnance; seoured an order for the stoppage of all passenger traffio on the railroads so that foots supplies could be moved- a meaaure rendered futIle by the lal1- ure to collect them at the proper places for transport. He in­ terfered in m1ll tary affairs , orde r l ng an offen31 ve . oounterma,nd­ lng an offensive; he secured the dlsmis3al of Po11vonov, whose military aoumen was aoknowledgedby Hlndenburg. He removed the foreign minister Sazonov, opposed autonomy for Poland and dicta- _ ted telegrams to the Ki ngs of Serbia and Greece. The oorrespond­ enoe of the Empress tell the trag1c drama in unaffeoted language. 42

The fol10wlng were culled at random from the vast oorreapon- denoe; thelmpersonal pro.noun 1"e1'er8 to Rasputin as also the re1'ereno. to "our Fr1end" . Appl1 ., 1915. "Our ,Friend 1s shooked at the. style of N. N." ( the Grand Duke) . ' April 6. "Be thougbt the Tsar sbould not have visi­ ted Galioia till after tbe war." June 10. "He says tbe seoond olaas or reQl'Ul t .s should no t be 0111e4." June 11. "He 1s against the assemblage of the Duma. 1f June 17. "Rasputln bege to postpone the Duma.n June l S.Of Samarin, Procurator or the Holy 51·nod: "He 1. an enemy or Our Fr1end's and that Is the worst th1ng there oan be." - J June 24. "The Premier (GoremykIn) 18 to tell Samarin and Shoherbatov (Minister of the Interior) how they are to behave to Ra.putln." Aug. 28. ne tell. the Tsar to set free oriminals and aend them to the front • .Nov ' 10. Raapubln haa reoommended the d1smi.ssa1 of the Premier (GoremykIn). Now he a.ka the Tsar to walt till he has seen the elder Khvoatov "to tom hIs 1m­ pre.alon of him." Dec. 4. Ra8 putin ba. prophesied great time.s com1ng tor the Taar and Rua.s!a. "Our friend 9 • dreama mean ao much". . Deo. 13. ne "entreate you to be firm, to be master, and we mnsteS1ve a strong country to Baby." (The 'faarevioh) ..

8 . Of. Sir a ernard Pares; "Rasputin and the Empre.8: Author' or the Russian Oollapse, " Fc>re1gn Affaire, O~tober, 1927, 6,140- 154.

The tragio story related above could be prolonged to great length but the aoope oonfinements of thl. paper neoe.sltate on­ ly a .ample. The Empre.a Alexan,dra waa an avowed enemy ·01' oon­ stitutlonal government. When the war orl11a brought on a wid.e publio demand tor a respon81ble mini8try. one that would have to give an aooount to a body repre.entative of' the people, the 45

Empress obtained the prorogation of the. Duma for fear of the

suoce8S of a move toward constitutional goveramen~ in the formation ot a real parliamentary Duma with legislative rights. Th1a was to be in oontrast to the weak instl'UDlent whoae power hat b.en whittled down in practIce a1nce 1906. It .a8 in this critioal phase that the .ar became lesa an instrument

for produoing a Russian Constltutiont~n one of the mediate faotor. whleh brought on the Revolution. At thIs time of or1eis the Empreas perauaded the Taar to dismiss the Grand Duke Nicholas trom the supreme command . a man who .aa popu ... lar with the Duma and the ocuntl"1i and alao to reinatate all the mln.iatera who had, so to speak, struok against Premier Goremykln becauae of his subservienoe to Raaputln. In the ab­ sence at the Emperor at the front; the Empress assumed the function of unof:r1oial regent, r eoeiving in the Emperor's ab­ senoe his oabinet ministers and try.ing to .hape governmental polioie. to her own taste.

Thus at I. time of world-wide .truggle, In the m1dst of olosest oollaboration with the best bralns of Western atatea­

manship, the Run1an ship of atate was navI.gated by an hys­ terical woman with minIsters .elected on the ba.is of their sub.ervienoe to an ignorant, fantaatic and debauched adventur-

I er. It It, .al under the l.aderlhip of suoh I. government, tt says Sir Bernard Pare., ftthat the live. of millionl ot pea.ant. were thrown.,. tnto the furnaoe olthe World War." 9

9 Ibid., 154. Gleb BotkIn, The Real HomanovI, 115 • - . 44

The ugly rumors concerning collusIon with the enemy which .ere attached to the name of the Empress have never been substantiated, and her reputation in t his respect wa. cleared by a committee of the Provisional Govel'nl!l.ent , whioh also had repre.entatives of the Soviets as.ociated with it. These unfounded rumors, however, had a damaging effect on army morale. "Pew historioal figu,res", says Florinsk:y, "have passed oft the stage leaving behind so great a train ot disaaterand suffering as the last Empress ot Russi .... 10

10 General A. I. Denikin, The Russian Turmoil, 19; Michael T. Florinaky, The End of the Russian Empire, 53.

From the realm of oourt personalities to the realm of the revolutionists is a broad j ump but it 1s expressive of the change that took place in Russia in 1917. The Revolution found the element of leadership needed for its success in the person of Lenin. APmaster strategist, he waa endowed from his

earlieat yout~ with the driving force and devotion to the

cause whioh .personified Nechaevta -ideal of ~ revolutionist. Lenin was the aon of a landowning minor educational otticia1. He studied .t the University of Kazan and later enterea tho faoulty of law at st. Petersburg . He .as an earnest and life­ long ~.votee of Marxist dootrine. and early b~came a8so01a­ ted with the revolutionary movement, a step which the execu­ tion ot his brother probably stimulated. His arrest in 1897

.a. followed by a three-year exile in Siberia, which he lett with the permisaIon of the GOVernment. He became at once a 45

member of the'Central Comm1ttee of the RussIan Soc1al Demo­ oratio Party ana oont1nued li te.rary and propagandistIc acti­ vity from abroad. Lenin play.ed a part in the revolutionary uprhings ot .1905-07, but he made no con8picuous appearanoe. Lenin'. later lire, together with his revolutionary aotivi­ tie., and the consequent vioi8situde. ot hi. oareer, made hie oharacter very strong, hard, and heartle.s. In putting into practice Marxian idea., Lenin utilized the Marxian principle that the good i. what benefit. the oause. 11

11 Jame. Mavor, Ope oit., 85 .

Lenin was a speaker ot immens ••ggres8ive foroe with the ability to reduce complioated problema to simple outlines. He hammered hl. facta Into the head. ot hie hearers over and over

, again until they w.re almost hypnoti.ed. Lenin' 8 spirit kne. noob.taclea, no he.itation, no human dltfIoult18., no oom­ mands ot prudenoe. An eyewltne.,a de80rlbe. the control he ex­

. ero18ed over the crowd .....mbl.d at Ksheslnskay.' 8 dra.lng room on the eve of the revolution. "1 ahall never forget the way he thunder.d. at them-- the way h. struok out unspar1ngly right and lett, not only agalnst my'selt', the heretic .ho ao­ oldent.lly waa preaent, but agalnst all orthodox Soolalista." 1.2

12 Nlohola8Suohonov, "How Lenin Oame to Rus8 i a," Living AEte, S.pt. 23, 1922, 314:763. .

Lenin waa an advocate of aotion .and believed 1n the aeiz­ ure ot political power by m.ans ot a violent r.volution to .s- 46 '

\ . tabllah the dictatorship of the proletariat-- ap01~t which , \ " h. emphasiz.d t1me and time agaln. 711.n onl lhe , h~ld; ~~Uld Yt there be aocomplished an .oonomio r ....&j\ultm.nt of the oountry, brlnglng "-;Ith. It what he b.lieved to be a more equitable ao­ oial order. He w,nted no half way meaaure. and consistently fought again8t a collaboration program with the bourg.ois elementa, following In thl. l1ne the plan of Marx. "We are asainat the minimum program," Lenin wrote to Kiev8ky, "(i.e. againat Itruggllng for reform. and democraoy), tor this neon- tradlota" the socialist revolution. rt 13

13 O. H. Gankln &: 'H.B. Fisher, the Bolsheviks and the World War, Documents Relating to t e Format!on of the Third Int., ~.

Lenin'. amazlng qualities of leaderahip stand out when we cons1der that after the r.action follow1ng the events of 1905, his followers dwlndled to a re. emigres, and Bolahev­

iam seemed de.tined to die out. In 1911-12 a new sp1rit took hold of the movement whioh found expres8ion in the publica­ tion of the first Sooial1st dally pap.r ,Pravda . From then on the movement gre., not so much in point of numbers or politi­ oal strength, but beoause under Lenin'. intelleotual guidance, Bolshevik leadership was the first to understand and correctly interpret the significance of later event.. 14,

14 ct. "Lenln; the Ma n and. his Ideaa," Current H1atol'Y', M.Y. Tlme.,Jan. una, Pt. 7, 14-17. (No author given) .

The indirect role played by foreign governments in en- 47

couraging def.atist slnatlment. 1n enemy . countr1e. aeoounts

1'01" the comparatlve freedom affo.rded auah men aa Lenin, ztn- !., oV1ev, Lounatoharaq, BOukal'lne and othera 1n Auatrian terrl.. t ory. Lenin W.8 freed :on apsolal order otOount Sturgck and reoeived -trom the Austrian poll.oe safe con,duott.o go to Sw1t­ zerland, where he engaged 1n defeatist propaganda. Alexlnsk7 glves the docUl'Ilentary pollce reports showing that surveillance control on LenIn'a lnovements evidence his contact with the German l egation at .13 8rne, SwItzerland, Cn Decemba..r 29, 1916, at 11.30 A. M. to 4100 P. M. the next day, Even as far back as 1910.. 11, the Austr~.n aut.horitie. aa8UNO polItical l1bel'­ ty of actIon and perlonal aeourlty to Lenin and other revolu­ tlonist. who obtained from the govel'nlD.ent the authorIzation to eataQll.h at Lwow, Oracow, and Vienna faoilities for the publicatlon of material prohibit ed 1n Ruse!a. 15

15 Grego1.re .Alexinsley I pu isarlsme auCOIDJ:t111nlsme , La Revolp~ 'ion Rue.e Sea Cauae.. Se. Eftect., 24& 31.

Another dominant personality o·f the Revolution was Leon

Trotsky, 8 . man who 'lisa in man1 reapeots the complement of Lenin 8t)d shares ld th hIm tbe ored1 t tor the success' of tbe Bolshevik. in 1917. Trotskyta father (Bronstein) was a wealthy landowner 1n tbe district of E1!lta1tetgrad, a faot which led )lavor to conolude t~t he !!lUst have been a oonform­ Ingor Chrlat1anlzed Jew as otherwise be could not have owned land. 16 48

16 James .Mavor, Op e cit., 85.

Trotsky was .ducat~d at the advanced technical school at Wiko lalev where he began hlsrevolutionary aotivities. Hi s conspicuous qualities while a student were hia honesty, ener.. gy. and aelf-conceit. He utilized companions as long as they were usetul to him and afterwards discarded them. Trotsky wae an early c.ritic ot Marxism and surprised his compa~lons when he entered the fold 1n 1897 to become one of its moat ardent advocates. His active contribution to the revolution- ary cause was in the capacity ot an organizer, wr1ter and pub­ lisher-- activities whicb brought about his arr est and exile to SIberia, trom which he escaped in 1902. Trotsky resembled

Lenin in his indifference to t he means by whlch an end W8.8 obtained but ditfered from him in his individualistic rather than partyattitude-- a trait that was to bring about his subsequent banishment and demIse. 'l'r.otsky was 1n tbe Un1 ted States in the spring of 1917, and at the outbreak of the Feb­ ruary Revolution he set aail for Ruasia only to be stopped by the Br1 tish author.ltles at Halifax, where he was imprisoned. On the applioation of Kerenaky, made at the instigation ot the Petrograd Soviet and 1n line with the Provisional Govem­ mentIs attitude wlth regard to politioal prisoners, Trotsky obtained his releaee and arrived 1n RUssia in time to playa major, role in the overthrow of the Provisional Government. 17

17 Ibid. , 86 . 49

The amazing variety of functions performed for the revo­ lutionary cause by Trotsky can be gathered from the biographi­ cal survey which prefaces Trotalcy's own hiatory of the revo­ lution. Trotsky was oonnected with the 1905 Soviet and atter his esoape trom exile pursued revolutionary act1vity in Aus­ tria, Switzerland, France, and Spain. The three last named oountries exiled him after whioh he passed a somewhat obsoure role 1n New York's Bronx, addressing radical mass meetIngs. Atter hls return to Ruslia, Trotsky wa$ .oon elected to the presidenoy o~ the Petrograd Soviet. He became a member of' the Central Oommittee of the Communist Party in 1917. During the revolution, he was tpe organizer and leader of the revolution­ ary foroes during the oritical days trom August to Ootober. It was Trotsky's brilliant exeoution of this role that drew thefollowing encomium trom Stalin which '.as published 1n

PraVda:, "All the work ot praotical organization 01' the insur­ rection was conduoted under the leadership ot the President 01' the Petrograd sovlet,comrade Trotslq." 18

18 cf. Leon Trotsk1, Hlstory ot the RUssian Revolution, . XII.XIV~

Trotsky was no less an able revolutionary strategl.st than his comrade Lenin. Both were in agree.ment on the main points of the program. They saw danger to the revolutIonary cause in the victorious pursuit of the war eftort and chose a suc­ ce.stul revolution in preferenoe to a suocessful war. Both were agalnst any ooalition alignment with non.olas8 partIes. 50

The oonvooation of the Oonstituent Assembly whioh was to de­ te~lne on a democratio basis the future government of Rusala offered no obstaole to Trotsky' wbo declared that: '!We were by no meana intected with the Oonstituent fetish." Bis pro­ gram could be summed up in his own wordsi "It was neoessary to sei.e the power from those elements whioh, direotly or indireotly, were only the servants ot the upper bourgeoisie, and who used the Government al a mean a of obstructing tbe revolutionary demands of the people.- 19

19 Leon 'l'ro'bsk7. "Bow We Made the Ootober Revolution," Our .. rent History, N. Y. Timea, Xl-Pt. I, Deoember, 1919, 51i7

In the intra-party faotionalism Lenin dominated Trotsky and all other opponents beoause· of hi. better knowledge of the Russian masses and his 8uperiorltrategio skill. One of the former'a most adroit maneuvers waa to aupport a platfo~ that went tar beyond bia original working"'olaas oonstituenoy. Lenin's promiae of iDllledlate "Peaoe, Bread, and Land" out • the g:round from tinder the feet ot tbe Socialist Revolution- lsts who were toying with the 1dea ot • defensive war. The appeal fitted in w1th the aspirations ot tbe mass of Russian peasants who had never grasped what tbe war was about other than tbat it took away men and liveatook. 20

20 Ethan Colton, Ope oit., 5.

One aignU'loant faot stands out 1n an examination ~f tbe 51 baokground of the revolutionary leaders, and that 1s that the revolutionary movement, 1n its leadership, had not its source In the people. Including Lenin and Trotsky; a group 01a88if1- - cation would place the milltant BolshevIk leadership among the intellectuals. wrIters, etc. Launatcharsky was the son of a sta t e counsellorJ Zlnovlev (Radomislskl) was of the boul'geo18IeJ Kamenev {Rosenfeld} was a former student of tbe Unlvera1t y of MO$cow;, Martov (Tsede;robt;t.um) wt;t.s a former stu... dent of the UniversIty of' Petrograd; Ouritski was an archI- tect; Rukov waa a tranalator; and Chernov was a volumInous wr1ter. The reaotion of the SocIalist party on the Russian people was above all a moral one, a aocial messian1sm ot the Tolato! type. After the fa11ure ,of 1905 the Party. at the Oongress ot Stockholm, urged more actlve organlzation among , . the wo rking clas8e8, and 1n 1917 it round the bulk of ita adherents among the undiscipllned, inexperienced, improvIsed workers who w~mt to the ctties to 1'111 up the ranks of the personnel who went to 'the front. 21

21 Etlenne Antonelll, o~. 01 t •• 22.

Thus Inbriet resume we have the contrasting elements-... the main aotors at a critioal stage of history. The inepti­ tude of one group contrasts with the agressive resourceful.. ness ot the ether. Neither the Tsar nor KerensKy was an able matoh for t he shrewd. Lenin, who exeouted one of the 52 boldest maneuvers 1.n all h1story. 'fh1s ,1s the man who, on the evening of the Bolshevik triumph, oould address his fol­ lowers 1n theae words: "We have the foree ot mass organi za­ tion whioh bas conquered all and whioh wl11 lead tbe prole­ tariat to world revolut1on;n22

22 ct. Prank Golder, Documents or Russian Hiatory. 618 . ------.------The part played by tenlnls a class10 example of the role ot a dom1nant pe rsonal1ty in historioal events. The strategist ot the revolution dld not pOBsess a brilliant ., ol'1:g1nal mental endowment. He lacked the literary acUmen and -r eceptiveness to new ideas oharacteristio ot Trotsky; Plekhanov surpasses him in erudition and Ryazanov in the knowledge ot Marxian theor,y . Lenin did combine, how ever ~ all the tl'aita ot a r evolut10nary leader. He had an unflinohing faith in his cauae. a sense ot taotical planning combined w1 th shrewd oommon 'sense . Be analyzed the weaknesses in the 'Pr ov1sional Government and oorrectly interpreted the influenoe ot the war on t he revolutionary cause. His driving foroe was r eminisoent ot a Mohammedan urg1ng the pursu1t ot a holy war, except, in Lenin's caae, the capitalist was the enemy to be el1:mlnated. 23

23 William Ohamberlain, op . cit., 136-137. 53

Chapter I I I

The I nfluence of the War

The content of this chapt er will be confined to a sur­ vey of the relationships arisIng 8S a result of the wa r 1n

80 far as these bore a direat influence on the Revolution. That the war brought the internal orisis in RUssia to a head and set 1n motion again the machinery of the revolutionary movement 1~ acknowledged by all. Perhaps Trotsky best ex­ pre8sed the situation when he wrote: "The Revolution was born directly from the war, and the war beoa.me the touch­ stone ot all the revolutionary parties and energies." 1

1 Leon Troteq, "Bow We Made the Ootobel' Revolution," Current Histon, N.Y. Times, XI- Pt. I, Deoember, 1919, 514 .

The prolongation of the reign ot Tsardom was contingent on a satistaotory settlement of the internal problema, and, in the ev.nt ot war, a not too coatly victo1'1_ When, there­ fore , the T8ar's Government entered the war 1n August, 1914, ita own existenoe was predicated on the outcome. ThatRussia was unprepared teohnically, indu8trially; and in her adminis­ trative struoture tor a war with a tirst 01a88 power has been proven by all observers ot the situation. However, at the time, 11ke other countries in Europe the oplnlon was ourrent In Russia that. the war would be over in a few months, and it was on the basis ot t his supposltion that the mobl1ization order was glven.

~he Russian bureauoracy, as we have seen, could hardly 54

evidenoe a capable administratIon of th~ vas t Empi re even in normal times. Under t he pressur e of war the laok of depart­ mental coordination proved disast rous. There was no oollec­ tive responsibility; i ndividual ministers were di r ect l y r e­ sponsible to the Tsar whose administrative incapaoity wa S ao­ centuated by the war. An example of an incredible lack of foresight 1'8.8 the Government's neglect tooonneot t he capital with the only lee-free port at Alexandrovsk, although they must have known that 1n the event ot war the l3alt l0 would be olosed to them as a channel ot communioation with t he outside world. The Government relied almost entirely on Russia'a in­ exhaustible manpower and baaed their material and equIpment commitment. on the bash of the Russo-Japanese war. It was only by a reckless aaorlflce of 11fe and by the dogged courage of her soldiers. says 'Buohanan, that Russia won her early vio... toriea.2 sa 6'eorg ..." W. Buchanan. "The Russian Revolution, 1te Genesis and Atte.rmath, tJ Fortnightly Revle., Deo.e, 1919, 1101819-29.

The miahandli.ng of the manpower 81 tuat10n was one o.t' the costliest blunders of the war . Far more tnen were mobilized for the aotive army and r eser ves than a not too effi cient RussIan industry could am., elothe , and feed. This excess of manpower r emained 1n battalUona of immense reserves, counting at !iif­

ferent time" five, seven, eight. I million men who uselessly olutter ed the military depot s. No discrimination was made be­ tween skilled workers needed for industry and ohanee worker., peasants etc., who 1n large part replaced the rare teohnically trained man. The large oonoentrationof reserves, half soldIers and half olvI11ans, wIthout work or land. and lIving on the , 55

Government furnished a milieu extremely favorable to the cUltivation of the revolutionary bacteria. The immense dis­ location of manpower had its effect on industry, and on am­ munition output and strained to the utmost Russia's inade­ quate transportation facilities. 3

3 Gregoire Alexlnsky, op. cit., 33-34.

In the absence of technical and industrial advance in keeping with the proportion of men mobilized, Russia's pur­ suit of the war placed an immense drain on human l1fe. Dur- ing the first year there was a~ average of some 300,000 los* ses a month according to the report of the Quartermaster Gen- eral, and by the end of- 1915 the loss totaled more than four million. 4

4 Quoted int George Soloveychik, op. cit., 143.

These 10s8es were in large part due to 1nadequate arming ot troops, many of whom had to wait unarmed to pick up the ritles of their fallen comrades. The injury to morale under these circumstances was tremendous. Many ot the returning soldiers and officers voiced the prevailing feeling among all rank8, when they openly declared that when the war was over they would sweep away the whole gang 6r~ bureaucrats who had lett the armJ defenseless before the enemy. The feelin~ aroused by this treatment was deep, dangerous, and endur1ng, and it was natural that the revolutionists should have expend­ ed as muoh as possible of the energy it ensendered against the 56

regime and its head. 5

5 E.J. Dillon, Ope oit., 735.

The interaction of psychological torces among group units of men, such as an army in time of war, is an important factor that is determinative of subsequent aotion. Military lite with its living together t ends to maintain a common level ot thought and action. A losing war 1s one ot the greatest causee in creating a psychologioal predisposition to radioal aotion, and in R~ssia, in the period 1914-17, that action found its expression in Bolshevism. Both Lenin, Trotsky and other Bolshevik leaders at home and abroad played a skillful propaganda role in their efforts to divert the elements of saorifice and devotion expended in the imper1alist war to the fight for the new sooial order. 6

6 John Spargo, The Psyohology ot Bolshevism, 86.

We have in part indicated 80me of the oauses which con­ tributed to making Russia'a war effort an added problem, to be taced along with those ot an internal nature whioh were temporarIly set aside in 1914. Politioal discontent had qeen spreading prior to 1914 and was reaching the population strata which had hardly been influenced before. The war had the effect ot uniting Russia as it had never been united be­ fore. Both oonservative and radical elements realized that internal changes would be futile in the eventuality of aGe%'- 57

man victory, and they wisely determined , to postpone domestic quarrels till peace returned. Until the situation became in­ tolerable, this decision was adheared to with admirable pa­ tience on the part of the Duma, in spite of the many provoca­ tions which it was called upon to surfer. From the Spring of 1915 until the fact of military breakdown became evident, the

Duma placed the war effort in the foreground. A va~ty coali­ tion composing two-thirds of the Duma members and known as the Progressive Bloc united in a demand for a government that would enjoy the oonfidenoe of the nation and conduct a program of national defense sucoessfUlly in harmony with public opin­ ion and the Duma. The Government, however, refused to acoede to these wishes. Rodzianko, the President of the Duma, in an interview with the Tsar stated that he had a oonviotion that this would be the last report he would make. And when Nicho­ las asked him why, Rodzianko replied: "Beoause ~he Duma will be dismissed, and the course whioh the Government pursues w111 lead to no good results." And then the Duma's president continued: "The result will be a revolution and suoh anarchy as no one will be able to control." The ~peror's only reply was a formal good-bye. 7

7 Prank Gold~r, ed., Docum~nts of Russian Hhtory 1914-17.120 • . <' Nicholas toyed with the idea of forming a responsible ministry and then wavered. The Duma waa prorogued on Septem­ ber 3, 1915, and from then on began a protracted struggle be- tween the Government on the one hand and the Duma and the na- tion on the other, leading finally: to the Revolution of Febru- ~ 8

ary, 1917, and t he collapse of' the monarch,.. Before the next Duma was convoked in February. 1917, all the legislation which the GOV81'nment needed was passed under clause 87 of the Oonsti­ tution which allowed the Cabinet ttin exceptlonal circumstances to adopt laws without Parliamentary sanction when the chambere were not 1n session." 8

8 E. H. Wiloox, "The Revolution and the War," Fortnlghtly Re­ .!!!!, May, 1917, 107:744-756 .

Meanwhile Nioholas drifted farther away from politioal reali ty, seU'lshly directing hls p;ollcy to the sale objeot ot protecting hie thro~e and refusing to admit t he urgent neces­ sity of r .estlng his Government upon the support of the Duma a nd the nation if' the war wa.s to be prosecuted successtully. The opinion was prevalent that the Tsar'e Government was more eager to repress demooratio aspirations tha.n to defeat the foreign foe. The atmosphere of dej ection and despair was In­ creased with no strl kingmll1tary suo cess to counteraot the enervating effects of the domestic pollcy. The mind of the Tsar, bombarded by diverse op1nions eunating from the eamp of the Empress under Rasputln's direotion on the one hand, and the earnest appeals trom the ml11taryand oivil ·o1'1'101a1s on the other, was best reflecte.d 1n one of hi. o.,n letters to the

Empress when he sald~ "These cursed a1'fal~s. They confound .e

80 much that I do not know where the truth 11es." 9

9 Frank Golder, ed . , op. 01 t. ,195.

The Duma convoked in February, 1917, was not long in se8- 59

alon when it was interrupted by an Imp.,rial Ukase (decree) ordering a reoess until April. The --uka.e was ordered at a time when the food shortages in Petrograd were giving rise to dlaorOera whleh culminated in tho mutiny ot the Petrograd garrison and the Revolution of February 27. The President of the Duma reoeived the r eoes80rdor on the 26th, and on the following day oocurred the revolt of the Volhyn1an and Lithu­ anian guards. W1thin two da'1s all the armed forces stationed 1n and around Petrograd jotned the revolt. 10

10 Paul P. Gronsky, The War and the RUssian RevolutIon, Eoo­ nomic and Soolal History of the World War. Rus8ian Serles. 1:44.

km1d the intrioate influenoes. born of t,he war . whioh had now oome to play their part In the Russian internal strug-

\ gle, standa out the one whioh had deep roots in Russian his- tory vlz., the st~ggle for politioal lIberation from auto­ oratio government. This struggle was oarried down to the ve'!"y end, w1 th 'the war oreating a situat10n ot .suoh a nature that the abolition of monarohloal government beoame a neoes­ sity. The ·ahortage of food and the strikes and street demon­ atrations to whleb it gave rise were merely the sparks that set oft the charge. But as these were a oontributing oause to the Revolution 80me briet survey of the eoonomio oondition8 in war-time Russia 18 required to see the oausal conneotloD.. The deplorable eoonomio oondition ot Russia during the war became accentuated around the end of 1916. The leading factor in the situation was the tood supply.. The urban popu-, 60 latton had great dIfficulty in procuring the neoessary pro­ visions. The isolation of consuming centers f rom producing centers , Q.factor of par t ioular importanoe to Petrograd be­ cause of 1 ta:3 geographioal position, was amain cause for the dIfficulty. The disorganization of railway transport aggra­ vated the situation. In a conference of aommander8 ~ln- Chlef held on Deoember 30, 1916, Ge.neral (lurko, Commander of the Sixth Army, affirmed that there was plenty of meat 1n Siberia which oould not be transported beoause of the l ack of locomo­ tives. "All the railway men were sent to the front at the beginning of the war, and there 1s no one to repair the 1000- motIves," reported the General, exemplifying in his explana­ tion how deteotive planning can lead to a whole host of diffi .. culties. 11

11 Prank G'Older, op.olt., 225.

other :factors entered into the situation affecting :food supply beside·s inadequate transpertation. The policy the Government pursued with regard to the grain trade Wils unwl ae and. unstable. In some areas the grain wa.8 deflected toward those centera where market prices were more profItable for the sellers and away' trom t hose mark§ta where prices we:re limited with a view to the oonsumer. On the other hand, ancexces$1ve 1ssue or pape:r mon.ey began to be felt, and at the same time the output or manufaotured goods requ1red by the populat10n begaD to decline. As a result the peasants lost all intere~t. 6 .1

1n le1l1'ng their prOduce to the town population together with the incentive for augmenting their agricultural produc­ tion. Cr.op cultlvatlonareas began to decline, and the dlf­

ficulties of industrial marketlng Increa.~d with the rislng monetary contusion. The pea,sant population became loaded w1 th 'la rge amcunts of devaluated ourrency whlch would not se­ cure their needs from an overtaxed industrial output except at e.xtravagant prices if goods were at all available. The whole 8er1e8 of economio disorders were- closely i nteroonnec- • ted. Transportation affected food t ransport. rolling stook replaoements were hindered by a lack of tueland iron, the productIon of which in turn was affected by poor transporta­ tion facilIties. Thus whIle the def1cienoy of food .supplies was due to complex causee , the dearth of rood .as the occa... slon which provoked popular disturbanoes which rapidly devel­ oped and ended 1n a revolutio,n.. 12

12 S.O . ,Zago,rlky, State Control of IndUstry in Russia, 164.

On the labor front the working classel suftered great disabilities under the old reg1me . They were deprived or the , . right ot tree association and of the right to strike. There was no real proteo'tion of labor and noorgan1zed body to Pl'O­ tect or r epresent their Intel"es te . The laboJ'ing class was of the opiniQn _hat government employees were taking advantage of war cond1t10ns ' and thelnetflclent policies of the Govern- ­ ment, to amass large personal profits which made them disin­ olined to promote more eff1cient methods of bUsiness. 62

Then, too, the numerous oommittees, Borne of whioh were founded on pr1vate initiative, and which had for their- pur­ pose the oontrol of various eoonomic problems ar1sing from the wa.r, added to the confusion. Thus there were the Bolshe­ vik dominated faotory committees whioh were eleoted direotly by the workers at each factory. These groups ware ardent advocatc,s of worker oontralof 1ndustry and exerolsad a .large measure of' 1ndependenoe. The :r-:oonomio Oouncil and t he 1!ain Eoonomic Oommittee were two semi .. offio1al bodies which inolud- ed members of the Government along w1 th me.mbers of' various . public organizations. They trIed, unsuooessfully. to avert strIkes and lockouts and to direct distrIbution into effeotive ohannel.. They could n·ot arrest the rapid ohanges takIng plaoe In soclal and economic conditions. The diaorganization of'alllndustry had atta1ned to suoh gigantio proportions that the Government was unable to cope with the elemental for­ ces of dlaaolution whloh were underminlng the basis of nation­ al existenoe. 13

13 s. o. Zagorsky, Ope oit •• 171; William Chamberlain, op.ott., 288, 271. .

I n the midst of thIs ohaotio oond1tio.n two telegrams were dispatohed to the Tsar on February 27 and 28 by Rodzianko, president of the Duma. "The aituation is serious," the firat read, tithe o".pital 1e 1n a state of' anarch1. The Government 1s para1yzed ••• the food and fuel supplies are oompletely dia.. organized. There 18 wild shooting on the streets." The seo.. ond telegram read: "The situat10n 1a growing worse. Measures 83

should be taken 1mmediately.. The last ~our has struck, when

the fat~ ot the country and dynasty 1s being decided." Neith­ er was answered by the Tsar. 14

Frank Golder, ed., oP.9it., 278. " .

Meanwhile, on February 28, the Senior Council of State

Duma passed a r esolution counteraoting the pro~ogat lon decree and prooeded to form the Provi s10nal Oommittee of the State Duma tor the purpose of maintainIng order in Petr ograd and establishing contact wi th various institutions and i ndivid­ uals. This Provl&lonal Committee thus became the first or­ gan of' revolutionary authority. 15

15 Ibid. 278 ... 280 .

With the object of securing the abdication of Nicholas II in favor ot his 8on, a minor, under the regency of the Grand Duke Michael, brother of the Emperor, the Provisional Commit ... tee of the Duma dispatched two Duma members, Guohkov lind Shul­ gin, to the Tsar whoee train was held up at Pskov. The two members were received by the Emperor at 10 P. M. the evenlng - of March 2. Here they learned that the Emperor, influenced by the advice of the Chlef of Staff, General Alexeev, and Oenerals Brusllov and Rusky had decided to abdicate. he ab- dlcation was prepared at General Headquarters and was signed by the Emperor, who tra·nsfered his rights to the t hrone t o his brother M1chael. At the request ot Shulgin some altera- 64 tions were made to the effect· that the Grand Duke Michael would be required to govern ''In complete agr eement with the representatives of the people. "The Grand Duke made his ac­ ceptance cond1tional on the expressed wl1l ,of the people. Meanwhlle the Provisional Government became the oustodian of governmental power pending the oall ing of a Constitutional Assembly whlch would determine the future permanent form of government. Thus a So! facto government was established which derived i ts prerogatives f r om, t he f act of t he revolution and the downf all of the mo narchy rather than by any legal aot. 16

16 Paul P. Oronsky, op. oit., 54.

The 3rd of March shoul d properly be oonsidered t he day of the downfall of the Monarchy. For, even though the Grand Duke Michael'a resignation was a conditional one, the faot remains t ha t trom the 3rd of Maroh onwards there was no longer an em­ peror in Ruasia. The mo nar chy had oome to an end and was re­ placed by a t ransi tional form of administration. 17 '

17 :!.EM.

The following extracts from the Tsar's diary reoords some ~nter est lng i mpressi ons from t he man himsel f on the day of his abdication: "Maroh 2nd, Thursday." "In the morning Ru,zskl came and read his very long direct w1re talk w1th Rodzlanko. • •• t he ai tuation in Petr ograd 1s suoh t hat a rn1 nist ry of the Duma would now be powerless to do any­ t hing, f or it has t o contend w1 t b the Soclnl­ Demooratic Party, represented by the workers' committee. Mya'bdlcation 19 required ••• • 1n order to aave Ruas1. and keep the army on the '65

tront. quiet, suoh a step mus t be .taken. I have agreed •• ••• Guohov and Shulgln arrived from Petrograd, with whom I discussed the matter, and I hand.ed them ·the signed and alter ed mani­ festo. At 1 o'clock i n the morning I left P.skov, with a heavy heart because of the things gone through. All around me there 1. treachery, cowar­ dice, and decelt. n On March 3 he notes the followlng with regard to the abdiea ... tion ot the Grand Duke Miohael: "It transpires that M18ha (Grand Duke Mioh­ ae1) has abdicated. His manifesto ends with a four tall formula (Universal, d1 reot, equal, and secret suffrage.) for the election of a oonstituent assembly within six months. God knows who put it in to his head to sign sueh stufr." 18

18 Frank Golder, ed. , op. cit. , 637 .

One of t he strangest facts of history Is that the unorgan­ ized mob that came out on the streets of Petrograd on Februal"1 27, 19 17, looking for bread, effeated the revolution without intending t o do so at that partioul ar t1me. To this day we do not know who t he l eader e of the mob were or what their objec­ tives were besides t he dema tld for bread. The demonstration was not organized unde~ any party ausp1oes, nor was it the r e­ sult of any carefully thougbt out plan. Sir George Bu cbanan, the Briti sh Ambassador, looked upon it as "The spontaneou8 act of a people worn out by sufferings and priVations whose patienee and power of csnduranoe were at last exhausted. ft 19

19 aeorge Buchanan, op. olt.; 824 . 66

Golder gives this in'taresting improssion: tlThere 1s reason for believing that the me ntally ' unbalanced M1n1ster of the Inter1or, Protopopov, lnst1gated the uprising in order to put it down. he movement got away from hi~ and .hen· he could no longer control it he called it a revolution an.d ran. Be was follo·.ed by the other Min1sters, and the extreme reactionaries 1n general, leaving the Libera18 and Soc1alists to o,lean up the mess." 20

20 Frank Go lder, Ope oit. , 265.

One thing 1s certain, however, and that is that the part ici ... pation of the milItary assured the sucoess of the demonstra­ tion and thus made 1t 1n n certain sense a military revolution. " Not in vain dId one of the organs created by the Revolutionary movement receive the name of It Petrog rad soviet of Workmens' and Soldiers' Deputies." Thu8 the unorganIzed bread t"10t was the oo casion wh10h brought about the end of the three hundred year old Romanov dynasty_ Technically the monarchy was not overthrown, as the P;rovislonal Oo:rmnittee of the Duma, for fear of the Socialista, wan ted to present to them the !!.ll accompli of a oonstitution­ al monarchy modelled after the English pattern. The actIon of the Grand Duke Michael prevented thia. Be.aldea, the Soclal­ ists, who were the .first to recover their equ1l1brIUl11 after the startling events of February 27, wanted no part of the monarchy 1n any form. "The revolutionary people should carry through to the end the revolut10n •• . • To return to the old 1s unthInkable," ran the edItorial 1n Izvestia for J4al'ch ~ 2.21 67

21 IbId., 296.

The top-heavy structure of Tsardom could not withstand

the pres'sure generated by internal dissolution and the exter­ nal exigenoies of a losing war. and; like the walls of ancient Jericho, the mob had but to blow on their trumpets to bring down the edifice. There is no other orisis in the life of a nation which serVOD to disolose weaknesses and strength more than a war. It ts an effective but onerous method of testing tbe sol idIty and soundness of a nation's structure . In Russia'. ca&e, the war simply manifested the appal11ng defic1enc ies of 'hariat rule. 22

22 Miohael T. Flor1ueky, 0E' cit., 25. ~e

Chapter IV

The Soviets Struggle for Powel'

With the downfall of the three hundred year old dynasty there came to an end the first phase of the Russian Revolu­ tion. The Revolution was to terminate its second phas60n Octooer 25 when the Soviets took oontrol of the Government from the Prov1sional admi nistration. The inter vening e1ght months 'are replete with the eventso! an aotlve struggle be­ tween the two revolutionary faotions for control of the Gov... ernment. The present chapterwtll confine itself, in the main, toa survey of the policies followed by the Provisi on­ al Govern.nu~nt whioh aooaaioned or caused the power us\u'patlon by the Bolsheviks. 'l'he1'lr8t questIon that presents itself at this potnt Is: who and what were, 'the Soviets? The word itself means "ooun.. cl1". The or1g1no1' the soviet goes back to the political strike of 1906. In order to direct this strtke a soelal... demo- cratic menshevik of Petrograd, M. 'Nossar; known also under the name ot Comrade Khroustalev, had the idea of creating a de1lb­ ,erattve body which would eXercise directlve control over indus­ tpia1 workers. The ,Soviet of 1905 did not last 10ngJtwo !!Ionths arter its foundation it was suppressed by the Government. and the leaders sent into exile into Siberia. Th~ first or 1905 Sovl... et had no hopes of Immediately efreating a revolution; it as­ pired only to political change. Ona comparative basis, a somewhat anale;gou8 oounte:rpapt exists in the Political Aotion 1 Commi'tteewlthin the American labor movement .. 69

10reg01re Alexinsky, Ope cit. , 36.

The histo17 of t he foundati on of the 1917 Soviet , such

88 i t 1s presented by Itsfounders, prese,nts some curious traits. According t o them, the i dea of resurrecti ng the 1905 Soviet oame to t hree social -democr ats of Petrograd (one of whom was Gi:mmer-Soukhanov, a Ger man agent and an avowed de­ featist) during a chance meetIng on ~ he street . This is an­ other incident, with whioh h1atory 115 replete, of moment ous consequences resulting from insigni ficant happe nings. 2

2 1E..!A.

Accordingly, the Soviet l eader s ~et at t he State Duma and issued a call to the soldiers t o elect one delegate for each company, and the workers were instructed to send one delegate for each thousand workers. This direct approach to the 801d­ iers had greater signi fIcance than at first supposed. Tro"tsky, vi ewing the situat10n, later wrote: " "The old regular army had been a monarchical in­ stitution. Tbe new a1'lll1 ot 8 ,000,000 men 1n uni­ form, was nothIng but the peasantry organized and equipped. It has always seemed to me that t his fact wa.s the key to the revolution. It was the inert mass which required stimulat10n. It was the revolutionaI] lead.ers that did it though not i m­ mediately." '

~ M. Burr, "Trotsky and the Revolution," 19th Oentury and After • .! ~~s~ . . 1 ~32, 112:250.

On. the very fi:rst day of the Revolution there wer e thus 70

to~ed two organs, both of revolutionary origin, whioh oame to be the two souroes from whioh were to develop within the next re. days two different systems of revolutionary institu­ tions. The Provisional Committee of the Duma oreated the Provisional Government, while the Petrograd Soviet of Work­ menta and Soldiers Deputies laid the first foundation for the tuture Soviet regime. Without going into a too detal1ed diaoussion ot the legal status of the.e bodles we may aftl~ that the Provisional Government emanated rrom the Duma, the only legally oonstituted organ in the oount~, while the Pet· rograd Sovie' was a selt-oon.tituted assembly_ The latter possessed no legal status but had behind it a strong party organization eupported by the looal Soviets that it had .et up throughout the oountry. The oonstitution of the Soviet must not be, readlly Iden­ tified wlth the Bolshevlk faotion, the leader. of whloh in the persons of Lenin, Troteky, Kamenev, Zinoviev and others had first to oome from their .x~le abroad. The original Petro­ grad Soviet, made up ot representative. ot faotorles, mille, revolted troope etc., had the basis ot thelr unity In a gener­ io sooiallam and in the fact that they were revolutionary. Even in its earliest stag•• the Petrograd Sovlet foreshadowed the tuture national organizatlon ot the oommunist regime. The Exeoutlvo Oommittee deolded to add to itselt persona ·of lett tendonole.,· and In matters of great importanoe or suoh as re­ quired policy .olution the olosely knit polioy Bureau was al­ ways on hand to direot events. 4 r( 71 f't

4 ct. Prank Golder, op. cit., 288-9.

Among the members ot the origlnal Executive Ooamitte. of the Petrograd Sovlet were such important men-to-be as Dzhugash­ vIlli, (Stalln) and Skriabin (.olotov). 5

5 For full 11st Ct. ~., 291

If we bear In mind that the eleotoral decree of 1907 dis- franohlsed most of the peasants and a great percentage ot the workers, it ls easy to understand that the dominant represen­ tation in the aurviving remnant a ot the Duma were ot the bourgeois liberal perauaaion. The socialiat elementa .ere a

minority taction. Hence when the Monarchy fel~ the latter group were not content to take aecond place to any taction but aet out, through the inatrumentality ot the Sovlets, ftto organize the popular toroe., and to tight tor the consolida­ tion ot political treedom and popular government." 6

6 -Ibid., 2S8. But as power exlated only in the Provisional Government, the Sovlet deoided to support It .1th the tamoua ftin so far clause. ft WIt i. urgently necessary to stand behind the Pro­ Visional Government," declared Izveatia, the organ ot the So­ cla11ata, "In so tar as it carrie. out It. announoed prograa." The Soviet reserved to Itse1f the right to change its attitude toward the Provisional Government should it deo1ine to live up 7. to Ita program. And In order to retain a check on the Gov­ ernment. the Soviet organized a' contact Commi8sion wIth the rollowing broad oontrol:

"To keep the Soviet Info~.d reg.~lng the Inten­ tlonl and aot8 of the Government. to keep the lat­ ter, In turn, Into~ed regardIng the damand. of the revolutionary people; to exert Influence upon the Government for the purpo.e or latlaf71ng the •• demandl." 7

7 ~., 310.

------.------~------Here we have rIght at the beginning a Government oompo.ed or .ode~t. liberal el•• enta who went all-out tor advanoed 80c1al theorle., subordInated In all theIr aotlvlty to an extra­ legal soolallat bodJ. The ProvIsIonal Government wa. 1n a help­ le.s and humIlIating positlon-- a pOlltlon whIch was bound to lead to conflIct and fInal dereat. The ~dlcal element. looked upon the PebruaF,J Revolution as a taInt fulfIllment ot theIr hopes. Rut the tarae.lng among thea aaw tbe po.aiblliti•• In­ herent In the altuatIon tor the fulfIllment or theIr own am­ bitlona atter the communist desIgn. Setore beginning a survey ot the polioie. or the Provi­ aional Government, we MUst remember that it 18 e.sy to be orit­ leal or a·otlonl posl taetUIB. One muat trr to picture the mInd or the men who raoed ,he altuation aa it exiated In Rua.la in the tUrbulent dars ot 1917 wIth a World War, a revolution, and a .evere internal economio and politioal orills, a~ one or whieh could absorb the beat qualltie. of leaderahlp. , 73 f ~.

Kerensky gIves a refleotion ot hls own attltude of mind as It existed at the time: "PolitIcal programs rarely interest.d me at the tIme. I was absorbed entir.ly bJ the vast and .,.terlou. development of event ••hiah .hioh .a• ••••ping us along ao s.1ftly and inexorably_ One t~lt that programs and disousslons could nelther ,peed nor prevent that .hlch had to come about." 8

8 Alexander Karen.ki, The Catastrophe, 32.

Ho.ever. the note of tatalism pre.ent In the above Is danger­ ou. In any crlsis. The reactlon ot the Provisional Government

a~ter the reign ot Tsardom waa to ev1denoe a oomplete 11bera1 attitude. At the same time It .anted no bloodshed or repres­ alve .eaaurea .hioh 1t .s.oolated wIth the preoeding regime. Kerensky an•• ere the crlticiam levelled agalnat the tolerant attItude the ProvIsIonal Government took to.ard the extreme. ot both the rIght and extre.e lett 1n thla f.ehion: "People 8ay no. this humaneneae was s1aply a 81gn ot ••aknea. of the revolutionary government, but aa a matter ot taot great determination and atrength .ere nee4ed to prevent and ourb bloodshed. The atrength ot our Revolution 1a1 preol.ely in the tact that it dId trlumph ••~7 .e~oy, love and Jus­ 'loe, even it on11 tor one day, tor one hour." 9

9 Ibid., U.

It .e make al10.anoe tor the taot that the Rue.lan Revolution .as not an armed oonteat bet.een two taotiona, .hich account. for the rela'tve17 small -loas ot lIte, •• must accord to the ProY1aional Governa.n' and Keren_ty some _ense ot moral rea- 7. pon.lbility. On the other hand, theIr a.ll-out liberallem waa a mlataken attitude in vIew ot the prevailing oondition. and the objeotlve. it sought to attain. In order to contInue the war, tor example, 1t was neces­ sary to entorce authority and to repress with the greatest severity every attempt at anarohJ and dissolution. Inatead, with the beat of Intent1.ona, the Government proolalmed a com­ plete amnesty, abolIshed all restriotlons on cIvic liberty, disbanded the old polioe; removed all Tsarist governors and replaced them with liberal-mlnded men incapable of keeping wi.thin reasonable bounds the feveriah politioal agitation ot the people. 10

10 GregoIre Alexlnaky. Ope cIt., 40.

Wlahing to evidenoe 1ta demooratlc progress1veness after the dark night ot Tsarlsm, the Government deoided to hold re­ elections w1thout delay and universal suffrage tor the Zemstvos and to prepare tor the ConstItuent Assembly w1thout awa1ting the end ot the war. These actions thr•• the entlre country lnto a vIolent contest 01" amb1tIon to the detriment ot nation­ al unity indispensable 1n time of war. On the other hand, saya Gronsky, the slow progress 1n call1ng the Constituent Assembly. gave to the Sovieta the bas1a tor the claim ot be­ ing the sol. representatives ot the maases ot the people.

The ProvIsional Gove~ent reoognized th1s .eaknesa, and it attempted to ottse' it by oreating bodies refleoting publio op1nioft made up ot members ot all tour Dumas and by organizing f n t I

In Ootober, tbe Provlnolal Counoll ot tbe aepubll0. Thls

belated aotlvlty proved a ~allure. The Sovlets had at thelr d1aposal the Executlve Committee, wh10h waa continuously In

aesalon and d1rected the line o~ aot1vity ot both the Soviets an.d the soola11st members ot the Provlsional Government. 11

11 Paul P. Gronsky, oR- ci~., 126.

The Provisional Government undertook the guidance of a atate praotloally devo1d of the maohinery ot government. It inherited trom tbe old reglme • d1a.atroua war, eoonom1c para­ lY81s, a food shortage, an empty treasury, and a population 1n a state ot discontent and anarohic dlsintegration. It re­ oeived at the beiinning a wholehearted support of the people and immediate reoognlt1on by the Al11ed Powers. As tlme went

on, however~ the dlfflcult!es mounted. The Provisional Gov­ ernment was 11ke a body suapended In tbe alr, laoklng the sup­ port of any popular repr•• 8ntatlve organ that would oarry auth­ orIty In the public 8Y8. This tact permitted the SovIet or­ ganlsatlona, 1n the abaenoe ot a nationally representatlve

body, to str1ve perslstently ~or influenoe and partloipatlon In the Government. Meanwhile, 1n the wake ot the revolution­

ary move, other~,8ov1ets were organized throughout the oountry, modelled a~ter the pattern of the Petrograd organlzatlon. 12 12 -Ibid., 62. 76

The war, which had been such a potent factor In brIngIng about the tall of the old reglm~ remalned a problem tor the ProvIsional Government. While the issue was being debated between the Government and the SovIet, Ml1iukov, the Minister at Foreign Aftairs, was faced with the dl1emoa resulting tro. the oonflicting demand. ot the Allie. and the 80vlets. After an Allied demand a. to where RussIa stood on the question, Vil1ukov issued a note to the Allie. on AprIl 18, affirming hia Government'. Intention to ob.erve the obligations assumed to­ ward them and to tight against the cammon enemy untIl the end. Meanwhil. the Sovl.t. declared through their spokesmen and the preSI their support ot the policy ot peaoe without annexations and Indemnltl•• on the basis of aelt-determination of people•• 13

13 Frank Oolder, (ed.), Ope olt., 322.

Atter hi. re.ignation tram the oablnet on May 2, Mll1ukov made a .pe.oh whloh, In the 11.ght of the .ubsequent publication ot the .eoret treaties between the All1.s and aussia, glv•• the dominant motivation tor the polloy ot contlnulng the war. Ml11ukov declaredr "I admit quite frankly, and stand tirmly by It, that the maln tbread at mJ polioy was to get tho strait. tor Ruasla." 14

14 ~ •• 334. , The etrect ot tbi. private expose on tb. part ot Miliukov In the tace ot the prev10us d.c1aratlon of tbe Provis10nal Gov­ ernment'. war al-. regarding no territorlal aggrandl ....nt In 77

jured the authority ot tho Govornment and lett it op.n to the oharge of duplioity.

Meanwhile the disintegration ot the a~ was golng on. The Soviets isaued their famoua Order Xo. 1 with the objeot of defining the mutual r.lations of soldier. and offioers.

This provi.ion transt.~.d authority trom the offioers to soldier. oommitt.... S.lt-gov.rnment by oommitteea, an un­ heard ot prooedure in any military organisation, broke down, and soon the ,oldi.r. around Petrograd fInding th.... lv.s without control became a mob. Perhaps it wa. not fore.e.n at the t~e_ but this very br.akdown ot disoiplin., to which must be added the defeatist propaganda amanating from Bolshe. vik souroe., paral7zed the army aa a tighting maohine, and also preventod it from being used .s a oounterforae to put down a Bolshevlk ooup. 15

15 (]eorge Buchanan, op. clt.,BSS.

As a result ot Miliukov's note of April lB, a publio manitostation took place on the streets ot Petrograd on April 20 demanding the resignation ot the Minister ot Foreign At­ tairs. The oommandant ot the P.trograd garrison, General Komilov, tried to restrain this outbreak. But the Executive Commlttee ot the Soviet detied the loldier' faithful to the Government to exeoute the order. ot the commandor and to quit the barraoka wlthout a written order ot the Sovlot delegate. "The orders ot the Milltary Commisslon ot the State Duma shall be exeouted only in such o.so ••a do not confl10t with the 78

Ord.~8 and re.olutions ot the Soviet," stated the order ad­ dr•• ~.d to the Petrograd garrlson. 16

------;--~----\----- 16 . Prank Gold.r, (.d.), op. oit., ~a7. , \ Any attempt on the part of the Provl.ional Gov.rnment authorl tle. to remove the soldlers t:rom th, Petl!'ograd garTi- .\ son 'was .tteotlve17 oounteHcted by the 80.1et. '~fi'he SovIets realit.sed that a strong m111 tal'1 toro. pr.sent In', t~e oapital and i1.,.l to the Go"emment "a8 aln.,.s a coril.tan~~~reat to I '\ , their operations. They, theretore, brought to th. a~t.ntlon ot the .01dlor8 the promi.e given In March to the'PetPOgl'8d garri80n b,. the Provi.ional Gov.rnm.nt, to the ett.ot that th. P.trograd garrlson, as a re"ard for it. partl01patlo¥$ 1n , \' the R.volution, "ould not be removed trom the caplta1. ..a~- whlle, by ••an. or the .oldler.t deputi.s, the Sovlet coUld etteotlve1y control the polltloal a1ignm.nt of the *oldler. the... 1ve.. Trotsk7 ".11 reali.ed the slgnlfloanoe of any troop movement. trom the capital when, later on, he afflrmed In a speeoh: "Les autorltle. ml11taire. veu1ent ...ener le. troupe., noua ne savona pas ou, mai. noua aavona bien d'ou, de Petrograd la revolutionnaire." 17

17 Serge 014enbourg, 'ed.), Le Ooup D'etat Bo1ohevl.~et Reoueil de Dooumenta, 42.

Thus in the intere.ting game being played bet".en the two re­ volutionary groups, the Petrograd Sov1.t and the Prov1sional

Government, the fo~er checkmated the latter 1n "hat could be ita strongest weapon, the u •• or a loyal mll1tary force. By 79 delibera'. aDd effective .trokes of .el1-der1ned polIcy, the '.'rosrad Soviet, composed of Sooi.l D•• oorats, Xenshlvlks, Sooial Revolutionaries, wlth • emall minority of Bolsheviks, w.a etteotlvely oonsolldatlng It. posltlon. ~o the cbargea ot Interferenoe and duallty In governaeni the Soviet ana.ered:

·We bave not overthrown one autoorat in order to have t.elve. What then limlt. the po.er of the Provi.ional Government? In the tirat plaoe, the vigIlant and ever wakeful oontrol of the whole natlon •••• ln the seoond place, the actual oontrol by the organa of the Petrograd Sovlet of Workera' and Soldlera'Dep­ utiea." 18

18 Prank Golder. (ed.), Ope olt., 316 •

••anwhl1. on the eoonoml0 tront, the revolutionary fervor acoentuated the oriala that exiated under the old regime. Groups ot profea.lonal workers and governsent employe.s formed a •• oclatlona, tollow~ by the industrial worker., allot who. demanded an eight-hour day wl 'h wage inorea..... Four montha ot revolution .ere .uffloient to brlns on a rinancial d.baole. Wl'h 1she tall ot the Tsarla' resl•• theN .....d to be a psy­ choloal.al ••• urge on the pan ot all group. to ru.h and olaim .ome non-exist.nt _terlal beri..... Pe.san'. ce.sed to pal the apo.,.) worker. and 80"e1'l1lD.nt tunctlona1rie. de. manded hlsber wage. and preferenttal treatment. The Sovle' and the Sool.11ets .ncouraged th•• e pre'ens1ons wlthout both­ erlng about the _nne:r ot fultllllng them. '.Ph. Go"ernment, , 80 f,

'~ins to remove aome ot tbe disabili'l~s ot the workers and others under the old regime, could hardly resist. In Jun., 1917, Ohingarev, Minister ot Finance, reported that impost. and taxes in the entire country had dtmini.hed trom 65 to 80•• Claiming that everyone was reaohing their hand a toward the treasury with no one wishing to give, Chingarev atated "that each week maniteats new demands. Produotion haa tallen to catastrophic depths. The only production which is progre.sing i. the printing ot paper money." 19

19 Gregoire Alexinsky, Ope oit., 51.

The sooialist·minded labor group., reveling 1n their new freedom, gave a tar broader interpretation to the law permit. t1ng their organisation into real union. than tbe Government intended. Almost trom tbe f1rst days ot the reVOlution, labor control ot production beoame tbe .logan ot aame ot the leader. ot labor. Fundamental 800ial adjustmenta in t1me of criai. have a tendenoy to add to any ex18ting ohaos. And this 1. what happened during the administration ot the Provisional Government. Most or the measure. adopted by the Government during tbe laat re. months ot ita existenoe .ere ahort-lived, while others .ere never put into praotioe. The disorganisation ot all the admlniltrative and eoonomio maohinery was 80 great as to place the very objeot ot governaent control beyond its grasp. The amnesty granted politioal prisoners and exl1es brought into Rusaia auoh able revolutionists aa Trotaky and, on April 3, Lenin, who arrived In a sealed car. The Bo18hevlk taotion 81 in the Petrograd Soviet now took on an added importance and leadership. The Petrograd SovIet and the Provisional Gov­ ernment were, for all practioal purposes sharIng the leader­ ship of the nation. But dIvlded authority with bourgeols minlsters was not in line w1th dootrlnaire Marxlst soolal1am. Trotsky, In a speech to the Soviet, for.mulated the pollcy whIch was to become the rallylng cry or the Bolshevlks. "What do we recommend?", he aaked, "I thlnk that the next atep should be the bandlng over all power to tbe Sovlet of Workers' and Soldierat deputies." A month later at the meetlng of the Flrst All-Russlan Congress at Soviets, Lenln replied to Tsere­

telll's spee.h favoring a coalitlon arrangement a8 followsl "He (Ts.retelll) sald that there is not a polltl­ aal party in Rus.la whioh would say that It 1s ready to take all the power Into its hands. I say there ls. OUr party ls ready at any mlnute to do that." After the laughter subsided Lenin replled: "Laugh all you want to." 20

20 Frank Golder, (ed.), Ope olt., 358 & 365.

Kerensk7 sucoeded Lenin on the apeakers rostrum at the same Congress and made this amazing declaration which hiatorr has proven so erroneous: "I am not a Marxist. but I have the highest re­ apect tor Marx, his t.aohing, and hi. disoiples. But Marxls. bas never taught auch ohildlike and primitive ••• na. (In rererenoe to Lenin's pro­ gram tor .eizure at power) I dare sa7 that oiti- zen Lenin haa forgotten what Marxism ls." 21 82

21 -IbId., 367. In thelight ot what we have seen in the first ohapter conoern­ ing Marxian revolutionary teohnique, the honors for knowing Marx would most assuredly go to Lenin. No wonder the latter tele&raphed to party members Who were leaving Stookholm to go to Russia: "Our tact1cs eonslst in an absolute mistrust of the new government, in refusing .0 support It. Kerensky i. especially suspicioua." 22

22 J. Bunyan and H. B. Fisher, The Solah.vlk Revolution 1917- 18, Dooumenta and Materiala, 5.

Meanwhile Kerensky tried to push the exhausted army, war weary and tiaorganized as lt was, into a new orrensive against the Ger.mana. The July oftenaive w.a 8ucoessful at first but then ended in a disastrous rout. The failure ot the military errort and the resignation of liberal ministers strengthened Bolshevik hop.,. Some ot the more irresponsible members ot the Bolshevlk tact10n, exoluding, ot oour.e, Lenln, thought it opportune '0 try a bid tor selz1ng power. They got the soldiera and workmen out on the streets ot Petrograd shouting "All power to the Sovieta," which at thi. time meant the more moderate aooi&11st.'ract10ns whioh controlled the Soviet. This group wa. aa diatasterul to the Bol.hev1k leadership .a the minister. of the Government .ere. Atter three days ot ahooting the movement was suppressed and with the publioation ot documents alleging Bolshevik collusion with the Germans, ree11ngs against the radicals ran hIgh. Lenin fled to Finland 93 and Trotsky was arrested. After the July uprlslng a ne. reorganizatlon of the Gov­ ernment took place with Kerensky assumlng the otflce of prem­ ler. The coalition arrangement made the soolalist ministera responsible '0 the Executive Oommitte. ot the Sovlet, while the Constltutional nemocrats reported to the central commit­ tee ot their party. Kerenaky tried to hold a middle position bet.een Llberallsm and Bolshevism. Although some of the lat­ ter's leaders, Includlng Trotsky were under arrest, the Gov­ ernment never pushed the issue. K.~en.k7ts policy was to avoid difficult contlicts and decisions until the oonvening ot the Oonstituent A•• .mbly_ tater on, during the Ootober orisi. when the Bolshevlk uprising was under way, he defended this attitude olaiming that the absence ot any repression would give him the rlght "de demander au pays 80n soutlen pour no. mesure. enerKlque., car nul ne pout suspeoter que noua avons pri. cos measures dana un autre but que 1. aalut de l'Etat."Sa

23 Serge Oldenbours, OR- cit., 133.

In the light ot sub.equent event. Kerenaky admitted that both 'hl. attitude, and the failure of the Duma in February to take a tlr.m and authoritatIve oontrol of the Government, .ere costly mis'.kes. In 1930 he admitted that a temporary demo­ cratic dictatorshlp would have been in order in 1917. 24

24 cr. George Vernadsky, The Ruaalan Revolution, 43. 94

I! f ~ However, when a supposed threat of .a dictator appeared from the right in the person of General Komilov, Commander­ in-Chief of the Russian armi8s under Xerenak7, the latter .ent into aot10n. Whether it was a real threat or not the psychologioal background tor one had been oreated. Both Kor­ nilov and Xerensky called each other traitor.. Meanwhile the Bolshevlk taotlon, aeeing in Kornilov·. armJ an immediate threat trom the right, haatened to respond to Xerensky's call for help. A Workera' Red Guard was created which aoon beoame the nucleus ot a Bol.hevik military torce. The whole unfor­ tunate Komilov inoident proved a boom tor the radicals. At­ ter the dismiaaal ot Komilav the army broke the last ve.tige. of di8oipl1ned organ1zation and de.ertions began to mount. 25

25 James Mavor, Ope oit., 124.

The serioua situation in the countr, led to the call1ng of two congresses under difterent ausplcea. The Provisional Governmen\ hoplng to bring same baaia ot under.tanding betw.en the right and the lett. spon.ored the All-Russian Congress ., Mo.cow on August 23. The Soviet, although repre.ented in the

to~e~, to~ed the Democratio Conterenoe at Petrograd on Sep­ tember 25. The net result was. to bring ou\ in clearly defined line., the t.paa.e that existed between the contending group•• Amidst the t100d at oratory that emanated trom the.e meet1ngs, the Bolsheviks qu1et1y ••nt about their work under Lenin'. d1rection from Finland. The able Trotsky was elected chairman of the Petrograd Soviet. Lenints atrategr was to concentrate 85 on the econom1c weakness of the Xerensky, regime, and 1n widely circulated newspaper articles written in Finland, Len­ in proposed a program of immediate peace, the workera' con­ trol of industry, and land distribution to the peasants. In addition, he proposed a rigid system of food distribution in the cities with the deprivation of food cards to the enemies of the 80vieta. 26

26 George Vernadsky, op •• cit., 63.

On S,pt.. ber 5, when Kerensky ordered the disbandment ot the armed oitizens oommittees whioh were formed to oountereot any poss1ble maneuver on the part ot Xornilov, the Bolsheviks ignored the order. "To disband them now showa little under­ standing ot oonditions," was the naive comment of Izvestia. 27

27 Frank Golder, op. clt., 588.

!he Sovlet apPOinted a Military Revolutionary Committee, wh10h now exer01.ed direct control over the Petrograd garri­ .on, ordering the soldiers to refuse obedienoe to orders which did not have their approval. The Keren.ky Government was now praotically helple •• in both the military and political sphere. Power was being exercised by the Soviet while respenaibility reated on the Government. Yet tbe Governaent, while nominally exercising power, appeared 1n the eye. ot the masses to be holding up the peacewhioh was suppo.ed to be the de.ired Ob- , 86

r. ,r

jeot of the vaat number of people. The Bolshevlks. who. by

now had control of the Pet~ograd Soviet, were Astute enough to recognize that the issue of the moment was peace versus 'the war policy of the Provisional Government. They rode in­ to power on the simple, peace, land, and, and br.ad formula and approved the 810gan of "All power to the Soviets" only when they actually oontrolled the Soviet of Petrograd. 28

sa James Mavor, op. olt., 133-34.

Meanwhile, the oountr,y was running deeper and deeper into the criaia. The pres. ret1eoted, on one alde, the danger. ot

the situatlon In an article by the Soclal-Revolutionist, Bu~ atev, who cited Lenin, Trotaky, Kamenev. and Rialanov .s traitora for thelr effort. to overthrow the Government by torce. 99

29 ~., 137.

On the other hand, the Hieoh, oonaervatlve organ of the Oonati­ tutional Demoorata, retlect.d the wldely prevalent pas.ivity 1n the tace ot danger by declaring: "In Government cirole. no attention is paid to the ruBora ot a Bolahevik uprising on lov­ ember 2. In any ca.e, the Government ls prepared to keep order. leo

30 Frank Go 1der, op •• clt., 611.

By the end ot Ootober, Lenln telt that the ttae was ripe tor the major move ot power .elzure. Be secretly reentered Rua. 87 aia from Pinland and hId in the auburba ot Petrograd. On 00- t,oher 23, he was the lead1ng fIgure at a aeoret meeting of the Central Committe. of the Bolshevik party during which he caretully analyzed the situation and arrived at the oonclu­ sion ot the nece.aity ot an ar.med uprising. ae took into consideratlon all taetors: the internat10nal s1tuat1on, the poss1b1l1ty ot a peace move on the part of the Government, the situation at the trant, and the poaaibility of KerenltJ delivering up Petrograd to the Germans. He encouraged hi. tollo.ers by the recent gains ot the Bolsheviks in their oon­ trol of the Petrograd Soviet and a favorable showing at the Moscow electionl. Be pOinted out the danger ot an•• Komi­ lov movement in the attempt ot the Proviaional Government to remove revolutionary minded troops from Petrograd and to bring in Coasack torc... All this, said LenIn, "pose a 1'­ ordre du Jour l'in.urrection armoe." When Zlnovlev and Kame­ nev objected that the maa. of soldiors was favorable to the Bolaheviks but was agaInst a revolutionary war, LenIn replieds "8i on ne peut prendre le pouvolr sans insurreotion, 11 taut proceder a l'lnsurreot1on a l t lnstant." ~l

31 Serge Oldenbourg, OR- cit., 30-31.

Kerenaky belleved up to the la.t that he was strong enough to quell any rebellion. On Ootober 25, he ordered the milltary cadet. to guard the W1nter Palace whlch was the .e.t of government. This move had 11ttle ef1'ect,_ tor all the other troop. of the Petrograd garr1son .ent over to the Bol.heviks_ 88

A battleship entered the Neva river 1n order to be ready in oase of need. During the night of Ootober 25, the Bolshevik troops occupied all the chier government buildings, the main telegraph office and the railway stationa. The Winter Palace

was beselged the next day and the Government surrendered the same night. At the meeting of the Petrograd Soviet held at 2:35 the same art.rnoon Trotsky announcedt "In the name of the War Revolutionary Committe., I announoe that the Provi­ slonal Government no longer exists." 32

32 Frank Golder, op. cit., 617.

The coup d'etat ot October 25 transferred power to the Soviets. The All-Russian Soviet Congress was proclaimed the supreme ruling authority of the country, while the Central ,Exeoutlve Committee ot Soviets was made the regular and su­ preme government organ, combining legialative and exeoutive po"era. This bodT exercised adminiatrative functions thttough a Council of People'a Commissaries which was responsible to the Central Executive Committe.. The Provisional Government baaed upon ooalition was displaced by a Council of People's Commissarie., and thus began the dictatorship ot the prole. tariat in Ruaaia. 89

Ooneluaion

With the ~.cordlng of the events ot Oc'obe~ 25, 1917. we

b~lng to a olole our atudy at the Ruasian revolutionary meve­ ment. There remainl now the task ot 8W11D1lrlz1np: the conolu­ alona and analysing the reaaona whioh led to the fall of the monarchy and the succeS8 of the Bolahevlks In thelr struggle wIth the ProvllIonal Government. Plrat of all, the fall of 'l'lardom and the Provislonal Government; wal caused and accompanied by a coincldenoe and

conjuncture at many disparate elementl, aome p~oxl.. te, othere remote In polnt at tlme orlg1n, all of whioh joined thelr pro­ portlonate intluenoe in ohanging the cour.e ot Russian, and tor tbat matter, world hlstorr. We have s.en how Ideaa ex-

I prelled through the medlum ot the wrltten word expounded two domlnant generl0 themea-- revolution and aoolalla.. The auto­ cratic policy of Taardcm prepared the way tor ita own downtall and also indirectly, a8 a result ot Ita polioiea, opened the .a,. tor the subsequent suoe.sl ot oommuni.t oontrol. The poli­ ole. ot Nioholas II had alienated praotioally all olalsea tpoa Bupport; ot the regime, and with auch a wide extentlon of oppo­ sition the Tsarlet Government could hardl,. continue ita precar­ loua existenee. The war with ita deteata and aooompanying ap­

pallIng economic m1.er,y toppled ove~ the weakened atructure. The abaence ot any armed auppor' to upbold the m.onarohy pre­ .ented cIvil war and allowed relatively weak toro.s to gain oontrol without oppoaitlon. The poliCies followed by the Taara extended their influenoe into the temporary control exercised b7 the Provisional Govern- 90

••nt. The high percentage ot toreign oapital at .ork in Rus­ aia waa an unhealthy development in many .aya. The forelgn capltallst••• re intereated in ble.ding the country for pro­ fita trom 1t. va.t natural re.ouroe., and they paid no atten­ tion to proble.. connected with the soclal weltare ot Rus8ian workers. This factor coupled wlth the dislnterest of the Taarl.t regi•• a In the weltare of It. worklng population waa R potent lnfluenoe in oreating social discontent. The com­ paratively n.w Rusaian working cla.a aligned It8elt wlth the only organization. which fought for remedlal meaaur•• , and the.e, .e aaw ••ere oontained wlthin varioua sooiallst fac­ tlons. Ordinarlly, .en 11vlng In sooiety are les8 oocupied wlth politloa tban they are wlth the ~edlat. eoonomlc prob- 1... ot exl.tence. When the economic order 1•• erlously dis­ turbed. the groups attected •• ek remedlea or change. through polltlcal means. Saaetlm•• the change In government peraon­ nel or In the torm of government la atfected peacably, .ome­ tlme. violently, and then .e have revolutlon. In any event, a 1001e'y which has large numbers of It. populatlon ste.ped In mlsery ls Imperl1led. and the feellng ot having nothing to

101e. when held by a oonsiderable number, il like 10 much dyna­ mit. under the loclal .tructure. Thl. de.truotive force i.

ready to be 19nited at the first provooation or oppo~tunlty.

The political and economic pollcies pursued under ~'8r­ lit auaplce. lett the oountrr wlthout that great bulwark of 800ial stabl1ity-- a large, .lde1y diltributed. property owning ola... The Rus.lan ownln8 01.1. was reduced because ot the 91 oonoentration of Russian industry in relatively large estab­ lishments. ~he land distribution problem was never ettective. 1y settled. The.e problems were carrled over into the admini­ stration ot the Provislonal Government, whloh, because ot its

tempora~ oharacter, lett their solutlon wlth the government that wal to ilsue from the Constituent Assembly. In any oase, however, these proble.s atfeoted both regimes in the same man­ ner; it lett both, in the absenoe of a large propertied mlddle olass, without any defenderl of the status guo. Too few posses­ sed a luttioient stake under either regime to tlght tor Its ex­ lstenoe. Another relult ot autooratio governaent was the lack ot real leaderahip whioh it caused in the oountrt. Centuries ot repression lett no opportunity to develop real states.en wlth the result that, wlth the fall ot Tsardom, only the volatile Eerenaky emerged to .ee' the greatest or18is in Russlan hlstory. His rlirtations with the radioals resulted in a pollcy that was neither oold nor hot, with the result that a small disoipllned mlnority had 11ttle trOUble In taking over the country. With the lack ot leadershlp allo went a corre8ponding evil among the masse. of the people, whioh also resulted rrom autocratio gov­ ernment-- the laok or civic responsibl1ity and in some measure or patrlotio loralty, both or whloh were f.ail in vie. of the lack ot experience in democraoy_ To this we must add the pas­

sivity of th~ ..ase. in vlew ot a real threat ot Bolshevik oon­ trol. Thls passivlty was also shared by the Eerensky Govern­ .ent, whloh even up to the eve of the October Revolut1on showed 92

11ttl. oonoern tor the course events .ere taking, and .hich tell with only ate. oadet. and women soldiers lett to defend it. On the part ot the masses there waa no diainclination to be reluctant in allowing a Bolahevik uprising. The have-nots among them, urged on by an elemental human urge to covetous­ ne.8, hoped that in the ensuing shuftle the7 .ould emerge ma­ terially enriohed. With reterence to the poliole. pursued by the Provialonal Government .e ma7 state that, in vle. ot the demoralised army and the ohaotio internal oondition ot the oountry, it was aui­ oidal to contlnue the .ar. A diaadvantageous peace would ap­ pear to be the le.ser ot t.o evila under the oircumstancea. In any oa.e, the pursuit ot the war and the maintatnance ot political and economio stabil1ty .ere irreoonoilable in vle. ot the conditions existing at the time. ~o this faotor we must add the cQ~~aed situation that re.ulted tram two revolutionarr bodie. exeroi8ing, or attempting to exerolse, government con­ t.rol. The protound dittorenoea bet•• en the 'oclali.t and non­ aooiali.t conoepta ot d.-ocracy in re.peot to taot108 and poli­ tioal polioie. could not go on tor long. The Fr~vI.Ional Gov­ ernment endeavored to consolidate the politioal conquest. ot the Revolution and to dratt measure. ot retorm to be submIt'ed to a Con.tituent As.embly elected on t~e baaia of universal suffrage. The Socialists deepened and extended the revolution­ ary process and clamored tor ~ed1ate reform without awalting tor the A•• e.bly_ The SovIets simp17 atole a maroh on the Con­ stItuent A.sembly and Usurped its place. In the very nature ot 98 thelr cla88 character they had to be opposed to the idea at a natlonal Conatltuent Assembly elected, not on the basls of a clas8 tranchl.e but of unlversal suffrage. When the Assembly dId meet In January 1918, It was dlaper.e4 by the BolshevIks with armed power.

In evaluatlng the cause. tor the Bolshevlk succ.ss t .e must not overlook the personal factor as repre.ented by Lenln and Tr.otsky. Lenln had revolutionary genius and great faith In hls cauae. Hla vision and guidance dIrected the BolshevIk tactlon at the Soclal-Democratic Party to control of the vaat country ot Ruasia. Hla move. wer.e due lea8 to sudden inspira­ tion than to a caretul17 planned taotlcal 8cheme learned from the ao-cal1e4 les80ns of historr-- particularly the Paris Com­ mune. Swltt action against the less radioal sooialist elements and the .eakened Provislonal Government .ere called for by Len­

Int s tactics. Hls polltloal program was adjusted to the asplra­ tlons of the proletariat with its program ot worker'. oontrol of industry. ae aeoured peasant support wlth tlle land program and promlsed peace for the war-weary soldiers. To Trotsky must be attrlbuted great organlsing abl1lt7 and an eloquenoe that Moved audienoes to aotlon. To the.e two .en, who .ere bold In thelr plana and bolder still in their exeoution, must be attri­ buted the main share tor the tlrst luocessful Marxlan revolu­ tlon. When.e look tor the source at thelr driVing foroe, •• do not flnd it In anJ reoognized objeotlve norm ot moral right­ eousne.s but in a subjectlve conviotlon In thelr oause that grew In direot proportion to the weakness ot the oppositlon. TOda7 all eyes are turned upon Russla as the world vl ••• apprehenalve17 the hlstorlcal rep-.rousslona flowlng trom the , event whlch baa been the theme ot tbla paper. Like Rome ot old, the world of Weatem 11beral democrac7 faoea .. n.w Eura­ alan Att!la. The program of 1deologloal penetrat1on, followed b1 po11tical and economic oontrol, movea 1n that order without geographioal limitation. Men who are faced wlth momentous de­ oialons In the tace of the new problems .ust learn, 11ke Leni~ the so-oalled lessoDs of history with all their impllcatioDs, to be enabled '0 meet the challenge. 9a

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ,Pr1m.al'Y Souro •••

BUD1an, J ..e., and Flaber, H. B., ~he Bolabe.1k Revolution, 1911-1918. Doouaenta and Material., loo.er tlbra2'1 War PUb­ IIcatlonl-- 10. 3. Stanto~ University Pres., 1934, pp. 735. Thia work I. a dooumental'J louroe tor the period Itartlng with the Bolshevik uprising and Is a continuation ot Golder'. work which covers the preceding period.

Peodorovna, Alexandra, ex-tsarina ot Ruasla, Letters ot the Taarltaa to the Taar 1914-1916. With an IntrodUcilon by §lr Bernara Pare., jew York, 1;24, pp. 478. . Thia collection i8 a valuable aource tor tracing the lntluence ot the Kaprall and a.apu­ tin on attalra during the 1aat daYI ot tbe Tsar. The lnt~uctlon la valuable and intormatlve.

Gankln, Olga B., and Fisher, H. H., The Bol.hevlk. and the World War, Docuaentary Collections on the 6rlsln or the 'bird International. The Hoover Llbrar, on War, Revolution, and Peace. Stanford Unlverslty Press, 1940, pp. S56. This dooumeotarr work contain. source ma­ terials on Bolahevlk internatlonall.. during the tlrat World War. It has been used becau.e ot the large amount ot tenin'a wrltlng. and .peeches it oontalna with the1r inoidental reterenoe. to the Rus.lan Revolution.

Golder, Frank Altred. Document. ot Ru •• lan History 1914- lilZ. Tranalated b7 EmAnuel Aronaberg, We. !ork.~§i7,pp. 66& Thl. valuable work oontaln. documentar7 mater­ lal, ne•• paper article. trom lave-t'. and the B'OAb, giving OPP08lns points ot v1e., .emoira, ape.che. ot the important leadera, government decree., etc. The chapter aummarie. b7 the author are valuable. The .ork covera the period trom the beginning ot the World War and tollow. up Important happenings untIl the period ot the Bolshevik aoqui8ition ot power. The work wa. undertaken wlth the coopera­ tion ot the Soviet Government. 96

Oldenbourg, serge, Le Ooup D'Etat BOlchevi.te Reeuel1 de Dooument. Traduits et Annote., Paris, Pa70t. t 92~, pp. 511. A book that conoentrates on the Important happenings occurring between October 20 and De­ cember 3, 1917, the critical period when the BolshevIks aoquired and oon.olidated their pow­ er. It Ie a valuable souroe tor materials not found In the Bunyan and Fisher oollectlon.

Secondary Source•• Book,.

Alexlnsk7, Gregoire, Du Tsaris.e au Communisme. La Revolu­ tion Russe, Se. Oause. et Ses Ilfets. Pari., A. Colln, 1923, pp. 287. UtilIzed tor the good analrsis or the poli­ tioal an4 eoonoml0 tactor. In01dent to the down­ tall ot the Provisional Government.

AntonellI, EtIenne, La aua.ie Boloheviat., La Doctrine, tea Ho.... , La Proprlete, te lesima tnauatri.l. Politlque In­ t.rieure et Exterieure, Textea Oftlc1els, ParIs, ~. Grasset, 1919, pp. 273. Containa a good polltioal and .001al analY8Ia goIng back to the nIneteenth centu~ and show. the oonneoting lInks with the eventa ot 1917.

Berdya.v, Blcolas, The OrIgIn of RussIan CommunIs., New York, 1937, pp. 237. ThIs work ••••y. • tracIng and apportIonment of Intluenoe or the nineteenth oentury RussIan wrltera, econamists. ao.iologl.t. and philo.ophers and theIr influenoe on the Revolution ot 1917.

BotkIn, Glib, Tbe Real Romanova, Bew York, Revell Co., 1931, pp. 335. An InterestIng biograpn, by the 80n of the Taar'. ph7.1c1an. Used tor blographloal data.

ChamberlaIn, Wll11am Henr,r, The Russian Revolution 1917-1921, 2 vols., Hew York, .acmillan, 1935, pp. vol. I, 511. A standard work by an American JournalIst. Used tor oerta1n conclu.lon. In dev.loplng the hls­ tor1cal background. 97

Oolton, Ithan, reUt patt'it! gt Revolutl~, New York. Asso- olation Preaa, 35, pp. .' A comparison between tour major modern revo­ lutlonary developments. Some of the oonclusions regarding the Rua.lan Revolution have been utl11zed.

D.nlkin, A. I., !be Rusalan ~oil, Memolra: Kl1itarr, So­ cial, and Political, Hew York, (no date), pp. 344.

A userul .ork by a to~r general In the Rua­ aian Arm,. Contalna a go04 tactual acoount ot the part played by the army during the R.yolutlon.

FlorinakJ, Michael, I., The End ot the Ru.sian Em,lre, Bco­ nomio and Soolal Hi.to~ 01 the Wori! War, v. IOn the Rus­ .ian Seri's, Je. Hav.n, Yale Univer.ity Prea., 1931, pp. 272. A acholarly interpretation by a w.ll known writer on Ruasian histo~.

Gerhardi, William, !he R9!!novs. Ne. York, Putnam's, 1939, pp. 484. Charact.r sketohe. ot the Ramanov dynasty trom the tlm. ot Ivan IV to Klcholas II presen­ t.d In a .ell written but unaympathetio manner. Ue.d tor its blographical intor.aatlon on the T8ar.

Gronsky, paul. P. The War and the Russian Qgv'rp!!gt, Carn.­ ,i' Endowment tor Int.rnational P.ao., Eoonomic and Sooial Hi.­ tory ot the World War, Rus.lan S.rl.a, Vol. I., Yale Unlv.r­ 81ty Pre.a, 1929, pp. 331. A valuable and authoritatlve sourc.. Util- 1.ed tor It•• xo.ll.nt oausal ana17als of the ev.nt. leading to the R.volutlon.

Hunt, Robert, Revolution, Whz. Ho., When, .e. York, Harper'., 1940, pp. 388. A work on revolution in gen.ral, Gontains .oa. int.re.ting theories on it. ooourenoe.

K.reasley, Alexand.r F., The Cata.trophe, lCerenakyts Own Sto~ ot The R.volution, Ie. York, Xppl.ton, 19S', pp. 376. 98

In the nature ot an aRologla tor the activ­ ity 01' an important figure in the Revolution. Should be read in conjunction with Mavor, Deni­ ken and Golder.

MoFadden, Charles J., The Philoaoez of OOUUqig, New York, Benzlger Pros., 1939, pp. !4!. Th1s work has been used for 1ta exoellent philosoph1oal analysis of' Marx1s. w1th speolal referenoe to its lnfluence on the Russian Revo­ lut10n.

Mavor, James, The RUssian Revolution. New York, Maomlllan Co., 1928, pp. 445. One ot the beat acoounts on the subjeot of' the Russ1an Revolution. Its primary conoern is with the events of Ootober and the suooeding per­ iod of the Soviet restme. Used frequently for tt. excellent interpretation ot events.

Milyoukov, Paul, Russia and ita Crisis, Chioago. UnIversity of Chioago Press, lO~5, pp. 589. · ,

A soholarly work by the man who subsequently became presIdent of the Duma. Covers the histori­ oal baokground oapablF. loble, Edmund, The Russian H,evolt, Boston, 1886, pp. 263. An earlier work useful in traoing out the his­ torioal development ot Rus.ia and the oaus.. whioh led to the later confliots wlth the Txarist regl.e. Contalns 80me good sidelights on Ru8sian 11te and ousto.e and the Influenoe ot rellgion and philoso­ ph7 on aubsequent developments.

Pare., Bernard, Rua.ia and Retorm, London, Conatable and Co., 1907, pp. 575. An earlier work by a .ell kno.wn observer or Russ1an development. Userul mostly tor the auth­ o~s personal observatlons during h1. long re.idence 1n Russia.

Rappaport, Angelo, S., Ploneere of the Russian Revolutlon, New York, 1919, pp. 281. 99

Dlscu8ses the elements composlQg the revolu­ tlonary move.ent In the nineteenth century RU8- 8ian writers. Trace8 out the struggle against autocracy undertaken by the earlier aociali.t movementa in Russla. The work ls not .lthout bias and inacouracles.

Rosenberg, Arthur, Riatoli of Bolshevi.. , London, Oxford Uni­ versity Prea., 1934, pp. 40. A history ot radlcal aoclal18m trom Marx to the tirst Flve Years' Plan. A favorable interpre­ tatlon.

Soloveytchik, George~ Russla in Perspective, lew York, 1947, pp. 243. A recent work, uaed for a corrective on ear­ lier writers. An interesting example of the In­ tluence ot the time el•• ent on hiatorlca1 vie.­ pointa.

Spargo, John, ~ol.hevi .., He. York, 1919, pp. 389. The Revolutlon as seen trom the viewpoint ot a moderate Socialist. Utilized tor the good sur­ vey of the historical baokground leading to the Revolution.

Spargo, John, The Psychololl of Bolahevi .., Ne. York, Harper', 1919, pp. 150. Contalns some pertinent observations in an an atte.pt to evaluate the intluenoe ot politi-" oa1, aocla1 economic factors on group actlvity .lth particular reterence to Rus.la and the Revo­ lutlon.

Trotsky, Leon, The Hiltort ot the RUlsian Revolutlon, 3 vols., Be. York, staon i SbUlter, 1932. Ua.d tor the author' 8 obaervations on Rus­ slat. historical development and ita relation to the Revolution.

VernadakJ, George. The Rus.ian Revolution; 1917·1931, H•• York, B.n~ Holt. Co., 1§!2, pp. 131. r.~. r 100 !.~

A short work by a recognized authority on Russian history_ Used tor its interpretation of certain events.

Zagorsky, S. 0., State Control of In4ust~ In RUssia Durlns the War, written under the auspices of t~ darnegie Endowment tor Internatlonal Peace, D1v1s1on ot Economlos and History, Vol. lOot the Russ1an Series. New Haven t Yale UnIversity Press, 1928, pp. 351. An author1tat1ve source tor the eoonomic faotors in01dent to the Hevolution. The work covers both the Taar1st and Provisional Govern­ ment reg1me ••

Secondary Souroe.. Perlodical~

Sechhoter, O. R., "Two Causes Celebres ot the Russ1an Revolu­ tlonarr Movement,ft The linet.enth Century and After. April, 1919, 66:798.810. This article gives a p1cture of the car­ eer. of two asents provacateurs and thus pre­ sents an interestIng aspeot of one torm of Tsariet repressive meaaures.

Buohanan, Georse W., "The Rus.lan Revolution, Ita Oene.is and Aftermath," Fortnishtlz Review, Deoember 2, 1918, 110:819-829. The British Ambassador in Russia at the tl.e of the Revolution give. his impresslon of the events. An authoritat1ve ey.witness ao­ count.

Burr, M., "Trotsky and the Revolut10n," 11neteenth centurz and After, August 1932, 112:245-256. Oontaina b10graphical material on one of the leadlng figure. 1n the Revolution together with hi. theorle. of revolut1on aa applied to Rua.ia.

Dlllon, E. I., "The Russian Upheaval," Fortnightlx Review, May, 1917, 107:787.743.

~b1. article contains • good baokground .urveJ of the RevolutIon. It baa b.en used tor the exoellent oharaoter ana17s1a of Bichol.s II. 101

Friedland, L. S., "The Background of the Revolution," !h! R!!!, Ma1 17, 1917, 62:429-30. A ahort survey 1n the form ot a book re­ v1.w which oontains some valuable observatlons on cauaal faetors present In RUBsia'a histori­ eal development.

Xarpovioh, M. M., "'lhe Russian Revolution. 1917~ Journal of ~odern Blato£l, June 1930, 2:258-260. Thls artiole surveys the bibliography on the topic ot this paper and has been utilized aa a reaearch guide.

Melamed, Dr. S. M., "Anthropologlcal Caus •• of the Ruaslan Revolution," Ruaalan Revle~, July, 1917, 3:45-49. Traces the lntluenoe of hereditary taotors In the torm In whloh they re.olve themaelves 1n the peraon ot oertain rulers who exeroia. power in t1me ot soolal oriais. The dlreot appllca­ tlon to Bioholas Ills not too conoluslvely drawn but the art101e has general Intereat.

Parea, Sir Bernard, "Rasputin and the Empress: Authors ot the Russlan Collapse," Porelgn Attairs, October. 1927, 61140-154. An exoellent artlcle treatlng ot the Intlu­ enoe ot two background personalitle. who exer­ clsed suoh potent efteot on the oourse ot affairs in Rus.la In 1917. Conta1na numerous pertinent extracts trom the oorre.pondence ot the Empre •• in outllne to?m.

Rappaport, Angelo 5., ·Philolophl0 Ball. ot the Rus.ian Revo­ lutlotr, Edlnburgh Revi •• , JUne, 1917, 226tll~-133. A survey ot the wttltett. In ntneteenth cen­ tury Rus.la wIth an evaluation ot thelr influenoe on the ttevolutionary movement. Thia artiole forma the baai. of the book cited prevlou.l1 b7 the lame author.

Sack, A. J., "Faotors in the Ruasian Revolution," New York Times CUrrent Hiat0ri. 6 Pt. I, June, 1917, 47~-47§. Trac•• the immediate, relevant politioal raototts tram 1905 onwarda and thelr conneotion wIth the Revolution In 1917. 108 r1· f f Suchonov, Nioholas, "flow I,enin Came to Ruasi," Living Age, Sep. 23, 1922, 314,759-764.

An art1c1e ~rom an eyewitness who give. hi. impressions on Lenin during the critical days o~ October, 1917. Used for an evaluation of Lenin'. speaking ab111ty and his oontrol over an audience.

Trotsky, Leon. "How We Made the October Revolution," New York Tirlles Current Histo1o necember. 1919, 11 Pt. I. 506-~f4, ana Jan. 19§0, 11 Pt .. 2, 0-104. . The storr of events aa ae.n by one who played such an important part in the RevolutIon. The ar­ ticle containa edItorial commenta and correctives written ostensibly by a start member of the publi­ cation.

Wilcox, E. H., "The nevolution and the War," Fortnightly Revi.w, May, 1917, 107:744-756. An article dealing wIth the war and its Immed­ ia te 1"ela tionahip w1 th br1.nglng about the events connected wIth the tall of the monarchy_

(No author given) "Lenin; the Man and Hia Ideas," New Yprk Time. Current Historl, January. 1918, Pt. 7, 14-17. An account of the tactical program of LenIn together wIth a brief survey of the ris8 of Bol­ sheviSM from 1905 till the Revolution.

(NO author given) "Literary Progenitors of the Bolshevik Revo­ lution," Fortnightlz Review, Jan. 1919. 68:49-50. An artIcle evaluating Tolstoi's influence on the Revolution.