Lnteragency Rivalry? Roy F

lnteragency RivalrY? Roy F. Houch¡n ll

The Relationship of the Department oÍ Defense and NASA in Developing the Air Force's Manned Orbiting Laboratory,196I-1965.

In la¡e 1961, ùe potential for t¡emen- dous interagency ¡ivalry prevailed betweeû the Ai¡ Fo¡ce, rhe Departrnenr of Defense (DoD) and NASA. Each agency speculated on how its objectives best ¡ePresented national obiectives, The Ai¡ Force believed Lhe requiremenrs for several ma¡med military space progra¡¡s existed. Concúrendy, NASÀ focused on Apollo, the program des- lined to fulfill Kennedy's lunar landing corlÍritment, In n¡m, the DepartmenL of Defense wanted to suppless Ai¡ Fo¡ce efforts to develop a ¡ival ma¡ned sPace prograrn; however, it also prefened m keep the ãerospace indusny suong. While NASA's civilian space p¡og¡am offered the Depart- ment of Defense tÏe best avenue for success, it would not rneet the Ai¡ Force's ¡e- quirements. To implement is requitement for sus- tained milita¡y space operatiorN, the Ai! Force proposed Gemini B/lvla¡med O¡biting Iaborãtory (MOL), a nilitary spâce station based on a pressùrized laboratory section and a spacecraft from NASA's recendy ap- proved Proje.t Gemini (the leaming Phase ior ¡endezvous and docking maneuve¡s i¡ NASA'S hmâr landing program). While NASA Administra¡or James E. Vy'ebb sup- Dorted the Air Force's activities, he feh ob- Mock-up of the US Air Force's Manned Orbiting Laboratory. @oeing Photo) iigared !o abide by Secrerary of Defense Robert S, McNamara's space policies Borh tion, Se¡ret¿¡y of Defense McNama¡a and Secretary of the Ai¡ Force the resPonsibility NASA a¡d the Ai¡ Force wanted space sra- DLec¡or of Defense Resea¡ch and Engi- to suppó¡L to the "extent compatible with rions; but since the Air Force lacked politi- neering (DDR&E), Dr. H¿rold Brown, did is priirary mission," specific NASA pro' cal supporr within the Depâ¡tmenr of De- nor aciept Air Force thinling. They be- iêcts and oroerams afisinc lfom tolnt fense a¡d NASA was busy with Apollo, a lieved the requirements for many milit¿ry fu¡sn¡oop âg-reements,T B-y rhe enã of cooperative venh.r¡e seemed the best solu- ooerations had not been accuratelv de- 1962, approximately fifry arrangemens and tion. l¡;ed.3 l¡d.ed, Secret¿¡y McNama¡ã be- ae¡eemènts between NASA and the DoD The Air Fo¡ce strongly questioned the lieved NASA's Apollo space program pro- eiisted while the DoD accomplished more validiry of ùe Secrerary of Defense's ma¡- vided Congress with a peaceful program ro than $550 million \À'orth of wo¡k fo¡ Searetary McNaman felt the agement system for ils ma¡ned space Pro- banle Sovièt space initiaLives and maintain NASA.8 Sdll, srams. How could a clash between institu- a s¡¡one base fo¡ the aerosDace indusky. DoD should inqease its utilization of ional titans be ave¡æd? By 1965, Secretary ln"the winter of l96l'Secretary NicNa- NASA asses. Iûdeed, if Gemini's sP¿ce- McNama¡a ¡educed the potential for intera- ma¡a, in a quest to cut spiraling Defense flight te¡hnology and polential exceeded gency riviilry by using NASA a¡d a sys- Depa¡t¡r¡enl cosls, curb Ai¡ Force research Dyna-Soar, Dyna-Soa¡ could be canceled. tems analysis approach of ma¡agemerit io a¡d developmenr programs, a¡d eliminate After hea¡ins a November 1962 NASA/ limit Air Fo¡ce ambitions to a single pro- úe possibility of duplicating NASA's Gem- DoD briefúg on the possibility of the Ai¡ gram- Gemini B/lvIOL. ini Progam, investiga¡ed altematives to fhe Force using, and funding, Gemini space' In September 1961, wiù an apprecia- Ai¡ Fo¡ce's reusable mini-space shuttle, crafL to explore military roles in space, tion of Soviet capabilitiea in space, Air Dyna-Soar (an acronym for Dynarnic Soar- McNâmãra recoÍuneÍded the DoD ¿ssume Force leaders prepared a 10-yea¡ space plan ing).4 To accomplish his goals, McNama- manapemenr of Gemini.g While NASA ad- ro furtlrcr identify the militaÍy requkements ¡a's civilia¡ expens initiared ùe Planning- minis-rator Webb favored Air Force partici- for space.l Lieutenant General James Fer- Programming-Budget Sysþm (PPBS) of Dation in Droiect Cemini, if it furthered Air l guson, Air Force Depury Chief of Staff for m¿magemen! and qeated five- year plans þo¡ce obiËcdies, he never inrended !o relin- Resea¡ch and Development, desc bed the for rese¿rch and development, weapons de- orrish ¿nï oo¡rion of the Droeram to the I September 1961 pla¡ before a Congession- veloDmenl- and cost reduction. Combined ôoD. As-ari inægral step in *rJctimu from Fo¡ce's wirh'the five-year pla.rs, he believed PPBS Proiect Mercury's firsl venh¡res into space al commiltee, outlining rhe Air l leading role in space ope¡ations. Among the would ensule. each of these factors-- to tire final landine on the moon with ho- objecrives, he emphasized the need for a including force requirements, military suat- iect Apollo, Gemini could not be delayed military space station to insure a suslained egy, 4nd foreign policy--remained in bal- by a NASA/DoD merger where NASA lost manned presence in low ea¡th orbit. From ance.5 Consequendy, in every functional cónuol of the p¡oject. Any del4y in Cemini their vantage point in space, he believed Air pyramid of t¡e DOD new layers of central- might- delay the lunar landi¡g.tu Fo¡ce asEonauts would be able to apply ized civilian bweaucracy ¡adiated ftom tle Durine 1962, Ai¡ Force Chief of Staft Lheir unique judgement to command and Ofhce of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).6 General C-u¡tis E. LeMay and other Air conEol, surveillanc^e, and ballistic missile 'Io ensure close coo¡dination of milÌ- Force plarners considered NASA's Gemi- defense oDeratioris.r tary and civilian space programs, Secretary ni, and its follow-on program Apollo, inca- Whii,e the Air Force felt c¡nfident of McNama¡a issued a policy dircctive on 24 pable of providing úè depth and b,readth of the miliEry info¡mation offered by Dyna-Soar its proposal to develop a military space sta- February 1962. This di¡ective assigned il 36 ouÊtf vcterrrc 4 Nuñbè.4 åI AI å and the military manned Ðace starion out- imentation.l4 Intuitively ¡ealizing the Vice- space..,.The problems of marned military lined in their September 1961 lO-year space P¡esident would not support funding for space flight are, and generally will continue plan. Nor would NASA programs develop both a DoD and NASA space statiorl even to be, more complex -and more difficult and úre q,pe of technical e4uipment (i,e., a rcus- if each agency painstakingly dehned separ- expensive to solve."lÚ able shuttle, electronic intelligence, signals ate requùemens for their respective space The DirecLor of Defense Resea¡ch & inrelligence, phorog¡aphic inrelligence, sar- statior¡s, Secreta¡y McNamara and Admin- Engineæring, Dr. Harold Brown, echoed ellite inspection and intercçtion) required istralor Webb met agair and agreed to in- Secreta¡y McNam¿¡a: fo¡ fuLure ma¡ned military operaLiors in corporate ûre requiremens of boLh agencies "The problems of mâTmed milhary space. In June, Ai¡ Fo¡ce leade¡s ¡ecom- inlo a single space sradon. However, each space flighs are. and gmerally will contin- mended the development of a m¿fied agency reserved ùe dght ¡o continue with ue !o be, moÊ complex afid more difhcult space station, or Military Orbital Develop- tñeir own advanced spõe station studies.l5 and expensive to solve. I want s[ongly to ment Syslem, to provide additional proof of Ironically, neither agency agreed on emphasize that as of rhis time even the re- milùary capabilities and complement Dyna- program specifics or a manage¡ for their ouirement lor manned militârv oDerations is Soar's mission. I¡ Augusr, the Ai¡ Fo¡ce coope¡âtive space station venru¡e. Subse- srill in quesrion."l9 outlined a Blue Gemini project detailing quendy, in an Ooobe¡ 1963 meeting be- If Ai¡ Fo¡ce leaders coùld sustair specific military objectives and ha¡dwa¡e tween McNa¡na¡a and Webb, McNama¡a Gemini BÂ4OL, the progIam would decide, modifications ro NASA's Gemini capsules. expanded on his July 1963 intentions. He qualiratively ãnd quarititariveþ, man's abil- These modificarions would allow a Limely would indeed eliminare Dyna-Soar arrd be- ity !o perform useful military missions in beginning to Air Force uaining in space,lì gin a follow-on to Cemini, simila¡ to the space and, by doing so, find oùt whether To fu¡rd these initiatives, they Foposed a Blue Gemini and MODS prograrns pro- fhese missions enhanced our national secur- $177 million allocation of the fìscal year posed by At Force leaders--and rejected by ity.20 lhe experiments, test ha¡dwa¡g and 1964 DoD budget for the two additional McNama¡a--ea¡lier in the year. NASA procedures programmed fo¡ Gemini B/ programs. Secretary McNama¡a conside¡ed countered by suggesting a military Gernini MOL placed primary emphasis on measù- ¡he objeclives of these new rnilitary space B/lr4OL (figure 4), similar to úe medium- ing man's value !o ùe total system, Each programs a duplìcaúon of NASA's Gemini sized MORL spacæ starion advocated þ is military mission would identif] ¿nd ana- program and excluded tlrem f¡om the de- Langley Research Cente¡. As AL Force lyze, in d-etail, functions man pa¡rmenr's Jaauary 1963 budget ¡equesfs to plarmers lauded the me¡its of using Dyna- mrght pertolm. "''""+e""specihc Congress. Unwilling !o relinquish the idea Soar as a supply vehicle fo¡ rlrc p'¡oposed Despite Air Force studies delineating of BIue Ge¡nini or MODS, Aù Force plan- Gemini B/À4OL, Secretary McNa¡nara re- specific manned military space require- ners broadened and detailed thei¡ ideas fo¡ fused to accept tle Ai¡ Force's continuing menls foT various types of recomâissã¡rce future developrnent.l2 desires to organize concùrent mamed mili- ¿¡d satallite inspection, the two yeârs fol- Irr a quest to ensu¡e the most effective tafy space programs. McNamara caûceled lowing the :¡nnounce¡nent of Dyna-Soar's use of national resou¡ces, Seøetary McNa- Dyna-Soar on 10 Decembe¡ 1963; in tl¡e cancellarion ard the funding of Gemini B/ ma¡a and NASA Adminisrato¡ Webb same pless statement, he announced the MOL found the DoD ¿nd the Ai¡ Fo¡ce signed anoùeJ,letts of agreement on 2l bi¡th of Gemini B¡vIOL. Yer, McNama¡a waging a "requirements" battle to prove the January I963.rJ Under rhis agleemenl Pro- believed Gemini B/MOL would require fur- uriliLy of manned military space operaLions. ject Gemini remained a NASA prograrn. In the¡ definition Þfore it co!¡ld receive ap- As Air Fo¡ce officials insisted they coùld tr.rm, the DoD gained an oppofrmiry to test proval for developmenr.l6 By evokirig nor emoiricallv show the details of a manned space reconnaissance capabilities PPBS, McNamara's action sftengrlered ci- manned'military rcle before they tesþd a ùlroùgh seve¡al optical experiments ori fu- vilian supervision of Ge_ryrini B/lr4OL's re- number of proposed roles in space (the 56.5 ture Cemini tlighb (rhese began with Gemi- search and development.l / hours NASA asFo¡auts accrued at the end ni lV and continued until the program end- F¡om the fiscal ashes of the $300-373 of the Mercury gogram would be their sole ed with Gemini Xtr, Gemini V represented million proposed to complete D¡'na-Soar basis of comparison), ùre Secrerary of De- the height of Defer¡se Deparmrent participa- and the program plans of Blue Cemini and fense continued to dem¿nd Air Force lead- rion). While the Aìr Force gained an oppor- MODS, rose a series of feasibility studies ers prove man's military utility in space.23 runity to experiment with mârìr¡ed recon- fo¡ Gemi¡i B/MOL. YeL even as the Ai¡ Simultaneously, SecreLary McNama¡a con- naissance, on â small scâle, du fig these Force proceeded with feasibiliry snrdies, tinued ¡o emphasize the need fo¡ all mili- Gemini spaceflighrs, it did nor believe these Department of Defense officials refr¡sed ¡o tary space proje.cts ro mesh witlt NASA ef- experiments constituted a complere investi- emb¡ace the utility of manred military fo¡s. This di¡ective enabled him ro garion into the milit¿¡y câpabilities of sus- space opefations: progress with his PPBS ¡efo¡ms while he tained manned spaceflight. Agai4 Air "This is an expe¡imental p¡ogram, not restrâined Air Fo¡ce olans fo¡ a manned Force plarurers believed a larger, more com- related !o a specific military mission. I military rnission.z prehensive, rnilitary space station, possibly [McNamara] have said in rhe past that the With 1964 being an eleation year, rhet- based on ùe Blì¡e Gemini and MODS pro- potential requftements foi mamed ope¡a- oric conceming civilia¡¡ and military space g¡ams, woùld be needed. tions in space are not clear. But that, despite programs Aom both presidential hopefuls By luly 1963, the issue of NASA's ci- the fact that they a¡e not clea¡, we will un- abounded. \Vhen contractors obje.ted to the vilia¡y'scientific requùements ior a space dertake a carefully controlled program of slow pace of Gemini B[r4OL development, station calne before the National Space developing the techniques which would be Adninist¡ation ofñcials ¡old them not to ex- Council, chaired by Vice-kesident Lyndon requi¡ed v'/erc we !o ever suddenly be coÍ- pe.t any cha¡te ufltil afte¡ the election. The B. Johnson. NASA'S decision in June 1962 ftonted with milita¡y missions in Johnson adminis&ation wanted an image of to use lun¿E orbilal rendezvor¡s ¡âthe¡ tha¡ ea¡th orbital ¡endezvous, allowed advanced sn¡dies into a post- Apollo space station to McNamara drew a sharp distinction between lhe Aù Force project nnd. îhe prosper. A North Amelicãn Rockwell sn¡dy Apollo moon landing progran ol the civilian space agency, NASA. He said NASA suggested an Extended Apollo projecl using has no similar project now underway.Ils nßnned space program is enlírely re- much of the plarmed Apollo lunar landing lated to putting men on the tnoon. "Ours is directly relaled to potenti^l mililary h¿¡dwa¡e. NASA's Langley Research Cen- said. He søid by cdnceling ær considered the Ma¡med Orbiting Re- requirenrznts-l emphasize potential," McNamara search Laboratory (MORL), a medium- Dyna-Soar...the Peitagon will save $100 million in militøry space expenditures sized zero-gravity starion using much of the in the rcxt l8 months. s¿me hardware ând conuaclors (McDoûrell UPI Release, 10 December 1963 fo! ùre spacecÌafr and Ma¡rin fo¡ the boosr- er) as the Air Force proposed in thei¡ Blue Air Force pldns to develop a manned orbital laboratory mßy well mark the Gemini and MODS programs, as dre best birth of a "U.5. Space Force." alreinative. The Ma¡shall Spacecrafr Cenær Washinglon Posl, proposed a la¡ger, conrinuously rotating, John G. Norris, space station. The space station's rotation Sub-heâdline dated 12 December 1963 would induce an a¡tificial graviry for exper-

oUES¡ Vckttnc 4 Nr¡n b¿t 4 37 action heþed to eliminate the political proved ousranding. The photogaphs, uken questions and economic concems of dupli- ftom a¡r altitude of mo¡e than 100 miles, cation with NASA's Apollo follow-on pro- cleårly showei the individual runways, gram (Apollo X-Sþlab)¿nd paved the way tari- strips, and b-ulldings of l¡ve Fieìd in to an operatronal system.- downrown Dallas.rr The chaíge in emphasis rowå¡d an op- Before the Gemini V asûonauts eralional space system Suaranteed Cemini splashed down, the Soviet miliury newspa- B/ùIOL's immediate survival. Membe¡s of per Red Star proclaimed the American æ- Congress arid úe Adminisuation--oùßide tronaus soied on communist countrie.s the DoD-envisioned great success for with powehrl cameras capable of detailing Gemini B/lvIOL's abiliry to provide pho¡o- ciries, ¡ailways, po¡ts. and ships. Surely, the graphic aJrd electronic intelligence data on Sovies believed, the Gemini B/lvfOL Soviet anti-ballisric missile (ABM) defer¡s- would offe¡ similar capabilities æ well as es, theù smaller solid fuel ICBM's, and rhe ootentiâl for anti-sâtellite and nuclear Chi¡ese effo¡s ûo develop a ballisric mis- bomLardment.34 sile force. Witï its capacity ¡o unite human Considering ùe ¡emarkable ¡esuls of judgmeît ¿nd recomaissance satellite tech- the NASA,IDOD Gemini expe¡iments, a ¡ology, it wouìd remendously enhance new aírÌs conÍol verifica¡ion mission, a¡d America's ùnde¡slanding of Sovier nuclear wide suppon ùúoughout the Administration forces. Ultimately, it coùld lead ¡o an inte¡- and State Depanment, Presidenr Iohnson nalionâl Eearv on formal i¡soecLion f¡om a¡nounced the fo¡mal stå.rt of Gemini B/ space.29 MOL'S development on 25 August l9ó5, Ironically, as Gemini BÂ4OL gained almost lr,vo vea¡s after the cancellation of new life from irs recoùtaissance role, a sec- Dyna-Soar.3s Yet, the key to Cemini B/ ond generation of high resolution a¡d a¡ea MOL's continued development in the years sùrveillance unmamed ¡ecomaissance sat- aìead would ìie in the Air Force's ability lo Model of the MOL and its Titan I C ellites made thei¡ debut beginning in 25 tie the program's military requirements booster (Boeing photo) February 1964 and 4 June 1964, respective- with ttre political, eÆonomic, and social ly. These satellites gave Secretary McNa- ramificatioÍs of Secretary McNama¡a's sys- budgetary economy presented lo the vot- ma¡a, æ¡d the Johnson Administsation, im- æms analysis approach to program manage- e¡s,þ On the other han4 Republicans proved estimâles of Soviet ICBM fo¡ces meirt and the evolving internationsl lela- called for a reorgaaization of tle America's a¡d military space operations.ru The contin- tionsl¡ip between the United States and the maíned space program. Republical presi- ued success of úese unma¡med reco¡unis- Soviet Union. dential ca¡didate Barry Goldwater wanted sarice satelliles would, eventually, conEib- When the Air Force began to consider ro tum the space program away fiom is ci- ute to the cáncellation of Gemini B/lvIOL. a space station in tlþ winter of 1961, they viliân focus of a moon landing and nward Yet, in the spring of 1965, AdminisEation envisioned it as one of several ma¡ned mili- militâ¡v acrivities in low ea¡th o¡bir. If P¡es- officials willingly contùrì¡ed ñ¡nding rhe tary programs. Secretary of Deferse McNa- ident Jôhnson pressed for Gemini B/lvlOL, Gemini B/lvIOL program, albeit at a rate mara srrongly questioned ùreì¡ effo¡s to in- it would only confirm Republican concerns. lowe¡ tha¡ Ai¡ Force leade¡s felt ne¡essa¡y tegrate any marned space ptograrr¡ into Concr¡rÌently, NASA begaû to look more !o ¿rssu¡ne the highest quality ånd lalesr national defense policy. Using NASA's ci- closely at a space station to follow the techno"lggy for spacebome recorutais- vilian space program a¡d a comprehensive Apollo program. Just as the possibiJity of a sånce.'' systems analysis appfoach to every aspecl NASA space station did in mid-1963, Apol- On 9 July 19ó5, Vice-P¡esident Hubert of research a¡d developmenL he intended lo X (eventually renamed Sþlab), raised H. Humphey, as Chaiman of the National to conùol the Air Force's desires fol an am- the specrer of duplicarion. On 26 Oclober Ae¡onautics and Space Cou[cil, presided bitious nilitary spac-e program. As NASA's 1964, NASA's Associaie Adminis[alor, over a meeting on ¡}le formal approval of manned spaceflight efforts provided Ameri- Robert Seamaris, stated, Apollo X, â Fro- Gemini B/lvlOL. Seclelary McNam¿¡a a¡d ca with a substantial lead in ùe struggle fo¡ gram designed for adva¡ced scienLific mis- NASA Administ¡ator Webb also attended, worldwide prestige, secrekry McNama¡a's sions, would Dot receive hadware funding borh sréssed Gemini B/MOL and Apollo X civilian managers pragmatically coordinat- údl the 1970's, much later rhan Gemini B/ did not duplicate one anothe!. Initially, rhe ed small-scale military experiments for sev- MOL. h addition, it wouìd focus on long- Vice-hesident showed conce¡n ove¡ wo¡ld erat of NASA's Gemini spaceflights rather ¡erm natìonal soace station obiecLives rather perceptior¡s towârd a ma¡ned milita¡y space than support multiple Air Force ma¡ured than shorr-temi military goals".ã Yet, many missioq but after asking seve¡al questiofis space programs. Indee4 NASA proved to rnliúcians srill ha¡bored fiscal conceE¡s about Ge¡nini B/lvfOL's abilities, he be- bè a caklyst for Se¡reø¡y McNama¡a's åver duplicaLion, even after Llmdori John- lieved the inælligence gathering value of plâ¡s to, at the very least, IiJnit the Air son's election as P¡esiden¡. Cemini B/lvfOL outweighe{^ any intema- Fo¡ce to a single rnanned space system-- On 7 Decembe¡ 1964, Senaro¡ Clinton tional political ramifica¡ions.r¿ Gemini B/À4OL. Q P. Anderson, Chairman of the Committee The sunme! of 1965 also offered the on Ae¡onautics arrd Space Sciences, sen[ DoD a¡ opportunity to ¡un seve¡al ma¡ned the P¡esident a lette¡ recofrunending the recormaissance expefiments onboa¡d rwo of Maiot RoJ F. Houchí¡ II is Deputl Chíe! møger of Apollo X a¡d Gemini B/14OL. NASA's Cemini spaceflighs. On 3 June, Ai; Staff H isroty at the Pentagon. He is cur- The Senalor believed such a merger would Gemini IV asûonauts ca¡¡ied a modified rcntly wtiting d fomol history of the X-20 'save one billion dollars over five years. To (tluee inch lens) version of the Hasselblad Dyna-Soar progran(see QUEST Vol.3 No. ease concems, NASA and Air Force repre- c¿¡¡nera to test the p¡actical ability and the 4) to be published bt the Smithsonian sentatives aereed to coordinate. ide¿s and cla¡ity of hand-held photography Èom Press. ha¡dware.21- space. Despite the sho¡t focal length, the During these departmentâl debâtes be- color pho¡ographs showed ¡ema¡kable de- tween the Ai¡ Fo¡ce, NASA, a¡d the DoD, tail. Gemini V, launched on 2l Ar¡gust, ca¡- Notes Ai¡ Force planners completed a reorienta- ried two lightweight telephoto lenses, as tion of Gemini BÂ{OL by adding test pro- well as the standard Hasselblad lens. One l. U.S. Congress, Housg Space Posnue, grams ¡o support military lecomaissa¡ce telephoto lens contained a ten-inch focal Hearings before the Commirtee on Sci- objectives. With the addition of experi- length while the other contained a forty- ence a¡d AsEonauúcs (88th Congress, ments P-14 (a sensirive radar anrerma) and eight inch focal lengtì, ingeniously reduced 1st sess., 1963), F,p. 229-231. P-15 (high resoluLion optics), Gemini B/ to eight inches to fit into the cramped cock- 2. U.S. Congress, House, Depa¡¡¡nent of MOL became a marir¡ed recomaissance pit of the Gemini capsule. Although the Defense Appropriatiors for 1963 (87th platform for intelligence gathedng, not an Questar company originally designed the Cong¡ess, 2nd Sess., pt 2, 1962), pp. experimental space slation designed solely lenses fo¡ amater¡¡ asfronomeß, the space- 477488: U.S. Congress, House, Hea¡- to prove man's military role in space, This bome ¡esults frorn the telephoto lenses ings on Military Posn¡¡e a¡rd H.R.

38 euEsÍ vohtrnê 4 Ntt.nbct 4 si _ä 9'151 (8'1th Congress, 2nd Sess,, pr 2. 20 P¡ojecl 1957-1963." Aerospace 33. Klass, Senties, pp.14'l-150. 1962), pp. 37 66-3'1'1 4 Historian ('lV t^terlDæember, 1988), p. 34. Ibid, p. 149; U.S. Congress, Senate, So- 3. U.S. Congress, House, Departmenr oI 2'.74. viet Space Progrants 1966-1970, pp. Defense Appropriations for 1963, p. I 7, Cla¡ence J. Geiger, Terminarion of rhe 345-348. 28,p.41'1. X-204 Dyna-Soar (AFSC Historical 35. Unfonunately, the DOD did no¡ hdef 4. U.S. Congress, House, Depart¡nent of Publica¡ions Se¡ies 64-51-trI, 1964), p. the Stare Deparrment about the mee!- Defense Appropriations for l9ó4 (88rh 2O-25; U.S. Congress, House, Deparr- ing; subsequendy, dre Srare Depart- Congress, lsr Sess., pt 1, 1963), pp. ment of Defense Appropriations for ment began ¡o express its concem over t73-17 5 , 257 -259 . 1965,pp.235-236. the same issues tÌrc Vice P¡esident 5. Robe¡t S. McNama¡a,The Essence ofSe- 18. U.S. Congress, House, Commitree on raised at the 9 July me€ting. This delay cutíty: ReÍlecüons in Offtce (l,ondon, Covemment Operatiors, Goverwien! pushed the formal a¡nouncement of 1968), p. 93-96: Alain Enthoven and Operuíons in Space: An Analysis of Gemi¡i B/ùIOL until 25 August 1965. K. Wayne Smi¡h, How Much Is C iv il-M i litary Roles an¿ RelatioìLshìps Fink, "CIA Con¡¡ol Bid Slowed Deci- Enough? Shapíng the DeÍeße Pro- (88¡þ Congress, lst Sess., 13th Report, sion on MOL," p. 23; NoÍnyle, "AF qran, 196l-1969 (New York, 1971), 1965), pp. 86-87. Give¡r Mar¡¡¡ed Space Role," p. 23: pp.30-36. 19. U.S. Congress, House, Deparûnent of l,eavitç "MOL: Evolution of a Deci- 6. McNama¡a, ?l¡¿ Essence o! Security, ptp. Deførse Appropriations fø 1965 (88th sion," p.40. 96-101. Congress, 2nd Sess., pr5,1964),p. 12. 7. Departrnent of Defertse, "Department of 20. Brigadier General Joseph S. Ble¡,rnaier, . Defense Support of Narional Ae¡onau- Address Inæmational to the Thi¡d REPORTS tics and Space Adminisuation," DOD Symposium on Bioast¡onautics and AFTERFLIGHT )þ Dlrective, 24 February 1962, Exploration of Space, Sal Anønio, V6LUME NINETEEN\o' 8. U.S. Congress, House, Departrnent of TX, 18 Novembe! 1968; USAF, Fact sTS-68, 5T5-66, srs63, sTs-67 Defense Appropriations for 1964, p'p. Sheet, Post FligtÍ Press Confere "Ma¡r¡red Olbiring-(W¿shinglon Labolatory- ilation of 173-175. Operational Aspects." featuring seleôted video & narration 9.Ibid, p. 258. DC: CPO, November 1965). nissions' crew Vol. 19 includês lirst À 10. Ba¡lon C. Hacker and James M. Gdm- 21. Curtis Peæ.bles, Gua íøns: Strategíc Indezvous, spacewalk, Space Radal wooò, On the Shoulders of Titans: A Reconnaissance S¿J¿¡tif¿s (Nova¡o arth views: erupt¡ng volcano, etc. ('V,lashtog- History of Project Cemini CA: P¡esido, 1987), p. 238-239. VHS v¡deo lxtscl ot{¿Y $2¿.95t 19 vot.sel $399 95 ton DC: GPO, 197'1), pp. 117 -120. 22. J.S. Butz Jr.. "MOL: The Technical 11. U.S. Congress, House, Deparmrent of ko¡nise and Prospecs," Ait Force RICON Enterprtses, lnc.,5863 Vlllagê Forest Cl, Defense AppropriaLions for 1964 (88rh Møgaziu (Octobet, 1965), p. 46. TX 77092'0. VISAJMC cârds accepted Congress, 1st Sess., pt 6, 1963), pp. 23. loyd S, Swenson,Jr., James M. G¡im- by FAX or VoiceñãrlÌOLL FRÉÊ: 1-à00-756-5841 521-522, 5U, 579-580; U.S. Cõn- wood, a¡d Charles C. Alexander, ?åis Pho¡é 1'7146810105 gress, House, Space Posnrre, p. 224- New Ocear A Hßtory of Project Met 6pm & wkends) E-mit colton@halpcorg 230: U.S. Congress, House, DeparL- czry (Washinglon DC: GPO, 1966), ÂFTER FLIGHT REPORTS ser¡es ment of Defense App¡opriations for pp.638-639. & sÞecial offer delails, please sênd â 1964 (88th Congress, lst Sess., pr 1, 24. Walter A. McDougall, The Heøens selladdressed-stamÞêd-enveloDe 1963), pp.479480. and The Earth, (New York: Basic 12. USAF, Fac! Sheet'Manned Orbiting Books, Inc., 1985), pp.32Ù-323. Laboratory Program Chronology," 25. "Washington RouídtJp," Ayíatíon Week SHUTTLE/MIR PATCHES: NASA Cos- (Washington GPO, November DC: ottd. Space Techñology (23 March monaut ser¡€s Phase One pro- 1965). 1964),þ. 15. Patches, gram, M¡r-18 prìmary and backup crew 13. U.S. Congress, Hoìrse, "Agleement Be- 26. Rolandoland W. Newkùk, Ivan D. E¡tel, and patches, Russ¡an Space Agency Logo tween NASA and DOD Conceming Courtney3ourtr¡ev G. Btooks-Brooks, Sþlab:Slcrlab: A Chro- patch, and OSC the Gemini Program, 1963," 1964 /¡¿¡og) (Washington DC: GPO, 197?), Delta Clipper Pegasus NASA Authoriza¡ion, Hearings Before pp.ÞÞ.28-30,36-38. ¿õ-Ju, Jo-Jð. program patches and more. Write or the Subcommirree on Marrned Space 27, Aero¡aut¡cs an¿ Astronaüics l9&1, call for list¡ngs: H.P. Enlerprises, 1126 Fliqht of the Committee or Science (Washington DC: GPO, f965), pp. W. Ocean Ave., Lompoc, CA 934Í16; and Astronautics, (88th Congress, lsL 424426,lbid, w.37 -39. PH: 805-735-1 322; E-mail: Spaceooun- Sess.,, 1963), pp. 406408. 28. Roland W. Newki¡k, Iva¡ D. Ertal, a¡d [email protected] V¡sit our WEBSITE at 14. W. David Compton and Cha¡les D. Courmey G. Btooks, Slcrla.b: A Chro- http://www.dm atrix.com/spaceco. Bercçq Living and. Working ln Space: ø/ogy (Washington DC: cPO, 1977), A Hislory oî Slcf lab (Washington DC: pp- 28-29,3631; Astronautics a¡rd SPACE DATA BASES: Shareware col- CPO, 1983), pp. 915. Ae¡onautics 19 64, p. 428 - lection ol U.S. spaco launches (Sound- i5, Adan L. Greun, "Chapter 5: MOI." 29. "Detection of ICBM'S Key in MOL Ap- ¡ng Rockets, M¡ssiles 'and Satell¡tes). chapter ftom a se.ond draft copy of ptoval," Ayíation Week and. Space his Ph.D. disseÍation sent ¡o au¡ho¡ fo¡ Teclvtology (27 September 1965), pp. Over 1 1,000 listed with details. For Ap- review, 26 April 1989. 26-27; Washington Posr, 5 Seprember ple ll (Applsworks requ¡red), Mac¡ntosh 16. U.S. Congress, House, Com¡¡ittee on 1965. (Microsoft Works required) and MS Covemment Operalions, C ov enlnen! 30. Lawerance F¡eedmar., U.S. Inrelligence DOS (M¡crosoft Works requ¡red). Cost Opetations la Space: An Analysís of ønd the Sovíet Threa, (Soulde¡: West- $40 plus $4 shipp¡ng. Wr¡te: Space- Cívíl-M ilitary Roles and Relationships view Press, 1977), p. 104; John Pra- works, P.O. Box 6246, Br¡dgeport, CT (S8th Congress. lst Sess., 13th ReporE dos, The Soviet Esrimate, (New York: 06606. 1965), pp. 86-87; U.S. Congress, Dial P¡ess, 1982), p. 190. House, Department of Defense Appro- 31. Phitip Klass, Secret Setúries ia Space, SPACE HISTOFY/SPACE FUTURE: priarions for 1965 (88rh Congress, 2nd (New York: Random House, l97i), p. Used NASA and the U.S. Space Sess., pt 5, 1964), p. l2i Clarence J. 149. by Geiger, Termination of the X-20A 32. Donald E. Fink, "ClA Cont¡ol Bid Command and now available for IBM- Dyna-Soa¡ (AFSC Historical Publica- Slowed Decision ot MOL," Aviation type PCs. Space 2000 has ìnformation tions Sedes &-51-IJI, 1964), pp. 2O- Week ønd Space Techtology Q0 Sep- Írom 1926 through 2011. All payloads 25: U.S. Congress, House, DepaÍment tember 1965), p. 23: Williarn J. Noì- (including failures) and debr¡s. Over of Defense Appropriations for 1965 myle, "Air Force Given Marured Space '100,000 records in 90 data bases. Data (88th Congresq 2nd Sess., pt 4, 1964), Role," Aviarion Week and. Space Tech- bases and accsss softwale plus 4 quar- pp.235-236; Roy F. Houchin tr, '"The nology Q0 August 1965), p. 23; Wil- terly updates $295. Wr¡te or call: SAR, Diplomatic Demise of D].¡rasoar: The liam Leavitt, 'MOL: Evaluation of a lnc., P.O. Box 49446, Colorado Impact of l¡temational a¡d Domestic Decision," Air Force Mavazine (Octo- Spr¡ngs, CO 80949; PH: 719-260-0500. Political Affairs on the Dyna-Soar X- be¡ 1965), p.40. l

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