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Into the Unknown Together the DOD, NASA, and Early Spaceflight

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Frontmatter 11/23/05 10:12 AM Page i Into the Unknown Together The DOD, NASA, and Early Spaceflight MARK ERICKSON Lieutenant Colonel, USAF Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama September 2005 Frontmatter 11/23/05 10:12 AM Page ii Air University Library Cataloging Data Erickson, Mark, 1962- Into the unknown together : the DOD, NASA and early spaceflight / Mark Erick- son. p. ; cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-58566-140-6 1. Manned space flight—Government policy—United States—History. 2. National Aeronautics and Space Administration—History. 3. Astronautics, Military—Govern- ment policy—United States. 4. United States. Air Force—History. 5. United States. Dept. of Defense—History. I. Title. 629.45'009'73––dc22 Disclaimer Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the editor and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public re- lease: distribution unlimited. Air University Press 131 West Shumacher Avenue Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6615 http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil ii Frontmatter 11/23/05 10:12 AM Page iii To Becky, Anna, and Jessica You make it all worthwhile. THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Frontmatter 11/23/05 10:12 AM Page v Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIMER . ii DEDICATION . iii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . ix 1 NECESSARY PRECONDITIONS . 1 Ambling toward Sputnik . 3 NASA’s Predecessor Organization and the DOD . 18 Notes . 24 2 EISENHOWER ACT I: REACTION TO SPUTNIK AND THE BIRTH OF NASA . 31 Eisenhower Attempts to Calm the Nation . 32 President’s Scientific Advisory Committee and Civil Space . 41 Johnson and the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee . 46 The NACA Enters the Fray . 51 The PSAC and “Introduction to Outer Space” . 53 Balancing Civilian and Military Responsibilities in Space . 57 Notes . 79 3 EISENHOWER ACT II: FORGING A NASA-DOD RELATIONSHIP . 93 To Compete with the Soviet Union . 93 Space for Peace? . 102 Air Force Philosophy Made Little Headway . 109 The NASA-DOD Relationship Phase I . 111 ARPA’s Space Role Fades . 119 Amending the Space Act . 120 The Civilian-Military Liaison Committee and the National Aeronautics and Space Council . 121 Space Act Amendments Stymied . 123 The Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board . 126 v Frontmatter 11/23/05 10:12 AM Page vi CONTENTS Chapter Page The NASA-DOD Relationship Phase II . 127 Notes . 136 4 MERCURY, DYNASOAR, AND THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE UNDER EISENHOWER . 149 Mercury’s Antecedents . 149 Notes . 185 5 KENNEDY, PRESTIGE, AND THE MANNED LUNAR LANDING PROGRAM . 191 Kennedy and the Cold War . 193 Kennedy, Space Policy, and Prestige . 200 To the Moon . 210 Did Kennedy’s Commitment Hold Firm? . 221 Kennedy, the Soviet Space Program, and a Joint Lunar Landing . 227 Notes . 240 6 NASA, DOD, MCNAMARA, AND THE AIR FORCE UNDER KENNEDY . 263 Air Force “Campaign” to Usurp NASA Responsibility . 263 DOD Directive 5160.32 . 274 The Air Force’s Space Philosophy and Space Plan . 277 The OSD’s Perspective . 281 One Space Program, Not Two . 294 The NASA-DOD Relationship: An Overview of Support, Coordination, and Rivalry . 296 The NASA-DOD Relationship: Tension and Rivalry Specifically . 302 The NASA-DOD Relationship: Coordination Specifically . 309 The NASA-DOD Relationship: Support Specifically . 314 The Reciprocal: NASA’s Contributions to National Security . 322 Notes . 326 vi Frontmatter 11/23/05 10:12 AM Page vii CONTENTS Chapter Page 7 GEMINI, DYNASOAR, AND THE MANNED ORBITING LABORATORY . 337 Project Gemini and the DOD . 337 Dynasoar in 1961–62 . 351 Dynasoar and Gemini . 357 The MOL Emerged as Dynasoar Expired . 361 An Addendum: Reconnaissance Satellites and Space Policy in the Kennedy Administration . 378 Notes . 385 8 JOHNSON’S PHILOSOPHY, SPACE POLICY, AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTINUITY . 395 Johnson, the Cold War, and Détente . 395 Johnson, Space Policy, Prestige, and Budgets . 402 Continuity in the Air Force and OSD Perspectives . 415 Continuity in NASA-DOD Relations I: Overview and Coordination . 421 Continuity in NASA-DOD Relations II: Support and Tension/Rivalry . 425 The Reciprocal: NASA’s Contribution to National Security . 438 Summary . 443 Notes . 444 9 APOLLO AND THE MOL . 455 Preliminary and Background Information . 455 The Concept of the MOL . 463 The Concept of the AAP . 479 The Execution of the MOL and the AAP . 489 Notes . 514 10 CONCLUSION . 525 Notes . 538 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS . 541 BIBLIOGRAPHY . 547 vii Frontmatter 11/23/05 10:12 AM Page viii CONTENTS Page INDEX . 655 Illustrations PHOTO SECTION . 255 Tables 1 Research and development funding for ballistic missiles . 4 2 General-space budgetary trends for the Eisenhower administration . 99 3 Long-term figures for military personnel assigned to NASA . 133 4 Military space expenditures proposed Space Plan of 1962 compared to DOD’s budgeting baseline for space . 281 5 The 1961 situation from the Air Force perspective . 290 6 Annual number of military officers assigned to NASA . 316 7 A breakdown of DOD support for Project Mercury . 322 8 NASA and military space budgets for the years shown . 406 9 NASA employment . 406 10 Federal expenditures for actual FY 67 budgets and expected amounts for FY 68 and FY 69 . 413 11 Unreimbursed expenses for Gemini support . 428 12 Apollo support . 438 viii Frontmatter 11/23/05 10:12 AM Page ix About the Author Lt Col Mark Erickson was born and raised on a small farm south of Ogden, Iowa. After graduating from Ogden Community High School, he earned his bachelor’s degree from Augustana College, Rock Island, Illinois, in 1985. Commissioned as a sec- ond lieutenant in the United States Air Force in 1987, his first assignment as a space and missile officer was to Comiso Air Sta- tion (AS), Italy, to serve as a launch control officer with the ground launched cruise missile system. He then served in the same capacity with the Minuteman Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles at Whiteman Air Force Base (AFB) from 1988 to 1992 while simultaneously earning his master of arts in history from Central Missouri State University. After his first tour as an in- structor of history at the United States Air Force Academy (USAFA) in Colorado Springs, Colorado, Colonel Erickson com- pleted a doctorate in history at George Washington University be- fore serving at Woomera AS, Australia, as a space warning offi- cer. He returned to USAFA as an assistant professor of history in 1999 and then attended Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, starting in 2001. He was a staff officer and executive officer at US Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Omaha, Nebraska, from 2002 through 2004 and the chief of safety at the 91st Space Wing, Minot AFB, North Dakota, from 2004 to 2005. In the summer of 2005, he took command of the 326th Training Squadron (Basic Military Training), Lackland AFB, Texas. Colonel Erickson is married to Rebecca (Kessler) Erickson and has twin daughters Anna and Jessica. ix THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Chapter 1 11/23/05 9:58 AM Page 1 Chapter 1 Necessary Preconditions Between the 4 October 1957 launching by the Soviet Union of the first artificial earth satellite, Sputnik I, and the success- ful American landing and return from the moon in July 1969, the United States sponsored five human-spaceflight programs. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) started and completed Projects Mercury and Gemini while its Project Apollo would land on the moon five times before De- cember 1972.1 Meanwhile, different administrations cancelled the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Project Dynasoar in De- cember 1963 and its successor the Manned Orbiting Labora- tory (MOL) in June 1969.2 Therefore, the US Air Force (USAF), as the agency directly responsible for both programs, failed in its attempts to evaluate and use humans in space for military purposes. This book examines the NASA-DOD relationship, with a special focus on these human-spaceflight projects, and the larger context in which this relationship existed. By exam- ining the geopolitical, domestic political, and bureaucratic en- vironments in which decisions concerning these projects were made, the relationships between America’s first five human- spaceflight projects will become clear. The author examines the NASA-DOD relationship in human-spaceflight programs by looking at three issues. First, what was the attitude of presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson toward the use of space exploration as a tool to secure international prestige and national pride as part of the Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union? While a complete examination of each president’s Cold War policies and general beliefs is outside the scope of this work, it is necessary to touch upon the highlights of Eisen- hower’s, Kennedy’s, and Johnson’s fundamental perspectives on the Soviet Union and the Cold War. More important, how- ever, is to examine what each man specifically believed con- cerning the role space exploration was to play in the geopoliti- cal struggle with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 1 Chapter 1 11/23/05 9:58 AM Page 2 NECESSARY PRECONDITIONS (USSR), by analyzing each president’s pronouncements on such topics as space for peaceful pursuits, human spaceflight, and space for prestige purposes. Each president’s specific ac- tions in the field of space policy, human-spaceflight projects, and cooperation with the USSR in space will also be a key piece of the puzzle. In essence, Eisenhower was not at all keen on such a construct; he did not believe the United States should race to the moon in search of prestige. Kennedy be- lieved and reoriented American space policy toward the moon. Johnson continued this lunar landing goal but refused to ex- pand American space policy beyond it as he grappled with the demands of Vietnam and the Great Society.
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