lnteragency RivalrY? Roy F. Houch¡n ll The Relationship of the Department oÍ Defense and NASA in Developing the Air Force's Manned Orbiting Laboratory,196I-1965. In la¡e 1961, ùe potential for t¡emen- dous interagency ¡ivalry prevailed betweeû the Ai¡ Fo¡ce, rhe Departrnenr of Defense (DoD) and NASA. Each agency speculated on how its objectives best ¡ePresented na- tional obiectives, The Ai¡ Force believed Lhe requiremenrs for several ma¡med mili- tary space progra¡¡s existed. Concúrendy, NASÀ focused on Apollo, the program des- lined to fulfill Kennedy's lunar landing corlÍritment, In n¡m, the DepartmenL of Defense wanted to suppless Ai¡ Fo¡ce ef- forts to develop a ¡ival ma¡ned sPace pro- grarn; however, it also prefened m keep the ãerospace indusny suong. While NASA's civilian space p¡og¡am offered the Depart- ment of Defense tÏe best avenue for suc- cess, it would not rneet the Ai¡ Force's ¡e- quirements. To implement is requitement for sus- tained milita¡y space operatiorN, the Ai! Force proposed Gemini B/lvla¡med O¡biting Iaborãtory (MOL), a nilitary spâce station based on a pressùrized laboratory section and a spacecraft from NASA's recendy ap- proved Proje.t Gemini (the leaming Phase ior ¡endezvous and docking maneuve¡s i¡ NASA'S hmâr landing program). While NASA Administra¡or James E. Vy'ebb sup- Dorted the Air Force's activities, he feh ob- Mock-up of the US Air Force's Manned Orbiting Laboratory. @oeing Photo) iigared !o abide by Secrerary of Defense Robert S, McNamara's space policies Borh tion, Se¡ret¿¡y of Defense McNama¡a and Secretary of the Ai¡ Force the resPonsibility NASA a¡d the Ai¡ Force wanted space sra- DLec¡or of Defense Resea¡ch and Engi- to suppó¡L to the "extent compatible with rions; but since the Air Force lacked politi- neering (DDR&E), Dr. H¿rold Brown, did is priirary mission," specific NASA pro' cal supporr within the Depâ¡tmenr of De- nor aciept Air Force thinling. They be- iêcts and oroerams afisinc lfom tolnt fense a¡d NASA was busy with Apollo, a lieved the requirements for many milit¿ry fu¡sn¡oop âg-reements,T B-y rhe enã of cooperative venh.r¡e seemed the best solu- ooerations had not been accuratelv de- 1962, approximately fifry arrangemens and tion. l¡;ed.3 l¡d.ed, Secret¿¡y McNama¡ã be- ae¡eemènts between NASA and the DoD The Air Fo¡ce strongly questioned the lieved NASA's Apollo space program pro- eiisted while the DoD accomplished more validiry of ùe Secrerary of Defense's ma¡- vided Congress with a peaceful program ro than $550 million \À'orth of wo¡k fo¡ Searetary McNaman felt the agement system for ils ma¡ned space Pro- banle Sovièt space initiaLives and maintain NASA.8 Sdll, srams. How could a clash between institu- a s¡¡one base fo¡ the aerosDace indusky. DoD should inqease its utilization of ional titans be ave¡æd? By 1965, Secretary ln"the winter of l96l'Secretary NicNa- NASA asses. Iûdeed, if Gemini's sP¿ce- McNama¡a ¡educed the potential for intera- ma¡a, in a quest to cut spiraling Defense flight te¡hnology and polential exceeded gency riviilry by using NASA a¡d a sys- Depa¡t¡r¡enl cosls, curb Ai¡ Force research Dyna-Soar, Dyna-Soa¡ could be canceled. tems analysis approach of ma¡agemerit io a¡d developmenr programs, a¡d eliminate After hea¡ins a November 1962 NASA/ limit Air Fo¡ce ambitions to a single pro- úe possibility of duplicating NASA's Gem- DoD briefúg on the possibility of the Ai¡ gram- Gemini B/lvIOL. ini Progam, investiga¡ed altematives to fhe Force using, and funding, Gemini space' In September 1961, wiù an apprecia- Ai¡ Fo¡ce's reusable mini-space shuttle, crafL to explore military roles in space, tion of Soviet capabilitiea in space, Air Dyna-Soar (an acronym for Dynarnic Soar- McNâmãra recoÍuneÍded the DoD ¿ssume Force leaders prepared a 10-yea¡ space plan ing).4 To accomplish his goals, McNama- manapemenr of Gemini.g While NASA ad- ro furtlrcr identify the militaÍy requkements ¡a's civilia¡ expens initiared ùe Planning- minis-rator Webb favored Air Force partici- for space.l Lieutenant General James Fer- Programming-Budget Sysþm (PPBS) of Dation in Droiect Cemini, if it furthered Air l guson, Air Force Depury Chief of Staff for m¿magemen! and qeated five- year plans þo¡ce obiËcdies, he never inrended !o relin- Resea¡ch and Development, desc bed the for rese¿rch and development, weapons de- orrish ¿nï oo¡rion of the Droeram to the I September 1961 pla¡ before a Congession- veloDmenl- and cost reduction. Combined ôoD. As-ari inægral step in *rJctimu from Fo¡ce's wirh'the five-year pla.rs, he believed PPBS Proiect Mercury's firsl venh¡res into space al commiltee, outlining rhe Air l leading role in space ope¡ations. Among the would ensule. each of these factors-- to tire final landine on the moon with ho- objecrives, he emphasized the need for a including force requirements, military suat- iect Apollo, Gemini could not be delayed military space station to insure a suslained egy, 4nd foreign policy--remained in bal- by a NASA/DoD merger where NASA lost manned presence in low ea¡th orbit. From ance.5 Consequendy, in every functional cónuol of the p¡oject. Any del4y in Cemini their vantage point in space, he believed Air pyramid of t¡e DOD new layers of central- might- delay the lunar landi¡g.tu Fo¡ce asEonauts would be able to apply ized civilian bweaucracy ¡adiated ftom tle Durine 1962, Ai¡ Force Chief of Staft Lheir unique judgement to command and Ofhce of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).6 General C-u¡tis E. LeMay and other Air conEol, surveillanc^e, and ballistic missile 'Io ensure close coo¡dination of milÌ- Force plarners considered NASA's Gemi- defense oDeratioris.r tary and civilian space programs, Secretary ni, and its follow-on program Apollo, inca- Whii,e the Air Force felt c¡nfident of McNama¡a issued a policy dircctive on 24 pable of providing úè depth and b,readth of the miliEry info¡mation offered by Dyna-Soar its proposal to develop a military space sta- February 1962. This di¡ective assigned il 36 ouÊtf vcterrrc 4 Nuñbè.4 åI AI å and the military manned Ðace starion out- imentation.l4 Intuitively ¡ealizing the Vice- space..,.The problems of marned military lined in their September 1961 lO-year space P¡esident would not support funding for space flight are, and generally will continue plan. Nor would NASA programs develop both a DoD and NASA space statiorl even to be, more complex -and more difficult and úre q,pe of technical e4uipment (i,e., a rcus- if each agency painstakingly dehned separ- expensive to solve."lÚ able shuttle, electronic intelligence, signals ate requùemens for their respective space The DirecLor of Defense Resea¡ch & inrelligence, phorog¡aphic inrelligence, sar- statior¡s, Secreta¡y McNamara and Admin- Engineæring, Dr. Harold Brown, echoed ellite inspection and intercçtion) required istralor Webb met agair and agreed to in- Secreta¡y McNam¿¡a: fo¡ fuLure ma¡ned military operaLiors in corporate ûre requiremens of boLh agencies "The problems of mâTmed milhary space. In June, Ai¡ Fo¡ce leade¡s ¡ecom- inlo a single space sradon. However, each space flighs are. and gmerally will contin- mended the development of a m¿fied agency reserved ùe dght ¡o continue with ue !o be, moÊ complex afid more difhcult space station, or Military Orbital Develop- tñeir own advanced spõe station studies.l5 and expensive to solve. I want s[ongly to ment Syslem, to provide additional proof of Ironically, neither agency agreed on emphasize that as of rhis time even the re- milùary capabilities and complement Dyna- program specifics or a manage¡ for their ouirement lor manned militârv oDerations is Soar's mission. I¡ Augusr, the Ai¡ Fo¡ce coope¡âtive space station venru¡e. Subse- srill in quesrion."l9 outlined a Blue Gemini project detailing quendy, in an Ooobe¡ 1963 meeting be- If Ai¡ Fo¡ce leaders coùld sustair specific military objectives and ha¡dwa¡e tween McNa¡na¡a and Webb, McNama¡a Gemini BÂ4OL, the progIam would decide, modifications ro NASA's Gemini capsules. expanded on his July 1963 intentions. He qualiratively ãnd quarititariveþ, man's abil- These modificarions would allow a Limely would indeed eliminare Dyna-Soar arrd be- ity !o perform useful military missions in beginning to Air Force uaining in space,lì gin a follow-on to Cemini, simila¡ to the space and, by doing so, find oùt whether To fu¡rd these initiatives, they Foposed a Blue Gemini and MODS prograrns pro- fhese missions enhanced our national secur- $177 million allocation of the fìscal year posed by At Force leaders--and rejected by ity.20 lhe experiments, test ha¡dwa¡g and 1964 DoD budget for the two additional McNama¡a--ea¡lier in the year. NASA procedures programmed fo¡ Gemini B/ programs. Secretary McNama¡a conside¡ed countered by suggesting a military Gernini MOL placed primary emphasis on measù- ¡he objeclives of these new rnilitary space B/lr4OL (figure 4), similar to úe medium- ing man's value !o ùe total system, Each programs a duplìcaúon of NASA's Gemini sized MORL spacæ starion advocated þ is military mission would identif] ¿nd ana- program and excluded tlrem f¡om the de- Langley Research Cente¡. As AL Force lyze, in d-etail, functions man pa¡rmenr's Jaauary 1963 budget ¡equesfs to plarmers lauded the me¡its of using Dyna- mrght pertolm.