Tactical Air Power Controversies in Normandy: a Question of Doctrine

Canadian Military History Volume 9 Issue 2 Article 5 2000 Tactical Air Power Controversies in Normandy: A Question of Doctrine Paul Johnston [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Recommended Citation Johnston, Paul "Tactical Air Power Controversies in Normandy: A Question of Doctrine." Canadian Military History 9, 2 (2000) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Johnston: Tactical Air Power Controversies in Normandy Paul Johnston he history of tactical air power in the battle in the campaign, in particular by the famous Tof Normandy has been fraught with both Field-Marshal Erwin Rommel. A much quoted misunderstanding and contradiction. Largely 12 June 1944 message from Rommel to Berlin ignored by the army-centric historians who have reads: written the histories of the campaign, it has been asserted on the one hand that Allied air power Our own operations are rendered extraordinarily was overwhelming and on the other that the difficult and in part impossible to carry out system for controlling it was cumbersome and [owing to] the exceptionally strong and, in some respects overwhelming, superiority of the enemy ineffective. On the face of it, at least, there would air force.2 appear to be some tension between those two schools of thought. Which is more accurate? In order to examine that question, it is important ...And Some Army Accusations to begin with an understanding of the doctrine for tactical air power - the contemporary doctrine t is perhaps somewhat paradoxical, therefore, of the time - and disputes about both that Ithat there is another theme running through doctrine and the role of air power in the commentary on the Battle of Normandy, and that campaign. What emerges is that there is enough is criticism of air support. Many critics have blame to go around for all parties - and enough complained - some vociferously if not viciously credit. In truth, the doctrine of the time was - that the RAF3 was intransigent, uncooperative under-developed, and this simply reflected some and sometimes downright stinting in its provision of the larger doctrinal weaknesses of the Western of air support to the land campaign. Allies' militaries. Only a year after the war, Major-General C.C. Mann, who as a brigadier had been the Chief of One Traditional View... Staff at First Canadian Army headquarters throughout the Northwest Europe campaign, ne of the more famous paintings of the made a striking and surprisingly blunt OSecond World War is Rocket Firing accusation. He described the basis of the British Typhoons over the Falaise Gap, Normandy 1944 and Commonwealth doctrine for air support as by Frank Wootton. It captures a traditional image "unsound."4 of Allied air power over the Normandy battlefield - crushing air supremacy that doomed the Mann strongly believed that RAF air support Germans. Chester Wilmot made this point early had been stinting and unresponsive during the in his classic history of the war, The Struggle/or campaign in Northwest Europe. And this was not Europe: "The value of this air supremacy can just his opinion upon reflection after the fact. In hardly be overrated."1 He is seconded in this the midst of some of the worst fighting of the opinion by virtually all of the Germans who fought Normandy campaign, he had felt strongly enough © Canadian Military History, Volume 9, Number 2, Spring 2000, pp.59-71. 59 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2000 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 9 [2000], Iss. 2, Art. 5 about this to have taken the time to pen a long over 2,000 in 2nd Tactical Air Force, specifically memorandum to Lieutenant-General H.D.G. dedicated to OVERLORD. Now, having amassed Crerar, the commander of First Canadian Army. such a vast armada, what should be done with it? Bomb German defensive positions right along The situation as it stands at present makes it the front? Attack supply depots further in the quite impossible to expect that there can be any rear? Try and shoot up columns on the move? heavy or effective air attacks within a matter of All of the above? Which is more profitable? Which several hours, to say the least, which require resources beyond those within the capacity of is more effective? Where should the emphasis the Tactical Group supporting the Army go? This is the nub of the doctrinal question, and concerned.5 as one might expect, there was not unanimity. But first of all, this whole discussion poses an Mann was especially disturbed by a obvious question: just how fast was the response particular air support request which he outlined to army requests for air support? Significantly, in great detail. In the end, the RAF had declined after making the above sweeping accusation, to fill it. Mann considered this unacceptable. Gooderson does not answer this question. In order to answer it, we need a quick overview of In my opinion, the action of the ground forces is the air support doctrine of the time. sabotaged, rather than supported, by the present practice of the Tactical Group with whom we have been cooperating.6 The Background: This issue of timeliness, or perhaps more Inter-Service Rivalry accurately responsiveness - getting close support y 1944, British air support doctrine had gone air attacks on target as quickly as possible after through an extensive evolution. The war Army request - has dominated consideration of B began in 1939 with some considerable enmity the tactical air support issue from the very start. between the Army and the RAF, even by the It was the issue that drove the first British efforts normal standards of inter-service rivalry. Indeed, to reform their air support system after the the Army (and the RN) had at various times tried debacle at Dunkirk and it was the issue that was to have the RAF dissolved and its assets divided central to complaints from the Army about air between the two older services.9 For its part, the support throughout the Overlord campaign, the RAF had preached the new doctrine of strategic most vociferous example being (then) Brigadier bombing, which the RAF's founders and early Mann's accusations. Indeed, the timeliness issue leaders believed would render the older services has dominated the historiography of the issue themselves obsolescent, if not entirely obsolete.10 down to the present day. Many commentators "The bomber will always get through," as the have discussed it, in tones generally disapproving 7 saying went. In this environment, not only did of the RAF. Most recently Ian Gooderson, in his the RAF not allocate any significant amount of analysis of Allied tactical air power, stated: resources towards air support to armies in the field, but they did not think very much about that 11 The British system proved very successful In particular issue either. The result of all of this processing pre-planned air support strikes, but was a system of air support in France in 1940 the more difficult test was how quickly air that was cumbersome, slow and ineffective - one support could be provided in response to of the contributing factors to the debacle at impromptu requests from forward troops, Dunkirk. where speed was vitally important. In this respect, both in Italy and in the early stages of the campaign in North-West Europe, the process While still convinced that strategic bombers was simply not fast enough.8 would win the war, even the RAF's hierarchy realized that air support would have to be Are such accusations fair or accurate? In improved, and shortly after Dunkirk Air Marshal large part this question comes down to doctrine. A.S. Barratt, who had been the commander of After all, just what is the best way to apply air the RAF forces in France in 1940, was made power against an enemy army in the field? Think commander of new command within the RAF - of it this way - in June 1944 the Western Allies Army Cooperation Command. And within this had over 9,000 aircraft in their various tactical new command two officers, both also veterans air forces, the British and Commonwealth with of the recent disaster in France - Brigadier J.D. 60 https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol9/iss2/5 2 Johnston: Tactical Air Power Controversies in Normandy A Spitfire of 2nd Tactical Air Force is loaded with a 500-pound bomb in preparation for a dive-bombing attack on the invasion coast. Woodall of the Army and Group Captain A. Wann This the RAF stoutly resisted, and even while the of the RAF - were sent to the quiet backwater of new tactical air force idea was coming together Northern Ireland to jointly study the problem of in North Africa the bureaucratic turf war over air support to armies and propose solutions.12 command and control escalated all the way up This they did, producing what came to be known to Churchill himself.14 He produced a as the "Wann/Woodall Report." The key feature compromise slightly favourable to the RAF. of the Wann/Woodall recommendations was the Contrary to the Air Staffs original wishes, a creation of an elaborate system of radio links, to considerable portion of the RAF's resources allow the rapid passage of air support requests would be devoted specifically to army support in via a special communications network, outside the tactical air forces. But against the Army's of the normal chain of command.

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