English As the Official Language of the South in 1918
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Evidence and Analysis VOLUME 1: Africa Public Disclosure Authorized UNDERSTANDING CIVIL WAR Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Edited by Paul Collier Nicholas Sambanis Public Disclosure Authorized VOLUME 1: Africa UNDERSTANDING CIVIL WAR VOLUME 1: Africa UNDERSTANDING CIVIL WAR Evidence and Analysis Edited by Paul Collier Nicholas Sambanis ©2005 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington DC 20433 Telephone:202-473-1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org E-mail: [email protected] All rights reserved 1 2 3 4 08 07 06 05 This volume is a product of the staff of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank.The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Directors of The World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. 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All other queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to the Office of the Publisher,The World Bank,1818 H Street NW, Washington,DC 20433, USA; fax: 202-522-2422; e-mail: [email protected]. Cover photo: ©Getty Images/Tyler Hicks ISBN-10: 0-8213-6047-7 ISBN-13: 978-0-8213-6047-7 eISBN: 0-8213-6048-5 DOI: 10.1596/978-0-8213-6047-7 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Understanding civil war: evidence and analysis / Paul Collier & Nicholas Sambanis, editors. p. cm Includes bibliographical references and index. Contents: v.1.Africa – v.2. Europe, Central Asia, and other regions. ISBN 0-8213-6047-7 (v.1: pbk.) – ISBN 0-8213-6049-3 (v.2: pbk.) 1. Civil war-Economic aspects–Case studies. 2.War–Causes–Case studies.I. Collier, Paul. II. Sambanis, Nicholas, 1967- HB195.U43 2005 330.9–dc22 2005047813 Contents Foreword by Ian Bannon ix Preface by Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis xiii 1 The Collier-Hoeffler Model of Civil War Onset and the Case Study Project Research Design 1 Paul Collier,Anke Hoeffler,and Nicholas Sambanis 2 Civil War and Its Duration in Burundi 35 Floribert Ngaruko and Janvier D. Nkurunziza 3 The Economics of Civil War: The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo 63 Léonce Ndikumana and Kisangani F.Emizet 4 Theory Versus Reality: Civil War Onset and Avoidance in Nigeria Since 1960 89 Annalisa Zinn 5 Sporadic Ethnic Violence:Why Has Kenya Not Experienced a Full-Blown Civil War? 123 Mwangi S. Kimenyi and Njuguna S. Ndung’u 6 The Civil War in Mozambique:The Balance Between Internal and External Influences 157 Jeremy M.Weinstein and Laudemiro Francisco v vi Contents 7 Sudan’s Civil War: Why Has It Prevailed for So Long? 193 Ali Abdel Gadir Ali, Ibrahim A. Elbadawi, and Atta El-Batahani 8 Algeria, 1992–2002: Anatomy of a Civil War. 221 Miriam R. Lowi 9 Senegal and Mali 247 Macartan Humphreys and Habaye ag Mohamed 10 Conclusion: Using Case Studies to Refine and Expand the Theory of Civil War 303 Nicholas Sambanis Contributors 335 Index 339 Figures 2.1 Refugee Numbers (thousands) and the Geography of Conflict (1985–99) 46 3.1 Real GDP per Capita (1996 PPP $) and Value Added by Sector (1995 $) 73 3.2 Risk of War: Prediction from Collier and Hoeffler (2002) 80 6.1 Regional Incidence of Violence Against Civilians 165 6.2 Responsibility for Violence Against Civilians 166 6.3 RENAMO’s Sources of Revenue 172 6.4 Size of RENAMO’s Victim Groups 183 6.5 Geographic Concentration of RENAMO Violence 184 7.1 External Interventions in African Civil Wars by Regional and Global Third Parties 209 7.2 Risk of Civil War 210 7.3 Risk of Prevalence of Civil War in Sudan Relative to Median Country of Sub-Saharan Africa (pw[Sudan] vs. pw[SSA]) 211 Contents vii 9.1 Probabilities of Civil War from the Collier-Hoeffler Model 261 9.2 Factors Contributing to Variation in the Probability of Civil War Outbreak in the Collier-Hoeffler Model 262 9.3 Probabilities of Civil War from the Fearon-Laitin Model 263 9.4 Factors Contributing to Variation in the Probability of Civil War Outbreak in the Fearon-Laitin Model 264 Table s 1.1 Outbreaks of War in the CH Model 4 1.2 Descriptive Statistics: CH Variables 6 1.3 Opportunity Model 10 1.4 Grievance Model 12 1.5 Combined Opportunity and Grievance Model 14 2.1 Key Characteristics of Burundi Civil War 37 2.2 Predicted Probability of Civil War in Burundi (1965–95) 40 2.3 Long-Term View of Ethnic Distribution of Leadership Positions (Percent of Total Posts) 41 2.4 Ethnoregional Background of Burundi Leadership (%) 42 2.5 Economic Underpinnings of Regionalism 43 2.6 Changes in Regional Distribution of Displaced People (Percent of Population) 50 2.7 Economic Indicators During the Period of Conflict 53 A2.1 Inequality Across Provinces 58 A2.2 Phases of Different Episodes of War 58 3.1 Characteristics of DRC’s Wars 64 3.2 GDP Growth,Value Added by Sector, Inflation, and Budget Deficits, 1960–98 74 3.3 Characteristics of Main Rebel Movements Involved in the Anti-Kabila War 78 3.4 Mineral Exports by Rwanda and Uganda, 1994–2000 79 3.5 Means of Variables in the Collier-Hoeffler Model for DRC and Sample 81 viii Contents 4.1 Summary of Violent Conflicts in Nigeria, 1986–99 90 4.2 Reported Antigovernment Violence in the Ijaw Rebellion 110 4.3 Reported Anti-Oil Company Activity in the Ijaw Rebellion 111 5.1 Ethnic Violence in Kenya 128 5.2 Ethnic Composition and Heterogeneity by District 140 5.3 Alienated Land by District 143 5.4 Land Potential in Kenya 145 5.5 Tribes Perceived to Be in the Opposition 148 5.6 Ethnic Composition in the Rift Valley,1989 (Percent of Total Population) 149 5.7 Estimated Voter Population of Selected Tribes in Clash Areas 150 5.8 Population of the Largest Tribes in Kenya (1989) 151 6.1 Mozambique in the World of Cases— Collier and Hoeffler’s Best Model 160 6.2 Incidents in Border Provinces (Percent of Total) 165 6.3 Growth of Forces (Trained Fighters) 170 6.4 Responsibility for Incidents of Violence, 1976–94 182 7.1 Population of Sudan by Major Ethnic Groups in 1956 206 7.2 Political Regimes in Sudan 1956–2001 208 7.3 Explaining the Prevalence of Civil War in Sudan Relative to Sub-Saharan Africa 212 8.1 Algeria Versus Civil War Group (n = 78) 228 8.2 Algeria Versus No Civil War Group (n = 1,089) 229 8.3 Phases of Violence 239 9.1 Evidence on Economic Grievances Prior to 1982 270 9.2 Evidence on Economic Grievances 1980s and 1990s 271 9.3 Socioeconomic Conditions by Region 273 9.4 Variables and Mechanisms of Civil War in Mali and Senegal 287 Foreword he World Bank’s role in addressing the ravages caused by violent conflict is historical—its first loans were made to support the reconstruction of Western TEuropean countries devastated by the Second World War.Over the following five decades, as most of the world’s conflicts amounted to proxy wars between the superpowers or postcolonial independence struggles, the Bank limited its involve- ment in conflict-affected countries to providing financial capital and rebuilding infra- structure after conflicts had ended. However, in a post-Cold War era marked by an increase in the number and severity of civil conflicts, the Bank found it had to adapt to different and more complex challenges.Two events in the mid-1990s marked a turning point in the Bank’s approach to conflict.The first occurred in 1994, when the Bank was asked to administer the multidonor Holst Fund for the West Bank and Gaza; the second occurred in 1995, when the Bank was asked to take the lead with the European Commission in planning and coordinating international support for postconflict recovery in Bosnia-Herzegovina.The Bosnia-Herzegovina program, in particular, broke the mold and formed the basis for a new postconflict framework that was to become a Bank operational policy within a few years. Realizing that it faced a far more difficult postconflict environment and growing expectations on the part of the international community,in 1997 the Bank created a small locus of expertise in postconflict reconstruction, the Post-Conflict Unit, and defined the parameters for Bank engagement in countries affected by conflict,firmly focused on the Bank’s reconstruction role after the conflict ended.To complement this expertise,in August 1997 the Bank created the Post-Conflict Fund,a grant facil- ity to support countries in transition from conflict to sustainable development and encourage innovation and external partnerships in dealing with conflict-affected countries.