CHAPTER VII1 ALTHOUGH the Confusion of the Landing In

Home , 4th Brigade (Australia)

CHAPTER VII1 THE LANDING AT GABA TEPE ALTHOUGHthe confusion of the landing in extremely difficult ccuntry, and the bitter nature of the fighting caused much difficulty in the collecting of wounded, yet, mainly through the fine courage and endurance of the bearers, the clearance to the beach was rapid. The concentration of all casualties at the Cove caused congestion which led to the cessation of attempts at classification and to casualties being sent off to the transports earlier than had been intended. In the Battle or' Krithia, the congestion and delay in the clearance of the wounded on shore were, through no fault of the small medical detachment sent with the 2nd Australian Brigade, greater than at Anzac. * * * At 4.30 a.m. on April 25th, in the critical hour between moonset and daylight, the 3rd Brigade effected a landing, captured the- " First;' ridge, and chased the 3rdThe BrigadeLm&g- enemy in1and.l During the long approach in darkness the tows had converged, so that on the beach battalions became mixed up. Of more serious im- portance was a deflection of a mile to the north caused by the tide. These mishaps, the peculiar intricacy of the terrain, and the im- perfection of the maps, combined to confuse the advance and dislocate the tactical scheme.

I The landing was at first opposed by only a single company.

131 132 THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN [25th Apr., 1915

Most serious was the failure to capture Gaba Tepe, from which the beach was observed and shelled. The consequence would have been disastrous but €or the existence of a small indentation in the coastline some 800 yards in length with shingly beach twenty yards wide at high water. This small bay, which has gained a place in history as “ Anzac Cove,” was protected in front by the sheer First ridge, “ Plugge’s Plateau,” and at each end by the terminal spurs of that ridge, which on the left formed the headland of Ari Burnu. This Cove became at once “ the Beach ” -the point from which diverged the fighting units and to which automatically converged the wounded. Here under shrapnel-fire the remainder of the force landed. The casualties in the boats and on the Beach were moderate. It was chiefly the endeavour to reach the objective of the covering force (the “Third” ridge): and the homeric struggle that followed to hold the “ untenable ” position achieved, that gave Australia “ Anzac Day.” The nature of the terrain was an important factor both in the fighting and in the collecting of wounded. Not only did the topographical accident of the cove determine the course of medical evacuation, but in the march of events, when instead of the success that might well have shortened the war an appalling disaster threatened, it made possible the compromise that spelt “ Anzac.” The slope between the Beach and the ridges widens out north of Ari Burnu to half-a-mile or more. On their sea- ward side the hills are for the most part The “Anzac ” area worn by winter storms into cliffs or sheer precipices scored by steep ravines. The crest of the range and its spurs form the watershed for somewhat more ambitious streams, some of which run deviously, between the steep and broken ridges forming the inland limbs, to the sea near “ Hell Spit ” and Gaba Tepe. ’Walking over the heights at Ari6,Burnu four years after the landing, a Turkish staff officer Major Zeki Bey, said it would have been alnipd impossible to have reached thise obiectives even in an operation of peace time Australiari Oficiul History, 6’01 I, p. 603.

25th Apr, 19151 THE LANDING AT GABA TEPE 133

Save for some open patches, highly dangerous to cross under fire, the country was everywhere thickly scrubbed with arbutus, dwarf holly-oak, and pine, from three to twelve feet high. Observation was possible only from the crests, and. except along occasional goat-tracks, passage had to be forced. The fighting was chiefly on the ridges. The valleys became the natural highways between the Beach and the fighting front. The beds of the streams, thickly beset with brush, were in parts the only possible thoroughfare. The rush of the covering force took it as far as the “Second” ridge and along the central spur3 up to the first peak (“ Baby 700 ”) , which commanded the whole position. Here resistance hardened : shallow rifle-pits were dug, forming an irregular defensive line. Scattered parties fought their way toward, and at parts some reached, their final objectives, losing heavily. Landing between 5 and 7 a.m., the 2nd Brigade was diverted to fill the gap on the right caused by the deflection of the tows.4 The Sth, 6th, and 7th The main force lands Battalions moved up from the rendezvous in “Shrapnel Gully”5 to the open “400 (feet) Plateau.” Here each company, as it topped the crest, was met by fire from the reinforced enemy, and became involved in the fierce struggle that during the day drew almost half the Australian force to this front. Between 8 and 9 a.m., the 8th Battalion dug in on “Bolton’s Ridge” (the continuation of the 400 Plateau) to form a right defensive flank. The Ist, znd, and 3rd Battalions of the 1st Australian Brigade, together with the Auckland Battalion, landing between 9 and 12 a.m., were sent at once to parts of the front hardest pressed. The 4th Battalion was held as divisional reserve.

Various elements of which became known as “ Plugge’s Plateau,” “ Razor Edge,’’ “ Russell’s Top,” and “The Nek.” See Sketch at p I34 “‘By 7.ao a.m. nearly 8,000 troops had been put ashore.” (Report by Rear. Admiral Thursby.) 3 The most considerable stream ”-though it was usual11 dry-within the area of operations entered the sea just south of the cove. It was known at first a; “ the long gully,” its lower end being called, from the first day, “ Shrapnel Gully. 134 THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN [25th Apr., 1915

The 4th Australian Brigade (corps reserve) and the remainder of the New Zealand Brigade arrived late at the roadstead; disembarkation of the latter began about 4 p.m., but was considerably delayed. The battalions were thrown into the struggle at the apex of the Second ridge-Baby 700 and “ Russell’s Top.” The 4th Brigade disembarked during the night and the next day. - The course of the fighting must be sum- marised briefly. The troops forming the right defensive flank on Bolton’s Ridge remained stationary throughout the day. Along The couFBe the northern cf end of the the plateau (‘I John- battle ston’s Tolly ”) and on “ MacLaur;n’s .WOO YDS Hill ” a defensive line had also been formed by the covering Smmh @r/@sO force, whose command- The San’ Bair range and its southcrn ing officer, Colonel spurs. Sinclair-MacLagan, had decided at an early hour that the “ Third ” ridge could not be gained. Between these two forces, about the 400 Plateau and its spurs, there was left till late in the day a gap, through which battalion after battalion passed and spread out in futile advances, broken up and decimated on the open plateau. A scattered advance-line was, however, formed along the forward edge of the plateau, on which some of the parties on “ Pine Ridge ” retired. This held on till evening, scourged with shrapnel from the heights and Gaba Tepe, and with rifle arid machine-gun fire from the ridges beyond. After dark, it fell back, by orders, on the main line in rear. Along the upper end of the long gully and on the slopes of Russell’s Top, The Nek, and Baby 700 the 25th Apr., 19151 THE LANDING AT GABA TEPE 135 fighting consisted of desperate efforts to hold the positions r in the day. On the on ‘( Walker’s Ridge,” the country occupied in the first rush had to be abandoned, and thereafter, except for three detached posts 4- along the shore, 1Valker’s Ridge formed the flank. On Baby 700, about 4 F.IIl., the Turkish counter-off ensive, begun about IO a.m, finally thrust back the line. Darkness found the force, with Baby 700 lost, precariously holding the crest of the Second ridge, 0 loa0 zm 3Wyem the situation being so critical that re-embarkation (which was Contours 50 metres. actually proposed) was not Positions temporarily attained on Afiril 25 shown thus carried out chiefly because of __..__. Posjtjons occupied the impossibility of attempting during night of Abril 25 it. 11-11. The regimental medical officers and their establishments landed with their battalions. Hardly any opportunity had been presented in the transports for Landing of regtl. medical consultation between field ambulance and detachments regimental medical officers, and the latter had little knowledge of the medical arrangements in general. In the covering brigade, medical officers, besides their eight stretchers, took only (( medical companions,” surgical haversack, and waterbottle from the official equipment. All, however, loaded their bearers with miscellaneous equipment and stores. In some units of the 2nd and 1st Brigades medical panniers were taken. The plans made by regimental medical officers for working their bearers had diverged along two lines. In view of the likelihood of considerable dispersal, the majority had arranged for the bearers to follow the companies, but retained with themselves their 136 THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN [zsth Apr., 1915 orderly corporal and “ A.A.M.C. attached ” : some (on the other hand) held it more important to keep control of their bearers and work them from the “aid-post.” Events in most cases settled the question in favour of dispersal. Almost all bearers of the 3rd Brigade on landing became scattered with the companies over the front, and lost touch with medical officers, who, waiting behind to attend wounded men on and near the Beach, also lost touch with battalions. Moving up in the direction of the fighting, and meeting streams of wounded, the medical officers collected some bearers and established aid-posts, some more and some less R.A.P’s advantageously placed at the head of the gullies, close behind the gradually forming battle-front. The battalions of the 2nd Brigade landed in better order, but here also most of the bearers followed the companies, and medical officers made the same mistake of losing touch. Only the R.M.O. of the 8th Battalion, which dug in as a complete unit on Bolton’s Ridge, was able to clear his own unit systematically. The R.M.O., 6th Battalion, followed the scattered parties of his unit across the 400 Plateau, but, finding himself unable to be of use, also got back to a position behind the defensive line. The medical officers of the 1st Brigade were able to keep their bearers together and to select suitable spots for aid-posts: those of the 1st and 3rd Battalions in the long gully became important medical positions. By noon all regimental medical officers had established themselves. As day advanced, walking wounded were directed to the Beach ; serious cases in large numbers, brought in by regimental bearers or helped by the less severely wounded: were held in aid-posts, awaiting clearance by the ambulance bearers. The bearer divisions7 landed with their respective brigades. No medical equipment was taken except surgical haversacks and waterbottles. The instruc- The field tions of the A.D.M.S., to clear “their ambulance bearers own brigades,’’ had left wide scope for initiative. ‘Strict orders had been issued by General Birdwood against the doing of this by unwounded men, and for the most part these were obeyed ‘Each of three officers and a7 squads of four, taking 36 stretchers. 25thApr., 19151 THE LANDING AT GABA TEPE 137

The 3rd Field Ambulance participated in the unique thrill of the approach in the dark, landing with the covering force north of Ari Burnu, and losing in the operation three killed and fourteen wounded. At daylight, after attending wounded on the Beach, officers and men made their way under fire over the open, to reach “dead ground” behind positions captured. Here two ‘‘ collecting posts ” were established, one on the extreme left, another in a position somewhat nearer the cove, approved by the A.D.M.S. Working with the regimental bearers, they collected wounded from the units holding the left flank and from the heights above it. About noon the post on the extreme left became untenable owing to the retirement of the troops, which, however, was delayed until by a hurried effort the wounded had been removed. The situation was saved by using abandoned boats, which were manned by tearers, many wounded being thus taken to transports, and others picked up by the navy. The remainder in the meantime were carried along the Beach round Ari Burnu to the cove. The flank was left; a headquarters was formed in a hollow in the hill above the cove, where the 1st and 2nd Field Ambulances were already established, and a fresh start was made. The bearers of the 2nd Field Ambulance, landing about 6.30 ani. north of Ari Burnu, assembled at the cove, whence, with no very definite plan of action, squads set out under the bearer captains up the long gully. The 1st Field Ambulance landed at the cove at 9.30 a.m. They found “ streams of wounded arriving, mostly walkers,” and some of the men were accordingly detailed by Colonel Howse to assist on the Beach. All three units concentrated their efforts chiefly on the long gully (afterwards known as Shrapnel and Monash Valleys) and its branches. Sections became broken up, and throughout the day ambulance bearers-like those of the battalions-worked to a great extent “ on their own.” The A.D.M.S., 1st Australian Division, landed with divisional headquarters at 7.30 a ni.B Wounded C.C.S. established were already accumulating on the Beach, and on Beach their disposal became an urgent matter. In

8The A.D.M.S., N.Z. & A. Division, landed at IO a.m. and established himself at fhe north end of the Beach. 138 THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN [25th Apr., 1915

the absence of corps or army representatives it was to Colonel Howse that fell the duty of establishing the casualty clearing station-now representing both field hospital and evacuating centre-and of arranging for the care of the wounded, serious cases and slight, until cleared from the Beach. To this task he devoted his utmost energy. The extent of his responsibility had not been defined; the Beach was a weak link in the chain. At the southern end of the cove he selected on the Beach an area twenty-one feet square, which was partly protected by “ MacLagan’s Ridge.” At 10.30 a.m. the Casualty Clearing Station” landed, and by noon was hard at work attending wounded. The A.D.M.S., N.Z. CP. A. Division, established a dressing station at the northern end of the Beach. During the forenoon (contrary to instructions, but, as at Helles, inevitably) men who had been wounded in the boats and on the beaches got away, some 300-400, mostly “ walkers,” being sent off or taken from various parts of the Beach in returning boats. From ahout noon of April 25th the work of the inedical service at Anzac was dominated by the fact that the failure of the force to achieve its object Collection of wounded involved some retirement. In the half or three-quarters of a mile between the precarious security of the defensive line along the Second ridge and the farthest points reached lay an area over which the hattle flowed and ebbed-a scene of desperate fighting by detached parties, who were ultimately forced to retire before dusk in face of the Turkish counter-attack At nightfall the enemy closely encompassed the force. It was chiefly in the ravines and scrub of the ridges close in front of the defensive line and during the latter part of the day that casualties occurred, and they were widely scattered. The stretcher-bearers could not reach them all. The lightly wounded for the most part made their own way in, as did also some whose wounds were serious: others were helped by comrades when withdrawing. The great majority were got in. but many were left. When night fell, some hundred or more wounded men lay in No-Man’s Land. where

0 Four officers and 5’) other ranks, equipment including zoo stretchers. 25thApr., 19151 THE LANDING AT GABA TEPE 139

they had fallen or were sheltering under cover awaiting help that could not reach them. Some were got in afterwards. The four prisoners who were taken by the Turks in this battle did not include any of the men who were lying out wounded. Systematic clearance was possible only behind the gradually defining defensive line. Here ambulance bearers worked out routes to the Beach. No advanced dressing stations were formed, and no attempt was made to concentrate wounded, except to the Clearing Station. For the most part bearer officers and N.C.O's and their squads, spreading over the area, searched the valleys and hillsides or responded to the call of " stretcher-bearers "-honourably encroaching on the dangerous domain of the regimental bearers in the fighting front, which, indeed, became common ground. It was not, however, till late in the day-in some instances not till the next-that touch was established with the regimental medical officers. As a consequence regimental bearers, during the forenoon to sane extent, and in the afternoon generally, carried back all the way to the Beach, thus being diverted from their legitimate task of rendering first-aid and removing wounded from the battle-zone to safety behind the firing line. As day wore on the situation cleared somewhat. Mesageslo from regimental medical officers arrived at the clearing station. Collecting became more systematic, but a great cause of confusion still lay in the fact that the place- names of Anzac were yet to be born. The vague map-references sometimes given in messages were almost useless. While the course of the fighting determined zones of collecting and evacuating, the topographical features divided the fighting front roughly into three sectors, with special routes radiating naturally from the cove, to which all roads soon led. The left flank was marked off by the central spur Natural running from Ari Burnu to Baby 700. From divisions- 4.30 p m. medical arrangements for this flank Left flank. ___-___- fell to the N.L. & A. Division. I* Information received through the official channels of communication (D.H.Q., brigades, and battalions) regarding accumulations of wounded was (as always) belated. 140 THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN [rgth Apr., 1915

A central sector included the watershed and head of the Centre long valley, the left branch of which (known later as “ Monash Valley ”) lay directly beneath Baby 700. Through- /- I out its length this branch &’ was open to direct rifle and machine-gun fire In-” from the slopes of “ Battleship Hill.” On the crest of its pre- cipitous right bank, which rose 100 feet or more above the bed Medical organisation, northcrn half of Anzac, and was Over- April 25-26. Numerals rrprrsent fhe corre- looked and com- sponding battalion aid-posts. manded from front, left, and rear, rifle-pits were dug during the 25th and held thereafter at great cost and by desperate fighting. These were in the positions which later, as “ Pope’s Hill,” “ Courtney’s,” “ Quinn’s,” and “ Steele’s ” Posts, held the gateway to the heart of Anzac. Here and on the hillsides of the range it was difficult during daylight even to com- municate with the firing line. It was impossible in most parts to bring up stretchers or to carry back; the only way of leaving the line was to run, crawl, roll, or be dragged to the edge of the slope and thence slide down the cliffs. Down the right branch of the gully (“ Bridges’ Road ”) passed the wounded brought from the southern end of MacLaurin’s Hill and Johnston’s Jolly or were lowered precariously down the steep cliffs of the “ Razorback.” Monash Valley and Bridges’ Road met at a point some three-quarters of a mile from the top of the former, the main valley (Shrapnel Gully) passing thence for about half-a-mile to the sea. The carry was exhausting in the extreme. Though systematic relays were not organised, medical positions were 25th-26th Apr., 19151 THE LANDING AT GABA TEPE 141

soon established in two echelons : (a) forward collecting-posts near the head of the valley, whence the squads carried through to the Beach ; (b) detachments at halting-places half-way down the valley where water was stored, hot bovril and tea made, and food prepared.ll In the early hours of the 26th the 4th Brigade took over the top of Monash Valley, and its regimental medical officers worked from one aid-post in the only safe spot, which, situated beneath Pope’s Hill, became an important medical position. Their squads carried through to the Beach--“ a fearful carry.” On the right, south-west of Johnston’s Jolly, six medical oficers established themselves behind the crest of the 400 Right flank Plateau in the short gullies--“ White’s,” ’’ Clarke,” (( Victoria ”--down which passed, in large numbers, the wounded from the plateau and its spurs. The line on Bolton’s Ridge acted as a preventive against clearance in front of it, and not a few wounded, who had made their way back to shelter between the spurs of the 400 Plateau, or lay out in the scrub and remained there during the day, were missed in the re- treat at dusk. The conditions at night precluded hfrdical organisatro~i. sorttlwrn systematic search. half of .-Inzac. April 25-26. It is opportune here to appreciate ” the clearance of the battlefield at the Anzac landing. Speaking broadly, it may be said that lack of system was offset by the 25- clearance short distance advanced and the fine physical emhed condition and spirit of the bearers. The 25th was, indeed, the stretcher-bearers’ day. At bottom, nothing was of real service to the severely wounded -~ ~~~ ______~-~ - %‘The R.M.O.. 3rd Battalion. early established liaisou with the 1st Fiel? Ambulance and worked with an effective system of reliefs. - 142 THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN [25th Apr., 1915

man but the courage, enterprise, and endurance of those whose duty it was to find him and to carry him to safety. Their worst, and a very serious, handicap was the shortage of stretchers. Quite early in the day (for reasons that will be seen later) the clearing station ceased to replace those taken over with casualties from the bearer squads. Improvised stretchers " proved torture for the patient and diflicult work for the bearers, some of whom discarded makeshift stretchers, preferring to carry on their backs." Perhaps the saving in army transport by reliance on improvisation in the medical service may conduce to victory, but the price must be paid by the wounded. Some shortage of dressings occurred, but was only local, replenishment from the clearing station never failing. News of the course of the fighting received at headquarters during the forenoon made it clear that the expected On Beach- success might not be achieved. The consequence A.D.M.S., 1st Australian Division, was thus Of to faced with the certainty that, unless special advance steps were taken, there would be a serious accumulation of wounded on the Beach, which was only partly protected and already becoming congested with the requirements in men, animals, munitions, and stores for a life and death struggle involving 20,000 troops. The Beach could be kept clear of wounded either by retaining then1 inland or by their rapid removal. For the former alterna- tive (though it was part of the general scheme of the D.M.S, M.E.F.) no arrangement was made at Anzac. Apart from the clearing station, there was no provision for any form of field hospital till the full tent divisions should land, and the placing of the clearing station on the necessarily crowded Beach to serve evacuation rendered it in a great measure unsuitable for the retention of cases, slight or serious, as a divisional collecting station. Owing to the course of events the tent divisions were not landed.12

~~ ~ "In the situation as it developed at Anzac the selection of lightly wounded and their concentration. a5 a temporary measure, at soma point on shore would have been a perplexing task and was held by the A.D.M.S 1st Australian Division, and the 0 C. of the Clekng Station (Lieut.-Col W. W. Ziblin) to be impracticable. The fact, however. that such selection was not made entailed the evaciiation of many slight cases, and was a material factor in crowding the Beach 25th Apr., 19151 THE LANDING AT GABA TEPE 143

For removal of seriously wounded the medical tow, not available till the 1st Division was landed, was of very limited capacity, and for the lightly wounded woundedEvacuation to Of the normal means of transportation, boats ships begun “ returning empty,” would, if the arrange- nients were adhered to. be barred “till the fighting troops have been landed.” In view, however, of the circumstances which might arise, Colonel Howse decided to concentrate his efforts on ensuring the embarkation of every wounded man as quickly as possible. From an early hour, therefore, acting as his own medical embarkation officer, lie urged on the naval beachmaster that the scope of clearance should be extended, and about noon, after all available troops had landed, obtained permission for clearance “ from any part of the Beach ’-which, however, by force of circumstance had already been begun. Though between I p.m. and 4.30 p m. no more infantry transports arrived 3t the anchorage and no troops disembarked, the landing of stores and munitions went on, under heavy shrapnel, with furious energy. Men and animals all passed along the narrow strip of beach in front of the clearing station, where, by 2 o’clock, some 500 wounded lay. At 3 p.m. a special pier was completed, which took craft of from four to five feet in draft and was available for wounded. With the assistance of bearer squads the clearing station had at first been able easily to cope with the situation; records were kept, cases classified, hot drinks given, and some urgent surgery attempted. Improvised splints were replaced from the “ field fracture box.” Stretcher shortage was the chief

During the afternoon wounded arrived rapidly, and the proportion of stretcher cases (“ liers ”) increased. From the clearing station they spread over the Beach, and by 5 p.ni the full consequence of the failure to advance had become manifest. Little evacuation of serious cases had been possible during the afternoon, partly because of the danger from shramel to the wounded. but chieflv because the medical tow

Is The zoo stretchers that were landed were soon used up. Those which were passed on with cases to the boats were not returned or replaced. 144 THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN [a5th Apr., 1915 was wholly insufficient for the numbers presenting. Through proper recognition of the military needs, little use had so far been made of boats “ returning empty.” It must be borne in mind (to quote the naval beachmaster) that it was hoped that sufficient ground would have been gained at the outset to place the field hospital in some convenient sheltered nullah away from the turmoil and confusion on the Beach. and it was not expected that large numbers of wounded would have to be re-embarked on the first day. About 5.30 p.m. returning tows were made available, and evacuation from the clearing station seriously began.l‘ The 5.30 p.m. chief difficulty now lay in transportation to “Returning the pier, a task for which clearing station Empties ” personnel were supplemented by military made available “ fatigues.” On the pier the wounded were taken over by the naval beach party. Between 5.30 and 8 p.m. 600 cases were cleared from the station. Evacuation was similarly taking place from the New Zealand dressing station. At dusk (sunset being then at 6.48) shelling ceased.

Classification of wounded into Ii light ” and serious ” cases by the affixing of the official white and red “tabs,” the theoretical basis of the scheme of evacuation, was by this time quite impossible, as was the making of nominal rolls. Ambulance, regimental, and artillery medical officers assisted, but “ it was like trying to classify a crowded hall with others pouring in.” For a time the needs were met, but, as night but to wore on, removal from the Beach fell the situation seriously behind the incoming streams. About 9 p.m. (to quote again the naval beachmaster) I became thoroughly alarmed at the state of affairs. The Beach at this time was a never-to-be-forgotten sight ; the number of wounded lying about practically stopped all work on the Beach. It was decided th3t at all costs effort must be made to relieve the congestion, and orders were given that all tows, after emptying their contents, would transfer wounded to the ships.” “The naval ayct of this evacuation is seen in the report of the landing by the rear-admiral: Through the number of these (woiinded am the Beach) the process of disembarbng troops and embarking the wounded had to go on side by side.” The queslion whether this re-embarkation interfered in any material degree with the disembarkation of the N.Z. B A. Division-whose troops, both .on general military principles and in view of the particular situation at the time, should have been rushed Nith the utmost vigour and speed into the swaying battle- is without doubt a very serious one, since the retention of Baby 700 and the 3rd Ridge might have resulted in much more than thr mere winning of this hattle -The disembarkation of the N.Z. and 4th Australian Brigades was not effected with tkr celerity that the urgent need in the late afternoon demanded. It is possible that the general use of “returning empties,” permitted after 5 p.m., may zsth-26th Apr., 19151 THE LANDING AT GABA TEPE 145

Clearance from the pier was carried out at high pressure till about 10.30 or II p.m. It then ceased, under the shadow of an appalling menace: for from 9 o’clock Clearance the question of immediate embarkation of all during the night troops on account of the military situation had been under consideration by the commanders. Wounded accumulated on the Beach to such an extent that “it was with difficulty that in the darkness one could pick one’s way between the stretchers covering the whole width of the Beach, at one time for 100 yards or SO.” About midnight, it having been decided by Sir Ian Hamilton that the Anzac Corps must “ hold on and dig in ”--Admiral Thursby, indeed, had stated that to re-embark that night was impossible-the evacuation of wounded was resumed. It had been intended-though the task would have been a terrible one-to get all wounded away if possible, and the lifeboats of several transports were specially sent to the Beach. In the meantime the crisis had stimulated initiative, and a solution of the problem of the stretcher cases was found in the use of lighters. Horse barges had been used to some estent since the afternoon. “About II p.m.,” it is recorded by the naval Senior Medical Officer (S.M.O.), a party of 80 was set to work, and with great effort were able to refloat a large lighter containing kerosene tins of water, which had taken ground early in the day, and with two others left derelict beside the pontoon we were able to ship about 150 stretcher cases besides a large number of walking wounded. These were got away soon after midnight. The New Zealand and Australian Division had at first sent wounded for embarkation to the Australian Casualty Clearing Station. When the hold-up occurred, four “ horse-boats ” were procured by the officer in charge of the New Zealand beach station, and 120 cases were got away at I a.m. The fatigue parties worked far into the night, embarking wounded in barges and boats and transferring them to the transports. By 3 a.m. the Beach was clear. Over 1,700 had been evacuated, and, of the last 500 of these, more than half were stretcher cases. in some degree have influenced the situation in this respect. There is no evidence, however. that instructions were given for the urgent disembarkatlon of these troops. The impressing of all tows for the purpose of the wounded took place at 9 p.m., when the urgency bad passed and the positions had been lust. 146 THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN [qth-30th Apr., 1915

Dawn of the 26th found the force clinging to the edge of the cliffs and heads of the ravines and precariously holding April 26-28th an area of some 500 acres almost everywhere overlooked by the enemy. But it had dug in and was in touch with supplies. As a base of operations the Beach had proved tenable and, with lines of communication intact, everything was possible. But the issue was still uncertain, and the fighting of the 26th and 27th was a bitter struggle for existence. These days saw little respite for the stretcher-bearers.l" The proportion of stretcher cases was large. Regimental officers reassembled their bearers, regained touch with their battalion headquarters, and formed new aid-posts. The trenches, at first mere shallow cuts or isolated rifle-pits, were deepened and connected up. Routes to the Beach improved slowly; the lie of the land became known; and a few names (the first requirement in human co-operation) became current. The greater part of the tent divisions of the 1st Aus- tralian Division, and all their transport, remained in the ships, as did the senior surgeon of the 1st Australian Casualty Clearing Station and its equipment. But on the night of April 27th the bearers of the 4th Field Ambulance landed and took over the evacuation of Monash Valley- " badly wanted," as were also their thirty-six stretchers. By April 28th the tactical situation was such as to make possible the reorganisation of the force. The area held was Reorganisation roughly one and a half miles in length; its greatest depth 1.000 yards. The front was now divided into sectors, the N.Z. & A. Division takinp over

Passed through Books. Evacuated 1grj. Irrepularl\ or 1st A.C.C.S. N.Z.F. Arnb, I R.N.D.F. Amb. Unrecorded Aoril as .. I 800

Total .. I 2.756 28th Apr.-2nd May, 19151 THE LANDING AT GABA TEPE 147 the left as far as Courtney’s Post, the 1st Australian Division the right. Field ambulances were made responsible for clearing definite sectors (not corresponding to the brigade fronts), and their headquarters were removed to the lower slopes of ‘( M’Cay’s Hill.” Here two tent sub-divisions of the 3rd and some details of the 2nd Field Ambulances, by dint of their own importunity, managed to Some tent divisions 1-d rejoin their units, dug in, and began to hold a few cases. Most of the troops were by this time utterly exhausted; many had fought without rest for three days. On the 28th and 29th four battalions of the Royal Naval Division, with their medical establishments, took over part of the line in Monash Valley. Brigades were relieved in turn, the battalions reorganised, and given definite fronts. A roll-call on April 30th revealed losses of 1,385 in the 1st Brigade, 1,681 in the znd, and 1,865 in the 3rd.17 The landing safely accomplished, the worst difficulties of the Beach were automatically resolved. Small craft for evacuation were more plentiful ; casualties arrived systematically. The work was still very heavy, and on the 28th the clearing station was relieved for a few days by the tent divisions (landed complete) of the Royal Naval and the 4th Field Ambulances. The New Zealand. Field Ambulance cleared its own R.N. and brigade through a dressing station at the 4th Field mulances north end of the cove. The staff now available on shore for evacuation was more than adequate. The shortage of stretchers was gradually overcome by the navy and the engineers: in addition to those improvised, there were provided regulation naval stretchers “made of canvas and cane, which are strapped round the body like a straitjacket. In one of these the case could be lowered down the gullies, and they were greatly valued by the bearers.”18 The force being now entrenched, attempts were made tn improve its chance of holding the position against the Action inevitable counter-attack. To meet the of ~ay2nd growing menace to Monash Valley, now

These figures however include some 3-400 who later reloaned their units At Helles, excluding French troops. the total casualties were 4,320. Sce olso p 172. In From the diary of an N.C.O. 148 THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN [znd-4th hlay, 1915

held by small garrisons in the various “posts,” and to capture Baby /”oo, a formidable night attack was planned for May end, to be undertaken by the 4th Australian Brigade, the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, and two battalions oi the Royal Naval Division. Medical arrangements were in the hands of the A.D.M.S., N.Z. 8- A. Division. No relay system had been arranged, hut co-operation I~etween regitnental and ambulance bearers was more effective. Evacuation was based on the aid-post beneath Pope’s Hill. The operation was among the most disastrous ever undertaken by Australian troops, for about 1,000 casualties were stistained and nothing won. Through an underestimation by the General Staff of the time required for the approach march of the New Zealanders, the Australian batglions had to launch their attack before the New Zealanders arrived. The clearance oi the first Australian wounded down the narrow valley congested the approach and still further delayed the New Zealanders. In the later stages of the action the wounded were got in with the utmost difficulty, “ tnen with broken legs had to hop in b selves.” Regimental bearers sustained heavy casualties. Evacuation was not completed until twenty-f our hours. To improve the tactical situation of the Beach, a belated attempt to Gaba Tepe was made 011 Action of May 4th- bfay 4th with a Gaba Tepe I20 Illell and fOUr OffiCets mainly of the 11th Battalion, the R.M.O., 11th B being in charge of medical ments. X surprise attack at dawn was attempted from destroyers and along the Beach, but, after a landing had been made, the position was found to be imPregnak unless by an Acfion of May 4th at Gaba Tepo. 4thdth May, 19151 THE LANDING AT GABA TEPE 149 assault in much greater force. Withdrawal in daylight was carried out with moderate loss. The R.M.O. with hia bearers formed under the low cliff an aid-post which gave temporary shelter, and the conduct of the medical personnel received commendation. The adventure itself is of considerable interest in that the collecting of wounded was permitted by the enemy. “The Turks did not fire a shot at the wounded men or those assisting them; the more lightly wounded limped down after the stretcher cases. IVhen they had been towed out the enemy’s fire broke out again.” The end of the first week in May found the Mediterranean Espeditionary Force landed and estahlished at two places ; hut the confident. if somewhat vague, KrithiaMay anticipation that, the task of landing once accomplished, a rapid advance across the Peninsula would follow was very far from being realised. Neither at Anzac nor at Helles had the invaders done more than gain a foothold on the beaches and advance less than a rifle shot inland. At Anzac the failure to regain Baby 700 and to capture Gaba Tepe left the tactical situation highly unsatisfactory, not to say precarious. At the toe of the Peninsula, where landings by the 29th Division on five beaches in the neighbourhood of Cape Helles had been accomplished under circumstances no less dramatic and exceptional, and by fighting not less intense, than at Anzac, the objective laid down by the general staff-namely, the heights of Achi Baba and Kilid Bahr Plateau-had proved as unattainable as that attempted by the northern force. Ten days of incessant fighting in conjunction with the Royal Naval and (after April 27th) the French divisions, which cost in casualties twenty- five per cent of the southern force, with an exceptional proportion of officers, resulted in no more than the capture of the toe of the Peninsula. The line held between “ Ravine Spur ” and Kereves Dere contained an area some 6,500 yards in depth from Cape Helles and 5.000 yards in width, every part being under shell-fire, and most under rifle-fire, from higher ground, as well as under shell-fire from the Asiatic shore. The effective strength of the defenders was increasing, that of the attackers diminishing through absence 150 THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN [sthdth May, 1915

of reserves.1e In addition to making frequent counter-attacks -the failure of which again demonstrated the commanding advantage of defence over attack in the absence of over- powering artillery-fire-the Turks were rapidly entrenching, but it was correctly believed by the general staff that the way to Achi Baba was not closed by organised defences. To avoid the threatened stalemate of trench-warfare- a result which would in the circumstances be only less disastrous than a failure to land-a supreme effort was planned by General Hamilton, to take the form of an advance from Helles. The 42nd Division, garrisoning Egypt, and the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade from the Suez Canal Defences, were to have reinforced the expedition, but only the 125th (Lancashire) Brigade and the Indians were immediately available. These were absorbed into the sadly depleted 29th Division. The New Zealand and 2nd Australian Brigades were brought from Anzac to Helles Two Anzac and associated with the composite naval

brigade as a “ composite division ”- nominally administered by the Headquarters of the Royal Naval Division. For command and administration this improvised formation came under the G.O.C., 29th Division (Major-General A. Hunter-Weston), whose A.D hl.S., though not made a “ Deputy-Director,” exercised a general control of the whole of the medical arrangements at Helles, including evacuation from the beach, which was now being organised as an advanced base. The two Anzac brigades were accompanied only by the bearer divisions of their corresponding field ambulances. Most of the tent division personnel and The medical detachment equipment of the Australian units, and the transport of both, were scattered over the Egeaii in the “ Temporary Hospital Ships.” The Royal Naval Division ambulance was without vehicles, but was otherwise complete. The strength of the Australian medical detachment was three officers and ninety-two other ranks ; the equipment taken was “only what we could carry- ”The British first reinforcements of io per cent d~dnot, as normally, accompany the force, but remained in England. 5th-8th May, 19151 THE LANDING AT GABA TEPE 151

stretchers, medical companion, surgical haversack and waterbottles, and our personal equipment.’’ The four regimental officers had the same equipment. Casualties among the regimental bearers had been made good from reinforcements. The Anzac brigades arrived at Helles on the 6th, and bivouacked in the vicinity of “V” Beach. They found themselves in open meadowland and patches of cultivation sloping gradually upwards towards Krithia village and Achi Baba-a sharp contrast to the ravines, cliffs, and scrub of Anzac. The area was traversed by three creeks or nullahs, whose channels, as at Anzac, afforded approach to the front line. Apart from the nature of the terrain, the medical situation at Helles at this timeZodiffered from that at Anzac chiefly in the greater distance of the main evacuating Medical centre-the casualty clearing station near situation “W” Beach-from the front line. This at Helles necessitated a long and difficult hand- carry, sometimes for a distance of three miles, for the most part possible only at night. Three horsed anihulance- waggons had been landed on the 28th, but by order of the G.0.C , 29th Division, their use was confined to evacuation from the casualty clearing station to the beach. Three advanced dressing stations were worked in reliefs by tent subdivisions of the three British field ambulances (87th, 88th, and 8gth), whose bearers “cleared” the wounded from the regimental aid-posts (“ R.A.P’s ”) and, assisted by returning empty supply-carts, back to the casualty clearing station, near which the resting tent sub-divisions were camped (“ unopened ”).21 The casualty clearing station was now working, under the Red Cross flag, in eight marquee tents, and was cleared by ambulance waggons to “ W ” Beach, 400 yards distant. Its function, as at Anzac, was almost purely that of clearance, little treatment being possible beyond first- aid. No cases were held on the Peninsula. ‘OMedical experiences at Helles were even more vaned and considerably more difficult and dancerom than at Anzac The landings were at five hcaches, in daylight. at “ Y ” “ X ” and “ S ” Beaches conditions permitted the establishment on shore of tent’suh-d:visions and the rctention for a time of the lightly wounded At the terrible “V ” and ‘I W” landings the troops could on the first day do no more than gain a precarious foothold on the beach. The wounded were cleared when and as they could be got off Manv of the features described at Anzac. C.K. the use of returning tows and the shortage of stretchers, were reproduced in exaggerated form. The medical casualties were heavier. ”That is, had not begun to function as field hospitals. I57 THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN [Sth-gth May, 1915

No steps had been taken by the D.M.S., M.E.F., to co-ordinate the medical arrangements made by the Anzac Corps, as regards the nature of the detachment sent, with those made by the A.D.M.S., 29th Division. It was indeed only at 3.30 pm. on the 5th that he was informed of the action to begin on the 6th. The lack of transport and field hospital personnel and equipment with the Anzac brigades “gave rise,” as the A.D.M.S., 29th Division, records in his diary, “ to enormous difficulties ” during the operations. The officer in command of the 2nd Australian Field Ambulance detachment, however, received no instructions or orders from .either the “Composite” or the 29th Division. From the British field ambulances he learned the situation of the clearing station and that, in default of returning supply carts, clearance thereto must be by hand-carry. The operations which took place on the 6th, 7th, and 8th gave the 2nd Australian Brigade an opportunity of showing The fighting that the Australian citizen soldier could carry through an advance under fire to the extreme limit of soldierly endurance; and to its medical personnel they provided a task which, though not attended by heavy casualties, was as difficult as any faced by the Australian Army Medical Corps in the campaign. On each day the fighting consisted of frontal advances, made in daylight against an enemy in unlocated positions, and supported by artillery-fire which to a great extent was random and, through shortage of ammunition, inadequate to the point of futility. On the 6th and 7th the Australian brigade was in reserve. The only result of the two days’ fighting was an advance of a few hundred yards here and there; except on the French front the enemy positions were not even located. The casualty roll, particularly in the French division, was heavy. The end of yet a third frontal advance, on the morning of the 8th, in which the New Zealand Brigade took part, losing heavily,z2 found the troops everywhere back in their trenches. =The work of the New Zealand Medical Corps is finely recorded in its medicd history. L.

- I k-

8th May, 19x51 THE LANDING AT GABA TEPE 153

As a desperate eleventh-hour attempt to retrieve the situation, General Hamilton at 4 p.m. gave orders that the whole allied line should fix bayonets and May 8th- move on “ Krithia ” at 5.30 p.m. precisely. 2nd Brigade in final attack The French reached their objective-the “ Brochet Redoubt,” losing heavily. On the greater part of the British line no advance was found possible. The Australian brigade had moved up in the forenoon, and between 3 and 4 o’clock bivouacked some 1,000 yards behind the British front. It had there settled down for the night ; the company cooks were preparing tea ; the ambulance detachment was bivouacked in a slight hollow a quarter of a mile in the rear. But at 4.55 p.m. the brigadier received the order to move on Krithia, along the flat central ridge or plateau between the Krithia Nullah on the left and the open Achi Baba Nullah on the right. Along it ran a white streak, the Krithia road. Partly screened at first by trees, the Australian brigade moved up to the British reserve line, and then-first in sections, but afterwards extending into open order-advanced 500 yards under direct rifle fire, machine-gun and shrapnel fire to the front line trench (known thereafter as the “ Tommies’ Trench ”). Thence in broad daylight the 6th and 7th Battalions, closely followed by the 5th and Sth, in open formation attacked the unseen enemy across the exposed meadow, under fire (says the Australian historian) “ as heavy as any experienced by Australian casualtiemper cent* Of troops in the war.” After going 500 yards the remnants of the brigade, lying on their bellies in the open, scratched themselves into the ground with entrenching tools and fingers, both flanks ‘(in the air.” The affair occupied less than an hour. Over 1,000 casualties-fifty per cent-lay scattered over the whole area of approach and attack, but most thickly near the front. Shortly afterwards, under cover of darkness, the units on each flank moved up into line with scarcely a casualty.2s The scene of the final Australian advance was approxi- mately 6.000 yards (three and a half miles) from the clearing **The 2nd Australian Brigade, which landed on April 25th 3,885 strong, had teceived 732 reinforcements before the Krithia action. It returned to Anzac 1,700 strong, having sustained at Anzac and Helles casualties equivalent to 75 per cent of its original atrength.

II 154 THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN [8th May, 1915 station. On it the Turks concentrated their fire, so that the collecting of wounded was possible only under cover of darkness: “it was unsafe to use a light, and every now and then a storm of machine-gun fire would sweep over the plateau.” Movement was dangerous in daylight over the greater part of the approach area. For Clearing the 1,000 yards behind the front clearance was ~~~d~~~ possible only down the Krithia Nullah. The carry ” Krithia road was swept by machine-gun fire night and day. Regimental medical officers and bearers-who, in the absence of any warning that the brigade would be engaged, had during the day helped in clearing 29th Division casualties -advanced with their battalions. Almost from the outset squads were carrying back wounded to the field ambulance- the first warning to the latter that the brigade was in action. When the advance was over, the regimental medical officers, working in pairs, formed aid-posts in echelon near the nullah. the most forward being some 300 yards from the line. The bivoua ambulance detachment became a “ collecting post,” th ambulance bearers at first working forward. Even in the rear area over which the brigade had advanced the wounded were SO numerous that they at first monopolised the attention of both regimental and ambulance bearers. From the area of attack the lightly wounded made their own way after dark The to the aid-posts or the Tommies’ Trench. regimental bearere But the seriously wounded lay out for long before they were reached. Among them were an exceptional number suffering from abdominal injuries, for in the final advance the troops had waded Map No. 4

8th May, 19151 THE LANDING AT GABA TEPE 155 through a veritable stream of bullets waist-high. As night wore on, clearance by ambulance bearers ceased forward of the collecting post, all being required for the long carry to the beach. Aid-posts became congested, and regimental bearers carried the wounded through to the collecting Post-'' a cruel carry." Towards midnight the brigadier, alarmed at the slow clearance forward, ordered his regimental medical officers to concentrate first on clearing the front area. This was done; casualties were assembled at the regimental aid-posts ; the bearers searched the plateau until it was too light to move about;24 and as day broke the aid-posts were cleared to the ambulance collecting post. Some wounded were not found till the following night: not a few died where they lay, but the great majority were found and brought in. A regimental medical officer records for his bearers " a continuous carrying over rough country with distances up to 3,000 yards, with only two men to a stretcher, for 20 hours." Greatly appreciated help in clearing the right flank was given by bearers of the Royal Naval Division. The field ambulance detachment was faced with difficulties not less severe than those of the regimental establishments. Without tent division personnel or equipment The for a field hospital, two and a half miles collecting pomt from the clearing station, without transport, with little knowledge of the country, and without warning, the detachment was faced with the maximum of casualties regarded by military authorities as possible to a formation in a deliberate advance. As has been already stated, the ambulance bearers at first worked forward of the collecting postZ6 in the area behind the front line. From here, under the direction of two medical officers, they cleared the wounded to the collecting post and also to the regimental aid-posts when these were formed. But as the character of the problem became evident and the little hollow at the collecting post filled up with men, the nature of whose wounds

W Search of the battlefield for wounded under Red Cross flag was not a recognised procedure at the Dardanelles at this time, Yrde volume II. 5 The collecting post was referred to as 'I advanced dressing station" (or "A.D.S."), a term at this time vaguely used in the A.I.F. without reference to the facilities for treatment. Early on the 9th the regimental medical otficers 6th and 7th Battalions moved to a position In Krlthia Nullah a little foruard of *' Tommies' Trench," of the 8th to a position on the right flank. See Sk p 154. 156 THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN [8th-gth May, 1915 made early evacuation a matter of life or death, stretcher cases a4 well as walking wounded began to AmbulanceThe be cleared back to the Beach. The bearer bearers squads made for the nearest road “in the hope that they might strike transport. Some few were lucky, others carried their cases right to the C.C.S. at the Beach-between three and four hours at the shortest for the double journey. Many of the squads went astray in the darkness, as the route was almost unknown.” At the collecting post the medical officers and batmen did what they could for the wounded during the cold wet night, without blankets or other equipment. *’ We were able to give them all something hot during the night, our batmen acting as cooks and dispensers of hot drinks. This was, I am afraid, the only comfort we could give.” When dawn broke, between 200 and 300 serious cases lay about in the hollow, dressings had run out, stretchers were very scanty.2a The officer in command saw that the situation was beyond the scope of his detachment. At 6 a.m. on the 9th he informed the A.D.M.S., Composite Division, of his plight, but that officer could give only cold comfort. Transport was not available--“ they should have brought their own.” The 29th Division bearers had “ been worked to a standstill.” “All my officers and men are absolutely done” (says the officer commanding 87th Field Ambulance in his diary). “ We hare been going night and day for practically the last 15 days under fire with little or no rest.” Ambulance waggons were still held to the Beach, and though a British field ambulance came to the rescue of the collecting post, and the Royal Naval Division bearers had already helped to Help clear the right flank, it was not till the British night of the 9th, and only by tremendous toil. that the post was cleared. During the beareun next day only about thirty men had to be evacuated ; these were cleared by ambulance waggons, which by noon were permitted along the Krithia road within three- quarters of a mile of the post. The advancing of the line had. indeed. considerably eased the medical situation. ’JAs at Anzac on the 25th. and for precisely the same reason, namely, lack of reserves and retention in the “Black Ships,” return or replacement of those stretchers on whlch wounded lay was refused by the casualty clearing station. 9th May, 19151 THE LANDING AT GABA TEPE 157 The trials of the wounded were far from being over when they reached the clearing station. Though its over- worked staff showed every kindness, its resources were quite overtaxed by the unexpected rush of Australian wounded, and the adjacent British tent divisions were opened up by the A.D.M.S., 29th Division, to take the overflow. Owing to the inadequacy of shipboard accommodation, clearance to the roadstead was also seriously held up. At 12.15 p.m. on the 9th the D.M.S., M.E.F., ordered that all lightly wounded should be retained ashore, and, at 7.15 p.m., that all evacuation should cease, cases to be held in field ambulances. “But these,” in the words of the A.D.M.S., 29th Division,

“ were already congested, cases were pouring in, the situation was critical.” Casualties were still sent off. but not a few remained during the night in the small craft, held up between the congested hospitals on shore and the crowded Congention ships in the ioadstead. The movement of at Eellee roadstead these casualties along the lines of communication will be followed later. It was more than five days before the majority of the seriously wounded received effective attention. The death rate was very heavy. For defects in the collecting of the wounded from this gallant but very terrible little “ affair ” the medical service received some criticism. It is obvious, however, that a casualty rate of fifty per cent was, under the circumstances, dealt with by the medical detachment in a manner which calls for commendation rather than censure. Australian medical casualties were few; one officer and one other rank were killed, and one oflicer and five other ranks ~ounded.~’Regimental stretcher-bearers lost more heavily. On the 12th the brigade was relieved, and on the 16th returned to Anzac. Here in the meantime things had Anzac- been quiet. Casualties (sick and wounded) May 612th averqxl only 135 per day, and with these The deaths included, however, a man whom medical science could ill spare. The R.M.O. 5th Battalion, Captain C. C. M. Mathison, a graduate of Melbourne University, whose research work had given promise of an intetnational reputation, was wounded in the head by a rlfle bullet outside his aid-post and died on the 18th. 158 THE GALLIPOLI CAhfPAIGh’ [sth-~gthMay, 1915 the 1st and 3rd Field Ambulances on the right and 4th Australian and Royal Naval on the left easily coped. The garrison (reduced to little over 10,000 rifles) was content to consolidate the position ; the enemy was fully occupied at Helles. Meanwhile the services of maintenance were developed. The engineers made piers and roads and dug wells. The supply service had established dBp8t units 011 the Beach, and, like the medical, telescoped or eliminated its land-transport system, while it endeavoured to adapt its organisation to amphibious conditions. The medical service had settled down, and clearance was becoming systematic. Equipment had been landed; in the absence of No. 4 Advanced DBp6t (detained in the transports), the 1st Australian Clearing Station was acting as supply dBp6t The Royal Naval Field Ambulance carried on with the clearing station on the Beach till May 12th, when it was replaced by the 4th Australian. For administration, Lieutenant-Colonel G. St. C. Thom, R.A.M.C., was on May

6th appointed ‘I Embarkation Medical Officer ” to “ supervise the transport of sick and wounded to the boats and thence to Black Ships or Hospital Ships,” replacing Colonel Manders, who, during four days, acted as (‘ D.D.M.S.” The clearing station remained attached to corps, though still administered by the A.D.M.S., I st Australian Division. Among the many deaths that at this time, in spite of sandbagged traverses, were taken in toll by snipers of the traffc in Monash Valley, two are now part Death of of Australian history and Australian tradi- General Bddges tion. It was difficult to induce General Bridges to exercise the discretion of movement which in this, the “Valley of Death,” even the most courageous permitted himself; and on May Igth, near the 1st Battalion aid-post, a sniper’s bullet severed his profunda femoris artery and femoral vein. Though first-aid was prompt, he died on May 18th in the hospital ship Gascon. When dying, his final instruction to Colonel Howse was that his regret should be conveyed to the Minister for Defence that his despatch concerning the Landing was not complete and-he was too tired now. Map No. 5

ANZACAT THE MIDDLE OF MAY 1915, SHOWING MEDICAL POSITIONS AND ROUTES OF EVACUATION FROM THE FRONT LINE TO THE BEACH Height contours, IO metres

5th-19th May, 19151 THE LANDING AT GABA TEPE 159

A stretcher-bearer of the 3rd Field Ambulance, of quiet disposition, enlisted as “ Simpson,” had obtained a small donkey, and with this animal (known as Death of ‘’ Duffy ”) he for many hours daily traversed 4‘ Simpson ” the valley, bringing down in this way an extraordinary number of cases. When warned of the extreme danger that he ran, he would always reply ‘‘My troubles! ”. On hlay rgth, at the same spot as General Bridges, Simpson was shot through the heart. No cross of bronze has marked his Valour, but in the memory of his brief service he gained a monument more enduring.2q “ Simpson ” has been selected for mention because the quality of his courage and the nature of the service in which he lost his life are typical of those demanded of the stretcher-bearer, who must carry his case undeviatingly, without haste but without rest, through long periods of exacting and dangerous toil. Conduct such as his, and the high standard set from the first in the rescue of wounded, gained for the stretcher- hearers what they desired-not a halo of sentimental eulogy, hut the confidence of the men who fought and comradeship on terms of equality with them. During this time, in the chain of events that inexorably followed the failure to advance, certain decisions brought home to the A.I.F. in very poignant fashion Results of failure the situation in which they now found themselves. In the first place, on May 5th General Birdwood recommended to the G.O.C., M.E.F., that the 7,000 horses (averaging 350 per transport) which had been on board ship off Anzac from four to twelve weeks should be returned to Egypt. With the rest went the transport divisions of the field ambulances. But worse was to come. The weakness of the position made a strong garrison necessary, and the second and third reinforcements had already been absorbed. To provide a garrison Genelal Bridges, as G.O.C., A.I.F., consented to the temporary use of the light horse as infantry. Supported 11y General hyaxwell, the light horse commanders fortunately prevailed ‘‘ Simpson ”-Private . S. Kirkpatrick-and his donkey have become (it may be noted for non .4ustrafian readers) among the best known personalities of Australian war history. 160 THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN [rzth-24th May, 1915 in procuring that, though separated from their beloved horses, the three light horse brigades should go to Anzac as distinct formations, not as mere reinforcements to infantry units. On May 12th the 1st Light Horse Brigade replaced the 3rd Royal Marine Brigade in Monash Valley; the 2nd and 3rd arrived a week later. The rst, znd, and 3rd Light Horse Field Ambulances, well trained and full of characteristic light horse spirit, found themselves very unhappily situated. Anzac did not want them. With roads and system now established, the bearers already landed could easily deal with the casualties; field hospitals had been cut out. Problems of water and supply made it necessary to exclude all but essential units. The 2nd and 3rd managed to get ashore, but found little to do. The 1st was detained on the lines of communication. On May 19th the Turkish command made their counter- attack at Anzac. At daylight along the whole front 40,000 Turks, advancing with the utmost bravery, May 19th- attack were met by a fire so intense that, almost without reaching the line, some 10,000 were killed or wounded, with only 350 casualties among the defending troops. Five days later, on the initiative of the enemy, there took place an “armistice for the burial of the dead,” in which the A.A.M.C. bore a responsible part and amicably swapped experiences and cigarettes with the “ enemy.” With the armistice for the burial of the dead ends. appropriately enough, the first phase (from the medical point of view) of this extraordinary military adventure. The prodigious slaughter of the strenuous three weeks left both sides licking their wounds in the comparative security of deepening trenches. Leaving for the time the medical service on shore to face new and even more difficult problems now looming, it is necessary to follow, on the lines of communication at sea, the fortunes and fate of the casualties, slight and severe, whose collection in the field and transfer from the Beach to the boats have been narrated2O

fD For a proper understanding of. the medical problems presented in this chapter the course of the fighting should be.studied in detail In the ,yilitary histork:. In particular. the advance of the covering force up the broken Central Spur calls for attention in greater detail than has been possible to afford.