SOLUTION NO. Uo.U
THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL
CEtOUP
PALESTINE CATJAIGIT.
OPERATION;' of the AUATMLIAJT 7,'CUKl«Er DIVI3ICIT, :.'ept,18,19lC to t)o 1UJ> ProbUm No StriM.
Captain Ko1)ort A,I.TcClxuro,Infantry.
IN CASE OF REPLY TO BE RETURNED TO RECEPTACLE BY 9:00 A.M.
1028—C. & Q. S. Set., Fort I^avenworth—0-26-31—26M * VGIU W\o Director, <"d Yoar Claop^Cocwand and Conoral f'taff .'ohoolfT'ort Loayonv/orv. iir
: V/crld V/cuM Talootino Ct'inraltjn* (KID^T
1«A "billiocTap}^ for tlda y ruipc,(on tliroo ohcoto), nhovdntf routoc and four oporatlonc*
Y KffijISIEBl). — T3io operations of the Australian llotmtod Divioion from 19 r3optom"bor,1918 to tho J\jpmiotaoo'#'
-1 1/Jinoo tho plwi of erjttj>&i{3i and tho military Geography of tho thoatro aro oovorGl in othor papers and,AD thin papor treats only vdth tho operations of tho .Vuotralian • ountod division,it in sufficient orientation to ztato that Allonby's plan v/as oarofully prepared,basod on intolli{;onoo data which provod to oc accurato* Unite woro assigned dofinito missions and objectives,tho taking of which vould acsuro tho dootruction of the
h Seventh and Eighth /vrjuico. plan provided for: Direct pursuit ty Corps Cavalry, Tactical purmiit "by the 5t3i Australian Li^ht Horse Brigade of tho Australian rountod Division,attached temporarily to tho XXI Corps,to attack tho enemyTs flank and immediate rear*
Strategic,(Parallel),pursuit "by the Desort lountecl Corps, (l)'# £hc bulk of the cavalry v/as assigned to tho strategic pursuit, Tho 4th and 5th Cavalry divisions being directed to reach vital points on the
Turkish lines of communication far in rearfviiilo the Australian Lxmnted Division,(herinafter /JT)),agted from the rear against tho retreating Turkish columns* Spoed "being a primary essential,parallel roads v/ere \ised little rosistonco was to be expected.
Australian Juountod Division, (AI*©), consisted of tho follov/ing xmits: 3d Australian Light Horse Brigade,(AHIB),vdth 0th,9th,10th Hogimont£ 4th " » " " " , » 4th, 11th, 12th "
Tr 5th «« " » « f « Uth & 15th Regiments and an attached French Cavalry Detachment* XIX 33rigade Hoyal Horse /irtillory,v/itli A & B Batteries M C and llott1 Battery- 1 AI.3) Field r.'quodron Engineers* (3)-* Eacli brigade had three regiments of throo squadrons each. Che squadron
(l)* (1-129 et socf;1 6-33S,334,336) (2)* (1-150, 2-150* 4-G92) * (3-6G7*) contained about 145 men|tho rogiuont about 470 monjtho brlgado about 2000 Monftha division about 8000 mon#(4)#
»f3ljr tho 10t3\ Soptombor t' o AVJ") had boon oonoontratod in tho vioin^y of LUTC and south of .'JEH EH, in aocordanco with tho plans for tho prrsuit. Ti\o :3th Cavalry Hri£;ado,vdt> tho l?ronoh Cavalry ^otaohmont attached,hud Voon placed tomporarily undor tho ordorc of t?\o COth "^ivinion of tho 1 ::a corps inirin;; tho 19th,it did littlo but follow tho 4th Division,as plnnnod, moving early in tho morning a distanoo of 20 milos and bivouacin^ for the ni$\t on tho north bank of tl\e imm (V/ADI) ir^JTDEBUlTAV(6). On tlio 20th,tho division marched about 1:00 All toward IBJJU1T (1.IEOID35O) arriving there with little or no opposition about 3:30 R% At this place reports indicated that the enemy was retreating in large numbers from JEHIJIITt Ehis latter tovm v/as the exit of tho passes behind the Turkish lines and on the only railroad serving the Turkish main forcoo, in addition,it was an important rood center and the fbfcttleneck! of the routes of communication from OTL ICEHAi,I and 1TAI3LUC3 • (7) • Tho 3d ALIEBrigade had boon advanco gviard for the DivisiorfV V/ith ono battery »and less the 8th Regiment,it v/as ordered to advance rapidly to occupy JEHHIN and block the rQtreat of tho forces reported retreating to and throu^ii that place. It covered tlie olevon miles in about seventjy minutes,encountering little resistance and entered tho town shortly before sun3ot by a vigorous combined attack which succeeded in ovor coming and demoralizing the dofendorn. All exits from the tovm woro *
blockcd#(8)# A lieutenant,with two machinogun3 and the necessary porconnol to handle them,wan sent to tho south of the tovm to block the
(5)# (1-139fMO* .?-149» 3-528. 4-694* 7-3D#)
(6). (2-155# 3-529) (7)# (1-139• 2-105, 3-529.)
(8). (1-139• 2-156* 3-529,530. 4-705,706,707V 7-36,)
-3 uo. Vbout 9:00H ho mol a Ion;; column of troops approaching from the* uoutlw Point; vuraipportod aiv' not kno.inr just v/horo "\o rorcaindor of Me
forco Y/an,tho L:loul;onantf1)y shoor "bluff fforoocl tl.o nurrendor of tie ontiro column, r of ::oa,nv/liilcfti c 4t: ^ri^do^.^ich l\nd Voon detailed as oroort r.nd troncport r ^ii£irdfarrivod .'it IiEJJ^3: and \.nc ordered to t?o a-riotnncc of tJ o r>d 3?ri£~ r r ado# J)-urinr; t--.o nirfit itf wrl t3:o 8t)i vioeixnont,arrived at JKl7n:: . (i?lio 4t3i ]lcclr.iont : f till rcminod at LEJJTj]: ao catarcl ca\6 escort}• rJ3)O follov/ dac'f (21flt)fthe 14th Brigade of tho 5th Cavalry division arrived v.\ JEIHTIH and ar;;;ictod in clcoxin^ tlic position; f'omo 7000 to 8000 priConors v/oro dispatched to LEJJini under escort of tie 8th 7?ecir.:cnt# (-ho Mt?- j3ri{;oxle tl.-cn v;a^ v/it' drav/n,after order : ad icon restored* (10)# 'l\o nnxt ±o:: dr^'s v/crc one a of comparative inactivity for the division, !•• In t;:C :noa2iY r:uccoss# 'X 6:00 r::,ono authority states,the rrigado alone had secured fifteen £uns and £000 prisoners. Another author it:' ©stirr-tos t! o prisoners at 5000• (9). (3-D31t 4-707, 7-58. ) (10). (:>ir>7. 3-531,532* 4-709.) (!!)• (1-140. 4-G90 to 704.) -4 rir.:0 nt: ::vi>;iv\o \/uci v:on ordoro.l to pusl> on r.».1 exit t3 o railv/ny "botv/oon ? 1 IWJJAJ;: :MI- JlJi::;i:F# -V: t?-.o l>ri:;ado \.uo vory coattoro3.fduo to it 2 r.otivity rfivin;; - c dayf it Y/ao nocrly morning of tho ."Oth ^oforo it coulu l>o aao omblot. and movo* 7/urinr.; the nomine it clt tho railroad jit anooriblod t fl.t a»l yrcparo'l to novo on :r/J3LU.'> oarly the next morning# It r.rrivod horof after :Jono minor opposition,and roooivod tlio formal D\irrondor of t?.io tcrvn. It thon aoDonl)?.cd jv.st rrout:. of 2T;j3LUo viioro i t rccoivod ordoro o rojoin tho AlIO at J&i:31L (l^)» On tho 2,?d it rojoined tho clivinion«(l3) D* fJP.\e 4th Brigade was ordorod to novc to tho capture of fXATJUHI. It did not march until the 24th.(14). OSio rciuiindor of tho division marched on EL AF .'23, arriving during the morning of the 23d and sending out reconnaissance tov/ard BEIfMlT.(l5) Q]"he 4th '/ri&ade narched early on tho .14th,reached BEIRUT after noon and JIfflR EL J.1JJJ\IHE that ni^it. fJ5io brigade was short tho 4th fiegimont and five troop3 of tho 12th,which wore on guard and escort detail. (G?ho over len£#honing linoe of comnrunication and the dispersion of the division made the gaoxd. kn (12)* (1-140. 4-700-704), (13)* (1-140. 4-729.) (M)* (1-140* 3-524, 4-730.) (15). (1-139. 4-750#) (1-140* 3-542,543. 4-731,732,734.) -5 Mio city of VHtEIlLV: wa« capturod aftor ahort opponition and tl.o div ioion conoontrr/tod in that vicinity.'17 )• Eho remainder of tho Corpo likov/i&o was concentrated near LIBERIA!,5 • f>. r-onofitod "by thoir abort,"but much noodod,rcat at G!IJ3ElUAS,tho Corpo l;ogan itf « advanoo on T>MIASCUE at 6:00 A!.:, £7 f>eptomT)or,with the .MID advancing "by the direct routoffollov/ed T>y tho bth Cavalry Mvision. Sho 4th C-valry T.iviaion parcuod and liaraoDOd tho F0Uiri2I AJQ.'QT and#*by convor^ inr; maneuverfdriving t>^o enemy into the hands of the main colTUnnt(l8)« ffiho country v/asi voty difficult;"mane of unrolled lava "bowlders otrev.Ti in tho roadway• Progrono v;ac extremely difficult for v/hools"«(l9)« Attach od licrcto is a relief jnap ahov/in£; the route of tho Ml) and giving a small hut comprehensive picture of the terrain* The difficulties of ito pacnaco are evident. f'outh of Lake 3TULE it v.'ao neconsary to crosr: t3io JOIU^/JT IUvor# Kic anciont I ridge MBITAQ? YMQSB had l^oon destroyed and the enemy v/ero prepared to defend t*-o cron3ingG from the lioighto to the oast thereof* Tixoy were approximately one thousand 3trong,v.ith artillery and many machino^uns. Time was an important considoration;t3io AI-.3) Y/as tho Corps advance goard; due to tho road conditions it \;as practically impossible to o,void this place as a crossing. Tl\o leading elements devolopod tho rooistanco and porformod tl-e usual reconnaissance. This action v/a3 probably tj->o only one,during tliis p3ia.«;o of the campaign,in vMch the A*,CD acted as a unit* Generally,tho actions wore "by brigades. lE\o orders for uhe attack,as actu ally icciied,if follov/inc; t}\o C#& G.S.r;,teaching,v.ould road somevAiat as f ollov/s: l#You laiow tl^c s n*T}\o Division attack:' at once,forcing; a crossing of the river,in order to continue t?\o pursuit and provide for tho rapid advanoo of tho Corp o.rVJhc advance guard,one regincnt nth Brig-adc/.ill attack frontally to contain t3\e oncmy in itn front and !>o prepared to cross t]\c river as soon ac tlic enveloping forco readies attack positions* (17). (1-140. 3-540,1562.) (10). (Z-22'6fZrA. 5-567• 4-738. 7-27G.) (19). (6-337• 7-165,166 & map)-. -6 h/Jho 3d Eripado,moving 1y cov:ro-I routoof will foroo a about 1 to r. mi lor? north of tho T>rid£Ofonvolop tho hootilo r.n;l ho prepare; to out of? tho rctroat of tho enony* o.Tho ftth ^ricnclofloor; one ro£;imontfand' with tho 41;;: regiment att achec, will move V oonooalo'l rout6n to tho vicinity of EL Hi:, v/horo it will force a cross inr; of the rivor and attack tho onoiny loft flruifc in conjunction *'ith t- o 'Jd 3)ri£odof c!/.1;;© ;.rti?l:'iv .it' tho .dvi(Jion vdll support t}o ritt-\ck 'ron rclcctof. r.orjitioni.' in ror.r of tVc pivot* 1 o/iic 4f rritfv'OjlQnn dt) "jlo{;ir.».ontfv.lll r.v^.it ordorr in rorjervo, propr.ro to pnj^rac, x#Cron"in.;;r; v:ill -o forced -..it: cu* ropard to nmtur.l cupport l.otwcon All tuiits proparcv. for prompt reorganization and continuance of th.e pursuit* 'JLMS double onvolopnont was 3uccefjsful,Tmt,d\ic to tho resistance and oxtroiacly difficult country and river hod,it was not rapid onough to cut off the energyf s retreat from their position*(HO)• }>y early afternoon tho f:Gt: September the loading elements of tho division reached 13nEI&V>m9(ffiilB2PJi)fimC. tho division as a wholo rested there for tho night,the town having t. plentiful supply of water •( P.I )• .OTIC to tho distance from supporting troops and tho length of the line:: of conrnmication, it was necessary to leave a strong guard "behind1* 'i!hc 11th, 14tli, and 15th Eegincnts of *he /ID and elements of the 5th Cavalry Division were directed to cover the linos of commujiication and "bo prepared,as Corps Hesorvo,to move on DATASCUS,if neo&odV All dismounted men and those whose horses v/ore in poor condition were loft "behind at 3OTTIM'HA,also*(22)« (It forms no part of thin papor/ossontially], hut id of interest to know that the casualties of tho /ill),in aniinals, duo to sore "backs and errors of march discipline and animal managomont wore nnich loss ±K than in the other two divisions of the Corps* u3iose facts wore researched "by the atithor a few years ago,for lectures in animal inanagomont rjid transportation)* 7* •Ihe advance continued with tho leading clomentsf (3d j-ri^do),moving out late in t: e afternoon of the 29th Septemberfv/ith 3;u.jtf*CTJC as r (ZO). (l-15 o, 2-.H5Df.?56* 3-DG7f5G0. 4-7/1-0. 7-277.) r.l)* (1~1!54. 2-nr.O* 3-5C0* 4-74D.) na)* (3-5G9. 4-745.) -ZZO. 4-745*) 'JF..0 rutxpti. nature of the country pormittod ooncidorallo rofdotanoo at w/X'AfViioro croso country action vrvx impor:sil>lo. (^oo map/'kctch 39).(< 4). rj/v/o rogimonts forood thoir v/ay through in tho dark,*by a frontal attack and clor-rod tho position "by 3:15 Ml (25). !i!hin ni^.t action naturally rosultod in con«idora"blo d:uporsion and disorganlssatlon of tho rttaoklnc forgos,no tj.c cdvanco gauird v/as relieved "by t'.o 4th brigade,(less 1 Jlog i::;ont at irJllBrjniA)•('-<>)• ^-i - '^ Brigade caiTicd on tho ijursuit v.ith small groups operating gainst tho 1?arkrj and mopping up an the rxlvanoo tlio route of advonoo the Turks hold a strong position at oc mapfwkctch 39 )• Bio advance eaard,(4rth and 12th He^iments), Y/crc ordered to attack, supported-"by the artillery. Hio attack \iv.z maO.o coon after 11:00 .AJ.^tiic 4th ?vO£imcnt charging frontally \7hilo the 12th ?.cgiinont enveloped,mountedt 'Fnis v/as hi^ily s\icdcar3ful# (^8)# l"canv&Lilofthe 5th and 3d brigades had hocii ordered to avoid tho action and puoh tovrcjpd nortliv.'CGt D-\j.VJ>CUrJ«(29). This action,to "block tho oxitn of DiU.IACCUrJjmot v.lth reoiotonco alonf; tho hills v/ost of EL V.'BZVA;liov.*over the rooictanco was quickly "brushed asido#(30). A glance at tho map#(C-kot 'o9)fv/ill chov/ the important oxits from tho city. The French Cavalry and the 14th hogiincnt succeeded in advancing,dir;inounted#to tho northv/ent of EL iVOEfUE,"by 4:30 KIfv/horo they caught large columns of retreating onomy, rail and othor trains. Firing fron the heights on the heads of tho columrjs in the BAMDA Gorge they turned tlio defile into a shambles. This Gorgo v/ac a rvxin avonuc due to the river for water supply, tho railroad and the ; good Id/jhv/ny. ]3y cutting off tho heads of the columns ancl^urning them l^ack on DM:j\SCU>'l>,tl\o Australians v;cro a"ble to capt-uro over 4000 prisoner and destroyed an inmense nraount of oquipjiicnt and/transportation.(31)• ffilio division "bivouacod for tho night on tho hattlofiold,v/ith all o::its C.^4). (1-1DO. 2^o30, 4-745,74G .) ~ (D5). (1-154. 3-569#570.) (ZG). (1-1D4. 2-232. 3-570. 4-747,) ($7). 02-232. 3-570. 4-747.) (28). (1-154. 2-232,233. 3-571,572,573.) (29). (1-154. T.-233. 3-573. 4-740.) (30). (1-154. 2-::34.) . (1-154. 3-573. :-749,750. 7-281,282.) -8 f olosod,oxccpt tic ono via tho HO3TJ roadfdoopito tho Clonnan Comnandor r< contention that tl.o !V;v;DA Cor^o had not hoon O1ODOCI.(32) r f 0 t i1:o /j.?j was dirootocl to maintain it » oovorinf; poni+ion and aluo to fclock tl.o HO::'. :ioafr.(33). In order to accomplish thio latter mine ion the 3d Frigarto wan ordorod to croon 7VJIADA Cor{;o,work around tho hillo and atroddlo tho 11CIV Head. Ho practicable routo could "bo found,so tho T-rifcadc commandor directed it to dash through tho oity of D-V.-irJCUf! and f roach it .o objective# Advancing at 5:00 Jli: it onccunterod aurpriGinely little opposition, except the delays inridont to clearing a path throx^Ji f t tho doad and do*bris in the gor^c#(34). i l\o "brigado cloarod D£X*\£CUC short r ly after 7:00 Al.I and overcome resiotance,successively,at !. LAHA5jifDDi.IA KUiSfJEK, engaging encn\y rear guards and oporating,v/it]> the usual pursuit tactics,againot tho flanks and rear of tho various dolaying positions,(35) aiicy "bivoxu?,cocl for the night at DUII/V.(5G). Hcports roceiveel early on October .?d indicated that a large column of tho enemy v.rorc in retreat some five miles away and rapidly approaching tho hills to the north where thoy would reach safety from pursuit', jflio 3d J3rigado galloped six miles to out them off and STicc©cdod#'by a mrmnted charge,in capturing some 1500 prisoners,26 inachino~£un3 and 3 field guns. By "blocking the road to the hills with machine-guns,tho remaining OXirks wore forced to surrender«(37) • T3io rest of the troops had closed in around j)/JTiV''CU.- "by this time and the climax of tho campaign was reachod 'Ilic Corps halted at ?Vjl\f'CUfi for a fov daye of much nooclcd ror;t and reorganization. Bio AID xv.z ordered to remain there until relieved of -rC. duty and tl.o protection of tho linos of co;:™unicc.tion l)y the inf- On Cctdl^cr :"7th,t:\c /•::),less lOtli Regiment,moved north on ALU3P3-O and :ac approaching ]•&£ v/licn the r.rmictaco v.T.r; announced.(39)• Continuing f lt n march nort!i#tho Division concontratod in !:0:.-3- early on r.ovombcr 1st; it marched from ]T0; V to arjPOLI to concentration comp,later in jrovombor.(4(|) 3:!)# (3-574• 4-7E30. 9-301,582). 33). 34). (Z-PAZ, 8~r>G0, 4-7^,753,760.) ) 35)• (1-1!*.4# ^-; 44. 3-590. 4-D61 to 5G5, 36 )• (r-^45# 3-!) 90.) 37)# (1-155. P^45. 5-590.) 38). (.vr,89. A-77,o#V7G#) 39).. (1-155. 2-S14. 3-G11. 4-779.) 40). (1-155. 4-779.) -9 ivt o: IJTIOI: c? 'X'B m\o:u 1« <>iuouJ?:;ion. — Any ooircnonto on t'c pursuit follov/ins t!.o broak-thru north of J7JFFA on cptombor 19,1910 v/ill no cloooly roeoniblo the prin ciples enumerator1, in the C-;vrlr; t; icl ; : r.mial en l^-TfUK find E:::;l/TT\* T 1 2IPJT of a ^i^B.^7.LmOUC8 ftV.o natural a'runption vwilc . ^o tl.at t:*o prin ciploj lai^1- do\/n v:oi-o Ocducod from t}.o oxtromoly ?n.\ccar;nful operations of tl\o ^eoort : ovjtitoc. Corps in V-.G :;*JJ3""'TC1!E caiipaient 'ilio fact ir t: ct Mlcnby fiinpl;: npplio--. principle- vldch ]>n/T T«con c-4or,*bliri]icd lone: o^o i'-ritir;!! .Viold orvico ~-:o3iilcitiona of 190D covcrod oxr.ctly the plan follov.^crl "by Allon'by* "ITo victory ic complete \mlor-n it io innthntly 1 follovct up# All tho ;ivr.ilftl)lc troopu SIIOMIC1. >o employee,and no ''ciwo should "bo iGLlov:ef. t • o cnei^ to rally, to take up a frosli poo it ion, or to form rear gunr&E* rjlio eidmurjtion or looses of troops cannot "bo accepted an an oxcuce for not puiTniinc;* 1"hc action of tr.e cavalry*1 * should "be characterised "by groct V;oldnesn,: "* t : c cavalry endeavor to head off the retreat::: >('• It .ill no cliff ictilt,however, to make timely preparations : for the purffu.it* -*;anc.\ the cavalry coM'i^ndorpf in default of definite orders,raact take upon t-:-omj;olvcn t]\e roaponni"bility of reaping tlio fruitc of victory/1 (43)V r British CAVALHY TM.IlUll(x9191P^ ,l^cara close rosom'blancc to our ^.TLOiTSlT of BAV-JCT1 and strerjccs the importance of parallol purouit l:y cavalr5r and anticipating tho enoniy at some critical point on his lincy of retreat*; (43), A reference lo our Cavalry )rill I^Tolations of 109G v/ill subotantiato t'::e rtatoncnt -that tl o x>rinciploa appliod "by Allon"by v^cro not nov; to our army and that v.c did not loam T>rinciple^ from Allonby's cavalr^r operations,but tliat v/c did learn their correct applioation and proved tj.cir rjound-noss, (44)V (42)•(11-135,134.) (44 )f ( 13-362 )• -10 'iSio operations of tho .17) v/oro typioal cavalry actiono ao tau#it for r pursuit. ^ c continued outflanking of ro;;iutonoof?}arracDirv; of columno, J ouvtinr routes of ro oroat,an 'Holdnoyo to the point of ranhnoss1 3ocmod to cliaractorizo tiro c.otionc of all unitr; of ii.o division. Tlio moiuxtod attao?: a^ainnt £roatly empcrior numoors scorned never to deter the pursuing forces» Opportxxnitios for noimted action v.lll "be fleeting and,imloss t)io attackor in "boldfvdll "be lout. In numerous nmall attacks,had tho Australians v/aitod for roin for cements, the l^xrkrJ v;ould have "boon a*ble to organize their resistance, more effectively civor tho retreat and the retreat v/otild not havo "boon turned into a routo;this docpito tlie fr-ct the Turks usod the German troop J to a m&xiinun in their rear guards and also that there seonod no shortaf;© r : of machine£uns# £ic Puxk v/as "badly defoatodf true,"but t3;o 0crman3 v/ere still {s*ood soldiers and excellent organizer a, v/ith exceptional ability to organize t}io cicfense. However, tho superior mobility of tho cavalry, their continued outflanking of renistanco or their daring frontal oharges loft no alternative Tnxt self-preservation in retreat or surrender. fflho action at BBHAO? YAKUB Bridge v/as the only division action,ao a v/hol T It o succosr? v/as to l>c expoctod under the circumstancos#yot it would bo faulty to use this example of v/hat could bo done with a determined oncmy equally v/oll nituatod/flioro v/as apparently no mobile rosorvo for tho Turks proparod to oppose a crossing at any other place than tho bridgo sito, thereby pomitting tlio position to be outflanked,as tho Australians did. liov.cvcxyfchio wie a roar guard action v/ith probably nc intention of a long delay* Mioy did stocood in dcluying t?^o Australians for a consider able tine. -11 fflio notion at ."EVJIi illuutrutos an attack in t'o darkt It v/as \voll plannod and "brilliantly carried out. It would havo euoocodod as well, proudly,in daylight, It does illustrate tl*o fact ymull {groups,compara tively, can operate at ni&ht with succosn, It slows t?at projection of darkness ^roatly reduces casualties. In this attack anoout 1000 men wore ontwpd.* 'ilioir casualties were no{;li^n'blo# '-i-'ho attack was over open co\aitry« ?'ad f ero l^ocn ar^r v/irc or othor o*bctaclcs to forco the cavalry into lanCL; v/hich coulcl have "boon covered "by machinogun firofit icj craootion£>."blc lioxr imcceucful tlie mounted attack v/ould have "been. l-'ron ^JA»>A to KAUIu-u t3ic actions wore advance guard v;orkfv.rith mounted attacks v^ainot tho)i hostile roar guards# ?\yo rogimonts and one "battery YA^rc en^tog>ed# It illustrates that vigorous mounted action suocoeds in disposing of rcciiTuancc "by covering forces xrhitih otr.crv/isc v;ould have hold up tho pursuit, 'I^o attacks were,as a loilo,covered V>y a pivot of fire, (riflct2iiaclLinogan and artillery}#vtith a mounted envelopment. fJho action of the rxichincgiin detachment at JEinTIN in capturing one hundred times it!s ctrongth is a striking example of the pov/er of a fevr monfY/i'w3': ? niachinogiinfto hold up largo numters in an ixncertain situation* vinco our marclies in tho future will "bo made at night,goncrally,partic~ ularly v/hon in proximity to the cnomy,it soem3 too little attention is paid to tho delays to "bo encountered and tho length of resistance of small enemy groups v/ith automatic weapons. Our night advances will not "bo made as rapidly as now taught and concidorahlo attontion should "bo devoted to training in reducing resistance,at night,and in defiles. This one instance cited is only one of many rdmilar ones,Aviation having forced troop movements to he mado at night, it soems Cavalry's role has ch&ngod and it's usofulnen3 has increased,rather than decreased,in opon v/arf arc, rj?i\o torrain i;}irou^"i v;hich tho division oporatod noods no discussion, v^io n^p,cittaclied, givco a £;ood picture of tho difficulties, 'JJlxc ratoo of r.u'irch,thc distances covered and the care of animals are all of suffiodint importance -to warrant noparato studios* ^uxfico to state that a gallop of six milor; to attftokjBO miles in twontyfour hours for largo units| 4:00 milos in ihirty-oight Cl?.yo for a division,v/oro not unknown during tho pursuit* Troops wore pushed v/itliout regard to rc:;t or condition* rj?hoco arc nor^-al to t2io pursuit and our cavalry must bo orcr*nizod,trainod and cqixippod to moot thoso conditions* v.'ho vital olomont of cavalry ic? it's mobility in a larnc cpacofa path froo for advance and J room laterally* It v/ill "bo expected,in "V/o riTOfJt learn"foayB a French authority,"to regard the lifo of a cavalryman as not so oapccioJly prociouo;v/o must expect t/.e ca'valry to cruffer loasesfv/hen the situation requires it,just as much as tho infantry do on ruiny occaoiono,\7ithout "bcinc affocted and v/ithout n^cing much ado £• Conclusion* — 'Hie AMD operated with the r,ccoptod cavalry tactical teaching's. It's actions wore generally by small groupsf(rho mountod arge was frequently used. Mounted action was uniformly successful* Itapidity of action and boldnoss in attack v/ill prevent rear guards from neutralizing the pursuit* Attention should be devoted to tho possibilities of small groups seriously delaying columns by the use of automatic v/oapons in defiles* Praining for night operations in outflanking resistenco should bo increase^. Jhc doctrine of our Cavalry and Field r'orvico Kcgulation3,regarding the pursuit,is nound and those principles wctfe exceptionally well carried >ut by tho ?Jtesert lountod Corps. o* — Hone required. — Nono required aptain,Tnfantry• (45)# (14-xi.) -13 BIBLIOGRAPHY ICoy: (2-10,25.) - llo\?< text ("below) pagos 10 and 25. 1* History: Palestine Campaign. Cavalry School, 1923-24. (Stencil 168), 2-V Alloriby1 c Final 'irixraph, vy.T.I-assoy. 3(« Hilitary Oporationo in Egypt and Palestine. Vol.IIV I.Iaj. Gen.Hodgson, 4. Official History of Australia in the Y/ar of 1914-.-18. Vol.VII.II.G.GULLI 5. Outlino of Egyptian and Palestine Campaigns,1914-1918• Cen.Bov/mon l-'aAJJ 6.0210 Great Events of the Great War. Vol.VI. national Alumnl# 7.British Cavalry Journal. Vol.XIII. 1923• O.KolGon1^ Perpetual Loooe-lcaf Encyclopaedia, Vol.IX. 9.Five Years in Turkey. Liman von Sanders,General of Cavalry. lO.tfhc Cavalry Piold Manual, (Tentative). War department, 1929. 11.Field Service Rcgalationc. (British). 1905. 12.Cavalry Training. (British). 1912. 13.Cavalry Drill Regulations/.?ar ^cpaptmontf1896# 14 .Cavalry on .Service. Polot-lTarbonno. 15 .A Brief Hecord of t1 o Advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Forco, July, 1917 to October, 1918. Compiled from Official So-urccs, All sources v/erc o*btainod from the Library,C & a C School,Port Loaven \70rth, IC-jasas,except: Reference Hos. 1,6,8,10,14. ffiioso are porsonal records of the author. PALESTINE • The Capture of SAMAKH. 25-h September, 1918. Scale of Miles GALILEE J Turkish Rear-guard Action atlActinng at KAUKAB & KISWE, SASA*. of 29^ Sept re of DAMASCUS. 9r V