ARMOR March-April 2008

The Professional Bulletin of the Armor Branch, Headquarters, Department of the Army, PB 17-08-2

Editor in Chief Features LTC SHANE E. LEE 6 Using Tactical Site Exploitation to Target the Insurgent Network Managing Editor by Michael Thomas CHRISTY BOURGEOIS 14 Human Terrain Mapping: A Critical First Step Commandant in Winning the Counterinsurgency Fight by Lieutenant Colonel Jack Marr, Major John Cushing, BG DONALD M. CAMPBELL, JR. Major Brandon Garner, and Captain Richard Thompson

19 How Information Operations Enable Combatant ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bi- Commanders to Dominate Today’s Battlefi eld monthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, ATTN: by Lieutenant Colonel Scott K. Fowler ATZK-DAS-A, Building 1109A, 201 6th Ave- nue, Ste 373, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721. 22 Win the Battle – Lead to Peace Disclaimer: The information contained in AR- by Colonel Bruno Duhesme, French Army MOR represents the professional opinions of the authors and does not necessarily reflect 26 An Approach to Route Security the official Army or TRADOC position, nor by Captain Nicholas C. Sinclair does it change or supersede any information presented in other official Army publications. 33 Ground School XXI – The Next Step Official distribution is limited to one copy for in Combined Arms Simulation Training each armored brigade headquarters, armored by Colonel Robert Valdivia cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion headquarters, armored cavalry squadron 36 Predator Palace: Gaining a Foothold headquarters, reconnaissance squadron head- by Captain Peter J. Young Jr. quarters, armored cavalry troop, armor company, and motorized brigade headquarters of 43 Team Enabler: Combining Capabilities the United States Army. In addition, Army li- braries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and During the Execution of Full-Spectrum Operations MACOM staff agencies with responsibility for by Captain David J. Smith and First Lieutenant Jeffrey Ritter armored, direct fire, ground combat systems, organizations, and the training of personnel for 46 Training the Warrior Mechanic to Meet such organizations may request two copies by Challenges of the 21st-Century Battlefi eld sending a request to the editor in chief. by Captain David Campbell Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor 51 2008 Armor Warfi ghting Conference: Center has proponency. That proponency in- “Forging the Thunderbolt in an Age of Persistent Confl ict” cludes: all armored, direct-fire ground combat systems that do not serve primarily as infantry 52 2008 Armor Warfi ghting Conference/Armor Trainer Update Schedule carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; any miscellaneous items of equipment which Departments armor and armored cavalry organizations use exclusively; training for all 19-series officers 2 Contacts and for all CMF-19-series enlisted soldiers; and 3 Letters information concerning the training, logistics, history, and leadership of armor and armored 4 Commander’s Hatch cavalry units at the brigade/regiment level and 5 Driver’s Seat below, to include Threat units at those levels. 48 Reviews Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright is indicated. Request all organizations not affiliated with the Department of the Army contact ARMOR for reproduction/reprinting permission. Periodicals Postage paid at Fort Knox, KY, and additional mailing offi ces. Postmaster: Send address changes to Editor, ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, ARMOR, 201 6th Avenue, Ste 373, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721. March-April 2008, Vol. CXVII, No. 2 USPS 467-970 “From My Position...”

“… Son can you play me a memory? I’m not really sure how it goes, miss the exultant, unrestrained joy of returning home after a deploy- but it’s sad and it’s sweet and I knew it complete when I wore a ment. No satisfaction of a job well-done was ever greater. No antic- younger man’s clothes.” ipation of better days was ever brighter, and no homecoming was Billy Joel from Piano Man, 1973 ever sweeter. Although I’m certainly not the old man sitting at the bar described Of course, I’ll miss much more than the few things I’ve listed inside in Billy Joel’s classic song, I can nevertheless relate to the mixture the boundaries of this page with a touch of occasional sadness. I of both sad and sweet emotions that flood over me as I write my fi- also know, however, that those same memories are the very ingre- nal editorial for ARMOR. As my term as editor in chief comes to a dients that will bring sweetness to my future life apart from the dust, close and my retirement date draws near, I know that I have a great mud, searing heat, and sometimes bitter cold of the track-based deal to look forward to. Nevertheless, at this moment, the memories heavy Army. They are memories both sad and sweet seasoned with of the things I will miss most about the Army easily displace any grateful pride. thoughts I may have of the future. Of all the things I have to be proud of, I’m most proud of the answer They are memories of the simple, universal, and ultimately pro- I’ll be able to give my son one day when he asks me, “Daddy, what found things to which many of my brother warriors can relate. As kind of Soldier were you?” any Abrams tanker will tell you, there is always a small, but palpa- With the conviction and passion born of sleepless nights, ble, element of doubt associated with telling the driver to, “crank it Dusty road marches, up,” especially if your tank has just completed services. With that in And the crackle of the command net, mind, I will surely miss the reassuring, lowered pitch of the engine’s whining turbine blades at the end of a successful start cycle. In fact, I’ll be able to tell him that I was honored and privileged that whistling engine is probably what sealed my decision to choose To have served with a small, powerful and magnificently heroic few armor branch more than any other factor. In the age of Top Gun, Who willingly bore the heaviest burdens of the many. there was nothing cooler than commanding a 70-ton, rolling ma- Some of them drew their power from their faith; chine that not only moved with the sound of a jet but sometimes flew Others from the depth of their training and the quality of their equipment; like one as well. Still others from the richness of their heritage, the character of their leaders, and their love of soldiering; I’ll also miss other things, such as the delirious, fatigue induced laugh- ter of a soldier’s joke that never seemed to be quite as funny when But ultimately all of them, repeated in the comforting, well-rested, confines of garrison life; or From their confidence in and love for their brothers. the taste and smell of a hot-A grilled steak in the field. No home- They were tankers and troopers; first sergeants and corporals of horse. cooked fillet of grade-A beef ever tasted as good or was nearly as They were Conquerors, Tigers, and Death Dealers. satisfying as a rib-eye earned at the successful completion of Tank They were Buffalo Soldiers and 9/12 Lancers. Table VIII. I’ll miss the snorting, belching, chug-chug-chug of ugly, idling M88s, whose grating, guttural, unmistakably mechanical tones A few of them were Marines. always sounded like sweet music as soon as they arrived to recov- They moved with speed, audacity, and precision er your mount from the vacuum-like clutches of a skirt-deep mire; And thought in miles rather than in yards. the scruffy, bone-tired, grease-stained, but unquestionably first-rate, They were and still are a unique band of brothers track mechanics who crewed them; the crack of man-made thunder And I was humbled to serve in their presence. at the command of “on the way!;” the recoil of the cannon; the sweet, For you see I wasn’t just any Soldier. acrid smell of cordite and the satisfying sound of “target, target, tar- I too was a mounted warrior — a Soldier who rode steel! get” over the net. Although, I will not miss the gut-deep, uncertain, sadness of leaving loved ones behind at home, I will most certainly S.E. LEE

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official:

JOYCE E. MORROW GEORGE W. CASEY, JR. Administrative Assistant to the General, United States Army Secretary of the Army Chief of Staff 0800401 DSN prefix – 464- Points of Contact Commercial prefix– (502) 624-

ARMOR Editorial Offices U.S. Army Armor Center

Editor in Chief Commanding General (ATZK-CG) LTC Shane E. Lee 4087 BG Donald M. Campbell, Jr. 2121 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected]

Managing Editor Deputy Commander (ATZK-DCG) Christy Bourgeois 4582 COL Peter Bayer, Jr. 7555 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Editor Vivian Oertle 2610 Chief of Staff (ATZK-CS) E-mail: [email protected] COL Peter D. Utley 1101 E-mail: [email protected] Art Director Mr. Jody Harmon 3923 Command Sergeant Major (ATZK-CSM) E-mail: [email protected] CSM Otis Smith 4952 Editorial Assistant E-mail: [email protected] Kathy A. Johnson 2249 E-mail: [email protected] Command Sergeant Major to DCG (ATZK-DCG-CSM) TBA 7091 E-mail:

ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: To improve speed and accuracy in editing, Special Assistant to the CG (ARNG) (ATZK-SA) manuscripts should be originals or clear copies, either typed or printed COL Marlin Levendoski 1315 out double-spaced, with a 3½-inch disk in Microsoft Word, Rich Text E-mail: [email protected] Format, or ASCII (please indicate wordprocessing format on disk or cover letter). Tape captions to any illustrations or photos submitted. Addi- Directorate of Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development tionally, we accept articles as e-mail or attachments at: COL Robert Valdivia (ATZK-TD) [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] 8247 When sending articles via e-mail, please include a complete mailing ad- TRADOC Capability Manager for Heavy Brigade Combat Team dress and daytime phone number. COL Jeff B. Swisher (ATZK-TS) * * * E-mail: [email protected] 7955 SUBMISSION POLICY NOTE: Due to the limited space per issue, we will not print articles that have been submitted to, and accepted for pub- TRADOC Capability Manager, Platform Battle lication by, other Army professional bulletins. Please submit your article Command/Combat Identification (ATZK-PBC-CID) to only one Army professional bulletin at a time. COL Alan Mosher 4009 * * * E-mail: [email protected] GRAPHICS AND PHOTOS: We prefer conventional photo prints, but will accept electronic graphic and photo files in no less than 300 dpi for- Office, Chief of Armor (ATZK-AR) mat. (Please do not send photos embedded in PowerPoint and Word.) If Aubrey Henley 5155 you use Power Point for illustrations, please try to avoid the use of exces- E-mail: [email protected] FAX 7585 sive color and shading. If you have any questions concerning electronic art or photo submissions, call Vivian Oertle at the phone number above. Assistant TRADOC Capability Manager * * * Soldier - Mounted Warrior (ATZK-ATS) UNIT DISTRIBUTION: To report unit free distribution delivery prob- Larry Hasty 3662 lems or changes of unit address, e-mail us at knox.armormag@conus. E-mail: [email protected] army.mil; phone DSN 464-2249, commercial (502) 624-2249; or FAX DSN 464-5039, commercial (502) 624-5039. Requests to be added to the official dis tribution list should be in the form of a letter or e-mail to the Editor in Chief. U.S. Army Armor School * * * EDITORIAL MAILING ADDRESS: ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, Director of the Armor School (ATZK-DAS) Bldg 1109A, 201 6th Avenue, Ste 373, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721. LTC Shane E. Lee 1050 * * * E-mail: [email protected] REPRINTS: Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to AR- MOR and to the author, except where copyright is indicated. Request 194th Armored Brigade (ATZK-BAZ) all organizations not affiliated with the Department of the Army contact COL David Hubner 8736 ARMOR for reproduction/reprinting permission. E-mail: [email protected] * * * 16th Cavalry Regiment (ATZK-SBZ) ARMOR MAGAZINE ONLINE: Visit the ARMOR magazine web site COL Robert R. Naething 7848 at www.knox.army.mil/armormag. E-mail: [email protected] * * * ARMOR HOTLINE — DSN 464-TANK: The Armor Hotline is a 24- NCO Academy (ATZK-NC) hour service to provide assistance with questions concerning doctrine, CSM Samuel Wilson 5150 training, organizations, and equipment of the armor force. E-mail: [email protected]

2 — March-April 2008 “The Ground” Has Ignored the Antithesis fantry units embedded each other s radio oper- In conclusion, Captain Rose has a good foun- ators. et, they still lacked a precision indirect dation for considering the effects of terrain at Dear ARMOR, fire capability, which could have been truly ef- tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war, fective in such compartmented terrain. but the individual e amples lead to isolated con- While I am impressed by Captain Anthony clusions that are too pedestrian and passive. Rose s articulation of the importance of terrain The failed British breakout at Caen was not and its effects on combat, in his article, The due so much to superior technology of the Ger- Good Lord, I served through TRADOC s orig- Ground, in the January-February 2008 issue man 88, but rather to the British attack s com- inal Active Defense, and never could I imag- of ARMOR, he has ignored the antithesis plete lack of combined arms tactics. Massed ine a more corrosive operational maneuver the combat actions taken on and around that tanks attacked in the leading waves, followed doctrine. Recall always the Principles of War terrain. Terrain influences the outcome, but bat- well behind by infantry waves, and with no ef- and never forget mass and offensive. Strike tles are won by tactics, techni ues, and proce- fective suppressive artillery support. Hard Treat Em Rough dures, enabled by technology. It comes down to the combined arms team. The U.S. M4 medium tank s inferiority to the CHESTER A. KOJRO heavier German Panther and Tiger tanks in LTC, U.S. Army, Retired In the macro terrain of the sea, the World open terrain is without uestion. Based on then- War I British fleet gained some advantage with current doctrine, available intelligence and their advanced dreadnought battleships, but production priorities, the U.S. took a risk and, A Closer Look at Swift’s Germany also had such ships. It was the over- in hindsight, chose poorly. But the Sherman Influence on the Current MDMP all mass of the Royal navy that assured its vic- was not isolated and alone the M36 tank de- Dear ARMOR, tory. During World War II, the Kriegsmarine stroyer with its 90mm cannon arrived in theater Ship Bismarck was not threatened by superior long before the famously belated M26 heavy I would like to offer a brief comment on the British fire control per se (after all, it sank the tank made its battlefield appearance. Regard- e cellent piece, A German Perspective on the HMS Hood in a fair fight), but rather by massed less, as training and technology improved com- MDMP, written by Captain Ulrich Humpert, in fire, having been isolated, crippled, surround- bined arms integration, including air interdic- the November-December 2007 issue. In his ar- ed, and pounded by overwhelming odds. Mid- tion, the superiority of the German tanks was ticle, CPT Humpert states that the American way was the turning point of the Pacific Cam- overwhelmed. MDMP process was first pioneered by then- paign, not because the U.S. fleet sank four Im- Lieutenant Eben Swift, a Fort Leavenworth in- Though my particular volume s translation has perial Japanese navy carriers, but rather that structor during the 1890s. Having done some a somewhat different choice of words, I accept the Japanese carriers (and trained pilots) were historical research on Swift, I would like to cor- Captain Rose s uote, Sun T u once said that irreplaceable, while the U.S. fleet carriers were rect this misleading statement. In itself, this there are two types of combat, orthodo and only beginning to arrive in overwhelming num- historical fact is not important, but I think that a unorthodo the way one mi es and matches bers. brief e ploration of Swift s views would actual- these two fights are infinite. However, I strongly shed some light on elements of our present The Normandy hedgerows were difficult be- ly reject his interpretation that these fights, MDMP. cause the U.S. Army was only beginning to co- orthodo and unorthodo , translate into the ordinate its combined arms at the company macro- and micro-terrain fight. Recall please First, it must be understood that Swift s life- and platoon levels. It was here that e ternal that Sun T u s Art of War includes an entire long preoccupation was the development of a phones were added to tanks, and tank and in- chapter on The Nine Varieties of Ground. systematic means for giving orders in fact, he was the originator of our present five-paragraph operations order (OPORD). Swift s study of military history led him to the conclusion that many earlier battles had been lost due to simple errors originating in poorly written orders with ARMOR and The Armor and Cavalry Journal missing, contradictory, or garbled information. Swift s work provided a means for leaders to rapidly, efficiently, and clearly communicate Dear ARMOR Readers, their intent. Unfortunately, Swift and many of his Beginning with the November-December 2007 edition of ARMOR, the Armor Associa- successors often went overboard in empha- tion began printing its new publication, The Armor and Cavalry Journal, which includes si ing format at the e pense of content. the professional contents of ARMOR Maga ine. The ARMOR staff completely devel- Captain Humpert tactfully praises the Ger- ops the maga ine and provides the Armor Association a copy of the electronic maga- man system, which in apparent contrast to our ine. The Association adds advertising and Association news, which is combined with own system focuses on the essentials of mak- the professional content of ARMOR, to produce The Armor and Cavalry Journal, the ing a decision and not getting wrapped up in official publication of the Armor Association that is distributed to its subscribers. the details. From this statement, I gather that ARMOR remains the professional journal of the Armor Branch and is distributed to Captain Humpert is under the impression that units on ARMOR s official distribution list. The mission of ARMOR has not changed, the American Army continues to privilege pro- nor has the publication been replaced. The Armor and Cavalry Journal is now pub- cess over substance. Although I cannot make lished by the Armor Association and includes the professional content of ARMOR. a categorical statement about the prevalence Both publications are currently in circulation and will remain so without interruption. of this throughout today s Army, I would con- Subscriptions to ARMOR through the Armor Association will automatically transfer to cede that it does seem to be alive and well in The Armor and Cavalry Journal. The ARMOR Maga ine and Association staffs will con- many places. tinue to work closely together to provide our readers with the same high- uality publi- Regardless of similarities in method, Swift s cation they deserve. work on communicating orders was fundamen- We invite all our readers, both ARMOR and The Armor and Cavalry Journal, to submit tally different from the MDMP. Swift was con- articles, write letters to the editor, and or contact us if you have any uestions, com- cerned with accurately communicating a course ments, or suggestions. of action, not determining one. His later work at the Army War College (1906-1910) provides ARMOR Maga ine and Armor Association Staffs some insight into the differences between the Continued on Page 50

March-April 2008 — 3 BG Donald M. Campbell, Jr. Commanding General U.S. Army Armor Center

Armor Warfighting Conference Highlights the Path to Our Future

ARMOR welcomes Brigadier General The Armor Center’s initiatives reach Donald M. Campbell, Jr. as the Command- well beyond BRAC — we are creating bet- ing General, U.S. Army Armor Center ter training methodologies for both insti- and Fort Knox, and bids a fond farewell tutional and operational training; we are to Major General Robert M. Williams. testing equipment, gear, vehicles, and train ing methodologies that will form the It is a great honor for me to address our foundation of the future force — we are readers as the 42d Chief of Armor. The hard at work, ensuring the current force U.S. Army’s Armor force has a world- In addition to our speakers, we are host- has the capabilities to stay viable well into ing a number of exciting panel discus- wide reputation for producing the high- the future. I have no doubt that our force est performing Soldiers, leaders, and or- sions and work groups on relevant top- will continue to be successful as we meet ics, such as emerging doctrine, Armor ganizations. It also has a great history of the challenges of the future. mission accomplishment and one of car- and Cavalry core competencies, materiel ing, competent, and capable leaders. Our developments, future reconnaissance re- Our mounted force has excelled through- quirements and capabilities, and influ- force also has a great future; we produce out its history because it has always been Soldiers and leaders who can not only ence operations. Of course, Skidgel Hall a learning organization. The Armor force, will be packed full of commercial ven- close with and destroy the enemy, but originally created to break the deadlock who are also capable of creating clarity dors who will be on hand to demonstrate of no-man’s land has certainly seen a few the latest in technologies and develop- out of chaos and making the right deci- mission changes throughout its history. sions in tough situations. I am humbled to ments that may certainly have an impact It goes without saying that our Cavalry on our future capabilities. be just a small part of this great legacy. force has seen even more variations in As I get reacquainted with the Fort Knox its mission scope throughout its distin- I also want to ensure that everyone has community, I realize how many changes guished history. The adaptability required the opportunity to nominate a deserving have occurred in my absence. Major Gen- for a tank battalion or cavalry squadron individual for this year’s Frederick M. eral Bob Williams and the entire Fort to succeed in the current environment Franks Award. With all the great work Knox team have done truly remarkable stems from a combination of visionary going on in the Armor and Cavalry force work in developing a comprehensive base leaders, intelligent and hard-working Sol- there are plenty of deserving awardees realignment and closures (BRAC) plan diers, and an overall desire to accom- — please take the time to submit your that addresses organizations moving to plish the mission. It is in the long-stand- nomination. The award will be presented and from Fort Knox over the next 5 years, ing spirit of learning from each other and at the annual Armor Association Ban- as well assisting in developing the new a desire to continue to grow as a force quet, which will be held on 7 May. De- Maneuver Center of Excellence. I am ex- that I invite all mounted leaders to attend tails for the award and updates on the tremely fortunate to have inherited a team our upcoming Armor Warfighting Con- conference agenda and guest speakers of professionals who understand the reference, during the week of 4-8 May, here can be found at the conference website at quirements of the mounted force and at Fort Knox. www.knox.army.mil/armorconf. work extremely hard to make those re- The theme for this year’s conference is Finally, I would like to thank all of you quirements a reality. “Forging the Thunderbolt in an Age of who are currently serving our Nation at I am extremely grateful to Major Gen- Persistent Conflict.” We have an impres- war. It is a challenging time to be a Sol- eral Williams and his wife, Deb, for tak- sive panel of keynote speakers lined up, dier, but it is also an exciting time. I am ing such good care of our Soldiers and to include the U.S. Army Training and learning everyday about new technolo- their families. I will continue to focus on Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Com- gies, doctrine, and training capabilities our Soldiers and their families as we lead mander, General William S. Wallace; Ser- we will bring to the force that will make the way to training innovations, combat geant Major of the Army, Kenneth Pres- us an even better fighting team. I under- developments, and creating both the Hu- ton; and the Chief of Infantry, Major Gen- stand the sacrifices you and your fami- man Resource Center of Excellence here eral Walter Wojdakowski, who will pro- lies make daily — I appreciate your ser- at Fort Knox and the Maneuver Center of vide an update on the Maneuver Center vice and your sacrifices. Excellence at Fort Benning. of Excellence. Forge the Thunderbolt!

4 — March-April 2008 CSM Otis Smith Command Sergeant Major U.S. Army Armor Center

Today’s Soldiers and Leaders are Battle Tough and Proven

In keeping with the theme of this year’s future, which brings us back to this year’s Armor Warfighting Conference, “Forg- Armor Warfighting Conference. ing the Thunderbolt in an Age of Persis- tent Conflict,” I would like to pay tribute The Conference will begin on Sunday, 4 to our Armor and Cavalry Soldiers and May, with an Armor Trainer Update break- This year’s conference places a heavy leaders — they are the toughest fighters fast, briefing, and evening social. Mon- emphasis on where the Armor force is on the battlefield and have proven their day, 5 May, kicks off with the “Domi- headed and the changes we will expect resilience time and again throughout this nant Land Power” subtheme, which is ac- along the way. The conference’s agenda age of persistent conflict. It is the com- companied by the commanding general’s is jam-packed with guest speakers, infor- mitment of the Armor Center to enable its opening remarks, followed by various mative discussion panels, and briefings force to continue to accomplish its mis- events, including guest speakers, the mas- that offer invaluable information for all sion — by building and maintaining the ter gunner panel, an FBCB2 briefing, a Soldiers on the “way ahead.” Noncom- capabilities Soldiers need to remain rel- PEO soldier update briefing, the commissioned officers and Soldiers of all evant and ready; to train and equip our mand sergeant major’s update, the week- ranks are encouraged to attend — this is Soldiers to fight as warriors; to grow long static vehicle and vendor’s display, a once-a-year opportunity for our Sol- adaptive and competent leaders capable an all-day shotgun/skeet shoot at French diers to share invaluable lessons learned of handling new and changing battlefield Range, and an evening Stable Call at the with their brethren. Patton Museum. challenges; and to maintain a quality of Our Soldiers will always remain our pri- life and well-being for our Soldiers and Tuesday, 6 May, the subtheme, “Persis- mary focus; they are the centerpiece of all their families. tent Conflict,” includes guest speakers, that we do as an Army. Throughout our Our first priority is to sustain the Armor the Armor Association briefing, CMETL/ history, Armor Soldiers have answered force’s increasing global commitments CATS briefing, heavy forces in irregu- the call to end tyranny, to free the op- that extend across the full range of mili- lar warfare panel discussion, NCOES pressed, and light the path to democracy tary missions, well beyond those associ- transformation briefing, core competen- for struggling nations. Armor Soldiers, ated with the current operating environ- cy training strategies work group, HBCT imbued with the Warrior Ethos, are, and ment. Today, our Armor force is provid- validation gunnery briefing, Stryker MGS will always remain, the foundation of the ing forces and capabilities for Operation update briefing, and the commanding Armor force. Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Free- general’s evening garden party. dom, and other global requirements; it As a reminder, the new Order of Saint continues to deter aggression and keep On Wednesday, 7 May, the subtheme, George Black Medallion is now available peace elsewhere around the world, as well “Forging the Thunderbolt,” offers an infor staff sergeants and below; the crite- as provide support for numerous human- fluence operations panel, BNCOC brief- rion for the medallion is available on itarian assistance missions globally. ing, ANCOC briefing, reconnaissance the Armor Association’s homepage at squad ron lessons learned briefing, HBCT www.usarmor-assn.org. To celebrate the Not only is our Army committed to fight- modernization briefing, an Armor School achievements of outstanding Soldiers in ing a “global” war on terror and execut- update, and an afternoon speech by Ser- the ranks of staff sergeant and below, leading current operations, but we are in the geant Major of the Army, Kenneth Pres- ers are encouraged to nominate them for process of resetting our forces and build- ton. the new medal. ing a modular Army. To meet this goal, the Armor force must position itself in Thursday, 8 May, wraps up with work- This year’s Armor Warfighting Confer- terms of mindset, capability, effective- ing group backbriefs in the morning, the ence promises to be the best yet! I look ness, efficiency, training, education, and golf tournament in the afternoon, and forward to seeing you there. leadership — all of which determine how the Armor Association Banquet in the “Teach our young soldiers and leaders the force will operate in the foreseeable evening. how to think; not what to think.”

March-April 2008 — 5 Using Tactical Site Exploitation to Target the Insurgent Network

by Michael Thomas

“All units collect and report information. Combined with the however, the increased roles executed by soldiers within maneu- mosaic nature of insurgencies, this means that the intelligence ver units are beginning to exceed their capabilities. Understand- flow in counterinsurgency is more bottom-up than top-down. ing the basic requirements of TSE, and evaluating the enduring Conducting aggressive intelligence, surveillance, and recon- requirement to exploit objectives, specifically when facing an naissance (ISR) operations and pushing intelligence collection asymmetric threat, requires a thorough analysis to determine an assets and analysis down to the tactical level, sometimes as far optimal solution. To understand the evolution of TSE and evalu- as company level, therefore benefit all ‘echelons.’”1 ate the enduring requirements, we need to view the basic threat context that initiated TSE developments. Today’s Army has adapted to meet the counterinsurgency threats in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time, certain requirements The Threat Scenario have escalated; specifically, to identify, collect, and preserve targeted material and personnel for potential intelligence value The small home enclosed within a courtyard was isolated by and host-nation prosecution. One result of this adaptation pro- the security element of first squad, setting the conditions to clear cess has been an increased scope of responsibility, at the maneu- the objective and conduct the search. The platoon leader direct- ver company level, to conduct a detailed exploitation on an objec- ed that the search element, second squad (+), look closely for tive. This exploitation, combined with an increased requirement hidden improvised explosive device (IED) components. As the for bottom-up intelligence-driven operations, has led to multiple reserve, third squad was observing the exfiltration route back to ad hoc solutions and expanded roles for combat arms soldiers. the combat outpost (COP). Platoon- and company-level organizations now conduct tasks The cordon and search mission was based on intelligence de- previously discounted or performed by supporting agencies. veloped primarily through interrogation of two insurgents at the To meet the increased requirement of supporting the intelli- brigade detention facility (BDF). The platoon apprehended the gence process and targeting the threat network through effec- two insurgents earlier that week when it observed the insurgents tive exploitation, company-level and below formations are con- emplacing an IED. The interrogation revealed information re- ducting a type of exploitation referred to as “tactical site exploi- garding a third insurgent. This insurgent was expected to be on tation” (TSE). Development of multiple ad hoc organizations, the objective, coordinating another IED emplacement. Upon in- such as company intelligence support teams, further exemplifies vestigation, however, the third insurgent was not found in the the increased burden on company commanders to manage op- targeted house. The only personnel observed by the search ele- erations and intelligence, as well as expand the skill sets and ment were three small children and two women dressed in full warfighting capabilities of soldiers at the lowest level. Tradition- burkas. After conducting a 15-minute search, the search element ally, soldiers have been adept at meeting emerging requirements; had found nothing. The two women stood passively in one cor-

6 — March-April 2008 ner of the room clutching the children. Frustrated, the platoon to the problem are as vast as the diverse opinions regarding ac- leader called the company commander and reported the situa- tual requirements. tion; just another dead-end lead. He requested that the platoon leave the area immediately rather than risk contact with an IED The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC’s) or sniper during retrograde back to the combat outpost. improvised explosive device defeat (IEDD) integrated capabilities development team (ICDT) is supporting the joint IEDD ef- Once the platoon left the area, the targeted bomb builder took fort. The ICDT leads the Army’s collaboration to solve the chal- off his burka and recovered the detonation devices hidden under lenges related to attacking the IED network, defeating the IED, his sister’s garment. The insurgent had concealed his identity, and training the force. The ICDT efforts have resulted in the de- and more importantly, he prevented the search team from find- velopment of skills and capabilities that have reduced the IED ing the new trigger device he had developed. He waited until threat. dark that evening, and then moved his operations to another location to avoid the risk of another search of his sister’s home. The Department of the Army (DA) G3 directed the establish- He was able to link up with another explosives courier and con- ment of an IEDD integrated process team (IPT) to conduct a ho- tinue developing IEDs for the jihadist zealots that would em- listic look at the IEDD proposed solutions and identify the en- place them during the following days. during requirements for the Army, which includes a site exploitation (SE) working group. The SE working group identified the Three days after the unsuccessful cordon and search mission, need for a capabilities-based assessment (CBA) to determine en- the platoon suffered three casualties due to an IED attack near during requirements for TSE within the BCT and subordinate the same area previously searched. Months later, the Combined formations. Efforts are currently underway to conduct this CBA. Explosives Exploitation Cell (CEXC) linked the explosives and Additionally, the sniper defeat (SD) ICDT has identified TSE as the trigger devices to the same bomb maker previously identified an area of focus in supporting their efforts. in the brigade detention facility. The Counter-Explosive Hazards Center (CEHC) matched a fingerprint lifted at the attack site by The Army assigned the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center the weapons intelligence team (WIT) team to that of an individ- (CAC) as the proponent for SE because it is the organization ual enrolled in the biometrics database during a routine patrol. best aligned to lead the effort to solve SE issues. The U.S. Army The IED maker was later apprehended by coalition forces. Armor Center, as a supporting effort, is the lead organization for TSE. CAC and the Armor Center, working with a number of Is this a Typical Scenario? other schools and centers, are initiating efforts to determine the Army’s enduring TSE requirements. Similar and recurring scenarios have triggered efforts to enhance the capability of forces operating in Iraq and Afghani- Doctrine and Organizational Developments stan. Initially, recommended solutions to this challenge ranged from treating every objective like a crime scene to integrating A primary problem relating to TSE and SE was identified by search training efforts at basic, intermediate, and advanced lev- Brigadier General Joe Ramirez, Deputy Commanding General, els. The scenario above highlights some of the many challenges Combined Arms Center, during the Directors of Training (DOT) tactical forces face regarding the threat when combined with Conference held at Fort Leavenworth in mid-2007. Ramirez cultural environment considerations. Specifically, the scenario referenced the initial draft TSE appendix for U.S. Army Field relates to counterinsurgency operations where IEDs and sniper Manual (FM) 3-90.5, The Combined Arms Battalion, which the attacks emphasize the asymmetric threat. Soldiers must initiate Armor Center developed, and determined that the absence of a TSE on initial contact to effectively attack IED and sniper net- doctrinal foundation inhibited the development and integration works, and ultimately eliminate this insurgent capability. Recent of various DOTMLPF solutions.2 Such doctrine must describe efforts have spanned a broad range of issues, which include: the integrated concept of site exploitation and the exploitation process, and must clearly define and differentiate terms used to • Developing doctrinal resources as a framework for site exploitation. • Fielding identity management tools, such as biometric automated toolsets (BAT) and handheld interagency identity detection equipment (HIIDE), down to the squad level. • Proposed force design updates (FDU) to increase intelligence analysis capabilities at both the brigade and joint levels, and shift some of that capability to the company level. • Enhanced cultural understanding and awareness through counterintelligence seminars. • Improved search techniques for tactical forces through training and organization. The Army has two primary issues to address regarding TSE, which include determining if the current brigade combat team (BCT) organization is capable of conducting TSE within the structure, training, and skill sets available when facing future adversaries; and identifying the Army’s enduring requirement relating to TSE. “To meet the increased requirement of supporting the intelligence process and tar- Collectively, the Army and the entire joint community have es- geting the threat network through effective exploitation, company-level and below tablished ad hoc organizations and implemented “stove pipe” formations are conducting a type of exploitation referred to as ‘tactical site exploitation’ (TSE). Development of multiple ad hoc organizations, such as company in- solutions to provide the BCT with the appropriate TSE capabil- telligence support teams, further exemplify the increased burden on company com- ities. The doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership manders to manage operations and intelligence, as well as expand the skill sets and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) solutions and warfighting capabilities of soldiers at the lowest level.”

March-April 2008 — 7 “Biometric automated toolset (BAT) is an accurate, timely, and efficient automated personnel enrollment and tracking system that collects and saves biometric data in a database that can be searched or queried. It incorporates iris scan, fingerprints, photographs, and biographical information of any individual, and stores the collected data on a central server located on a secure network.”

subsequently published in the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbook 07-26, Tactical Site Exploitation and Cache Search Op- erations.6 Equally important and integrated in both TSE and SSE is technical exploitation, which CADD’s draft definition describes as, “the ap- address TSE and sensitive site exploitation (SSE), thus avoiding plication of specialized means to assess personnel, documents, misuse and confusion. electronic data, and other material in order to generate intelli- Following the conference, the site exploitation working group, gence to support follow-on actions.” Technical exploitation pri- members from multiple centers of excellence (COEs), and the marily supports BCT operations through agencies and special- Combined Arms Doctrine Division (CADD), drafted and staffed ized assets not normally organic to the BCT, such as weapons a proposed definition for site exploitation operations. The result intelligence teams (WIT), CEXC, or other task force elements defined site exploitation operations as: “Related activities that organized under joint tenets within CENTCOM to support the- gather and make use of the personnel, information, and/or ma- ater IED defeat efforts. terial found during the conduct of operations in order to support Site exploitation has emerged as the overarching concept in the tactical, operational, and strategic objectives.” absence of current doctrine outlining the interaction of existent Within the context of SE, the two distinct areas addressed are and emerging technical intelligence (TECHINT) agencies and SSE and TSE. Soldiers supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom on-site exploitation requirements. CADD is currently develop- (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) often incorrect- ing doctrine to codify these concepts and agency relationships. ly use these terms synonymously, which has led to some confu- TECHINT has not historically provided the immediate direct sup- sion in various Army organizations as to their true definitions, port to tactical operations that we see today. The need to support as well as the exploitation activities themselves (what elements tactically based targeting operations to remove various IED (bomb conduct the exploitation). maker, funding, and emplacement) networks has influenced the efforts of multiple centers of excellence in developing concepts SSE is best described in the context of a “sensitive site,” which and capabilities, which range from every soldier is a sensor (ES2) is “a designated geographically limited area with special mili- to law enforcement programs (LEP). These programs support the tary diplomatic, economic, or informational sensitivity to the BCT’s analysis of criminal activity linked to funding or support- United States.”3 SSE is currently defined in Joint Publication ing insurgent activity. As an example, the TECHINT effort in (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Asso- OIF was also supported by other government agencies such as ciated Terms, as “A related series of activities inside a captured the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF). sensitive site to exploit personnel documents, electronic data, Since March 2005, ATF has deployed special agent certified ex- and material captured at the site, while neutralizing any threat plosives specialists and explosives enforcement officers to sup- posed by the site or its contents.”4 Examples of sensitive sites port the Iraq CEXC within CENTCOM.7 are described in FM 2-0, Intelligence, and may include war crime Site Exploitation Advances sites, critical hostile government facilities, areas suspected of containing persons of high rank in a hostile government, stor- The integration and linkages within the exploitation process age areas for enemy classified files, or research and production have evolved exponentially over the past few years, as the Army facilities involving breakthrough technologies. Although still moves to improve the integrated exploitation process. The Army used, “sensitive site exploitation” is considered a legacy term has improved its ability to effectively search for, identify, and relating to specialized teams formed during initial OIF opera- properly collect documents and media of value for subsequent tions to support the exploitation of suspected sensitive sites to exploitation by joint organizations. The resulting intelligence locate Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The term pro- analysis and dissemination tempo for these products has ex- liferated and was subsequently used throughout Central Com- panded to include support to tactical operations, which has in- mand (CENTCOM) to describe the actions by any agency at- creased support to the BCT, enhancing the military decision- tempting to exploit an objective for information. making process (MDMP) and threat network targeting. The Armor Center’s Directorate of Training, Doctrine, and Military search operations are focused at the tactical level to Combat Development introduced the term “tactical site exploi- ensure that tactical units can effectively identify, preserve, and tation,” or TSE, and defined it as “the actions taken to ensure collect material during tactical operations (for subsequent anal- that personnel, documents, electronic data, and other material at ysis or criminal prosecution). The improved search focus can be a site are identified, evaluated, collected, and protected in order attributed to early OIF challenges in the Central Criminal Courts to facilitate follow-on actions.”5 This term was included in the of Iraq (CCCI), and the inability to consistently identify, collect, initial draft of FM 3-90.5, The Combined Arms Battalion, and and preserve evidence along with corroborating witness state-

8 — March-April 2008 ments for prosecution. Initial TSE efforts focused on ensuring agement provide rapid on-site identity confirmation of high-val- that soldiers were cognizant of evidentiary requirements for ue individuals (HVI) and facilitate enrollment of unknown per- CCCI prosecution. Military search, a key TSE task, has evolved sonnel. The following tools are primary assets that support the beyond that to the point where various agencies provide “search” BCT in identity management: training with emphasis ranging from systematic routine search • techniques to forensic collection to support biometric identifi- Biometric automated toolset (BAT) is an accurate, timely, and cation. efficient automated personnel enrollment and tracking system that collects and saves biometric data in a database that can be The shift from major combat operations to irregular warfare searched or queried. It incorporates iris scan, fingerprints, pho- has identified the importance of supporting the criminal prose- tographs, and biographical information of any individual, and cution of detainees for various crimes, including crimes against stores the collected data on a central server located on a secure humanity and war crimes. The document and media exploita- network. Additionally, BAT has the ability to create identification (DOMEX) process, particularly through its captured docu- tion cards that aid in the timely identification or verification of ments, media, and material chain of custody procedures, provides personnel. direct support to the criminal intelligence (CRIMINT) process • through preservation of potential evidence. Handheld interagency identification detection equipment (HIIDE) is a portable, battery-operated, handheld, multimodal Technical exploitation support has been enhanced by employ- (iris, fingerprint, facial photo, biographic contextual informa- ing personnel with specific skills who can effectively search/an- tion) biometric device that can support biometric identification alyze specific sites or incidents and subsequently evaluate and tasks and biometric enrollment tasks. The HIIDE system is in- exploit the related findings. This effort has been centered on the teroperable with BAT. capacity and capabilities supported by WIT and their availability to support the BCT commander, as well as the integration and With an increased scope of responsibility and capabilities to employment of specialized joint assets. Jointly staffed WIT teams support effective exploitation, with an emphasis on tactical-lev- are currently employed in direct support of maneuver BCT com- el organizations, challenges exist within the Army as to the train- manders, with one team per BCT assigned to joint task forces in ing strategies needed to promote these efforts. TRADOC’s zero- Iraq and Afghanistan. growth policy regarding institutional training, combined with the systematic approach to training development within the in- Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) assets and organizations stitutional domain, constrain the ability to find effective solu- support the collection and evaluation of IED-related material tions to current problems. Multiple agencies not normally as- by rendering IEDs safe and by providing first-line tactical exploitation, collection, and evaluation of IEDs and components. EOD exploitation supports a two-way flow of information on IEDs for tactical and technical intelligence. EOD personnel can ensure that enemy explosives and ordnance are rendered safe and subsequently exploited to facilitate effective threat analysis and targeting. Biometric advancements and identity management equipment have improved the Army’s ability to identify and track potential insurgents. Through effective collection, exploitation assets can link individuals to material by using forensic analysis, which enables more effective targeting at the operational level. At the tactical level, the tools supporting identity man-

“Military search operations are focused at the tactical level to ensure that tactical units can effectively identify, preserve, and collect material during tactical operations (for subsequent analysis or criminal prosecution). The improved search focus can be attributed to early OIF challenges in the Central Crim- inal Courts of Iraq (CCCI), and the inability to consistently identify, collect, and preserve evidence along with corroborating witness statements for prosecution. Initial TSE efforts focused on ensuring that soldiers were cognizant of evidentiary requirements for CCCI prosecution.”

March-April 2008 — 9 task and condition to encompass the range of search skills such as personnel, area, vehicle, and building search. Quantifying what type of search skills are required by soldiers is a key to resolving this issue. However, what is being intimated is that every soldier requires search skills and training, which sounds like an institutional training requirement that will not simply be solved by MTT. Reports from joint task forces indicate that units operating in theater require effectively trained search personnel. This report should be quantified within the context of the unit’s specific mission — is Task Force Troy looking for basic search requirements, media collection for exploitation, and/or forensic preservation for exploitation, or perhaps there’s a gap in training within the EOD and WIT teams who support collection and analysis efforts? This leads “Search should be viewed as a supporting task for TSE and other collective tasks, and integrated at back to the root question: are we expecting various levels. Additionally, search requirements and capabilities need to be clarified by task and con- entry-level 11B/19D/19K soldiers to become dition to encompass the range of search skills such as personnel, area, vehicle, and building search. forensic evidence collectors? Until we quan- Quantifying what type of search skills are required by soldiers is a key to resolving this issue.” tify the requirement from the bottom up, by skill set required, we will continue to floun- der in this area. All existing search training initiatives may be valid, but the target audi- sociated with training the force, such as the National Ground ence requires clear delineation. Intelligence Center (NGIC) and Asymmetric Warfare Group One solution is to ensure specifically trained personnel with (AWG), have developed training products and provided mobile specialized search skills that are resident with military police, training teams (MTTs) to address the operational requirements EOD agencies, chemical personnel, and other specially trained that have emerged based on the threat and the truncated Army assets are integrated into mission sets. Meanwhile, basic capa- force generation (ARFORGEN) model. bilities and an understanding of basic search skills and evidence Improving the Army’s Search Techniques handling could be taught to standard for maneuver company- level soldiers and linked to an integrated capability within the While the integrated efforts outlined above may be complex and BCT; however, we should not expect entry-level 11B/19D/19K require linkages to joint agencies and processes, emerging re- soldiers to become forensic evidence collectors. quirements for search may have the most impact on BCT forces, their current structure, and the training requirements based The Process — Practical Application Considerations on the capabilities we now expect infantry, reconnaissance, and Currently, TSE is focused on meeting three primary purposes armor soldiers to execute. An evaluation of recent efforts to im- for the maneuver commander: prove search training exemplifies the problems across the institutional and operational training domain. The CEHC has ag- • Answering information requirements. gressively argued for the formal assignment of a search propo- • Facilitating subsequent operations (through intelligence, nent in an effort to ensure uniformity of search training to meet analysis, and targeting). Forces Command (FORSCOM) requirements. • Facilitating criminal prosecution by host-nation authorities. The premise is that one agency serves as the coordinating lead or proponent for search, since there are a number of agencies Answering information requirements. All operations are teaching search with different agendas, equipment lists, and fo- founded in effective reconnaissance, and every soldier can make cus. Currently, NGIC trains two separate search MTTs. One fo- observations that answer the commander’s information require- cuses on biometrics support and forensic collection, which is ments and support the development of situational awareness, taught by the biometrics department; and the other focuses on which drives planning and execution. The commander should properly handling and collecting material and media, which is provide clearly understood commander’s critical information re- taught by the DOMEX department. Each MTT teaches a skill to quirements (CCIR), which can be supported by effective TSE. support their subsequent portion of exploitation. The Joint Cen- Forces can use TSE to answer CCIR through a range of tools ter of Excellence (JCOE) at the National Training Center (NTC) from tactical questioning to DOMEX. is attempting to expand the existing search training to link inte- Effective planning for patrols, cordon and searches, raids, and grating tasks, such as tactical questioning and employment of other counterinsurgency operations can yield information that biometric tools, into the training. JCOE training supports cur- answers CCIR. When conducted effectively, TSE can protect rent requirements for the collective task of conducting TSE, but valuable information that is properly collected and analyzed, does not solve the requirement of defining the tasks and respon- and can answer higher headquarters’ CCIR. The value of infor- sibilities in relation to the various soldiers within the BCT. This mation is further emphasized in FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency: limits the subsequent development of training that will ensure all “Counterinsurgency (COIN) is an intelligence-driven endeav- the search requirements are achieved. or. The function of intelligence in COIN is to facilitate under- Search should be viewed as a supporting task for TSE and oth- standing of the operational environment, with emphasis on the er collective tasks, and integrated at various levels. Additional- pop ulace, host nation, and insurgents. Com manders require ac- ly, search requirements and capabilities need to be clarified by curate intelligence about these three areas to best address the

10 — March-April 2008 Organizing for TSE issues driving the insurgency. Both insurgents and counterinsurgents require From Engineer School an effective intelligence capability to be successful. Both attempt to create Specialized elements and maintain intelligence networks Tech while trying to neutralize their oppo- Teams nent’s intelligence capabilities.”8 Facilitate subsequent operations. WIT / EOD The information gained from TSE can lead to immediate follow-on actions on or near the objective, or may require Search Element Time on Objective:

detailed analysis to support the target- Complexity of Objective: ing process. Effective TSE provides critical data for inclusion in the intel- First Soldiers on Obj ligence process that subsequently sup- Functions ports targeting. Soldiers identify material and personnel of interest, collect Task organization for TSE depends on the complexity of the objective and METT-TC these items and, after the operation is complete, conduct a debrief with the S2. The material that was collected is processed and analyzed; ily debated. From a maneuver BCT perspective, TSE should be appropriate agencies conduct personnel interrogation; and the planned, organized, and executed in the same context as a com- intelligence process develops information for inclusion in the tar- bined arms breaching operation. In the deliberate planning pro- geting process. cess, the appropriate TSE elements should be task organized to Facilitate host nation prosecution. Stability operations often meet the exploitation requirements anticipated on the objective support attempts to establish local governance and control. These and tasked/resourced accordingly. This technique is similar to operations may focus on assisting local law enforcement with the task organizing a breach force with the assets required to reduce capture and subsequent prosecution of criminal/insurgent targets. an obstacle. Assignment of a specified task and purpose to ele- Collection of material that can be associated with criminal/in- ments conducting TSE operations at all levels will clarify respon- surgent activity and provided to the local government for pros- sibilities and ensure the commanders’ end-state objectives are ecution is critical to the success of operational and strategic Army met. If resources are not available to execute the required tasks objectives. Generally, the collection of material for prosecution or mission, specialized support should be requested through high- purposes coincides with the collection of material for exploita- er headquarters. All specialized support elements must be inte- tion in the intelligence and targeting cycle. Commander’s guid- grated into the plan, or coordinated as a reactionary capability ance for handling this type of material dictates the priority. At based on specific criteria or triggers, with planning consider- the battalion level and above, the judge advocate general (JAG) ations for response times and security requirements. can assist the staff and subordinate elements in coordinating the Hasty TSE should be considered synonymous with the manner collection of material for criminal prosecution. in which an infantry squad would conduct a hasty breach of a From an execution perspective, TSE falls along four basic tasks, blocked entryway. A hasty breaching operation will be executed which when effectively integrated, support the exploitation ob- based on the tenets and principles of the breaching operation. jectives. These basic primary tasks include: TSE should be executed using basic standard organizational requirements and tasks. When facing a hasty exploitation, sol- • Search. diers should be tasked via fragmentary orders to conduct the ex- • Collection. ploitation based on training and capabilities and within the pre- • Tactical questioning. scribed context of SE. Small unit standing operating procedures • Analysis. (SOP) should be developed outlining exploitation team organization, requirements, and tasks by element. Priority intelligence Also nested within these tasks are the preservation consider- requirements (PIR) should be clearly disseminated and associ- ations within the context of the tactical situation. ated with decisions (triggers) that require external support from To effectively execute TSE, planning must be fully integrated specialized exploitation agencies. within the MDMP or troop leading procedures (TLP). The anal- BCT Deliberate TSE Operations Scenario ysis of mission requirements is the prevailing tenet that will support effective exploitation of a site or objective. In a counter- The BCT has determined through collaborative analysis that a insurgency environment, almost every tactical mission will re- group of individuals are coordinating development of IEDs in a quire, or lead to, some form of exploitation, and leaders should small neighborhood, which includes a storage building. Intelli- plan accordingly. The requirement to conduct a detailed exploi- gence developed over time has indicated that three individuals tation based on criticality or expected value of a site will dictate linked to specific IED events are involved in IED construction. how an organization will task organize elements for the opera- There are three buildings on the objective where the IED com- tion. Triggers and decision points for routine operations execut- ponents are stored and constructed. The storage building is used ed at the small-unit level still require coordinating instructions as a distribution point for the individuals emplacing the IEDs. to subordinate elements and effective use of CCIR. When staff The components are delivered from multiple sources, therefore, analysis of the mission dictates that TSE is a critical or primary while suspected insurgent personnel located on the objective task, the planning considerations and level of detail should es- are targeted for apprehension, the material may also be exploit- calate appropriately. ed in an attempt to trace the components to the point of origin and link the material to the supplier (the higher network). The concept and organization of a formalized exploitation team or element within an organization established solely to respond This operation, a standard cordon and search mission, will in- to an objective or an event to conduct exploitation tasks is heav- clude a critical and deliberate TSE requirement, with the efforts

March-April 2008 — 11 • A specified search element with leadership, assigned all assets required to conduct an effective search, including collection and protection of the material on the objective or site. • An appropriate tactical questioning element with corresponding linguist capabilities. • Personnel capable of conducting a search of individuals located on the objective. • A documentation element (or assistant element leader) responsible for supervising or conducting the documentation of the objective with photographs and site sketches docu- menting where personnel and material were located and recovered. “Anticipatory planning is essential to seizing and retaining the initiative. It involves project- “The concept and organization of a formalized exploitation team or element within an organiza- ing thoughts forward in time and space to deter- tion established solely to respond to an objective or an event to conduct exploitation tasks is mine how to influence events before they occur, heavily debated. From a maneuver BCT perspective, TSE should be planned, organized, and rather than responding to events dictated by oth- executed in the same context as a combined arms breaching operation. In the deliberate planning process, the appropriate TSE elements should be task organized to meet the exploitation ers. To seize the initiative, commanders must an- requirements anticipated on the objective and tasked/resourced accordingly.” ticipate events and act purposefully and effectively before enemies do, starting with the initial commander’s visualization.”9 linked to operational and potentially strategic objectives. Inte- Company-Level Tactical Site Exploitation Scenario gration of the entire suite of BCT capabilities should be coordinated to conduct effective exploitation of the objective. The Referring to the threat scenario at the beginning of this article, staff evaluates all assets available during mission analysis, along the basic requirements ensuring successful TSE can be identi- with their capabilities and limitations, prior to developing cours- fied. When the company commander initiates TLP, specifically es of action (COA). Additionally, the integration of the WIT and upon receipt and analysis of a mission and while making a ten- CEXC should be considered for this mission and potentially re- tative plan, the tasks associated with successful TSE execution quested from the joint task force. Traditional cordon and search should be identified. The majority of these tasks remain the same considerations apply. Additionally, when specifically looking at for every mission that includes a TSE requirement; they should the exploitation of the objective, the staff should consider the be specifically assigned during the orders process and coordi- following: nated through rehearsals and SOP. Below is a list of tasking re- • quirements and tasks: Available EOD assets. • • Assign a TSE team leader (TL). It is imperative that one in- Detainee handling. dividual be responsible for the overall TSE portion of the mis- • Integration of HUMINT teams with tactical interrogation sion. During basic cordon and search missions, this could be the capability. • Availability and classification of linguists. TSE TEAM NOTES: • Forensic collection capacity. Linguists LEADER • 1. LINGUIST PRIORITIZED Biometric asset availability. BETWEEN DOCUMENT • WIT/CEXC integration if avail- SEARCH & TQ. able. TSE ATL 2. ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS ADDED IAW METT-TC: • Joint, interagency, and multination- - DOG TEAMS al asset availability. -EOD • Documentation asset availability; for example, the combat photogra- SEARCH SEARCH TQ ELEMENT pher may assist in site documenta- ELEMENT ELEMENT LEADER tion. LEADER LEADER • Time on the objective (time re- SEARCHERS SEARCHERS THT/HET/ quired to fully exploit the impor- SEARCHERS SEARCHERS tance of the site). SEARCHERS SEARCHERS BATS Within the identified assets and capa- FEMALE IAW METT-TC bilities, the element tasked with con- SEARCHER ducting TSE is configured to meet the following basic requirements: IAW METT-TC SECURITY • A unit leader specifically tasked to ELEMENT complete the TSE requirements.

12 — March-April 2008 search element leader, or a specific squad leader, within the pla- required to support effective decisionmaking. When developing toon tasked as the search element. a plan, the commander must consider modified requirements • for an escalated exploitation by reactionary forces with special- If available based on the size and scope of the mission and ized capabilities such as WIT or military police investigators. troops available, an assistant TSE team leader (ATL) can sup- These considerations include increased security requirements, port the following documentation tasks: increased time on the objective, and coordination requirements Z Complete a sketch of the site, annotating where personnel for battle handover. The collective task developed by the Armor and material collected from the site were located; and Center, “conduct tactical site exploitation,” outlines the integrated procedures for conducting TSE.10 Z Coordinate video collection of the site (digital camera or To ensure effective- video), chain of custody, and documentation procedures. ness of TSE, a thorough debrief must be conducted to ensure successful exploitation. • Assign photographer/recorder who is responsible for video The Way Forward documentation of the site. Include 360-degree panoramic photos when possible, along with photographs of every item in its While today’s soldiers are intelligent, aggressive, and adapt- original location before collection. Additionally, items collect- able, the increased spectrum of tasks that infantry, reconnais- ed should be photographed with the suspected insurgent to sup- sance, and armor soldiers are expected to execute is rapidly ap- port subsequent prosecution. proaching a task saturation point. Additionally, the institutional • training domain, while focused on training fundamental soldier Designate a search element, size and scope based on mission, tasks, may be behind the curve in meeting the current task re- enemy, terrain, troops, time available, and civilians (METT-TC). quirements to counter today’s increased asymmetrical threat. At a minimum, the search element should be prepared to exe- With the Army’s force generation model taxed in an abbreviat- cute building, area, personnel, and vehicle searches as required, ed cycle, the institutional training domain may be required to along with employment of the materials that will support search radically modify traditional programs of instruction to meet efforts, such as explosive detection assets, metal detectors (both training requirements traditionally conducted within the opera- personnel and ground), and other technical assets that will en- tional domain at home station during force generation. hance the search. When available, include female soldiers in search team organization to mitigate cultural hurdles. Until the Army can establish a baseline for all soldiers, devel- • op tasks, and subsequently implement soldier training (entry lev- A tactical questioning (TQ) element organized, on the basis el and noncommissioned officer education system), the opera- of linguist availability and number of personnel anticipated on tional force cannot effectively expand the training to support the objective. The TQ element may be one soldier with a linguist brigade/battalion search teams. Additionally, the ability to iden- (interpreter), or may be organized with personnel prepared to tify the transition points for integrating specialized or “advanced” handle detainees using the tenets of segregate, search, silence, search skills while simultaneously identifying which soldiers safeguard, speed, and tag. The individual employing the HIIDE should possess those skills is inhibited. The way forward re- or BAT for identity management should be incorporated within quires a thorough task analysis and a collaborated capability- this element. based assessment to ensure that the requirements are integrated Commanders at all levels conduct analysis to determine the into future training and force structure. events or “triggers” that would indicate the requirement of specialized exploitation resources. Company commanders must effectively inform subordinates on their “limit of advance” relating to their exploitation capabilities and the specific informa- Notes tion requirements that imply external resources may be required. 1U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, Headquarters, Department of the Leaders ensure subordinates understand the commander’s PIRs, Army (HQDA), U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, December 2006. specifically PIR that indicate the presence of critical, exploitable 2FM 3-90.5, The Combined Arms Battalion (Draft), Directorate, Training, Doctrine, and Com- bat Development, U.S. Army Armor Center, Fort Knox, KY, TBP. documents, media, weapons related material, or personnel ex- 3 ceeding their exploitation assets. FM 2.0, Intelligence, HQDA, GPO, Washington, DC, May 2004. 4Joint Publication 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Department of Defense, Effective dissemination of PIR and soldiers’ effective recogni- GPO, Washington, DC, 12 April 2001 (As Amended through 17 October 2007). tion and reporting provide the commander with the information 5FM 3-90.5; and Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbook, Tactical Site Exploita- tion and Cache Search Operations, No. 07-26, CALL, Fort Leavenworth, KS, May 2007. 6Tactical Site Exploitation Training Support Package, Directorate, Training, Doctrine, and Com- bat Development, U.S. Army Armor Center, Fort Knox, KY, August 2007. 7Statement of Michael J. Sullivan, Acting Director Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, before the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, 19 April, 2007. TSE Team Leader 8FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. (FSO) 9FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, HQDA, GPO, Washington, DC, January 2005. 10Collective Task 17-2-9400, “Conduct Tactical Site Exploitation,” Directorate, Training, Doc- trine, and Combat Development, U.S. Army Armor Center, Fort Knox, KY, TBP. TSE Assistant TL (Master Gunner) Michael Thomas is currently a contractor supporting tactical site exploitation at Directorate, Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development, Fort Knox, KY. He served a full military career as a Marine Corps armor offi- Search Element TQ Element cer. He received a B.A. from the University of New Mexico and is a grad- (Squad or team) (Senior NCO w/linguist) uate of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, Marine Corps Security Forces, U.S. Naval Central Command, Bahrain; instruc- Example notional CO/TM TSE Organization. METT-TC considerations will dictate personnel requirements and availability. Ensure each area has tor, Maneuver Captains Career Course, Fort Knox, KY; and operations been assigned as a specified task to a subordinate element/individual. officer, logistics officer, and inspector instructor, 4th Tank Battalion, 4th Marine Division.

March-April 2008 — 13 Human Terrain Mapping: A Critical First Step in Winning the Counterinsurgency Fight

by Lieutenant Colonel Jack Marr, Major John Cushing, Major Brandon Garner, and Captain Richard Thompson

According to counterinsurgency (COIN) Task Force (TF) 1st Battalion, 15th In- human terrain mapping, TF Dragon was doctrine, the struggle for a population’s fantry (TF Dragon), 3d Heavy Brigade able to better understand the population, support is the core of the counterinsur- Combat Team, 3d Infantry Division from gain the trust of local leaders, and dem- gency fight. To truly get to know the pop- Fort Benning, Georgia, inherited an area onstrate our commitment to local com- ulation, you must really understand its southeast of Baghdad during Operation munities. This, in turn, led to the devel- culture. One could argue that the U.S. Iraqi Freedom V that had not seen a con- opment of actionable intelligence on in- military was not attuned to this at the out- sistent coalition presence in nearly 2 surgent activities, the construction of a set of Operation Iraqi Freedom, but sol- years. TF Dragon’s operational environ- biometric census of military-age males, diers and leaders with the experience of ment straddled a Sunni/Shia sectarian and improved security. multiple rotations in Iraq and Afghani- fault line with the majority of the Sunnis The Importance of Having stan understand and actively accept these living along the Tigris River (our west- Human Terrain Mapping two ideas as central to our current fight. ern boundary), and Shia areas in the north The population is the center of gravity (close to Baghdad) and the east (along The center of gravity in all counterin- and must be considered first in everything the Baghdad-Al Kut highway). The infor- surgency operations is the population; we do. The key to success is finding ways mation gap between what we knew and controlling the population is essential to to separate the insurgents from the popu- what we needed to know was fairly sig- the isolation/dislocation of insurgents. lation; therefore, it is critical that we un- nificant. Isolating the insurgents facilitates a unit’s derstand the human terrain in which we efforts to deal effectively with both the operate. The important question is no lon- To fill this gap, the entire battalion be- enemy (through lethal targeting) and the ger “why” or “if” we need this informa- gan focusing on the systematic collection local population (through nonlethal tar- tion — but “how” we gather it. How does of information about the local people in geting). This enables units to drive a wedge a tactical-level military unit amass the our assigned area of operations (AO) between the insurgents and the popula- necessary information about the area in through a process we described as human tion within which they hide. At the tacti- which it operates? terrain mapping. As a result of con ducting cal level of this fight, this is the critical ac-

14 — March-April 2008 tion. We discovered that developing a dynamics of a particular area. We identi- any other important people such as human terrain map of the task force’s AO fied each tribe, town, city, or village with- government officials, Iraqi Security was the best way to enable control of the in which the enemy might have sought Forces (ISF), etc. population, defined in U.S. Army Field refuge. We determined who supported the Location of mosques, schools, and Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, insurgents and their needs and wants. In areas of commerce/markets. as “determining who lives in an area and essence, a human terrain map is the phys- what they do.” In simple terms, a human ical manifestation or tool to collect and Identification of the population’s bat- terrain map outlines who the players are.1 catalog cultural and ethnographical infor- tle rhythm or pattern of life such as As any veteran, leader, or student of this mation encapsulated in the historical coun- when they wake up, sleep, shop, etc. terinsurgency principle of understanding war recognizes, insurgents hold the up- the environment. Nearest ISF locations/checkpoints. per hand with their better understanding of local customs and politics, their abili- Defining Tactical Economic driving forces and em- ty to speak the language, their freedom of Human Terrain Mapping ployment histories. movement within the society, and their The human terrain mapping effort that Employment/unemployment levels. better comprehension of the population’s interests. Unfortunately, the enemy in this TF Dragon began in the early summer of Determining if people are moving in war does not wear a uniform; this war 2007 was a deliberate process designed or out of the AO. to gain ethnographic information about comes without a program outlining the our operating environment. With nearly Identifying anti-coalition presence players. 400,000 people in the Dragon’s AO, and and/or activities. In preparation for our current combat little coalition presence over the past 2 Access to essential services such as tour, TF Dragon’s leaders looked hard at years, there was a critical requirement for fuel, water, emergency care, fire re- the examples of units that were enjoying ethnographic information. To accomplish sponse, etc. success on the battlefields of Iraq. Over- this, we planned and executed a deliber- whelmingly, the units that seemed to be ate process of decentralized patrols to Local population concerns/issues. winning the fight had made significant in- answer specific questions about the pop- Human terrain mapping information roads with local leaders and found pro- ulation we secured. The goal was to an- was gathered by platoon-level combat pa- active ways to understand and respect lo- swer specific information requirements trols, conducted during daylight hours. cal cultural norms and address specific about each separate village and town, To avoid pattern-setting and predictabil- community needs. Although we recog- which included: ity, companies planned these terrain map- nized and understood this lesson, when ping missions in a systematic, yet unpre- we arrived in our AO, we found that very Defining (graphically) each tribal dictable to the enemy, pattern. In this way, little of this data had been collected, and area with specific attention to where all areas would be covered without mak- the information that was available was they adjoined or overlapped with ing it obvious to the insurgents which ar- spread out across the continuity files of neighboring tribes. eas might be visited next. For example, nearly every staff section. Furthermore, Location and contact information for our B Company used the main road in when we tried early on to verify the infor- each sheik or village muhktar and their AO (running between Jisr Diyala and mation, we found that people had moved, opinions had changed, and, in many cases, not much was known. Therefore, TF Dragon’s commanders and staff outlined a plan by which we could capture the human terrain mapping information in a medium that all soldiers could monitor and understand. Once the formatting and baseline information requirements were set, we leveraged the shared situational awareness enhancing capabilities of the command post of the future (CPOF) to maintain a visual database. Each company in our task force was allocated a CPOF to post the results of their human terrain mapping. Each company identified the specific data points about their AO, which included religious boundaries, key economic structures, mosques, and sheiks. When incidents occurred in specific areas, all companies could plot the location and contact the local sheik to gain intelligence or ask critical questions. “We saw the first step of the counterinsurgency fight as determining the human dynamics of a par- Screenshot of ticular area. We identified each tribe, town, city, or village within which the enemy might have Human Terrain Mapping sought ref uge. We determined who supported the insurgents and their needs and wants. In essence, a human terrain map is the physical manifestation or tool to collect and catalog cultural and We saw the first step of the counterin- ethnographical information encapsulated in the historical counterinsurgency principle of under- surgency fight as determining the human standing the environment.”

March-April 2008 — 15 Salman Pak, near Baghdad) as the focal uted to the delivery of information oper- peared to be uncomfortable with this re- point, and began with the villages on the ations themes and messages. Generally, quest, the unit would arrange a date to re- east and west side of this main thorough- these themes included the rewards pro- turn to the village and revisit the biomet- fare. Each day, they would alternate di- gram (money for information of extrem- ric-data system entry process. However, rection, moving north or south of the vil- ist activities), examples of the positive most local leaders immediately agreed lages they had previously visited. After steps taken by the local government and/ with the request and viewed the biomet- 2 or 3 days of patrolling, they would or ISF, and the benefits of cooperation ric census as evidence of their innocence schedule a day with no patrols to further with the coalition. Whenever possible, and willingness to cooperate with coali- disrupt any patterns they may have been these messages were delivered in the form tion forces. Throughout the entire patrol, setting. of pamphlets or handouts given to local soldiers talked to as many people as pos- citizens. Knowing these messages and sible to pass on specific information oper- Patrols were planned and organized with having handouts prepared was consid- ation themes/handouts. On average, these specific objectives and purposes for each ered TF Dragon’s information operations patrols took about 2 to 4 hours to com- sub-element. Our three critical tasks in- basic load, and was the responsibility of plete. cluded security, information gathering, every soldier on the patrol. and relationship building. As the compo- Oftentimes, patrols were reinforced with sition of most patrols was centered on a civil affairs teams, human intelligence col- During a typical human terrain mapping lection teams, psychological operations mechanized infantry or tank platoon, some patrol, the platoon would move tactically augmentation was required. Generally, (PSYOP) teams, and/or additional med- and establish a cordon around the specifical personnel. These military specialists the company commander was present on ic area to be mapped. As this was being patrol to ensure a first-hand look at the provided specific areas of expertise to asset, the commander/FSO would move to sist the patrols, and were leveraged to en- AO. Additionally, the company’s fire sup- the likely center of the town or begin im- port officer (FSO), acting as the compa- hance the perceived importance of the mediately talking with citizens to deter- tactical unit. For example, having a unit ny’s intelligence officer, accompanied the mine the residence of the local sheik or commander on every patrol, which en- medic treat a civilian, especially a child, village leader. While the commander met with an acute problem provided direct ev- abled us to build a framework to address with these citizens, the FSO (and any aug- the three critical tasks. The commander idence of our unit’s goodwill, as well as mentees) talked with as many of the mil- added the tangible benefit of cooperation focused on building relationships with itary-age males as possible. The com- key individuals, while his FSO (augment- with the coalition. Additionally, having mander asked the sheik or village elder special teams along increased the overall ed by part of the platoon) focused on for permission to enter the military-age answering specific information require- number of people we could talk with in men of the village into our biometric-data the village and increased the number of ments and the platoon leader concentrat- system (HIIDES/BATS). Depending on ed on security. human sensors that could report on our the reaction to this request, the platoon information requirements. This augmen- In addition to these three sub-element might establish a centralized location and tation also provided excellent start points tasks, everyone within the patrol contrib- begin this process. If the sheik/elder ap- for “Team Village,” an element combining civil affairs, human intelligence collection, and PSYOP teams, which targeted specific effects for follow-on visits. Special care and planning was taken to ensure that these special teams did not in- terrupt or interfere with the relationship between the company/platoon and the population that was being mapped. We placed a lot of importance on the supremacy of the responsible company commander (the landowner) as the primary point of contact for each village leader. We worked to preclude any confusion among local leaders as to who would make decisions regarding projects or future support. This is especially critical when dealing with civil affairs teams, who are often seen in the eyes of the population as the “money guys.” Through a deliberate effort, we made it clear that these teams supported the company commander, not the other way around. Following every patrol, the responsible platoon/company would prepare a detailed analysis of the area that was mapped, and “Patrols were planned and organized with specific objectives and purposes for each sub-element. Our three critical tasks included security, information gathering, and relationship building. As the links were made to other villages based composition of most patrols was centered on a mechanized infantry or tank platoon, some aug- on sect, tribes, and terrain. The results mentation was required. Generally, the company commander was present on patrol to ensure a were a census-like compilation of data first-hand look at the AO.” that was collated by the task force staff.

16 — March-April 2008 The primary actors at the side knowledge of local battalion level were the S2, citizens and a ready-made the effects/information op- cross-reference capability, erations cell, and the S5. This providing a better frame- helped in developing and re- work for determining the re- fining both lethal and non- liability or motivations of lethal targeting. Human ter- informants. rain mapping also provided a graphical depiction of Human terrain mapping where potential sectarian puts a human face on con- fault lines may be located, tact with the population be- which gave us a focal point ing secured. An intended to begin our efforts to quick- second-order effect of hu- ly establish security so oth- man terrain mapping is to er logical lines of operation enable a unit to move into “Oftentimes, patrols were reinforced with civil affairs teams, human intelligence unfamiliar territory and be- could be worked. collection teams, psychological operations (PSYOP) teams, and/or additional medical personnel. These military specialists provided specific areas of expertise to as- gin separating the insurgents We used this approach to sist the patrols, and were leveraged to enhance the perceived importance of the from the population. In the deliberately develop our hu- tactical unit. For example, having a unit medic treat a civilian, especially a child, with words of one company com- man terrain map. The over- an acute problem provided direct evidence of our unit’s goodwill, as well as added mander, “I believe it was vi- all process took more than 2 the tangible benefit of cooperation with the coalition.” tal to the initial impression of months when balanced with the locals in our AO that they other tactical missions. Of saw us out walking amongst note, information contribut- them, knocking on doors, ing to our overall human terrain map was first arrived (for example, in a database), shaking hands, and asking questions spe- also gathered on offensive missions. Dur- we might have had a false sense of how cific to that family/tribe. I feel it put a ing intelligence-driven raids, cordon and well we understood our environment. human face on our company and opened searches, and attacks, the platoons/com- There is a tremendous advantage gained the door to many of the initial dialogues panies used the same information require- in the actual process of gathering ethno- that we are currently exploiting with great ments used on our human terrain map- graphic information. By way of analogy, success.” ping patrols. having a ready-made database would be similar to doing math on a calculator in- Human terrain mapping is critical to Our unit’s biggest success was getting stead of actually learning the hard way building trusted networks. The number all military-age males entered into the how to solve math problems — in con- one tenet of the 3d Infantry Division’s biometric data system, which enabled an ducting human terrain mapping, we counterinsurgency philosophy is “It’s all additional data point for piecing togeth- learned to multiply the hard way. about the people.” Building a trusted net- er the intelligence picture on the extrem- work involves personal relationships be- ist groups in TF Dragon’s AO. It also al- tween coalition leaders at the tactical lev- lowed the intelligence officer to cross ref- Specific Benefits el and the leaders of the population they erence the person against the database of Human Terrain Mapping secure. Once these relationships are built, built during previous human terrain map- The benefits of human terrain mapping units are better able to deliver and assess ping missions. For example, if we had are numerous; however, there are seven the effects of information operations mes- met an individual during a human terrain significant benefits worth mentioning: sages and PSYOP products, determine if mapping patrol in Baker Company’s AO local governments are talking to their con- and he turned up on the objective during Human terrain mapping provides a stituents, and, if necessary, minimize un- a Crusader Company mission, we were practical start point for gathering hu- rest among the population through con- immediately alerted to this person’s pres- man intelligence (HUMINT). Human sequence-management procedures. ence in two different areas of the battle- terrain mapping affords coalition forces field. Cross referencing allowed the in- the opportunity to become acquainted Human terrain mapping has an indi- telligence officer to possibly link the per- with leaders of the different tribes, towns, rect effect on the enemy. Having soldiers son to an extremist cell that may reside villages, and cities of a particular AO. If out in the village conducting foot patrols in one part of AO Dragon, but is conduct- a unit earns the respect and trust of vil- among the civilian population was vital ing missions in another portion, thus al- lage sheiks and elders, the locals are more to the initial tone set by 1st Battalion, 15th lowing us to create an initial link diagram willing to provide intelligence. As our Infantry. If the enemy tested our strength, of possible extremist activities. units moved through the various villages we were out of our vehicles with a gun bar- and towns of AO Dragon, they consis- rel and set of eyes in every direction, pre- The Importance of Doing tently found local citizens more than will- pared to maneuver instantly on contact. Human Terrain Mapping ing to provide information, but who were We approached every human terrain map- hesitant to call our “tips hotline” or visit ping patrol as if the enemy was watch- In retrospect, having a human terrain our combat outposts. ing and assessing our every move. Human map is not nearly as valuable as doing terrain mapping brought us closer to the human terrain mapping. Human terrain As often as possible, we tried to inte- locals and deterred enemy contact. mapping provided an effective technique grate our supporting HUMINT collection to learn and begin to understand the bat- teams into human terrain mapping pa- Human terrain mapping provides un- tlespace for which we were responsible. trols, which provided an excellent op- foreseen opportunities to demonstrate In other words, if the type of information portunity to make initial contacts and de- our resolve to the population. During the we gathered had been available when we velop sources. It also provided good in- process of getting to know local leaders

March-April 2008 — 17 and meeting with them in their villages, the companies of TF Dragon oftentimes conducted hasty raids on weapons traf- fickers and improvised explosive device (IED) emplacers. These raids proved to local leaders that our soldiers were dedicated to making their villages more secure. Furthermore, these raids also proved to local leaders that when given critical intelligence information, coalition forces act on it. Human terrain mapping provides ground-level insight into local politics, motivations, and differences — and this can be the start point for reconciliation. Understanding the differences between Sunni and Shia areas is easy; finding the start point for reconciliation is not. How- “Human terrain mapping affords coalition forces the opportunity to become acquainted with leaders of the different tribes, towns, villages, and cities of a particular AO. If a unit earns the respect ever, once a unit has met and befriended and trust of village sheiks and elders, the locals are more willing to provide intelligence.” leaders from separate areas, those leaders now have a common association — a partnership with us. For example, in one particular TF Dragon area, Sunni and Shia families living as neighbors had different op a process to continuously reassess the Major John Cushing is currently serving as S3, sheiks as their leaders. Unfortunately, the information they have, if they inherited a 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, 3d BCT, 3ID, Fort sheiks in these areas were not eager to developed map from a previous unit. Benning, GA. He received a B.A. from the Unit- ed States Military Academy and an M.S. from work together to reconcile their differenc- Counterinsurgency is probably the most the University of Virginia. He is a graduate of es. To add further confusion to the situa- difficult form of warfare because it forc- the U.S. Army Command and General Staff tion, al-Qaeda forces often attacked both es military professionals out of their “com- College. He has served in various command the Shia and the Sunni as a means to keep fort zones,” and into the complex realm and staff positions, to include brigade planner, their foothold. After working numerous of interacting with human beings. Cen- 2d Brigade, 3ID, Fort Benning, GA; command- human terrain mapping patrols in these er, B Company, 1st Battalion, 64th Armor, 3ID, tral to this is gaining the population’s Fort Benning, GA; and instructor, Department areas to outline the villages and actually support, which often requires a simulta- identify the leaders, the company com- of Systems Engineering, U.S. Army Military neous effort to drive a wedge that will iso- Academy, West Point, NY. mander earned the trust of both the Sun- late the insurgents. Human terrain map- ni and Shia leaders. Using this as lever- ping enables units to better understand Major Matthew B. Garner is currently deployed age, he facilitated discussions between the — and exploit — these complex human to Iraq as assistant S3, 1st Battalion, 15th In- two sheiks based on the common goals relationships, which is time and energy fantry, 3d BCT, 3ID. He received a B.A. from the of security and economic development. University of Texas – San Antonio. His military well spent. education includes the U.S. Army Command Human terrain mapping gives tactical- and General Staff College, Armor Captain Ca- level units significantly improved first- reer Course, Armor Officer Basic Course, and hand knowledge of their areas of opera- Airborne School. He has served in various tion. Nothing can replace the importance Note command and staff positions, to include com- of personal reconnaissance — this prin- 1Headquarters, Department of the U.S. Army Field Manual mander, C Company, 1st Battalion, 15th Infan- ciple has existed in our doctrine for de- (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, U.S. Government Printing Of- try, 3ID, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) III and cades. Even though the data entered into fice, Washington, DC, December 2006. V; assistant S3, 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, 3ID, OIF III; battalion maintenance officer, 2d Battal- biometric databases includes addresses ion, 72d Armor, Camp Casey, Korea; and armor and street names, this information is of- Lieutenant Colonel Jack Marr is currently serv- company XO and platoon leader, 3d Squad- ten difficult to include/catalog on map ing as commander, 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, ron, 8th Cavalry, Fort Hood, TX. overlays. Furthermore, different people 3d Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 3d Infantry may refer to streets/locations by different Division (3ID), Fort Benning, GA. He received Captain Rich Thompson is currently serving as names, and roads in rural areas are not gen- a B.A. from the University of Minnesota, an M.S. commander, B Company, 1st Battalion, 15th In- erally trafficable by coalition vehicles. from Saint Mary’s College of Kansas, and an fantry, 3d BCT, 3ID, Fort Benning, GA. He re- M.M.A.S. from the School of Advanced Military ceived a B.A. from Troy University, Alabama. As the U.S. Army continues to examine Studies. His military education includes the U.S. His military education includes Infantry Cap- this aspect of counterinsurgency warfare, Army Command and General Staff College, tains Career Course, Officer Candidate School, we would warn, based on experience, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, Infantry Of- Ranger School, Pathfinder School, and Spe- against relying on an automated solution ficer Basic Course, Ranger School, and Air- cial Forces Combat Diver and Dive Supervisor borne School. He has served in various com- Course. He has served in various command to this problem, or against creating a sin- mand and staff positions, to include S3, 1st Bat- and staff positions, to include deputy S3, 3d gular special-staff section to provide hu- talion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82d Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 3ID, Fort Ben- man terrain insight. From what we learned, Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC; and XO, 2d ning, GA; platoon leader, 1st Battalion, 15th In- a unit must either physically go out and Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, fantry, 3ID, Fort Benning; and platoon sergeant, collect this information initially, or devel- 82d Airborne, Fort Bragg. 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Benning.

18 — March-April 2008 How Information Operations Enable Combatant Commanders to Dominate Today’s Battlefield by Lieutenant Colonel Scott K. Fowler

In a world of asymmetric warfare, one war, it needs to address two central is- According to JP 3-13, “Adversaries are area gaining a great deal of attention is sues; providing Iraqi media security and, increasingly exploring and testing nonle- information operations (IO). Joint Publi- more importantly, facilitating access to thal or symmetrical warfare tactics that cation (JP) 3-13, Information Operations, the most relevant stories-of-interest. can thwart U.S. military objectives, espe- defines IO as: “the integrated employ- Should the coalition continue to over- cially those that are heavily reliant on in- ment of electronic warfare (EW), com- look these two fundamental issues, the information systems. This requires the U.S. puter network operations (CNO), psy- surgents will remain the dominant and military to employ defensive technolo- chological operations (PSYOP), military most influential group having an impact gies and utilize leading-edge tactics and deception (MD), and operations security on the Iraqi population’s perceptions and procedures to prevent our forces and sys- (OPSEC), in concert with specified sup- behavior.”2 tems from being successfully attacked.”3 porting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversar- Obtaining information superiority is crit- Combatant commanders must realize the ial human and automated decisionmak- ical to achieving success, especially in necessity to integrate IO into battle plans; Iraq. With the citizens of Iraq having ac- well-planned and synchronized IO as- ing while protecting our own.”1 cess to media through outlets such as Al- sists the commander in achieving an end- Jazeera, Al-Iraqiya, Al Hurra, and other state devoid of enemy kinetic strikes in The Necessity to Integrate Arab television stations, positive portray- the near term, while simultaneously fos- IO into Battle Planning al of information pertaining to coalition tering better relationships with local na- “For the coalition to make significant forces (CF) is necessary to win the local tionals in the long term. To accomplish progress toward winning the information population’s hearts and minds. this goal, leaders at company and bat- “With the local media in attendance, they can cover the event and broad- dia to a cooperative medical engagement cast it on the local Iraqi news that afternoon. Perhaps another example where the unit provides medical services would be to invite the local media to a veterinarian operation where the to a community in need. With the local unit provides services to a rural community that has livestock.” media in attendance, they can cover the event and broadcast it on the local Iraqi news that afternoon. Perhaps another example would be to invite the local media to a veterinarian operation where the unit provides services to a rural community that has livestock. This requires a major effort, which begins with the brigade S7, PAO, and tactical PSYOP team leader, all of whom collectively coordinate with their division counterparts. By doing so, the local media fills airtime with “good- news” stories that show what the coalition is doing to enhance the Iraqi people’s standard of living. This also serves to eliminate potential negative airtime while reinforcing coalition forces’ activities, which are directed toward winning the population’s “hearts and minds.” Iraqi Media Section “Contrary to what many doctrine writ- ers and military scholars might believe, this out-of-box approach has worked extremely well. As of October 2007, the IMS has conducted 38 battlefield circulations, bringing Iraqi media crews to the story, translated and disseminated over 300 good-news stories in Arabic. Market pen- talion levels should use their brigade The commander should make certain etration for IMS-translated articles re- S7, public affairs office (PAO), combat that the local media accompanies his units mains constant at just over 50 percent camera, and tactical psychological oper- when they are conducting operations that and battlefield circulations average over ations (PSYOPS) teams; these entities emphasize positive coalition forces activ- 98 percent.”4 have access to their counterparts at divi- ities and efforts, thereby placing a “good sion who have reach back to their corps face” on coalition forces. For example, I personally witnessed the creation of an sections. the command should invite the local me- Iraqi media section (IMS) in the Bagh-

20 — March-April 2008 dad Province from May to September 2007. In this short time period, I watched Task Force Marne resource and implement a division-level Iraqi media section whose sole function was to engage the local media to promote good-news stories in the division’s operational environment. This was a huge task as there were no clear-cut doctrinal publications to provide guidance. Furthermore, aligning Iraqi media with IO is contrary to current public affairs doctrine.

How It Gets Done Coordinating and integrating local media begins with the commander’s understanding of his operational environment. Good troop commanders use IO to their advantage; by knowing their operational environment and the local population and “The commander should make certain that the local media accompanies his units when leaders, these commanders were better they are conducting operations that emphasize positive coalition forces activities and able to exploit positive events. Their suc- efforts, thereby placing a “good face” on coalition forces. For example, the command cess began by working closely with the should invite the local media to a cooperative medical engagement where the unit pro- brigade S7, who, in turn, worked with the vides medical services to a community in need. With the local media in attendance, they division G7, who possessed assets to get can cover the event and broadcast it on the local Iraqi news that afternoon.” the Iraqi media to the scene. Close and constant coordination would see the arrival of the division Iraqi media section and the Iraqi media crews just in The first step in using available assets is 2Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Decarvalho, “Reaching Out time to capture the high pay-off event and to know those assets (see yourself). Know- to an Influential and Overlooked Population: Task Force Marne then, under the protection of the soldiers Partners with Iraqi Media,” unpublished manuscript, p. 1. ing there are brigade, division, and corps 3 and supervision of the Iraqi media section JP 3-13, Information Operations, p. I-10. assets available to assist commanders dur- 4 lead, the Iraqi media crews would return “Reaching Out to an Influential and Overlooked Popula- ing daily missions is vital. Commanders tion,” p. 4. to home base where they broadcasted the who know their enemy will be better pre- 5Author’s personal conversation with a brigade executive of- good-news story. Using IO in the compared to employ available assets and tai- ficer, 30 June 2007. mander’s operational environment cre- lor correct messages to reach out and win 6“Reaching Out to an Influential and Overlooked Popula- ates closer relationships between coali- the hearts and minds of the local nation- tion,” p. 8. tion forces and local leaders and citizens. als (see the enemy). Commanders who I also witnessed a maturing phenome- know their local population will not only Lieutenant Colonel Scott K. Fowler served as non known as “concerned local citizens,” be better prepared to tailor messages, but the Center for Army Lessons Learned liaison who are local nationals working to pro- more importantly, determine the correct officer for Multinational Division-Center (MND- vide security within their neighborhoods. delivery mechanism, such as radio, tele- C) observing information operations. Current- These concerned local citizens will even- vision, newsprint, leaflet, handbill, or tac- ly, he is the executive officer, Office of the Spe- tually become members of the Iraqi Se- tical loudspeaker operations, for those cial Assistant to the Commanding General, Fort Knox, KY. He received a B.A. from Northern curity Forces or work force where they messages. Kentucky University. His military education in- will become productive citizens, provid- By using all available assets — brigade, cludes the U.S. Army Command and General ing a myriad of services to the Iraqi peo- division, and corps — commanders en- Staff College, the Armor Officer Basic and Ad- ple. Creating concerned local citizen hance their ability to deliver the right vanced Courses, and Combined Arms and Ser- groups leads to the reduction in violence vices Staff School. He has served in various message, by the best means, at the right command and staff positions, to include exec- throughout much of Iraq. A U.S. Army time, to the widest audience, achieving cavalry officer outside Baghdad com- utive officer, 4th Brigade, 85th Training Support the greatest results. The end-state of good Division (4/85 TSB), Fort Knox, KY; plans offi- mented that, “IED strikes and small-arms IO is to reduce the number of kinetic fire against [his] patrols was down 72 per- cer, 4/85 TSB, Fort Knox; S3, 103d Chemical 5 strikes against coalition forces and local Battalion, Kentucky Army National Guard (KY- cent for the month of June 2007.” nationals, as well as the instruments of the ARNG); commander, University of Kentucky, government of Iraq. Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), See Yourself, See the Enemy, Lexington, KY; company commander, 3d Bat- and Know Your Local Nationals talion, 123d Armor, KYARNG; platoon leader, A Troop, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 1st Infantry “The BCT S7s synchronize planning ef- Notes Division (Forward), Boeblingen, Germany; and forts with each of their maneuver battal- tank platoon leader and company XO, C Com- 1Chairman, Joints Chief of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, ions and nominate events for Iraq media Information Operations, U.S. Government Printing Office, pany, 4th Battalion, 37th Armor, 2d Brigade, 6 coverage.” Washington, DC, 13 February 2006, p. ix. Fort Riley, Kansas.

March-April 2008 — 21 Win the Battle — Lead to Peace

by Colonel Bruno Duhesme, French Army

“Our armed forces must continue to update and expand their educational programs. This means broadening the curricula of formal schools to reflect the complexity of the modern operating environment and increasing opportunities — and rewards — for leaders to serve in assign ments outside the traditional military structure.” — Lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli

Though it remains a confrontation of War has also changed with the introduc- of the global engagement and the de- will, which still breeds suffering and vio- tion of new belligerents, whose behavior cisive phase of the engagement, which lence, war has fundamentally changed, as is miles apart from traditional military takes place essentially on the ground. well as its place in today’s world. Mili- logic, and who live and operate among The French Army Doctrine Command tary confrontation, which once led to im- the population, which is a major and de- has launched a reflection on these evolu- mediate political success, is no longer suf- cisive player. tions and has issued a capstone document ficient to achieve today’s strategic objec- to that purpose.1 tives. Moreover, destroying the adversary In this changing environment, military sometimes proves to be an inappropriate action must adapt. Lethality is no longer This article presents and summarizes response to a situation of conflict. The the supreme capacity for the military, the pamphlet and attempts to underscore battle is no longer the sign of final victo- which is no longer the only player in the main challenges western ground forc- ry or definitive failure for the protago- achieving the strategic objective. Armed es are likely to face in the contemporary nists. From now on, battle is only the first forces are required to coordinate with a operational environment (COE). step of the overall process of conflicts. large number of players who share the The last step is normalization and in be- responsibility for success or failure. Ini- The New Face of War: tween is stabilization, which is the deci- tial intervention, with the use of power- New World; New Conflicts sive phase because it sets the conditions ful and lethal assets, is required to pre- Setting conditions for strategic suc- for the return of peace. pare the stabilization phase — the core cess. For a long time, war was used to solve conflicts among powers promoting crowd control or humanitarian actions. manipulation, certain capabilities that suit their own interests and will for conquest. Planning considerations are crucial for the conventional art of war (symmetric/ But in the modern age, war entered an this phase as well. To enable the transi- dissymmetric conflicts) are somewhat in- international legal framework, which no tion between phase 1 and phase 2, all po- adequate to asymmetric warfare. longer recognizes the use of force as a tential players have to be involved in the way to solve conflicts and differences be- planning process. A successful transition The New Enemy tween states. In this new framework, our generally augurs well for the future. armed forces operate within systems char- Yesterday, our armed forces fought an acterized by chaos and violations of inter- The stabilization phase precedes the nor- enemy of regular forces belonging to na- national laws or threats on peace to re- malization phase, which is typically the tion states. Today, new adversaries are store order, which supposes, in most cas- return to peace, with a durable political, emerging and are using an asymmetric es, to reestablish a stable social and po- legal, and social system, that all protag- approach. These new enemies include: onists accept. Due to cultural differenc- litical system. Therefore, while the aces, the “norm” is likely to differ with Predacious systems mostly linked to complishment of the strategic objective the “norm” to which intervening nations organized crime and dedicated to the relied yesterday on the outcome of an are accustomed. In this respect, cultural search for profits. These systems es- armed confrontation, military success on aware ness is an important issue, not only sentially concern police and justice. today’s battlefield contributes solely to establish the minimum conditions for the for the military, but for all agencies in- Claiming systems aimed at achieving achievement of political goals. volved. political objectives by using armed force against the state they oppose to Stabilization: the decisive stage of to- From Symmetric War gain political influence through the day’s three-phase conflict. Following the to Asymmetric Conflicts conquest of territories or populations. decisionmaking and planning processes, today’s military commitments in armed The David vs. Goliath concept of con- Subversive systems that are revolu- conflicts roughly consist of three phases: flict is nothing new; however, it is more tionary in nature and use unbridled intervention, stabilization, and normal- likely to occur today due to the huge op- violence to serve their global politi- ization. All three phases include periods erational supremacy of western armies cal objective, which generally relies of coercion, violence control, and high- which have to adapt to “small wars,” as on the foundation, without any com- or low-intensity operations. Clausewitz described them. promise, of a new society. Symmetric/dissymmetric conflicts are The intervention phase is essential and The New Environment must lead to tactical success, which will those that oppose institutional armed forc- enable the achievement of the strategic es with similar objectives, means, and Even if it is necessary to win the tacti- objective through a smooth transition with courses of action (COAs). The distinc- cal battle, defeating the enemy is not suf- the next phase. This raises two concerns. tion between symmetric and dissymmet- ficient to achieve the strategic objective. First, a modern force has to have all the ric conflict reflects the difference of pow- In modern theaters, all actions are mixed capacities to deter, defeat, and even de- er among the warring parties. Symmetric and tangled in what U.S. Marine General stroy an enemy who has decided to op- conflicts oppose comparable adversaries Charles Krulak refers to as the “three- pose the force deployment. In other words, and dissymmetric reflects the military su- block war,” in which soldiers simultane- lethality remains a “must-have” capacity. periority of one of the belligerents. Dis- ously conduct combat operations, human- Second, the need for a smooth and steady symmetry often leads the weaker bellig- itarian aid, and reconstruction efforts. erent to shift to asymmetry to maintain transition between phase 1 (intervention) The three-block war is conducted in cit- and phase 2 (stabilization) has important his chances of success against the stronger opponent. ies and is the preferred battlefield for en- planning consequences. For example, emy forces who intend to inflict signifi- while preparing the intervention, plan- In an asymmetric conflict, one of the cant damage on western armies, whose ners have to endeavor to limit destruc- belligerents will deliberately avoid direct main effort will be placed in cities while tion of infrastructure to the strict necessi- confrontation and/or the domain in which attempting to control the rest of the bat- ties, keeping in mind that the force will his adversary has an obvious superiority tlespace. On this new battlefield, the pop- have to reconstruct in the next phase. and will emphasize and take advantage ulation is both an actor and a major stake- The stabilization phase is the decisive of the disparity of means and COAs. In holder in the conflict. All military efforts phase in which military forces operate in these conflicts, the weak will attempt to are dedicated to populations who aspire to close coordination with their entire envi- transform the technological and opera- order, security, and respect. To prove its ronment to restore stability through glob- tional superiority of his opponent into efficiency and credibility, the force must al control of the area. This phase aims at powerlessness or vulnerability, thus high- satisfy these needs simultaneously. Al- establishing conditions for achieving the lighting his assets that are materially, psy- though security remains the top priority, strategic objective. Even if this phase re- chologically, and culturally superior to the population is also seeking respect. his opponent’s. lies on civilian skills, military presence Since the use of force is essentially ex- remains essential to support the organi- The huge military superiority of west- erted among human societies, controlling zation and individuals involved in the re- ern countries should normally result in the ground is essential in stabilization; it construction process. Depending on the more asymmetric conflicts, which are enables the transition from military to security level, armed forces lead or sup- nothing new to military history. Dissym- political control. This control must be per- port the entire interagency operation. In metry and asymmetry are the most pre- manent and sustained, because it takes a this phase, armed forces have to conduct dictable forms of war for the next de- long time to consolidate. It also requires full-spectrum operations, which range cades. But in some cases, such as insur- a large number of ground forces that are from combat and security operations to gency, terrorism, guerrilla, or population appropriately trained, deployed, and re-

March-April 2008 — 23 “...a modern force has to have all the capacities to deter, defeat, and even destroy an enemy who has decided to oppose the force deployment. In other words, lethality remains a ‘must-have’ capacity.”

lieved, which supposes a huge capacity option is sometimes much more difficult ations is time-consuming and may con- to endure and sustain. to implement than the indiscriminate use sequently degrade conventional skills. of fire. As a consequence, force protec- Therefore, it is essential to maintain branch A New Role for Soldiers tion is one of the major requirements gen- core competencies even when current re- Today, western soldiers belong to soci- erated by the new operational environ- quirements are essentially stability and eties in which the demand for security is ment. counterinsurgency operations. Prior to the stabilization phase is the intervention increasing. The new operational frame- New Challenges work is largely influenced by law, which phase, which ends with tactical success; is omnipresent and rules over the con- Adapt or die, but keep your conven- this success relies on conventional war- duct of operations. In addition, our fel- tional warfare intact. Western armies fare skills. low citizens are very eager for immedi- were organized, equipped, and trained to ate information; electronic media provide confront Warsaw Pact forces, not insur- Equipment and Organization information 24/7. Today’s soldier must gents, rioters, or angry citizens. Adapta- In this domain, the challenge is, once know how to deal with the press and un- tion was imperative, but when one enters again, to equip soldiers with the appro- derstand that the journalist’s mission does the world of stability and counterinsur- priate weapons, vehicles, and other ma- not necessarily promote military actions, gency, one realizes this is much more than terials in accordance with planning. This but relates perceived facts. Anyway, like a couple of minor adjustments. The new means that western armies still need it or not, press is part of the terrain in environ ment needs new doctrine and new heavy armor to accomplish the interven- which soldiers operate. training strategies. Leaders have to be tion phase and a sufficient dismount ca- grown differently; organizations must be Given the multiplicity and variety of pability, appropriately equipped, to con- adjusted and innovative equipment de- trol the ground system during the stabili- players involved in stabilization and nor- veloped to meet today’s operational re- malization business, soldiers at every ech- zation phase. There is also a need for sen- quirements. In short, one has to create a sors, unmanned aerial vehicles, and non- elon must display their ability to commu- new system, which has to be well bal- nicate. While geographic proximity with lethal munitions during the stability phase; anced so it can manage the intervention however, modernizing tanks, artillery and the population has become a must for and stabilization phases. In other words, stabilization operations, the soldier, iron- aviation assets, and infantry vehicles is of modern soldiers do not have to get rid of paramount importance, as well as main- ically, must maintain a certain distance their conventional combat skills; they just to remain vigilant and impartial. Com- taining supremacy in a conventional war- have to add other competencies and know- fare area. On the other hand, stability op- passion and understanding are two no- how to their military knowledge. tions that somewhat differ. erations need boots on the ground, and technology cannot replace human intelli- Although stability operations use less Training gence in such complex environments. A lethal power than conventional combat Training units and individuals for both tragic mistake would be trading human operations, soldiers still need to be mor- high- and low-intensity conflict is a ma- strength for technology. To face the con- ally and mentally tough to maintain con- jor challenge; however, training soldiers temporary environment, a modern army trol and good judgment. The “no-shoot” on counterinsurgency and stability oper- needs both technology and strength.

24 — March-April 2008 The Cultural Confrontation frustration. In this respect, the enemy is prior to the stability phase, there is a tac- In asymmetric conflicts, western soldiers much more aware of our culture than we tical battle to win. must deal with a cultural gap; we have are of theirs. Maintaining national sup- As for me, educating and training tacti- watches, our enemies have time. There- port is not easy during these protracted cal leaders constitutes the main effort in fore, while we are counting long term conflicts — this issue must be addressed the adaptation process. In this respect, I with months or even years, their unit of by an effective and sustained communi- strongly recommend Lieutenant General measurement for time is eternity. In the cations campaign. Peter Chiarelli’s article, “Learning from same sense, western countries attach a our Modern Wars: The Imperatives of high value to human life, while other cul- Conclusion Preparing a Dangerous Future.”2 I am con- tures do not. Casualties are painful for Obviously, this type of conflict is very vinced this principle could apply to the westerners, but can fuel an insurgency — challenging. For the French army, the French armed forces. enemy casualties are glorified and used time to rethink doctrine, organization, as an incentive for recruiting. equipment, and training to meet the re- National Support quirements of the new operational environment has arrived. But this approach Notes As previously mentioned in this article, has to be appropriately balanced between 1The French Land Forces Doctrine, FT-01 Winning the Bat- the host-nation’s population is a possible high intensity and low intensity. The trag- tle, Building Peace, Land Forces in Present and Future Con- center of gravity. Fine! What about ours? ic mistake would be sweeping away the flicts, Ministère de la Défense, 2007. The French armed forces received no sup- conventional capacity to the exclusive 2Lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli and Major Stephen M. Smith, “Learning from our Modern Wars: The Imperatives port from its fellow citizens during the In- benefit of “small wars” capabilities. One of Preparing a Dangerous Future,” Military Review, Septem- dochina War and lost national support dur- must keep in mind an important thing: ber-October 2007. ing the Algerian War. As a consequence, despite some tactical and operational successes, both conflicts ended with a strategic defeat for France. From my perspec- Colonel Bruno Duhesme is the French Army liaison officer for the U.S. Army Armor Center and tive, this is probably the most challenging Fort Knox, Fort Knox, KY. His education includes the Military Academy of Saint Cyr, Armor and aspect of stability operations. I am not Cavalry School Basic Officer Training Course, Armor Captain Career Course, French Army Com- talk ing about supporting troops, but sup- mand and Staff College, and Joint Staff and Defense College. He has served in various command porting the operation. Stability operations and staff positions, to include commanding officer, 1st Regiment de Spahis, 6th Light Armored Bri- gade, Valence, France; military advisor to the Royal College for Military Advanced Studies, Keni- are protracted wars that need time, pa- tra, Morocco; S3, 1st Regiment de Spahis, 6th Light Armored Brigade, Valence; commander, 4th tience, and dedication. They are some- Troop (Antitank), 7th Regiment de Chasseurs, Arras, France; and tank platoon leader, 3d Compa- times frustrating because results are slow, ny, 2d Regiment de Dragons, Laon, France. During his career, he has deployed in support of making it easy for the enemy to exploit French, UN, and NATO operations, to include UNPROFOR Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina; our impatience and our fellow citizens’ KFOR, Kosovo; and Operation Epervier, Chad, Africa.

“The stabilization phase is the decisive phase in which military forces operate in close coordination with their entire environment to restore stability through global control of the area. This phase aims at establishing conditions for achieving the strategic objective. Even if this phase relies on civilian skills, military presence remains essential to support the organization and individuals involved in the reconstruction process.”

March-April 2008 — 25 by Captain Nicholas C. Sinclair

The only feature of the Iraq conflict that is consistent is its in- U.S. forces was the Mahdi Militia, led by Shiite cleric Muqtada consistency. The battlefield, the threat, and the social environ- al-Sadr. As H. John Poole points out in his book Tactics of the ment are ever changing. What worked in Ramadi during 2004 Crescent Moon, Sadr was supported by Iran from the onset of or in Mosul during 2005 did not work in east Baghdad during the 2003 invasion, and his militia received intense training from 2006. Soldiers who operated within the same sector during their the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.1 The Iranians provided great previous tours to Baghdad hardly recognized it when they re- sums of money, equipment, and military training to the Shiite turned. During our tour of duty to Iraq, my unit conducted route militias in Iraq to counter the mission of coalition forces.2 security operations, which worked reasonably well in this sector; however, the recommendations in this article are not the The Mahdi Militia favored ambushes over direct-fire contact. end-all solution to combating deadly roadside bombs coalition They rarely stood and fought; instead, they opted for hit-and- soldiers face daily. run tactics. Roadside bombs have been a constant theme in the Iraq conflict since its inception; however, the roadside bombs In mid-December 2005, 3d Battalion, 67th (3-67) Armor Reg- we faced in east Baghdad were hardly improvised explosive de- iment, 4th Infantry Division, deployed to Iraq. As an infantry vices (IEDs); they were manufactured pieces of weaponry whose company executive officer, I took over the battalion’s scout pla- basic form has been around for more than a century. toon, which was attached to the engineer company. The situation in east Baghdad was very different from my previous de- Whether it is a shaped charge, a platter charge, or an explosive- ployment to central Baghdad in 2004. The Iranian intervention, ly formed projectile (EFP), the fundamental concept is the same largely unknown in 2003 and early 2004, was operating at full — sizeable amounts of explosives detonated behind a plate of strength by 2005. The proxy used by the Iranians to fight against metal sent hurling at a target. The contemporary catch-all phrase

26 — March-April 2008 “Whether it is a shaped charge, a platter charge, or an explosively formed projectile (EFP), the fundamental concept is the same — sizeable amounts of explosives detonated behind a plate of metal sent hurling at a target. … These weapons are difficult to identify because they can be disguised as ordinary debris scattered along the roadside. Often insurgents place the device in a wooden box, wrap it in foam, and roll it in the dirt, making it look like a misplaced curbstone.”

used by the Army for these types of bombs is “armor-defeating advice from our counterparts in theater, our battalion command- device” (ADD). The weapon is hardly revolutionary; armies have er gave the task of route security to the battalion’s engineer com- used it since World War II, and the idea dates back even further. pany. This differed from most engineer companies, who were Most armies, including our own, use this type of weaponry to de- given a sector and operated much the same way as an infantry feat enemy armor. These weapons, often equipped with passive or armor company. Instead of being given a piece of land, our infrared laser beams, detonate when vehicles pass in front of engineers were given the roads. The battalion engineer’s mission them — the same technology used to open automatic entrance was to provide route security to make the roads safe for coali- and exit doors at the grocery store. These weapons are difficult tion vehicle travel. The mission was three-fold: sanitizing, pro- to identify because they can be disguised as ordinary debris scat- tection, and clearance. This turned out to be a Herculean task tered along the roadside. Often insurgents place the device in a that literally reshaped the battlefield in east Baghdad. wooden box, wrap it in foam, and roll it in the dirt, making it look like a misplaced curbstone. These weapons have a terrifying psy- Route Sanitizing chological effect. Our first mission was to physically remove trash and debris We arrived in theater and conducted a relief in place with 1st from the sides of the roads. Anyone who has been to Iraq will tell Battalion, 64th (1-64) Armor Regiment, 3d Infantry Division. you the country looks like a landfill. The country is devoid of any The soldiers of 1-64 Armor were the first to experience the wide- organized trash-removal system, so residents simply take a few scale use of ADDs and immediately began developing ways to steps outside their homes and throw their garbage on the road- counter the device. Our steps to defeat the roadside bombs be- side. Additionally, the infrastructure is in a miserable state of gan prior to our unit’s deployment. Based on information and disrepair, to include curbstones and concrete strewn alongside

March-April 2008 — 27 artillery shells intended to detonate on vehicles as they drove past. To remove the rails, we simply wrapped chains around them and ripped them off their beams with an ACE or Bradley fighting vehicle (BFV). The work was backbreaking and foul; raw sewage from slit trenches flowed into roadside debris, making removal arduous and unhealthy. To protect our soldiers from diseases, we wore surgical gloves underneath work gloves, but getting spattered with raw sewage was unavoid- able. The most difficult part of the mission was keeping our soldiers motivated; after all, soldiers enlist to fight, not pick up Iraqi trash. They often referred to themselves as “combat garbage men” and “combat janitors,” and dubbed the “Cleaning the roadsides was no easy task; we operated at night, during curfew, which al- missions as “community service detail.” More- lowed us to work unhindered from civilian traffic and during hours when attacks from insur- over, they were teased by others in the battalion gents were least likely. We literally began walking from the front gate of the forward operat- for having the unenviable task. ing base (FOB) down both sides of the road, loading pieces of concrete onto trailers and pushing trash far away from the roadside. We made good use of the armored combat earth- Following precautionary measures, we cleared mover (ACE) and Bobcat tractors.” as far as we could from 2100 hours to 0500 hours, yielding to morning traffic and physical exhaustion. Using this method, we cleared the major routes in our area of operations, which in- the roads. These nauseating conditions provide insurgents with cluded 32 kilometers of a two- to four-lane divided highway, in the perfect camouflage in which to hide bombs. roughly three months. Once we accomplished this task, we con- Cleaning the roadsides was no easy task; we operated at night, tinued performing route maintenance missions to ensure the during curfew, which allowed us to work unhindered from civil- roads remained free of debris. Although not nearly as difficult ian traffic and during hours when attacks from insurgents were as the initial clean up, it was still demanding physical labor. least likely. We literally began walking from the front gate of the In addition to clearing the routes, there were more than 100 forward operating base (FOB) down both sides of the road, load- large concrete sewer pipes abandoned on the main route in our ing pieces of concrete onto trailers and pushing trash far away sector. These sewer pipes were placed there, but never installed from the roadside. We made good use of the armored combat and served as a great location to hide explosives. Together with earthmover (ACE) and Bobcat tractors. We also tore down the the battalion’s support platoon, the engineers removed all of these remaining guardrails in the battalion’s area of operations. The sewer pipes, greatly reducing the enemy’s opportunity to em- guardrails had become a popular location for insurgents to hide place roadside bombs. We also opened contracts to fix the roads, which included removing broken and loose curbs and replacing them with new ones. The curbs were freshly painted, which allowed us to identify any curbs that may have been tampered with or removed. Local contracts allowed us to put money into the Iraqi economy by hiring local construction busi- nesses to fix the roads. Every night, we faced the danger of booby- trapped debris. We were limited to a night’s work, which forced us to pick up the next day where we left off the night before, so it was very probable the enemy could have emplaced a bomb. Oftentimes, a soldier would hesitate, taking an extra long drag on his cig- arette before lifting an odd-looking piece of concrete. Luckily, we did not encounter any bombs during our clean-up efforts. Route Protection Throughout our mission in Iraq, we aggres- sively pursued the enemy in an effort to pre- “The work was backbreaking and foul; raw sewage from slit trenches flowed into roadside debris, making removal arduous and unhealthy. To protect our soldiers from diseases, we wore vent roadside bomb emplacement. We con- surgical gloves underneath work gloves, but getting spattered with raw sewage was unavoid- ducted long- and short-term observation posts able. The most difficult part of the mission was keeping our soldiers motivated; after all, sol- (OPs), overwatching sections of road and diers enlist to fight, not pick up Iraqi trash.” intersections that were historic locations for

28 — March-April 2008 roadside bombs. Long-term OPs were conducted from 24 hours to several months, while short-term OPs were conducted from 1 to 24 hours. The theory was simple: a sniper overwatching an area would shoot and kill insurgents emplacing roadside devices, making emplacement vir- tually impossible. East Baghdad was a sprawling urban slum composed of mostly buildings, 2.4 million people, and heavy traffic flow. Finding a good OP site without being seen was challenging — we were under constant surveillance the moment we left our FOB. The insurgents had counterrecon- naissance OPs in depth throughout our sector and used cell phones or gunshots to warn of our presence. Just by the nature of the city, there was always some- “Acquiring these emplacement teams was made even more difficult by the enemy’s use of the natural chaos of busy intersections and roads. In a single day, there were thousands of vehicles one alert and watching us everywhere we travelling on the major roads. At any moment, there were dozens of cars lined along the roadside went. When we were seen, word spread while their drivers fixed flat tires, bought bread, or waited at fuel stations. Pedestrians were every- quickly, alerting everyone to our location where selling cigarettes, emptying trash, or digging; from a soldier’s perspective, everyone looked and activities. We tried various deception suspicious.” methods to insert sniper teams, but we never fully knew if we had been seen. Many of our OP sites were empty buildings or, with the home- In protecting the route, the battalion also took on the construc- owner’s consent, occupied residential buildings. If our team en- tion and manning of several checkpoints. Throughout our tour, tered an occupied home, the residents could not leave, which the battalion’s maneuver companies occupied two to three check- posed problems because family members and neighbors quick- points at major intersections in sector. The battalion command- ly realized something was amiss when they did not see or hear er referred to these checkpoints “as key terrain” because they from the residents of the home. This, coupled with rumors that formed the “tactical breach” through which units moved into sec- we had recently been in the area, made it relatively easy for lo- tor. Historically, these were preferred locations for insurgents to cals to piece together the two events. Residents feared our pres- target coalition force vehicles. These checkpoints were occupied ence would cause them to be viewed as coalition force collabo- around the clock and their constant presence deterred insurgents rators and they would suffer serious consequences by the Mahdi from emplacing bombs. These checkpoints were a precursor to Militia. These complications meant that most OPs could not be the combat outposts now common in theater. used for more than 24 hours. During OP operations conducted To supplement our checkpoints, Iraqi Security Forces had check- for more than 24 hours, the teams either occupied locations de- points spread along main routes. These checkpoints were scat- void of civilian presence or they occupied overt OPs such as tered haphazardly throughout sector, seemingly without thought checkpoints. to their tactical locations, which offered little protection. The During short-term OP operations, we had limited time to find haphazard checkpoints provided substandard living conditions and kill enemy emplacement teams. Furthermore, the enemy’s for Iraqi soldiers who were expected to stay there for a month at presence was unpredictable; they were patient, and if they knew a time. Their poor locations and dreary conditions destroyed the we were in the area, they were not compelled to emplace de- morale in these units, leaving them totally ineffective. vices. They would patiently wait until conditions were perfect Throughout the year, my company conducted a complete over- before emplacing devices. The enemy had a large area in which haul of the Iraqi checkpoints in the battalion area. The company to work and any chance of them emplacing a device while we commander conducted a careful analysis of the terrain and re- were watching was slim to none. placed the older, ineffective checkpoints. He placed the check- Acquiring these emplacement teams was made even more dif- points in tactical locations, providing mutually supporting sec- ficult by the enemy’s use of the natural chaos of busy intersec- tors of observation with neighboring checkpoints. For check- tions and roads. In a single day, there were thousands of vehicles point construction, we used privately contracted cranes, ACEs, travelling on the major roads. At any moment, there were doz- Bobcat tractors, dozers, bucket loaders, graders (from corps), ens of cars lined along the roadside while their drivers fixed flat and hundreds of concrete barriers. The new checkpoints provid- tires, bought bread, or waited at fuel stations. Pedestrians were ed much better protection and increased the Iraqi soldiers’ qual- everywhere selling cigarettes, emptying trash, or digging; from ity of living; however, getting them to do their duties was anoth- a soldier’s perspective, everyone looked suspicious. As John Nagl er enterprise altogether. points out in Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, insurgents used Route Clearance this to their advantage because they wanted to elicit the “Army’s inappropriate use of force.”3 One of the core fundamentals of The term “route clearance” was nonexistent in Army field man- counterinsurgency is to win the people’s support; to indiscrimi- uals prior to this current conflict. It is another “Iraqism” that nately shoot any Iraqi who appeared suspicious would not only found its way into the Army lexicon and refers to the act of ac- contradict the purpose of winning the people’s trust and confi- tively searching for and destroying roadside bombs. Route clear- dence, but it would also draw thousands to the insurgents’ side. ance is by far the most dangerous mission in Iraq; insurgents

March-April 2008 — 29 the flanks in neighborhoods. The enemy became so bold that upon identification of the route clearance convoy, they would emplace ADDs specifically to attack the engineers. Since most of the engineer vehicles were elevated, the enemy adjusted the trajectories on their weapons to target the Cougars and Buffalo. Our company commander quickly realized that we needed security on our flanks to clear high- risk routes. My scout platoon was tasked to provide dismounted flank security while the engineers cleared the routes. As with our route sanitization mission, we conducted route clearance at night during curfew hours. The engineers would clear approximately 20 kilometers of route “Our route clearance equipment included a package of BFVs, HMMWVs, the RL-31 Cougar during every mission. Due to time con- hardened engineer vehicle, and the Buffalo mine-protected clearance vehicle. The Cougar, straints and distance covered by the clear- with its elevated V-shaped carriage, offers better blast protection than the HMMWV. It also ance team, my platoon could not provide provides excellent observation for its crew with large windows, which wraps around all four flank security throughout the entire mis- sides of the vehicle.” sion. Instead, we focused on the historic ambush positions. The engineers cleared one side of the road at a time, moving up one side and back down the other. A con- specifically target clearance teams because without the roadside crete median roughly one meter high provided additional pro- bombs, coalition convoys have freedom of maneuver through- tection to the clearance teams. out the area. The clearance mission involved three phases: movement, se- About 7 months after our arrival in Iraq, we took over the route curity, and clearance. Movement to the objective was achieved clearance mission from the engineers of 101st Airborne’s 506th through two different methods. In one approach, our platoon left Regimental Combat Team (RCT). Our route clearance equip- shortly after the engineers began their clearance mission and ment included a package of BFVs, HMMWVs, the RL-31 Cou- traveled secondary routes, swinging wide left or right of the pri- gar hardened engineer vehicle, and the Buffalo mine-protected mary route being cleared. This technique was designed to con- clearance vehicle. The Cougar, with its elevated V-shaped car- fuse the enemy because my team moved through neighborhoods riage, offers better blast protection than the HMMWV. It also disguised as random patrols and not linked to the nearby route provides excellent observation for its crew with large windows, clearance mission. While the enemy was focused on the route which wraps around all four sides of the vehicle. The Buffalo is clearance team on the main road, my team moved in from the similar to the Cougar, but is much larger, and its most obvious rear. With the two forces converging simultaneously, we achieved feature is a giant mechanical arm. The arm is equipped with a mass on the objective, overwhelming the enemy. metal claw, which is used to interrogate suspicious objects on the road. It also hosts a complement of cameras that can be used The second movement method we employed was less discreet, to scan the road. but useful in breaking up the routine. Our platoon followed directly behind the engineers, much like a tailback following a Our continuous route sanitization efforts made our route clear- blocker. Shortly before the engineers reached a likely ADD area, ance mission all the more effective. Before we cleaned the roads, we would drive off the road left or right, moving through the the enemy could hide bombs among the abundant trash and clut- neighborhoods to the flanks. After the engineers had completed ter. With the roads clear and clean, EFPs became obvious to the their mission, we collapsed our security and moved back to the most casual observer. FOB in a similar fashion, either through sector or trailing the Throughout the major routes in sector, a single engineer pla- engineers. toon could accomplish the route clearance task. Along these The second phase of the route clearance mission was security. routes, there was considerable distance between the edge of the On these missions, our platoon was composed of four HMMWVs, road and the buildings lining the routes, which allowed easy iden- with three-man crews (driver, gunner, and truck commander), tification of anything within this buffer area. On other routes, an interpreter, a medic, and a five-man sniper team. A day or however, there was little buffer area between the edge of the two prior to the mission we conducted a reconnaissance of the road and adjacent buildings and market areas. Stacked bricks, area with the sniper team leaders, identifying possible OP loca- vendor kiosks, and dirt mounds offered numerous locations to tions. Once on mission, the sniper team dismounted about 500 hide bombs. These roads, though used daily by our forces, were meters from their OP site and moved to their location on foot. not as well traveled and could not be observed throughout most The sniper team overlooked the most likely ADD locations, of the day. The roads posed an even greater danger because they providing constant surveillance throughout the mission. They ran directly through neighborhoods that had intense Mahdi Mi- were prepared to engage any insurgent emplacing ADDs, but litia followings. primarily reported suspicious activity along the road or in the The route clearance teams were bound to the roads, which meant neighborhoods along the street. My four trucks were split into the enemy enjoyed freedom of movement and observation from two sections and moved to two separate lateral routes oriented

30 — March-April 2008 on the road. We provided more coverage by dismounting the clearance operations saved countless lives through acquiring and truck commanders, who performed local surveillance immedi- recovering deadly ADDs that littered the sector. Taking control ately outside of the HMMWV. We ensured the OP and trucks of the major roads allowed us to move freely into sector and had overlapping sectors of observation, so there was no space in take the fight to the enemy. The successes of our operations were the road that was not being watched. stunningly obvious compared to battalion sectors that had not The third phase was the actual clearance mission. While my focused on route security; these routes were littered with trash platoon overwatched the road, the engineers could move through and debris, offering ample locations from which to ambush co- and clear the area without being worried about what was on their alition forces. flanks. Our presence alone either disrupted or scared off any in- Negative Outcomes surgent triggermen in the area, leaving us to search for bombs. If enemy forces were committed to emplacing devices in our area Our route clearance efforts, though successful, did not defeat of operations, which was rare, their freedom of maneuver and the enemy in our sector. The insurgents adjusted to our counter- ability to operate was severely hindered due to our presence. measures and found other ways to attack our forces. Once we The lead engineer vehicles scanned the sides of the road and took back the major routes, the insurgents shifted to placing when they identified a suspicious object, the Buffalo was called their bombs on secondary roads, deep in their neighborhoods to investigate. ADDs were somewhat easy to identify because where the same level of route clearance was impossible. About the claw on the Buffalo’s hydraulic arm could tear through the midway through our tour, insurgents began targeting our units, foam and wooden camouflage that concealed the bombs; how- which were conducting checkpoint security operations, with ever, concrete or curbstone would stay intact. If there was any sniper fire and rocket propelled grenade (RPG) attacks. Although question about a suspicious object, my trucks would move to lo- we went to great lengths building checkpoints for the Iraqi Se- cation and the truck commanders would dismount and take a curity Forces, many went unmanned due to their personnel short- closer look at the object. We looked for wires leading from the ages. These checkpoints, constructed to secure the routes, became areas in which to hide ADDs. Moreover, the quality of device, which was a sure sign of a roadside bomb.4 If the object some Iraqi Security Forces was poor and their allegiances were was positively identified as a bomb, the wire was traced back to questionable. its source, where residents in the immediate area were ques- tioned and their homes were searched. Finally, we cut the wire, Insurgents began burying ADDs in the side of the road, mak- secured the area, and requested the explosive ordinance dispos- ing them all the more difficult to identify. The enemy probed al (EOD) unit to either recover the device or detonate it in place. our blind spots, finding places to hide roadside bombs in areas Positive Outcomes we thought were protected. On one occasion, an insurgent was seen crawling on his belly, pulling an ADD attached to his waist The roadside bombs restricted our freedom to maneuver through by a length of rope. The vehicle crew at a nearby checkpoint sector, giving control to the insurgents. However, our route san- could see him, but they were too far away to engage. However, itization, route protection, and route clearance operations were one crew pushed the limits of their BFV’s coax machine gun by mutually supporting efforts that enabled our forces to move into knocking down two members of an emplacement team from sector and provide security to the population, and thus restore the legitimacy of the local Iraqi government. The operations were physically and mentally exhausting, but they paid off. We reduced ADD activity in our sector by an amazing 60 percent overall and entirely in several previously targeted areas. Route sanitization operations created a buffer area that allowed us to readily identify devices placed on the side of the road, which gave confidence to soldiers moving through sector. Before these operations, soldiers re- luctantly passed by roadside clutter, bracing for impact. Stretches of road previously considered too hazardous to traverse became frequently used by our forces. Route sanitization also had a pleasing aesthetic effect. In- stead of the stomach-turning eyesore of trash and debris, the area had a neat and clean appearance, which showed progress in the area. Route protection operations allowed us to hold the ground we had reclaimed through route sanitization. It also allowed our forces to work side by side with Iraqi Security Forc- “Throughout the major routes in sector, a single engineer platoon could accomplish the route es, which built trust and understanding be- clearance task. Along these routes, there was considerable distance between the edge of the tween the two forces. Using sniper OPs dem- road and the buildings lining the routes, which allowed easy identification of anything within this onstrated we were no longer targets and we buffer area. On other routes, however, there was little buffer area between the edge of the were going on the offensive, which boosted road and adjacent buildings and market areas. Stacked bricks, vendor kiosks, and dirt mounds confidence among our soldiers. The route offered numerous locations to hide bombs.”

March-April 2008 — 31 a distance more than twice the maximum effective range of the Roadside bombs remain a challenge for coalition forces in Iraq. weapons system. As Hezbollah demonstrated against the Israelis in the Lebanese conflict during 2006, it is a trend that is likely to be seen in fu- Most obvious was the fact that we could clear the road every- ture conflicts. The U.S. Army is a force carried into battle on day; however, the moment we left, it was no longer secure. It trucks and tracked vehicles; our logistics are especially depen- would have been impossible for the battalion to secure every dent on roads to sustain our force. Controlling the roads will be meter of road in our sector with the limited number of forces we the decisive operation in future conflicts — without the ability had at our disposal. Even more startling was that the enemy was to move, it is difficult to fight the enemy and protect the popu- placing all of his energies toward targeting the engineer clear- lation. Route security operations must be a priority for any unit ance teams and destroying the Buffalo. deployed to a hostile theater in current and future conflicts. Lessons Learned Route security is a three-fold operation that cannot be achieved without one or more of its elements: sanitization, protection, and Notes clearance. Sanitization, although the most physically intensive 1 of the three operations, was the easiest to achieve and maintain. H. John Poole, Tactics of the Crescent Moon, Prosperity Press, Emerald Isle, NC, 2004. 2James Glanz, “U.S. Says Arms Link Iranians to Iraqi Shiites,” New York Times, 12 February Route protection was the most difficult because we did not have 2007. enough forces to secure every route. The only secure roads in 3John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, sector were the ones our forces were immediately standing on; 2005. once we left an area, it was no longer secure. 4Command wire was preferred by the insurgents over remote-control detonation due to the success of our jamming systems. The enemy was gifted at blending in with the everyday activities of the population, which enabled them to openly emplace bombs. As with any insurgency, differentiating insurgents from Captain Nicholas Sinclair is currently attending the Cavalry Leader the population remained most difficult. We learned that until a Course, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 3d Squadron, 16th Cav- competent, hardworking, and loyal Iraqi Security Force is cre- alry, Fort Knox, KY. He received a B.A. from the Citadel and his military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course and the Maneuver Cap- ated, it is difficult to rely on them to maintain security on their tains Career Course. He has served in various command and staff posi- own. If any routes were to be protected, our troops had to do it. tions, to include scout platoon leader, 3d Battalion, 67th (3-67) Armor, Route clearance teams saved countless lives, but their successes 4th Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 4th Infantry Division (ID), Fort Hood, made them high payoff targets for the enemy. We also discov- TX; XO, 3/67 Armor, 4th BCT, 4th ID, Fort Hood; and scout platoon lead- ered that on the more dangerous roads, the engineers needed er, 4th Squadron, 7th Cavalry, Aviation Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, Camp flank security to accomplish their mission. Garry Owen, Korea.

“Route security is a three-fold operation that cannot be achieved without one or more of its elements: sanitization, protection and clearance... Route protection was the most difficult because we did not have enough forces to secure every route. The only secure roads in sector were the ones our forces were immediately standing on; once we left an area, it was no longer secure.” Ground School XXI — The Next Step in Combined Arms Simulation Training

by Colonel Robert Valdivia

“Take off the blinders; show me the realm conduct joint full-spectrum operations. fective warfighters.” GSXXI is on point of the possible.” The MCoE, as a critical part of the “Gen- with two imperatives as a guide: align — General William S. Wallace erating Force,” was tasked by TRADOC training with how soldiers fight and op- Commander, TRADOC to determine the need for new families of erate; and ensure soldiers see it first dur- simulations and simulators that will en- ing training. Ground School XXI (GSXXI) is a Ma- able more efficient and cost-effective in- neuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) ini- dividual and collective training and edu- The genesis of GSXXI is the Flight tiative co-chaired by the armor and infan- cation. In other words, “use virtual and School XXI (FSXXI) program at Fort try centers. This program establishes train- constructive simulations and other tools Rucker, Alabama. FSXXI was developed ing strategies that employ combinations in conjunction with live training to con- to solve an urgent need to improve pilot of live, virtual, and constructive simula- serve resources, use available resources training at the Aviation Center. FSXXI tions to train future soldiers, leaders, com- more efficiently, and produce more ef- contracted with industry to provide commanders, and staffs in conduct- mercial off-the-shelf flight sim- ing military operations in the ulators and training in a con- contemporary operating envi- tractor-owned facility. In one re- ronment (COE). Simulation ca- spect, it followed the Stryker pabilities have continued to im- program model of accelerated prove and the Army must lever- procurement to cover a critical age the emerging capabilities in Army capability gap in the COE. training to meet the challenges This allowed the Aviation Cen- of an Army at war. ter to immediately address a critical training shortfall while The U.S. Army Training and forgoing the traditional Army Doctrine Command (TRA- development and acquisition DOC) has implemented a cam- model. The Fort Rucker pro- paign plan to meet the challeng- gram has two distinct advantag- es of training an increasing es: leveraging state-of-the-art number of warfighters as the Ar- simulations; and rapid fielding, my continues operations in Iraq. which makes it attractive to Efforts are moving forward to TRADOC leaders. field more combined-arms forces (grow) and simultaneously GSXXI incorporates the improve the Army’s ability to FSXXI lessons and successes

March-April 2008 — 33 “The explosion of digital technologies and the potential to effect how we train and equip the force make GSXXI a training imperative. GSXXI has tremendous implications for the entire force as we look to develop immersive training scenarios that reflect the challenges of full-spectrum operations.” to overcome new and differ- FOR SAF will provide basic ent challenges. Major issues officer leadership course addressed by GSXXI include (BOLC) students, as well as a requirement to support dis- noncommissioned officer mounted soldier tactical training, as well and train first in simulation — the MCoE course students, with the opportunity to as mounted (platform-based) training; team is developing requirements, which lead a virtual platoon during tactical op- train leaders to plan, prepare, and execute include a system of systems that repli- erations. Imagine a simulator that offers combat operations; train full-spectrum op- cates/simulates platforms and weapons immersive scenarios that provide students erations; and incorporate new weapons systems that can be used to train soldiers a virtual platoon of avatars that enables and systems. As with FSXXI, lessons on core competencies with primary weap- them to interact with, and role play in, learned at the MCoE likely have broader ons systems and crewmembers on com- challenging scenarios. application across the institutional and bat platforms during combined-arms op- operational Army. erations. The system must have the capa- The system of systems must interface bility to provide gunnery/weapons and with live combined-arms training/support The explosion of digital technologies maneuver train ing to resident MCoE stu- operations, which allows the force to train and the potential to effect how we train dents and units across the full spectrum in a live environment using a full array of and equip the force make GSXXI a train- of conflict. It must also support training available weapons that are otherwise pro- ing imperative. GSXXI has tremendous for individuals, crews, and units up to hibitive because of cost, space, or both. implications for the entire force as we the brigade combat team level, beginning This new system should include a train- look to develop immersive training sce- with a target date in 2012. ing management system that records and narios that reflect the challenges of full- demonstrates the performance of the stu- spectrum operations. This new system of systems would ide- dent in the associated task. It must also Another key issue is the rapid change in ally immerse soldiers in tactical environ- provide measured feedback and record warfighting requirements, environments, ments by replicating the sight, sound, and the completion of gates as a student pro- and technology. Training solutions should smells of conflict, weapons effects, and gresses through each gate. This system be synchronized with the expansion in temperature, which is controlled to repli- would also track student progress, train- overall requirements across the spectrum cate stressful conditions, to include cli- ing schedules, and performance, which of conflict, especially the challenges of mate conditions in potential areas of op- would include access to a library of stu- fighting with a combined-arms team in eration. The system must also have the ca- dent texts, test, and reference materials, as urban environments. pability of being updated with new weap- well as provide and capture necessary ons technology as new weapons systems data for student administration and man- The GSXXI program also evaluates ma- are fielded to the Army. agement. It would also support unit after- neuver training requirements for both the action reviews (AAR), and as such, serve generating and operating forces to deter- The GSXXI systems must include semi- as a tool to predict both individual soldier mine what type of simulators are required automated forces (SAF) that can be pro- and unit performance. to best support the force. The current sys- grammed to either supplement Blue Force tems were designed to train mounted forc- (BLUEFOR) units or serve as opposing Part of the program will be to provide a es to defeat a Cold War adversary. The forces (OPFOR). The SAF OPFOR must library of training support packages (TSP) close combat tactical trainer (CCTT) cur- be robust enough to support the entire designed to support tables and gates for rently trains mounted platforms and does spectrum of conflict to include asymmet- selected weapons qualification. The TSP not integrate dismounted elements. Cur- ric threats and local populations. BLUE- library will also support local command- rent and near-future threats reer’s needs by providing a reser- quire a mounted force to work voir of scenarios available to closely with dismounted ele- units Armywide. ments, which is another factor to consider in the maneuver An exciting insight in how we force training requirements. The can achieve the GSXXI vision technology base continues to can be gleaned from the De- produce new systems that will fense Advanced Research Proj- challenge our current family of ects Agency’s (DARPA’s) Real- simulations to remain relevant. World project. RealWorld con- Fielding advanced munitions sists of three components: air, with extended ranges and incor- ground, and maritime combat. porating unmanned aerial sys- In essence, the DARPA project tems (UAS), unmanned ground simulates an environment that systems (UGS), handheld laser models the physics of the real designators, and precision-guid- world. This is a marked depar- ed munitions will require im- ture from current simulations bedded or simulator training. that “cheat” to achieve a specific effect for an application. To support the GSXXI vision — training the way we fight/ RealWorld’s earth is modeled operate, see it first in training, from maps and digital terrain

34 — March-April 2008 elevation data (DTED) provid- through brigade levels could ed by the National Geospatial be issued to every student. As Intelligence Agency and its government-owned software, it software has tools that allow would also be available to op- users to modify the simulations erational units. Students could to meet their own requirements. take their software and train- The tools are designed so users ing scenarios to their next duty without special training can assignment. New platoon lead- change the simulation by con- ers could run scenarios with structing buildings or modify- their tank commanders and new ing terrain. For example, a com- company commanders could pany/team defense that includes train their platoon leaders. The fighting positions and tank ditch- MCoE could provide one-stop es could be added to a piece of ground. Simulations to support classroom tacti- shopping for software updates, scenari- DARPA has already built a radio plug- cal instruction are another area GSXXI os, and related training material on the in, which has a single-channel ground and has identified as a potential area of im- Army Knowledge Online (AKO) web- airborne radio system (SINCGARS) ra- provement. Since the late 1980s, instruc- site. The MCoE would synchronize new dio emulator that allows users to display tors have occasionally used commercial scenario and software releases that would a SINCGARS radio that requires correct off-the-shelf (COTS) gaming software to match changes in doctrine and material frequency, hopping sets, and encryption supplement tactical instruction. An after- fielding. codes. The radio emissions are modeled duty-hours walkthrough of any Army bar- GSXXI will provide the Maneuver Cen- to include the effects of terrain on trans- racks will likely discover soldiers locked ter of Excellence with a road map to the mitting range. The model is so sophisti- in deadly combat using any number of future using simulation-assisted train- cated that electronic warfare officer stu- available game titles. Whether the sce- ing to keep pace with an ever-changing dents at Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, nario is World War II, Vietnam, or the COE and evolving technologies. The Ar- are using it to train. The Air Force also current Global War on Terror, commer- my has a number of initiatives and exist- uses RealWorld to provide low-cost, por- cial industry produces realistic combat ing programs that may provide the solu- table simulation training for pilots transi- simulations that can be networked with tions for its emerging training require- tioning to the A10C, and DARPA is work- other players. Soldiers are drawn to these ments. GSXXI will provide the MCoE ing on a Force XXI Battle Command Bri- games because they are realistic and chal- with clearly defined requirements and a gade and Below (FBCB2) module that lenging. vision of the future. These requirements will be available soon. The Army has leveraged gaming indus- and vision will assist Army agencies and The initial ground version of RealWorld try products to produce effective train- commercial vendors in producing the will be available to Department of De- ing. DARWARS Ambush was delivered tools we will need to train in 2012 and be- fense users in March 2008. RealWorld is in September 2004 to assist in training yond. a government-owned simulation, which the operational Army on how to react to allows government agencies to use the a convoy ambush. Additional scenarios program anywhere it would be useful. were developed to train soldiers on how With traditional vendor-owned models, to conduct an assault on a suspected weap- Colonel Robert Valdivia is currently serving as the government pays for the initial devel- ons cache and surveillance of a suspected the director of the U.S. Army Armor Center’s opment, as well as user licensing fees and suicide bomber. DARWARS Ambush is a Directorate of Training, Doctrine, Combat De- upgrades. RealWorld is designed to use mod ification of Operation Flashpoint, a velopments, and Experimentation, Fort Knox, commercially available game. Operation KY. His military education includes Armor Of- a variety of three-dimensional models, ficer Basic Course, Armor Officer Advanced which provides a large library of existing Flashpoint includes a scenario builder that allows users to develop scenarios using a Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff vehicle and weapon models ready for use School, U.S. Army Command and General Staff with the simulation. RealWorld is also wide selection of U.S. and OFPOR equip- College, and the U.S Army War College. His scalable, allowing students, instructors, ment and entities. Equipment includes previous command and staff assignments in- and small-unit leaders to run the program M1 Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting ve- clude training and operations officer, 2d Battal- on laptops in a classroom environment hicles, and Strykers, to name just a few. ion, 1st Basic Training Brigade, Fort Jackson, or in the field to assist in training. SC; platoon leader, executive officer, and com- DARWARS Ambush is currently being mander, A Company, 4th Battalion, 64th Ar- There are many existing simulation tech- evaluated for integration into the Ad- mor, 3d Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, GA; nology functions that can be applied to a vanced Noncommissioned Officers commander, A Company, 2d Battalion, 72d Ar- training simulation, such as RealWorld, Course at Fort Knox. While commercial- mor, 2d Infantry Division, Camp Casey, Korea; to quickly meet COE training require- ly available games offer new opportuni- executive officer, 2d Squadron, 12th Cavalry, ments for the mounted force. Dismount- ties for training tactical operations, there 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas; executive officer, 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry (Ironhorse), ed controllers, which allow infantrymen is not one game that meets all the require- Eagle Base, Tuzla; and commander, 1st Battal- to communicate with hand and arm sig- ments for instruction in professional de- ion, 67th Armor (Death Dealers), 4th Infantry nals during conduct of fire and maneuver, velopment courses. An adaptation of Re- Division, Fort Hood, TX. In April 2003, the Death are just one example of what is currently alWorld, or a similar simulation, that is Dealers deployed with the 4th Infantry Division available. tailored for tactical operations at the squad in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

March-April 2008 — 35 PPredatorredator PPalace:alace: GainingGaining a FootholdFoothold by Captain Peter J. Young Jr.

“I hear the war drums pounding again,” a private; it was humbling to stand be- Terrorists committed similar incidents remarked Sergeant First Class (SFC) Pat- fore them. The men of third platoon were throughout the city on a weekly basis, rick Thompson, referring to the rumors combat-proven, battle-hardened warriors, broadcasting their message with poignant he heard in the dining facility that morn- wearing combat patches on their uni- clarity — support for Iraq’s election pro- ing about a possible upcoming deploy- forms to prove it. Sadly, their platoon cesses would not be tolerated. Cable News ment. War drums already? It was 24 No- leader was the only member of the pla- Network (CNN) and Fox News were quick vember 2004. toon without a combat patch — I had to publicize pictures of the executions, Barely two years ago, SFC Thompson much to learn. labeling Haifa Street and the surrounding area north of Baghdad “an all-out war heard those same “war drums” pound- Several days into our deployment, we 1 ing as he packed his bags and joined 3d discovered why we were so desperately zone.” Infantry Division’s March 2003 invasion needed. Third platoon had been called on Haifa Street, we would later discover, into Baghdad. He and the brave men of to support the 3d Battalion, 325th Air- was one of the insurgent strongholds the third platoon, Bravo Company, 307th En- borne Infantry Regiment (3-325 AIR) Blue Falcons were called on to help seize gineer Battalion, 82d Airborne Division (Blue Falcons), 82d Airborne Division in and secure. The street, which has a long endured a long year of austere living con- its efforts to seize and secure a series of history of violence, is roughly 2 miles in ditions. Ten days after SFC Thompson violent insurgent strongholds north of length and surrounded by high-rise, dense- made the comment about the war drums, Baghdad. Interim Iraqi Prime Minister ly-populated apartment buildings. It serves he and I were tightly packed on a C17 Ayad Allawi, with the U.S. Army’s help, as a main high-speed avenue of approach transport aircraft taking off from Fort planned to initiate a democratic election northwest from Baghdad’s Green Zone Bragg, North Carolina, headed for Bagh- process that would lead Iraq to political and is frequented by U.S. troops. Haifa dad, Iraq. Ironic, I thought to myself; Ser- stability. This election process would se- Street was the site of several massive car geant Thompson is a prophet. lect a government to provide security and bombings (one of which killed 47 civil- peace in what was now a war-torn coun- ians) and countless improvised explosive I had assumed the coveted position of try. Prime Minister Allawi could not, how- devices (IED) and grenade ambushes, sapper platoon leader (PL) just five months ever, elicit voter participation without first which claimed the lives of at least 12 prior to our deployment. It was sobering providing security to the Iraqi populace American troops. to think that just 12 months ago, I had — security so desperately needed. earned my commission as a second lieu- Luckily for us, the Blue Falcons were tenant. My Army experience amounted At the onset of election efforts, Bagh- not the only U.S. Army unit assigned such to the Engineer Officer Basic Course, the dad’s citizens lived in a constant state a daunting mission. The 1st Squadron, Sapper Leader Course, Ranger School, of fear and abject horror. Days before 9th Cavalry Regiment, 4th Brigade Com- and Airborne School, which wasn’t too third platoon arrived in Iraq, three Iraqi bat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, (Task shabby for a lieutenant. Compared to my election officials working for Allawi Force 1-9), a mechanized cavalry outfit men, however, I might as well have been were pulled from their car and executed. from Fort Hood, Texas, had been attempt-

36 — March-April 2008 ing to secure Haifa Street for the past five sessed, were currently unable to protect made sure to coordinate with several of months. During their brief stint, the bat- palace occupants from vehicle-borne im- Task Force 1-9’s maneuver elements to tle-weary soldiers conducted over 100 provised explosive devices (VBIEDs) and make this force protection plan happen. patrols up and down Haifa Street, which RPG attacks. The three high-speed ave- Simultaneously, CPT Horsey contacted they renamed “Grenade Alley” and “Pur- nues of approach leading into the palace the task force commander and initiated ple Heart Lane,” ripping down Zarqawi required machine gun positions from the military decisionmaking process banners and collecting abandoned Iraqi which to observe and engage the enemy (MDMP) for what was now dubbed, “Op- security force uniforms.2 They received with direct fire weapons systems. The riv- eration Field of Dreams.” To sum up the AK-47, rocket-propelled grenade (RPG), erbank to the north and east required an- order, Operation Field of Dreams tasked and mortar fire during nearly every pa- tipersonnel blocking obstacles to prevent Charlie Company, Task Force 1-9, to pro- trol. Three soldiers were killed in action swimmers from infiltrating the palace un- vide armored transportation (M2 Brad- and 60 out of 118 men qualified for Pur- detected from the Tigris River. Finally, ley tracked vehicles) from Camp Inde- ple Heart medals, which were awarded Predator Palace required several hundred pendence north along the deadly Haifa for wounds sustained during combat.3 On sandbags to wall up the open doorways Street to Predator Palace gate. SFC Thomp- a positive note, Task Force 1-9 accumu- and windows, and also to protect future son coordinated with Task Force 1-9’s S4 lated intimate knowledge of the terrain oc cupants from AK-47, RPG, and mor- to provide palletized load system (PLS) and enemy situation, especially near Hai- tar fire. trucks equipped with downloadable “flat fa Street’s most notorious neighborhoods. rack” trailers to transport concertina wire; They provided the Blue Falcons with sat- Once we returned from the reconnais- fence pickets; sandbags; meals, ready to ellite imagery depicting areas of signifi- sance, CPT Horsey alerted his company eat (MREs); fuel; and bottled water to the cant activity, known enemy locations, and while SFC Thompson and I began pla- palace. Operation Field of Dreams also ideal patrol routes to maximize presence toon-level troop leading procedures. The tasked the attack aviation unit attached while minimizing risk to maneuvering platoon’s leadership gathered to deliver a to Task Force 1-9 to provide overhead se- forces. The men of Task Force 1-9 were warning order with the satellite imagery curity and close air support (CAS) for the tremendously helpful and happy to wel- we used for our engineer reconnaissance. barrier plan. come us to their team. Our squad leaders had plenty of ques- Predator Palace: Gaining a Foothold tions, mostly about supplies and barrier CPT Horsey’s engineer company was The Events material, but SFC Thompson was one step tasked to provide two M9 armored com- ahead. Before issuing my warning or- bat earthmovers (ACEs) from his assault A thorough satellite imagery reconnais- der, SFC Thompson met with Task Force and obstacle section to clear the heavily sance of Haifa Street and the surround- 1-9’s logistics officer (S4) and gave him wooded areas surrounding the palace, ing area revealed an old fortress rumored a “shopping list” of supplies and barrier which would prevent insurgents from ap- to once have been occupied by Saddam material needed to complete our force proaching the palace undetected and lob- Hussein’s third and youngest daughter protection plan. bing grenades over the wall at friendly Hala.4 The fortress, affectionately dubbed forces. The engineer company would also as “Predator Palace,” seemed like an ide- To match SFC Thompson’s prowess, I provide two M60A1 armored vehicle al location for a combat outpost (COP). had to be one hell of a platoon leader. I launched bridges (AVLBs) to block traf- Americans and Iraqis could jointly establish a base of operations from which they could conduct daily patrols, engaging and winning the trust of the local populace, while simultaneously gathering intelligence on insurgent locations and activities. This intelligence would facilitate raids and ambushes, during which we would capture or root out terrorists and thus quell the violence on Haifa Street, thereby setting the conditions for a peaceful and productive election process. Task Force 1-9’s engineer company commander, Captain (CPT) Horsey, was one step ahead of us; he had also identified Predator Palace as suitable and ideal, but was unable to personally visit the site to conduct an engineer reconnaissance. SFC Thompson and I met with CPT Horsey and explained our ideas and concerns. CPT Horsey suggested that all three of us visit the site together to conduct a force protection assessment, and we agreed. “Interim Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, with the U.S. Army’s help, planned to initiate a democrat- During our reconnaissance, we identi- ic election process that would lead Iraq to political stability. This election process would select a fied a few areas of interest. The walls sur- government to provide security and peace in what was now a war-torn country. Prime Minister Al- rounding the fortress were made of thin lawi could not, however, elicit voter participation without first providing security to the Iraqi popu- non-reinforced concrete which, we as- lace — security so desperately needed.”

March-April 2008 — 37 fic on Haifa Street several hundred me- within the palace. They would also pull concrete barrier trucks to and from Camp ters to the north and south of the palace local security for us as we pounded hun- Independence. to prevent VBIEDs from interdicting our dreds of fence pickets into the ground, The Iraqi government was already en- force protection efforts. CPT Horsey’s strung concertina wire fences, and built forcing an 8:00 p.m. nightly curfew in idea to use two of his expandable bridges machine gun nests. an effort to curtail violence, so we cap- to block traffic was sheer brilliance. Since local Iraqi workers were unwill- italized on the curfew and maneuvered Task Force 3-325 AIR volunteered its ing to operate cranes and drive barrier forces to Predator Palace under the cover Bravo Company, commanded by CPT transport trucks for fear of being execut- of night. This was ideal because it mini- Massey, to provide security and addition- ed, a U.S. Army National Guard engi- mized civilian interference with our move- al manpower for our engineers. Bravo’s neer company attached to Task Force 1-9 ment and it also rendered curfew-break- infantrymen would help us transport and volunteered to help. The company sup- ing insurgents easier to identify and tar- stack thousands of sandbags to reinforce plied two cranes with operators and sev- get. Once at the palace, we would quick- windows, doors, and other weak spots eral long-bed trucks that would transport ly establish local security, set AVLBs

“ Haifa Street, we would later discover, was one of the insurgent strongholds the Blue Falcons were called on to help seize and secure. The street, which has a long history of violence, is roughly 2 miles in length and surrounded by high- rise, densely-populated apartment buildings. It serves as a main high-speed avenue of approach northwest from Bagh- dad’s Green Zone and is frequented by U.S. troops. Haifa Street was the site of several massive car bombings (one of which killed 47 civilians) and countless improvised explosive devices (IED) and grenade ambushes, which claimed the lives of at least 12 American troops.”

38 — March-April 2008 down to block the roads, and then their own lives. Whatever call supply trucks and crane oper- the reason, they didn’t at- ators forward to begin working. tack us at all that night. We would continue working together as long as it would take, fo- Time flew by. With so many cusing the majority of our heavy things going on all at once, I lifting during hours of limited vis- quickly lost track of time. ibility to minimize risk. Before long, the sun began Surprisingly, our plan worked to rise and the skyline began better than we imagined. Opera- to light up. Morning light tion Field of Dreams began at would signify the end of 8:00 p.m. on 22 December 2004. Operation Field of Dreams, Our tactical combat patrol from day 1. Camp Independence to Predator Once Baghdad’s nightly Palace was quiet and without in- cur few was lifted, the Na- cident, and AVLBs were already tional Guard crane-barrier blocking the road when we ar- team and the Task Force 1-9 rived. After a quick sweep of Pred- resupply team did not feel ator Palace, infantrymen set a safe working outside the tight security perimeter around the pal ace walls or traveling court yard and gave us the “thumbs on Haifa Street. To mitigate up.” I, in turn, called CPT Horsey risk and keep from losing and gave him the “thumbs up” for more soldiers to the insur- his assault and obstacle section “Bravo’s infantrymen would help us transport and stack thou- gent cause, the Task Force (Reaper 6) to begin clearing the sands of sandbags to reinforce windows, doors, and other weak 1-9 com mander ordered all heavily wooded area outside the spots within the palace. They would also pull local security for force protection efforts to east gate. His ACE blade team us as we pounded hundreds of fence pickets into the ground, cease during daylight hours. plowed over trees and shrubs up strung concertina wire fences, and built machine gun nests.” CPT Massey worked out a to 6 inches in diameter, leaving plan with me and SFC John- nothing but dirt in their tracks. son to rotate shifts — B Com- The National Guard crane-bar- pany’s infantrymen would rier team was hot on the heels of CPT truck driver quickly fell into a rhythm, patrol dur ing the day while we slept. In Horsey’s ACE blade team, emplacing tall speeding up the process as they worked. reciprocation, we would conduct force concrete barriers around the palace to re- At one point, the crane team was emplac- pro tection upgrades to B Company’s for- inforce its walls. They began at the east ing barriers so fast that the truck driver tress at night while its men slept. It was a gate and worked their way clockwise to could not supply them quickly enough! great plan and would work out quite well the south gate. Soon after the ACE blade over the next few days. However, on this team began working, I saw the first PLS The moan and whine of tracked vehi- particular day, we decided to continue truck arrive at the south gate to drop off cles, combined with the chop-chop of working inside the palace walls to im- its first load of sandbags. The PLS truck Apache helicopter teams patrolling over- prove survivability within the fort. backed up as close as possible to Preda- head, kept the night from being too qui- tor Palace’s north entrance to minimize et. ACE teams plowed over tree after tree Staff Sergeant (SSG) Runkle and his carrying distance for the heavy sandbags. and M2 Bradleys patrolled back and first squad continued to erect triple-strand Once the PLS flat rack was downloaded, forth along Haifa Street; their 25mm bar- concertina fences within the gates of the infantrymen and sappers unfastened the rels pointed toward the Carter Apart- fortress, focusing their efforts on the cargo straps and began carrying sand- ments. As I watched the Bradleys patrol, banks of the Tigris River. Once complete, bags inside the palace. The sandbags were I reflected back to Task Force 1-9’s intel- they shifted their focus to constructing stacked neatly and carefully, blocking ligence officer (S2) who briefed enemy another triple-strand concertina wire out- windows, doors, and other weak areas us- com position, disposition, and activity. side the gates of Predator Palace, run- ing an over lapping pattern (brick-laying The S2 predicted sniper fire, RPG at- ning generally southeast from the east technique), reinforced every five layers tacks, and sporadic AK-47 gunfire origi- gate to Haifa Street. Sergeant (SGT) Tra- with wooden 2x4 beams. nating from the Carter Apartments. He vis and his second squad, with the help also predicted heavy mortar fire from of some exhausted infantrymen, man- Once satisfied that the sand bag detail the surrounding alleyways and grenades aged to continue downloading the last was under control, I headed back to SFC being lobbed from the balconies of Cart- flat-rack that was delivered prior to dawn. Thompson and retrieved my radio. I then er Apartments. Yet, throughout the first They reinforced and improved the exist- sent SFC Thomp son to check on our first night, there was no activity reported what- ing sandbag walls that protected Preda- squad, who were pounding fence pickets soever; nor was there any sign of anyone, tor Palace’s occupants from shrapnel and and stringing a triple-strand concertina anywhere. Maybe the insurgents were small-arms fire. SGT Weiczorek and the wire fence outside the east gate. At this sleeping, or maybe they were watching majority of his third squad shifted their point, the National Guard crane-barrier us — making careful observation of our focus to building machine gun nests atop team was picking up speed; the first 8 to patterns and waiting for the perfect mo- the south gate arch. Two sappers from 10 concrete barriers had taken the longest ment to strike. Maybe they fled the area, SGT Weiczorek’s squad were detached to emplace, but the crane operator and the intimidated by U.S. forces and fearful for to cut down trees outside the south gate,

March-April 2008 — 39 providing an unobstructed view of Haifa guard positions to provide overhead cov- were outside the gate conducting a patrol Street from the machine gun positions. er from mortar and rocket attacks. Before of Haifa Street; they happily obliged. As At noon, around the same time CPT sunrise on the second night, the crane- my platoon boarded the Bradley, I heard Massey sent out his first dismounted pa- barrier team was “mission complete” and sporadic gunfire outside the gate — the trol, I put my platoon to sleep. They had had departed safely. They did tremendous first gunfire I’d heard since we began Op- spent all of the previous day planning work. eration Field of Dreams. “Great,” I thought. and preparing their equipment for last SGT Travis’s second squad, with some “Here they come, just as I’m leaving.” night’s mission, and had worked all night help from CPT Massey’s infantrymen, to improve the fort’s survivability. Their erected a machine gun nest guarding the Outcomes rest was well-deserved — I would wake east gate from the palace courtyard. Si- The ramifications of the Predator Palace them at sunset for day 2. SFC Thomp son multaneously, SSG Runkle and his first fortification mission were immediately and I were also exhausted, but first, we squad made last-minute improvements to apparent. Later that week, I heard that in- had to take care of our men. CPT Massey’s the sandbag walls within Predator Pal- surgents had fired exhaustively at our patrol departed without a hitch, while ace. SGT Wieczorek and his third squad machine gun positions, simultaneously the remainder of his company manned shifted their focus to “safety construc- launching mortars and grenades over the guard posts and the machine gun nests we tion,” building handrails around the sec- wall and inside the palace’s courtyard. It built — they were more exhausted than ond- and third-story ledges to prevent sol- was the first of many failed attempts to we were. diers from accidentally falling off. By and influence CPT Massey and the brave men Operation Field of Dreams, day 2 be- large, third platoon was “mission com- of Bravo Company. Each and every time gan at 8:00 p.m. that night with the arriv- plete” midway through the night and was they attacked, insurgents met their fate at catching up on sleep and eating MREs by the hands of his infantrymen. al of the crane-barrier team and the first sunrise. sandbag-laden PLS flat-rack of the day. Later that week, CPT Massey increased The crane-barrier team emplaced over 50 By sunrise on day 2, SFC Thompson and the intensity and frequency of his pa- tall concrete barriers the night prior, rein- I ran out of things to improve — there trols. He escalated from low-intensity re- forcing the palace perimeter from the east wasn’t much else we could do to improve connaissance and security patrols along gate to south gate. Tonight would be an the already massive force protection ef- Haifa Street to high-intensity raids of the easier night for the wary National Guard forts surrounding Predator Palace. We Carter Apartments and surrounding build- unit, as they only had 25 concrete barri- decided to leave SGT Travis and his sec- ings. Sometimes he would send his en- ers and three scud bunkers to emplace. ond squad behind for any additional entire company after someone who sprayed Their focus would be on reinforcing the gineer support, with the solid guarantee a few rounds at his reconnaissance patrol palace wall from the south gate to west that my platoon was “on call” and would and ran into a nearby building to hide. gate, then reinforcing Predator Palace’s return if needed. CPT Horsey and the On several instances, CPT Massey’s pa- northern entrance from small-arms fire sappers of A Company, 8th Engineers trols located weapons caches and IED- aimed from across the Tigris River. Fi- were also heading out, so SFC Thomp- making material, though each time in a nally, three scud bunkers would be em- son asked about empty seats. CPT Hors- different area. The more his company placed near the palace and surrounding ey requested a platoon of Bradleys that patrolled, the more the Iraqi citizens began to trust him. Sometimes, Iraqi citizens would come out to greet him personally and give him information about insurgents hiding in the area, which was unheard of prior to Operation Field of Dreams. Though CPT Massey felt successful at times, he was also frequently dumbfounded that the more he patrolled his area of operations, the more his patrols were greeted with gunfire and grenade attacks — it should have been the opposite. CPT Massey and his Blue Falcons maintained the intensity and ferocity of their patrols for more than 3 months. In March 2005, the Blue Falcons relinquished responsibility of the fortress to 1st Battal- ion, 1st Brigade, 6th Iraqi Army Divi- sion.5 Six months later, Dennis Steele, a writer for the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) Magazine, visited Haifa Street to do a follow-up story on Iraqi progress since CPT Massey’s handover. During his visit, he marveled at the “The Iraqi government was already enforcing an 8:00 p.m. nightly curfew in an effort to curtail vio- lack of violence that supposedly made the lence, so we capitalized on the curfew and maneuvered forces to Predator Palace under the cov- street famous. Haifa Street was, as he ex- er of night. This was ideal because it minimized civilian interference with our movement and it also plained, “a showcase of Iraqi security.”6 rendered curfew-breaking insurgents easier to identify and target.” Steele credits the pacification of violence

40 — March-April 2008 “The ramifications of the Predator Palace fortification mission were immediately apparent. Later that week, I heard that insurgents had fired exhaustively at our machine gun positions, simultaneously launching mortars and grenades over the wall and inside the palace’s courtyard.”

to CPT Massey’s aggressive patrolling bers of his family reduced to lifeless corps- … living in your sector, in close proxim- technique, perpetuated by the Iraqi army es. Iraqi army advisor Lieutenant Colo- ity to the population.”10 That’s exactly unit emulating CPT Massey’s techniques, nel (LTC) Steve Duke made a move to why the engineers built up and reinforced and currently occupying Predator Palace. diffuse the situation; he attempted to per- Predator Palace. Instead of commuting to He explains that violent neighborhoods suade locals to help him remove the bod- Haifa Street from Camp Independence can be quelled through the use of contin- ies.9 The locals refused for fear of their daily to conduct patrols, we built a com- uous “overwhelming forces” and consis- lives, a situation that was all too familiar. bat outpost on Haifa Street so we could tent, aggressive action.7 LTC Duke attempted to move the bodies live with and win the trust of the local himself and was greeted with a hail of populace. Michael Hastings, a Newsweek report- bullets from insurgents in a nearby apart- er, following in Steele’s footsteps, did a ment complex. Insurgents once again had When the troopers of Task Force 1-9 follow-up of the infamous “Purple Heart the initiative; once again, the citizens of first arrived in country, they patrolled Alley” two years after CPT Massey’s Haifa Street were petrified with fear and neighborhoods much like Haifa Street in unit relinquished control. What Hastings abject horror. One can theorize that the armored convoys several hours a day. discovered is quite the opposite. Conse- Unfortunately, they paid for that mistake aggressive and relentless pace CPT Mas- 11 quences of the lack of aggressive patrol- sey and his unit set as a precedent must with blood. Commuting to combat from ling were evident in his January 2007 have lost momentum over the years. How a super forward operating base, Kilcul- Newsweek article, “The Battle for Haifa could this happen? len says, “degrades situational awareness, Street.”8 Upon arrival, Hastings discov- makes you a target, and is ultimately more ered that recently, 27 dead bodies (later dangerous.”12 Put another way, it doesn’t found to be family members of Haifa Lessons Learned win any hearts and minds, nor does it gain Street’s Iraqi police chief) were dumped David Kilcullen, author of the famous the trust of the local populace. Insurgents in an alleyway next to a police station. publication, “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fun- were one step ahead of Task Force 1-9, The scene seems disturbingly reminis- damentals of Company-level Counter- well aware of their tactics, techniques, cent of the Iraqi election official execu- insurgency,” echoes three essential les- procedures, and patterns. Our enemies tions: once again, the insurgents broad- sons to be learned from Operation Field know they cannot defeat us head on; this casted a crystal clear message — although of Dreams. In my opinion, Kilcullen’s is exactly why they attack us asymmetri- this time 24 dead bodies stronger — that most non-negotiable and relevant lesson cally. Insurgents will go into hiding when support for Iraqi stability and security will is counterinsurgency principle 10: You we patrol through their areas in force and not be tolerated. The Iraqi police chief must “be there.” He states that, “Your first they will return once our patrols are com- looked on in horror as he saw 27 mem- order of business is to establish presence plete. After all, we may own the street and

March-April 2008 — 41 the neighborhood for 4 hours a day, but finished once the neighborhood goes qui- tions outside the palace (to include CPT that means they own it for the other 20. et. Once you quell the violence in a hos- Horsey’s tree-clearing ACE missions) The heavily-fortified Predator Palace out- tile community, you must continue to ag- would not have been possible without at- post, combined with CPT Massey’s ag- gressively patrol and engage the local tack aviation overhead and Bradleys pa- gressive, frequent, and unpredictable pa- populace. Michael Hastings’ Newsweek trolling up and down Haifa Street; and B trolling procedures denied the insurgents article about Haifa Street highlights the Company’s infantrymen guarded the in- neighborhood ownership and influence. consequences of complacent patrolling.15 side perimeter of Predator Palace to allow engineers to construct triple-strand Equally relevant is Kilcullen’s counter- There are several engineer-specific les- wire fences along the Tigris riverbank. insurgency article 13, which states that sons to be learned from Operation Field “building trust networks” will “displace of Dreams. First, it is possible to use the As mentioned earlier, the ultimate pur- enemy networks, bringing him into the armored vehicle launch bridge as a traf- pose of Operation Field of Dreams was open to fight you.”13 At one point, CPT fic-blocking obstacle, which is definitely to set the conditions for CPT Massey and Massey was dumbfounded at the in- outside-the-box thinking. Secondly, nev- his men to root out the terrorists on Haifa creased frequency of attacks that did not er underestimate the motivation, team- Street. The outpost we fortified for his seem to coincide with the increased secu- work, and competence of a National men would allow him to conduct aggres- rity he thought he was providing. In ac- Guard engineer company. The crane-bar- sive, intense, and unpredictable patrols tuality, the insurgency network had been rier team blew me away with their pro- through Haifa Street to quell the violence, which, in turn, would set the conditions for Prime Minister Allawi’s peaceful and productive election process. I think we did one hell of a job. “Operation Field of Dreams was a success because of all-around teamwork, coordination, support, and a solid understanding of why Predator Palace needed to be Notes occupied and fortified...” 1Lisa Burgess, “Patrols Turn Ugly on Baghdad’s Haifa Street,” Stars and Stripes, 22 September 2004. 2Gretel C. Kovach, “U.S. Soldiers Dig In at Baghdad Palace,” Dallas Morning News, January 3, 2005. 3Lisa Burgess, “Patrols Turn Ugly on Baghdad’s Haifa disrupted by the fortification and occu- fessionalism and work ethic. Thirdly, al- Street.” pation of Predator Palace and by CPT ways personally conduct an engineer re- 4Scott Peterson, “A Violent Street Finds Calm,” Christian Massey’s frequent patrols. Civilians were connaissance whenever possible. Satel- Science Monitor, May 26, 2005. 5Dennis Steele, “Haifa Street: Purple Heart Boulevard Re- initially fearful and skeptical of U.S. forc- lite imagery, while remarkably detailed dux,” Association of the United States Army (AUSA) Magazine, es occupying Predator Palace, as they and exceptionally helpful, is just that — September 2005, p. 24. thought it would bring more violence into a view of a portion of the earth’s surface 6Ibid. their community. Although incidents did seen from above. Satellite imagery can- 7Ibid. initially spike, the locals felt a tremen- not tell you where to place machine guns 8Michael Hastings, “The Battle for Haifa Street,” Newsweek, January 12, 2007. dous sense of security knowing there was or where the enemy can and cannot en- 9Ibid. now an American presence in their com- gage you with small-arms fire. A proper 10David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of munity and their neighborhoods were be- engineer reconnaissance/force protection Company-level Counterinsurgency,” Military Review, May ing continuously patrolled. assessment must be done in person, with 2006, p. 4. your own eyes. I credit much of our suc- 11Lisa Burgess, “Patrols Turn Ugly on Baghdad’s Haifa Finally, Kilcullen’s counterinsurgency Street.” cess during Operation Field of Dreams to 12 article 16 highlights the importance of David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of practicing “deterrent patrolling,” which the leader’s reconnaissance we performed Company-level Counterinsurgency,” p. 5. days earlier. 13Ibid. he defines as “flooding an area with nu- 14 merous small patrols working together Ibid. Operation Field of Dreams was a suc- 15Hastings, “The Battle for Haifa Street.” to keep your enemy off balance.”14 CPT cess because of all-around teamwork, co- Massey’s enemy was, indeed, knocked ordination, support, and a solid under- off balance as he continually sent out pa- Captain Peter J. Young Jr., is currently a Spe- standing of why Predator Palace needed cial Forces student, D Company, Support Bat- trols at erratic times and in small num- to be occupied and fortified; the sandbag bers. Instead of sending his infantrymen talion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Air- walls and machine gun nests were made borne), Fort Bragg, NC. He received a B.S. out in company- or platoon-sized forma- possible by engineers and infantrymen tion, he spread his men out across a wide from the U.S. Military Academy. His military ed- building and sweating side by side; Task ucation includes Maneuver Captains Career area to keep them from becoming targets. Force 1-9’s support company kept sand- Course, Engineer Officer Basic Course, Com- This paid huge dividends during one par- bags, MREs, bottled water, concertina bat Diver Qualification Course, Sapper Leader ticular grenade attack, when SGT Travis wire, pickets, and building materials in Course, Ranger School, Airborne School, and sustained superficial shrapnel wounds. constant supply with frequent PLS truck Jumpmaster School. He has served in various Had he and the other squad members command and staff positions, to include XO, B visits and flat-rack deliveries; the con- Company, 307th Engineer Battalion (Airborne), been closer together, SGT Travis might crete barrier plan outside the palace was not have been so lucky. 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg; and sapper successful because of the National Guard’s platoon leader, 3d Platoon, B Company, 307th Another lesson learned from Operation unparalleled sense of urgency, teamwork, Engineer Battalion (Airborne), 82d Airborne Di- Field of Dreams was that the work is not and “esprit de corps;” engineer opera- vision, Fort Bragg.

42 — March-April 2008 Team Enabler: Combining Capabilities During the Execution of Full-Spectrum Operations

by Captain David J. Smith and First Lieutenant Jeffrey Ritter

The current operational environment in ry Regiment (3-1 Cavalry), 3d Heavy Bri- 3-1 Cavalry saw a visible improvement Iraq is more dynamic than ever, as we gade Combat Team, 3d Infantry Division, and an increase in trust between coalition work to transition lines of operation, such formed an element, Team Enabler, that forces and the Iraqi population. as security and governance, to the gov- combined these capabilities during the ernment of Iraq. Units must have the abil- execution of full-spectrum operations in Building or improving Iraqi government ity to conduct full-spectrum operations the Mada’in Qada (southeast of Bagh- institutions is critical to the success of our across their entire area of operations. Bat- dad) during Operation Iraqi Freedom V. mission in Iraq. The Team Enabler orga- talion- and brigade-sized organizations nization allows units to not just conduct are challenged by the numerous tasks as- Team Enabler allowed line companies/ spheres of influence with leaders, but to sociated with providing security to the troops and platoons to focus on the se- devote the time necessary to build and local populace, creating effective govern- curity lines of operation and the critical improve government structure and effi- ment systems that work within the gov- tasks of securing the local population ciency. Civil affairs teams are experts in ernment of Iraq’s structure, providing or from extremist elements and preventing assisting civil leaders in making commu- improving essential services, creating en- sectarian violence. Team Enabler supple- nity improvements using existing gov- during employment, and bolstering the mented traditional combat forces by pro- ernment structures and promoting effi- local economy. Combining attachments, viding a venue to build initial trust and re- ciency in executing basic governance such as civil affairs teams, tactical psy- lationships with local civil and tribal lead- tasks. They also provide the support chan- chological operations (PSYOP) teams, ers. This was accomplished through com- nels to coordinate directly between bri- and human intelligence collection teams, bined spheres of influence engagements gade-level partners at the Qada level and into a cohesive, separate maneuver ele- with maneuver or “ground-owning” com- Iraqi provincial reconstruction teams ment under command and control of the manders and focused efforts to improve (PRT) that coordinate efforts with the Iraqi battalion allows units to attack problem local government organizations and es- provincial and national government. This sets across all lines of operation (see Fig- sential services. Within a few months of partnership allows maneuver command- ure 1). Our unit, 3d Squadron, 1st Caval- implementing the Team Enabler concept, ers to focus on establishing security and keeping pressure on extrem- in their organization to pro- ist elements who may try to vide the right amount of disrupt coalition force and knowl edge, time, and energy Iraqi government efforts. to properly develop econom- Team Enabler successfully ic near- and long-term plans developed a project plan by within an area of operations. using water delivery contracts Additionally, this relieves ma- and drilling artesian wells neuver commanders at the along Butler Range Road, a company/troop and platoon key line of communication level from having to provide (LOC) that connected the en- combat power to escort these tire brigade combat team teams. It also allowed a singu- (BCT) with logistics support lar focus on achieving “visible improvement” through out from division and corps, “...the team made enormous progress in the small village of Hollandia by which significantly improved the area of operations. Tacti- securing medical treatment for a 3-year-old boy whose intestines were cal PSYOPS teams collected the quantity and quality of outside of his body at birth. He was the darling of the village, but his life drinking water for several vil- atmospherics and determined expectancy was very limited due to his condition. Team Enabler coordi- the problem areas in which lages. This rapid and visible nated surgery for the young boy with an Iraqi medical clinic in Najaf, and projects were necessary to improvement created a rela- by doing so, won over the village’s entire population.” tionship with local leaders deny ex tremists sanctuary and and citizens that greatly en- safe haven. They were also hanced the security environ- able to determine if a unit was ment along that vital LOC. achieving its effects on a pop- forward and provide useful information ulation over time. Human intelligence Tactical PSYOPS teams conducted ag- to Team Enabler and the collection team. collection teams once again provided in- gressive information operations (IO) cam- formation on extremists in an area through paigns that focused on building support Multiple tailgate medical operations a nonthreatening environment. We found for local government institutions and agen- (MEDOPs) and larger medical capacity that information is sometimes easier to das as they began the process of “winning (MEDCAP) operations involving Iraqi collect by a Team Enabler organization hearts and minds” by reducing popular doctors and medicines provided by the using the “carrot” instead of the “stick,” support for extremist elements. Through a ministry of health were particularly effec- which validates the human intelligence close working relationship with local lead- tive. These operations, along with water collection team being a part of Team En- ers, human intelligence collection teams and school-supply drops, provided oppor- abler. were able to provide units with informa- tunities for the human intelligence col- tion that allowed for the accurate target- lection team to engage local citizens in a Team Enabler was extraordinarily suc- ing of high-value individuals. During mul- secure environment without endangering cessful at making connections with local tiple operations, the human intelligence themselves or their sources. citizens that the more kinetically orient- collection team that was embedded with ed combat forces were unable to make. Providing essential services, creating For example, the team made enormous Team Enabler engaged and developed enduring employment, and building the sources that provided significant intelli- progress in the small village of Hollandia local economy were key tasks that Team by securing medical treatment for a 3- gence on squadron targets. This informa- Enabler had the greatest ability to affect. tion was used to kill or capture extremist year-old boy whose intestines were out- Civil affairs teams, through project de- side of his body at birth. He was the dar- leaders and greatly reduce the security velopment and prioritization, identified threat to coalition forces and local citi- ling of the village, but his life expectancy what was needed to achieve the desired ef- was very limited due to his condition. zens. The synergistic effect of the reduced fects of the unit and the local government. security threat encouraged locals to come Team Enabler coordinated surgery for the These teams have trained individuals with- young boy with an Iraqi medical clinic in Najaf, and by doing so, won over the village’s entire population. The entire at- mosphere and attitude of Hollandia per- manently changed as a result of Team TEAM ENABLER ORGANIZATION Enabler’s efforts, paving the way for the ground-owning commander to develop a M240B M240B50 CAL 240B relationship with the village leader, who provided significant intelligence on extremist activities. CAT-A SECURITY TPT HCT Team Enabler was not without potential CA Team Leader Security Team Leader TPT Team Leader HCT Team Leader drawbacks, which, unless properly iden- CA Team Member Security Team Member TPT Team Member HCT Team Member tified and mitigated, could have caused CA Team Member Security Team Member TPT Team Member HCT Team Member serious problems within our area of op- Translator Security Team Member Translator Translator erations. Team Enabler, as its own maneuver element, increased the risk of CAT (Civil Affairs Team) TPT (Tactical Psychological Operations Team) HCT (Human Intelligence Collection Team) “spheres of influence fratricide” and “broken promises” in the event the maneuver commander and the civil affairs team Figure 1 leader were not synchronized — the ma-

44 — March-April 2008 neuver commander promises one thing sponsibility and Team Enabler support- and Cavalry Leaders Course. He has served and the civil affairs team leader promises ed the ground-owning commander. When in various command and staff positions, to in- another. Iraqis are quick to identify seams correctly employed, combining capabil- clude commander, B Troop, 3d Squadron, 1st Cavalry, 3d Brigade Combat Team, 3d ID, in the command structure and when they ities, such as civil affairs teams, tactical Iraq; officer in charge, military transition team, do not get what they want from one per- PSYOP teams, and human intelligence 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, 3d ID, Iraq; XO, son, they will go to another. It is imper- collection teams into a cohesive, separate Headquarters and Headquarters Company, ative that civil affairs team leaders and maneuver element is a powerful combat 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (CD), Fort maneuver commanders work closely to- multiplier. Hood, TX; XO, A Company, 2d Squadron, gether through detailed reporting and 12th (2-12) Cavalry, 1st CD, Fort Hood; and regular meetings to achieve desired ef- platoon leader, C Company, 2-12 Cavalry, 1st fects. CD, Fort Hood. There is also a risk of maneuver com- Captain David J. Smith is currently the troop First Lieutenant Jeffrey S. Ritter is currently manders not being completely involved in commander, Headquarters and Headquar- serving as the S5, 3d Squadron, 1st Cavalry, their areas of operation because they see ters Troop, 3d Squadron, 1st Cavalry, 3d Bri- 3d Brigade Combat Team, 3d Infantry Divi- gade Combat Team, 3d Infantry Division (ID), sion (ID), Iraq. He received a B.A. from the Team Enabler and the lines of operation Iraq. He received a B.A. from Western Mich- University of Northern Iowa. His military edu- that do not relate to security as “their re- igan University. His military education in- cation includes the Chemical Officer Basic sponsibility.” In the end, conducting full- cludes Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Course. He has served as chemical officer, spectrum operations in an area of opera- Captains Career Course, Combined Arms 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, 3d Heavy Brigade tions is the maneuver commander’s re- and Services Staff School, Airborne School, Combat Team, 3d ID, Fort Benning, GA.

Team Enabler successfully developed a project plan by using water delivery contracts and drilling artesian wells along Butler Range Road, a key line of communication (LOC) that connected the entire brigade combat team (BCT) with logistics support from division and corps, which significantly improved the quantity and quality of drinking water for several villages. This rapid and visible improvement created a relationship with local leaders and citizens that greatly enhanced the security environment along that vital LOC. Training the Warrior Mechanic to Meet Challenges of the 21st-Century Battlefield

by Captain David Campbell

As our Army continues to fight the war fuse insight, lessons, and best-practices vehicle. There are four major phases of on terror and simultaneously transforms, gained from hard-won experiences into the warrior mechanic training. All main- 1st Battalion, 81st (1-81) Armor Regi- our training methodology. tainers begin with classroom blocks of ment, 194th Armored Brigade, contin- instruction on subjects common to all ues to train Abrams and Bradley systems Today’s Warrior Mechanic maintenance personnel, such as shop and maintainers to support maneuver forces. Program of Instruction vehicle safety, technical manuals, prin- For the first time in a generation, many of ciples of engines, and basic electronics. our leaders and cadre are combat veter- The reality of today’s Army assumes Students are then broken down into ans with significant operational experi- that a soldier’s first field training exercise groups of four, each with their own in- ence. We leverage this leadership experi- (FTX) will be combat. The current pro- structor in a laboratory environment for ence to shape soldiers who are soundly gram of instruction for Abrams and Brad- hands-on training. Fault verification, trou- grounded in the warrior ethos and build ley systems maintainers trains technical- bleshooting, and replacing parts on criti- units based on standards and discipline. ly and tactically proficient soldiers who cal power plant, hull, and turret systems are ready to contribute immediately on are presented and demonstrated by in- As we train our soldiers to fight and win arrival at their first unit. structors and executed by students until against an adaptive enemy in a full-spec- Today’s warrior mechanic program of the standard is met. The same methodol- trum environment, 1-81 Armor embraces instruction for Abrams and Bradley main- ogy is continued as students move to a culture of innovation. Our efforts on tainers trains 6 days a week and focuses the turret systems and armaments pack- staying current and relevant constantly in- on the critical task list for their particular ages. Students’ information retention and

46 — March-April 2008 “All maintainers begin with classroom blocks of instruction on subjects common to all maintenance personnel, such as shop and vehicle safety, technical manuals, principles of engines, and basic electronics. Students are then broken down into groups of four, each with their own instructor in a laboratory environment for hands-on training.”

task proficiency are evaluated with per- Ready to Meet the Challenge Captain David R. Campbell is currently serving formance-oriented testing procedures. The warrior mechanics trained by 1-81 as commander, B Company, 1st Battalion, 81st Students who excel throughout the Armor are ready to meet the challenges of Armor Regiment, 194th Armored Brigade, Fort course are provided additional training the 21st-century battlefield. During train- Knox, KY. He received a B.A. from the Univer- through the battalion excellence in main- ing, students are transformed into soldiers sity of Minnesota-Twin Cities. His military edu- capable of accomplishing their mission in cation includes the Armor Officer Basic Course tenance program, which develops stu- and the Armor Captains Career Course. He has dents’ task proficiency at the next high- the full-spectrum environment. Now, and served in various command and staff positions, er level. In addition to the combat plat- in the future, 1-81 Armor remains fully to include assistant S3 and battalion mainte- form, students are taught to maintain oth- committed to providing the mounted com- nance officer, 1st Battalion, 13th (1-13) Armor er types of vehicles, such as the M88, munity with soldiers who are prepared to Regiment, Fort Riley, KS; and XO and platoon M113, forward repair system (FRS), light contribute technically and tactically to a leader, A Company, 1-13th Armor Regiment, medium tactical vehicle (LMTV), and values-based Army from day one. Fort Riley. high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), they will likely see in their operational units. Warrior tasks and drill reinforcement training is key to developing warrior mechanics. Small groups from classroom instruction are formed in tactical squads and led by instructors through a series of tactical exercises. Students are taken to a multipurpose range complex where they execute a mounted combat patrol live- fire exercise using armored personnel carriers and crew-served weapons. Instruc- tors lead the students through a 3-day urban operation train-up, where they begin with basic tasks and culminate with a tactical mission at the collective level. Indi- vidual and crew-served weapons proficiency is further reinforced with mechanical training, as well as the engagement skills trainer. All of the warrior mechanics technical and tactical skills are brought “The reality of today’s Army assumes that a soldier’s first field training exercise (FTX) will be into application during a 3-day field train- combat. The current program of instruction for Abrams and Bradley systems maintainers ing exercise in a simulated combat envi- train technically and tactically proficient soldiers who are ready to contribute immediately on ronment. arrival at their first unit.”

March-April 2008 — 47 Knudsen is an active duty field artillery officer, complished in Operation Enduring Freedom in General James Longstreet – The Con- who has served in a wide variety of positions Afghanistan, this book shows how Special Forc- federacy’s Most Modern General by at the tactical level, including assignments with es supported a U.S.-led conventional air and Lieutenant Colonel Harold M. Knudsen, 3d Army and the Army Staff. He has maintained ground offensive to collapse the regime of Sad- Word Association Publishers, Tarentum, a life-long interest in General Longstreet and dam Hussein and capture Baghdad. Army Spe- PA, 2007, 110 pp., $14.95 (softcover) the American Civil War. He completed the bulk cial Forces performed its traditional role, serv- of his research and writing while stationed in ing as a dynamic force multiplier, in support of the Alexandria, Virginia, area with easy access the major offensive effort. Army Special Oper- to several of the battlefields that he refers to in ations Forces were responsible for three fronts You have got to like an author who quotes the his book. during the U.S. Central Command campaign against Iraq: scud missile/weapons of mass works of Jomini, Mahan, and Guderian. Knud- While I very much enjoyed reading Knud- destruction hunt in the west; the Kurdish uncon- sen has written an intriguing study on the in- sen’s study of Longstreet, the book has two ventional warfare mission in the north; and the novative contributions that James Longstreet areas that could be improved. The publisher psychological operations mission. They also di- made not only to the campaigns during the needs to do a better job of proofreading and rectly supported the other two fronts: the air Civil War but to future battles as well. In Gen- correcting errors that distract from the reader’s campaign and the ground offensive to seize eral James Longstreet, Knudsen details sev- ability to move easily through the book. Read- Baghdad. eral key contributions and decisions that Long- ers may also find Knudsen’s hypothetical vi- street made during campaigns with the Army gnette of how the Battle of Vicksburg might Army Special Operations Forces spearhead- of Northern Virginia and the Army of Tennes- have ended if Longstreet had been in com- ed ground operations in Iraq; they were as- see, which were discounted and/or mischar- mand, or if his concepts had been implement- signed special reconnaissance missions and acterized in the aftermath of the Civil War by bi- ed, a bit of a stretch. were infiltrated into the Karbala Gap by the ographers and historians who disliked Long- 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, street’s political opinions during the reconstruc- Those who are interested in Civil War lead- the “Night Stalkers,” while other members of the tion period. ers and how they impacted the battles and campaigns they fought will certainly enjoy read- Night Stalkers attacked border posts and anti- Following a brief narrative of Longstreet’s pre- ing Knudsen’s work. Most ARMOR readers aircraft systems. The 75th Rangers assaulted Civil War military career and how the “lost will find this well-written book worthwhile and by parachute and helicopter deep inside Iraq cause” political actions damaged Longstreet’s enjoyable, and at slightly over 100 pages, it can after psychological operations had successful- military reputation, the book leads the reader be read in just a few hours. ly completed broadcasts and dropped leaflets through the battles of Antietam, Fredericks- all over the country. Signal, support, and civil burg, Gettysburg, Chickamauga, and the de- DALE MURRAY affairs soldiers rounded out the Army special fense of Petersburg. Knudsen uses each of MAJ, U.S. ARMY operations team; their stories are well docu- these campaigns to highlight the innovative tac- mented in this book. tics that Longstreet used, or attempted to use, All Roads Lead to Baghdad does an excel- including his recognition of how the prolifera- All Roads Lead to Baghdad: Army Spe- lent job of explaining what Army special oper- tion of rifles made Napoleonic tactics obsolete, cial Operations Forces in Iraq by Charles ations elements accomplished during the U.S.- and that the Confederacy needed to pursue a H. Briscoe, Kenneth Finlayson, Robert led coalition offensive to collapse the regime of “defensive-offensive” strategy to shepherd their W. Jones Jr., Cherilyn A. Walley, A. Dwayne Saddam Hussein in Iraq. As a 5-month snap- limited resources and inferior numbers. Aaron, Michael R. Mullins, and James A. shot of OIF, the book covers the period of ma- The author makes several very interesting Schroder, U.S. Government Printing Of- jor combat operations when Army Special Forc- points in his book. First, he uses Longstreet’s fice, 2006, 517 pp., $45.00 (hardcover) es were most active. This current operations successes at the Battles of Antietam and Fred- history, according to the authors, is not intend- ericksburg to demonstrate how the general rec- ed to capture operational lessons learned, resolve special warfare doctrine issues, or clarify ognized that using terrain would allow his forc- The Americans are not there. They’re not in definitions for Army Special Forces; rather, the es to successfully defend their positions against Baghdad. There are no troops there. Never. book seeks to show the actual events and plan- attacks from superior Union forces, while many They’re not at all! other commanders suffered heavier casualties ning that occurred during the run-up phase to using irrelevant Napoleonic tactics. Second, – Mohammed “Baghdad Bob” Saeed al-Sahaf, capture Baghdad, presenting an unclassified Knudsen notes that Longstreet’s advice to Lee Iraqi Minister of Information version of classified operations and planning. Especially useful in this book is the inclusion of on conducting a defensive campaign proved Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is one of the successful at the Battle of Chancellorsville, and a timeline at the bottom of chapters 4 through most controversial operations conducted by the 10, which overlays operational and strategic when not heeded, proved unsuccessful at the U.S. military since Vietnam. However, one must Battle of Gettysburg. Third, the author uses events with tactical stories detailed in each not forget that while post-hostility (phase IV sta- chapter. Longstreet’s support of an ineffective General bility operations) may not have gone as envi- Bragg at the Battle of Chickamauga, and how sioned by departments of defense and state All Roads Lead to Baghdad does not intend his campaign in eastern Tennessee in 1863 planners, the first three phases, preparation, to resolve the Army’s special operations doctri- demonstrated his aptitude for independent shape the battlespace, and decisive operations nal issues nor clarify military definitions; it was command. were, in fact, so successfully executed that the written to provoke discussion and promote anal- opening phases of OIF will rank in history with ysis and comparisons. The book is also not in- Knudsen does an effective job demonstrating the 1940 German lightning invasion of the low tended to be the definitive history of the uncon- Longstreet’s military skills and also defends his countries during World War II. U.S. Army Spe- ventional war in Iraq — that war is still ongoing. subject well against attacks on his character cial Operations Forces played a large role in and abilities following the Civil War, specifical- the initial success of this operation, as shown All Roads Lead to Baghdad was written as a ly by demonstrating how the concept of the in All Roads Lead to Baghdad, which provides collaborative effort by historians from the U.S. “defensive-offense” influenced combat leaders a detailed account of how U.S. Army Rangers, Army Special Operations Command History in subsequent conflicts. The author uses cor- Special Forces, and Army Special Operations Office at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The au- respondence between Lee and Longstreet to Aviation units helped redefine the modern bat- thors’ access to classified documents, person- illustrate the relationship the two had during the tlespace during the first 5 months of OIF. al and unit histories, and personal interviews war, which significantly supports his argument with the officers and soldiers make this book that Lee had great confidence in Longstreet’s Much like its predecessor, Weapon of Choice, both entertaining and informative. This book is ability and advice. explained what Army special operations ac- a must read for students of unconventional war-

48 — March-April 2008 fare and commanders who may someday de- with the military chain of command. In a frus- eral internationalists, and Jacksonian (a refer- ploy Special Forces in harm’s way. trating series of events, the reader watches ence to Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson Amer- helplessly as the United States’ chances for a ican Nationalists). Fukuyama argues for an al- JAYSON A. ALTIERI quick and clean exit from Iraq rapidly bogs ternative to these four trends. LTC, U.S. Army down into the quagmire of today. Ricks’ writing The book traces neoconservatism to its roots continues up until mid-2006, demonstrating in the City College of New York of the 1930s how a lack of planning, foresight, and accurate among Americans shaped personally by the intelligence resulted in the current situation in events of European fascism and encroaching FIASCO: The American Military Adven- Iraq today. ture in Iraq by Thomas E. Ricks, Pen- communism. Its first foray into public advocacy guin Press, 2006, 496 pp., $27.95 (hard- There is little doubt Ricks has issues with the came in its fight against Stalinism, not as a World War II ally, but identifying the regime for cover) current political administration and their handling of the Iraqi war. Additionally, his constant what it really was. They also opposed the 1960s attacks on some of the senior military leaders counter-culture in the United States, but bal- involved in Iraqi Freedom distracts slightly from anced this with a desire to address the under- Thomas Ricks, the senior Pentagon corre- the overall effectiveness of the book. These lying causes of social inequity. spondent for The Washington Post delves deep- minor problems aside, Ricks had access to Pages dispel the unconstructive hype about ly into the planning and execution of the war in many of the key military and political players Leo Strauss, an academic at the University of Iraq in his book, FIASCO: The American Mili- planning for the invasion and through the sub- Chicago, who stressed the study of political tary Adventure in Iraq. Ricks’ position in the sequent policy blunders. His description of the classics and a serious approach to western Pentagon afforded him access to some of the strategic failure to match ends, ways, and philosophical thought. Strauss never imparted most senior-level planners and leaders within means is about as perfect as any strategist public policy theory, but a passion to under- the U.S. military. The result is a work that is could ask for. Additionally, every military plan- stand western classical political philosophy as both introspective and brutally honest regard- ner and leader should read his assessment of a means seeking a rationalization of nature and ing mistakes made by military planners and both the lack of planning for a post-Saddam its relationship to political life. Strauss also pre- policymakers in handling the situation in Iraq. Iraq and how the U.S. policies fueled instead ferred liberal democracy to communism and Fiasco begins with the first Gulf War in 1991, of mitigated the current insurgency. fascism, and admired Winston Churchill’s stand against totalitarian regimes. The pure view of analyzing the United States’ policy of contain- Fiasco combines the military planning exper- Strauss is that humans are political by nature ing Iraq, and ends in mid-2006 with the latest tise found in Gordon and Trainor’s Cobra II, and realize their full potential by participating in post-Saddam Iraq situation. During the journey and the political insight of Bob Woodward’s the life of the city (polity). This is Aristotle redis- from 1991 until recently, Ricks highlights nu- Plan of Attack. There is little doubt that Ricks’ covered, and typically clashes with those who merous key events such as 9/11 and the dra- work is a worthy read for all interested in gain- argue for freedom from government power. matic shift in national policy regarding Iraq. ing a better understanding of how the United From 1991 until 2001, U.S. policy effectively States ended up in Iraq and how to avoid the Fukuyama lays out a few common themes of contained Iraq and many considered it not a same mistakes in the future. neoconservatism that are not a mystery and threat of any sort, including the former Central are widely published in the open media, includ- MICHAEL D. SULLIVAN ing beliefs that the internal character of regimes Command (CENTCOM) commander, General MAJ, U.S. Army Zinni. Ricks draws a large portion of his initial matters, that American power can be used for research from Zinni and his experiences as a moral purposes, a distrust of social engineering combatant commander. Zinni and his staff de- projects, and skepticism that international law veloped numerous plans and estimates for an and institutions (such as the United Nations) invasion of Iraq, including an in-depth assess- America at the Crossroads: Democra- can achieve security and justice between na- ment of the post-invasion requirements. This cy, Power, and the Neoconservative tions. post-invasion analysis called for hundreds of Legacy by Francis Fukuyama, Yale Uni- America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Pow- thousands of troops to stabilize Iraq for numer- versity Press, New Haven, CT, 216 pp., er, and the Neoconservative Legacy contains ous years. However, when Zinni spoke to the 2006 an interesting discussion on the nature of the planners who were getting ready to launch Op- Islamist extremist threat. Fukuyama is a pro- eration Iraqi Freedom in early 2003, none of ponent of the theories of Olivier Roy, a noted them had seen or read the previous CENTOM French researcher on Islamist extremism. The assessment. Ricks does an excellent job high- The debate about America’s national security in the 21st century is too important to rele- central ideas state that the threat is not from lighting these discrepancies in planning and fo- observant Muslims in the Muslim world, but cuses on the “hawks” within the Bush admin- gate it to slogans and mischaracterizations of different approaches to U.S. foreign policy. One from alienated groups located in the Middle istration. After 9/11, the once quiet, but steady, East and Western Europe who are cut off from drumbeat for war with Iraq became a deafen- group that has been the subject of much debate and frankly wild conspiratorial charges is authentic local traditions. From a counterter- ing crescendo. Ricks, masterfully paints this rorism perspective, this means the battle lines picture for the reader and brings out the incon- the neoconservative movement. Francis Fuku- yama’s new book, America at the Crossroads: are not only in Afghanistan, but in the slums of sistencies in the national strategy and the post- Paris and Hamburg. Ideologically, jihadists mix invasion civil/military plan. Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy, is part of a 3-day lecture series spon- Islam with western political theories of the ex- Ricks briefly, but effectively, takes the reader sored by Yale University’s Program in ethics, treme right and left, such as fascism and Marx- through the invasion and downfall of Iraq in politics, and economics. His book cuts through ism, of the 20th century. The book ends with 2003. The book then enters into what I consid- the noise of what characterizes a neoconser- appeals for the United States to shape inter- er the best part: in two chapters, both titled vative and places it in proper perspective. Fu- national institutions, such as the United Na- “How to Create an Insurgency (I + II),” Ricks kuyama is the director of the International De- tions and World Bank, and not withdraw from vividly describes missed opportunities for the velopment Program at John Hopkins Universi- them, and consider not only power, but legiti- United States to mitigate a potential insurgen- ty, and worked for former Deputy Defense Sec- macy in pursuing American goals around the cy, instead fueling it. It is clear that Ricks has a retary Paul Wolfowitz, both at the U.S. Arms globe. Fukuyama offers an excellent book that firm understanding of both U.S. doctrine and the Control and Disarmament Agency and the draws focus to the idea of America’s future role basic tenets of counterinsurgency operations. State Department. The author places neocon- as the sole superpower. He highlights the ineffectiveness of the Coali- servatism amidst four approaches to American YOUSSEF ABOUL-ENEIN tion Provincial Authority (CPA) and their discord foreign policy; the other three are realists, lib- LCDR, U.S. Navy

March-April 2008 — 49 LETTERS from Page 3

U.S. Army then and now. Swift s premise was ficer has pithily described it as a sub-hand re- I would like not only to clarify, but emphasi e that completely average officers working in con- ceipt of responsibility from a commander to his that they refers to the Ira i NP RF leaders, cert were better than the rare genius, such as subordinates. I would not go that far, but I have specifically company-grade officers, who were Napoleon. In line with this doctrine of safe lead- noticed in some of my past units of assignment enforcing discipline on their subordinates. For ership, he instituted a rigorous system of map that the most confident (and very often more the most part, we only observed the NP RF e ercises essentially elaborate tactical de- competent) battalion commanders have very leaders taking these actions. cision games in the hopes of eventually re- often short-circuited, or even discarded, the vealing an appropriate doctrine through multi- MDMP outright, which brings me to my final PAULO SHAKARIAN ple iterations of the process of problem, discus- point only once have I observed a battalion CPT, U.S. Army sion, and synthesis the underlying assump- where I regarded all three field grade officers tion was that all officers could come to agree to be fully competent in their jobs. I do not be- on a relatively tightly defined best solution to lieve that my e periences in this regard have Defensive and Evasive Driver Training — any tactical problem. The accumulation of many been unusual. With current promotion rates, Good, Old Fashioned Training such solutions would lend itself to an inductive this unfortunate trend will only continue. Be- doctrine built from the bottom-up. With such a cause of this reality, and its strengths in pro- Dear ARMOR, notion, the purpose of a decisionmaking providing a framework for incorporating all ele- Major Rich Rouleau and Captain John Haw- cess was very different from ours today it was ments of combat power that provide our Army baker s article, Defensive and Evasive Driver not to choose from one of several feasible op- with a great advantage over our current and Training, in the September-October 2007 issue tions, but to unearth the true path buried some- prospective opponents, the MDMP retains great of ARMOR, is an e cellent article that proves where in the depths of our collective mediocre utility. leaders across the Army are applying their minds. Of course, our present MDMP is not combat e periences and lessons learned to solely about determining courses of action, but Captain Humpert s article also highlights several areas that should be addressed. Certain- all aspects of our training to make our Army Swift devoted little attention to its other facets more lethal and survivable. such as synchroni ing different elements of ly, the process should be pared of its more cum- combat power. To a great e tent, he was lim- bersome accretions. Likewise, we might place It is often said that the three most important ited by the lack of a set divisional structure, too much on the process at the e pense of con- things deal with the ability to shoot, move, and which did not come until 1905. Without a stan- tent in both education and training. Although communicate. I believe this to be true, but it is dard table of organi ation or staff structure, the MDMP might well be a burden for the great also true that the shoot and communicate many of the procedural elements formali ed in commander who possesses the wonderful in- fields often overshadow the move field, and the MDMP could not have been addressed by ner light that illuminates the proper course of when the move field is addressed, it is usual- Swift, even had he been so inclined. action, the process can be readily modified to ly a technological solution for a training issue. fit the individual commander s taste. We should This is clearly not the case in Major Rouleau However, I think Swift would find great fault refrain from being mindlessly doctrinaire in how and Captain Hawbaker s article. The authors with probably the most important element of we evaluate such individuals, whether in train- note and identify, based on their e periences, the MDMP its implications for the relation- ing or combat. et, for the remainder, who may a definite training deficit in the area of current ship between the commander and staff. For either prefer or need its structure, there is some- driver training and their war-time mission. They Swift, who drew his inspiration primarily from thing to be said for safe leadership. tackled the problem from a training standpoint, the American Civil War with its active command- J.P. CLARK rather than from a technological one, by ad- ers and small staffs, commanders did just what MAJ, U.S. Army dressing areas they could fi from their current their titles imply they commanded. He as- position, rather than just critici e the current sumed that the captains and majors who made system. The training model and certification up the bulk of his Army War College classes “Stand and Fight” Author Clarifies Reference system they developed is one I would recom- would be promoted to colonel or higher in the mend all units adopt. event of a major war. Indeed, this would happen Dear ARMOR, Just as the re uired standard rifle ualification with the decade, but World War I staffs were I received a few in uiries on my article, Stand does not e uate to trained marksmen, neither significantly larger than their Civil War counter- and Fight: Lessons for the Transition Mission in does the re uired standard vehicle licensing parts. A colonel in the Civil War was almost in- Ira , which appeared in the November-Decem- procedures e uate to trained drivers. I have evitably a unit commander, but in World War I, ber 2007 issue. One in uiry in particular re- seen master driver courses at several military they were just as often a chief of staff or pri- uested clarification of the following reference: installations I think it is time for the Army to get mary staff officer at the division level or above. “‘The Spartans observed their NPQRF leaders serious about driver training and develop a true But Swift s method was essentially to train all in action, they stopped younger policemen from COE-centric master driver course, just as we his students to think like commanders, which playing Muktadah Sadr’s (a national militia lead- have done for almost every other system, such would lead to some problems during World War er) propaganda music at checkpoints, they set- as Bradley fighting vehicles, Abrams main bat- I, when the inevitable unlucky combination of tled a fuel dispute between the NPQRF and the tle tanks, artillery vehicles, air defense systems, strong personalities, who saw things different- local SWAT, and they ordered subordinates to and even aviation master gunner courses. Not ly, would lead to ruptures between command- camouflage the REVAs, which were painted po- only would this course allow us to be more pre- er and chief of staff. Although some instructors lice colors of blue and white, with local mud.’ pared, survivable, and safer in combat, but it at Fort Leavenworth at the time had anticipat- would make our soldiers more survivable and ed and wrote about this problem, I found no in- “Does the reference to ‘they’ refer to the Spar- safer in training. dications that Swift gave any serious thought tans; if so, then the Spartans stopped the JAM to dividing responsibilities between the com- music and ordered subordinates to camou- Survivability and force protection are constant- mander and staff. flage the REVAs. If this is true, then why didn’t ly emphasi ed in our Army it is imperative that the Spartans get the NP commanders to stop we not forget that the best answer to an issue As a colonel in the Philippines, Swift com- the music, rather than doing it themselves, and is not always system focused, but sometimes manded his cavalry regiment from the front of why is the word ‘subordinates’ used to describe just good, old fashioned training that gets to the column and would not likely have given the relationship between the Spartans and the the heart of the issue, as the authors have any thought to having his staff develop cours- NP? (We normally use the word ‘counterpart’ done with their article. Job well done and Sua es of action. A battalion commander, recently or ‘partner’ to describe the Iraqis rather than Sponte back from Ira , commented that our present ‘subordinates’). I might be missing something MDMP diffuses responsibility away from the here. Would you please clarify? I’m wondering MARK S. LESLIE commander to the staff. Another field grade of- if the ‘they’ is actually the NPQRF leaders.’ ” MAJ, U.S. Army

50 — March-April 2008 2008 Armor Warfighting Conference: “Forging the Thunderbolt in an Age of Persistent Conflict”

The U.S. Army Armor Center is preparing for the 2008 evening social. The Armor Trainer Update’s topics will Armor Warfighting Conference to be held at Fort Knox, focus on the Army National Guard (ARNG) and its role Kentucky. This year’s conference will be held from 4-8 as a mounted force. Presentations include transforma- May 2008. Registration begins at 0800 hours on Sun- tion of force structure; equipping the armor and caval- day, 4 May, at the Leader’s Club and will be available ry force; infantry update; career management field 19- until Thursday, 8 May. series reclassification training programs; heavy bri- The theme for this year’s conference is “Forging the gade combat team update; training aids, devices, sim- Thunderbolt in an Age of Persistent Conflict.” In keep- ulators, and simulations (TADSS) update; and Region- ing with this year’s theme, we have a dynamic and var- al Training Institute/Total Army School System update. ied agenda, which includes a mixture of subject-mat- As always, the conference is packed full of social events, ter expert briefings, focused discussion panels, and which include the Armor Association Banquet, the com- work product panels. Brigadier General Campbell and manding general’s garden party, Stable Call at the Pat- Command Sergeant Major Smith have invited leaders ton Museum, a day-long shotgun/skeet shoot at French from across the battlefield spectrum to offer presenta- Range, a golf tournament, and the week-long static tions on current and future operations for the force. vehicle and vendor displays at Skidgel Hall. This year’s conference centers around two subthemes: As a standing tradition, the Frederick M. Franks Award dominant land power and an age of persistent conflict. will be presented during the conference. The Franks These two subthemes expand to include guest speak- Award recognizes an active duty or reserve officer, non- ers, discussion panels, and work product panels that commissioned officer, or Department of the Army ci- cover a wide range of relevant topics, such as influ- vilian who has demonstrated a long time contribution ence operations, contingency mission essential task to the warfighting capabilities of the U.S. Army. In keep- lists/combined arms training strategy (CMETL/CATS), ing with the example demonstrated by the award’s the heavy force in irregular warfare, noncommissioned namesake, any soldier in the Army can recommend officer education system (NCOES) transformation, another soldier or civilian. This award is a great chance core competency training strategies, heavy brigade to recognize someone who has worked hard to make combat team (HBCT) validation gunnery, Stryker mo- the armor branch and our Army better. bile gun system (MGS) update, basic and advanced The Armor Warfighting Conference is a great oppor- noncommissioned officer course (BNCOC/ANCOC) tunity for the Armor and Cavalry community to cele- updates, reconnaissance squadron lessons learned, brate the achievements of the greatest mounted com- HBCT modernization, Armor School update, master bat force in history. For more information please visit gun ner training, and a PEO Soldier update. the Fort Knox website at: The heart of the conference will be the focused discussion panels and work product panels. Work prod- www.knox.army.mil/armorconf/ uct panels not only discuss key issues, but also provide detailed, documented feedback for future Event POC Phone* initiatives. Some panels will focus MAJ Paul Peterson (502) 624-1044 on the HBCT formation and future Armor Conference structure while others will review SSG Robert Valentino (502) 624-4573 the current status of armor core Armor Trainer Update LTC Scott Fowler (502) 624-1315 competencies in full-spectrum operations. Topics for the discussion CSM Update SGM Thomas Klingel (502) 624-1321 panels will include heavy forces in irregular warfare, influence opera- External Scheduling Conf. Bob Stubblefield (502) 624-2591 tions, counterinsurgency opera- Vendor Displays SFC Walter Ivory (502) 624-1451 tions, reconnaissance squadron lessons learned, master gunner Armor Association LTC(R) Mark Gavula (502) 942-6170 training and issues, and NCOES transformation. VIP Billeting Reservations Desk (502) 624-6180 The Armor Trainer Update is sched- (502) 943-1000 On-post Housing Carolyn Burton uled on Sunday, 4 May. The update (502) 624-3491 will begin with breakfast, followed by briefings, and concludes with an * DSN Prefix: 464 2008 Armor Warﬁ ghting Conference and Armor Trainer Update 3 - 8 May 2008 “Forging the Thunderbolt in an Age of Persistent Conﬂ ict”

TIME EVENT HOST LOCATION Saturday, 3 May 0900-1600 Vendor Setup Skidgel Hall Sunday, 4 May 0800-1700 Registration Leader’s Club 0830-0900 Armor Trainer Update Breakfast SACG Leader’s Club 0900-1700 Armor Trainer Update SACG Waybur 0900-1700 Vendor Setup Skidgel Hall 1730-2100 Armor Trainer Update Social SACG Patton Museum Monday, 5 May 0800-1700 Registration Leader’s Club 0800-1700 Shotgun Shoot Armor Association French Range 0830-0930 CG’s Opening Remarks CG Waybur 0830-1000 External Unit Scheduling Conference DPTMS Patton Museum 0945-1430 CSM Update CSM, USAARMC Leader’s Club 1000-1400 Brigade and Battalion Commander’s Conference * OCOA Leader’s Club 1000-1430 Master Gunner Forum Chief, MG Branch Boudinot Hall 1000-1430 Subject-Matter Updates/Panels Varied 1000-1430 Honorary Colonels and Sergeants Major of the Regiment * OCOA Leader’s Club 1000-1700 Vendor Displays Skidgel Hall 1445-1700 Guest Speakers CG Waybur 1800-2200 Stable Call OCOA Patton Museum Tuesday, 6 May 0800-1700 Registration Leader’s Club 0830-0930 Guest Speaker CG Waybur 1000-1400 Subject-Matter Updates/Panels Varied 1000-1700 Vendor Displays Skidgel Hall 1030-1600 Working Groups Boudinot/Staff & Faculty 1415-1630 Guest Speakers CG Waybur 1700-1930 CG’s Garden Party CG Quarters 1 Wednesday, 7 May 0800-1700 Registration Leader’s Club 0830-0930 Guest Speaker CG Waybur 0945-1600 Subject-Matter Updates/Panels Varied 1000-1400 Vendor Displays Skidgel Hall 1030-1600 Working Groups Boudinot/Staff & Faculty 1430-1645 Guest Speakers CG Waybur 1800-2100 Armor Association Banquet Armor Association Leader’s Club 1900-1945 Presentation of the 13th Annual Franks Award CG Leader’s Club Thursday, 8 May 0800-1700 Registration Leader’s Club 0830-0930 Guest Speaker CG Waybur 0930-1130 Working Group Back Briefs Waybur 1000-1200 Vendor Displays Skidgel Hall 1030-1300 Former Commandants and CSM Update and Luncheon CG HQ Conference Room 1315-1830 Golf Tournament MWR Lindsey Golf Course * Indicates an “invitation only” event. An expanded schedule will be available at registration and up-to-date information is available at the Armor Warﬁ ghting Conference website: www.knox.army.mil/armorconf/

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PB 17-08-2 Headquarters, Department of the Army PIN: 084584-000 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.