CHAPTER VII1 THE LANDING AT GABA TEPE ALTHOUGHthe confusion of the landing in extremely difficult ccuntry, and the bitter nature of the fighting caused much difficulty in the collecting of wounded, yet, mainly through the fine courage and endurance of the bearers, the clearance to the beach was rapid. The concentration of all casualties at the Cove caused congestion which led to the cessation of attempts at classification and to casualties being sent off to the transports earlier than had been intended. In the Battle or' Krithia, the congestion and delay in the clearance of the wounded on shore were, through no fault of the small medical detachment sent with the 2nd Australian Brigade, greater than at Anzac. * * * At 4.30 a.m. on April 25th, in the critical hour between moonset and daylight, the 3rd Brigade effected a landing, captured the- " First;' ridge, and chased the 3rdThe BrigadeLm&g- enemy in1and.l During the long approach in darkness the tows had converged, so that on the beach battalions be- came mixed up. Of more serious im- portance was a deflection of a mile to the north caused by the tide. These mishaps, the peculiar intricacy of the terrain, and the im- perfection of the maps, combined to confuse the ad- vance and dislocate the tactical scheme. I The landing was at first opposed by only a single company. 131 132 THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN [25th Apr., 1915 Most serious was the failure to capture Gaba Tepe, from which the beach was observed and shelled. The conse- quence would have been disastrous but €or the existence of a small indentation in the coastline some 800 yards in length with shingly beach twenty yards wide at high water. This small bay, which has gained a place in history as “ Anzac Cove,” was protected in front by the sheer First ridge, “ Plugge’s Plateau,” and at each end by the terminal spurs of that ridge, which on the left formed the headland of Ari Burnu. This Cove became at once “ the Beach ” -the point from which diverged the fighting units and to which automatically converged the wounded. Here under shrapnel-fire the remainder of the force landed. The casualties in the boats and on the Beach were moderate. It was chiefly the endeavour to reach the objective of the covering force (the “Third” ridge): and the homeric struggle that followed to hold the “ untenable ” position achieved, that gave Australia “ Anzac Day.” The nature of the terrain was an important factor both in the fighting and in the collecting of wounded. Not only did the topographical accident of the cove determine the course of medical evacuation, but in the march of events, when instead of the success that might well have shortened the war an appalling disaster threatened, it made possible the compromise that spelt “ Anzac.” The slope between the Beach and the ridges widens out north of Ari Burnu to half-a-mile or more. On their sea- ward side the hills are for the most part The “Anzac ” area worn by winter storms into cliffs or sheer precipices scored by steep ravines. The crest of the range and its spurs form the watershed for somewhat more ambitious streams, some of which run deviously, between the steep and broken ridges forming the inland limbs, to the sea near “ Hell Spit ” and Gaba Tepe. ’Walking over the heights at Ari6,Burnu four years after the landing, a Turkish staff officer Major Zeki Bey, said it would have been alnipd impossible to have reached thise obiectives even in an operation of peace time Australiari Oficiul History, 6’01 I, p. 603. 25th Apr, 19151 THE LANDING AT GABA TEPE 133 Save for some open patches, highly dangerous to cross under fire, the country was everywhere thickly scrubbed with arbutus, dwarf holly-oak, and pine, from three to twelve feet high. Observation was possible only from the crests, and. except along occasional goat-tracks, passage had to be forced. The fighting was chiefly on the ridges. The valleys became the natural highways between the Beach and the fighting front. The beds of the streams, thickly beset with brush, were in parts the only possible thoroughfare. The rush of the covering force took it as far as the “Second” ridge and along the central spur3 up to the first peak (“ Baby 700 ”) , which commanded the whole position. Here resistance hardened : shallow rifle-pits were dug, forming an irregular defensive line. Scattered parties fought their way toward, and at parts some reached, their final objectives, losing heavily. Landing between 5 and 7 a.m., the 2nd Brigade was diverted to fill the gap on the right caused by the deflection of the tows.4 The Sth, 6th, and 7th The main force lands Battalions moved up from the rendezvous in “Shrapnel Gully”5 to the open “400 (feet) Plateau.” Here each company, as it topped the crest, was met by fire from the reinforced enemy, and became involved in the fierce struggle that during the day drew almost half the Australian force to this front. Between 8 and 9 a.m., the 8th Battalion dug in on “Bolton’s Ridge” (the continuation of the 400 Plateau) to form a right defensive flank. The Ist, znd, and 3rd Battalions of the 1st Australian Brigade, together with the Auckland Battalion, landing between 9 and 12 a.m., were sent at once to parts of the front hardest pressed. The 4th Battalion was held as divisional reserve. Various elements of which became known as “ Plugge’s Plateau,” “ Razor Edge,’’ “ Russell’s Top,” and “The Nek.” See Sketch at p I34 “‘By 7.ao a.m. nearly 8,000 troops had been put ashore.” (Report by Rear. Admiral Thursby.) 3 The most considerable stream ”-though it was usual11 dry-within the area of operations entered the sea just south of the cove. It was known at first a; “ the long gully,” its lower end being called, from the first day, “ Shrapnel Gully. 134 THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN [25th Apr., 1915 The 4th Australian Brigade (corps reserve) and the remainder of the New Zealand Brigade arrived late at the roadstead; disembarkation of the latter began about 4 p.m., but was considerably delayed. The battalions were thrown into the struggle at the apex of the Second ridge-Baby 700 and “ Russell’s Top.” The 4th Brigade disembarked during the night and the next day. - The course of the fighting must be sum- marised briefly. The troops forming the right defensive flank on Bolton’s Ridge remained stationary throughout the day. Along The couFBe the northern cf end of the the plateau (‘I John- battle ston’s Tolly ”) and on “ MacLaur;n’s .WOO YDS Hill ” a defensive line had also been formed by the covering Smmh @r/@sO force, whose command- The San’ Bair range and its southcrn ing officer, Colonel spurs. Sinclair-MacLagan, had decided at an early hour that the “ Third ” ridge could not be gained. Between these two forces, about the 400 Plateau and its spurs, there was left till late in the day a gap, through which battalion after battalion passed and spread out in futile advances, broken up and decimated on the open plateau. A scattered advance-line was, however, formed along the forward edge of the plateau, on which some of the parties on “ Pine Ridge ” retired. This held on till evening, scourged with shrapnel from the heights and Gaba Tepe, and with rifle arid machine-gun fire from the ridges beyond. After dark, it fell back, by orders, on the main line in rear. Along the upper end of the long gully and on the slopes of Russell’s Top, The Nek, and Baby 700 the 25th Apr., 19151 THE LANDING AT GABA TEPE 135 fighting consisted of desperate efforts to hold the positions r in the day. On the on ‘( Walker’s Ridge,” the country occupied in the first rush had to be abandoned, and thereafter, except for three detached posts 4- along the shore, 1Valker’s Ridge formed the flank. On Baby 700, about 4 F.IIl., the Turkish counter-off ensive, begun about IO a.m, finally thrust back the line. Darkness found the force, with Baby 700 lost, precariously holding the crest of the Second ridge, 0 loa0 zm 3Wyem the situation being so critical that re-embarkation (which was Contours 50 metres. actually proposed) was not Positions temporarily attained on Afiril 25 shown thus carried out chiefly because of __..__. Posjtjons occupied the impossibility of attempting during night of Abril 25 it. 11-11. The regimental medical officers and their establishments landed with their battalions. Hardly any opportunity had been presented in the transports for Landing of regtl. medical consultation between field ambulance and detachments regimental medical officers, and the latter had little knowledge of the medical arrange- ments in general. In the covering brigade, medical officers, besides their eight stretchers, took only (( medical companions,” surgical haversack, and waterbottle from the official equip- ment. All, however, loaded their bearers with miscellaneous equipment and stores. In some units of the 2nd and 1st Brigades medical panniers were taken. The plans made by regimental medical officers for working their bearers had diverged along two lines. In view of the likelihood of con- siderable dispersal, the majority had arranged for the bearers to follow the companies, but retained with themselves their 136 THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN [zsth Apr., 1915 orderly corporal and “ A.A.M.C. attached ” : some (on the other hand) held it more important to keep control of their bearers and work them from the “aid-post.” Events in most cases settled the question in favour of dispersal.