Note N°04/13

note n°04/13

Yves Boyer Deputy Director, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique and Professor, Ecole polytechnique

French defence policy in a time of uncertainties (January 2013)

This note was originally published in Fokus, Austria Institut für Europa- und Sicherheitspolitik, 5/2012

Besides the United States the EU is the only of the UN’s regular budget, for a significant grouping of nations able to project its influence amount of UN peacekeeping operations, and one worldwide. Despite the current crisis, the EU -half of all UN member states’ contributions to remains a global economic superpower with the UN funds and programs. EU member states are highest GNP worldwide when the various GNP also signatories to almost all international trea- of its members are combined. In the foreseeable ties currently in force. In the last two decades, future this situation will be preserved, allowing the EU has finalized the single market; estab- the Union to generate financial surpluses which lished a single currency; created a zone without can be used to back its policy of global influence internal frontiers (“Schengen”); launched com- based on diverse forms of “civilian” power with a mon defense, foreign and internal security poli- central position in various international net- cies; and expanded from twelve to 27 members. works and a significant role in international These are very positive developments in a global- institutions. Indeed, the EU is the single largest ised world where cooperation in trade, social de- financial contributor to the UN system: at the velopment, environment preservation, etc. are end of the 2010 decade the EU provided for 38% the dominant value.

Even in defence matters, Europe does possess He provides guidance (subsequently agreed on know-how and capabilities which do not impede by the Parliament) on the overall strategy and fruitful cooperation and interoperability with the military organisation. He carefully controlls their United States. With about 20% of the world’s execution through his military staff at the Elysée military spending, the EU is far ahead of China palace and directs their implementation through (6 to 5%), Russia (3%) or India (2%) in relation the chairing of the high council on defence to other « big» countries. But precisely for the (Conseil de défense). He particularly cares about reason that the influence exerted by the EU is maintaining autonomy of action in key domains, more “civilian” than “military”, the defence respecting commitments to alliances (EU, dimension of the EU has never had the priority NATO, out of areas agreements such as those over others aspects of the European project. Of with some African countries or Abu Dhabi) and course several reasons (historical, societal, diplo- coherence of the French defence posture. This matic, etc.) explain the many difficulties met by precise stature gives the French head of State a the Europeans to further their cooperation in wide margin of action who can decide to commit that field and the various ambiguities in the con- French forces without prior acquiescence from duct of each EU country’s defence affairs. the Parliament even if, debates are, later, orga- France shares with her EU’s partners, and nota- nized where parliamentarians from the National bly those members of the Eurozone, the dire Assembly and the Senate are discussing the effects of the financial and economic crisis. The rationale and the scope of the military operation, debt issue, in conjunction with economic stagna- sometimes without any vote following the tion, will affect public spending and, notably, debates. Such debates occur when the issue is defence expenditure. However, France retains involving a certain amount of forces and allies. particularities in terms of a national consensus Otherwise concerning “small” operations in on defence, in terms of prominence of the execu- Africa, the Parliament is rarely consulted. For tive power vis-à-vis the Parliament, to contain example, this was the case for operation Epervier the extent of the likely reduction of the defence in Chad which has been in place since 1986 or budget in order to preserve the current cohe- operation Boali in the Central African Republic rence of the French military model. (since 2002) where French forces contribute ac- tively to the stability of these countries in the heart of Africa. Operation Boali provides a good France’s defence organisation and example of the functioning of the French pro- cooperation with NATO’s countries cesses to commit forces in urgency. In 2007 a Probably one of the key and original characteris- small detachment of French forces, based in tic of this model remains that strategic affairs Birao, near the Sudanese border, was attacked and defence are deeply embedded into the power and encircled by an important group of rebels. If of the French State. Even the defence industry is Birao had fallen, there would have been a big closely linked to the State’s nomenclature, risk of destabilization in Chad and subsequently including privatised firms, whose leaders are by in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Elysée and large selected from Grandes Ecoles (Ecole palace military headquarters was immediately polytechnique dubbed as l’X and Ecole Natio- warned of the situation and, after the president’s nale d’Administration, ENA), as are their coun- approval, ordered the EMA (Etat-Major des terparts in politics and the banking system. In Armées) to take the appropriate measure in air addition, the State remains a key purveyor of dropping parachutists flying from Gabon and investments in high tech firms and notably those Djibouti to intervene as a backup force. The working in armament development and produc- French chain of command from the political tion. Those many connections serve as a hedge decision to the actual use of force is probably against drastic reductions of the format of those unique among Western democracies and it con- industries. Such realities bear heavily upon col- tinues to give a significant capacity of reactivity laborative projects in the framework of NATO to the French president. In his tasks as com- which are US lead and often seen as a potential mander in chief, the head of state is supported risk to national and European industries. by diverse structures to implement his decisions. Two are noteworthy. The first one is the general In the military domains the French defence staff (Etat-major des Armées – EMA) who con- organisation, whatever its limits, has been orga- ducts forces in actions, plans operations and is in nised to be efficient and to maintain the cohe- charge of training the forces. The second one is rence of the French defence posture. The Execu- the defence industry directorate (Direction Gé- tive (the President of the Republic) is the head of nérale de l’Armement – DGA) who oversees the the armed forces according to the constitution. elaboration and oversee the production of de-

fence equipment and is a guarantor, in conjunc- whose share in world spending in defence has tion with EMA, of the coherence of the French fallen down from 29 to 20%. Politically, this evo- defence architecture. Coherence means that gen- lution justifies for the French the transfer to the eral functions are assigned to the military. MIC of the experimenting and planning of future The French defence organization remains, thus, complex military operations. However, NATO highly centralised. It is built around the pre- retains its role as provider of proven command eminence of the president of the Republic, com- structures and of processes to enhance intero- mander in chief, from whom EMA and DGA perability among allies. For the French, the EU receive presidential guidance to maintain auto- defence perspectives are far from being ignored nomy of action in key domains, ability to respect in that scheme, once the dynamic of closer finan- commitments to alliances (EU, NATO, out of cial, banking and fiscal harmonization will start areas agreements such as those with some Afri- again, defence will follow. Then the benefit of can countries or Abu Dhabi) and coherence of NATO’s heritage as well as the knowhow deve- the French defence posture. Such an organiza- loped at MIC will be by and large transferred to tion, although in some aspects relatively cum- the EU as a military actor when and if the EU bersome, permits consistency and long term under one form or another develops its own planning – protecting French armed forces from defence policy. hasty cuts that may lead to incoherence in the In the meantime the French have to maintain French military posture. coherent, well trained conventional forces. In 2011 these forces have been engaged for actual military operations in Kosovo, Ivory Coast, the Conventional forces Sahel region, Lebanon, Libya, the Indian Ocean Conventional forces have their role and structure and Afghanistan. As a whole, these operations defined in large part by three key tasks enun- amounted to around € 1,3 Bn for 2011. ciated in the “2008 White Book on Defence” which will certainly be maintained under the leadership of president Hollande: prevention, The structuring effect of nuclear protection and projection. For each component deterrence on French defence po- (Air, Land and Sea) an adequate command licy structure for engagement at the operational level The reduced level of immediate threat to Europe exists and each is NATO certified. This certifica- does not equate to the absence of any threat, tion also includes Special Forces. This certifica- hence the strong reaffirmation in the NATO tion is important in the sense that it signifies Strategic Concept adopted in Lisbon of the role having capabilities to enter first on a theatre of of nuclear deterrence in the defence of the allies. operation. This remains a key requirement in France is particularly sensitive on this issue. order to maintain autonomy of decision as well Besides historical reasons, nuclear deterrence as in the ability to develop cooperation with ma- has become the central component of French jor allies such as the US, Great-Britain or Ger- security policy. Having reduced the size of its many. France participates with these countries nuclear forces in the last two decades Paris is in the MIC (Multinational Interoperability Coun- determined to maintain a robust nuclear posture cil) where complex command structures and new benefiting internally of a large political consen- modes of operation are tested in common. sus. President François Hollande, during his French participation in the MIC dates back to electoral campaign conspicuously indicated, to the early 2000s. The development of the MIC, its allies from the green party (EEVL – Europe although not highly publicised – probably Ecologie les Verts) that nuclear deterrence will because of the complexity and the technicality of continue to be the backbone of France’s military the works being done – also signifies a relative posture. Indeed nuclear deterrence has kept for neglect with regards to NATO. the French its relevance. Former French presi- The decrease in the European defence budgets dent, Nicolas Sarkozy, enunciated in 2008 the and its potential implications are becoming a role of deterrence for France in full continuity recurring theme for French officials. The French with his predecessors: to preserve France from Chief of Staff, Admiral Edouard Guillaud, men- aggression against its vital interest; preserve tioned, when testifying at the National Assembly, France’s independence and strategic autonomy; early January 2012, on the next defence budget, to guarantee the ability of a limited nuclear that, between 2001 and 2010 defence spending warning shot against any adversary who may increased by 80% in the USA and 70% in East misread the delineation of French vital interest; Asia, while it increased only by 4% in Europe to conceive and built in total national autonomy

the necessary tools for possessing a credible nu- The geopolitical and geostrategic clear deterrence; to plan and execute strategic context of French defence policy strike. The place and role of nuclear deterrence The NATO Strategic Concept adopted in Lisbon explains that a significant part of the defence in 2010 reaffirmed the military nature of the budget (26% of the equipment budget, i.e. € 3,7 Atlantic alliance and its primary responsibility to Bn) is allotted to deterrence. protect the population and the territory of its With approximately 300 operational warheads, members. This has been a long-lasting objective France has reached what is considered as proper of the Alliance as stated in the Washington level of sufficiency. These capabilities are split treaty’s article 5. Such positive reaffirmation of into two components: four SSBN of a new ge- the indivisibility of allies’ security confirmed the neration are carrying each 16 M51 missiles with enduring strength of the link binding them an approximate range of 9 000 km carrying 6 together; it did not, however, add new supple- MIRVs of about 100 kt each and penetration mentary tasks for the Western alliance. In addi- aids; 2 squadrons of Rafale mod.3 fighter- tion, the disappearance of direct military threats bombers are carrying a supersonic cruise missile to the European area lessened the practical im- (ASMP-A) with a 100/300 kt warhead. The tech- plication of this traditional goal of the alliance. nological and industrial capacities that lead to At the same time, the complexity and the great develop and built these nuclear components fluidity of the international scene have signifi- have, in fact, give France a special position cantly reduced the ability of the Atlantic alliance within NATO. A fact barely understood among to provide solutions to the many challenges con- most of NATO’s allies – with the exception of the fronting the Western allies. UK and the USA. On the European continent perspective of con- Indeed the control of nuclear weapons is not in flicts has almost vanished. Although a difficult itself enough to explain that situation. The issue partner still haunted by a Cold war mind-set, here is about possessing and maintaining a spe- Russia, with the exception of its significant cific technological and industrial base in the nuclear forces, can no longer be considered as a domain of nuclear weapons as well as well some threat. From a military standpoint, the bulk of key intelligence assets notably space based. Both Russian military forces have been significantly provide strategic benefits and open the way to reduced in quantity and in quality. They are ge- bilateral cooperation which go far beyond their nerally lacking high tech equipment in number initial purpose in bringing strategic and political and conventional forces, with the exception of values. Numerous examples can support this selected units for rapid intervention, are, in assertion. The military nuclear R&D complex is terms of training, lagging behind the professio- central to explore new domains related notably nalism of most western forces. Lastly, deploy- to nuclear simulation. Simulation has become a ment of Russian military units, particularly for priority after France renounced, with the others ground forces, is no longer oriented towards nuclear powers part of the TNP, to nuclear tes- Western Europe. If one looks, for example, at the ting. Billions of euros have been spent on these disposition of the eleven existing Russian army programs in the last decade, they brought results corps, nine are located far away from the west- and many strategic sides effects with political ern borders of Russia on a line spreading from consequences. Among the many simulation the Caucasus to the Far East. The NSC con- processes built one can mention the cooperation firmed the strategic character of the partnership on an equal footing between the French Atomic the Alliance is seeking to develop with Moscow. establishment (CEA-DAM: Commissariat à If the Kremlin may poses difficulties with its l’Energie Atomique-Direction des Applications rather controversial governance organization, Militaires) with its US equivalent to design and France tends to consider Russia as an essential built, in each country, a highly sophisticated La- component of any future security architecture of ser, the Laser Méga Joule having been built near Europe. Despite the fact that scepticism remains Bordeaux, in southern France and its US equiva- about democratic life in Russia, the French have lent the National Ignition Facility at the Law- not, with few exceptions, significant grievances rence Livermore National Laboratory in the US. concerning Russia that still haunt relations with The cooperation carried not only the expected Moscow – notably in the Baltic area or in Eas- technological advantages but also led to an tern Europe where criticism was strong when agreement between France and Great-Britain on Paris sold two Mistral class helicopter carrier to nuclear issues signed in December 2010 at Lan- the Russians. caster House.

The NATO dimension: malaise and framework of ad hoc coalitions they will do it as necessity “off-shore balancer” as they did during the The Chicago summit of May 2012 had in many operations against Gaddafi’s Libya. They will of- ways confirmed the slow decline of the NATO’s fer logistical support and intelligence but will military organization and the diminished place it refrain from committing active forces participa- has for the US who, nevertheless continues to ting to the kinetic part of the operations. consider the organization as the main channel of their political influence throughout Europe. Seen Conclusion from Washington, the symptoms of the relative Today NATO is under the pressure of different decline of NATO are numerous, however largely forces and requirement which are politically camouflaged by an active policy of lobbying and disruptive. On one hand one finds small coun- communication. One can only be amused by the tries. The Baltic States are obsessed with a resur- use of the term “historic” to describe the NATO’s gence of a possible Russian military threat and Lisbon summit of November 2010 that was said are ready to defer their security to requirements to be “the most important in NATO’s history”. defined by the US in exchange of the protection NATO’s Chicago summit-the city of President offered by Washington. The Scandinavian coun- Obama - was the first to be held in the United tries still have the Russian factor in mind due to States in 13 years, having been initially billed as their geostrategic proximity to Russia. But they an “implementation summit” at which the are in a position where it is probably easier to alliance’s political leaders assessed the evolution compromise with America than to choose the of the ambitious plan agreed on in Lisbon to path of any form of European defence policy that speed up NATO’s efforts to adapt to the 21st cen- will compel them to work and cooperate with a tury, its purpose was, also, to back President country like France which they do not under- Obama’s stature in the presidential campaign. stand and to which they express a certain form of However, behind the scene, the withdrawal of mistrust and suspicion. Eastern and Central American forces from Europe is amplified by the European countries of NATO are mostly in the repatriation of two US Army brigades (both sta- same position as the Baltic States with the excep- tioned in Germany: the 170th in Baumholder and tion of Poland whose commitments to defense is 171th in Grafenwöhr). The strength of the US serious, although with little to offer in terms of Army in Europe will amount to 30 000 men budgetary and military capabilities. However, against 270 000 25 years ago. In total, the US Poland has shown a real commitment to enhan- will maintain around 70 000 personnel in cing European defence perspectives and it is Europe. The reasons of such withdrawal are va- worth mentioning that in the framework of the rious and range from US internal political rea- Weimar Triangle, Warsaw associated with Berlin sons to the shift of US national interest. and Paris to plea for the creation of a European Budgetary pressures are becoming strong with a strategic headquarters (OHQ). Berlin itself is Federal budget deficit almost out of control. If modernizing its forces in a very interesting man- budgetary constrains provoke an increased irri- ner although the internal political condition tation in Washington about NATO’s allies, the existing in Germany makes Berlin largely absent apparition of a new generation of American lea- when committing forces out of area as witnessed ders, far less inclined to look towards Europe as during the Libyan campaign of spring/summer did their predecessors, may accentuate the rela- 2011. The UK is in a state of disarray regarding tive distance that the American are taking with its defence policy. Having one of the best milita- NATO. The reassessment of US national inte- ries in Europe, the British defence posture has rests is linked to the growing importance of Asia been dramatically impacted by the deflationary in the world game. It is striking to see that, in the effect of the 2010’s SDR which have been trans- strategic guidance on U.S. defence priorities for lated by internal incoherence. The UK shares the years ahead, released by President Barack with France the will to remain a key player in Obama in early January 2012, the word Asia ap- defence but is currently haunted by a kind of peared nine times, while NATO makes just two existential crisis which resurrect new appeal to- appearances. These shifts, also, correspond to a wards a rapprochement with its former associate transformation in the way the Americans intend within the Commonwealth as if it represented a to use force. The lessons of the last 15 years led serous opportunity. This crisis may endure as them to curtail, in the future, military engage- long as they will have not cut the Gordian knot ments about situations which are not linked to about their relations with Europe leaving their major US interests. Accordingly, if they are wil- partners uncertain about the degree to which ling to continue supporting their allies in the further cooperation with London.

France is, as many other European countries, strategy: working for preserving a certain degree suffering from the financial and economic crisis. of autonomy, acting as a fair player in NATO to Temptation to retreat to oneself exists. However, wait for the favorable moment to speed up a as for the British, this does not represent a genuine European defence policy while develop- promising opportunity. There remains the ing ad hoc bilateral cooperation with the Ameri- option of continuing a traditional ambiguous can ally.◊

Assertions and opinions in this paper Yves Boyer are solely those of the author. [email protected]

A longer version of this text will be published early 2013 in « NATO’s European Allies » ed. by Janne Haaland Matlary/Magnus Petersson, Palgrave Macmillan.

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