note n°04/13 Yves Boyer Deputy Director, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique and Professor, Ecole polytechnique French defence policy in a time of uncertainties (January 2013) This note was originally published in Fokus, Austria Institut für Europa- und Sicherheitspolitik, 5/2012 Besides the United States the EU is the only of the UN’s regular budget, for a significant grouping of nations able to project its influence amount of UN peacekeeping operations, and one worldwide. Despite the current crisis, the EU -half of all UN member states’ contributions to remains a global economic superpower with the UN funds and programs. EU member states are highest GNP worldwide when the various GNP also signatories to almost all international trea- of its members are combined. In the foreseeable ties currently in force. In the last two decades, future this situation will be preserved, allowing the EU has finalized the single market; estab- the Union to generate financial surpluses which lished a single currency; created a zone without can be used to back its policy of global influence internal frontiers (“Schengen”); launched com- based on diverse forms of “civilian” power with a mon defense, foreign and internal security poli- central position in various international net- cies; and expanded from twelve to 27 members. works and a significant role in international These are very positive developments in a global- institutions. Indeed, the EU is the single largest ised world where cooperation in trade, social de- financial contributor to the UN system: at the velopment, environment preservation, etc. are end of the 2010 decade the EU provided for 38% the dominant value. Even in defence matters, Europe does possess He provides guidance (subsequently agreed on know-how and capabilities which do not impede by the Parliament) on the overall strategy and fruitful cooperation and interoperability with the military organisation. He carefully controlls their United States. With about 20% of the world’s execution through his military staff at the Elysée military spending, the EU is far ahead of China palace and directs their implementation through (6 to 5%), Russia (3%) or India (2%) in relation the chairing of the high council on defence to other « big» countries. But precisely for the (Conseil de défense). He particularly cares about reason that the influence exerted by the EU is maintaining autonomy of action in key domains, more “civilian” than “military”, the defence respecting commitments to alliances (EU, dimension of the EU has never had the priority NATO, out of areas agreements such as those over others aspects of the European project. Of with some African countries or Abu Dhabi) and course several reasons (historical, societal, diplo- coherence of the French defence posture. This matic, etc.) explain the many difficulties met by precise stature gives the French head of State a the Europeans to further their cooperation in wide margin of action who can decide to commit that field and the various ambiguities in the con- French forces without prior acquiescence from duct of each EU country’s defence affairs. the Parliament even if, debates are, later, orga- France shares with her EU’s partners, and nota- nized where parliamentarians from the National bly those members of the Eurozone, the dire Assembly and the Senate are discussing the effects of the financial and economic crisis. The rationale and the scope of the military operation, debt issue, in conjunction with economic stagna- sometimes without any vote following the tion, will affect public spending and, notably, debates. Such debates occur when the issue is defence expenditure. However, France retains involving a certain amount of forces and allies. particularities in terms of a national consensus Otherwise concerning “small” operations in on defence, in terms of prominence of the execu- Africa, the Parliament is rarely consulted. For tive power vis-à-vis the Parliament, to contain example, this was the case for operation Epervier the extent of the likely reduction of the defence in Chad which has been in place since 1986 or budget in order to preserve the current cohe- operation Boali in the Central African Republic rence of the French military model. (since 2002) where French forces contribute ac- tively to the stability of these countries in the heart of Africa. Operation Boali provides a good France’s defence organisation and example of the functioning of the French pro- cooperation with NATO’s countries cesses to commit forces in urgency. In 2007 a Probably one of the key and original characteris- small detachment of French forces, based in tic of this model remains that strategic affairs Birao, near the Sudanese border, was attacked and defence are deeply embedded into the power and encircled by an important group of rebels. If of the French State. Even the defence industry is Birao had fallen, there would have been a big closely linked to the State’s nomenclature, risk of destabilization in Chad and subsequently including privatised firms, whose leaders are by in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Elysée and large selected from Grandes Ecoles (Ecole palace military headquarters was immediately polytechnique dubbed as l’X and Ecole Natio- warned of the situation and, after the president’s nale d’Administration, ENA), as are their coun- approval, ordered the EMA (Etat-Major des terparts in politics and the banking system. In Armées) to take the appropriate measure in air addition, the State remains a key purveyor of dropping parachutists flying from Gabon and investments in high tech firms and notably those Djibouti to intervene as a backup force. The working in armament development and produc- French chain of command from the political tion. Those many connections serve as a hedge decision to the actual use of force is probably against drastic reductions of the format of those unique among Western democracies and it con- industries. Such realities bear heavily upon col- tinues to give a significant capacity of reactivity laborative projects in the framework of NATO to the French president. In his tasks as com- which are US lead and often seen as a potential mander in chief, the head of state is supported risk to national and European industries. by diverse structures to implement his decisions. Two are noteworthy. The first one is the general In the military domains the French defence staff (Etat-major des Armées – EMA) who con- organisation, whatever its limits, has been orga- ducts forces in actions, plans operations and is in nised to be efficient and to maintain the cohe- charge of training the forces. The second one is rence of the French defence posture. The Execu- the defence industry directorate (Direction Gé- tive (the President of the Republic) is the head of nérale de l’Armement – DGA) who oversees the the armed forces according to the constitution. elaboration and oversee the production of de- 2 fence equipment and is a guarantor, in conjunc- whose share in world spending in defence has tion with EMA, of the coherence of the French fallen down from 29 to 20%. Politically, this evo- defence architecture. Coherence means that gen- lution justifies for the French the transfer to the eral functions are assigned to the military. MIC of the experimenting and planning of future The French defence organization remains, thus, complex military operations. However, NATO highly centralised. It is built around the pre- retains its role as provider of proven command eminence of the president of the Republic, com- structures and of processes to enhance intero- mander in chief, from whom EMA and DGA perability among allies. For the French, the EU receive presidential guidance to maintain auto- defence perspectives are far from being ignored nomy of action in key domains, ability to respect in that scheme, once the dynamic of closer finan- commitments to alliances (EU, NATO, out of cial, banking and fiscal harmonization will start areas agreements such as those with some Afri- again, defence will follow. Then the benefit of can countries or Abu Dhabi) and coherence of NATO’s heritage as well as the knowhow deve- the French defence posture. Such an organiza- loped at MIC will be by and large transferred to tion, although in some aspects relatively cum- the EU as a military actor when and if the EU bersome, permits consistency and long term under one form or another develops its own planning – protecting French armed forces from defence policy. hasty cuts that may lead to incoherence in the In the meantime the French have to maintain French military posture. coherent, well trained conventional forces. In 2011 these forces have been engaged for actual military operations in Kosovo, Ivory Coast, the Conventional forces Sahel region, Lebanon, Libya, the Indian Ocean Conventional forces have their role and structure and Afghanistan. As a whole, these operations defined in large part by three key tasks enun- amounted to around € 1,3 Bn for 2011. ciated in the “2008 White Book on Defence” which will certainly be maintained under the leadership of president Hollande: prevention, The structuring effect of nuclear protection and projection. For each component deterrence on French defence po- (Air, Land and Sea) an adequate command licy structure for engagement at the operational level The reduced level of immediate threat to Europe exists and each is NATO certified. This certifica- does not equate to the absence of any threat, tion also includes Special Forces. This certifica- hence the strong reaffirmation in the NATO tion is important in the sense that it signifies Strategic Concept adopted in Lisbon of the role having capabilities to enter first on a theatre of of nuclear deterrence in the defence of the allies. operation. This remains a key requirement in France is particularly sensitive on this issue.