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French defence policy in a time of uncertainties Yves Boyer

Besides the United States the EU is the reasons (historical, societal, diplomatic, In the military domains the French only grouping of nations able to project etc.) explain the many difficulties met by defence organisation, whatever its limits, its influence worldwide. Despite the the Europeans to further their cooperation has been organised to be efficient and current crisis, the EU remains a global in that field and the various ambiguities in to maintain the coherence of the French economic superpower with the highest the conduct of each EU country’s defence defence posture. The Executive (the Pre- GNP worldwide when the various GNP affairs. sident of the Republic) is the head of the of its members are combined. In the armed forces according to the constitu­ foreseeable future this situation will be shares with her EU’s partners, tion. He provides guidance (subsequently preserved, allowing the Union to generate and notably those members of the agreed on by the Parliament) on the financial surpluses which can be used to Eurozone, the dire effects of the financial overall strategy and military organisati- back its policy of global influence based and economic crisis. The debt issue, in on. He carefully controlls their execution on diverse forms of “civilian” power with conjunction with economic stagnation, through his military staff at the Elysée a central position in various international will affect public spending and, notably, palace and directs their implementation networks and a significant role in interna- defence expenditure. However, France through the chairing of the high council tional institutions. Indeed, the EU is the retains particularities in terms of a national on defence (Conseil de Défense). He par- single largest financial contributor to the consensus on defence, in terms of promi- ticularly cares about maintaining autono- UN system: at the end of the 2010 decade nence of the executive power vis à vis the my of action in key domains, respecting the EU provided for 38 % of the UN’s regu- Parliament, to contain the extent of the commitments to alliances (EU, NATO, out lar budget, for a significant amount of UN likely reduction of the defence budget in of areas agreements such as those with peacekeeping operations, and one-half of order to preserve the current coherence of some African countries or Abu Dhabi) and all UN member states’ contributions to UN the French military model. coherence of the French defence posture. funds and programs. EU member states This precise stature gives the French head are also signatories to almost all interna­ France‘s defence organisation and of State a wide margin of action who can tional treaties currently in force. In the last cooperation with NATO countries decide to commit French forces without two decades, the EU has finalized the sin- prior acquiescence from the Parliament gle market; established a single currency; Probably one of the key and original even if, debates are, later, organized created a zone without internal frontiers characteristic of this model remains that where parliamentarians from the National (“Schengen”); launched common defense, strategic affairs and defence are deeply Assembly and the Senate are discussing foreign and internal security policies; and embedded into the power of the French the rationale and the scope of the military expanded from twelve to 27 members. State. Even the defence industry is closely operation, sometimes without any vote These are very positive developments in linked to the State’s nomenclature, includ­ following the debates. Such debates a globalised world where cooperation in ing privatised firms, whose leaders are by occur when the issue is involving a certain trade, social development, environment and large selected from Grandes Ecoles amount of forces and allies. Otherwise preservation, etc. are the dominant value. (Ecole polytechnique dubbed as l’X and concerning “small” operations in Africa, Ecole Nationale d’Administration, ENA), as the Parliament is rarely consulted. For Even in defence matters, Europe does are their counterparts in politics and the example, this was the case for operation possess know-how and capabilities which banking system. In addition, the State Epervier in Chad which has been in place do not impede fruitful cooperation and remains a key purveyor of investments in since 1986 or operation Boali in the Cen- interoperability with the United States. high tech firms and notably those working tral African Republic (since 2002) where With about 20% of the world’s military in armament development and produc- French forces contribute actively to the spending, the EU is far ahead of China (6 tion. Those many connections serve as a stability of these countries in the heart of to 5%), Russia (3%) or India (2%) in relation hedge against drastic reductions of the Africa. Operation Boali provides a good to other « big» countries. But precisely for format of those industries. Such realities example of the functioning of the French the reason that the influence exerted by bear heavily upon collaborative projects processes to commit forces in urgency. the EU is more “civilian” than “military”, the in the framework of NATO which are US In 2007 a small detachment of French defence dimension of the EU has never lead and often seen as a potential risk to forces, based in Birao, near the Sudanese had the priority over others aspects of national and European industries. border, was attacked and encircled by an the European project. Of course several important group of rebels. If Birao had

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fallen, there would have been a big risk of key tasks enunciated in the “2008 White as well as the knowhow developed at MIC destabilization in Chad and subsequently Book on Defence” which will certainly be will be by and large transferred to the EU in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The maintained under the leadership of presi- as a military actor when and if the EU un- Elysée palace military headquarters was dent Hollande: prevention, protection and der one form or another develops its own immediately warned of the situation and, projection. For each component (Air, Land defence policy. after the president’s approval, ordered the and Sea) an adequate command structure EMA (Etat-Major des Armées) to take the for engagement at the operational level In the meantime the French have to main- appropriate measure in air dropping para­ exists and each is NATO certified. This cer- tain coherent, well trained conventional chutists flying from Gabon and Djibouti tification also includes Special Forces. This forces. In 2011 these forces have been to intervene as a backup force. The French certification is important in the sense that engaged for actual military operations chain of command from the political deci- it signifies having capabilities to enter first in Kosovo, Ivory Coast, the Sahel region, sion to the actual use of force is probably on a theatre of operation. This remains a , Libya, the Indian Ocean and unique among Western democracies and key requirement in order to maintain au- Afghanistan. As a whole, these operations it continues to give a significant capacity tonomy of decision as well as in the ability amounted to around € 1,3 Bn for 2011. of reactivity to the French president. In his to develop cooperation with major allies tasks as commander in chief, the head of such as the US, Great-Britain or Germany. The structuring effect of nuclear state is supported by diverse structures to France participates with these countries deterrence on French defence policy implement his decisions. Two are notewor- in the MIC (Multinational Interoperability thy. The first one is the general staff (Etat- Council) where complex command struc- The reduced level of immediate threat to major des Armées – EMA) who conducts tures and new modes of operation are Europe does not equate to the absence of forces in actions, plans operations and is in tested in common. French participation any threat, hence the strong reaffirmation charge of training the forces. The second in the MIC dates back to the early 2000s. in the NATO Strategic Concept adopted in one is the defence industry directorate The development of the MIC, although not Lisbon of the role of nuclear deterrence (Direction Générale de l’Armement – DGA) highly publicised – probably because of in the defence of the allies. France is who oversees the elaboration and oversee the complexity and the technicality of the particularly sensitive on this issue. Besides the production of defence equipment and works being done – also signifies a relative historical reasons, nuclear deterrence has is a guarantor, in conjunction with EMA, of neglect with regards to NATO. become the central component of French the coherence of the French defence ar- security policy. Having reduced the size of chitecture. Coherence means that general The decrease in the European defence its nuclear forces in the last two decades functions are assigned to the military. budgets and its potential implications Paris is determined to maintain a robust are becoming a recurring theme for nuclear posture benefiting internally of The French defence organization remains, French officials. The French Chief of Staff, a large political consensus. President thus, highly centralised. It is built around Edouard Guillaud, mentioned, François Hollande, during his electoral the pre-eminence of the president of when testifying at the National Assembly, campaign conspicuously indicated, to its the Republic, commander in chief, from early January 2012, on the next defence allies from the green party (EEVL – Europe whom EMA and DGA receive presiden- budget, that, between 2001 and 2010 Ecologie les Verts) that nuclear deterrence tial guidance to maintain autonomy of defence spending increased by 80% in will continue to be the backbone of action in key domains, ability to respect the USA and 70% in East Asia, while it France’s military posture. Indeed nuc- commitments to alliances (EU, NATO, out increased only by 4% in Europe whose lear deterrence has kept for the French of areas agreements such as those with share in world spending in defence has its relevance. Former French president, some African countries or Abu Dhabi) and fallen down from 29 to 20%. Politically, , enunciated in 2008 the coherence of the French defence posture. this evolution justifies for the French the role of deterrence for France in full conti- Such an organization, although in some transfer to the MIC of the experimenting nuity with his predecessors: to preserve aspects relatively cumbersome, permits and planning of future complex military France from aggression against its vital consistency and long term planning – operations. However, NATO retains its role interest; preserve France’s independence protecting from hasty as provider of proven command structures and strategic autonomy; to guarantee the cuts that may lead to incoherence in the and of processes to enhance interopera- ability of a limited nuclear warning shot French military posture. bility among allies. For the French, the EU against any adversary who may misread defence perspectives are far from being the delineation of French vital interest; to Conventional forces ignored in that scheme, once the dynamic conceive and built in total national auto- of closer financial, banking and fiscal har- nomy the necessary tools for possessing Conventional forces have their role and monization will start again, defence will a credible nuclear deterrence; to plan and structure defined in large part by three follow. Then the benefit of NATO’s heritage execute strategic strike. The place and role

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of nuclear deterrence explains that a sig- the Laser Méga Joule having been built is no longer oriented towards Western nificant part of the defence budget (26% near Bordeaux, in southern France and its Europe. If one looks, for example, at the of the equipment budget, i.e. € 3,7 Bn) is US equivalent the National Ignition Facility disposition of the eleven existing Russian allotted to deterrence. at the Lawrence Livermore National Labo- army corps, nine are located far away ratory in the US. The cooperation carried from the western borders of Russia on a With approximately 300 operational not only the expected technological line spreading from the Caucasus to the warheads, France has reached what is ad­­van­tages but also led to an agreement Far East. The NSC confirmed the strategic considered as proper level of sufficiency. between France and Great-Britain on nuc- character of the partnership the Alliance These capabilities are split into two com- lear issues signed in December 2010 is seeking to develop with Moscow. If the ponents: four SSBN of a new generation at Lancaster House. Kremlin may poses difficulties with its are carrying each 16 M51 missiles with an rather controversial governance organiza- approximate range of 9 000 km carrying 6 The geopolitical and geostrategic tion, France tends to consider Russia as an MIRVs of about 100 kt each and penet- context of French defence policy essential component of any future security ration aids; 2 squadrons of Rafale mod.3 architecture of Europe. Despite the fact fighter-bombers are carrying a supersonic The NATO Strategic Concept adopted in that scepticism remains about democratic cruise missile (ASMP-A) with a 100/300 kt Lisbon in 2010 reaffirmed the military na- life in Russia, the French have not, with warhead. The technological and industrial ture of the Atlantic alliance and its primary few exceptions, significant grievances capacities that lead to develop and built responsibility to protect the population concerning Russia that still haunt relations these nuclear components have, in fact, and the territory of its members. This has with Moscow – notably in the Baltic area give France a special position within NATO. been a long-lasting objective of the Alli- or in Eastern Europe where criticism was A fact barely understood among most of ance as stated in the Washington treaty’s strong when Paris sold two Mistral class NATO’s allies – with the exception of the article 5. Such positive reaffirmation of the helicopter carrier to the Russians. UK and the USA. indivisibility of allies’ security confirmed the enduring strength of the link binding The NATO dimension: Indeed the control of nuclear weapons is them together; it did not, however, add malaise and necessity not in itself enough to explain that situa­ new supplementary tasks for the Western tion. The issue here is about possessing alliance. In addition, the disappearance The Chicago summit of May 2012 had in and maintaining a specific technological of direct military threats to the European many ways confirmed the slow decline of and industrial base in the domain of area lessened the practical implication the NATO’s military organization and the nuclear weapons as well as well some key of this traditional goal of the alliance. At diminished place it has for the US who, intelligence assets notably space based. the same time, the complexity and the nevertheless continues to consider the Both provide strategic benefits and open great fluidity of the international scene organization as the main channel of their the way to bilateral cooperation which go have significantly reduced the ability of political influence throughout Europe. far beyond their initial purpose in bringing the Atlantic alliance to provide solutions Seen from Washington, the symptoms of strategic and political values. Numerous to the many challenges confronting the the relative decline of NATO are numerous, examples can support this assertion. The Western allies. however largely camouflaged by an active military nuclear R&D complex is central policy of lobbying and communication. to explore new domains related notably On the European continent perspective of One can only be amused by the use of to nuclear simulation. Simulation has conflicts has almost vanished. Although a the term “historic” to describe the NATO’s become a priority after France renounced, difficult partner still haunted by a Cold war Lisbon summit of November 2010 that with the others nuclear powers part of the mind-set, Russia, with the exception of its was said to be “the most important in TNP, to nuclear testing. Billions of euros significant nuclear forces, can no longer NATO’s history”. NATO’s Chicago summit- have been spent on these programs in be considered as a threat. From a military the city of President Obama - was the first the last decade, they brought results and standpoint, the bulk of Russian military to be held in the United States in 13 years, many strategic sides effects with political forces have been significantly reduced in having been initially billed as an “imple- consequences. Among the many simula- quantity and in quality. They are generally mentation summit” at which the alliance’s tion processes built one can mention the lacking high tech equipment in number political leaders assessed the evolution of cooperation on an equal footing between and conventional forces, with the excepti- the ambitious plan agreed on in Lisbon to the French Atomic establishment (CEA- on of selected units for rapid intervention, speed up NATO’s efforts to adapt to the DAM: Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique- are, in terms of training, lagging behind 21st century, its purpose was, also, to back Direction des Applications Militaires) with the professionalism of most western President Obama’s stature in the presiden- its US equivalent to design and built, in forces. Lastly, deployment of Russian mi- tial campaign. However, behind the scene, each country, a highly sophisticated Laser, litary units, particularly for ground forces, the withdrawal of American forces from

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Europe is amplified by the repatriation of obsessed with a resurgence of a possible France is, as many other European coun- two US Army brigades (both stationed in Russian military threat and are ready to tries, suffering from the financial and Germany: the 170th in Baumholder and defer their security to requirements de­ economic crisis. Temptation to retreat to 171th in Grafenwöhr). The strength of fined by the US in xchangee of the protec- oneself exists. However, as for the British, the US Army in Europe will amount to 30 tion offered by Washington. The Scandina- this does not represent a promising 000 men against 270 000 25 years ago. In vian countries still have the Russian factor opportunity. There remains the option total, the US will maintain around 70 000 in mind due to their geostrategic proxi- of continuing a traditional ambiguous personnel in Europe. The reasons of such mity to Russia. But they are in a position strategy: working for preserving a certain withdrawal are various and range from US where it is probably easier to compromise degree of autonomy, acting as a fair player internal political reasons to the shift of US with America than to choose the path of in NATO to wait for the favorable moment national interest. any form of European defence policy that to speed up a genuine European defence will compel them to work and cooperate policy while developing ad hoc bilateral Budgetary pressures are becoming strong with a country like France which they do cooperation with the American ally. with a Federal budget deficit almost out of not understand and to which they express control. If budgetary constrains provoke a certain form of mistrust and suspicion. an increased irritation in Washington Eastern and Central European countries Yves Boyer is Professor at the Ecole Polytéch- about NATO’s allies, the apparition of a of NATO are mostly in the same position nique and Deputy Director at the Fondation new generation of American leaders, far as the Baltic States with the exception of pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris. less inclined to look towards Europe as did Poland whose commitments to defense their predecessors, may accentuate the is serious, although with little to offer in A longer version of this text will be published relative distance that the American are terms of budgetary and military capabi- early 2013 in “NATO‘s European Allies“ ed. by taking with NATO. lities. However, Poland has shown a real Janne Haaland Matlary/Magnus Petersson, commitment to enhancing European Palgrave Macmillan. The reassessment of US national interests defence perspectives and it is worth is linked to the growing importance of mentioning that in the framework of the Asia in the world game. It is striking to Weimar Triangle, Warsaw associated with see that, in the strategic guidance on U.S. Berlin and Paris to plea for the creation of defence priorities for the years ahead, re- a European strategic headquarters (OHQ). leased by President Barack Obama in early Berlin itself is modernizing its forces in January 2012, the word Asia appeared a very interesting manner although the nine times, while NATO makes just two internal political condition existing in appearances. These shifts, also, corres- Germany makes Berlin largely absent pond to a transformation in the way the when committing forces out of area as Americans intend to use force. The lessons witnessed during the Libyan campaign of of the last 15 years led them to curtail, in spring/ summer 2011. The UK is in a state the future, military engagements about of disarray regarding its defence policy. situations which are not linked to major Having one of the best militaries in Eu­ US interests. Accordingly, if they are rope, the British defence posture has been © Austria Institut für Europa- willing to continue supporting their allies dramatically impacted by the deflationary und Sicherheitspolitik, 2012 in the framework of ad hoc coalitions they effect of the 2010’s SDR which have been Alle Rechte vorbehalten. will do it as “off-shore balancer” as they did translated by internal incoherence. The UK during the operations against Gaddafi’s shares with France the will to remain a key Nachdruck oder vergleichbare Verwendungen von Arbeiten des Austria Instituts für Europa- und Libya. They will offer logistical support player in defence but is currently haunted Sicherheitspolitik (AIES) sind auch in Auszügen and intelligence but will refrain from com- by a kind of existential crisis which resur- nur mit vorheriger Genehmigung gestattet. Die mitting active forces participating to the rect new appeal towards a rapprochement im AIES-Fokus veröffentlichten Beiträge geben ausschließlich die Meinung der jeweiligen Auto- kinetic part of the operations. with its former associate within the Com- rinnen und Autoren wieder. monwealth as if it represented a serous Schlossgasse 6 Conclusion opportunity. This crisis may endure as long A-2344 Maria Enzersdorf as they will have not cut the Gordian knot Tel. +43 (0)2236 411 96 Today NATO is under the pressure of about their relations with Europe leaving Fax. +43 (0)2236 411 96-9 E-Mail: [email protected] different forces and requirement which their partners uncertain about the degree www.aies.at are politically disruptive. On one hand one to which further cooperation with London. finds small countries. The Baltic States are Layout: EGENCY Medienbüro Patrick Meyer

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