FOKUS | 5/2012 French defence policy in a time of uncertainties Yves Boyer Besides the United States the EU is the reasons (historical, societal, diplomatic, In the military domains the French only grouping of nations able to project etc.) explain the many difficulties met by defence organisation, whatever its limits, its influence worldwide. Despite the the Europeans to further their cooperation has been organised to be efficient and current crisis, the EU remains a global in that field and the various ambiguities in to maintain the coherence of the French economic superpower with the highest the conduct of each EU country’s defence defence posture. The Executive (the Pre- GNP worldwide when the various GNP affairs. sident of the Republic) is the head of the of its members are combined. In the armed forces according to the constitu- foreseeable future this situation will be France shares with her EU’s partners, tion. He provides guidance (subsequently preserved, allowing the Union to generate and notably those members of the agreed on by the Parliament) on the financial surpluses which can be used to Eurozone, the dire effects of the financial overall strategy and military organisati- back its policy of global influence based and economic crisis. The debt issue, in on. He carefully controlls their execution on diverse forms of “civilian” power with conjunction with economic stagnation, through his military staff at the Elysée a central position in various international will affect public spending and, notably, palace and directs their implementation networks and a significant role in interna- defence expenditure. However, France through the chairing of the high council tional institutions. Indeed, the EU is the retains particularities in terms of a national on defence (Conseil de Défense). He par- single largest financial contributor to the consensus on defence, in terms of promi- ticularly cares about maintaining autono- UN system: at the end of the 2010 decade nence of the executive power vis à vis the my of action in key domains, respecting the EU provided for 38 % of the UN’s regu- Parliament, to contain the extent of the commitments to alliances (EU, NATO, out lar budget, for a significant amount of UN likely reduction of the defence budget in of areas agreements such as those with peacekeeping operations, and one-half of order to preserve the current coherence of some African countries or Abu Dhabi) and all UN member states’ contributions to UN the French military model. coherence of the French defence posture. funds and programs. EU member states This precise stature gives the French head are also signatories to almost all interna- France‘s defence organisation and of State a wide margin of action who can tional treaties currently in force. In the last cooperation with NATO countries decide to commit French forces without two decades, the EU has finalized the sin- prior acquiescence from the Parliament gle market; established a single currency; Probably one of the key and original even if, debates are, later, organized created a zone without internal frontiers characteristic of this model remains that where parliamentarians from the National (“Schengen”); launched common defense, strategic affairs and defence are deeply Assembly and the Senate are discussing foreign and internal security policies; and embedded into the power of the French the rationale and the scope of the military expanded from twelve to 27 members. State. Even the defence industry is closely operation, sometimes without any vote These are very positive developments in linked to the State’s nomenclature, includ- following the debates. Such debates a globalised world where cooperation in ing privatised firms, whose leaders are by occur when the issue is involving a certain trade, social development, environment and large selected from Grandes Ecoles amount of forces and allies. Otherwise preservation, etc. are the dominant value. (Ecole polytechnique dubbed as l’X and concerning “small” operations in Africa, Ecole Nationale d’Administration, ENA), as the Parliament is rarely consulted. For Even in defence matters, Europe does are their counterparts in politics and the example, this was the case for operation possess know-how and capabilities which banking system. In addition, the State Epervier in Chad which has been in place do not impede fruitful cooperation and remains a key purveyor of investments in since 1986 or operation Boali in the Cen- interoperability with the United States. high tech firms and notably those working tral African Republic (since 2002) where With about 20% of the world’s military in armament development and produc- French forces contribute actively to the spending, the EU is far ahead of China (6 tion. Those many connections serve as a stability of these countries in the heart of to 5%), Russia (3%) or India (2%) in relation hedge against drastic reductions of the Africa. Operation Boali provides a good to other « big» countries. But precisely for format of those industries. Such realities example of the functioning of the French the reason that the influence exerted by bear heavily upon collaborative projects processes to commit forces in urgency. the EU is more “civilian” than “military”, the in the framework of NATO which are US In 2007 a small detachment of French defence dimension of the EU has never lead and often seen as a potential risk to forces, based in Birao, near the Sudanese had the priority over others aspects of national and European industries. border, was attacked and encircled by an the European project. Of course several important group of rebels. If Birao had 1 FOKUS | 5/2012 fallen, there would have been a big risk of key tasks enunciated in the “2008 White as well as the knowhow developed at MIC destabilization in Chad and subsequently Book on Defence” which will certainly be will be by and large transferred to the EU in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The maintained under the leadership of presi- as a military actor when and if the EU un- Elysée palace military headquarters was dent Hollande: prevention, protection and der one form or another develops its own immediately warned of the situation and, projection. For each component (Air, Land defence policy. after the president’s approval, ordered the and Sea) an adequate command structure EMA (Etat-Major des Armées) to take the for engagement at the operational level In the meantime the French have to main- appropriate measure in air dropping para- exists and each is NATO certified. This cer- tain coherent, well trained conventional chutists flying from Gabon and Djibouti tification also includes Special Forces. This forces. In 2011 these forces have been to intervene as a backup force. The French certification is important in the sense that engaged for actual military operations chain of command from the political deci- it signifies having capabilities to enter first in Kosovo, Ivory Coast, the Sahel region, sion to the actual use of force is probably on a theatre of operation. This remains a Lebanon, Libya, the Indian Ocean and unique among Western democracies and key requirement in order to maintain au- Afghanistan. As a whole, these operations it continues to give a significant capacity tonomy of decision as well as in the ability amounted to around € 1,3 Bn for 2011. of reactivity to the French president. In his to develop cooperation with major allies tasks as commander in chief, the head of such as the US, Great-Britain or Germany. The structuring effect of nuclear state is supported by diverse structures to France participates with these countries deterrence on French defence policy implement his decisions. Two are notewor- in the MIC (Multinational Interoperability thy. The first one is the general staff (Etat- Council) where complex command struc- The reduced level of immediate threat to major des Armées – EMA) who conducts tures and new modes of operation are Europe does not equate to the absence of forces in actions, plans operations and is in tested in common. French participation any threat, hence the strong reaffirmation charge of training the forces. The second in the MIC dates back to the early 2000s. in the NATO Strategic Concept adopted in one is the defence industry directorate The development of the MIC, although not Lisbon of the role of nuclear deterrence (Direction Générale de l’Armement – DGA) highly publicised – probably because of in the defence of the allies. France is who oversees the elaboration and oversee the complexity and the technicality of the particularly sensitive on this issue. Besides the production of defence equipment and works being done – also signifies a relative historical reasons, nuclear deterrence has is a guarantor, in conjunction with EMA, of neglect with regards to NATO. become the central component of French the coherence of the French defence ar- security policy. Having reduced the size of chitecture. Coherence means that general The decrease in the European defence its nuclear forces in the last two decades functions are assigned to the military. budgets and its potential implications Paris is determined to maintain a robust are becoming a recurring theme for nuclear posture benefiting internally of The French defence organization remains, French officials. The French Chief of Staff, a large political consensus. President thus, highly centralised. It is built around Admiral Edouard Guillaud, mentioned, François Hollande, during his electoral the pre-eminence of the president of when testifying at the National Assembly, campaign conspicuously indicated, to its the Republic, commander in chief, from early January 2012, on the next defence allies from the green party (EEVL – Europe whom EMA and DGA receive presiden- budget, that, between 2001 and 2010 Ecologie les Verts) that nuclear deterrence tial guidance to maintain autonomy of defence spending increased by 80% in will continue to be the backbone of action in key domains, ability to respect the USA and 70% in East Asia, while it France’s military posture.