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Our Military Forces' Struggle Against Lawless, Media Savvy Terrorist

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Our Military Forces' Struggle Against Lawless, Media Savvy Terrorist OUR MILITARY FORCES’ STRUGGLE AGAINST LAWLESS, MEDIA SAVVY TERRORIST ADVERSARIES Our Military Forces’ Struggle Against Lawless, Media Savvy Terrorist Adversaries A COMPARATIVE STUDY 2nd Edition HIGH LEVEL MILITARY GROUP FEBRUARY 2016 1 OUR MILITARY FORCES’ STRUGGLE AGAINST LAWLESS, MEDIA SAVVY TERRORIST ADVERSARIES Copyright © 2016 by Friends of Israel Initiative All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior written permission of the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical reviews and certain other non-commercial uses permitted by copyright law. 2 OUR MILITARY FORCES’ STRUGGLE AGAINST LAWLESS, MEDIA SAVVY TERRORIST ADVERSARIES TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD 5 ABSTRACT AND KEY CONCLUSIONS 6 INTRODUCTORY ESSAY 9 A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY 16 CASE STUDIES 22 Author Biographies 23 Operation Moshtarak, Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 13 – 25 February 2010 24 2006 Israel – Lebanon Conflict, Southern Lebanon, 12 July – 14 August 2006 38 Operation Al Fajr, Fallujah, Iraq, 7 November – 23 December 2004 53 Operation Serval, Sahel Region, Africa, 11 January – 30 July 2013 66 Operation Barkhane, Sahel Region, Africa, 1 August 2014 – Present-day 77 War Plan Espada de Honor I, Cauca Region, Colombia, 2012 – 2013 84 The Battle of Sadr City, Sadr City, Iraq, 26 March - 15 May 2008 105 United States Drone Campaign in Pakistan, FATA, Pakistan, 2009 – 2015 115 German Contribution to the International Security Assistance Force 133 Mexican Military Operation to Capture Ignacio “Nacho” Coronel Villarreal 141 Methodology for Examining Military Norms and Conduct During Armed Conflicts in Populated Areas 150 ABOUT THE HLMG 166 3 OUR MILITARY FORCES’ STRUGGLE AGAINST LAWLESS, MEDIA SAVVY TERRORIST ADVERSARIES HIGH LEVEL MILITARY GROUP General Klaus Dieter Naumann (Germany) is the former Security Cooperation of the OSCE Mission in Bosnia Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr, the German armed forces and Herzegovina. and served as Chairman of the NATO Military Committee Colonel Richard Kemp (United Kingdom) was from 1996 to 1999. Commander of British Forces in Afghanistan and has General Vincenzo Camporini (Italy) is the former Chief of served in Iraq, the Balkans, South Asia and Northern Defence Staff of Italy. He served as Deputy Chief of Defence Ireland. He has led the international terrorism team at General Staff and President of the Italian Centre for High the UK’s Joint Intelligence Committee and served as Defence Studies before being appointed Chief of Staff of the chairman of the strategic intelligence group for COBRA, Italian Air Force and subsequently Chief of Defence General the UK national crisis management committee. Staff. Colonel Vincent Alcazar (United States) served as a fighter Lieutenant General David A. Deptula (United States) was pilot in Operations Desert Storm and Southern Watch as well the principal attack planner for the Desert Storm coalition as various other post 9/11 theatres. He subsequently served in air campaign in 1991, served as Director of the Combined strategic roles at the Pentagon, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Air Operations Center in Afghanistan and served as the Agency and at the U.S. embassy, Baghdad, Iraq. first Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Colonel Eduardo Ramirez (Colombia) is an Advisor Reconnaissance (ISR), Headquarters Air Force. to the Congress of Colombia who served with the Admiral José María Terán (Spain) serves in the Office of Colombian National Police from 1987 until 2013. He was Strategic Assessment of the Minister of Defence of Spain. A formerly the Chief of Security Staff for President Uribe former Chief of the Joint Staff and Chief of the Strategic Analysis of Colombia, as well as Chief of Section at the Judicial Group, he has also served as Director for Reorganisation of the and Criminal Directory of the National Police. Spanish Intelligence Service. Ambassador Pierre-Richard Prosper (United States) was Major General Andrew James Molan (Australia) Ambassador-at-large in charge of the US Secretary of State’s served as the Chief of Operations for the Headquarters Office of War Crimes Issues. A former Presidential envoy and Multinational Force in Iraq. He is a former Commander adviser to the National Security Council he was previously a of the Australian Defence College and has served as Adviser war crimes prosecutor for the United Nations International to the Vice Chief of the Australian Defence Force on Joint Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Warfighting Lessons and Concepts. Rafael L. Bardají is the Executive Director of the Friends Lieutenant General Kamal Davar (India) served as the first of Israel Initiative and National Security Advisor to Former Director General of the Defence Intelligence Agency of India. President, José María Aznar. He formerly served in the A former Director-General, Mechanised Forces at Army Government of Spain as the National Security Adviser and in Headquarters, he has held a large number of high ranking leadership positions in the Ministry of Defence. command posts in the Indian Army and served on the Indian Davis Lewin is the Rapporteur of the High Level Military Military Training Team in Iraq. Group. He is the Deputy Director and Head of Policy and Brigadier General Alain Lamballe (France) served in Research at The Henry Jackson Society, a London based the General Secretariat for National Defence as head of Foreign and Defence Policy think tank. the Southeast Asia and Europe sections as well as heading the Central Liaison Mission for Assistance to Foreign Forces. He is the former Director of the Department of 4 OUR MILITARY FORCES’ STRUGGLE AGAINST LAWLESS, MEDIA SAVVY TERRORIST ADVERSARIES FOREWORD The essence of warfare has not changed since its earliest occurrence: it still is a contest of wills. Nonetheless, the way war is conducted has evolved dramatically on account of myrriad factors, be they new technology and the rise of irregular combatants, developments on land, in the air and sea to the cyber domain, and from rocket and drone warfare to the impact of the Internet and social media. Today’s battlefield has become truly multidimensional, densely populated, blurred in distinction between combatants and civilians, and exposed to the public 24/7 in real time. Tactical decisions have to be made in an environment more complex than ever before. Strategic decisions must take into consideration the realities on the battlefield as well as those around it, such as the sentiments on the airwaves, on Twitter and in international organisations. Last year the Friends of Israel Initiative organised a group of professionally distinguished and respected high-profile military officers, the High level Military group (HLMG), to assess Operation Protective Edge conducted by the Israeli Defense Forces against Hamas in Gaza in 2014. The conclusions of the first HLMG report can be found on its web site (http://www.high-level-military-group.org). In conducting that work, the HLMG members felt from the outset that no single military operation can be appropriately judged unless it is placed in the full context of current operations worldwide. The Law of Armed Conflict exists in principle, but an accurate professional and legal assessment requires an understanding of how these rules are effectively applied by other military forces defending liberal democracies in different parts of the globe. The report at hand is the result of this conclusion by the group. FoII commissioned several experts to study specific military operations conducted by their respective nations to furnish the HLMG with a set of analyses that can help situate their broader conclusions in the first report in appropriate relative terms. The studies you are about to read are important in themselves since they illuminate trends and generic lessons that are applicable to modern conflicts today. But they are also relevant since their variety in time, location, types of forces and enemies, serve as the real- world context where military operations must be conceived and executed. There will be a third and final report in this series, with the strategic lessons to be learnt from the HLMG and the experts who authored the case studies being presented here. Liberal democracies - the Western world - must adjust to public perceptions about warfare and the conditions modern conflicts impose on us. Hopes for the eradication of or conduct of a form of “humanised” war as set against the brutality shown by our enemies, offset by the ethical behavior of our troops in the face of the systematic abuse of any and all norms of war by our opponents are a challenge to our democracies. No doubt this second report is another contribution towards the goal of informing our publics about the true scale of the challenge and equipping our leaders with the analysis to make the case. Rafael L. Bardají Director, Friends of Israel Initiative 5 OUR MILITARY FORCES’ STRUGGLE AGAINST LAWLESS, MEDIA SAVVY TERRORIST ADVERSARIES Abstract and Key Conclusions About This Study The High Level Military Group (HLMG) aims to add a professional military and legal element to debates about warfare in the 21st Century. Its primary mandate is to explore the implications for democratic nations of warfare against enemies who have a total disregard for life and law, but who actively exploit our own nations’ adherence to the rule of law for strategic and tactical gain. HLMG members formed the view that an accurate professional and legal assessment requires an understanding of how these rules are effectively applied by law-abiding military forces defending liberal democracies against such enemies in different parts of the globe, so as to be able to judge performance appropriately in context, informed by real-world practices and dilemmas. A number of HLMG members nominated relevant experts who were tasked with furnishing a set of analyses to help situate these challenges in the context of contemporary experience across the globe.
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