THE KING IS DEAD: POLITICAL SUCCESSION AND WAR IN EUROPE, 1000–1799 ANDREJ KOKKONEN ANDERS SUNDELL WORKING PAPER SERIES 2017:9 QOG THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTE Department of Political Science University of Gothenburg Box 711, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG September 2017 ISSN 1653-8919 © 2017 by Andrej Kokkonen & Anders Sundell. All rights reserved. The King is Dead: Political Succession and War in Europe, 1000–1799 Andrej Kokkonen Anders Sundeöö QoG Working Paper Series 2017:9 September 2017 ISSN 1653-8919 Andrej Kokkonen Anders Sundell Aarhus University The Quality of Government Institute Department of Political Science Department of Political Science
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[email protected] We are grateful to Oeindrila Dube, Jørgen Møller, Johannes Lindvall, Jan Teorell, and seminar participants at Copenhagen University, Gothenburg University, Linköping University and the 2017 APSA meeting for comments on previous versions of the paper. 1 “The order of succession is not fixed for the sake of the reigning family; but because it is the interest of the state that it should have a reigning family.” - Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (1748) “The most plausible plea which hath ever been offered in favor of hereditary succession is, that it preserves a nation from civil wars; and were this true, it would be weighty; whereas it is the most bare-faced falsity ever imposed on mankind.” - Thomas Paine, Common Sense (1776) Seldom is an autocratic regime as fragile as when the autocrat has died, and there is uncertainty—or outright disagreement—over who his successor will be. Conflicting claims to power can easily deteriorate into violent conflict between members of the regime (Acharya and Lee 2017; Brownlee 2007; Frantz and Stein 2017; Herz 1952; Kokkonen and Sundell 2017; Kurrild-Klitgaard 2000; Svolik 2012; Tullock 1987; Wang 2017), since violence is “the ultimate arbiter of political conflicts” in autocracies (Svolik 2012, 20).