Center for Security Studies

STRATEGIC TRENDS 2021 Key Developments in Global Affairs

Editors: Brian G. Carlson, Oliver Thränert

Series Editor: Andreas Wenger Authors: Brian G. Carlson, Julian Kamasa, Linda Maduz, Niklas Masuhr, Lisa Watanabe

CSS ETH Zurich STRATEGIC TRENDS 2021 is also electronically available at: www.css.ethz.ch/publications/strategic-trends

Editors STRATEGIC TRENDS 2021: Brian G. Carlson, Oliver Thränert Series Editor STRATEGIC TRENDS: Andreas Wenger

Contact: Center for Security Studies ETH Zurich Haldeneggsteig 4, IFW CH-8092 Zurich Switzerland

This publication covers events up to 1 April 2021.

© 2021, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich

Images © by Reuters

ISSN 1664-0667 ISBN 978-3-905696-76-9 CHAPTER 3 Turkey’s New Outlook: Power Projection in the Middle East and Beyond Niklas Masuhr

Turkey’s military operations in 2020 and beyond lie at the intersection of a more activist and autonomous foreign policy, the continuous mutation of the country’s guiding ideologies, increased autocracy at home, and an expedition- ary military machine 25 years in the making. Trends and shifts in both the short and long terms, from changing government coalitions in Turkey to the Syrian civil war, help to explain the erstwhile Kemalist Republic’s accelerated transformation, both internationally and domestically, as well as its likely strategic implications.

A Turkish soldier walks next to a Turkish military vehicle during a joint US-Turkey patrol, near Tel Abyad, Syria, September 8, 2019. Rodi Said / Reuters

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Turkish military operations through- While interventions in Libya, Syria, out 2020 came as a shock to many and in the Nagorno-Karabakh war Western policymakers and commen- rely on similar tools and operation- tators, both in terms of their political al preferences, the politico-strategic audacity and their aggressive nature. drivers behind them are anything In particular, its armed forces’ use of but uniform. Turkey’s military inter- Unmanned Aerial (Combat) Vehi- ventions in all three theaters notably cles (UAV/UCAV) made headlines featured the use of UCAVs, but its far beyond the usual bubble of mil- objectives in Syria, Libya, and the itary technology watchers. Beyond Southern Caucasus were quite differ- the battlefields of Syria, Libya, and ent in each case. The Syrian civil war the Caucasus, President Recep Tayy- naturally has a direct impact on Tur- ip Erdogan’s increasing assertiveness key’s own national security and deter- in foreign policy and heavy-handed- mines its relations with regional and ness at home have long invited dip- extra-regional powers, most notably lomatic frustration and pensive anal- the US and Russia. Importantly, the yses in NATO countries. Indeed, the Syrian war also prompted renewed very trustworthiness and reliability of concerns in Turkey over the Kurdish Ankara as a NATO member has been conflict. Operations in Libya reflect questioned. both the ideological makeup of Tur- key’s current governing coalition and Many facets of Turkey’s recent behav- the country’s policies to ensure ener- ior have simmered for years, even de- gy security. Support for Azerbaijan cades, and have only now reached full against Armenia over Nagorno-Kara- maturation. In domestic politics, the bakh, meanwhile, was similarly driv- ruling AK Party’s soft Islamism has en by ideological support and energy merged with ethno-nationalist cur- security as well as Turkey’s ambiguous rents. In the military sphere, mean- relationship with Russia. While Mos- while, important force design deci- cow has acquiesced to direct Turkish sions made decades ago ensure that and Turkish-supported military ac- Erdogan has the capacity to project tion in all three theaters, the results power as he sees fit. These develop- in each case likely would have played ments intersect with a destabilized in- out much differently if Russia had not ternational environment that permits, done so. This lenience appears to be and perhaps even advantages, the driven mostly by Moscow’s desire to overt use of military force that Turkey further weaken the already strained undertook in 2020. bonds between Ankara and its NATO

54 TURKEY’S NEW OUTLOOK allies in the West. Taken together, all The fall of the Soviet Union, howev- three areas of operation showcase not er, fundamentally changed Turkey’s only Turkey’s current assertiveness, strategic environment. Within Turkish but also the multi-vectored drivers of security policy circles, the two main this trend and how the country seeks internal opponents to Kemalism, sep- to position itself in an increasingly un- aratism (meaning Kurdish resistance) certain security environment. and Islamism, replaced the Red Army at the top of the threat list. Against Is- Kemalist Past and Recent Shifts lamist forces, the military set up mon- There is no straight line between itoring mechanisms in order to collect the rise of the Islamist Justice and intelligence, ban non-secular parties if Development Party (AKP) to pow- necessary, and prevent the circumven- er and Turkey’s current approach to tion of the Kemalist canon – even in international engagement. The de- the face of Islamist movements gath- velopments that have led here can ering steam among the electorate. By be viewed through the prism of civ- the mid-1990s, an Islamist-influenced il-military relations and changes in coalition government, headed by the the state-endorsed doctrine in three Welfare Party, was in power. In 1997, phases: pre-2002 military dominance, the military intervened and overturned the AKP’s struggle to roll back that the government, eventually banning dominance culminating in the failed the Welfare Party. This, however, coup attempt in July 2016, and, lastly, merely delayed the rise of some of its the reintegration of military elites by members, among them Erdogan him- way of ideological realignments inside self, who successfully regrouped as the Turkey. Justice and Development (AK) Party.

During the first phase, until the elec- In 2002, the AKP swept national pol- tion of the conservative AKP in 2002, itics in a landslide victory at the gen- the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) eral election. From the beginning, the served as the guardrails of Atatürk’s Islamist party was hindered by the Kemalist vision. Turkey joined NATO military, setting the tone for a con- in 1952; inter-military links with the flictual relationship that culminated in US were especially pronounced until the attempted coup on 15 July 2016. and beyond the end of the Cold War. These two events serve as bookends for The corollary of anchoring Turkey to the second period under observation. the West was that it withdrew from During this period, the AKP and its the wider Middle East.1 allies wrested control of the state and

55 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2021 societal institutions from the TSK, even contingency plans leading to a coup, as instability rose throughout Turkey’s referred to as “Sledgehammer.”2 While neighborhood after the outbreak of the ultra-nationalist officers and civilian al- Arab Spring in 2011. In terms of the lies were certainly opposed to the AKP country’s broader foreign policy and government and had proven their pro- strategic outlook, the new government pensity for intervening in politics, the sought to capitalize on the pivotal posi- vast judicial proceedings also caught tion afforded to it by straddling Europe left-of-center journalists in its nets.3 and Asia. Under the so-called Strate- gic Depth doctrine, Ahmet Davuto- Externally, a string of events after glu, a political scientist-turned-diplo- 2010 put the Erdogan government mat-turned-politician, formalized the into “survival mode.” The first exter- idea that Turkey possessed a natural nal event and the ignition for much sphere of influence not only in terms of what followed was the eruption of geography but also by virtue of his- of the Arab Spring. Erdogan at first toric linkages throughout the region as sought to ride its wave by present- the heir to the Ottoman Empire. These ing himself as patron and partner to ideas formed the basis for ‘neo-Ot- moderate Islamist forces, many of tomanism’, which would replace Ke- which were national organizations of malism as the state ideology. Part and the Muslim Brotherhood. This ap- parcel of this construct was the dic- proach, however, meant that Turkey tum of “zero problems” with Turkey’s was overtly at loggerheads with more neighbors, as Davutoglu in his capacity secular regimes. In Egypt, a military as Turkey’s foreign minister sought to coup aborted the attempt to create an position the country as a pivotal power Islamic republic.4 The shockwaves of drawing its political capital from diplo- the Arab Spring also reached Istan- matic relations. bul itself, and in 2013 the city was rocked by a series of liberal protests The AKP and its then-allies in the re- at Gezi Park directed against the ever ligious Gülen movement proved quite increasing autocracy of the AKP. The successful in rolling back military in- response was a major crackdown on fluence, mainly through a series of tri- left-of-center opposition and a stifling als from 2007 onward that exhibited of critical media and the judiciary. questionable adherence to the rule of Across the border, the destabilization law. Prosecutors alleged the existence of Syria and Iraq and the expansion of an ultra-nationalist network (“Er- of the Islamic State (IS) resulted in a genekon”) and the existence of military long-term zone of instability.

56 TURKEY’S NEW OUTLOOK

Perhaps the most significant catalyst essence, ethno-nationalist paradigms for Erdogan’s transformation of the were imported into the state canon country, however, was the 15 July even before the coup attempt oc- 2016 coup attempt, undertaken by a curred. In 2018, the AKP entered into coalition of disgruntled TSK officers. a coalition with the far-right Nation- After the attempt was suppressed, loy- alist Movement Party (MHP), which alists carried out further purges of the holds even more hostile views towards military, judiciary, media, and opposi- the Kurds, Armenia, and the Western tion. In total, 130,000 public servants world. Since then, the vision of Tur- were dismissed, including teachers key as a major power in the Ottoman and academics, and almost 80,000 Empire’s former borders has remained suspects were formally arrested on but has been complemented by the grounds of supposed links with Kurd- willingness to use military force in ish elements and the Gülen network, this perceived sphere of influence.8 which had turned from ally to domes- Two decades of TSK force develop- tic enemy.5 As one might expect, the ment dovetail with these aspirations. purges within the military targeted those individuals encultured in NATO In 2016, Erdogan listed a number of and US military contexts. Leaked US regional defense precepts that benign State Department cables revealed that media would dub the “Erdogan doc- even by the early 2000s, these “Atlan- trine.” Its main tenets, notably a pol- ticists” were on the backfoot against icy of proactive incursions into neigh- “Eurasianists” who preferred the boring countries to pre-empt attacks AKP’s neo-Ottoman vision of Turkey against Turkey, have roots that extend as a pivotal, autonomous power.6 as far back as the 1990s. In fact, con- temporary operations under this guise The failed coup also serves as the closely mirror those undertaken in the starting point for the third and cur- 1990s, though of course now enhanced rent phase of civil-military relations. by additional military capabilities. While the military was institutionally defanged, elements of the old guard’s During the military modernization nationalism have been re-introduced campaign of the 1990s, Turkey’s and play an important role in foreign forces were not simply symmetrically policy formulation. This shift meant modernized across the board. Rath- that Davutoglu’s neo-Ottomanism er, specific elements geared towards a has been superseded by what some particular way of war were upgraded. have called “Turkish Gaullism.”7 In Namely, investments and acquisitions

57 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2021 were made to develop a robust recon- Syria: Overthrowing Assad naissance-strike complex enabled by Ankara’s policies during the first five systems such as rocket artillery, UAVs, years of the conflict were publicly and airborne tankers. In essence, the justified along moral lines based on ability to conduct strikes into enemy Turkey as a champion of democrati- territory was emphasized, as were mo- zation, with Russia and Iran playing bile and flexible mechanized forma- the roles of counter-revolutionary tions. However, the Cold War high- enforcers. In this narrative, the US lighted the vulnerability to Western and NATO were viewed as fickle at arms embargoes and convinced Turk- best and treacherous at worst.9 The ish planners to build an autonomous Assad regime’s crackdown in the arms industry capable of producing the summer of 2011 forced Turkey to necessary platforms, systems, and spare choose between support for the dic- parts. These domestic developments tator and the credibility of the Turk- intersected with external events, espe- ish/AKP model of soft, bottom-up cially the dynamics of the Syrian civil Islamism in the wider Arab world, a war and its Kurdish dimension. Opera- key tenet in Davutoglu’s neo-Otto- tions in Syria, Libya, and the Southern man program. Caucasus illustrate how the third phase of civil-military relations shapes Tur- In this period of enforcing regime key’s power projection in the region. change, Turkey permitted and sup- ported the formation of organized Syria quite naturally presents the most Syrian opposition and the founding important theater for Turkey’s secu- of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) on its rity policy. Operations in Libya and territory in November 2011. Simul- Nagorno-Karabakh are results of the taneously to Qatar and Saudi Arabia domestic political shift in 2016, but (but without coordinating with ei- Ankara involved itself in its neigh- ther), Ankara also supported radical bor’s civil war from the very beginning Islamist groups of credible combat in 2011. One month after the coup, effectiveness in the region such as Turkish tanks entering Syria marked al-Qaeda-linked Jabhat al-Nusra and the Syrian dimension of Turkey’s “new precursor elements of IS.10 Turkish look” as a more aggressive actor. Turk- action effectively strengthened the ish involvement in Syria was also a Islamic State group, mostly due to crucial driver of Ankara’s alienation its preference for toppling Assad and from Washington and its increasing, if preventing the emergence of a Kurd- ambiguous, alignment with Moscow. ish-controlled quasi-state.

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By 2015, it was clear this low-cost a ceasefire. The Syrian civil war and approach had failed: Assad was still its dynamics, however, reignited ten- in power, and stabilized thanks to a sions. With the exception of certain massive joint Iranian/Hezbollah proxy Iraqi special operations forces, Syrian campaign and Moscow’s intervention. Kurdish (YPG/YPJ12) units and the However, Turkey’s attempts at regime PKK had been virtually the only mil- change from a presumably safe dis- itary units able to stem the tide of the tance also failed because of the mis- IS onslaught into Syria and Iraq – sig- calculations inherent in the approach. nificantly boosting their international Two events that would have precipitat- reputation as a result. In 2014 and ed regime collapse, namely en masse 2015, Kurdish-led forces had held defections from the Syrian Arab Army out in the besieged city of Kobane, (SAA) or a NATO air campaign, did supported from the air by the count- not materialize, contrary to Turkey’s er-IS coalition, while Ankara refused expectations. In the latter case, the to support the Kurdish holdout on its White House’s infamous “Red Line” border. Turkey’s refusal to assist the declarations surely contributed to Tur- fighters, and a series of Islamic State key’s assumptions.11 After threatening bomb attacks that targeted members military action if Assad were to use of the Kurdish opposition, reignited chemical weapons, President Obama the PKK’s insurgency inside Turkey failed to follow through, thereby un- after the flagging peace process broke dercutting the US position on Syria down in 2015. Erdogan was quick and failing to deter subsequent use of to pivot from peacemaking efforts chemical weapons by Assad. to warnings that the Kurds were the major threat facing Turkey – some- In addition, events on the ground in what foreshadowing the return of the Syria meant that Turkish attention ethno-nationalist over the neo-Ot- shifted from Assad back to Kurd- toman paradigm that would later be ish influence as the major perceived formalized. threat even before the coup attempt occurred. As recently as 2013, Erdo- In the chaos of the civil war, YPG and gan had attempted to negotiate di- its allies carved out zones of effective rectly with the imprisoned leader of control in northwestern Syria around the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Afrin City and controlled most of the Abdullah Öcalan, to peacefully end country’s rural northeast and east. or mitigate the Turkish-Kurdish con- The decision by the United States and flict. Both sides had, in fact, agreed to its NATO allies to work with the YPG

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and its local allies as their preferred response, and would be followed up ground component in counter-IS op- by three more major offensive cam- erations was a source of consternation paigns by the spring of 2020, two of for Ankara. The prospect of a con- which were aimed at Kurds. tiguous Syrian Kurdish quasi-state, straddling borders and receiving ex- Syria: Adjustment of ternal support, constituted the worst Ends and Means possible result of the Syrian civil war Euphrates Shield is principally the in Turkey’s eyes. Operation Euphrates operational result of an adjustment Shield in August 2016 was Turkey’s of aims and investment: Whereas

60 TURKEY’S NEW OUTLOOK previously Ankara had pursued a low- groups defending the besieged city cost, maximalist approach, now both of Aleppo that would fall to the SAA sides of the equation were adjusted. in December – a tacit acceptance of The operation was, furthermore, tight- spheres of influence.17 ly linked with the unsuccessful coup attempt that had occurred only one Russia’s established military domi- month earlier. For one, TSK leader- nance in Syria and growing disen- ship had opposed deploying ground chantment with the Obama admin- forces into Syria for over a year13 and, istration compelled Erdogan to seek secondly, the offensive proved the rapprochement with Russia. Turkey Turkish military’s continued readiness increasingly viewed the US as an in- and operational ability in the wake of trusive rival due to its support for the post-coup purges. It also serves as the YPG/YPJ, whereas Turkey could work inciting incident for the current expe- with Moscow once it had dropped the ditionary political and military con- priority of toppling Assad. The tepid figuration observed in Syria and later reaction of Turkey’s Western allies to theaters.14 the coup attempt was in clear contrast to its swift condemnation by Russia. The operation’s objective was to cre- Even during the previous, “idealistic” ate a secure zone on Syrian soil and period of Turkey’s Syrian policies, the to prevent the SDF from connecting Obama administration’s refusal to their northeastern territories to Syria’s turn its airstrikes against Assad and its northwestern Afrin province and cre- support for Kurdish elements on the ate a “corridor of terror,” in Ankara’s ground had soured relations consider- parlance. In order to launch the oper- ably. In 2015, various Kurdish, Arab, ation, the Turkish government estab- Assyrian, and other armed groups had lished the parameters of engagement organized under the umbrella of the with Washington and Moscow – but Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – proceeded to exceed the limits agreed even if YPG units formed the opera- with the US.15 By ensuring Russian tional core and leadership. acquiescence, Turkey established itself as an additional state actor in the civil Ankara’s priority of containing the war, securing a stake in Syria’s future YPG’s influence became even clearer and establishing a precedent for what in subsequent operations after 2016. has been called “cooperative competi- While the TSK’s armed occupation of tion” with Russia.16 In addition, Tur- the SDF-controlled majority Kurdish key quietly withdrew support from Afrin enclave in early 2018 was more

61 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2021 or less accepted by the US, its broad- a Russian Su-24 attack aircraft, caus- front incursion into Kurdish territory ing a major diplomatic crisis. Russia in October 2019 showcased the de- in response imposed a series of eco- gree to which Washington and Ankara nomic sanctions, targeted at Turkey’s had been on a collision course. These export, construction, and tourism sec- events also underlined Turkey’s swing tors. However, the sanctions were not towards Russia in a variety of ways. designed to be extensive, as Moscow When SDF forces retreated in front sought to minimize negative reper- of the Turkish army and its proxies in cussions for Russia, and consequently 2019, they agreed on a compromise they did not inflict massive damage on with Assad and his Russian backers. In the Turkish economy. For this reason, effect, this meant thatSAA troops en- Moscow also did not threaten to re- tered SDF-held territories to deter fur- duce or cease deliveries of natural gas ther TSK advances. The US position in to Turkey, its second-largest foreign Syria, meanwhile, was concomitantly consumer, despite Ankara depending weakened due to its apparent inability on Moscow for 56 per cent of its sup- to manage its relations with the SDF ply.18 Ankara formally apologized for and Turkey. It also propelled Putin and the downing of the Russian aircraft Erdogan to sign an agreement in So- and endorsed the Russian-driven As- chi during the same month, agreeing tana process to discuss Syria’s political to joint patrols along Syria’s northern future. As mentioned above, Euphra- border and deconfliction measures to tes Shield operationalized the new be undertaken in the western province reality of Turkey’s acceptance of the of Idlib. This settlement with Russia to status quo – Assad remaining in pow- some degree neutralized or at least mit- er – and the new consultative if still igated the perceived threat emanating competitive relationship with Russia from SDF’s control of border cross- regarding Syria. Two military devel- ings. In many ways, this turnaround is opments showcased this shift partic- remarkable, as Russo-Turkish relations ularly clearly: Turkey’s acquisition of had been at a low as recently as 2015. Russian S-400 air defense systems, ig- noring significant US resistance to this From its main airbase in Khmeimim, action, and its 2020 aerial offensive Latakia province, the Russian Air against Assad’s SAA in Idlib province. Force started to conduct bombing campaigns against the opposition in By February 2020, Ankara had long September 2015. However, in Novem- abandoned the idea of toppling As- ber a Turkish F-16 fighter shot down sad, but the TSK conducted a series of

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drone and artillery strikes against the pressure on this perimeter, they were SAA that month that crippled its forc- also conducted in retaliation for a es in Idlib province on Syria’s north- Russian air strike that killed 33 TSK western border with Turkey. Civilian soldiers. The fact that it was the SAA refugees, along with Turkish-backed that was punished through UCAVs rebel groups and jihadist elements and precision artillery, and not Rus- (organized within the Nusra-successor sian forces, reflects the nature of coop- HTS) had been pressed into a shrink- erative competition between Ankara ing perimeter slightly larger than Lux- and Moscow. With Assad being iced embourg and only three-quarters the out of the Sochi format, the diplo- size of Rhode Island. While the Turk- matic vehicle that manages deconflic- ish strikes (referred to as Operation tion in Idlib, Russia and Turkey have Spring Shield) were intended to relieve been able to send military signals to

63 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2021 each other over his head. Spring Shield Erdogan’s relationship with Moscow was a manifestation of the current mo- appears similarly asymmetrical. dus operandi between the two powers. These dynamics would be replicated Securing the Libyan Bridgehead later in Libya and to some extent in While the application of military force Nagorno-Karabakh. inside Syria is not too surprising giv- en the state’s role in Turkey’s security, While Spring Shield proved the po- the military campaign in Libya arose tency of the TSK’s modern recon- largely due to Turkish nationalists’ vi- naissance-strike complex, it did not sion of the country’s regional posture prove strategically decisive, as it failed and their resurgent influence within to push the line of contact back sig- the security apparatus. While Ankara nificantly from the Turkish border.19 has sought to influence the political Yet, as suggested above, the operation and military balance in Libya ever proved useful in demonstrating that since the overthrow of Muammar Russia and Turkey were able to wage Gaddafi in 2011, it only overtly in- proxy warfare across a very limited tervened in the civil war in late 2019. space without coming to blows direct- In November of that year, the Turkish ly. To some extent, this is surely the re- government signed a Memorandum sult of Russia’s militarily and politically of Understanding (MoU) codifying entrenched position inside the coun- the Turkish interpretation of maritime try. Euphrates Shield in 2016 did buy claims with Libya’s internationally Turkey a seat at the table regarding the recognized Government of National future of Syria and provided Turkey Accord (GNA), based in the capital with some degree of leverage over Rus- Tripoli. In exchange for recognition sia. However, this influence appears to of Turkish maritime claims, Ankara be confined to Syrian territory itself promised to stabilize the GNA’s pre- and, even more narrowly, the zone carious military situation in a separate of contact between Turkish and Rus- MoU – and duly delivered. In doing sian-backed forces. Russia sits much so, the TSK joined a long list of ex- more comfortably and has the ability ternal actors that are pursuing various to increase pressure on Turkey at will degrees of overlapping and competing through the expendable instrument goals in the North African country. of Assad’s SAA. While rapprochement with Putin was a logical consequence The GNA has been locked in civil of US support for the YPG and its war with Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan Na- opaque policies on intervention, tional Army (LNA), a consortium of

64 TURKEY’S NEW OUTLOOK militias and mercenaries that has co- case specifically theUAE and Egypt, alesced around a core of former regime as well as safeguarding economic in- troops, since 2014.20 TheLNA has terests inside the country, mostly been supported materially and militar- bound up in the construction sec- ily by the UAE, as well as politically by tor. TheAKP ’s coalition with the na- Egypt and France, and is increasing- tionalists in the MHP, however, has ly reliant on Russian private military folded personnel and ideas from the companies, such as the now-infamous formerly dominant Kemalist military Wagner Group that has entrenched it- brain trust into official government self in the Libyan conflict. In terms of policy, and Libya happens to play a interests, the UAE are driven by their key role in the current government’s version of domino theory, fearing aspirations. The ideological set of be- Muslim Brotherhood-style bottom-up liefs most responsible for the move Islamism creeping closer to the Gulf, into Libya is a 2006 pronouncement whereas its local ally Russia has broad- by then-Rear Admiral Cem Gürdeniz er and more diffuse aims, including to of Turkey’s “Blue Homeland” (Mavi accommodate Turkey somewhat in or- Vatan), which claims a wide exclusive der to weaken NATO cohesion.21 zone of influence around Turkey’s shores.23 Erdogan’s ideological pivot is Turkey’s interest in Libya is not new, exemplified by how Gürdeniz, purged but the domestic political shift in Tur- and arrested in the Sledgehammer tri- key has also manifested itself in the als, has now become a major author Libyan theater. In the years immedi- of Turkey’s regional posture. Mavi ately after the overthrow of Gadda- Vatan has become the maritime ele- fi, Turkey had mostly been involved ment of the ruling coalition’s drive through its support for Islamist forc- for global relevance through regional es inside the country, in line with its dominance and underpins the expan- priority of proselytizing the AKP’s sion of Turkey’s naval power projec- model throughout the region. This tion capabilities. Ankara’s attachment extended to support for ideologically to the GNA, and its internationally aligned groups, reportedly including recognized status in particular, stems those responsible for the 2012 attacks from its conflict with Greece, the Re- on US diplomatic and intelligence public of Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt facilities in Benghazi.22 Secondary over competing interpretations of ex- motivations for the intervention may clusive economic zones in the Eastern have included countering and impos- Mediterranean and the gas drilling ing costs upon regional rivals, in this rights that come with them. While its

65 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2021 rivals have locked shields through the supplies, but rather in the idea that EastMed Gas Forum (EMGF), coor- Turkey cannot accept exclusion from dinating their efforts, the GNA is the any spheres of influence, especially only state actor recognizing Ankara’s as the long-simmering conflict with interpretation. Greece lies at the heart of the issue, both geographically and metaphori- At first glance, the reasons for Turkey’s cally.24 Confronting Greece in partic- confrontational stance, as well as its ular over competing interpretations willingness to engage in a proxy war of national sovereignty of course also abroad, appear to be tied to interests acts as a cause célèbre, especially among over carbohydrate exploitation. After Erdogan’s nationalist-Eurasianist allies all, Turkey imported 72 per cent of its in the military and MHP. energy in 2018. It has also sought to substitute deliveries from its occasional Libya thus presents both a political cooperative regional rivals Russia and and military bridgehead for Turkish Iran with gas from its ally Azerbaijan. exploitation efforts necessary to break However, these priorities only go so far out of the perceived containment im- in explaining Ankara’s willingness to posed by its neighbors. In broader engage in a militarized tug-of-war with regional strategic terms, this aim has Greece and France, which deployed na- been viewed as an element of the piv- val forces in support of Athens in early ot that has been observed since 2016 2020, in the Eastern Mediterranean. regarding Syria, where Ankara moved There have – as of early 2021 – not away from attempting to export Tur- been significant finds of natural gas in key’s soft Islamist model by toppling the exclusive economic zones claimed Assad. In geographic terms, this shift by Turkey and agreed to by the Tripoli constitutes a reframing of Turkey’s government. Ankara instead appears to strategic areas of concern – a narrow- be motivated by its new desire to es- ing of priorities onto the Kurdish issue tablish itself as a major regional power regarding Syria and the wider Middle and global actor, as well as its disen- East and an elevation of the Eastern chantment with Europe and the US. Mediterranean. This also carries with With the latter’s disengagement from it an emphasis on Turkey’s growing the wider region, Turkey seeks to assert navy, which has not only been used itself into pivotal positions and make to support combat operations in Lib- itself indispensable. In other words, ya but has also escorted Turkish ex- Turkey’s principal problem with the ploration vessels and intimidated Eu- EMGF lies not in claims over gas ropean and Israeli ones.25 It also has

66 TURKEY’S NEW OUTLOOK been used to escort arms shipments coast, where the front lines appear to into Libya in contravention of the have settled into a stalemate following UN arms embargo – which the EU’s a Russo-Turkish announcement in IRINI mission seeks to enforce. Most May 2020. From here, the assessment incendiary in this regard was a spring becomes less clear-cut. Turkey has 2020 incident in which TSK frigates raised the stakes by significantly con- radar-locked a French naval vessel.26 tributing to a theater-wide arms race between the warring Libyan factions. While Ankara insists on the legitima- In 2014, most external supplies con- cy of its intervention, Tripoli only ac- sisted of infantry weapons, including ceded to the twin memoranda when shoulder-launched air defense systems the LNA was about to break into the (MANPADs) at the upper end, but capital, after Turkish diplomats had since then the conflict has been fought agitated for a maritime demarcation by UCAVs, attack helicopters, modern deal for over a year. As such, the GNA anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), reluctantly put itself at Ankara’s mer- and mobile air defense systems such cy and likely should be considered as Pantsir-S1.27 In addition, around fully reliant militarily on Turkey’s 10,000 foreign mercenaries have support. The Tripoli government had flocked to the country’s battlefields, been under significant pressure from including the SNA and nominally pri- the LNA. Turkey’s January 2020 de- vate Russian forces. Most notable in ployment, based around UCAVs and this regard is surely Russia’s Wagner Syrian National Army (SNA, formerly Group, which has not only supplied FSA) fighters used as a mercenary ex- advisors and specialist frontline forces, peditionary force, was able to reverse but also maintains and operates MiG- the momentum – despite Haftar be- 29 and Su-24 fighter and attack air- ing supported operationally by UAE craft, in addition to having established manned and unmanned aviation and a fixed command and control infra- Russian mercenaries. structure. On the eastern side, Wagner contractors have reportedly built ma- While Turkey managed to stabilize jor fortifications and trenches along a the GNA’s military position, its in- 280-kilometer line between Sirte and tervention can hardly be viewed as an al-Jufrah airbase in the desert – quite unqualified success. Ankara and its literally entrenching the current polit- allies’ forces managed to counter-at- ical and military status quo. On top tack and drive the LNA back to Sirte, of these military developments, the in the center of Libya’s Mediterranean GNA dissolved in early 2021 to be

67 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2021 replaced by a Government of National The success of the efforts that Ankara Unity (GNU) that seeks to re-unify the has undertaken in pursuit of securing country – even if, as of April 2021, it is a bridgehead in the Maghreb is very unclear how the military and political much dependent on broader pro- divide of the country can be overcome cesses still to be resolved. While the if external actors have invested so heav- Libyan theater does not constitute ily militarily. a major drain on the TSK’s resourc- es, Turkey risks overextension in the At present, both Ankara and Moscow political sphere by its bullish stance appear to have achieved favorable con- towards European NATO allies. In ditions, in particular at the expense of such a calculation, a strategic assess- the LNA and UAE, as well as the Trip- ment of Libyan operations could only oli government, which is at the mercy be seriously undertaken once the gas of its protectors. That being said, it is exploration feud with the EMGF has unclear how exactly these dynamics been settled one way or the other. translate into the GNU’s stated task Until then, Turkey has opened a flank of forming a unified government and that comes with vulnerabilities. For how Turkey and Russia might leverage one, a permanent presence and com- their military positions for political mitment to the GNA and its succes- advances inside the new government. sor elements on the ground permits Erdogan’s government, meanwhile, Russia to potentially put pressure on continues its confrontational course Turkey, even for gains related to other with the EU and its NATO partners, theaters or political issues. While its whose responses have been compli- local allies are dependent on Turkish cated by both France and Italy, which support and protection, Ankara also support different sides of the Libyan depends on the semi-legal status con- Civil War. That being said, while Tur- ferred to its operation provided by key has again showcased its willingness the November 2019 MoUs. Perhaps to accommodate Russia at the expense most significantly, however, the Er- of the West and its local allies, its po- dogan government’s confrontational sition in Libya is perhaps fairly vulner- course towards Europeans, in particu- able due to how intimately it is tied lar France, might come back to haunt to the Tripoli government’s legitima- Ankara if the Eurasianists’ promises cy and Ankara’s wider Mediterranean fail to materialize. While Turkey has ambitions. Some suggest that Turkey proven in Libya that it can “work is in the process of overextending its with” Russia, just as it did in Syria and footprint beyond its political means.28 subsequently in Nagorno-Karabakh,

68 TURKEY’S NEW OUTLOOK it has to be noted that Moscow’s le- French, Russian, and US leadership. nience is at least partially based on However, frustrations at the lack of weakening ties between Turkey and progress contributed to Baku’s deci- the West. Whether this is a sustainable sion to attempt a military solution.30 foundation for years to come remains to be seen. At first glance, the issue of Na- gorno-Karabakh might appear as Two States, One Military Doctrine a partial Russo-Turkish proxy war, Turkey’s energetic diplomatic and mil- as the former is allied with Arme- itary support for Azerbaijan in the fall nia through the Collective Security 2020 war over Nagorno-Karabakh to Treaty Organization (CSTO). At the some extent mirrors the ideological same time, Turkey and Azerbaijan’s shift of 2016. However, while the cur- warm relations and the slogan “two rent configuration of Erdogan’s leader- states, one nation” showcase Anka- ship cadre has indeed proven decisive, ra’s preferences clearly. But just as in the ground for Turkey’s support in the Syria since 2016 and in Libya, the re- war had been prepared for almost a de- ality is more complex, and it can be cade. As recently as 2011, Turkey had argued that Moscow and Ankara are pressured Baku not to re-open conflict acting more in concert than against over Azerbaijan’s breakaway region, each other. Russian acquiescence to where tensions have simmered since the Azerbaijani offensive likely results 1994. In fact, Davutoglu had previ- from its government’s disdain for Ar- ously even sought to normalize rela- menian Prime Minister Nikol Pashin- tions with Armenia, only to have his yan and his pro-Western leanings. In efforts successfully torpedoed by Turk- effect, Turkey and Azerbaijan acted as ish nationalist circles, the Azerbaijani Russia’s muscle in sending a message government’s protests, and resistance to the region, beyond Armenia, that amongst Armenians. As a result of Russian power could also manifest it- this failed normalization experiment, self through acquiescence to external links with Baku were strengthened threats.31 This line of thinking was and the military dimension of the indeed shown by Yevgeniy Prigozhin, Strategic Partnership and Mutual As- oligarch and head of the conglomer- sistance Treaty gradually reinforced.29 ate that the Wagner Group is attached Wider diplomatic efforts to defuse to, who – speaking most likely as a and ultimately resolve the issue of Na- proxy for Moscow – effectively de- gorno-Karabakh are anchored with- scribed Pashinyan and his 2018 Vel- in the OSCE’s Minsk Group under vet Revolution as a CIA project and

69 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2021 only drew a red line at Armenia’s bor- prohibitively costly, both militarily ders, purposefully excluding the terri- and politically. The Four-Day War of tory of Nagorno-Karabakh.32 2016, in which both sides deployed heavy weapons in a limited capacity Turkey’s motives for the engagement had shown, however, that an Arme- were multifaceted, though more direct nian victory was not guaranteed. This than in Libya. For one, oil-rich Azer- experience encouraged Baku to go for- baijan serves as a major supplier of en- ward on 27 September 2020. This was ergy resources to Turkey, and SOCAR, a calculation that ultimately proved Azerbaijan’s state-owned petroleum successful, when to the surprise of and gas company, is the biggest single virtually all commentators, Azerbai- foreign investor in the Turkish econ- jani forces achieved a clear battlefield omy. Second, increasing its footprint victory in six weeks by threatening in the Caucasus would provide useful to move on to the regional capital of leverage over Russia in other, more Stepanakert. Of greatest significance, relevant, theaters. Lastly, hostility to- however, were not only deliveries of wards Armenia is of great importance Turkish UCAVs but also the degree to to the ultra-nationalist MHP and its which the TSK had exported its exper- main constituency. Baku itself, mean- tise in utilizing a modern, drone-en- while, was likely driven by a wave of abled reconnaissance-strike complex. anti-Armenian sentiment in the wake The amount of operational input that of clashes that occurred in the summer Turkish officers had in Azerbaijan’s of 2020 in conjunction with an eco- campaign is not known publicly, but nomic slump. it was likely significant.34

As such, the Azerbaijani government, Still, Russia’s apparent unassailable headed by its autocratic president Il- position in the Southern Caucasus ham Aliyev, likely identified a window puts into question how much Turkey of opportunity. Previously, most West- actually gained in the conflict. While ern commentators had assumed that, Turkish nationalists regard the Azer- as in the 1990s, superior Armenian baijani campaign as a success and the forces would be able to hold their posi- oil-rich country is indebted to Turkey, tions in mountainous terrain, enabling it is questionable how much leverage a successful counter-offensive.33 An- over Moscow was actually gained. The other assumption was that Armenia’s ceasefire that ended open hostilities on air defense and territorial advantages 9 November was a trilateral agreement would make an Azerbaijani assault between Russia and the two former

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Soviet Republics. Neither Turkey nor government coalition feels it has to the OSCE’s Minsk Group played a continually stoke the flames of aggres- diplomatic role. Moscow thus demon- sive ethno-nationalism for domestic strated regional superiority by ending and ideological reasons. Regardless, the war on its own terms – having been and while both complexes were cer- happy to acquiesce to the decimation tainly at play, the war’s perceived suc- of Armenian and Karabakh forces and cess might create an unrealistic bench- the resultant loss of territory. As a result mark for the utility of military force of the ceasefire, Russian peacekeepers – especially if Ankara was motivated have been deployed to guard the bor- primarily by ideological reasons. ders of what is left of Armenian Na- gorno-Karabakh, with Azerbaijan re- Implications claiming almost two-thirds of its area. As has become apparent, the political cocktail that created the current iter- Moscow was able to quickly and de- ation of Turkey’s foreign policy ori- cisively impose red lines and deploy entation did not magically appear in airborne forces as peacekeepers. Re- 2020, but has simmered at least since flecting back on Prigozhin’s statements the AKP’s accession to power in 2002 regarding Armenia, this to some extent and in many ways precedes it. While mirrors the Idlib scenario in which Erdogan first sought to defang the Moscow sat back while its proxy suf- military institutionally and roll back fered casualties, only to step in later. the secular old guard, this group has In another parallel, Turkey and Russia re-emerged somewhat as a force fa- effectively conspired to ice out Western voring an assertive, anti-Western eth- influences from the region, as neither no-nationalism. What is new, how- the US, the EU, nor the Minsk Group ever, is a military force designed for played a significant role in ending the the type of operations that the ruling conflict. What is not known so far is to coalition requires to pursue its goals, what extent Baku will have to pay for namely fairly rapid, low-cost power Turkish assistance in the war and how projection activities in both Turkey’s its relationship with Russia is affected neighborhood and beyond. by aligning so closely with Erdogan. Ultimately, it cannot be conclusively This gives Ankara the flexibility re- stated whether Ankara was driven more quired to insert itself militarily into by the desire to protect its economic theaters of critical relevance to its ri- health and energy supplies by ingrati- vals: Turkey has impinged upon the ating itself with Aliyev or whether the perceived backyards of the European

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A New Robotic Way of War?

Perhaps the most publicized feature of Turkey’s military campaigns were glossy aerial recordings taken mostly by Turkish-made ANKA-S and TB2 UCAVs that ravaged the Syrian Arab Army and Karabakh-Armenian forces, respectively. A second element that caught the international eye was the deployment of SNA fighters to Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh as an expeditionary force outside Syria, in the latter case reportedly at brigade strength. The creation of a largely strategically autonomous arms industry providing a modern reconnaissance-strike complex is certainly not without operational and even strategic value. In Turkey’s case, the autonomy of its forces means it is virtually invulnerable to sanctions. However, beyond the notion that attrition on the battlefield failed to achieve politico-strategic success in any of the three theaters, Turkish military actions have not even been unequivocally successful on the tactical level.

• In Syria, the TSK’s Operation Spring Shield crippled Assad’s forces and destroyed large quantities of armored fighting vehicles, artillery pieces and, most significantly, Russian-made air defense systems, especially of the Pantsir-S1 variety. Similar drone feeds emerged from Libya that seemed to suggest Turkey had found a way to overcome the dreaded Russian air defense. However, it should be noted that the SAA’s overall performance has not been of particularly high quality, whether directed against Turkish drone strikes or those strikes conducted by NATO forces or the Israeli Air Force during years prior – a result of inferior export versions and lack of training and ability on the part of SAA crews. Air defense and electronic warfare systems controlled by Russia’s own military are likely much more capable, even against low-flying UCAVs and loitering munitions. As a case in point, electronic warfare systems at Russia’s Gyumri base in Armenia reportedly brought down numerous TB2s when they had crossed the border and approached the base’s perimeter.

• Meanwhile, Turkish drones reportedly achieved much less favorable attrition rates against the LNA’s forces in Libya. This is compounded by the fact that currently the TB2 drone (as opposed to the heavier ANKA-S) can only be operated by line-of-sight guidance and is consequently dependent on ground stations and signal repeaters. As a result, their offensive value in particular would be much lower in a more expansive and fluid battlefield.

• The Armenian and Karabakh forces were certainly not designed to counter an enemy equipped with modern UCAVs and loitering munitions. Even so, while the impact of these systems should not be discounted, it has to be noted that Azerbaijani special operations forces still had to fight arduously through the mountains to take the vital town of Shushi on Stepanakert’s only supply route to Armenia, effectively winning the war. As with Spring Shield, had Russia decided to step in and come to its nominal ally’s rescue, the campaign would likely have ended in a much less favorable outcome for Turkey.

• Lastly, while the use of the SNA is a convenient way for Ankara to avoid sending non-special forces infantry into harm’s way, it has to be noted that their use comes with strings attached. For one, their performance in each Turkish incursion into Syria has been less than satisfactory militarily. Secondly, they present a rather large problem in terms of political optics: The expeditionary use of mercenary forces that have been credibly accused of looting and war crimes in the past is likely not helpful to Turkey’s regional image in the long run.

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Union in Libya and the Eastern Med- relations between multiple Arab coun- iterranean and of Russia in the South tries and Israel in the waning months Caucasus. The TSK has been an effec- of the Trump administration and the tive tool in gaining leverage in these announced resumption of multilateral areas and in securing Turkey’s position formats by the White House, Turkey as pivotal and perhaps even indispens- likely cannot afford to continue on able in the international sphere. As has its present course of alienating neigh- been argued above, none of the 2020 bors.35 The two most significant stum- operations have achieved far-reach- bling blocks to at least a more concil- ing successes, mostly due to Moscow iatory relationship with the US are holding superior cards in each theater. surely questions regarding US support Paradoxically, however, here also lies for the YPG and Turkey’s acquisition a problem in the anti-Western course of S-400 systems. President Biden charted by the nationalists and Eur- might also be more inclined to use asianists: The more Turkey distances economic sanctions against Turkey itself from the US and Europe, the less than his predecessor was. Russia needs to accommodate Ankara. If Western-Turkish relations were to These dynamics will, to some extent, break down even further, it is unclear increasingly burden Europe, particu- what would stop Russia from apply- larly in light of the Eastern Mediter- ing pressure across secondary theaters ranean confrontation. While Greece, or even in Syria. In such a scenario, backed up by France, is willing to an- bridgeheads could quickly turn into swer military pressures in kind, a uni- exposed flanks. fied European position is unlikely to emerge. NATO, as a result, will have This also means that the Biden ad- to play a key role in keeping lines of ministration’s cold stance towards communication open and to soften Erdogan – neither Secretary of State (or blunt) the edges of Ankara’s an- Antony Blinken nor President Biden ti-Western rhetoric and actions. In bothered to reach out to their counter- some ways, it already does so, as the parts directly for weeks – and its likely Hellenic Armed Forces and the TSK selective engagement with the region run deconfliction measures regarding are not necessarily good news for Er- the Aegean struggle through NATO.36 dogan’s government. Already in De- Beyond NATO, Europe appears ill- cember 2020, Erdogan moderated his equipped to deal with a more muscu- tone vis-à-vis the US and Israel. Partic- lar Turkey that is willing and able to ularly in view of the normalization of resort to military force. Here the main

73 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2021 areas of contention are the Eastern region. However, the ideological tint Mediterranean and related issues: Lib- in Turkey’s foreign policy might be- ya, the political dispute over Turkey’s come a liability down the road, de- occupation of Northern Cyprus, mari- spite the institutional marginalization time demarcation zones, and migration of the TSK. At some stage, the heated in the Mediterranean region. Further rhetoric runs the risk of outrunning on the horizon, the question of Syrian the TSK’s military capabilities or reconstruction arises, including the re- what Erdogan and his advisors con- spective roles of Europe and Turkey. sider acceptable risk. In other words, operations such as those conducted Ankara’s military posture has afforded in 2020 risk establishing precedents it direct levers “on the ground” that that military campaigns can be un- European powers lack, especially in dertaken quickly and cheaply. How- Syria and Libya. With the exception of ever, while the resumption of hostili- France, whose president has dispatched ties with Armenia would certainly be naval assets into the Aegean to back up popular with the MHP and its ideo- Greece, it is questionable to what ex- logical allies, as would operations tent other European powers are will- against Kurds or a further distancing ing and able to push back actively and from the West, the calculation would pursue regional interests. In this way, change quite dramatically once Mos- the war in Nagorno-Karabakh must cow decides not to acquiesce. be a cautionary tale to Europeans (and the US): Due to Turkish and Azerbai- 1 Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, “The Evolution of the jani willingness to pursue military op- National Security Culture and the Military in tions, the Minsk Format has effectively Turkey,” Journal of International Affairs 54:1 (2000), pp. 199 – 216. been rendered obsolete – and with it, France’s role in its mediation. 2 Günter Seufert, Überdehnt sich die Bewegung von Fethullah Gülen? Eine türkische Religions- gemeinde als nationaler und internationaler Ak- Presently, Ankara attempts to run an teur, (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), 2013), pp. 16 – 17. increasingly complex multi-vectored balancing game in its neighborhood 3 Dani Rodrik, “Ergenekon and Sledgeham- mer: Building or Undermining the Rule of by seeking to apply and release pres- Law,” Turkish Politics Quarterly 10:1 (2011), sure across multiple theaters and fo- pp. 99 – 110. rums. The sheer ability and (equally 4 Lars Haugom, “Turkish Foreign Policy Under important) willingness to resort to Erdogan: A Change in International Orien- tation?”, Comparative Strategy 28:3 (2019), military force swiftly can be consid- pp. 206 – 223. ered a great advantage in an unstable

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5 “A Look at Turkey’s Post-Coup Crackdown,” 19 Jennifer Cafarella et al., Turkey Commits to Idlib AP News, 30.08.2018. (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 2020), pp. 1 – 6. 6 Leela Jacinto, “Turkey’s Post-Coup Purge and Erdogan’s Private Army,” Foreign Policy, 20 Jalel Harchaoui / Mohamed-Essaid Lazib, 13.07.2017. Proxy War Dynamics in Libya (Blacksburg, VA: Virginia Tech Publishing, 2019), p. 4. 7 Haugom, Turkish Foreign Policy, pp. 209 – 210. 21 Jalel Harchaoui, “The Pendulum: How Russia 8 Arne Strand / Siri Neset, Turkish Foreign Policy: Sways Its Way to More Influence in Libya,” Structures and Decision-Making Processes, (Ber- War on the Rocks, 07.01.2021. gen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2019). 22 Aaron Stein, “Turkey’s Proxy War in Syria,” 9 Sener Aktürk, “Turkey’s Role in the Arab Spring War on the Rocks, 15.01.2015. and the Syrian Conflict,” Turkish Policy Quarter- ly 15:4 (2017), pp. 87 – 96. 23 International Crisis Group, “Turkey Wades into Libya’s Troubled Waters,” Crisis Group Europe 10 Christopher Phillips, The Battle for Syria: Report 257 (2020), pp. 7 – 8. International Rivalry in the New Middle East, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016), 24 Galib Dalay, Turkey, Europe, and the Eastern pp. 129 – 131, 139 – 140. Mediterranean: Charting a Way Out of the Cur- rent Deadlock, (Doha: Brookings Doha Center, 11 Christopher Phillips, “Eyes Bigger than Stom- 2021), pp. 2 – 7. achs: Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar in Syria,” Middle East Policy 24:1 (2017), pp. 36 – 47. 25 Günter Seufert, Turkey Shifts Focus of its Foreign Policy (Berlin: German Institute for Inter- 12 People’s Protection Unit and Women’s Protec- national and Security Affairs (SWP), 2020), tion Unit, respectively. pp. 2 – 4.

13 Ozlem Kayhan Pusane, “Turkish Public Diplo- 26 “France Blasts ‘Extremely Aggressive’ Turkish macy and Operation Peace Spring,” War on the Intervention against NATO Mission Targeting Rocks, 13.01.2020. Libyan Arms,” France 24, 17.06.2020.

14 Jeff Jager, “Turkey’s Operation Euphrates Shield: 27 Florence Gaub, “What if…There is no An Exemplar of Joint Combined Arms Maneu- Disarmament in Libya?”, in: Florence Gaub ver,” Small Wars Journal, 17.10.2016, p. 3. (ed.), What if…not? The Price of Inaction (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies 15 Murat Yesiltas / Merve Seren / Necdet Özcelik, (EUISS), 2021), pp. 61 – 65. Operation Euphrates Shield: Implementation and Lessons Learned (Ankara: Foundation for Po- 28 Iain MacGillivray, “What’s Turkey’s Endgame litical, Economic and Social Research (SETA), in Libya?”, (Sydney: Lowy Institute, 2020). 2017), p. 21. 29 Daria Isachenko, Turkey–Russia Partnership 16 Nicholas Danforth, “What did Turkey Gain in the War over Nagorno-Karabakh (Berlin: from the Armenia-Azerbaijan War?”, Eurasianet, German Institute for International and Security 11.12.2020. Affairs (SWP), 2020), p. 2.

17 Christopher Phillips, Eyes Bigger than Stomachs, 30 Cindy Wittke, “Bergkarabach,” Russland-Analy- p. 49. sen 394 (2020), pp. 14 – 17.

18 Idil Bilgic-Alpasan et al., “Economic Implica- 31 Daria Isachenko, “Türkei, Russland und tions of Russia’s Sanctions against Turkey,” Eu- Bergkarabach: Eine Ambivalente Konflikt- ropean Bank for Reconstruction and Development, konstellation,” Russland-Analysen 394 (2020), 07.12.2015. pp. 21 – 22.

32 Isachenko, Turkey–Russia Partnership, p. 3.

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33 Michael Kofman, “A Look at the Military Les- sons of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”, The Moscow Times, 21.12.2020.

34 Ibid; John C.K. Daly, “Baku and Ankara Deny Turkish Military Bases Being Established in Azerbaijan,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 18:19 (2021).

35 Dan Arbell, “What will a Biden White House Mean for Turkey-Israel Relations?”, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 29.01.2020.

36 Dalay, Turkey, Europe and the Eastern Mediterra- nean, p. 9.

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