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Middle East, North Africa MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA The Role of UAVs and Intelligence in Turkey’s Syria Operations OE Watch Commentary: Turkey has increased its warfighting capabilities by developing indigenous weapons systems for its military, including multiple- launch rocket systems, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and precision air-ground munitions. Turkey’s domestically made UAVs, especially, the Bayraktar TB2 and ANKA have played a significant role in Turkey’s fight in Syria. While the first accompanying article highlights Turkey’s UAVs and weapons systems used in Idlib against the Russian-backed Syrian army, the second article discusses the role of intelligence in countering the Syrian regime’s attacks. The first article from the pro-governmentDaily Sabah states that the “air campaign against the Bashar Assad regime in northwestern Syria’s Idlib are run entirely by locally developed armed drones” such as the Bayraktar TB2 and ANKA. One of those drones deployed to TAI ANKA-S. Source: N13s013 vis Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:TAI_ANKA-S.jpg, CC BY SA 4.0 Syria, ANKA-S is satellite-enabled and has operational range beyond 100 miles and “can collect intelligence and provide assistance for the operation center to precisely aim at targets and locate hostile elements.” In addition to these UAVs, the article references videos shared by the Turkish Ministry of National Defense on Twitter which show Turkey’s domestically made Bayraktar TB2 UAVs striking an “active Russian-made Pantsir S-1 air defense system deployed inside Idlib” with MAM-L, a laser-guided smart micro munition system produced by Turkish defense industry manufacturer ROKETSAN. The article also provides insights into other domestically produced weapons systems deployed to Syria such as the MAM-C, a smart micro munition that was developed for UAVs by ROKETSAN. According to the second article, besides domestically made UAVs and weapons systems, several other factors helped Turkey avoid a disastrous outcome during Operation Spring Shield launched into Syria. The first factor that Ankara leveraged on the battlefield was signals intelligence (SIGINT). A former Turkish intelligence officer told the author that after the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) took over the Turkish Armed Forces’ (TAF) Electronic Systems Command, it restructured as a Signals Intelligence Directorate to increase Turkey’s SIGINT capabilities. The second factor was “spy commandos” engaged in activities on the ground and using human intelligence to coordinate attacks. MIT coordinated with TAF to engage in targeted strikes on Syrian high-profile targets using UAVs. According to a former MIT officer who spoke to the author, “MIT assets – especially members of militant opposition groups or intelligence operatives implanted into those groups” – must have played a significant role in conducting targeted strikes. However, a “Turkish defense and security analyst… expressed skepticism” to the author arguing that most of the targets TAF hit would not have required “careful intelligence work by ‘spy commandos’” but attacks “on Nayrab airbase and an alleged chemical weapons factory in Aleppo” might have. As the article states, without realistic policies towards Syria, “good equipment and well- trained personnel only can do so much.” End OE Watch Commentary (Gündüz) “The expanded air campaign against the Bashar Assad regime in northwestern Syria’s Idlib runs entirely by locally developed armed drones.” OE Watch | April 2020 40 MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA Continued: The Role of UAVs and Intelligence in Turkey’s Syria Operations Source: “Ankara’s armed drone campaign against Assad regime shapes battlefield dynamics”Daily Sabah, 02 March 2020. https://www. dailysabah.com/business/defense/ankaras-armed-drone-campaign-against-assad-regime-shapes-battlefield-dynamics The expanded air campaign against the Bashar Assad regime in northwestern Syria’s Idlib run entirely by locally developed armed drones… Among a large amount of video footage, including a series of those posted on Twitter by the Defense Ministry, showing Turkish drones strikes targeting a range of regime assets, the one showing a domestically developed Bayraktar TB2 armed drone striking an apparently active Russian-made Panstir S-1 air defense system… … Particularly homegrown drones, Bayraktar TB2 and ANKA, have both played a significant role and demonstrated the progress Turkey has made in the nationalization process in the defense industries. … The Bayraktar TB2, capable of carrying four MAM-L and MAM-C missiles produced by ROKETSAN on its wings, can make precise targeting with its built-in laser target marker… Another UAV deployed, the ANKA-S, which has also made its way to the country’s inventory, can be controlled via satellite and has a task range of thousands of kilometers. It can also collect intelligence and provide assistance for the operation center to precisely aim at targets and locate hostile elements. Source: Barın Kayaoğlu,“How Turkey’s soldiers and spies saved the day in Syria” Al Monitor, 8 March 2020. https://www.al-monitor.com/ pulse/originals/2020/03/turkey-syria-russia-turkish-spies-saved-the-day-in-idlib.html While global media outlets credit Turkey’s… [UAVs] for turning the tide, a wide range of weapons systems and the TSK and MIT’s intelligence work contributed to the partial successes of the recent Turkish military operation in northwest Syria… … The first factor enabling Ankara to hold its own was its “signals intelligence” (SIGINT) capabilities. SIGINT refers to intercepting the opposing side’s communications (telephones, radios, satellite transmissions) and electronic footprint (especially radars) and, where possible, producing actionable intelligence. A former MIT officer… after the TSK turned over its Electronics Systems Command to MIT in 2012 (which restructured it as Signals Intelligence Directorate), Turkey’s SIGINT capabilities expanded considerably… “Successful steps have been taken in recent times in developing manned and unmanned aerial vehicles and the destruction of terror or military targets in foreign countries through ground units. … The second factor that helped Turkey to avoid a disaster in Syria were “spy commandos.” The TSK and MIT operated along similar lines in northwest Syria on March 1-5. While Turkish military UAVs carried out much of the fighting in Idlib with MIT support, various attacks against high-profile Syrian targets… According to the former MIT officer from Istanbul, along with SIGINT capabilities and TSK military units on the ground, MIT assets — especially members of militant opposition groups or intelligence operatives implanted into those groups — must have been instrumental in locating Syrian targets. An Istanbul-based defense and security analyst who spoke with Al-Monitor… expressed skepticism that Turkish special forces would have been involved for the sorts of targets destroyed in northwest Syria… But the expert outlined several exceptions in which Turkey may have used “spy commandos” or highly trained rebel forces to attack the Syrian military. He cited the attack on Nayrab air base and an alleged chemical weapons factory in Aleppo, which are not so close to the front lines between Turkish and Syrian forces. OE Watch | April 2020 41.
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