FOI
From: Ceri Gibbons
To: Department for International Trade Subject: Internal review of Freedom of Information request ‐ Export licence documents ‐ Turkey
Dear Department for International Trade,
Please pass this on to the person who conducts Freedom of Information reviews.
I am writing to request an internal review of Department for International Trade (DIT) handling of my FOI request 'Export licence documents ‐ Turkey' in order to clarify the following points.
1. The present response appears to be inconsistent with a previous FOIA response from DIT. In DIT's Internal review IR2020/00007 ( original case ref: FOI2019/05650) ‐ dated 4 February 2020 ‐ the DIT Head of Information Rights confirmed that DIT granted a total FIFTEEN (15) and refused ZERO (0) export licence applications for the export of Hornet bomb racks by EDO MBM Technology to Roketsan in Turkey between 2014‐September 2019.
2. However the present response to part 1 of the present request ‐ which is essentially a request for an updated figure of the previous request with undecided cases included ‐ gives a lower number of export license applications ‐ ELEVEN ( 11 ) . One of these is 'stopped', presumably before application approval was decided by DIT and therefore would not have been included in the earlier figure anyway. If that is correct please explain why it appears FIVE (5) approved applications disclosed in the earlier response are not not now listed in the present response. For clarification please provide a table ( as in the previous response) that breaks down the licences by date of approval with the added date of the stopped application.
3. The DIT response to sections 3 to 8 of the request shows EDO MBM'S license applications do not disclose Turkish drone companies or particular Turkish armed drones as end users for the Hornet bomb rack. This is despite the fact that it was verified by the The Guardian in November 2019 that EDO MBM's Hornet technology was used to develop the Bayraktar TB2 bomb rack with Baykar and Roketsan. According to EDO MBM's Businsess Development Manager Nick Guard in a 2016 report from Janes Defence Weekly, the Hornets were also being marketed to TAI and Vestal for use on their armed drones as well. https://eur02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theguardian.com%2Fnews%2F2019%2 Fnov%2F27%2Frevealed‐uk‐technology‐turkey‐rise‐global‐drone‐ power&data=02%7C01%7Cfoi%40trade.gov.uk%7Cf3b8aa2bc0374ee33d6908d7f43f4b63%7C8fa217ec33aa46f bad96dfe68006bb86%7C0%7C1%7C637246425009575226&sdata=LcYFjj2RISSRproTH3vX7o4ec8d%2BIQMW73 L%2ByRsdWGg%3D&reserved=0
4. There is further photographic evidence in the public domain showing the Hornet attached to these Turkish drones on display in Turkish arms fairs. A 'sell sheet' for the Hornet bomb rack produced in 2019 by EDO MBM's own parent company L3Harris and linked in the Guardian article shows the Hornet rack attached to TAI ANKA‐S drone in a photographic image from an arms fair. Images on twitter from Technofest 2019 in Turkey also show the TAI ANKA‐S and Vestal Karayel drones both armed with Hornet bomb racks carrying Roketsan MAM‐L and MAM‐C munitions. It is therefore quite clear the Roketsan is importing these bomb racks/launchers into Turkey to supply these Turkish drone companies with weapon systems that are used to launch Roketsan munitions. https://eur02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.harris.com%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles %2Fdownloads%2Fsolutions%2Fl3harris‐wasp‐and‐hornet‐carriage‐and‐release‐units‐sell‐sheet‐ 1 sas.pdf&data=02%7C01%7Cfoi%40trade.gov.uk%7Cf3b8aa2bc0374ee33d6908d7f43f4b63%7C8fa217ec33aa46 fbad96dfe68006bb86%7C0%7C1%7C637246425009585222&sdata=EwNWNja%2BNy%2FZEud2PX0CgLise6jcG9 EDRX2a88z6Qh8%3D&reserved=0
6. Please explain how EDO MBM could lawfully be granted a licence for the export of this equipment to Roketsan in Turkey without providing this publicly apparent end‐user information? Furthermore how could such licences continue to be granted in light of the evidence in the public domain that Turkey has likely used its drones of in killing of civilians with Roketsan munitions that include incendiary weapons. The Times reported last year that likely war crimes had been committed by Turkey against Kurdish civilians in North‐east Syria with Turkey's use of incendiary weapons dropped by its armed drones. The Roketsan MAM‐C munition is ‐ according to Roketsan's online data sheets ‐ capable of deploying incendiary warheads. https://eur02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.thetimes.co.uk%2Farticle%2Fsyria‐un‐ refuses‐to‐investigate‐claims‐of‐white‐phosphorus‐use‐in‐turkish‐offensive‐ 3bv7qdmxz&data=02%7C01%7Cfoi%40trade.gov.uk%7Cf3b8aa2bc0374ee33d6908d7f43f4b63%7C8fa217ec33 aa46fbad96dfe68006bb86%7C0%7C1%7C637246425009585222&sdata=jlFMChQgMHAeHggNuNHMgUnt6HSA vu6gHXjvTZAIJHE%3D&reserved=0 https://eur02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.roketsan.com.tr%2Fen%2Fproduct%2F mam‐c‐smart‐micro‐ munition%2F&data=02%7C01%7Cfoi%40trade.gov.uk%7Cf3b8aa2bc0374ee33d6908d7f43f4b63%7C8fa217ec3 3aa46fbad96dfe68006bb86%7C0%7C1%7C637246425009585222&sdata=jL4X9nNvoVcHqx5Ktz7EwaE%2Fp9Hl zFaenSzW2xEZnzY%3D&reserved=0
7. It has also been widely reported by international media organisations, human rights groups and the United Nations that the Baykar Bayraktar TB2 drone has been exported to Libya by Turkey in violation of a UN arms embargo. Please explain how it is lawful for EDO MBM to be granted export licences for Hornet bomb racks/launchers to Roketsan where there is a clear risk these may be re‐exported as part of drone systems to Libya in breach of a UN arms embargo. https://eur02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theguardian.com%2Fworld%2F2019%2 Fdec%2F09%2Fun‐says‐member‐states‐violating‐libya‐arms‐ embargo&data=02%7C01%7Cfoi%40trade.gov.uk%7Cf3b8aa2bc0374ee33d6908d7f43f4b63%7C8fa217ec33aa 46fbad96dfe68006bb86%7C0%7C1%7C637246425009585222&sdata=KVyutqLrwp4PpPnTVtVSpDMrGxfY4fVbw k4Z%2BpF6mBU%3D&reserved=0
8. It has been reported that a Saudi company Intra Defense Technologies has provided the Turkish built Vestal Karayel drones to Saudi Arabia and these have been used in military conflict in Yemen. As stated above the Karayel appears from arms fair photographs to have been armed with the Hornet bomb rack system carrying Roketsan munitions. Images of the drone downed in Yemen appear to confirm this. Please explain how it is lawful for EDO MBM not to declare this likely re‐export end use in UK export licence applications. https://eur02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.intras.net%2Fproject%2Fkarayel%2F&a mp;data=02%7C01%7Cfoi%40trade.gov.uk%7Cf3b8aa2bc0374ee33d6908d7f43f4b63%7C8fa217ec33aa46fbad96dfe 68006bb86%7C0%7C1%7C637246425009585222&sdata=mLhgOGV1daod8Dd66y6sdq0CWoNOBRh0VnnBC%2 BehtUA%3D&reserved=0 https://eur02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.janes.com%2Farticle%2F93459%2Fkara yel‐uav‐lost‐over‐ yemen&data=02%7C01%7Cfoi%40trade.gov.uk%7Cf3b8aa2bc0374ee33d6908d7f43f4b63%7C8fa217ec33aa46f bad96dfe68006bb86%7C0%7C1%7C637246425009585222&sdata=Bq0g9CxvgS1jKjvP0q30AKzl0HJQdLDwmBB7 Ul7QBJI%3D&reserved=0
9. It is in the public domain that Ukraine ‐ another country involved in an ongoing military conflict‐ is also importing Turkish drone systems armed with Roketsan weapons. Please explain how it is lawful for EDO MBM not to disclose this end use in its export licence applications? https://eur02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.defensenews.com%2Funmanned%2F2 019%2F09%2F16%2Fturkey‐ukraine‐seek‐to‐jointly‐produce‐sensitive‐defense‐ technology%2F&data=02%7C01%7Cfoi%40trade.gov.uk%7Cf3b8aa2bc0374ee33d6908d7f43f4b63%7C8fa217e c33aa46fbad96dfe68006bb86%7C0%7C1%7C637246425009585222&sdata=PwomewOOoyc%2Fxh9V9wCtTcQ Mq5I6pcSAgV8TvrRoGyY%3D&reserved=0
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10. Regarding part 9 and 10 of my request. DIT has refused this under Section 41 and 43 of the Act. I submit that public interest in the numbers of Hornet bomb rack units exported overrides any duty of confidence or commercial sensitivity under the Act or in common law. The scale of EDO MBM's supply of Hornets to Roketsan would confirm the level of deception by EDO MBM especially in its serial failure over five years to disclose the actual end users of its equipment. If the number of units exported is large it would confirm the fact that EDO MBM is in full production of these weapons systems for the expanding Turkish drone fleet.
11. The leader and a majority of elected representatives on the Brighton and Hove City Council have written to the government asking for for an investigation of the company's export licences to Saudi Arabia after bomb parts made by the Brighton company were found at the site of a Saudi coalition attack on civilian target, considered a war crime by the United Nations. https://eur02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theargus.co.uk%2Fnews%2F17955227. cross‐party‐concern‐brighton‐arms‐firm‐edo‐mbm‐ technology%2F&data=02%7C01%7Cfoi%40trade.gov.uk%7Cf3b8aa2bc0374ee33d6908d7f43f4b63%7C8fa217e c33aa46fbad96dfe68006bb86%7C0%7C1%7C637246425009585222&sdata=LtCJ%2FJzmXS6KwcGh2%2F03GvQ waKEB7BV1JC%2FBGBaFf3w%3D&reserved=0
12. Two local MPs have called for the closure of the factory and the editor of the local paper The Argus has called the presence of the factory a stain on the image of the city. Public demonstrations and protests have taken place outside the factory gates for many years and have raised the issue of exports to Turkey as a key concern. EDO MBM is clearly the focus of an intense public public political debate in the city and the withheld information under sections 41 and 43 of the numbers of Hornet bomb racks exported to Roketsan would serve to better inform that public debate. Even if no iniquity were disclosed by this information, the need to get to the bottom of the extent of EDO MBM's involvement in Turkish drone expansion is clearly a pressing one as Turkey projects its drone power beyond its borders and drives proliferation of dangerous unmanned systems in Central Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. As the range and payload of these systems grows so the danger of their misuse by an ever more undemocratic Turkish state is also a cause of great public concern.
13. The public interest in the disclosure of the actual numbers of Hornet units exported to Roketsan overrides the duty of confidentiality.
Yours
Ceri Gibbons
Yours faithfully,
Ceri Gibbons
Yours faithfully,
Ceri Gibbons
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