DOCSLIB.ORG

Internal Review of Freedom of Information Request - Export Licence Documents - Turkey

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Internal Review of Freedom of Information Request - Export Licence Documents - Turkey FOI From: Ceri Gibbons <[email protected]> Sent: 09 May 2020 18:35 To: FOI Subject: Internal review of Freedom of Information request - Export licence documents - Turkey To: Department for International Trade Subject: Internal review of Freedom of Information request ‐ Export licence documents ‐ Turkey Dear Department for International Trade, Please pass this on to the person who conducts Freedom of Information reviews. I am writing to request an internal review of Department for International Trade (DIT) handling of my FOI request 'Export licence documents ‐ Turkey' in order to clarify the following points. 1. The present response appears to be inconsistent with a previous FOIA response from DIT. In DIT's Internal review IR2020/00007 ( original case ref: FOI2019/05650) ‐ dated 4 February 2020 ‐ the DIT Head of Information Rights confirmed that DIT granted a total FIFTEEN (15) and refused ZERO (0) export licence applications for the export of Hornet bomb racks by EDO MBM Technology to Roketsan in Turkey between 2014‐September 2019. 2. However the present response to part 1 of the present request ‐ which is essentially a request for an updated figure of the previous request with undecided cases included ‐ gives a lower number of export license applications ‐ ELEVEN ( 11 ) . One of these is 'stopped', presumably before application approval was decided by DIT and therefore would not have been included in the earlier figure anyway. If that is correct please explain why it appears FIVE (5) approved applications disclosed in the earlier response are not not now listed in the present response. For clarification please provide a table ( as in the previous response) that breaks down the licences by date of approval with the added date of the stopped application. 3. The DIT response to sections 3 to 8 of the request shows EDO MBM'S license applications do not disclose Turkish drone companies or particular Turkish armed drones as end users for the Hornet bomb rack. This is despite the fact that it was verified by the The Guardian in November 2019 that EDO MBM's Hornet technology was used to develop the Bayraktar TB2 bomb rack with Baykar and Roketsan. According to EDO MBM's Businsess Development Manager Nick Guard in a 2016 report from Janes Defence Weekly, the Hornets were also being marketed to TAI and Vestal for use on their armed drones as well. https://eur02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theguardian.com%2Fnews%2F2019%2 Fnov%2F27%2Frevealed‐uk‐technology‐turkey‐rise‐global‐drone‐ power&amp;data=02%7C01%7Cfoi%40trade.gov.uk%7Cf3b8aa2bc0374ee33d6908d7f43f4b63%7C8fa217ec33aa46f bad96dfe68006bb86%7C0%7C1%7C637246425009575226&amp;sdata=LcYFjj2RISSRproTH3vX7o4ec8d%2BIQMW73 L%2ByRsdWGg%3D&amp;reserved=0 4. There is further photographic evidence in the public domain showing the Hornet attached to these Turkish drones on display in Turkish arms fairs. A 'sell sheet' for the Hornet bomb rack produced in 2019 by EDO MBM's own parent company L3Harris and linked in the Guardian article shows the Hornet rack attached to TAI ANKA‐S drone in a photographic image from an arms fair. Images on twitter from Technofest 2019 in Turkey also show the TAI ANKA‐S and Vestal Karayel drones both armed with Hornet bomb racks carrying Roketsan MAM‐L and MAM‐C munitions. It is therefore quite clear the Roketsan is importing these bomb racks/launchers into Turkey to supply these Turkish drone companies with weapon systems that are used to launch Roketsan munitions. https://eur02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.harris.com%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles %2Fdownloads%2Fsolutions%2Fl3harris‐wasp‐and‐hornet‐carriage‐and‐release‐units‐sell‐sheet‐ 1 sas.pdf&amp;data=02%7C01%7Cfoi%40trade.gov.uk%7Cf3b8aa2bc0374ee33d6908d7f43f4b63%7C8fa217ec33aa46 fbad96dfe68006bb86%7C0%7C1%7C637246425009585222&amp;sdata=EwNWNja%2BNy%2FZEud2PX0CgLise6jcG9 EDRX2a88z6Qh8%3D&amp;reserved=0 6. Please explain how EDO MBM could lawfully be granted a licence for the export of this equipment to Roketsan in Turkey without providing this publicly apparent end‐user information? Furthermore how could such licences continue to be granted in light of the evidence in the public domain that Turkey has likely used its drones of in killing of civilians with Roketsan munitions that include incendiary weapons. The Times reported last year that likely war crimes had been committed by Turkey against Kurdish civilians in North‐east Syria with Turkey's use of incendiary weapons dropped by its armed drones. The Roketsan MAM‐C munition is ‐ according to Roketsan's online data sheets ‐ capable of deploying incendiary warheads. https://eur02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.thetimes.co.uk%2Farticle%2Fsyria‐un‐ refuses‐to‐investigate‐claims‐of‐white‐phosphorus‐use‐in‐turkish‐offensive‐ 3bv7qdmxz&amp;data=02%7C01%7Cfoi%40trade.gov.uk%7Cf3b8aa2bc0374ee33d6908d7f43f4b63%7C8fa217ec33 aa46fbad96dfe68006bb86%7C0%7C1%7C637246425009585222&amp;sdata=jlFMChQgMHAeHggNuNHMgUnt6HSA vu6gHXjvTZAIJHE%3D&amp;reserved=0 https://eur02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.roketsan.com.tr%2Fen%2Fproduct%2F mam‐c‐smart‐micro‐ munition%2F&amp;data=02%7C01%7Cfoi%40trade.gov.uk%7Cf3b8aa2bc0374ee33d6908d7f43f4b63%7C8fa217ec3 3aa46fbad96dfe68006bb86%7C0%7C1%7C637246425009585222&amp;sdata=jL4X9nNvoVcHqx5Ktz7EwaE%2Fp9Hl zFaenSzW2xEZnzY%3D&amp;reserved=0 7. It has also been widely reported by international media organisations, human rights groups and the United Nations that the Baykar Bayraktar TB2 drone has been exported to Libya by Turkey in violation of a UN arms embargo. Please explain how it is lawful for EDO MBM to be granted export licences for Hornet bomb racks/launchers to Roketsan where there is a clear risk these may be re‐exported as part of drone systems to Libya in breach of a UN arms embargo. https://eur02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theguardian.com%2Fworld%2F2019%2 Fdec%2F09%2Fun‐says‐member‐states‐violating‐libya‐arms‐ embargo&amp;data=02%7C01%7Cfoi%40trade.gov.uk%7Cf3b8aa2bc0374ee33d6908d7f43f4b63%7C8fa217ec33aa 46fbad96dfe68006bb86%7C0%7C1%7C637246425009585222&amp;sdata=KVyutqLrwp4PpPnTVtVSpDMrGxfY4fVbw k4Z%2BpF6mBU%3D&amp;reserved=0 8. It has been reported that a Saudi company Intra Defense Technologies has provided the Turkish built Vestal Karayel drones to Saudi Arabia and these have been used in military conflict in Yemen. As stated above the Karayel appears from arms fair photographs to have been armed with the Hornet bomb rack system carrying Roketsan munitions. Images of the drone downed in Yemen appear to confirm this. Please explain how it is lawful for EDO MBM not to declare this likely re‐export end use in UK export licence applications. https://eur02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.intras.net%2Fproject%2Fkarayel%2F&a mp;data=02%7C01%7Cfoi%40trade.gov.uk%7Cf3b8aa2bc0374ee33d6908d7f43f4b63%7C8fa217ec33aa46fbad96dfe 68006bb86%7C0%7C1%7C637246425009585222&amp;sdata=mLhgOGV1daod8Dd66y6sdq0CWoNOBRh0VnnBC%2 BehtUA%3D&amp;reserved=0 https://eur02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.janes.com%2Farticle%2F93459%2Fkara yel‐uav‐lost‐over‐ yemen&amp;data=02%7C01%7Cfoi%40trade.gov.uk%7Cf3b8aa2bc0374ee33d6908d7f43f4b63%7C8fa217ec33aa46f bad96dfe68006bb86%7C0%7C1%7C637246425009585222&amp;sdata=Bq0g9CxvgS1jKjvP0q30AKzl0HJQdLDwmBB7 Ul7QBJI%3D&amp;reserved=0 9. It is in the public domain that Ukraine ‐ another country involved in an ongoing military conflict‐ is also importing Turkish drone systems armed with Roketsan weapons. Please explain how it is lawful for EDO MBM not to disclose this end use in its export licence applications? https://eur02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.defensenews.com%2Funmanned%2F2 019%2F09%2F16%2Fturkey‐ukraine‐seek‐to‐jointly‐produce‐sensitive‐defense‐ technology%2F&amp;data=02%7C01%7Cfoi%40trade.gov.uk%7Cf3b8aa2bc0374ee33d6908d7f43f4b63%7C8fa217e c33aa46fbad96dfe68006bb86%7C0%7C1%7C637246425009585222&amp;sdata=PwomewOOoyc%2Fxh9V9wCtTcQ Mq5I6pcSAgV8TvrRoGyY%3D&amp;reserved=0 2 10. Regarding part 9 and 10 of my request. DIT has refused this under Section 41 and 43 of the Act. I submit that public interest in the numbers of Hornet bomb rack units exported overrides any duty of confidence or commercial sensitivity under the Act or in common law. The scale of EDO MBM's supply of Hornets to Roketsan would confirm the level of deception by EDO MBM especially in its serial failure over five years to disclose the actual end users of its equipment. If the number of units exported is large it would confirm the fact that EDO MBM is in full production of these weapons systems for the expanding Turkish drone fleet. 11. The leader and a majority of elected representatives on the Brighton and Hove City Council have written to the government asking for for an investigation of the company's export licences to Saudi Arabia after bomb parts made by the Brighton company were found at the site of a Saudi coalition attack on civilian target, considered a war crime by the United Nations. https://eur02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theargus.co.uk%2Fnews%2F17955227. cross‐party‐concern‐brighton‐arms‐firm‐edo‐mbm‐ technology%2F&amp;data=02%7C01%7Cfoi%40trade.gov.uk%7Cf3b8aa2bc0374ee33d6908d7f43f4b63%7C8fa217e c33aa46fbad96dfe68006bb86%7C0%7C1%7C637246425009585222&amp;sdata=LtCJ%2FJzmXS6KwcGh2%2F03GvQ waKEB7BV1JC%2FBGBaFf3w%3D&amp;reserved=0 12. Two local MPs have called for the closure of the factory
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Turkey Aerospace & Defense
    TURKEY AEROSPACE & DEFENSE 2016 AEROSPACE TURKEY TURKEY AEROSPACE & DEFENSE 2016 Aerospace - Defense - Original Equipment Manufacturers Platforms - Clusters - Multinationals - Sub-Tier Suppliers Distinguished GBR Readers, Since the inception of the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries 30 years ago, significant steps have been taken to achieve the goals of having the Turkish armed forces equipped with modern systems and technologies and promoting the development of the Turkish defense industry. In the last decade alone, the aerospace and defense (A&D) sector's total turnover quadrupled, while exports have increased fivefold, reaching $5.1 billion and $1.65 billion in 2014, respectively. The industry's investment in research and development (R&D) reached almost $1 billion in 2014. The total workforce in the A&D industry reached 30,000 personnel, of which 30% are engineers. Even more remarkable, Turkey is now at the stage of offering its own platforms for both the local market and to international allies, and has commenced a series of follow up local programs. Although this progress has been achieved under the circumstances of a healthy and consistent political environment and in parallel with sustained growth in the Turkish economy, the proportion of expenditure for defense in the national budget and as a percentage of Turkey’s GDP has been stable. With the help of the national, multinational and joint defense industry projects that have been undertaken in Turkey by the undersecretariat, the defense industry has become a highly capable community comprising large-scale main contractors, numerous sub- system manufacturers, small- and medium-sized enterprises, R&D companies who are involved in high-tech, niche areas, research institutes, and universities.
    [Show full text]
  • WATCH February 2019 Foreign News & Perspectives of the Operational Environment
    community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/ Foreign Military Studies Office Volume 9 Issue #2 OEWATCH February 2019 FOREIGN NEWS & PERSPECTIVES OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT EURASIA INDO-PACIFIC 3 Radios in the Russian Ground Forces 21 Chinese Military Launches Largest-Ever Joint Logistics 50 IRGC: Iran Can Extend Ballistic Missile Range 5 Northern Fleet Will Receive Automated C&C System Exercise 51 Turkey to Create Space Agency Integrating Air, Land and Sea 23 Luo Yuan Describes an Asymmetric Approach to Weaken 52 Iran’s Army Aviation Gets UAV Unit 6 The Inflatable Sentry the United States 53 Turkey to Sell ATAK Helicopters to the Philippines 7 The S-350 Vityaz Air Defense System 25 Military-Civil Fusion Cooperation in China Grows in the 54 Chinese Military and Commercial Cooperation with Tunisia 8 Bigger is Better: The T-80BVM Tank Modernization Field of Logistics 10 The Power Struggle for Control of Russia’s Arctic 27 Chinese Military Completes Release of New Set of Military AFRICA 11 The Arctic Will Have Prominent Role in 2019 Operational- Training Regulations 55 Anger in Sudan: Large Protests Against al-Bashir Regime Strategic Exercise “Center” 28 China Defends Xinjiang Program 56 Africa: Trouble Spots to Watch in 2019 12 Preparation for the 2019 Army International Games 29 Is Pakistan Acquiring Russian Tanks? 57 Can Businessmen Bring Peace in Gao, Mali? 13 Cossacks – Hybrid Defense Forces 30 Russia to Deploy Additional Anti-Ship Missile Batteries 58 Chinese Weapons in Rwanda 14 Update on Military Church Construction Near Japan by 2020
    [Show full text]
  • Produkce a Nasazení Tureckých Ozbrojených Dronů Turkish Armed Drones Production and Deployment
    Vojenské rozhledy č. 1/2021 DOI: 10.3849/2336-2995.30.2021.01.021-037 Recenzovaný článek Produkce a nasazení tureckých ozbrojených dronů Turkish Armed Drones Production and Deployment Pavel Faus, Miroslav Mareš Abstrakt: Článek se věnuje problematice tureckého vývoje a použití ozbrojených bezpilotních prostředků v kontextu zvýšené mediální pozornosti vyvola- né jejich nasazením v několika konfliktech. Autoři v úvodu představují klasifikaci bezpilotních prostředků, a dále pak sledují vývoj a operační nasazení průzkumných a bojových dronů v minulosti. Následná stěžejní část práce se věnuje tureckému vývoji a použití ozbrojených dronů. Text analyzuje produkci hlavních tureckých společností, export a nasazení jejich produktů v nedávných konfliktech. Autoři v závěru textu diskutují úroveň turecké produkce, kterou srovnávají s lídrem na poli ozbrojených dronů, Spojenými státy. Srovnání odhaluje nedostatečnou vyspělost sou- časné generace dronů i přetrvávající závislost na dodávkách komponentů ze zahraničí. Abstract: This article studies the current stage of development of armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicle technology in Turkey, within the context of the current media attention caused by its deployment in various conflicts. Authors first provide a classification framework for surveillance and armed drones. Text proceeds with an overview of the technology and its military use. The core of the text focuses on Turkey’s past and present use of armed drones. Authors analyse the current stage of Turkey’s armed drone development production and export destinations. Furthermore, operational use by Turkey or other parties is discussed. Authors conclude by comparing current generation of Turkish drones to those deployed by the United States, highlighting technological edge on the side of the US, as well as continuing dependency of Turkey’s main drone systems on foreign components.
    [Show full text]
  • The Turkey-UAE Race to the Bottom in Libya: a Prelude to Escalation
    The Turkey-UAE race to the bottom in Libya: a prelude to escalation Recherches & Documents N°8/2020 Aude Thomas Research fellow, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique July 2020 www.frstrategie.org SOMMAIRE THE TURKEY-UAE RACE TO THE BOTTOM IN LIBYA: A PRELUDE TO ESCALATION ................................. 1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................. 1 1. TURKEY: EXERCISING THE FULL MILITARY CAPABILITIES SPECTRUM IN LIBYA ............................. 3 2. THE UAE’S MILITARY VENTURE IN LIBYA ................................................................................ 11 2.1. The UAE’s failed campaign against Tripoli ....................................................... 11 2.2. Russia’s support to LNA forces: from the shadow to the limelight ................ 15 CONCLUSION: LOOKING AT FUTURE NATIONAL DYNAMICS IN LIBYA ................................................... 16 FONDATION pour la RECHERCHE STRATÉ GIQUE The Turkey-UAE race to the bottom in Libya: a prelude to escalation This paper was completed on July 15, 2020 Introduction In March, the health authorities in western Libya announced the first official case of Covid- 19 in the country. While the world was enforcing a lockdown to prevent the spread of the virus, war-torn Libya renewed with heavy fighting in the capital. Despite the UNSMIL’s1 call for a lull in the fighting, the Libyan National Army (LNA) and its allies conducted shelling on Tripoli, targeting indistinctly residential neighbourhoods, hospitals and armed groups’ locations. The Government of National Accord (GNA) answered LNA’s shelling campaign by launching an offensive against several western cities. These operations could not have been executed without the support of both conflicting parties’ main backers: Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The protracted conflict results from both the competing parties’ unwillingness to agree on conditions to resume political negotiations2.
    [Show full text]
  • Drone Databook Update: March 2020
    CENTERDatabook Update FOR THE STUDY OF THE DRONE AT BARD COLLEGE DRONE DATABOOK UPDATE: MARCH 2020 DAN GETTINGER Since the publication of “The Drone Databook” in September 2019 we have continued to track developments in global military drone proliferation. We now estimate that there are at least 102 countries with active military drone programs, up from 95 in the “Databook.” Another six countries are believed to have inactive or pending drone programs. This update contains more than 100 additions, modifications, and corrections to the inventory, personnel, operations, infrastructure, research and development, and export sections of nearly 50 countries. SUMMARY Databook Post Update 1. Countries with active military drone programs 95 102 2. Countries with inactive or pending drone programs 6 6 3. Countries with active _____ drones Class I (Light) 85 90 Class II (Medium) 44 45 Class III (Heavy) 31 35 4. Bases and test sites 236 247 5. Units 269 280 6. System types (active only) 171 181 Vist dronecenter.bard.edu/databook for the original “Drone Databook.” Edited by Arthur Holland Michel. Editorial support provided by Isabel Polletta. Copyright © 2020 Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College. 1 Databook Update INVENTORY BAHAMAS Model Make Origin Class Intro Qty Operator Notes Swift USA I 55 Engineering Mark Huber, “Swift Awarded $17 Million Bahamas UAS Contract,” Aviation International Online, 9 January 2020, https://www.ainonline. com/aviation-news/general-aviation/2020-01-09/swift-awarded-17-million-bahamas-uas-contract. BRAZIL Model Make Origin Class Intro Qty Operator Notes ScanEagle Insitu USA I 2020 6 Navy Guilherme Wiltgen, “Marinha do Brasil seleciona o ScanEagle no programa ARP-E,” Defesa Aérea & Naval, 14 December 2019, https:// www.defesaaereanaval.com.br/aviacao/marinha-do-brasil-seleciona-o-scaneagle-no-programa-arp-e.
    [Show full text]
  • The Revolution in the Drone Warfare
    JEMEAA - FEATURE The Revolution in Drone Warfare The Lessons from the Idlib De-Escalation Zone RIDVAN BARI URCOSTA urkey and Russia are learning how to operationally use a new type of twenty- first- century warfare—unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) warfare. Many historical analogies can be traced to the advent of new types of Tweapons and resulting strategies implemented for their use in a direct, kinetic confrontation. UAVs have existed since the Cold War, but in the 1990s few coun- tries possessed first- generation UAV technologies. Russia and Turkey joined the military UAV technology club relatively late, and both set a straightforward aim toward creating their own indigenous drones—first for utility-based roles and then purely combat drones. Russia achieved the first aim, but Turkey soon man- aged to field its own combat drone. However, Russia has a larger UAV fleet. The beginning of 2020 nearly witnessed Russia and Turkey in direct kinetic war, initially due to a successful Syrian offensive against Turkish-backed rebel forces. This success forced Turkey to enter a war against the Syrian Army, and from 27 February until 5 March 2020, an active phase of hostilities in the Idlib Province ensued. Russia and Turkey came to this confrontation well- experienced in the use of UAVs and electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) warfare technologies, having demonstrated their proficiencies in actions taken against rebel factions in Syria—and in Ankara’s case against Kurdish groups in Turkey—but neither Rus- sia nor Turkey, or other countries for that matter, have experience in employing these technologies in a direct clash against a peer competitor.
    [Show full text]
  • The Ascension of Turkey As a Drone Power History, Strategy, and Geopolitical Implications
    THE ASCENSION OF TURKEY AS A DRONE POWER HISTORY, STRATEGY, AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS SIBEL DÜZ ANALYSIS JULY 2020 NO.65 THE ASCENSION OF TURKEY AS A DRONE POWER HISTORY, STRATEGY, AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS SIBEL DÜZ COPYRIGHT © 2020 by SETA All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, without permission in writing from the publishers. ISBN: 978-625-7040-63-1 Layout: Erkan Söğüt SETA | SİYASET, EKONOMİ VE TOPLUM ARAŞTIRMALARI VAKFI FOUNDATION FOR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH Nenehatun Cd. No: 66 GOP Çankaya 06700 Ankara TÜRKİYE Tel: +90 312 551 21 00 | Faks: +90 312 551 21 90 www.setav.org | [email protected] | @setavakfi SETA | Istanbul Defterdar Mh. Savaklar Cd. Ayvansaray Kavşağı No: 41-43 Eyüpsultan İstanbul TÜRKİYE Tel: +90 212 395 11 00 | Faks: +90 212 395 11 11 SETA | Washington D.C. 1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 410 Washington D.C., 20036 USA Tel: 202-223-9885 | Faks: 202-223-6099 www.setadc.org | [email protected] | @setadc SETA | Berlin Französische Straße 12, 10117 Berlin GERMANY Tel: +49 30 20188466 SETA | Brussels Avenue des Arts 27, 1000 Brussels BELGIUM Tel: +3226520486 THE ASCENSION OF TURKEY AS A DRONE POWER: HISTORY, STRATEGY, AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS CONTENTS ABSTRACT 7 INTRODUCTION 8 HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF TURKEY’S DRONE PROGRAM 8 TURKEY’S DRONE INDUSTRY 11 THE RISE OF TURKEY AS A DRONE EXPORTER 16 STRATEGIC IMPACT AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS 19 CONCLUSION 26 setav.org 5 ANALYSIS ABOUT THE AUTHOR Sibel Düz Sibel Düz completed her BA in International Relations at the Middle East Tech- nical University (METU) in 2013.
    [Show full text]
  • The Defense Industry in Turkey
    THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY IN TURKEY MARKET OVERVIEW The defense industry in Turkey has undergone a major transformation over the past decade. Initially an importer, the country, whose international recognition of its systems is increasing every year, is now a manufacturer of defense equipment and materials. Today, 3 Turkish groups rank among the 100 largest defense companies in the world. Defense is an extremely dynamic sector and a highly strategic market for Turkey, which aims to provide its armed forces with state-of-the-art war materials and equipment. Despite the industry's gain in autonomy in recent years, technological independence has not yet been fully achieved (68.5% of equipment manufactured locally) and Turkey, ranked 17th in the world in terms of military spending in 2016, remains dependent on foreign expertise and know-how. Turkish industry is nowadays forced to call on the skills of international companies for technologies whose design it does not fully master. Indeed, Turkey has a strong interest in the development of its military industry: Ankara allocates a budget of about USD 18 billion each year and aims to reduce its dependence on the outside world completely by 2023, the centenary year of the Republic of Turkey. To this end, the government is pursuing a policy of incentives that considerably favors local production and encourages technological partnerships with international players with a view to increasing the skills of Turkish manufacturers. THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY IN TURKEY THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY HAS TRANSFORMED ITS MILITARY PROCUREMENT STRATEGY... Evolution of the sector to the present day Percentage of materials manufactured locally and used in defense 1990-2000 2010-2020 68,5% Local design Direct Co- Partial design Technology and purchase production development production 24% Avant 1990 2000-2010 2020-2030 2002 2016 Source : SSM Key Figures $16.9 $6 $1.74 $1.25 billion billion billion billion Total expenses (2017) Turnover including aeronautics Exports including aeronautics R&D expenditure (2017) (2016) (2017) ..
    [Show full text]
  • Trends in the Turkish Military Industry
    NEW WEBSITE! community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/ NEW WEBSITE! Foreign Military Studies Office Volume 7 Issue #5 OEWATCH June 2017 FOREIGN NEWS & PERSPECTIVES OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT SPECIAL ESSAY: TRENDS IN THE TURKISH MILITARY INDUSTRY MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA LATIN AMERICA CENTRAL ASIA, CAUCASUS 3 Hezbollah Learning New War Fighting Skills in Syria 21 Mexican Gas Smuggling 36 More Fallout from the St. Petersburg Metro Bombing 5 Turkish Airstrikes on Kurdish Groups in Iraq and 22 Measuring Mexican Gas Theft 37 The Espionage Case Between Pakistan and India Syria: What’s Next? 23 On the Next Cuban President 39 Georgia’s “Strategic Defense Review” 6 Turkish Otokar Designs New Battle Tank for 24 About Bolivarian Motorcycle Colectivos Asymmetrical Warfare 25 Outcry over Maduro’s Military Courts RUSSIA, UKRAINE 8 Iran Unveils New Sniper Rifle 25 Venezuela: PSUV to Militarize? 40 Russia Establishes New Army Corps in the Arctic 9 Iran: Qods Force General is New Ambassador to Iraq 41 New S-500 Will Increase Russian Anti-Satellite Capability 10 Iran: Military Budget Increased 145% ASIA-PACIFIC 42 Russia Fielding First C2 System for Electronic Warfare 11 Syrian War: The Race to Deir Ezzor 26 Bhutan’s Relations With China and India Brigades 12 Internal Disputes and the Future of ISIS 27 Philippines Choose Chinese Investment Over 43 A Russian Leader to Watch 13 Saudi-UAE Friction in Yemen Territorial Defense 44 Insourcing Military Utilities and Housing 28 China and Thailand Arms Factory Deal is One Step 45 Crisis of Trust over Afghanistan
    [Show full text]
  • SPECIAL REPORT – Killer Optics: Exports of WESCAM Sensors to Turkey
    PLOUGHSHARES SPECIAL REPORT KILLER OPTICS EXPORTS OF WESCAM SENSORS TO TURKEY – A LITMUS TEST OF CANADA’S COMPLIANCE WITH THE ARMS TRADE TREATY by Kelsey Gallagher, MA SEPTEMBER 2020 PROJECT PLOUGHSHARES 20-09 Killer Optics: Exports of WESCAM sensors to Turkey – a litmus test of Canada’s compliance with the Arms Trade Treaty ©2020 Project Ploughshares Author: Kelsey Gallagher Adviser: Kenneth Epps Editor: Wendy Stocker Designer: Tasneem Jamal First published: September 2020 Project Ploughshares 140 Westmount Road North Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G6 Canada Telephone: 519-888-6541 Email: [email protected] TABLE OF CONTENTS FIGURES iv ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS v OVERVIEW 7 WESCAM EO/IR SENSORS 8 MX-15 8 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WESCAM AND TURKEY 9 Export trends 9 A crack in the relationship 11 WESCAM sensors on Turkish UAVs 12 KALE-BAYKAR BAYRAKTAR TB2 12 KALE-BAYKAR AKINCI 13 VESTEL DEFENCE INDUSTRY’S KARAYEL 13 TURKISH AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES’ (TAI) ANKA 14 Combat zones in which Turkey has used WESCAM systems 15 TURKEY 15 SYRIA 15 Operation Olive Branch 15 Operation Peace Spring 16 Operation Spring Shield 17 IRAQ 19 Operation Claw 19 LIBYA 20 CANADIAN ARMS CONTROL AND WESCAM EXPORTS 22 International humanitarian law 22 Regional stability 22 Diversion 23 Final Report: Review on Export Permits to Saudi Arabia 23 APPENDIX I: TURKISH AIRSTRIKE FOOTAGE AND WESCAM VIDEO FEEDS 24 APPENDIX II: WESCAM EXPORT FIGURES 27 NOTES 29 FIGURES FIG. 1 WESCAM MX-15D 8 FIG. 2 Total Canadian military exports to Turkey 9 FIG. 3 Exports of HS Code 901380 vs. total Canadian military exports to Turkey (2015-2019) 11 FIG.
    [Show full text]
  • 2016 ASELSAN Annual Report
    41 YEARS OF RELIABLE TECHNOLOGY 2016 ASELSAN is a company of Turkish Armed Forces Foundation. ANNUAL REPORT CONTENT ASELSAN at a Glance Financial Information Shareholding Structure Consolidated Statement of Financial Position Summary Financials Consolidated Statement of Financial Profit or Loss Local Affiliates Consolidated Statement of Financial Comprehensive Income Global Affiliates Consolidated Statement of Changes in Equity Facilities in Turkey Consolidated Statement of Cash Flow Organization Main Financial Indicators Human Resources Management Abbreviations Management Contact Chairman’s Message Members of the Board of Directors Corporate Governance CEO’s Message Members of the Execution Board In 2016 TO access the dıgıtal report Strategy and Business Development www.aselsan.com.tr Marketing Activities Research Center Human Resources at ASELSAN ASELSAN 2016 Annual Report ASELSAN Academy Integrated Logistic Support (ELD) Highlights in 2016 Awards in 2016 Field of Activities Communications and Information Technologies Business Sector Defense System Technologies Business Sector Microelectronics, Guidance and Electro-Optics Business Sector Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems Business Sector Transportation, Security, Energy and Automation Systems Business Sector Our Vision Being a national technology company that maintains its sustainable growth by creating value in the global market; preferred due to its competitiveness, trusted as a strategic partner, and caring for the environment and people. Our Mission By focusing primarily on the needs of the Turkish Armed Forces; to provide high-value-added, innovative and reliable products and solutions to both local and foreign customers in the fields of electronic technologies and system integration; continuing activities in line with global targets as well as increasing brand awareness and contributing to the technological independence of Turkey.
    [Show full text]
  • The Turkish Defence Industry. First-Class Strategic Asset
    Analysis Paper 06/2021 10/02/2021 Felipe Sánchez Tapia The Turkish defence industry. First-class strategic asset. Visit the WEBSITE Receive the E-NEWSLETTER La industria turca de defensa. Activo estratégico de primer orden Resumen: Como ha quedado patente con ocasión del reciente conflicto en Nagorno-Karabaj, la industria turca de defensa ha demostrado su valor como activo estratégico que proporciona a Turquía una autonomía que le permite, por un lado, reducir su dependencia del exterior y, por otro, influir en su entorno para reforzar su cada vez más asertiva política exterior. Aunque en particular han sido los drones los sistemas de armas que han sobresalido durante este conflicto, la industria de defensa ha evolucionado durante las últimas décadas para cubrir hoy en día la mayor parte de las necesidades de la defensa nacional. A pesar del espectacular desarrollo, esta industria continúa siendo dependiente tecnológicamente del exterior en ciertas capacidades críticas. La manera en que Turquía trate de solventar estas carencias se dejará notar en su inestable equilibrio estratégico entre Rusia, por un lado, y EE. UU. y países occidentales, por otro. Palabras clave: Turquía, industria de defensa, drones, UAV, UCAV, estrategia. *NOTE: The ideas contained in the Analysis Papers are the responsibility of their authors. They do not necessarily reflect the thinking of the IEEE or the Ministry of Defence. Analysis Paper 06/2021 1 The Turkish defence industry. First-class strategic asset. Felipe Sánchez Tapia The Turkish defence industry. First-class strategic asset. Abstract: As the recent Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has shown, the Turkish defence industry has proved its value as a strategic asset that provides Turkey with an autonomy that allows it, on the one hand, to reduce its dependence on the outside world and, on the other, to influence its environment in order to strengthen its increasingly assertive foreign policy.
    [Show full text]