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Department of Political Science Master’s Degree in International Relations – Global Studies Chair in Islam: culture and politics Adventurism in the enlarged Mediterranean: the geopolitical impact of Turkey’s strategic autonomy on Italian national interests. Professor Francesca Maria Corrao Professor Pasquale Ferrara SUPERVISOR CO-SUPERVISOR Elettra Pelino CANDIDATE Academic Year 2019/2020 2 Table of Contents Introduction……………………………………………………………...7 1. Erdoğan’ foreign policy: from Neo-Ottomanism to Realpolitik…….12 Introduction………………………………………………………………………...12 1.1. The new Sultan………………………………………………..…………………...12 1.1.1 From Empire to Republic ……………………………………………..…………13 1.1.2 An “anti-Atatürk Atatürk”. Erdoğan’s rise……………………………………….15 1.2 Turkish foreign policy from the birth of the Republic to the AKP years. Continuity and change………………………………………………………………………………19 1.3 Erdoğan’s geopolitics………………………………………………………………23 1.3.1 Strategic depth and Zero problems with neighbors: Neo-Ottomanism………….23 1.3.2 The geopolitical awakening of July 15. Realpolitik……………………………..29 1.4 Turkey’s hedging strategy………………………………………………………….36 Conclusions………………………………………………………………………….38 2. Turkey between (and beyond) NATO and Russia. The Syrian chessboard……………………………………………………………….40 Introduction………………………………………………………………………....40 2.1 Turkey–NATO relations…………………………………………………………….40 2.1.1 From collective defense to collective security……………………………….…...43 2.1.2 Factors of divergence……………………………………………………………..48 2.2 Turkey and Russa: bilateral relations………………………………………………..62 2.2.1 The Russian roulette……………………………………………………………….64 2.2.2 An unknown unknown?............................................................................................68 2.3 Turkey’s Syria policy: Turkey first….........................................................................75 2.3.1 Turkey’s shifting conduct in the Syrian civil war………………………………....77 3 2.3.2 Turkish military incursions into Syrian territory…………………………………..79 2.4 Ankara as Turkey’s only axis………………………………………………………..83 Conclusions…………………………………………………………………………84 3. Turkey’s hybrid weapons: migration and maritime boundaries………………………………………………………………..86 Introduction……………………………………………………………………….....86 3.1 The weaponization of migrants..…….……………………………………………....86 3.1.1 Coercive engineered migrations………………………………………………….87 3.2 Turkey as an opportunist. The wrestling match with the European Union………....90 3.2.1 Direct coercion. The EU–Turkey refugee deal…………………………………..91 3.2.2 Indirect coercion. Libya …………………………………....................................97 3.3 Rediscovering the sea. The “Blue Homeland” doctrine……………………….…...103 3.4 Challenging the Eastern Mediterranean Order……………………………………..107 Conclusions………………………………………………………………………..113 4. Cuius mare? Scenarios for Turkey and geopolitical implications for the Italian national interests…………………………………………..116 Introduction………………………………………………………………………..116 4.1 The renewed strategic centrality of the Mediterranean…………………………...116 4.1.1 The enlarged Mediterranean…………………………………………………..120 4.1.2 Italian national interests……………………………………………………….122 4.2 Italian foreign and defense policy in the Mediterranean……………………..........127 4.2.1 The three circles approach……………………………………………………...127 4.2.2 Rome’s current geopolitical posture……………………………………………133 4.3 Scenarios analysis of Turkey’s short-term posture in Libya……………………….135 4.3.1 The indicators.......................................................................................................136 4.3.2 Alternative Futures Analysis……………………………………………………138 4 4.4 Policy recommendations for Italy. Strategic self-awareness and flexibility…...…140 Conclusions………………………………………………………………………..143 Conclusion……………………………………………………………...145 Bibliography…………………………………………………………...148 Book references………………………………………………………………….......148 Reports & E-books…………………………………………………………………..149 Official documents…………………………………………………………………..151 Journal articles……………………………………………………………………….153 Newspaper articles…………………………………………………………………...156 Online articles………………………………………………………………………..159 Websites……………………………………………………………………………...163 Summary…………………………………………………………….....165 5 List of Figures Figure 1. Turkish interventionist military policy 37 Figure 2. Map of US and NATO military presence in Turkey 42 Figure 3. Kurdistan 52 Figure 4. Armenia–Azerbaijan peace deal 73 Figure 5. Mapping “Operation Euphrates Shield”, “Operation Olive Branch”, and “Operation Peace Spring” 81 Figure 6. Operation “Spring Shield” 82 Figure 7. Mediterranean routes and Turkey’s area of exploitation in Libya 90 Figure 8. Delimitation of EEZs in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Turkey–Libya MoU 99 Figure 9. Turkey–Libya patron–client strategies 102 Figure 10. Turkey’s Mavi Vatan 104 Figure 11. Maritime boundaries according to Turkey 110 Figure 12. The enlarged Mediterranean 120 Figure 13. A more fragmented and more connected Mediterranean space 122 Figure 14. The Mediterranean and the Italian energy supply 126 Figure 15. The 34 Italian missions abroad underway in 2019 130 Figure 16. An Alternative Futures Analysis of Turkish posture in Libya 137 6 Introduction “The power of accurate observation is commonly called cynicism by those who have not got it.” George Bernard Shaw1 The twenty-first century is witnessing a transition from a unipolar, Western-dominated international system to a multipolar order, with the hub of world politics and the economy increasingly shifting to the Pacific and new spheres of influence forming––namely the Sino- Russian strategic entente. As Cooley and Nexon (2020) exposed, in an unsettled geopolitical environment, “bottom-up” processes have also contributed to tectonic shifts in the balance of power, eroding the liberal ecosystem presided by the United States of America. 2 In fact, transnational political movements, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and non-Western international organizations 3 open up “exit options” from U.S. leadership. Hence, changes driven by high politics (strategic competition and conflict) and low politics (population dynamics), as well as “the democratization of cyber capabilities worldwide”4 shape the current risk landscape. According to the World Economic Forum (2020: 5), they will likely bring about the diffusion of hegemonic power as old alliance structures and global institutions are tested.5 As a matter of fact, the Trump presidency (2016-2020) brought to completion the Obama doctrine of “partial retrenchment” (2009-2016), grounded in a more solvent approach to national security, better matching Washington’s chronically overambitious policy goals to its finite military and fiscal means.6 Yet, unlike in the previous administration, multilateralism has been interpreted, rather than an instrument of benign hegemony of the United States, as the place par excellence of deceit by everyone else (Colombo and Magri, 2019).7 Above all, in the elaboration and political rhetoric of the administration, there was no longer room for the old virtuous circle between hegemony and multilateralism. Hence, the most striking change introduced by the Trump 1 Clark, R.M. (2017) Intelligence Analysis. A Target-Centric Approach. Fifth Edition. CQ Press 2 Cooley, A., Nexon, D. (2020) Exit from Hegemony. Oxford University Press 3 I.e., the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) or the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). 4 Garamone, J. (2018) Intel Chiefs Tell Senate Committee of Dangers to America. US Dept of Defense [Online] 5 World Economic Forum (2020) The Global Risks Report 2020 [Online] 6 Unger, D. (2016) The Foreign Policy Legacy of Barack Obama. The International Spectator [Online] Vol. 51, no. 4 7 Colombo, A., Magri, P. (2019) La fine di un mondo. La deriva dell’ordine liberale [Online] ISPI 7 administration resides in the unprecedented divorce between the United States and the international order that they had first set up and then continually expanded. Moreover, the post- national, liberal European integration project is in a profound crisis, with some member states openly challenging the values and principles underpinning the European Union (EU). In the words of former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, ex-colonial countries and imperial legatees in world politics embraced a “global political awakening”.8 Among these, Turkey’s aspirations to become a regional power – or better, a pivotal state9 in the “post-Ottoman space” – found a suitable environment in the wake of U.S. failures, and particularly in the immediate aftermath of the Arab revolts. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğ an reacted to the rapidly changing strategic environment with an effective slogan: “Dünya beşten büyüktür (The world is bigger than five)”.10 Thus, he disputed the legitimacy of the global multilateral arrangements dominated by the UN Security Council and its five permanent members––the US, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France. Not only was he challenging the institutional arrangements that had formalized the distribution of global power at the end of World War II and the dominant position of the West in that world order–– even though Turkey is a member of the transatlantic security system. He was also demanding that the premier league of power games recognize emerging powers such as Turkey as rightful participants.11 After the AKP (the “Justice and Development Party”) came to power in 2002, Erdoğ an delivered a decade of record-breaking economic growth, boosting his popularity. In the 2011 parliamentary elections, 49.9 percent of the electorate supported his party, up from