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View Full Report Tenth Annual Report: The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in 2020 The Bleeding Decade Tuesday 26 January 2021 The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), founded in June 2011, is a non-governmental, independent group that is considered a primary source for the OHCHR on all death toll-related analyses in Syria. R210104E Photo showing damage to residential buildings in Ariha city in Idlib suburbs caused by a Russian air attack - January 29, 2020 Content I. Background 2 II. Landmark Key Events in 2020 4 III. Most Prominent Political, Military and Human Rights Events Related to Syria in 2020 32 IV. The Syrian Regime’s Direct Responsibility for Committing Violations in Syria in 2020 and the Names of Individuals We Believe Are Involved in Committing Egregious Violations 44 V. Achieving Progress in the Accountability Process 48 VI. Record of the Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in 2020 According to the SNHR Database 53 VII. Comparison between the Most Notable Patterns of Human Rights Violations in 2019 and 2020 59 VIII. Summarizing the Most Notable Human Rights Violations Committed by the Parties to the Conflict and the Controlling Forces in Syria in 2020 62 IX. Recommendations 107 X. References 114 2 Tenth Annual Report: The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in 2020 I. Background: The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), founded in June 2011, three months after the outbreak of the popular uprising in March 2011, is a non-governmental, non-profit independent organization whose primary objective is to doc- ument all violations that occur in Syria, archive them within our extensive database, and issue periodic reports and studies based on them, with SNHR aiming to expose the perpetrators of these violations as a first step to holding them accountable, protecting the rights of the victims, and saving and cataloguing the history of events. The Syrian Network for Human Rights is a mem- ber of the International Campaign to Ban Land- In 2020, the Syrian Network for Human Rights mines - Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC), continued its work, issuing approximately 81 the International Coalition for the Responsibility reports in which it addressed multiple types of to Protect (ICRtoP), the International Coalition the most notable human rights violations com- of Sites of Conscience, and the Every Casualty mitted by the parties to the conflict and the Worldwide Network. controlling forces in Syria, such as extrajudicial killings, arrest, torture, displacement and forced It should also be noted that the Office of the High displacement, and the use of prohibited mu- Commissioner for Human Rights has relied, in all of nitions and other highly destructive munitions, its statistics on the analysis of victims of the conflict and other violations. These reports were based in Syria, on the Syrian Network for Human Rights on evidence from numerous sources, including as a primary source; SNHR also works in cooper- approximately 263 testimonies of injured or sur- ation with the Independent International Commis- vivors of the attacks, paramedics, central signal sion of Inquiry (COI) and has signed a data-sharing workers or victims’ families. All these testimo- agreement with the Independent International and nies were obtained through speaking directly Impartial Mechanism (IIIM), United Nations Chil- with eyewitnesses, with none of them cited from dren’s Fund (UNICEF), and other UN bodies, as well any open sources. All these procedures are car- as with international organizations such as the Or- ried out under SNHR’s internal protocols, which ganization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons we have worked for years to perfect, and which (OPCW). The SNHR is one of the most important we strive constantly to develop through our ex- data sources for the Syria situation reports issued perience in order to keep pace with the highest by the foreign ministries of many countries world- standards of care and reliability, in addition to wide, with a large number of Arab and international hundreds of photos, videos and other sources news agencies relying on the SNHR’s reports and of information. Readers can study our working statistics for their coverage and reports on Syria. methodology more extensively at this link. 3 Tenth Annual Report: The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in 2020 As we emphasize in every report, the informa- tion provided in this report represents the bare minimum of the actual severity and magnitude of the violations that occurred which we were able to document, given the exceptional difficul- ties and challenges that we have faced during our work as shown in the methodology. Also, it doesn’t include any analysis of the profound so- cial, economic, and psychological ramifications. We also emphasize that the legal references which we use in relation to the Syrian situation are international humanitarian law and customary international law, along with international human rights law, and that we do not base our work on the Syrian constitution and local laws because both the constitution and many of these articles of legislation are security state texts that violate international law and the fundamental spirit of the law, meaning that we refer to them only when necessary. In addition, the report includes key political, judi- cial and military events that occurred in 2020 in order to give a clearer picture of the context of the events in which these violations took place. Fadel Abdul Ghany, Chairman of the Syrian Network for Human Rights, says: This is our tenth annual report since the start of the popular uprising in March 2011, and for the tenth consecutive year, we are still documenting egregious violations, some of which amount to crimes against humanity. The international community and the Security Council have failed to mitigate the severity of the violations in any way or even to achieve the bare minimum of end- ing any of the crimes against humanity. The root cause of the Syrian issue remains the combination of factional, dynastic regime opposing a popular uprising demanding political change to lead the country to- wards a democratic system that respects human rights and the transfer of power, and prioritizes the wellbeing of the Syrian state and people. 4 Tenth Annual Report: The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in 2020 II. Landmark Key Events in 2020: 2020 saw three ceasefire agreements, all in the Idlib region: The The The first: second: third: Announced on January 9, The Turkish Ministry of The agreement result- 2020, when Major-General Defense announced that it ing from the meeting of Yuri Borenkov, chief of the had concluded a ceasefire the Turkish and Russian Russian Center for Recon- agreement with Russia Presidents, which came ciliation of the Opposing that would enter into force into force at 00:00 on Parties in Syria, declared at 00:01 on January 12, March 6, 2020, is the fifth the start of a ceasefire 2020. Despite this agree- such agreement in the in Idlib region, starting at ment, the ground attacks region since April 26, 2019. 14:00 on the same day, by Syrian Regime forces It should be noted that which had no actual effect, did not stop, while the air Russian forces committed even in briefly reducing the strikes by Syrian-Russian a massacre against IDPs frequency of military at- alliance forces resumed in Ma’aret Misreen town tacks. after only two days on Jan- on March 5 during the uary 14, 2020. Turkish-Russian consulta- tions that concluded in this ceasefire agreement, clearly demonstrating a desire to We noticed that in the period between the last two agreements, kill as many people as pos- sible before the beginning Syrian regime’s forces and allies managed to make advances of the ceasefire. on the ground which were the most extensive since April 26, 2019, seizing control of an area amounting to approximately 35 percent of the land area that had been outside regime control. By taking control of that area, the regime has tightened its con- trol over the ‘M5’ Damascus-Aleppo International Road. Following the ceasefire which came into effect on March 6, the SNHR monitored the cessation of air strikes by the Syrian-Russian alliance forces in the subsequent period, which saw several attacks by Russian forces, with most of these being against military sites of Hay’at Tahrir al Sham, while also documenting ground attacks by Syrian regime’s forces and allies, although this has been the lowest number of such attacks compared to previous months, with the COVID-19 pandemic apparently affecting the military capabilities of the Syrian regime’s army and affiliated Iranian militias, which has contributed to a reduction in the rate of their killing of Syrian civilians. 5 Tenth Annual Report: The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in 2020 We further note that in 2020 we monitored the entry of dozens of Turkish military convoys into the Idlib region in northwest Syria, which were deployed at dozens of posts throughout the areas out- side the control of Syrian Regime forces in the Idlib region. Among the most prominent events in 2020, which had the greatest impact on the humanitarian sit- uation for the Syrian people, was the renewal of Resolution 2165 (July 2014)1 providing for the Unit- ed Nations to provide cross-border delivery of humanitarian aid, which would have been renewed in December 2019 if the Russian-Chinese veto had not been used; thereafter, on January 10, both countries abstained from voting on Resolution No. 2504, which included additional amendments in favor of Russia, as the extension was limited to six months, that was, until July 10, with aid entry through the al Ramtha and al Ya’rubiya border crossings being canceled.
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