1.0 Meeting Agenda Draft

Emergency Dispatch Advisory Committee E-DAC PRRD Electoral Area “E” Feb 9th E-DAC Committee Meeting Agenda DRAFT 2016-01-30, Revision 1

1. APPROVAL OF AGENDA

2. COMMITTEE PROCEDURE 2.1 Elect chair and secretary 2.2 Schedule next meeting 2.3 Discussion re. Communications technical (including forum, email) 2.4 Discussion re. Communications procedure: agendas 2.5 Discussion re. Communications procedure: official communications procedures 2.6 Discussion re. Committee process: working subgroups Page 2 2.7 Discussion re. Committee process: public forums

3. COMMITTEE BUSINESS 3.1 Discussion re. Requirements of mandate: Outline of first report for mid-March Page 3 3.2 New Business

4. ADJOURNMENT

5. FYI 5.1 Electoral Area ‘E’ Emergency Dispatch Advisory Committee Page 4 Terms of Reference 5.2 9-1-1 Services in British Columbia: Background Review in Relation Page 8 to a Province- Wide Call Answer Levy 5.3 Strategic Vision Summary of Consultation Comments, Ministry of Justice Page 98 2015 summary of 9-1-1 PSAP workshop for input for the future of future of emergency communications across the province. 5.4 British Columbia Earthquake Preparedness Consultation Report Page 107 5.5 A Report on Matters Related to Emergency 9-1-1 Services (CRTC) Page 177 5.6 Auditor General’s Catastrophic Earthquake Preparedness Report Page 257

Feb 9th Meeting Agenda Page 1! of 1! 2016-01-30 Emergency Dispatch Advisory Committee E-DAC PRRD Electoral Area “E” Discussion Paper - Subgroups 2016-01-30, Revision 1

1.0 Overview

The scope of the work tasked to the E-DAC Committee is of sufficient magnitude that we need to form subgroups. This document provides a starting point for the discussion of how to form subgroups, how subgroups could work, and what sort of subgroups we should consider forming.

2.0 Subgroup Structure

Questions for discussion: a) Size of work items for subgroups — how long? how many people? b) Reporting — how often? in what format? c) Involvement of non-committee members d) Others?

3.0 Possible subgroups

Subgroups will likely reflect the structure and outline of the final report, along with the deliverables associated with the committee terms of reference.

Possible subgroups could include: a) Dispatch in the context of Emergency Services - Set the stage of the larger emergency services mandate and how emergency dispatch is an integral part. This can help make sure that we’re not recommending a limited "point solution” that does not integrate into the broader mandate of the LIVFD and associate services. b) Wireline Telecommunication Services - Investigate current and future characteristics, availability, quality, investment and reliability of local (Lasqueti) wireline telecommunication services as provided by Telus c) Cellular Telecommunication Services - Investigate current and future characteristics, availability (coverage), quality, investment and reliability of local (Lasqueti) cellular telecommunication services as provided by Rogers, Telus, etc. d) 9-1-1 Reliability Assessment - Investigation of the reliability and availability of 9-1-1 service as outlined in various emergency and disaster scenarios e) Mapping and Dispatch - Investigations of options for mapping, and use in the dispatch process f) Training and Documentation - Investigations into required, recommended and suggested training and documentation required to meet legal obligations and best practices g) Legal and Liability - Investigations into the legal requirements for the LIVFD & associated dispatch services h) etc.

Committee members and members of the public are encouraged to come to the meeting with additional ideas about subgroups.

Subgroups Discussion Paper Page 1! of 1! 2016-01-30 Emergency Dispatch Advisory Committee E-DAC PRRD Electoral Area “E” Initial Report Outline 2016-01-25, Revision 1

1.0 Overview

In the Nov 27th Terms of Reference (ToR) from the PRRD, under the “Reporting Mechanisms” section, the E-DAC is obligated to provide a written report “prior to the March 2016 meeting of the PRRD Board”. The contents and purpose of this report are not specified.

This document describes a proposed outline for this report, hereto titled the “Initial Report of the Emergency Dispatch Advisory Committee”, or simply the “Initial Report”. This report shall act as the opening “bookend” of the committee’s work, with the “Final Report” acting as the ending bookend.

2.0 Initial Report Objectives

The purpose of the Initial Report is to set the stage for the committee’s work, and shall serve the following purposes:

a) Provide a summary document to aid bringing new participants up to speed, and b) Provide clarity and visibility to the Lasqueti Island community and PRRD stakeholders regarding the work planned to be done by the committee during 2016

At a high level, the report shall include the following information:

a) a summary of the issue at hand, b) the history that has lead up to the formation of the committee, c) the work done to date, d) the work planned to be done, and e) an outline of the final report

3.0 Initial Report Outline

Cover Letter Single page formal letter submitting the Initial Report to the PRRD board to fulfil the requirements of the ToR, signed by all committee members. Executive Summary Single page summary of the contents of the report. To be written last, after the body of the report is completed. History of Emergency Two page description of the history of emergency dispatch on Lasqueti Dispatch in Electoral Island, up to the triggering event of the discontinuation of Telus service and Area “E” the PRRD proposal to add Electoral Area “E” to the 9-1-1 service area. Community Two page description of the consultation process undertaken in 2015, leading Consultation up to the formation of the Emergency Dispatch Advisory Committee. Terms of Reference Two page summary of the terms of reference and mandate of the committee.

Outline of Work Two page description, at a high level, the work planned by the committee to meet the terms of reference, including the final report. Planned Deliverables Seven page (estimated) outline of the final report of the committee, including:

1. Interests (Community, LVFD/FR & PRRD), 2. Requirements (including regulatory requirements), 3. Systems (options, communication, reliability, etc), 4. Assessment of available options, 5. Recommendations of the committee, and 6. Appendixes providing technical details, supporting materials, etc.

Initial Report Outline Page 1! of 1! 2016-01-25 Electoral Area ‘E’ Emergency Dispatch Advisory Committee Terms of Reference

Name Electoral Area ‘E’ Emergency Dispatch Advisory Committee

Members The committee shall consist of a) 9 regular voting members who must (i) own property or reside within Electoral Area ‘E’; and (ii) be 18 years or older; and must include (iii) the Fire Chief of the Lasqueti Island Volunteer Fire Department (LIVFD) (iv) one current First Responder with the LIVFD (v) one current Dispatcher with the LIVFD (vi) Local Emergency Coordinator b) 1 Non-voting member: (i) Regional District Electoral Area ‘E’ Director

The majority of voting members must reside within Electoral Area ‘E’.

Individuals who have an interest in a business that may benefit from this committee’s recommendations or who may otherwise be in a conflict of interest are excluded from the committee.

Term of Membership The PRRD will advertise applications for membership in the local newspaper and through postings on the PRRD and Lasqueti Island websites.

Members will be appointed by the PRRD Board.

The committee’s term will end no later than December 2016. The committee may end earlier if all goals are completed.

Purpose An effective emergency dispatch system is integral to public safety as well as the safety of emergency responders. This committee is being formed to research and advise the Powell River Regional District on the best options to implement and support emergency dispatch within Electoral Area ‘E’.

Goals: 1. Recommend to the PRRD Board an emergency dispatch system that effectively supports public and emergency responder safety 2. Research and explain all necessary components 3. Clearly identify all forecasted costs for the recommended system

Deliverables This committee will recommend an effective emergency dispatch system, detailing all necessary components. Specifically, the committee will research all aspects of the recommended system ensuring that the system is sustainable in regard to financial, technical, and human resources requirements. The committee will submit a business case to the PRRD Board addressing the following:

• Public phone number(s) to reach dispatchers. • Communications network linking dispatchers and emergency responders. • Communications system effectiveness/coverage across the service area. • Communications equipment standards. • Communications equipment redundancies in case of main system failure. • Surge capacity for times of major emergencies or disasters. • Plan for alternative power supply for all necessary components in case of power failure. • Dispatcher training. • Dispatcher staffing to ensure 24/7 service and will include a longer term dispatcher succession plan. • Identify any applicable specific obligations by the PRRD to meet Workers Compensation Act Occupational Health and Safety Regulations regarding dispatcher operations. • Ensure PRRD obligations per Bill C-45 for effective workplace safety. • House numbering or other property/location identifier system. • Ability to implement any “next generation” communications (ie text message option for hearing impaired, or other media usage). • Appropriate dispatch recording practices including call times and all relevant communications records. All dispatch personnel, training, and operations records must be maintained in a records management system that ensures appropriate storage and retention of records and ensuring privacy concerns are addressed. • Ensure the recommended dispatch system equipment, structures, and operations comply with all relevant statutes and regulations, particularly but not limited to: Industry Canada, Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, Office of the Fire Commissioner, BC Building Code, Workers Compensation Act, and any relevant PRRD bylaws and policies. • All costs for equipment purchasing, training, ongoing maintenance, licences, contracts, professional fees and any other anticipated necessary expenditures for the system’s first ten years. • Any major capital items (ie communications towers) must show anticipated lifecycle and replacement costs.

Scope / Jurisdiction / Authority This scope of this committee is limited to matters related to emergency dispatch within Electoral Area ‘E’. This committee is an advisory committee, reporting to the Board of the PRRD, and as such it has no direct authority over any PRRD services.

Resources and Budget Committee members will serve without remuneration.

Costs of copying and circulating materials for agendas and miscellaneous expenses will be financed through the Lasqueti Island Fire Protection Service budget.

Governance The Committee shall conduct meetings in accordance with the Powell River Regional District Board Procedure Bylaw:

The Committee will elect a chair at its first meeting.

The Chair will approve each meeting’s agenda. Members are to contact the Chair at least one week in advance of the meeting to advise of items they would like included on the agenda.

The objective will be to make decisions by consensus. If a consensus cannot be reached, a majority vote will prevail.

Members are expected to regularly attend the meetings. Absence from 3 consecutive meetings without notification to the Chair and without reasonable cause will be grounds for a member to be removed from the committee.

A quorum will consist of a majority of members of the Committee.

Frequency of Meetings The committee will meet at least once per month with dates and location to be determined by committee members. Additional meetings may be scheduled as required to deal with current business.

Record of Meetings The committee will elect one member to act as the committee recorder for preparing agendas and minute taking.

The committee recorder shall prepare an agenda which shall be circulated to the committee members at least 48 hours in advance. The committee may waive the requirement for advance notice of the agenda in emergency situations requiring a special meeting.

Wherever possible, information will be circulated in advance by e-mail.

The committee recorder shall prepare minutes of committee meetings. Copies of minutes shall be circulated to committee members. Minutes of the prior meeting will be circulated as part of the agenda package and adopted at the following meeting. Meeting minutes will be forwarded to the PRRD one day after adoption.

Reporting Mechanism The committee will provide at least one written report: • prior to the March 2016 meeting of the PRRD Board, and • at the committee’s conclusion in December 2016 or before this time if the committee chooses to conclude earlier. This final report will include the business case for the recommended dispatch system.

The committee may provide additional reports during its term to the PRRD Board if it so chooses.

Additional Notes The committee is recommended to review the following documents for understanding of current standards and discussions on emergency dispatch: • NFPA Standard 1061 Standard for Professional Qualifications for Public Safety Telecommunications Personnel. • NFPA Standard 1221 Standard for the Installation, Maintenance, and Use of Emergency Services Communications Systems. • 9-1-1 Services in British Columbia: Background Review in Relation to a Province- Wide Call Answer Levy. Study produced by Dave Mitchell & Associates Ltd, 2013 for UBCM. • Strategic Vision Summary of Consultation Comments, Ministry of Justice 2015 summary of 9-1-1 PSAP workshop for input for the future of future of emergency communications across the province. • British Columbia Earthquake Preparedness Consultation Report, Henry Renteria (2014), particularly Recommendation 8.5.

9-1-1 Services in British Columbia: Background Review in Relation to a Province-Wide Call Answer Levy

Dave Mitchell & Associates Ltd.

12 July 2013

Table of Contents Executive Summary ...... 3 1. Introduction and Background ...... 8 2. Definition of 9-1-1 Services, Public Safety Context and Standards ...... 9 a. Definition of 9-1-1 Services ...... 9 b. Public Safety Context ...... 14 c. Standards ...... 16 3. Legislative Responsibility ...... 18 4. Existing 9-1-1 Services in British Columbia ...... 20 a. Overview ...... 20 b. Summary of Survey Results ...... 22 c. PSAP Surveys ...... 23 d. Local Government Surveys ...... 24 e. Existing Technology and Infrastructure ...... 24 f. Costs and Funding Issues ...... 26 5. Coverage Gaps...... 29 a. Regional Districts ...... 29 b. First Nations ...... 30 6. 9-1-1 System Developments and Issues ...... 31 a. Next Generation 9-1-1 ...... 31 b. Abandoned, Misdialed and Short Duration Calls ...... 33 c. Service Delivery and Efficiency Issues ...... 35 7. Canadian and Other Jurisdictions’ 9-1-1 Service and CAL Models ...... 36 a. Introduction ...... 36 b. Review of Canadian Jurisdictions ...... 36 i. Canadian Overview ...... 39 ii. Nova Scotia ...... 40 iii. New Brunswick ...... 44 iv. Prince Edward Island ...... 47 v. Saskatchewan ...... 49 vi. Québec ...... 51

vii. Alberta ...... 56 c. Approaches in Other Jurisdictions ...... 58 i. Manitoba ...... 58 ii. State of Kentucky ...... 59 8. Issues, Challenges and Options for Introduction of a Provincial CAL Legislative Responsibility ...... 62 a. Legislative Approach and Issues ...... 62 i. Legislation/Regulation...... 62 ii. Managing Liability ...... 63 b. Scope of Services to be Funded by a CAL ...... 64 c. Allocation and Management of CAL funding ...... 66 d. Governance and Oversight Issues ...... 70 i. National Participation Issues ...... 70 ii. PSAP Regulation, Standards and PSAP Operational Role ...... 70 e. Amount of the CAL and Administration Fee for CAL Collection ...... 71 Appendix A: Glossary ...... 74 Appendix B: Forms of Survey ...... 76

Executive Summary

In January 2013, a Steering Committee was formed comprising representatives of local government, the Union of British Columbia Municipalities and the Province, to examine the issues surrounding the introduction of a uniform, province-wide Call Answer Levy to support and improve 9-1-1 services in British Columbia. This background paper was commissioned by the UBCM in support of the Steering Committee’s work. The paper examines how 9-1-1 services currently are delivered in the province, reviews call answer levy legislation and the operation of 9-1-1 services in other jurisdictions, and sets out a framework of the options and issues facing the introduction of a call answer levy in British Columbia.

9-1-1 services are an integral part of the province’s emergency communications system. They are a front-end gating mechanism which connects the public to the correct emergency service dispatch agency. There are 12 Public Safety Answering Points which operate under local government authority and provide 9-1-1 services to most of the province.

The operation of 9-1-1 services, indeed, of all aspects of the emergency dispatch and communications system, is time-impacted and often life-critical. The system itself is interdependent and may be viewed as a continuum commencing from when a member of the public places a call to 9-1-1, where the call is assessed by the 9-1-1 operator and transferred to the relevant emergency dispatch agency, to the dispatch of emergency services and the operation of those services at the incident itself. A failure or delay at any point in this continuum will potentially affect how the entire system operates. Such failures or delays may increase the risk to life of both the public and emergency responders, or result in increased damage to property. Consequently, the entire system, from 9-1-1 services through to dispatch and the emergency radio system, needs to be resilient. It must operate to recognized standards, be adequately housed and staffed with properly trained personnel, and supported by carefully considered programs and processes for quality assurance/quality improvement, centre back-up and business continuity.

Research was conducted on the operation of the existing 9-1-1 system in British Columbia, and on the operation of similar systems in other jurisdictions, with a focus on Canadian provinces where provincial Call Answer Levies have been introduced. The B.C. research included two surveys: one for local governments which were responsible for providing 9-1-1 services; and the other to the 12 Public Safety Answering Points which actually operate the service. In addition, follow up telephone interviews and email exchanges were conducted with local government, RCMP and PSAP1 personnel, all of whom willingly and generously assisted in providing data, information and insight.

9-1-1 Services in British Columbia

The existing 9-1-1 system has developed organically since its inception in the 1980s. Responsibility for the service lies with local government. Typically, this responsibility is met at

1 A list of acronyms used is set out in Appendix A. Capitalized terms and acronyms used in the Executive Summary are defined in the body of the paper when they are first used.

3 the regional district level, though a number of municipalities either contract for, or directly provide the service as well. As technology has developed and improved, a number of local governments have banded together to coordinate the delivery of the service through a single centre. With current technologies, 9-1-1 services can be provided safely and effectively from distant locations.

9-1-1 services are available in most areas of the province, but there are still some unserviced areas and some coverage gaps. Two regional districts – the Northern Rockies Regional Municipality and Central Coast Regional District – and one provincially governed region (the Stikine Region), lack any 9-1-1 service. Additionally, there is no 9-1-1 service in Skeena-Queen Charlotte Regional District outside of the City of Prince Rupert and District of Port Edward. Seven other regional districts reported coverage gaps, either in some electoral areas or on some First Nations reserves. As part of the move to a uniform, province-wide Call Answer Levy, it will be necessary to address the 9-1-1 service coverage gaps, which may involve some financial assistance for the unserved areas. More detailed investigation of coverage gaps also will be required, to assess the cost of service expansion and confirm the areas which still lack service.

The existing 9-1-1 system manages between 1.5 and 1.6 million calls annually. The cost of operating the existing system is in the range of $12-13 million per year. All of the PSAPs have sought to address business continuity issues: every PSAP has back up and alternate power supplies for critical systems; 11 of 12 have designated fail-over centres and most of the PSAPs have back-up sites for their operations. Only half of the PSAPs, however, were able to confirm that their infrastructure was built to current post-disaster standards.

The 9-1-1 system faces various challenges. In addition to the coverage gaps noted above, the system is also struggling to deal with “Abandoned Calls”. These calls, which almost exclusively come from mobile phones, place significant strain on PSAP, dispatcher and police resources. In some jurisdictions, nearly a quarter of the calls for service for police involve follow-up on abandoned 9-1-1 calls. A formal study of the issue needs to be undertaken and a province-wide policy adopted on how such calls are treated, from PSAP through to police response. The issue also highlights the need for an effective, province-wide educational program aimed at the public, to reduce the number of “pocket dials” received by PSAPs.

The most significant development for 9-1-1 and dispatch services is the imminent advent of Next Generation 9-1-1. NG911 will involve moving PSAPs and Secondary Safety Answering Points to internet-protocol based systems. It will allow emergency communication centres to accept a broader range of connections and data sources – including text, video and pictures. Moving to NG911 will involve a substantive transformation of the existing systems used by emergency communication centres in the province, and will entail technological, operational, economic and institutional change. The system and equipment architecture for NG911 are still being developed, debated and reviewed. However, transitioning to the new systems will be a costly undertaking, in terms of capital investment as well as staffing and training issues. A “precursor” to NG911 is already on the horizon as the CRTC has mandated that carriers must

4 enable text connections to 9-1-1 services for the deaf, hard of hearing and speech impaired, by 2014.

The review showed that larger PSAPs tended to be more cost-efficient when measured on a “per-call” or per capita basis. Larger centres enjoy economies of scale which are significant. Cost efficient operation of the emergency communications system is important, to ensure that limited budgets are well invested. This reality, however, should not be viewed as a criticism of the existing system, given that it developed organically over the past 30 or so years. Indeed, local governments have worked hard to combine the delivery of the services in most areas of the province, as the technology enabling them to do so has become available. British Columbia compares well to most Canadian jurisdictions: given its geographic size and population, it already has a reasonably efficient PSAP footprint. On a per capita basis, Québec has nearly 60% more PSAPs, while Alberta has more than twice the number of that in British Columbia. The numbers are even more significant when compared to the Maritime Provinces and Ontario.2 Improved efficiencies should still be encouraged, however, as it ensures that monies can be invested in improving the operation and resilience of the system, and enhancing service to the public.

9-1-1 Services and Call Answer Levies in Other Jurisdictions

A significant part of this review involved research into the operation of 9-1-1 systems and Call Answer Levy regimes in other Canadian provinces. Six other Canadian provinces have established, or are introducing, a province-wide CAL: Alberta, Saskatchewan, Québec, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia. In five of those provinces, the CAL applies to all devices which can connect to 9-1-1 services; only Alberta has introduced a CAL which is limited to wireless devices. Each Canadian jurisdiction which has introduced a CAL has also either established procedures, guidelines and operational requirements for PSAPs, or has created a process for establishing them. Four of the six provinces also have introduced liability exemptions covering the operation of PSAPs.

The Maritime Provinces and Saskatchewan fundamentally approach 9-1-1 services as a provincial responsibility (even though service delivery everywhere but Prince Edward Island generally remains with local governments). In Québec and Alberta, 9-1-1 service delivery remains the responsibility of local governments – though Québec has taken the step of requiring that local governments make the service available (either directly or by contract) in most areas of the province.

In the Québec system, the provincial government set detailed requirements for PSAPs, ranging from location and infrastructure, to operational requirements, procedures and quality assurance processes. The allocation of funding from the CAL, however, rests with an agency which is operated by local government. That same agency is responsible for reviewing PSAP operations. In essence, though the province established the requirements, it gave control and

2 The number of PSAPs in Ontario is not reported. An email from Inspector Paulo DaSilva of the York Regional Police, who responded to an information request placed to the Ontario 9-1-1 Advisory Board, indicated that there are “over 100” PSAPs in Ontario. Email from Insp. P. DaSilva, 8 July 2013.

5 oversight of the system to local government, which remains responsible for actual service delivery. An interesting feature of the Québec system, moreover, is that it strictly limits the amount of the funding available for “administration”: a maximum of 3% of the CAL funds can be spent by the responsible agency for its administrative overheads.

Other provinces (notably Saskatchewan, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia) have established committees comprising various stakeholders, including representatives of local government and PSAPs, and emergency services personnel, to develop and implement consistent policies, procedures and standards for their 9-1-1 services. In Alberta, which is in the process of introducing a new CAL and attendant standardized requirements for PSAPs, the principal responsibility lies with the Alberta Emergency Management Agency. The AEMA is seeking to coordinate policy development with local governments and PSAPs.

In four of the six Canadian jurisdictions, the permitted use of CAL funds is broader than a narrowly conceived view of 9-1-1 services. Nova Scotia, among other things, funds its poison control centre using CAL monies. New Brunswick recently broadened its definition of allowable expenditures to include the “coordination of emergency services” in the province, while Saskatchewan uses about half of the CAL funding to subsidize the connection of local government and provincial agencies (including fire departments and municipal workers) to the province’s emergency radio network. Québec utilizes a set allocation formula for distributing CAL funds to (or at the direction of) local governments. It does not actually limit or prescribe how those funds must be spent, though in practice, 96% of the funds are distributed directly to PSAPs.

Two other jurisdictions also were examined: Manitoba and the State of Kentucky. Manitoba has not introduced a provincial CAL. However, it has adopted a centralized approach to the establishment of standards governing PSAP operations and established a wide-ranging liability exemption for PSAP operations. The State of Kentucky, conversely, epitomizes the decentralized approach. With an area only one-third that of British Columbia and a smaller population, Kentucky supports 109 certified PSAPs, and more than 80 uncertified PSAPs, which are not tracked by any state agency. PSAP operation is a local government responsibility and is principally funded through a combination of landline CALs and property taxes. The state also has established a wireless CAL, which it uses to subsidize certified PSAPs and to regulate how those PSAPs manage wireless 9-1-1 calls. It is probably not surprising that the system suffers from significant efficiency issues and many local governments are struggling with funding problems.

Issues and Options for a Province-wide CAL in British Columbia

As a starting point it should be noted that this background paper assumes that a CAL will be imposed on all devices which connect to 9-1-1 services (including landline, wireless and Voice over IP). The CAL will be set at a uniform level and will be province-wide. The principal function of the CAL will be to fund 9-1-1 services, though the introduction of the new system should not result in any local government losing any amount of existing revenue which it currently raises from a landline (or, in the case of Prince Rupert, landline and wireless) CAL. In

6 other words, the CAL should provide at least the same existing level of funding to such jurisdictions.

Establishment of a CAL and related structures and processes, will involve senior legislation and related regulations. The legislation and regulations will need to address a range of issues, which are set out in greater detail in the body of the paper (including the scope of the CAL, liability issues, collection issues, processes etc.). In general, however, the three principal, interrelated issues which need to be addressed are: the allowable scope of expenditure of funds raised from the CAL; the method or process by which those funds will be managed and allocated; and the extent to which (and process by which) common standards and requirements for PSAP operations will be developed and implemented.

The paper does not seek to prejudge the appropriate scope for the application of CAL funds. That is a policy issue for local governments and the province, though a range of matters are identified which could be included as “in scope”, on both a narrow conception of 9-1-1 services and a broader approach to the use of the funds. Simply put, however, the broader the scope of the CAL – the more elements of the emergency communications system that will be funded, in whole or in part, by this levy – the more complex the allocation process and the more complex the oversight and management of the system will become.

Certain issues or principles did emerge from discussion both with stakeholders during the research process, and through the review of an initial draft of the paper with the Steering Committee:

1. The CAL funding should only be applied to specific, agreed purposes, which should be clearly defined in the senior legislation; 2. The principle use of the funding will be “9-1-1 services”; 3. Control over the allocation of CAL funding should remain with local governments; 4. The allocation process will likely involve both a metrics-driven formula and some form of grants process; 5. The allocation process will need to take into account existing funding and cost structures of local governments; 6. Any administration costs related to the oversight of the system (i.e., to manage the allocation process and any similar functions) should be strictly limited; and 7. Any standards or procedures which are established should be created through a consensus process involving relevant stakeholders – the costs of developing, implementing and meeting those standards must be factored into the CAL funding formula.

Finally, the legislation will also need to address the quantum of the administration fee which telecommunication companies will be permitted to charge for collecting and remitting the CAL. As a matter of principle, this fee should be set at a rate that is no more than the actual cost of collection. With a uniform levy across all devices, and a single point of remittance for CAL funds, the administration fee should be nominal, and certainly far less than the $0.07 currently charged for the collection of landline CALs.

1. Introduction and Background

In January 2013, a steering committee (the “Steering Committee”) was established comprising representatives of local government, the Union of British Columbia Municipalities (“UBCM”) and the province. The goal of the steering committee was to examine issues related to the introduction of a uniform call answer levy to support and improve the operation of 9-1-1 services in British Columbia. In early May 2013, Dave Mitchell & Associates Ltd. commenced work to develop a background paper to help inform the review process being undertaken by the Steering Committee.

The work to be undertaken included a review of the existing 9-1-1 services in the province, a consideration of how such services are delivered in other jurisdictions, a review of how other Canadian jurisdictions with provincial call answer levies have implemented and manage those levies, and a review of the issues, challenges and options in relation to the introduction of a call answer levy (“CAL”) in British Columbia.

The Steering Committee established a series of strategic objectives and principles in relation to the establishment of a practical and sustainable CAL model.3 From the province’s perspective, three criteria need to be met:

the CAL needs to be province-wide and harmonized with other jurisdictions (if possible); the establishment of a CAL must offer improvements to public safety (e.g. enhanced capabilities, additional training, enhanced capacity to meet future demands, etc.); and, the CAL needs to feature a consensus funding formula based on industry and local government leadership.

From the local government perspective, a province-wide CAL must:

provide new revenue to assist in the development of local 911 services;4 ensure that all users of the local 9-1-1 service help pay for the service, both wireless and landlines; and respect the delivery of 9-1-1 services by local government.

To gather the necessary background information, two separate surveys were created. One survey was for the 12 Public Safety Answering Points (“PSAPs”) which operate under local government authority and are responsible for handling the vast majority of 9-1-1 services in the province. This survey focused on issues ranging from the number of calls handled, the number of agencies to which calls were downstreamed and staffing, to infrastructure, training and standards. The second survey was designed for those local governments which were

3 UBCM/Provincial Government Committee on Provincial 911 Call Answer Levy: Terms of Reference (undated - 2013). 4 Various comments from local government representatives have emphasized that this criterion refers to net new revenue, after taking into account existing local governments costs and revenue sources. Comment from T. Whiting, Senior Manager, Protective Services, CRD, 8 July 2013.

8 responsible for delivering 9-1-1 services in their jurisdictions. These surveys therefore went principally to regional district governments, which typically have responsibility for this service. Where municipal governments were known to be directly involved in providing the service, the questionnaire was also provided to those governments.

In addition, extensive research was conducted on how 9-1-1 services are delivered in other Canadian provinces, with a particular emphasis on those jurisdictions which have established a CAL. The manner in which other provinces are operating their 9-1-1 systems, and managing the corresponding CAL funds, provides a guide as to the issues that need consideration in British Columbia and some conceptual approaches that may be applicable here.

Assistance was also obtained from various individuals in local government and the PSAPs, who willingly shared information and their expertise. Particular thanks are owing to Inspector Rick Greenwood (RCMP E-Division Operational Communication Centres), Bill Figgitt (RCMP – SE District Deputy Leader), Mike Webb and Doug Watson (E-Comm), Cary Berger (Central Okanagan Regional District), Donna Munt (Regional District of Fraser-Fort George), Deb Middleton (Bulkley-Nechako Regional District), Per Kristensen (City of Nanaimo), Travis Whiting (Capital Regional District), Debra Oakman and Marie Lapp (Comox Valley Regional District) and Mike Gilbert (Northern Rockies Regional Municipality).

2. Definition of 9-1-1 Services, Public Safety Context and Standards

The potential introduction of a province-wide CAL to support and improve 9-1-1 services will necessarily involve a consideration of the funding, operation, applicable standards, oversight and control of those services. As such, it is critical to bear in mind the public safety context applicable to 9-1-1 services as those decisions are made. This section seeks first to define what constitutes “9-1-1 services,” then to place those services in the public safety context and to develop some principles which should inform the decision making process.

a. Definition of 9-1-1 Services

9-1-1 services are part of the continuum of emergency communications which start with a member of the public seeking assistance, and ends when that event has been responded to and dealt with by the relevant emergency service. While each element may be distinctly identified and its processes defined, it needs to be understood that they are fully interconnected and interdependent. The failure of the system at any one point will negatively impact the operation of the system as a whole. The general structure of the system in shown in Figure 1, below, along with the potentially applicable standards for each element of 9-1-1 call handling and emergency service dispatch process:5

5 Note that BC Ambulance Service Dispatch also applies standards to call answer and dispatch. The former is essentially the NENA standard of answering 90% of the calls within 10 seconds or less. The dispatch standard is essentially the same as NFPA 1221 (2010), though BCAS breaks its measurement into two separate components. Fundamentally, however, an EMS unit must be dispatched within 60 seconds, 90% of the time. Email from G. Kirk, Director, Dispatch Operations, BCAS, 10 July 2013.

Incident BCAS EMS Dispatch Unit

Emergency

911 PSAP Police Police Caller P, F Dispatch Unit or A Radio

Network

Call Answer: NENA or Fire Dispatch Fire Unit NFPA 1221

Time for Call Transfer to Dispatch: NFPA 1221

Dispatch Turn-out Time: Time: NFPA NFPA 1221 or Figure 1: Emergency Communications 1221 BCAS Standard Continuum and Relevant Standards

On this continuum, the 9-1-1 service is actually a relatively limited piece – it is the initial interface or gating mechanism through which a member of the public is directed to the correct dispatch agency for the relevant emergency responders.

In practice, the call flow from a PSAP to the relevant emergency dispatch agency, and from that agency to the relevant emergency service personnel, can be complex. For example, a 9-1-1 call placed from the Shuswap Lake area in the Columbia Shuswap Regional District (“CSRD”), will be routed to the Kelowna RCMP PSAP. If the call is for a fire department, the Kelowna RCMP PSAP will downstream the call to Surrey Fire Dispatch, which is contracted to provide fire dispatch services for the CSRD’s regional fire departments. Surrey Fire Dispatch, in turn, will then assess the call and page out the appropriate CSRD regional fire department.

A diagrammatic representation of how emergency calls get routed from 9-1-1 to emergency service agencies is shown in Figure 2 below, which sets out how the current system operates in the Capital Regional District (the “CRD”).6 The CRD is served by three PSAPs.7 Each of the PSAPs also dispatches police services (two for multiple jurisdictions). 9-1-1 calls can also be downstreamed to one of three fire dispatch centres or to the BCAS dispatch centre. Two of the fire dispatch centres, in turn, dispatch multiple agencies.

6 Diagram provided courtesy of the CRD, by Travis Whiting, Senior Manager, Protective Services, CRD. 7 There is a fourth PSAP which serves only the DND regions of the CRD, as noted at the top of the diagram.

Figure 3: CRD PSAP Operation

For the purposes of this background paper, 9-1-1 services are understood to comprise the following:

(a) Call answer on the incoming 9-1-1 line.

(b) Caller interrogation/call evaluation to determine:

o to which emergency agency or Secondary Safety Answering Point the call should be directed; and o the jurisdiction and location to which it relates.8

The “Transfer” step may involve any one of the following:

the call taker notionally switching roles, and undertaking a caller interrogation/dispatch function for either fire or police; the call being transferred across the room to a police or fire dispatcher position; or the call being transferred to an external agency – such as to BC Ambulance, or to a police or fire dispatch agency such as Surrey Police Dispatch or Kamloops Fire Dispatch.9

The 9-1-1 function ends when the “transfer” is complete, either through a call hand-off to another agency or when the notional transfer occurs and the call taker commences agency- specific call evaluation and/or dispatch functions.

On this basis, when viewed as part of the continuum of the emergency communications system, 9-1-1 services are a very limited piece, at the front end of the process. Subsequent references in this background paper to “9-1-1 services” will be predicated on this definition. A provider of 9-1-1 services is properly referred to as a “public safety answering point” or “PSAP”.10 Communication centres which provide only dispatch services are referred to as “Secondary Service Answering Points” or “SSAPs”.

An issue to be considered by stakeholders, including local governments, the province, emergency communication centres and emergency agencies, is the role to be played by PSAPs in relation to abandoned or short duration 9-1-1 calls. This issue, which can consume

8 In many cases, as the system is currently structured, the “jurisdiction” question may not need to be answered, as there may be only one relevant dispatch agency to which the PSAP downstreams the call. However, as noted in the Kelowna OCC’s operational manual: “The primary source of information, including location and type of emergency is the caller. ANI/ALI information is used as a secondary or confirmation source only, unless the caller is unable to provide the information.” 9 There are approximately 50 – 60 external dispatch agencies in the province to which PSAPs may downstream 9-1-1 calls, in addition to the in-house dispatching that they also perform. 10 The use of the term “PSAP” in some sources is used to refer to any emergency communication centre, including those which only provide dispatch services. In this background paper, the term “PSAP” will only refer to an emergency communication centre which provides 9-1-1 services. In B.C., every PSAP in the province also provides police, fire, or police and fire, dispatch services, in addition to 9-1-1 services.

13 significant amounts time for both SSAPs and for police resources, will be examined elsewhere in this paper (see section 6(b), below).

The use of this definition is not intended to prejudge how funds from a CAL should be used. As will be seen, other Canadian jurisdictions use the funds raised for purposes broader than what may be considered “9-1-1 services” as narrowly defined and some also have 9-1-1 operators play a much more expansive role in the emergency communications system.

Principled arguments can be made for using this funding source to enhance emergency communications as more broadly conceived (including dispatch and emergency radio systems). Ultimately, that decision rests with the local governments and the province. It needs to be appreciated, however, that the further along the emergency communications continuum one goes, the more complicated the issues related to funding allocation methodologies, standards, operational requirements, oversight and similar issues become.

b. Public Safety Context

9-1-1 services are, first and foremost, a question of public safety. It is critical to ensure that the public safety context of these services remains the driving factor in any decision being made regarding the introduction of a CAL and any related consideration of funding allocation, operations, standards, oversight and control.

Emergency communications systems, of which 9-1-1 services are an integral part, require speed, accuracy, thoroughness and resilience. Emergency call handling is time-impacted and often life-critical. An emergency call taker must handle calls quickly, gathering the required information accurately and then fulfilling his or her function in the emergency communications continuum. These four criteria apply along the entire continuum, from 9-1-1 through to dispatch and the role played by dispatchers in emergency incident management.

Speed. If call handling is slow at any point in the system, it will delay the arrival of an appropriate emergency response, which can result in greater risk to life for both the public and the emergency responders, and potentially greater damage to property. Slow call handling can also impact other segments of the emergency communication process – if a dispatch centre cannot quickly effect the dispatch of units for which it is responsible, 9-1-1 call takers may not be able to pass on further calls to that centre. In turn, the queue for 9-1-1 calls may back up, since a 9-1-1 call taker cannot take a new call until an existing call has been transferred.

Slow call handling can result from a variety of issues, including insufficient staffing, insufficient training, a lack of quality assurance/quality improvement processes and problems with technology, equipment or software.

Accuracy. As with speed, if call handling is inaccurate at any point in the system, it may delay the arrival of an appropriate emergency response, which can result in greater risk to life for both the public and the emergency responders, and potentially greater damage to property. If call takers are not accurate, the wrong service may be dispatched, the wrong types of units may be sent or the units may be delayed in reaching the correct

destination. In the 9-1-1 context, an error in the appropriate jurisdiction, or selection of the wrong type of service, or technological issues stemming from insufficiently current master street address guides, GIS mapping problems, or similar issues, may significantly delay an emergency response.

Thoroughness. Given the limited mandate of 9-1-1 services, thoroughness is less of an issue for 9-1-1 call takers than it is for dispatch functions. That being said, at each gating point of the emergency communication process, call takers must ensure that they obtain all of the relevant information necessary to carry out their role in order to activate and direct the appropriate emergency response.

Resilience. The emergency communications system, from the 9-1-1 call taker position through to on-scene radio communications between emergency responders, must be resilient and robust. The system must be able to function effectively regardless of adverse circumstances. In the context of 9-1-1 services, resilience relates to the following issues:

Infrastructure – the building housing the communications centre, including all essential telephone, power and other service connections and related back-up systems; Technology and IT systems; Staff training and recognized service standards; Staffing levels; Proper organizational processes and management (including quality assurance and quality improvement); and Effective overflow, back-up and business continuity plans.

A PSAP needs to be able to continue functioning (or the service needs to be appropriately backed up by another centre) so that regardless of call volume or an incident affecting a particular 9-1-1 service provider, this critical connection service between the public and emergency responders is not lost or unduly delayed.

The final issue that needs to be borne in mind is that the delivery of the service has to be efficient. If the service does not operate efficiently, monies will be wasted which could have been invested in improving the standards or quality of service delivery to the public and to emergency responders.

An emergency communication centre, whether a PSAP or an SSAP, which meets the four criteria listed above, is an expensive undertaking. Given the capital costs of constructing and maintaining a resilient operation, one which is properly staffed and which utilizes current technology and software, there has been a move towards coordinating the delivery of emergency communication services. In delivering 9-1-1 services, various regional districts and

15 municipal governments have already banded together to share services through single points of coordination. Example of these shared or combined 9-1-1 services include:11

the arrangements made through the Central Okanagan Regional District, which coordinates and manages provision of 9-1-1 services to itself and eight other regional districts; the arrangements made through the Regional District of Fraser-Fort George, which coordinates and manages provision of 9-1-1 and fire dispatch services to itself and three other regional districts; E-Comm, which is owned by local governments and provides 9-1-1 services to three regional districts, in addition to fire and police dispatch services; Central Island 911, which is an arrangement between two regional districts and a municipality to manage the provision of 9-1-1 services; and North Island 911, through which six regional districts arrange for 9-1-1 and fire dispatch services.

These trends towards centralization of service delivery reflect both the benefits that can be obtained through economies of scale and the capabilities of current technologies. They enable investments in infrastructure, technology and staff which enhance service delivery to the public and to emergency responders and should be encouraged as part of this process.

c. Standards

The adherence to standards is one of the hallmarks of modern emergency services. The adoption of standards is critical to the efficient, safe and effective delivery of life-critical, time- impacted services. They also ensure that such services are delivered in a uniform and well understood fashion, thereby improving oversight and mitigating operational risk. In the context of emergency communication centres, established standards also enable such centres to undertake appropriate quality assurance and quality improvement reviews, with established and relevant benchmarks against which to measure performance.

In relation to 9-1-1 services, two recognized sets of standards are potentially applicable: those established by the National Emergency Number Association (“NENA”) and those established by the National Fire Protection Association (“NFPA”). Both are already used to varying degrees by different PSAPs in the province.

NENA is a professional organization focused on 9-1-1 policy, technology, operations and education issues.12 NENA has established a call answering standard and model for 9-1-1 services which covers five areas: 13

11 In some cases, one regional district may participate in two separate services. Thus, the Squamish- Lillooet Regional District (“SLRD”) arranges for 9-1-1 services through both the Central Okanagan Regional District, for its northern portion, and with E-Comm for the southern portion. Two municipal governments within the SLRD – Squamish and Whistler – separately contract with E-Comm for 9-1-1 and dispatch services. 12 See the NENA website, at: http://www.nena.org/

Operational level of service; Order of answering priority; Answering Protocol; Information gathering; and Call Transfer.

The NENA standard provides that 9-1-1 calls should be answered within 10 seconds, 90% of the time. It also prescribes that a 9-1-1 operator should always answer by saying “9-1-1”. The priority for handling calls are the 9-1-1 and 7 or 10 digit emergency lines, followed by non- emergency lines and finally by administrative or internal phone lines.14

The NENA standard offers certain recommendations as to what information should be obtained from callers, as well as processes to be followed by operators to verify address.15 While the standard specifically identifies call transfers to dispatch agencies as an issue, and provides that “the telecommunicator will transfer the call without delay”, it does not actually establish a measurable standard for such transfers.16

NENA also has established specific standards for responses to wireless 9-1-1 calls, TTY/TDD17 operating procedures, the use of call processing protocols and an operational study of “silent or hang-up” 9-1-1 calls.18

The NFPA has established comprehensive standards for 9-1-1 call taking and dispatch by emergency services. The NFPA is a professional organization which develops consensus standards for use by fire and other emergency services.19 Various NFPA standards already have been mandated by the province and by WorkSafe BC for use by the fire service.20

13 NENA, NENA Call Answering Standard/Model Recommendation (2006), at p. 5/12. 14 Ibid., at p. 8/12, sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. 15 Ibid., at pp. 8-9/12, section 3.6 and 3.6.1. 16 Ibid., at p. 9/12, sections 3.7. 17 TTY/TDD refers to “Telecommunications Device for the Deaf”. The device is essentially a typewriter that allows the deaf, hard of hearing or speech impaired to communicate with the emergency communications services through text. Not all PSAPs in the province currently have TTY/TDD capabilities. 18 See, for example: NENA, NENA Guidelines For Minimum Response To Wireless 9-1-1 Calls (2004); NENA TTY/TDD Communications Standard Operating Procedure Model Recommendation (2005); NENA Emergency Call Processing Protocol (2008); and NENA Silent or Hang-Up 9-1-1 Calls for Service: An Operations Focused Study (2002). NENA also has standards on civic addressing. 19 See the NFPA website at: www.nfpa.org. 20 The province, pursuant to section 3(3)(b) of the Fire Services Act (B.C.), has mandated that the training standards to be used by the fire services in the province are those set by the NFPA. See: Minister’s Order (OIC M368), 18 December 2002. Various NFPA requirements have also been adopted by WorkSafe BC in Part 31 of the Occupational Health and Safety Regulation made under the Workers Compensation Act (B.C.).

The relevant standard for emergency communications is NFPA 1221, Standard for the Installation, Maintenance, and Use of Emergency Services Communications Systems (2013 Edition) (“NFPA 1221”). The NFPA has prescribed a full range of call answer and handling standards, from 9-1-1 call answer and transfer to the ultimate dispatch of emergency services. Under the NFPA system, 9-1-1 calls should be answered within 15 seconds, 95% of the time, with 99% of all calls answered within 40 seconds. Call transfer by the 9-1-1 operator should be effected within 30 seconds, 95% of the time. 21

The NFPA standard, however, also covers most aspects of an emergency centre’s operations, including detailed requirements for infrastructure, equipment, back-up power supplies, continuity planning and similar issues. Centres which meet NFPA 1221 standards are designed to be resilient and secure.

All of the PSAPs which responded to the survey utilize either NENA or NFPA call answer standards, with the exception of E-Comm. E-Comm has a more stringent call answer standard – call answer within 5 seconds, 95% of the time – established under contract with its local government clients, and uses NFPA standards for call transfers. Only two centres reported that they have adopted the NFPA call transfer standard.

A corollary to establishing standards is the need to report on a communication centre’s performance against those standards and to utilize appropriate quality assurance/quality improvement processes to ensure that the standards are being met. Regular reporting requirements are an essential discipline. They ensure that a PSAP is regularly reviewing its performance against applicable standards,22 and assessing the quality of the service it delivers in a measurable fashion. The quality assurance and quality improvement processes then assist in identifying any issues with existing services and developing improvements to the system. Regular reporting on performance metrics and formal quality assurance/quality improvement programs, however, are far from universal in the province.

3. Legislative Responsibility

In British Columbia, delivery of 9-1-1 services is a local government responsibility. The provision of 9-1-1 services, like the provision of fire services, is an optional power. A local government is not obligated to provide such service and the province has not regulated any standards or requirements in relation to such 9-1-1 services if they are provided.

In general, this responsibility has been met by regional district governments, which have established and/or contracted for the provision of service across most of the province. Typically, amendments to the relevant Letters Patent for each regional district conferred the

21 See: NFPA 1221, s. 7.4.1. 22 Every PSAP and SSAP collects large volumes of data. It is surprising, however, that many do not then analyze and report on such data.

18 necessary powers to undertake the provision of 9-1-1 services, which are then implemented by bylaw as a regional service in accordance with the Local Government Act (B.C.).23

There are a few notable exceptions: in both Prince Rupert and Nelson, 9-1-1 services are municipally provided. The Prince Rupert PSAP is a combined 9-1-1, fire dispatch and communication centre, which is operated by the Prince Rupert Fire Rescue Department. The service was established under a city bylaw, “9-1-1 Dispatch Service Establishment Bylaw No. 3183, 2004.” The bylaw establishes 9-1-1 services within the municipal boundaries and permits the city to enter into agreements to provide those services to “any other area outside the City that has given consent and entered into an agreement” with the city.24 Prince Rupert also provides 9-1-1 services to the District of Port Edward under contract. The Regional District of Skeena-Queen Charlotte itself, however, does not provide any 9-1-1 services, and there are a number of settled areas within that regional district without 9-1-1 services.

The City of Nelson, in the Regional District of Central Kootenay (“RDCK”), also provides 9-1-1 services within its municipal boundaries. In this case, the services are incorporated as part of the operation of the Nelson Police Department emergency communications centre. Unlike the Prince Rupert example, however, the RDCK does provide 9-1-1 services to the rest of the regional district. The RDCK is one of eight regional districts which have contracted with the RDCO, to obtain 9-1-1 services through the Kelowna RCMP Operational Communications Centre.

In some cases, individual municipalities also have arranged for 9-1-1 services directly with a PSAP. Thus, in the Squamish-Lillooet Regional District (the “SLRD”), both Squamish and Whistler have separately contracted with E-Comm to obtain both 9-1-1 and dispatch services. Similarly, Central Island 911 is an arrangement between the City of Nanaimo, the Cowichan Valley Regional District and the Regional District of Nanaimo (acting on behalf of the area covered by the boundaries of School District 68) for the provision of 9-1-1 services to each of those parties.

As a local service, funding of 9-1-1 operations is the responsibility of local government. Two primary funding mechanisms are used: property taxes and a CAL on landlines. Most jurisdictions appear to rely on property taxes to fund 9-1-1 services; typically the same tax is used to pay for other portions of the emergency communications system, including dispatch services and the radio network.

A number of jurisdictions use both property taxes and a landline CAL. Landline CALs are implemented through agreements between local governments and the relevant Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier (“ILEC”) (in British Columbia, Telus is the ILEC) and Competitive Local

23 See, for example, Capital Regional District, Supplementary Letters Patent, Division XXXVI (OIC 1906, 15 October 1988), which conferred the power on the Capital Regional District to establish, operate and fund an “Emergency Response Telephone Service”; see also Regional District of Central Okanagan (“RDCO”), Supplementary Letters Patent, Division XXV (20 February 1985), which established comparable powers in the RDCO. 24 Prince Rupert, Bylaw No. 3183 (2004) s. 2(b).

Exchange Carriers (“CLECs”). Although the amount of the CAL varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the terms of such agreements are standardized, including a set fee of $0.07/line/month charged by Telus and the CLECs to collect the local levy.25

Finally, one jurisdiction in the province has managed to implement a wireless CAL. The Prince Rupert bylaw establishing the service in 2004 also established a CAL on wireless devices. Some funds are actually being collected through the mechanism, but it appears to be limited to wireless devices activated through Citytel, the telecommunications company owned by the city itself. As is well known, the attempt by Nanaimo to impose a CAL on wireless service providers was struck down by courts as a tax that was ultra vires the city.26

An issue that arises when assessing the costs associated with the provision of 9-1-1 services is that, in every case, these services are provided out of a facility which also offers dispatch services. Given that local governments usually treat 9-1-1 services as a related component of their emergency communication systems (in the broadest sense), it is therefore challenging to determine the precise costs of 9-1-1 service delivery for certain jurisdictions.

As will be seen, not all PSAPs in the province are required to report regularly on their performance metrics. Some Canadian jurisdictions prescribe both the standards applicable to call handling, as well as reporting requirements and quality assurance processes. In connection with the development of a CAL model, consideration of an appropriate approach to establishing consensus performance standards, reporting requirements and quality assurance processes for PSAPs should be included as an aspect of improving the delivery of 9-1-1 services in the province.

4. Existing 9-1-1 Services in British Columbia

a. Overview

9-1-1 services are available throughout most of the province,27 provided through either regional district or municipal governments. 9-1-1 services are provided by 12 PSAPs, plus a PSAP operated by DND Esquimalt (the operation of which is outside the scope of this review). Of the 12 PSAPs, six are located in RCMP Operational Communication Centres (“OCCs”).28 In some cases, 9-1-1 staffing of the OCCs is provided, in whole or in part, by local governments, a

25 The administration fee is expressly provided for as part of the general tariff. See, for example, Telus, General Tariff: Local Switched Access Service (CRTC 21461), Item 203.2D, “Local Government Authority Call Answer Levy”, paragraph 2. There also are CRTC-approved standard form agreements for “local governments” wishing to establish landline call answer levies with ILECs and CLECs. 26 Canadian Wireless Telecommunications Association v. Nanaimo (City) 2012 BCSC 1017, at para. 95 27 This is true, whether it is considered in a geographic sense (i.e., wherever there is a landline or reliable cell phone coverage) or in terms of coverage for resident populations. It is not meant to suggest, however, that coverage is complete. 28 In relation to the OCCs, this paper uses the location to name the OCC, rather than using the standard RCMP naming convention. For example, the “Southeast District OCC” is called the “Kelowna OCC”. In this way, it will be immediately understandable for the average reader where the particular OCC is located.

20 situation that figures most prominently in the Nanaimo and Kelowna OCCs. The following table shows each PSAP and its approximate or usual coverage zone:

PSAP Regions/Areas Served

Saanich Police Department Capital Regional District (Saanich and Oak Bay only) Victoria Police Department Capital Regional District (Victoria and Esquimalt only) Westshore RCMP OCC Capital Regional District (remainder of CRD except DND Esquimalt) [DND Esquimalt PSAP] [Capital Regional District (DND area only)]

Nanaimo RCMP OCC City of Nanaimo, Nanaimo Regional District (south portion – School District 68 only), and Cowichan Valley Regional District

Courtenay RCMP OCC North Island 911. North Island 911 is owned by and arranges for 9-1-1 services to six participating regional districts: Alberni- Clayoquot Regional District, Comox Valley Regional District, Mount Waddington Regional District, Powell River Regional District and the Regional District of Nanaimo (north portion – School District 69).

E-Comm (Emergency Communications for Metro Vancouver (Greater Vancouver Southwest British Columbia) Regional District), Sunshine Coast Regional District, District of Squamish, Resort Municipality of Whistler, Squamish-Lillooet Regional District (southern portion).

Chilliwack RCMP OCC Fraser Valley Regional District (part) Abbottsford Police Department Fraser Valley Regional District (part) Communications Centre

Kelowna RCMP OCC Regional District of Central Okanagan, which coordinates provision of services for eight other regional districts as well: Columbia Shuswap Regional District, Kootenay- Boundary Regional District, Regional District of Central Kootenay, Regional District of East Kootenay, Regional District of North Okanagan, Regional District of Okanagan- Similkameen, Squamish-Lillooet Regional District (north), and Thompson-Nicola Regional District).

Nelson Police Department Communications City of Nelson Centre

PSAP Regions/Areas Served

Prince Rupert Fire Rescue Services City of Prince Rupert, District of Port Edward Communications Centre (both in Skeena-Queen Charlotte Regional District)

Prince George RCMP OCC Peace River Regional District; and Regional District of Fraser-Fort George, which coordinates the provision of 9-1-1 services to: Cariboo Regional District, the Regional District of Bulkley-Nechako and the Regional District of Kitimat-Stikine.

b. Summary of Survey Results

In connection with the review of the operation of the 9-1-1 system in British Columbia, two surveys were developed: one was designed for and provided to each PSAP; the second was designed for local governments which had responsibility for providing, or arranging the provision of, 9-1-1 services for their jurisdictions. In addition, a PSAP survey was provided to BC Ambulance Service (“BCAS”), which provides back-up 9-1-1 service support for E-Comm. The forms of the survey used are attached as Appendix B.

Response rates from the surveys was high: all of the PSAPs responded and 21 out of 28 local government surveys were returned. The willingness of both emergency communications personnel and local governments to participate and to offer views and suggestions throughout the research process was greatly appreciated.

Certain of the data received needs to be treated with some caution. Time constraints affecting this project limited our ability fully to confirm or investigate all anomalies. For example, as noted above, a number of jurisdictions were unable to isolate and identify separately the cost of 9-1-1 services, since such services were fully integrated with their dispatch functions. The cost estimates presented later in this paper will need further investigation before a CAL is introduced.

Similarly, the reporting of call volumes by certain PSAPs does not actually reflect the full volume of calls received, and there were discrepancies between the total number of calls received by some centres and the detailed call breakdown that also was provided. In other instances, it was reported that where a particular event may generate a large number of repetitive calls, the PSAP call taker will initiate “call-screening”.29 If the PSAP call taker determines that the caller is repeating information about an existing incident, the call may be terminated without connecting the caller to the SSAP or dispatcher (leading, again, to significant discrepancies in call volume reporting and itemized breakdown).

In large measure, the call-screening approach (which is not ideal) is driven by capacity constraints at the SSAP, not the PSAP, level. A small dispatch centre which is attempting to

29 This term is extracted from the operations manual of one of the PSAPs where such a practice exists.

22 manage a major incident may not be able to handle the volume of calls presented while still dispatching and monitoring units active at the event. If the PSAP holds the calls until the SSAP is available, there is the risk that 9-1-1 lines would then become congested. Such congestion could result in a different emergency, at another location, not receiving timely assistance. This issue dramatically illustrates the inter-connected nature of each element in the emergency communications chain.

c. PSAP Surveys

The aim of the PSAP surveys was to get an overview of the actual operation of PSAPs in the province, including call volumes, call handling standards, infrastructure, staffing levels, training programs, reporting requirements and continuity planning. It is clear from the responses and the opportunity we had to exchange views with these centres, that their members are dedicated professionals seeking to ensure and enhance public safety. They welcomed the effort to review how services were delivered and were forthcoming with suggestions for improvements. All 12 PSAPs operating under provincial jurisdiction responded to the survey request.

The questions were grouped into several categories, not all of which will be summarized or repeated here. In aggregate, the following statistics provides a snapshot of how the PSAPs are currently operating:

Question or Issue Responses Total 9-1-1 Call Volume (2012) ~1,583,000 Highest 911,571 Lowest 2,839 Median 48,379 Number of abandoned or “short duration” calls ~260,000 (approximately 16.4%) PSAPs without TTY/TDD 5 of 12 PSAPs without access to translation services 2 of 12 Number of external SSAPs to which calls are sent ~50 – 60 Number of agencies and police detachments ~167 dispatched by primary PSAPs PSAPs with back-up centres 9 of 12 PSAPs with a fail-over centre 11 of 12 PSAPs with call volume overflow centre 5 of 12 PSAPs with prescribed call answer standards All PSAPs with prescribed call transfer standards (time to 2 of 12 assess the call and connect to the SSAP) PSAPs with established protocols for call answer All PSAPs requiring the 9-1-1 call taker to stay on the All line until SSAP accepts call PSAPs in purpose-built communications facility 2 PSAPs co-located in police buildings 9 PSAPs co-located in fire halls 1 PSAPs in buildings built to current post-disaster 6 of12 (three surveys marked as standards “unsure” & one left blank are treated as “noes”) PSAPs with generator power back-up All

Question or Issue Responses PSAPs with UPS for IT systems All PSAPs with formal, documented training processes All PSAPs with formal quality assurance programs 8/12

A number of these results are considered in further detail in section 4(e) “Technology and Infrastructure,” below.

d. Local Government Surveys

The local government surveys were intended to determine how the delivery of 9-1-1 services is organized and governed across the province, and the approximate cost of delivering such services. The surveys were primarily sent to those local governments which had direct responsibility for the service. Thus, if the service was delivered by a regional district government, the municipal governments which comprise that regional district were not separately surveyed. The primary results from the local government surveys are summarized below:

Question or Issue Responses

Population represented by returned surveys ~4,250,000 Estimated cost of existing 9-1-1 services ~$12,000,000 - $13,000,00030 Number of regional districts without any 9-1-1 service 231 Number of regions with known coverage gaps 732 (including First Nations areas) Number of responding jurisdictions with landline CALs 12 Range of landline CALs $0.47/line/month - $2.72/line/month

e. Existing Technology and Infrastructure

Appropriate technology and infrastructure are essential to ensuring that 9-1-1 service providers can meet the four criteria identified in the discussion of the public safety context of the service. Given the range of technologies being used and relatively short time lines for conducting the background review, no effort was made to ascertain the various systems in use at each PSAP. Rather, the focus was on major infrastructure and the back-up systems.

The review showed that all centres have available, on either a dedicated or shared basis, back- up power from one or more generators, as well as UPS systems for critical IT systems. Loss of

30 These estimates are analyzed in greater detail in section 4(f) below 31 To this number needs to be added the Stikine Region, which lacks any form of statutory local government and is managed directly by the province. Stikine Region has a total population of around 1,000, with significant areas of settlement at Atlin and at Dease Lake, as well as some First Nations reserves. Additionally, in Skeena-Queen Charlotte the only 9-1-1 services are those provided by the City of Prince Rupert to itself and the District of Port Edward. 32 A number of the regions reporting coverage gaps have multiple electoral areas or First Nations reserves without coverage.

24 power arising from a natural or human induced event, therefore, will not have an immediate impact on the operation of any of the PSAPs.

Most of the centres are co-located in police facilities, which should ensure a reasonable level of physical protection from outside intrusion. E-Comm and Saanich, as standalone communications centres, have been specifically designed to resist such intrusion, both in terms of construction and controlled access.

Of the PSAPs in the province, only six confirmed that the buildings in which they were located were known to be built to current post-disaster standards.33 While the degree of seismic risk varies throughout the province, post-disaster construction is important for public safety infrastructure. In areas such as coastal British Columbia, including Vancouver Island, the lower mainland region and Prince Rupert, meeting such standards is critical.

Most of the PSAPs (9 of 12) had back-up centres to which they could move in the event that their main facility became inoperable. Even more PSAPs (11 of 12) had a “fail-over” centre, which could be activated in the event that their facility suffered a temporary failure. Few centres, however, reported that they had arrangements in place to cover a surge in call volumes (though many had additional capacity within their organizations to manage such surges, by distributing 9-1-1 call handling work to dispatchers).

Business continuity is critical to both PSAP and SSAP functions. A model to be considered, one which would improve emergency communications resilience within the province, is the creation of a virtual PSAP, through well-defined interconnections between each of the centres. This model operates currently in Nova Scotia (see discussion in section 7(b)(ii), below). The Nova Scotia system permits both fail-over and volume surge protection – if calls are not being picked up by the regular PSAP for the particular region, they are diverted to one of the three other PSAPs in the province. This is also the model used by the four BCAS dispatch centres, which provide both fail-over and call surge coverage for each other.

In British Columbia, moreover, there also is a good argument that “fail-over” centres should be geographically distinct from one another. If two PSAPs provide back-up to one another, but both would be affected by a regional emergency, such as a seismic event, then the protection offered by the fail-over centre may prove illusory.

The challenges of developing a resilient emergency communications system are significant. There are material issues that would need to be addressed, ranging from appropriate technology interfaces and compatible systems to standardized procedures and training. These efforts would also have to include planning for back-up of the dispatching done by the PSAPs in question.

If the challenge is viewed holistically, moreover, it is apparent that similar back-up systems will be needed for all SSAPs as well. The issue is easily illustrated. If a regional emergency (for example, a seismic event) were to impact the operation of E-Comm, such an event will also

33 Of the other six, three were confirmed “noes”; two were “unsure” and one questionnaire was left blank.

25 potentially impact the 14 SSAPs to which E-Comm downstreams 9-1-1 calls. Even if E-Comm’s 9-1-1 and dispatching functions are backed up in a fail-over centre which is located in an unaffected region of the province, that fail-over centre potentially will not be able to connect 9-1-1 callers to other lower mainland SSAPs, if they also were affected by the particular emergency.

While the example postulated is extreme, it is intended to reinforce the reality that, although there are distinct functions identifiable within the emergency communications system, the system as a whole is interconnected and interdependent. It is not sufficient to provide a back- up or fail-over solution for 9-1-1, if the SSAPs to which those 9-1-1 calls should be directed are not similarly resilient.

The need to provide coordination and to develop solutions to these issues should be considered intrinsic to improving the 9-1-1 system. As noted in relation to extending the system to unserved areas, a formal process for obtaining and managing input from affected stakeholders – including local governments, the province, PSAPs, SSAPs and emergency service agencies – should be considered as the processes around implementing a CAL are developed.

f. Costs and Funding Issues

Part of the goal of the local government survey process was to determine the approximate cost of operating the 9-1-1 system, to assist in assessing an appropriate rate for a CAL. Data was received from all but one local government responsible for directly funding a PSAP.34 As noted above, the data must still be treated with some caution for several reasons:

1. 9-1-1 services are typically fully integrated into and form part of a larger dispatch centre. Proper cost allocations between dispatch functions and the narrower conception of the 9-1-1 call answer and handling role often has not been conducted.35 In some cases, the charge for emergency dispatch services includes the charge for 9-1-1 services, which has not been separately broken out or invoiced. In a number of instances, therefore, the cost attributed to 9-1-1 services represents an estimate. 2. Local governments which are receiving services through one of the six RCMP OCCs will be experiencing material cost increases over the next one to three years. In some cases, the increase could be as much as 30% or more. Those numbers had not been finalized at the time of writing. One region has produced a firm 2013 budget which includes an estimated 24% increase in PSAP costs from the RCMP (that data was included in the estimate below). The other RCMP price increases will impact budgets valued at approximately $5,000,000 in the aggregate.

34 Some responses were not received from local governments which arrange for their service through another regional district. Aggregate amounts and cost allocations, however, were received from each regional district government or entity which is primarily responsible for acquiring such services on behalf of those non-responding local governments. 35 For example, the Capital Regional District is conducting such a review in consultation with the three PSAPs with which it has contracts or arrangements. This process is time consuming and complex.

3. In many cases, for a local government (here, called the “Purchaser”) which contracts for its service through another regional district government or other entity, the amount included in the estimate below reflects only the direct cost of that service. It does not reflect any administrative or other overhead of the Purchaser for participating in or managing the service locally, including managing any educational efforts or dealing with contract and service management issues. No attempt has been made in this paper formally to assess such additional administrative or overhead costs. 4. Certain other costs which impact the operation of 9-1-1 services – including civic addressing and maintenance of appropriate digital mapping – often are covered through a CAL in other Canadian jurisdictions.36 No attempt to assess these costs has been included in this paper, and these amounts have not been included in the estimate given below. 5. The transition to NG911 (discussed in section 6(a), below) will involve significant capital, training and, potentially, staffing costs for PSAPs. These amounts are not currently calculable.

Subject to the foregoing caveats, the estimated current cost of delivering 9-1-1 services in B.C. is approximately $11,000,000. Assuming a 20% average increase in price for those centres receiving services from the RCMP, this amount increases to approximately $12,000,000 for 2013 and adding in a margin for overhead costs which were not reported would mean that the total cost is likely in the range of $12,000,000 – $13,000,000 (not including civic addressing costs). To put this in context of a CAL on all devices, raising between $12 -13 million to cover the cost of the system as currently operated would require that the CAL (net of any collection or administration costs) be about $0.21 – 0.23 per device or connection per month (or about $2.52 - $2.76 per year).37

There is some level of cross-subsidization that occurs in both directions between 9-1-1 call taking and same-centre dispatch functions. In some cases, it is clear that existing local landline CALs are being used, in effect, to subsidize dispatch functions.38 In other areas, the situation is far more complex. For example, E-Comm operates a dynamic call answering model. In general, for security and training reasons, most 9-1-1 call taking positions are fully dedicated to that function (and perform no dispatch role). However, E-Comm also provides dispatch services for 13 police and 19 fire agencies (in addition to downstreaming 9-1-1 calls to 14 external dispatch centres). If there is a surge in 9-1-1 calls, dispatchers not otherwise engaged can be assigned to handle 9-1-1 call taking duties. In those instances, the dispatch function is essentially subsidizing the 9-1-1 call taking process.

In the Kelowna OCC, the nine regional districts which obtain PSAP services through this centre fund three PSAP call taking positions. The PSAP call takers are local government employees

36 As is the case in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, PEI and Saskatchewan. 37 This assumes around 5 million devices or connections. The assumptions on which this calculation is based are considered in greater detail in section 8(e) below. 38 This issue is more acute in one or more of the smaller centres and will add a layer of complexity to managing any CAL allocation process, as will be discussed further below.

27 who are fully trained as police dispatchers, and can (and do) handle some of the dispatching function. The RCMP dispatchers, however, are also trained to manage 9-1-1 call taking. During a surge in volume, these dispatchers are able to assist with 9-1-1 call taking.

No attempt has been made to estimate the level of cross-subsidization that exists. It should be noted that the dynamic staffing models described above are efficient approaches to managing unpredictable call volumes, and should not be inadvertently discouraged through an overly narrow interpretation of “9-1-1 services”.

Local governments used a combination of property taxes and landline CALs to fund PSAP (and related dispatch) functions. Only twelve jurisdictions reported having landline CALs:39

Jurisdiction Amount of CAL40 Amount Raised Central Kootenay Regional District $0.75 $201,400 City of Nanaimo $0.47 ~$475,000 in aggregate Cowichan Valley Regional District $0.47 See City of Nanaimo Capital Regional District $0.66 ~$1,542,000 Fraser Valley Regional District $0.72 $939,835 Powell River Regional District City of Prince Rupert $2.72 $162,032 Regional District of Bulkley-Nechako $0.68 $160,200 Regional District of Kitimat-Stikine $0.75 $121,045 Regional District of Nanaimo (SD 68 region) $0.47 See City of Nanaimo Squamish-Lillooet Regional District $0.75 $32,000 (excluding Squamish & Whistler) Kamloops (to pay its contribution to the $0.75 $212,000 service arranged by the Thompson-Nicola Regional District)

Total amount raised from Landline CALs ~$3,845,000

The amount raised from landline CALs has been falling each year, as individuals move from traditional network access lines to wireless devices. Telus reported that, for 2011, the number of residential landlines it provided fell by some 6.4% from the previous year.41 Each jurisdiction which uses a landline CAL also imposes a property tax as well to cover the full cost of its emergency communications requirements.

The remaining jurisdictions use only property taxes to fund their 9-1-1 services (and related dispatch/emergency communication functions). In some cases, most notably Metro Vancouver, the possibility of using a landline CAL to fund 9-1-1 services was considered and expressly rejected. The primary basis for the rejection was that the tariffed administration fee of $0.07/month/line sought by Telus was considered excessive, as it did not reflect the actual

39 There may be other municipalities with landline CALs, which were not covered by the survey process. 40 This is the gross amount of the landline CAL, before the subtraction of the telecommunications carrier’s fee for administration. 41 Telus, Annual Report 2011, at p. 65.

28 collection and administration costs of the company and unduly increased the amount of the CAL.

Prince Rupert is a unique case, in that the city owns the local telephone company (which appears to be the basis on which a wireless levy has been imposed). It currently raises about half of its funding for 9-1-1 and fire dispatch/emergency communication services from a combination of a landline and wireless CAL. The wireless CAL raises approximately $29,800 per year. Given the size and nature of the Prince Rupert Fire Rescue Department Communications Centre, costs attributable to “9-1-1 services” alone are difficult to estimate, but probably are in the range of $50,000 - $75,000.42

5. Coverage Gaps

In examining coverage gaps, two issues should be noted. First, the paper is discussing coverage gaps in the provision of 9-1-1 service, not coverage gaps in terms of availability of landline or wireless telephony. The latter is a wholly separate consideration: the focus here is on areas where there already is either landline or wireless coverage, but no access to 9-1-1 services.

Second, one of the aims of a CAL is to ensure that the costs of the system are fairly borne by the users based on modality of contact rather than simply being another service which is funded through property taxes or an impost on a limited selection of connection services. If there are areas of the province where resident users are paying the fee, but not able to access the service, the fairness of the structure rightly can be questioned (and the excerpting of “unserved” areas from the CAL would make the system more cumbersome and inefficient).

a. Regional Districts

As noted earlier in the report, three areas in the province lack any 9-1-1 service: Central Coast Regional District (“Central Coast”), Northern Rockies Regional Municipality (“NRRM”) and the Stikine Region. The permanent population across the three regions is about 11,000 people. However, both the Central Coast and the NRRM have active tourism industries. The Central Coast actively promotes the “eco-tourist” trade and its major settlements – Bella Coola, Bella Bella, Ocean Falls, Denny Island and Klemtu – are regular stops on the BC Ferries’ “Discovery Coast Passage” tour.

The Alaska Highway passes through the NRRM, and local estimates are that as many as 200,000 (or more) visitors per year travel through Fort Nelson.43 NRRM is also host to large resource development works, including mining and the oil and gas sector. The number of

42 Based on email correspondence with the Chief of Prince Rupert Fire Rescue Service, the costs attributable to 9-1-1 services were estimated at between 10 – 20% of the total cost of operating the dispatch centre. 43 Email correspondence with Mike Gilbert, NRRM Community Development Officer, 7 June 2013.

29 workers at such sites in the NRRM is difficult to estimate with certainty, but is thought to be around the same number as the permanent population.44

Another major gap in 9-1-1 coverage is found in Skeena-Queen Charlotte Regional District. The regional district itself does not provide 9-1-1 services, and there is no coverage outside of the City of Prince Rupert and the District of Port Edward. As with the Central Coast and NRRM, Skeena-Queen Charlotte actively promotes its tourist trade, which in part is driven by the BC Ferries “Inside Passage” tours.45

The availability of 9-1-1 services is a public safety issue. The provision of emergency services to local residents will be enhanced by the availability of 9-1-1. The situation is even more compelling when considering the impact on visitors. Local residents are aware of the existing limitations of their system (and the need to dial a 10-digit number for emergency services). Visitors, however, may not realize that 9-1-1 services are not available and may encounter significant delays in obtaining access to the appropriate emergency service as a result.

The cost of establishing and connecting remote communities to 9-1-1 services is substantial relative to the limited tax bases of these areas. It is, nevertheless, important to extend existing 9-1-1 services to each area of the province where there are landline connections or reliable cell phone coverage.

In terms of equity, moreover, if a province-wide CAL is to be imposed, it would be inappropriate to require residents to pay the levy if the service is not available to them (or not being introduced as part of the process that created the levy).46 Some subsidization may be necessary to ensure that these improvements are effected and should be factored into any CAL which is established. In the context of operating and improving the system, the amount of that assistance is likely to be relatively small in percentage terms.

b. First Nations

A number of jurisdictions reported that, although 9-1-1 services were being provided, those services did not extend to all of the First Nations territories within their boundaries. Six regional districts which returned surveys reported that one or more First Nations areas within their jurisdictions did not have 9-1-1 coverage. These results almost certainly underestimate the

44 Ibid. The permanent population in the NRRM is about 4,000. 45 Prince Rupert itself (which has 9-1-1 services) reports in the order of 190,000 visits annually. A portion of those tourists will also visit other areas within the regional district which lack 9-1-1 services. Tourism figures are from 2007: Prince Rupert and Port Edward Economic Development Corporation, Tourism Industry: Sector Profile [undated – 2011?], at p. 3. Available from: www.predc.com/images/editor/File/Tourism%20Sector%20Profile.pdf . 46 Bell Canada recently lost (at first instance) a class action lawsuit for imposing a “9-1-1 fee” on residents in the north, when no service was available to them. See: Jeff Gray, “Bell loses class-action case over 911 fees in North” Globe and Mail, 17 May 2013, at: www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on- business/industry-news/the-law-page/bell-loses-class-action-case-over-911-fees-in- north/article12003832/#dashboard/follows/ .

30 problem, though it should be noted that, in many areas of the province, arrangements have successfully been concluded to provide such services.

A number of issues exist with connecting all First Nations lands to the 9-1-1 system, ranging from cost to the lack of municipal addressing. The latter greatly complicates managing emergency communications and, ultimately, dispatching and response by emergency services. Managing these coverage gaps will require a coordinated approach with the affected First Nations bands and with Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. As with the issue of extending 9-1-1 services to remote areas of the province, some subsidization of the costs of establishing services on First Nations lands may be necessary.

It should be noted that this is an area which was identified as a potential concern by some local governments, but time constraints prevented any in-depth consideration. Further follow-up is required to ascertain the size and extent of this coverage issue, and to enable some reasonable estimate of cost to be developed.

6. 9-1-1 System Developments and Issues

a. Next Generation 9-1-1

The looming advent of NG911 will have a significant impact on PSAP (and SSAP) operations. NENA defines NG911 as follows:47

NG9-1-1 is an Internet Protocol (IP)-based system comprised of managed Emergency Services IP networks (ESInets), functional elements (applications), and databases that replicate traditional E9-1-1 features and functions and provides additional capabilities. NG9-1-1 is designed to provide access to emergency services from all connected communications sources, and provide multimedia data capabilities for Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs) and other emergency service organizations.

In the simplest terms, NG911 involves moving emergency communication centres to wireless and IP-based systems. By so doing, both PSAPs and SSAPs will be able to accept a broader, more comprehensive range of connections – including text messages – as well as new data sources, such as pictures and video. Moving to NG911 will involve a substantive transformation of the existing systems used by emergency communication centres in the province. As noted by NENA, which is heavily involved in developing standards for NG911 in the United States, transition to the new system will involve “technological, operational, economic and institutional change.”48

47 NENA, NENA Master Glossary of 9-1-1 Terminology (2012) at p. 82. For a more detailed definition and description, see: NENA, What is NG9-1-1? (2008). 48 NENA, NENA NG9-1-1 Transition Plan Considerations (2011), at p. 10 (hereafter, “NENA Transition Plan”).

The system and equipment architecture for NG911 are still being developed, debated and reviewed.49 In Canada, the CRTC has assigned a subgroup of the Emergency Services Working Group (“ESWG”) responsibility for managing the processes around the implementation of NG911.50 This working group is responsible for reviewing developments internationally (particularly in the United States), identifying technical and policy issues relating to the transition to NG911 in Canada, and helping to develop solutions to challenges as they arise.51

There will be significant capital and operational costs involved in the transition of PSAPs to NG911 infrastructure and systems. These capital and operational costs will also have to be incurred by SSAPs and emergency response agencies, if the new data sources received by PSAPs are to be of any operational use in the field. New systems and new data sources will require significant extra training of PSAP and SSAP staff, as well as emergency services personnel.

A precursor of NG911 is already being readied for implementation. Under CRTC Decision 2013-22,52 wireless service providers are required “to make the changes in their networks, systems, and processes required to support the provision of Text Messaging with 9-1-1 service for hearing- or speech-impaired persons…”. The changes are required to be made by service providers within 12 months of the decision which means the service is to be available as of January 2014.53

The effect of this decision is actually quite limited. Only users who are hearing or speech impaired will be entitled to register to use this system. The ability of PSAPs (and SSAPs) to process this new data source, however, will likely take longer than 12 months to implement, and service availability will vary with location. Nevertheless, it is an indication of the types of changes to come. Indeed, there already is a reported communication issue with youth, who mistakenly assume that 9-1-1 services already can be contacted through text messaging services.54

The move to NG911 will require careful and detailed planning. There will need to be close coordination between PSAPs, SSAPs and emergency services. Existing mechanisms for managing these processes will need to be reviewed. Part of the outcome of introducing CAL

49 See: NENA, Understanding NENA’s i3 Architectural Standard for NG9-1-1 (2011); and NENA Transition Plan. 50 Emergency Services (E9-1-1) Working Group. 51 See Emergency Services (E9-1-1) Working Group, Status Update for Next Generation (NG) 9-1-1 in Canada: Consensus Report (31 January 2013) at http://www.crtc.gc.ca/public/cisc/es/ESRE0058.pdf. On some of the issues which are emerging in relation to NG911 see: Ken Sluman, “Preliminary Overview – Suggested Work Plan Items,” ESCO0423 (14 December 2012), prepared for the ESWG at: http://www.crtc.gc.ca/public/cisc/es/ESCO0423.pdf . 52 CISC Emergency Services Working Group – Consensus report regarding Text Messaging with 9-1-1 trial and service implementation, CRTC 2013 – 22 (24 January 2013). 53 The ESWG is reportedly looking at trying to delay this implementation to Q1, 2015: comment from T. Whiting, Senior Manager, Protective Services, Capital Regional District, 8 July 2013. 54 Presentation by Jasmine Bradley, Corporate Communications, E-Comm, on 17 May 2013.

32 legislation could and should be the establishment of a recognized stakeholder group comprising the province, local government, emergency communication centres, emergency services and telecommunication providers, to manage the significant structural and operational challenges that a transition to NG911 will pose.

b. Abandoned, Misdialed and Short Duration Calls

While the issue of abandoned, misdialed and short duration calls (here, referred to as “Abandoned Calls”) may appear tangential, the scope of the problem significantly impacts PSAPs, SSAPs and police services. The problem raises questions about the appropriate role of the 9-1-1 operator (and potentially the cost of operating the PSAP portion of the service), as well as significant issues of public safety, risk management and liability. Abandoned Calls are a growing burden on both emergency services and the emergency communications system.

It should be noted that the number of these calls which get presented to 9-1-1 operators may vary depending on the equipment and set-up of the particularly PSAP. In simplest terms, in some PSAPs, certain very short duration calls may not actually get presented, while in other PSAPs, such calls do go to a call taker.

Each of the PSAPs in the province has a protocol for managing these types of calls, though the role played by the 9-1-1 call taker may vary. In some cases, the 9-1-1 operator will attempt to reconnect with the caller (based on the protocols that were described, they typically make three attempts to reconnect with an abandoned call, though that process may vary with different PSAPs).55 Where no reconnection is possible, the call is then either downstreamed to a police agency, or, if the 9-1-1 operator also does police dispatching, then a police call is created. In other PSAPs, details regarding the call are immediately downstreamed to the relevant police dispatcher or police dispatch agency, which then attempts the reconnection before creating a police call. This approach has the effect of increasing the work for police dispatch agencies.

The response by police to an abandoned 9-1-1 call will vary, depending on the level of detail and information received. In each case, however, unless a reconnection attempt is successful, a police incident is created and, if sufficient information is available, a unit dispatched.56

The volume of these calls is significant and creates enormous pressure on the system. The PSAP survey results indicated that Abandoned Calls represent between 10 – 20% of all 9-1-1 calls received. The impact on the police service is even more significant. Statistics provided by the RCMP show that dealing with Abandoned Calls is an enormous and expensive drain on police resources. In many cases, the single largest number of dispatched events in a

55 This is the role prescribed for 9-1-1 operators in Saskatchewan, who also have responsibility for contacting service providers to confirm subscriber details, if required. Sask911, Standard Operating Guidelines v. 1.5 (June 2012), sections 4.12. For wireless call backs, however, only one attempt is made and if the call back goes to voice mail, no message is left. See section 6.2. 56 The level of priority will vary: based on data provided by the RCMP, most such incidents are rated “P2” or lower in priority. This also assumes there is sufficient information from the terminated connection to enable follow-up, which may range from actual dispatch of a unit to follow up with the service provider for the particular number, subscriber details, etc.

33 jurisdiction involves follow-up on Abandoned Calls. For the City of Surrey alone, more than 36,000 police dispatch events, representing 24% of all calls for service in the city, were for Abandoned Calls.57

This problem may be exacerbated with the eventual roll-out of NG911. As noted in an assessment provided to the ESWG committee responsible for NG911:58

“1. Primary PSAP’s will be notified of many more calls to 9-1-1. These additional calls will have been of very short duration. The calls will have been disconnected or terminated before they could have been answered at the PSAP. [emphasis added]

2. The notification of the additional calls will be provided in the form of ALI data packets only. There will not be a telephone call presented to a 9-1-1 call taker.”

While the quoted comments relate to issues identified in connection with the proposals from Bell for IP-based systems in Ontario and Québec, the problem of increased call volume may also affect any system established in British Columbia as well.

The growth in the number of Abandoned Calls is directly related to the growth in the number of mobile phones in use. It is likely that most such calls are inadvertent “pocket dials” (or similar misdialing) by cell phone users. Nova Scotia reported that 99% of its Abandoned Calls were from mobile devices.59 In the context of developing policy, however, the challenge is that the issue has not been systematically studied. While anecdotal statistics exist, it is currently not possible to quantify with any certainty how many Abandoned Calls reflect genuine attempts to reach aid, which were prematurely terminated because of circumstances. This creates an enormous risk management issue and potential source of liability.

There is clearly a need for a uniform and consistent provincial policy to be developed addressing the issue of Abandoned Calls. This policy should:

be based on a substantive and formal review of the issues involved; address the public safety risks, and other risk management and liability concerns arising from these call types; define appropriate roles for the 9-1-1 operators, police dispatchers and the police services in managing such calls and assess the costs of any recommended approaches; and

57 Data provided by Inspector R. Greenwood, RCMP E-Division - Operational Communications Centres, in a presentation entitled: “General Duty Officer (GDO) Staffing Assessment” (undated: 2013), at p.12. 58 Ken Sluman, “Preliminary Overview – Suggested Work Plan Items,” ESCO0423 (14 December 2012), at p. 2. 59 See: EMO, 911 Performance Report, 2009-2010 (2010), at p. 2/4, under “Service Summary”. Prince Edward Island is reportedly considering amendments to its 9-1-1 legislation to make it illegal to sell a mobile phone which has “9-1-1” preprogrammed into the device. Comment from T. Whiting, Senior Manager, Protective Services, Capital Regional District, 8 July 2013, based on email from Pat J. Kelly, Provincial Coordinator of 9-1-1 Services, Prince Edward Island.

include an educational component which is directed at mobile phone users about the problem and appropriate responses to it (including not hanging up if a misdial has occurred).

It should not be assumed that Abandoned Calls are the only operational issue that may need consideration as legislation for a CAL is contemplated. Other issues – such as the fact that wireless devices which are no longer connected to any network can still connect to 9-1-1, but are difficult for operators to locate if the call is terminated prematurely – also impact the operation of the system and should be formally studied. Indeed, improving the ability of PSAPs and SSAPs to pinpoint the location of wireless users is a major on-going concern. One benefit that could arise through the creation of an official users’ group as a related aspect of any CAL legislation, would be that such operational challenges and risks could be considered and addressed consistently across the province.

There also is a role for legislation. A number of Canadian jurisdictions make it illegal to pre- program a phone to dial 9-1-1, with the goal of reducing the number of “pocket-dials” received by mobile devices. A secondary function should be to clarify that PSAP and SSAP operators are entitled to require provision of subscriber information from telecommunication carriers, where needed to support emergency communication operations.

c. Service Delivery and Efficiency Issues

The emergence of centralized 9-1-1 call handling and emergency dispatch centres was largely an organic process. Originally, separate dispatch operations developed within each emergency service in every community, reached directly by the public of that community. The advent of the 9-1-1 system beginning in the mid-1980s led to the establishment of a front-end gating mechanism which directed the caller to the right dispatch agency – which initially meant multiple separate dispatch agencies in each separate community.

With improvements in dispatching technologies and communication systems over the past 20 years, it has become possible safely and effectively to dispatch multiple agencies in widely disparate geographic locations from a single centre. Indeed, if one were to design from scratch a 9-1-1 call taking and related emergency dispatch system for the province using current technologies, it is a certainty that there would be far fewer separate operations than currently exist. Rather, there would be an integrated system that comprises a number of larger, better connected and fully interoperable emergency communication centres, with appropriate local back-up facilities and geographically distinct fail-over sites.

This observation should not be taken as a criticism of the existing system. Indeed, the move to develop collaborative approaches to 9-1-1 and dispatch services has been evident as technologies and systems have developed. It does mean, however, that there is a wide variation in the relative economic efficiency and costs to operate the different PSAPs in the province. Local governments should be commended for both developing and implementing an effective 9-1-1 system initially, and having taken steps to make that system more efficient as technological developments emerged. British Columbia compares well to most Canadian jurisdictions: given its geographic size and population, it already has a reasonably efficient

PSAP footprint. On a per capita basis, Québec has better than 50% more PSAPs, while Alberta has more than twice the number of that in British Columbia. The numbers are even more significant when compared to the Maritime Provinces and Ontario.

In general, properly managed larger PSAPs will operate more cost efficiently when measured on a per capita or per call basis, without any loss of effectiveness or compromise of public safety. The economies of scale offer a number of advantages, including the ability to staff with greater depth in the event of a major event, and ability to afford investment in more resilient and robust equipment, systems and infrastructure.

The costing data collected through the survey process can only be treated as indicative. Nevertheless, it was clear that the larger PSAPs were more cost efficient – the two PSAPs which serve the largest respective population bases, were the two most cost efficient operations based on the metrics noted above (an issue that is looked at in greater detail in section 8(c) below).

The challenge when introducing a province-wide CAL will be to ensure that, notwithstanding the introduction of a new funding source, the impetus that currently exists to improve economic efficiencies will continue. The initiatives taken by local governments to combine and create single points of service delivery should be actively encouraged. This approach will better enable the development and improvement of both the quality of service and overall resilience of the infrastructure and systems. It will also make it easier to oversee PSAP operations, and ensure that services are being provided in a fashion that meets modern standards and the public’s expectations.

7. Canadian and Other Jurisdictions’ 9-1-1 Service and CAL Models

a. Introduction

This section of the report considers how 9-1-1 services and CALs operate in other jurisdictions, with a particular focus on Canadian provinces where provincial CALs have been introduced. It also places that analysis in the context of how those provinces manage their 9-1-1 systems with a particular focus on whether the system is centralized or decentralized and the level of centralized direction and control that is exerted.

b. Review of Canadian Jurisdictions

At present, five Canadian provinces have introduced and are operating provincially mandated CALs. In addition, in May 2013, the province of Alberta passed the Emergency 911 Act (AB) which will impose a CAL on wireless devices in that province, and give the province the ability to prescribe standards for delivery of 9-1-1 services by PSAPs. Figure 3 summarizes the status and some of the principal components of 9-1-1 and related CAL legislation across Canada:

Province Statute/Regulation CAL Telecom Fee Admin Charge

Alberta Bill 15, Emergency 911 Act 0.4460 ? New Brunswick Emergency 911 Act (N.B.) $0.53 $0.07

Regulation 2008-23 under the Emergency 911 Act (O.C. 2008-77)

Nova Scotia Emergency 911 Cost Recovery Fee Regulations made under Section 14 of the $0.43 $0.07 Emergency “911” Act S.N.S. 1992, c. 4 O.I.C. 2001-44 (February 2, 2001), N.S. Reg. 8/2001

Prince Edward Emergency 911 Act, RSPEI 1988, ch. E-5 – Fee is found in the Schedule. $0.70 $0.07 Island 911 Cost Recovery Fees Regulations, PEI Reg EC342/06

Quebec Statutes $.40 0.04 An Act respecting municipal taxation (R.S.Q., chapter F-2.1). See Sections 244.68 to 244.74, subsections 13, 14 and 15 of first paragraph, Section 262, and second and third paragraph of section 262. Civil Protection Act (R.S.Q., chapter S-2.3). See Sections 52.1 to 52.20, in force since December 30, 2010. An Act to amend various legislative provisions respecting municipal affairs (2008, chapter 18, as modified by 2012, chapter 30, section 34). See section 135 which provides that 9-1-1 emergency centres in operation on the date of coming into force of the first regulation made under section 52.4 of the Civil Protection Act (i.e. December 30, 2010) have three years from that date to obtain a certificate of compliance (until December 30, 2013). An Act respecting pre-hospital emergency services (R.S.Q., chapter S-6.2). See sections 7, 22, 24 and 86. An Act respecting the Québec sales tax (R.S.Q., chapter T-0.1). Section 162.1 provides that a supply made to a municipality of a service of receiving and processing telephone calls through a 9-1-1 emergency centre is exempt. An Act respecting the exercise of certain municipal powers in certain urban

60 The Alberta government has indicated that the cell charge will be the same as for a land line.

agglomerations (R.S.Q., chapter E-20.001). See paragraph b) of subsection 8° of section 19, which provide that 9-1-1 emergency center is a matter that concerned related municipalities as a whole. See also sections 118.2. 118.27 and 118.79 about financing such an expenditure in certain urban agglomerations.

Regulations Regulation governing the municipal tax for 9-1-1 (R.R.Q., c. F-2.1, r. 14.2) Regulation respecting standards, specifications and quality criteria applicable to 9- 1-1 emergency centres and to certain secondary emergency call centres (R.R.Q., c. S-2.3, r. 2). In force since December 30, 2010. Regulation respecting the police services that municipal police forces and the Sûreté du Québec must provide according to their level of jurisdiction (R.R.Q., c. P- 13.1, r. 6). See section 2 , subsection 1 b)

Saskatchewan The Emergency 911 System Act, SS 1996 ch. E-7.3 $0.62 $0.07

The Sask911 Fees Amendment Regulations, 2010 (OC 196/2010), amending The Sask911 Fees Regulations, 2003 (chapter S-35 Reg 5), under s. 46 of The Saskatchewan Telecommunications Act (C. S-34) as amended. Figure 3 – Chart of Other Provincial Legislation/Regulation and CAL Fees

i. Canadian Overview

Six Canadian provinces have, or are in the process of introducing, provincially-mandated call answer levies. Five of those provinces – Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Québec and Saskatchewan – have implemented CALs which attach essentially to any device which connects with the 9-1-1 system. Thus, the governing statutes cover traditional landline connections, wireless, and voice over internet protocol (“VoIP”), typically with the power for the relevant minister to designate any other device or connection as being covered as well. Alberta, which has not yet proclaimed its legislation, has limited its legislation to wireless devices. This approach means that not all landlines in the province are covered by a CAL, because not all municipalities have entered in agreements with the ILEC or the CLECs.

All six provinces which have introduced CALs also have used the legislation to establish or enhance provincial authority to set standards of service, policies, procedures and guidelines for the operation of PSAPs. The range of explicit centralized control varies from province to province. Nova Scotia, which contracts with three municipal providers and one private provider, sets performance standards and operating procedures by regulation and contract. It also takes responsibility for training of 9-1-1 call operators. New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island also have the powers to set such standards, though they do not provide direct training for 9-1-1 operators. New Brunswick has issued standard operating procedures governing PSAPs and some aspects of SSAP operations. Prince Edward Island has only one PSAP, which is governed by the terms of a contract with the province.

Saskatchewan also has the power to regulate PSAP operations, which it has exercised through a committee established by Sask911.61 This committee, which includes membership from each of the province’s four PSAPs as well as representatives of Sask911, has developed comprehensive and detailed standard operating procedures. These guidelines are limited to the operation of the 9-1-1 system (as narrowly defined) and do not directly regulate SSAP operations (though, by defining the role of the PSAP operator, the procedures also define certain aspects of the role played by a dispatcher, particularly with regards to issues such as abandoned 9-1-1 calls).

Québec has a well-developed regulatory structure, which specifies requirements for a broad range of PSAP activities, from call answer standards and training requirements, to equipment and infrastructure for its 34 municipally-operated PSAPs. Québec PSAPs are required to be provincially certified to operate.

Under its new legislation, the Alberta government will have the power to regulate PSAP operations. Responsibility for this role will fall to the Alberta Emergency Management Agency, which has indicated that it intends to develop consistent standards for 9-1-1 services, in consultation with local PSAPs.

61 The Sask911 Standard Operating Procedures Committee – Call-taking Working Group. The committee also included participation by a representative of SaskTel.

Four of the six provinces (Alberta, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island) have included exemptions of liability for PSAP operators and other stakeholders (e.g., telecommunication providers, emergency service providers and the provincial and local governments). Saskatchewan has a liability exemption, but it applies to volunteer emergency services, not to the PSAPs themselves. Québec has not exempted PSAP operations from liability.

In terms of the scope of the CALs, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Saskatchewan have permitted or directed that the levy be used for other purposes, in addition to funding 9-1-1 services. Saskatchewan uses some of its CAL funds to cover a portion of the costs of the provincial emergency radio network. Nova Scotia uses a portion of the amounts raised to fund the provincial poison control centre. New Brunswick has recently revised its senior legislation to broaden the potential scope of expenditures to include coordinating emergency communications across the province.

The Québec situation is somewhat different – once funds are paid to the municipalities, in theory there is no further direction from the province on how the monies are used. In practice, however, it appears that the amounts paid are very closely tied to the actual cost of operating, maintaining and upgrading 9-1-1 services. As a result, it is clear that the funds are being expended on 9-1-1 services, though some portion of those monies may also, in effect, be used to subsidize other aspects of the emergency communication centres’ operations.

Both Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia have established committees to oversee and provide input as to the how the 9-1-1 system operates. Québec established a separate agency for this purpose, which is headed by representatives of local government (with a provincial government observer). That agency is also responsible for setting standards, allocating the CAL funds and certifying PSAP operations. Alberta has indicated that it will coordinate oversight of PSAP operations through the Alberta Emergency Management Agency, in consultation with PSAP operators and other stakeholders.

ii. Nova Scotia

Nova Scotia has established a centralized, provincially administered system for delivering 9-1-1 services. The Emergency Management Office (“EMO”), a division of the Nova Scotia Department of Justice, has authority over the operation of the 9-1-1 system in the province. The EMO was established under and derives its authority from the Emergency Management Act.62

The Nova Scotia 9-1-1 service itself is governed by the Emergency “911" Act63 and the regulations made thereunder. The principal regulation is the Emergency 911 Cost Recovery Fee Regulations,64 which establishes the amount of the provincial CAL and the processes for managing the funds raised. The statutory structure centralizes the administration of 9-1-1 services in the province and permits the Minister to prescribe standards and recover the costs of

62 Emergency Management Act, SNS 1990, c.8 (as amended). 63 Emergency “911" Act, SNS 1992, c.4. 64 Emergency 911 Cost Recovery Fee Regulations, N.S. Reg. 8/2001.

40 operating the system. Section 9 of the Emergency “911" Act also exempts from liability the entities (including local government and emergency service agencies) which are responsible for operating the 9-1-1 system.

The Nova Scotia 9-1-1 system comprises four interconnected PSAPs. Although the service is centrally administered, each PSAP is owned and operated by a different entity:

Halifax Regional Municipality in Dartmouth; the RCMP OCC in Truro; Cape Breton Regional Municipality in Sydney; and Valley Communications Inc., a privately owned communication centre located in Kentville.

The integration of the PSAPs means that overflow calls are automatically routed to another of the four centres. As of 2010, the EMO reported that they had never had a recorded instance where a caller received a “busy” signal or voice recording when attempting to call 9-1-1.65

The relationship between the province and each PSAP is governed by a standard agreement. This agreement:66

(a) makes the province responsible for providing and maintaining the necessary telecommunication equipment (ss. 4(5) and 7(1)); (b) makes the province responsible for establishing the training program for emergency call takers (s. 8(1)). The training curricula, however, is subject to input from the PSAPs (s. 8(9)); (c) makes the PSAP responsible for supplying the necessary facilities infrastructure for housing the call takers and telecommunications equipment (s. 4(1)). The agreement does not, however, expressly specify any standards applicable to those buildings (e.g., post-disaster construction, NFPA 1221, etc.); (d) requires the PSAP to conform to standardized operating procedures (“SOPs”) developed by the EMO (ss. 4(4) and 6(1)). Changes to the SOPs, however, require the consent of the PSAPs (s. 6(2)(c)); (e) establishes a standard for call answering (90% of calls answered within 10 seconds) (s. 6(2)(a)). The agreement, however, does not establish a standard for call transfers to downstream PSAPs;67 (f) requires the PSAP to hire sufficient trained staff as required to meet the standards and other SOPs (s. 6(2)(c)); (g) establishes the fee for service (s. 11(2));

65 EMO, “911 Fact Sheet,” (Nova Scotia, 2010), at p. 2. 66 The information in this section is based on the agreement approved as to form by the Halifax Regional Municipality on 29 May 2007. 67 NFPA 1221 includes a reporting metric for call transfers (within 30 seconds, 90% of the time). It is also interesting to note that the Nova Scotia EMO reports on a different call answer metric in its public communications – it reports against a 20 second, not 10 second, call answer time. See: EMO, 911 Performance Report, 2009-2010 (2010), at p. 2/4, under “Service Summary”.

(h) establishes a process for reimbursement of “extraordinary or unforeseen expenses” incurred by a PSAP in relation to the operation of the 9-1-1 service; (i) includes an indemnity from the province in favour of the PSAP for any liability arising out of the operation of the 9-1-1 system (s. 12(1)), which indemnity is backed by the exemption from liability for PSAPs under section 9 of the Emergency “911" Act; and (j) includes a somewhat narrower indemnity from the PSAP to the province in relation to breaches of the agreement itself (for example, if the PSAP breached the agreement by permitting the untrained personnel to act as 9-1-1 call takers, this indemnity could be invoked by the province).

The fee for service established under section 11(2) of the agreement is driven solely by the number of “qualified” 9-1-1 calls handled by the PSAP. For each qualifying 9-1-1 call, the PSAP is paid $9.21 (adjusted annually in accordance with the Canadian CPI). There are significant limitations, however, on reimbursable 9-1-1 calls. Where the PSAP is also a dispatch agency, a 9-1-1 call which is converted to a dispatchable event at that same PSAP will not be compensated.68

The agreement also includes, as Appendix A, an annex dated “February 2007” which further specifies the roles and responsibilities of each party. This annex provides that travel and backfill costs related to the training of 9-1-1 call takers will be reimbursed by the province.

From an infrastructure perspective, there are two 9-1-1 switches in the province – one primary and one back-up – which are operated by Bell Aliant (a subsidiary of BCE, the owner of Bell). The province has a master service agreement with Bell Aliant governing the provision and maintenance of the 9-1-1 infrastructure.

Nova Scotia Call Answer Levy. The funding of EMO’s obligations in relation to the 9-1-1 service is obtained primarily through a province-wide call answer levy. The levy is established under the Emergency “911” Act and the regulations thereunder.

Paragraph 14(1)(ea) of the Emergency “911" Act permits the Governor in Council to make regulations “respecting any matter necessary or advisable for the establishment of fees to recover costs for any services or materials provided in the course of the administration of this Act or the regulations.”69

In 2001, the Nova Scotia government introduced the Emergency 911 Cost Recovery Fee Regulations, which creates a comprehensive structure for establishing and managing the CAL in the province. Under this regulation:

(a) a CAL of $0.43 per month was established for landlines and wireless devices (VoIP connections are not expressly mentioned);

68 See section 1 of Appendix B, “Call Counting Methodology” to the master agreement between the province and Halifax Regional Municipality. 69 The Emergency “911" Act was amended in 2000 to add this power (see: Financial Measures (2000) Act, SNS 2000, c.4, section 7).

(b) the “E911 Cost Recovery Fund” (the “Fund”) was established as a separate, special fund,70 to hold and disburse the amounts received; (c) the objects of the Fund were specified; and (d) the “E911 Cost Recovery Committee” was established to advise the Minister on the administration of the Fund (including collection and disbursement of monies).

Appointments to the E911 Cost Recovery Committee are made by Minister of Justice from among “individuals who have suitable qualifications and experience and have demonstrated suitable interest.”71 One member must be a representative from the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities.

The objects of the Fund are broader than just the 9-1-1 service. Subsection 5(3) of the Emergency 911 Cost Recovery Fee Regulations permits the Fund to be used for the following purposes:

the management, administration and operation of the E911 program including civic addressing, public education and training components of the E911 program; the acquisition, installation, maintenance and operation of PSAP equipment; the maintenance, support and upgrading of databases owned and managed by the Province and related to the administration of the E911 System; the maintenance, support and upgrading of digitized civic address mapping; the development, installation and maintenance of signage to assist in the reporting of, and response to, emergencies; support to the facilities responsible for the receipt and triage of calls reporting poison- related emergencies to the E911 System; support to municipalities in the administration of civic addressing programs; the payment of any costs, charges, audits, taxes, fees or other expenses incurred in the administration and management of the Fund; and the payment of such other things as the Minister may direct, in respect of the provision of E911 Services.

One issue of particular note is that the province’s poison control centre is funded through the CAL, in addition to the provision of 9-1-1 services.

The audited statements for the Fund show that, since 2008/09, it has received between $4.5 – $4.7 million annually, net of collection costs and bad debt costs (which together amount to

70 The E911 Cost Recovery Fund is a separate fund originally created under clause 2(1)(n) of the Provincial Finance Act (Nova Scotia); when the latter was repealed in 2010, the fund was continued under s. 83 of the Finance Act, SNS 2010, c.2. 71 See Emergency 911 Cost Recovery Fee Regulations, ss. 6(6) and 6(8).

43 approximately $950,000 annually). Overall, collection costs and bad debt represent approximately 17% of the gross fees collected.72

iii. New Brunswick

The New Brunswick approach to its CAL and the operation of its 9-1-1 service appears similar to that of Nova Scotia’s. The six regional PSAPs in the province operate under the authority of the Emergency 911 Act73 and regulations made thereunder.74

There is less public detail about the operation of the New Brunswick system than that in Nova Scotia. Overall authority for the operation of the New Brunswick 9-1-1 system rests with the Minister of Public Safety, which operates the system through its 911 Bureau. The PSAPs themselves, however, are independently operated under contract with the province. The PSAPs are owned either by municipalities or the RCMP. The 911 Bureau oversees service provision, helps coordinate and implement technological upgrades, and develops operating standards and requirements. The 911 Bureau is also responsible for civic addressing in unincorporated areas of the province.

Like its Nova Scotia counterpart, the Emergency 911 Act (NB) contains a liability exemption for participants in the 9-1-1 service. Section 8 of that act exempts the province, the Minister, “a telecommunications service provider,” a municipality, an “emergency service provider” and employees or volunteers of any of them, from any liability:

“for any loss or damage suffered by any person by reason of anything in good faith done or omitted to be done…under the authority of this Act or the regulations.”

Under the New Brunswick legislation, the province has the right to oversee and control 9-1-1 service delivery and related PSAP operations. Under section 11 of the Emergency 911 Act (NB), the Minister may make regulations regarding, among other things,

the performance and operation of PSAPs; the training and certification of PSAP employees; the services and functions to be performed by PSAPs; how PSAP operations are to be monitored and evaluated; the amount of any CAL; and how the CAL is to be billed, collected and remitted by telecommunication service providers.

72 See: Grant Thornton, Financial Statements: Nova Scotia E911 Cost Recovery Fund (31 March 2012); and Grant Thornton, Financial Statements: Nova Scotia E911 Cost Recovery Fund (31 March 2010), which together provides aggregated information for the period from 2008/09 – 2011/12. 73 RSNB 2011, c.146 (as amended through to June 2012). 74 The two principal regulations are New Brunswick Regulation 96-104, which designates the six PSAPs and deals with civic addressing, and New Brunswick Regulation 2008-23, which establishes the New Brunswick CAL.

Notwithstanding these powers, however, New Brunswick is not as active as Nova Scotia in the training and certification of 9-1-1 call takers. Training is left to the individual PSAP, though the province mandates that each operator “shall be trained on all necessary equipment to process 9-1-1 calls as per the NB 9-1-1 Operating Procedures Directive.”75

The province, through its New Brunswick 9-1-1 Bureau, has issued an “Operating Procedures Directive” (the “NB-OPD”). The NB-OPD sets out call handling procedures, PSAP responsibilities, the responsibilities of emergency service dispatch agencies and certain requirements relating to the operation of the PSAPs (e.g., records keeping, incident reporting, etc.). The NB-OPD is binding on both PSAPs and SSAPs in the province.

One difference worth noting regarding the operation of the New Brunswick 9-1-1 system is that the role of the 9-1-1 call taker is far broader than that in most other provinces. In New Brunswick, the 9-1-1 call taker is required to obtain basic information about the nature of the emergency (not just the emergency agency that is sought by the caller). This information is then relayed by the 9-1-1 operator to the SSAP operator, before the caller is handed over to the SSAP. In addition, if additional emergency service agencies are to be notified, responsibility for such notification falls to the PSAP operator.76

The New Brunswick approach contrasts sharply with the situation in British Columbia, where substantive caller interrogation is conducted by the SSAP, which then will notify additional emergency response agencies if required. The New Brunswick approach would add considerable time to the 9-1-1 call handling process (and likely require additional 9-1-1 operators). Also, the 9-1-1 operator is expected to transmit information to other emergency service providers (or to screen additional callers on the same incident), without necessarily having received the full or complete details of the incident from the caller.

New Brunswick Call Answer Levy. Under section 7 of the Emergency 911 Act (NB), a separate fund was established to hold the monies collected through the CAL. The funds may be used for:

developing, establishing, operating and improving the “NB 911 service”; and paying for costs associated with administering the Fund.

The term “NB 911 service” was redefined in 2012 as:77

“a province-wide system for the coordination of emergency services and for the reporting of emergencies to emergency service providers through a public safety answering point.”

75 New Brunswick 9-1-1 Bureau, Operating Procedures Directive, Policy D-2 (2010). 76 NB-OPD, Policies C-1, C-2 and C-4. 77 The revision was made in An Act to Amend the Emergency 911 Act, SNB c. 25 (2012).

The original definition read:78

“a province-wide 911 emergency telephone service for the reporting of emergencies to emergency service providers through a public safety answering point.”

The new definition has the effect of expanding the range of allowable expenditures by the CAL fund, to include expenditures on efforts to develop a “system” for coordinating emergency services, in addition to 9-1-1 call answering services.

Under the Emergency 911 Act (NB), a telecommunications company either can enter into an agreement with the Minister to collect the prescribed CAL fee, or it must collect the fee in accordance with the terms of the regulations.79

The level of the CAL is prescribed by New Brunswick Regulation 2008-23; this regulation also contains rules which govern how those fees are to be collected and remitted to the province. We have not seen copies of any separate agreements between the carriers and the province; it is not clear, therefore, whether the terms of those agreements differ from the rules prescribed in the regulations.

The New Brunswick CAL covers landline, wireless and VoIP connections.80 It prescribes a fee of $0.53 per “exchange service” connection, and permits the telecommunication carriers to retain $0.07 per connection as a billing and collection fee.81 Each carrier is required to set out the fee in its billing to its subscribers, and must make all commercially reasonable efforts to collect the fee.

The New Brunswick system requires that the CAL be deducted from the accounts of prepaid phone subscribers, but if insufficient funds are available, “the subscriber shall not be deemed to have refused to pay the fee” and the carrier does not have to make any further efforts to collect it.82 The logic behind this section is unclear. Even where a prepaid phone no longer has any time available, it can still be used to connect to 9-1-1. In principle, there is no reason why the fee should not be accrued from month to month, until the amount available in the phone’s account is replenished (or some reasonable sunset provision is reached).

The CAL fees are payable 45 days after the end of the relevant month. Each payment has to be accompanied by a statement which includes:83

the amount of the CAL fees billed; the amount of the CAL fees collected;

78 See the earlier form of the act at http://www.canlii.org/en/nb/laws/stat/rsnb-2011-c-146/96293/rsnb- 2011-c-146.html#history (accessed 20 May 2013), at section 1. 79 Emergency 911 Act (NB), ss. 5 and 6. 80 New Brunswick Regulation 2008-23, s. 2, definition of “exchange service”. 81 Ibid., ss. 3 and 5(1). 82 Ibid., ss. 10(1) and 10(2). 83 Ibid., s. 11

the amount of the CAL fees remitted; the amount of the retained billing and collection fee; and the number of “exchange services” (connected lines and devices) provided by the carrier in the province during the relevant period.

The monthly statements are required to be certified annually by an accountant.84

Unlike the Nova Scotia legislation, no express allowance appears to have been made in New Brunswick for bad debt, which presumably is borne by the carriers.

iv. Prince Edward Island

On Prince Edward Island (“PEI”), responsibility for 9-1-1 services falls to the Minister of Environment, Labour and Justice, who oversees the 911 Administration Office which operates under the umbrella of the Office of Public Safety. Operation of the 9-1-1 system is governed by the Emergency 911 Act, RSPEI 1988, ch. E-5.1 (as amended through 2012), and regulations made thereunder. The operation of the CAL in PEI is specifically governed by the 911 Cost Recovery Fees Regulations, PEI Reg EC342/06. A 2012 estimate provided to the UBCM indicates that New Brunswick’s CAL raises approximately $3.3 million per year.85

In 2011, PEI consolidated its three 9-1-1 PSAPs into a single centre located in Charlottetown. This PSAP is a privately operated communication centre owned by Medacom Atlantic Inc.86 Medacom also provides dispatching services for a number of rural PEI fire departments, two police services and the province’s EMS. There is no publicly available documentation that describes the respective responsibilities between the province and Medacom in connection with delivering 9-1-1 services. Nevertheless, under the Emergency 911 Act (PEI), the Minister has authority to establish and operate the 9-1-1 service, in “cooperation with” other identified stakeholders. The Minister has the power to determine how those services are operated including codes of practice, policies, standards and similar matters.87

Like its Nova Scotia and New Brunswick counterparts, the Emergency 911 Act (PEI) contains a liability exemption for certain participants in the 9-1-1 service. Section 4 of that act exempts the province, the Minister, “telecommunications carriers,” a municipality, an “emergency service provider” and employees or volunteers of any of them, from any liability “for any loss or damage suffered by any person by reason of anything in good faith done or omitted to be done” in connection with the 9-1-1 service.

This language is substantially identical to that of the New Brunswick statute. With the recent consolidation of 9-1-1 services into a single, privately owned PSAP, however, it is not clear that

84 Ibid., s. 19. 85 Document provided by K. Vance, Senior Policy Advisor, UBCM. 86 See: “Centralized PSAP will be provided by Medacom Atlantic Inc.” on http://www.gov.pe.ca/newsroom/index.php?number=news&dept=&newsnumber=7551, accessed on 24 May 2013. 87 Emergency 911 Act (PEI), ss. 2(1) and 2(5).

47 the liability exemption in the Emergency 911 Act (PEI) extends to Medacom Atlantic’s communication centre. Although the Minister may, by order, designate a person or a service to be considered an “emergency service provider”, there is no evidence that such an order has been made.

PEI Call Answer Levy. The PEI CAL itself is set in the act and its Schedule, although how the levy is administered is determined by the regulations. The fee is currently set at $0.70 for each “telephone service that is subscribed to by a local subscriber.”88 The fee applies to landlines, wireless and VoIP connections, as well as to “any other telecommunications service that is of a type or class prescribed by the regulations.”89 This additional language gives PEI the flexibility to easily adapt the CAL to new types of telecommunication services as they develop.

Under the PEI legislation, the CAL may be used “for the purpose of recovering the costs of the Government in connection with the provision of the PEI 911 service”.90 The PEI 911 service is narrowly defined as being “a province-wide 911 emergency telephone service for the reporting of emergencies to emergency service providers through a public safety answering point” (which is essentially the same definition as that used by New Brunswick, before its 2012 revision).91

The PEI legislation does not establish a separate fund for holding the amounts raised from the CAL, and the PEI government does not appear to account for its CAL receipts and expenditures as a separate item (unlike, for example, Nova Scotia).

Under the regulations, a telecommunication carrier is permitted to deduct a “collection” allowance of $0.07 for each CAL it bills.92 The regulations also contain provisions requiring carriers to provide documentation supporting the billings and remittances (standardized forms are available for this) and permitting the Minister to reassess returns from carriers and to audit the carriers’ books and records.93 Any records submitted by carriers which reveal how many subscribers they have in the province are protected as confidential information under the main statute.94 Depending on how a carrier elects to account for the CAL (it can be done on either a billed or collected basis), it may be permitted to deduct an amount representing bad debt.95 The regulations also contain extensive provisions dealing with payment defaults by carriers as well

88 Ibid., s. 2.1 and “Schedule: Cost Recovery Fee”. The fee originally was $0.50 per month per connection, but was adjusted upwards in 2012 to $0.70. 89 Ibid., s. 1(i1)(vii). 90 Ibid., s. 2.1(1) 91 Ibid., s. 1(f). 92 911 Cost Recovery Fees Regulations, PEI Reg. EC342/06, s. 5 93 Ibid., ss. 6,7(1), 17 94 Emergency 911 Act (PEI), s. 4.1. 95 911 Cost Recovery Fees Regulations, PEI Reg. EC342/06, s. 2(2). The service allowance is reduced in these circumstances.

48 as processes for managing any reassessment of the CAL by the Minister. PEI collects an estimated $850,000 annually through its CAL.96

v. Saskatchewan

The E911 system in Saskatchewan was established in 1996 under the The Emergency 911 System Act, SS 1996 ch. E-7.3. Saskatchewan still has a provincial telecommunications company, SaskTel, and the E911 service utilizes SaskTel’s CRTC regulated infrastructure for 9-1-1 call routing. SaskTel, CLECs and wireless service providers are made responsible for billing the CAL to their customers. Under the Saskatchewan model, the CAL funds are remitted to and held by SaskTel. Phase 2 wireless E9-1-1 has been implemented throughout the province.97

Under The Emergency 911 System Act (Sask.), the Sask911 system is defined as “a province- wide emergency telephone service that connects a person dialling the telephone digits 911 to emergency service providers through a public safety answering point, and includes the province-wide radio communication network to be used by emergency service providers.”98

Responsibility for managing the Sask911 system falls to the Saskatchewan Office of the Fire Commissioner, which operates under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Corrections, Public Safety and Policing. There are four PSAPs in Saskatchewan, located in Prince Albert, Saskatoon, Lloydminster and Regina, each with defined coverage areas. Each PSAP is operated independently99 under contract with the provincial government.

Under section 45.1 of The Saskatchewan Telecommunications Act, RSS 1978, c. S-34, SaskTel is required to establish a fund, and to collect, hold, invest and, at the direction of the Minister, disburse the CAL funds. The funds are required to be accounted for annually, and SaskTel is required to prepare a corresponding report and financial statement for the minister.

A distinctive feature of the Saskatchewan system is that a portion of the province’s financial obligations for the Provincial Public Safety Telecommunications Network (the “PPSTN”) is also funded through the CAL.100 The PPSTN is partnership between the province, SaskPower and the RCMP, and provides radio coverage for the partner agencies throughout most of the province. It has an annual budget of slightly under $15 million, and each of the partners contributes capital in alignment with its responsibilities for maintaining the system. Each partner is also responsible for funding its own users of the system (e.g., in terms of providing equipment, training and meeting any interconnection requirements).The province’s direct financial contribution to the PPSTN (excluding user-specific costs), amounted to some $5.5

96 Document summarizing Canadian CALs provided by K. Vance, Senior Policy Advisor, UBCM. 97 Description is based on SaskTel, Sask911 Annual Report (April 1, 2010 – March 31, 2011), p. 1 98 The Emergency 911 System Act (Sask.), s. 1. This definition reflects amendments made in 2009. 99 Two PSAPs are municipally operated (City of Prince Albert and Lloydminster) and two PSAPs are operated by municipal police agencies (Regina Police Service and Saskatoon Police Service). 100 The Emergency 9-1-1 System Act (Sask.) was amended in 2009 to broaden the scope of the CAL to include the PPSTN. See: Office of the Fire Commissioner, Annual Report 2009-10 (2010) at p 13/24.

49 million in 2011-12.101 The province increased the CAL specifically to cover a portion of the PPSTN costs, including subsidizing connection costs of various provincial users.102

Under The Emergency 911 System Act (Sask.), the minister has the power, among other things, to set the location, number and areas of coverage for PSAPs and prescribe standards, protocols, systems and procedures for communicating, equipping, mapping and addressing, as well as standards for call taking and dispatching. The province may also set requirements for training and education and set standards for civic addressing.103 The legislation also requires the minister to establish an advisory committee to advise on the development, implementation and operation of the Sask911 system.104 The Sask911 Advisory Committee fulfils this role in the province.

In Saskatchewan, call answer and call handling times are provided for in the standard operating guidelines developed by a working group of the Sask911 Advisory Committee. Interestingly, Saskatchewan does not expressly provide a standard for call answer (though it extensively references the NENA standard for other purposes), but does prescribe a standard for call transfers, using the NFPA 1221 standard of 95% of calls transferred to the appropriate dispatch agency within 30 seconds or less.105 The Saskatchewan guidelines also establish training and proficiency requirements for staff, procedures for managing public complaints, confidentiality obligations, certain equipment requirements, staffing obligations, security requirements and the requirement for auditing compliance with guidelines and standards.106

The Sask911 Advisory Committee, in addition to developing comprehensive standard operating guidelines, also has developed contingency planning requirements for PSAPs, including business continuity and infection control/pandemic response plans.107 The establishment of standards and PSAP procedures in Saskatchewan reflected input from the PSAPs, the province and SaskTel.

101 This description of the PPSTN is drawn from: Provincial Public Safety Telecommunications Network, Operating Report, 2011-12 (Saskatchewan: 2012). 102 Ministry of Corrections, Public Safety and Policing, [Untitled memorandum to users], undated [November 2009]. In the memo, which was distributed to groups such as the Saskatchewan Volunteer Firefighters Association, the ministry noted that: “The operating fee for users of the PPSTN will be $40 per month per radio. The actual cost is $90 per month with the difference being funded by a 24-cent increase in the Sask911 charge on consumer phone bills.” See: www.svffa.ca/news_events_pdfs/PPSTN_announcement_2009_Nov.pdf , accessed on 28 May 2013. 103 See: The Emergency 911 System Act (Sask.), ss. 5 – 8. 104 Ibid., s. 8(5). 105 Sask911, Standard Operating Guidelines v. 1.5 (June 2012). The NFPA standard is used, but not expressly identified as NFPA 1221. See section 4.8, final bulleted point. 106 Ibid., sections 3 (training), 7 (public complaints), 12 (confidentiality), and 13 (PSAP standards). 107 Sask911, Business Continuity Planning (April 2012); and Sask911, Sask911 Infection Control Policy (April 2012).

Although there is an exemption of liability provision in The Emergency 911 System Act (Sask.),108 unlike comparable provisions in the Maritime Provinces, it does not actually exempt the PSAPs from liability. Rather, the provision applies to “a volunteer or a volunteer organization” and exempts liability on the following basis:

“by reason of anything in good faith done, caused, permitted or authorized to be done, attempted to be done or omitted to be done by any of them in carrying out or in the supposed carrying out of any responsibility, duty or power while:

(a) responding to an emergency 911 telephone call; or

(b) acting at the request of an emergency service provider who is responding to an emergency 911 telephone call.”

While an interesting exemption, and undoubtedly of significance to organizations such as volunteer fire departments and volunteer search and rescue organizations, it seems odd to include it in legislation dealing with 9-1-1. The exemption fails to define what constitutes a “volunteer” (which could be problematic in situations where responding emergency workers are receiving a small stipend to cover gas or similar costs, or are paid “per call”), and does not address situations where a volunteer agency responds without a 9-1-1 call having been received.

PSAPs, however, are not expressly exempt from liability in Saskatchewan.

Saskatchewan Call Answer Levy. The Saskatchewan CAL has been set at $0.62; an administration fee of $0.07 is charged by SaskTel and other carriers for collecting the CAL. In 2012, more than $8.9 million was collected through the CAL. Of this amount, $4.6 million was directly spent on “Public safety answering points”, while $4.43 million was expended on “Central co-ordination”.109 The latter line item clearly includes amounts spent on both provincial administration and related costs for managing the Sask911 system, as well as amounts expended on the PPSTN.110

vi. Québec

Québec centrally administers and oversees the operation of its 9-1-1 PSAPs, imposing a range of provincially-established standards and requirements. It also operates a certification process which involves a provincial review of any centre operating as a PSAP. The certification process was introduced in legislative amendments in 2010, with existing facilities granted until December 2013 to qualify. Actual responsibility for the funding, staffing and operation of

108 The Emergency 911 System Act (Sask.), s. 9. 109 SaskTel, Sask911 Annual Report (Fiscal Year April 1, 2011 – March 31, 2012) (2012), at p. 5/8. 110 The charge for “central co-ordination” has jumped from approximately $669,000 in 2007 to the current $4.43 million. The increase is directly related to the change in legislation in 2009 which added the PPSTN funding to the CAL. See: SaskTel, Financial Statements of Sask911 Account for the year ended March 31, 2007 (2007), at p. 3/8 for comparison. The central coordination fee increased as the PPSTN system came online in 2010-11.

PSAPs, however, falls to municipal governments. There are some 34 PSAPs operating in Québec. Most are operated by municipal police agencies; some, however, are separate legal entities (like E-Comm in B.C. or Medacom Atlantic in Prince Edward Island). There is a wide range of size, with the largest PSAP handling 9-1-1 services for more than 530 municipalities.111

Québec’s legislative structure is more complex than that of the other provinces reviewed. Conceptually, it provides an interesting model, since although there is central regulation of the system, much of the enforcement (including allocation of the funds from the CAL) is actually devolved to an agency which is primarily controlled and operated by local governments.

The following statutes and regulations are applicable to the operation of the PSAPs and implementation of the CAL:

Statutes

1) An Act respecting municipal taxation (R.S.Q., chapter F-2.1). See sections 244.68 to 244.74, subsections 13, 14 and 15 of first paragraph, section 262, and second and third paragraphs of section 262. 2) Civil Protection Act (R.S.Q., chapter S-2.3). See Sections 52.1 to 52.20, in force since December 30, 2010. 3) An Act to amend various legislative provisions respecting municipal affairs (2008, chapter 18, as modified by 2012, chapter 30, section 34). See section 135 which provides that 9-1-1 emergency centres in operation on the date of coming into force of the first regulation made under section 52.4 of the Civil Protection Act (i.e. December 30, 2010) have three years from that date to obtain a certificate of compliance (until December 30, 2013). 4) An Act respecting pre-hospital emergency services (R.S.Q., chapter S-6.2). See sections 7, 22, 24 and 86. 5) An Act respecting the Québec sales tax (R.S.Q., chapter T-0.1). Section 162.1 provides that a supply made to a municipality of a service of receiving and processing telephone calls through a 9-1-1 emergency centre is exempt. 6) An Act respecting the exercise of certain municipal powers in certain urban agglomerations (R.S.Q., chapter E-20.001). See paragraph b) of subsection 8 of section 19, which provide that a 9-1-1 emergency center is a matter that concerned related municipalities as a whole. See also sections 118.2., 118.27 and 118.79 which cover financing such expenditures in certain urban agglomerations.

Regulations

7) Regulation governing the municipal tax for 9-1-1 (R.R.Q., c. F-2.1, r. 14.2) 8) Regulation respecting standards, specifications and quality criteria applicable to 9-1-1 emergency centres and to certain secondary emergency call centres (R.R.Q., c. S-2.3, r. 2). In force since December 30, 2010.

111 Email correspondence with Serge Allen, General Manager Municipal Finance and Development Agency for Emergency 9-1-1 Call Centers in Québec, dated 5 June 2013.

9) Regulation respecting the police services that municipal police forces and the Sûreté du Québec must provide according to their level of jurisdiction (R.R.Q., c. P-13.1, r. 6). See section 2 , subsection 1 b).

Under the Civil Protection Act (Que.), each municipality or regional municipality,112 other than certain northern villages, must ensure the provision of 9-1-1 services through a certified PSAP. A municipality may meet this requirement by establishing its own PSAP, contracting for the service from another municipality or contracting with a private or non-profit enterprise.113

The minister is required to establish the criteria which must be met by PSAPs to obtain certification; he or she may also set the criteria applicable to any other dispatch agencies, other than “health communication centres.”114 The minister may also set binding guidelines governing PSAPs and secondary dispatch agencies (other than health communication centres).115 The legislation also permits the minister to appoint inspectors to ensure that PSAPs (and other dispatch agencies, if relevant) are meeting the prescribed standards and guidelines. Certification may be revoked if agencies do not meet the specified requirements.116

The regulations governing the establishment and operation of PSAPs and emergency dispatch centres cover a wide range of issues, from location and infrastructure to equipment, call handling and training. Some of the regulatory provisions apply only to PSAPs, while others apply to both PSAPs and emergency dispatch centres.117 The Québec Dispatch Centre Regulations prescribe that PSAPs:118

(a) must not be located in an “industrial zone” or in an area with known “disaster risks”; (s. 2) (b) must provide physical security to prevent intrusions by unauthorized personnel; (s. 4) (c) must be located in a building which complies with standards applicable to post- disaster buildings, as at the time the PSAP was installed (and, if being materially renovated, upgraded to current standards); (ss. 5 (1) and (2))

112 In Québec, it appears that “regional municipalities” provide services to unincorporated areas of the province, and in that regard are similar to B.C.’s regional districts. (Email correspondence with Serge Allen, General Manager Municipal Finance and Development Agency for Emergency 9-1-1 Call Centers in Québec, dated 5 June 2013). 113 Civil Protection Act (Que.), ss. 52.1 and 52.2. 114 Ibid., s. 52.3. In Québec, the relevant emergency dispatch centres are referred to as “secondary emergency call centres”. 115 Ibid., ss. 52.3 and 52.4. 116 Ibid., see sections 52.12, 52.15, 52.16. 117 Regulation respecting standards, specifications and quality criteria applicable to 9-1-1 emergency centres and to certain secondary emergency call centres,(R.R.Q., c. S-2.3, r. 2), s. 1 (hereafter, the “Quebec Dispatch Centre Regulations”). 118 Certain of these standards are also applicable to emergency dispatch centres, particularly those relating to quality of service. In many respects, the requirements in these regulations are similar to (though less detailed or comprehensive than) those set out in NFPA 1221.

(d) must have appropriate fire alarm and detection systems, as well as fire extinguishing equipment;(s. 5(3)) (e) must have a means for shutting off external air intakes from the heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems; (s. 5(4)) (f) must have the dispatching equipment and call takers located above the first (ground) floor of the building; (s. 6) (g) must have appropriate back up and uninterruptible power supplies, which systems are tested every three months; (s. 6(1)) (h) meet certain requirements with respect to telephone infrastructure, including the ability to process E911 calls and at least two work stations capable of handling TTY/TDD calls; (ss. 7 – 8 ) (i) meet certain specified staffing requirements and call handling / quality of service obligations (ss 9 – 11). Calls must be answered within 10 seconds, 90% of the time and landline calls must be transferred to the relevant emergency dispatch centre within 60 seconds or less; (j) must create and maintain certain records about each call, and keep information relating to their records confidential (ss. 12 -14, 16); (k) must develop, maintain and exercise business continuity and backup plans (ss. 17 – 20). The backup plans have to include the identification of a functional backup centre and procedures for dealing with call overflows; and (l) must ensure that their staff meet certain requirements when hired, and certain minimum initial and on-going training standards. (ss. 21-22).

These detailed regulatory provisions regarding PSAP facilities, equipment and operations set Québec apart from other Canadian jurisdictions which have implemented a province-wide CAL. Oversight of the system is provided by the Agence municipale de financement et de développement des centres d'urgence 9-1-1 du Québec (the “Agency”),119 which is responsible for managing the certification processes, as well as distributing the CAL funds.

Notwithstanding the over-arching nature of the provincial regulatory structure, responsibility for 9-1-1 services (including funding and operations) remains with municipal governments. Accordingly, the Agency is governed by a board of directors comprising representatives of the Union of Municipalities of the Province of Québec, the Fédération québécoise des municipalités and the Ville de Montréal, in equal numbers. The province is entitled to appoint an observer to the Agency, and one has been designated by the Minister of Municipal Affairs, Regions and Land Occupancy.120

In accordance with its mandate, the Agency also operates a Technological and Regulatory Monitoring Committee, which stays abreast of issues impacting 9-1-1 services, and develops

119 The Agency was established by the Minister pursuant to section 244.73 of An Act Respecting Municipal Taxation, RSQ, c. F-2.1. 120 This description was extracted from the Agency’s website, http://www.agence911.org/en/theagency , accessed on 2 June 2013.

54 forward planning to address those issues. It also has a responsibility for public education regarding 9-1-1 services.121

The operation of the Agency is funded through the CAL. The Agency may retain a maximum of 3% of the CAL funds remitted to it by Revenu Québec for its administrative costs.

Québec Call Answer Levy. The Québec CAL is implemented as a municipal tax, albeit one required by provincial legislation. Under the senior legislation, each municipal government was required to pass a bylaw implementing the CAL. The CAL is set at $0.40 per connection per month;122 telecoms companies are permitted to retain $0.04 of that amount as an administration fee. The Québec government established the fee after reviewing the operational costs of the 9-1-1 services before the legislation was implemented.

Carriers are required to remit the amounts raised to Revenu Québec, which in turn remits the CAL to the Agency for distribution amongst its municipal members. In 2012, the CAL raised gross revenue of $42.5 million. From that amount, some $4.25 million was paid to telecoms carriers for administration fees, and a further $400,000 was retained by Revenu Québec for its own administration costs. Of the remaining approximately $37.85 million, some $37.1 million was distributed to municipal members to cover 9-1-1 costs, while approximately $750,000 was retained by the Agency for its overhead and the cost of fulfilling its mandate, including certifying PSAPs.123

As noted above, the Agency comprises solely municipal representatives, with a provincial representative acting as an observer. Its members have developed a formula for distributing the funds available based on two principal metrics:124

1. An amount calculated based on historic revenues received from previous landline CALs (and where no such revenues existed, on the basis of an estimated amount for same);125 plus 2. The remainder distributed pro rata based on population.

An arbitrary amount was also established for certain unorganized areas within the province which are not within municipal or regional municipal boundaries.126

121 Agence municipale de financement et de développement des centres d'urgence 9-1-1 du Québec, Rapport d’activité, at p.4/41 (hereafter: “Agency 2012 Annual Report”). 122 The tax applies to any device or connection which permits connection to 9-1-1 services. See: Agency 2012 Annual Report, at p. 10/41. 123 Agency 2012 Annual Report, at pp. 8-9/41. Decisions by the Agency about how to distribute CAL funds must be unanimous; see: An Act Respecting Municipal Taxation, RSQ, c. F-2.1, s. 244.73(2). 124 Agency 2012 Annual Report, at p. 40/41 125 The amount for each municipality is 1/12 of the amount raised in either 2007 or 2008 (whichever year had the most revenue). 126 Email correspondence with Serge Allen, General Manager Municipal Finance and Development Agency for Emergency 9-1-1 Call Centers in Québec, dated 5 June 2013.

With the Québec approach, the funds are distributed without regard to actual cost of operation of the underlying PSAPs and delivery of 9-1-1 services. If the revenue is insufficient, municipalities would be required to cover the deficit through normal funding channels. If there is a surplus, there is no technical limitation on how such surplus is spent. In general, there was an recognized funding shortfall before the introduction of the uniform CAL. With the new certification requirements, moreover, PSAPs had to invest in upgraded equipment, training and, potentially, staffing. As such, it was felt that there were unlikely to be any significant surpluses available. Indeed, the vast majority of municipalities (96%) reportedly direct the Agency to make the payments to the relevant PSAP, rather than to the municipality itself.127 The amount of the CAL is expected to be revisited in 2014.128

The Agency itself does not retain any significant funds for special projects, system expansion or upgrades, or similar matters.

It should be noted that the CAL appears to have been set at a level that would result in significantly more funds being available than had been the case with the comparable landline levy. On its website, the Agency estimated that the new CAL would raise approximately $13.5 million more than the previous landline CAL. The 2012 figures are actually $16.5 million higher.129 These additional funds were expected to be used to enhance the provision of 9-1-1 services, although as noted, there is nothing in the Québec statutory or regulatory structure that would require that excess funds be invested in enhancing PSAP operations.

vii. Alberta

In Alberta, PSAP operation is a municipal responsibility. Until recently, there has been little provincial oversight or involvement in the establishment or operation of PSAPs. There currently are some 25 PSAPs managing 9-1-1 services in the province. While the number of PSAPs has declined somewhat over the past decade as a result of consolidations, there are still more of them than is typical based on the experience in comparable Canadian jurisdictions.

At the time of writing, Alberta is in the process of introducing a province-wide CAL. Bill 15, Emergency 911 Act passed third reading on 6 May 2013 and received Royal Assent on 27 May 2013. It is expected to be proclaimed in force later this year. Unlike the CAL legislation in other jurisdictions, the Alberta statute is narrowly focused on wireless devices. The 9-1-1 levy is established under section 4. The amount is to be set by regulation (not yet promulgated), but applies only to a “wireless subscriber”.130 It is currently anticipated that the CAL will be set at

127 There is, however, the possibility that the CAL is subsidizing the cost of dispatch services provided by the centres which offer PSAP services. 128 Based on information provided in email correspondence with Serge Allen, General Manager Municipal Finance and Development Agency for Emergency 9-1-1 Call Centers in Québec, dated 5 June 2013. 129 See the FAQ section on the Agency’s website, at http://www.agence911.org/en/faq#68 , where it notes: that, after costs are deducted, it was expected that the municipalities would receive $34.5 million, which was $13.5 million more than under the old landline CAL. By 2012, the amount available for distribution had grown to $37.5 million. 130 Bill 15, Emergency 911 Act (Alta.), s. 4(2).

$0.44 per device per month.131 The Alberta government has not yet made public how much of an administration fee will be retained by telecom companies for collecting the CAL.

The focus on solely wireless devices means that the patchwork of local government landline agreements will also remain in place, which is neither particularly efficient nor does it ensure a fair sharing of the burden amongst users (as in some regions, landline users may not have to pay a fee for the ability to connect to 9-1-1 services and the amount paid may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction). The narrow focus also excludes static VoIP connections. In theory, the Minister may, by regulation, define “other purposes” for the Act, and “prescribe other devices as wireless devices”.132 However, this seems an awkward approach and it is likely preferable to ensure that all existing forms of connection to 9-1-1 services are captured by statute.133

Under the Alberta structure, the Minister is responsible for establishing how CAL funds are to be distributed to PSAPs. Section 6 of Bill 15 provides:

“The Minister may, in accordance with the regulations, make payments or grants from the 911 levy … for carrying out the purposes of this Act.”

Regulations regarding the distribution of CAL funds are still being drafted. The Alberta Emergency Management Agency (the “AEMA”) is leading the effort to consult with PSAPs and other stakeholders on how the funds are to be distributed, including the metrics which are to be used. Our understanding is that the proposed process will involve a grant system. Each PSAP will receive a basic grant, plus an amount based on population served. The suggested approach seem quite complex – separate grant applications from each PSAP are required every quarter in order to qualify for continued funding. This proposal, which may well change in the final form, seems overly bureaucratic and time consuming, both for the PSAPs involved and for the administration of the system. Initial estimates are that the administration costs (including amounts paid to the telecom companies for collecting the CAL) will amount to about 20% of the sums collected.134 This contrasts unfavourably with, for example, Québec, where the total administration costs, including amounts expended on PSAP certification and standards setting, is only 12.7%.

The new legislation also permits the Minister to establish province-wide standards, guidelines and policies respecting 9-1-1 call taking processes and procedures. The AMEA has indicated that this new provision means that the province intends to “work with stakeholders to create

131 Alberta Emergency Management Agency, http://www.aema.alberta.ca/911.cfm accessed on 3 June 2013. 132 Bill 15, Emergency 911 Act (Alta.), ss. 12(b) and 12(c). 133 Even with the broad powers to add to the statute through regulation, it is unlikely the Minister would be able to extend the scope of the statute to include landline connections (which may also limit his ability to extend it to include static VoIP). 134 Alberta Emergency Management Agency, “Emergency 911 Regulation and Program Guidelines: Public Safety Answering Point Meetings – Discussion Questions,” Undated [June 2013]. This document sets out the framework for discussion of issues relating to, among other things, how the CAL funds will be distributed and what constitutes eligible expenses. As at the date of writing, no definitive decisions had been made by the AEMA on how to manage the distribution of funds.

57 province-wide standards processes and procedures for 911 call taking. This will ensure consistent service delivery across the province.”135

Like the legislation in the Maritime Provinces, Bill 15 includes a provision which exempts liability for certain groups involved with 9-1-1 services. Section 11 of Bill 15 exempts the Government, the Minister, a “wireless telecommunications provider”, a PSAP operator and any of their respective employees or volunteers from liability in relation to providing 9-1-1 services or acting under the authority of the new Act or regulations. The caveat to this exemption is that the party in question must have been acting in good faith.

Interestingly, this section does not specifically exempt wireline carriers from liability. Telus provides wireless services through a subsidiary (Tele-Mobile Company), which is a separate legal entity from the one that provides the wireline backbone infrastructure for PSAPs in Alberta. As such, it is not entirely clear that the exemption from liability would apply to Telus’s provision of wireline services or the backbone infrastructure used to support the 9-1-1 system (though its liability in respect of such services may be limited in other ways, including through the terms of the tariffs issues by the CRTC).

c. Approaches in Other Jurisdictions

The approaches of two other jurisdictions also were reviewed as part of the gathering of background information on 9-1-1 systems.

i. Manitoba

Manitoba does not currently have a province-wide call answer levy. Nevertheless, it does have legislation which governs and regulates the operation and functioning of PSAPs. Manitoba’s regulation of its PSAPs is provided for under The Emergency 911 Public Safety Answering Point Act, C.C.S.M. c. E85 (the “Manitoba PSAP Legislation”) and the corresponding regulations, Emergency 9-1-1 Public Safety Answering Point Regulation, Manitoba Regulation 60/2005 (the “Manitoba PSAP Regulation”).

Under the Manitoba system, although PSAP services are delivered by local government, they are subject to provincial regulation and oversight. The Manitoba PSAP Legislation requires that PSAPs be provincially licensed, and makes them subject to provincial inspection. The minister is given the power to control the operation of PSAPs, including functions performed, operational standards, training standards, procedures and equipment.136 The Manitoba PSAP Legislation also:

makes it an offence to connect automatic dialing devices to 9-1-1 services; makes it an offence to make a false, frivolous or vexatious call to 9-1-1 services; and

135 Alberta Emergency Management Agency, http://www.aema.alberta.ca/911.cfm accessed on 3 June 2013. 136 The Emergency 911 Public Safety Answering Point Act, C.C.S.M. c. E85, s. 12.

establishes the confidentiality standard applicable to 9-1-1 calls made “in good faith”.137

The Manitoba PSAP Legislation also includes a wide-ranging liability exemption for the provincial and local governments, an emergency service provider (police, fire, EMS and others prescribed by regulation), a licensed, not-for-profit PSAP, and their respective employees or volunteers, for:138

responding to an emergency 911 telephone call; acting at the request of an emergency service provider who is responding to an emergency 9-1-1 telephone call; operating a public safety answering point; or carrying out any responsibility or duty or exercising any power under the legislation.

Employees and volunteers of “for-profit” PSAPs are granted comparable exemptions, but for- profit PSAPS, and their officers, directors and principals, are not.139

Under the Manitoba PSAP Regulation, a comprehensive regime covering matters ranging from facilities, infrastructure and equipment, to staffing, training and records keeping, is established for PSAPs in the province. PSAPs are mandated to have back-up locations and fail-over procedures. They also are required to have quality assurance processes and performance reviews and are subject to inspection by the province.140

Actual operating procedures appear to be established at the PSAP level, rather than New Brunswick model, where they are prescribed by the province. One approach taken by the Winnipeg Police Service in relation to 9-1-1 call handling, is that 9-1-1 operators are expected to “confirm that an emergency exists” as part of the caller interrogation.141 In general, the policy in British Columbia is to pass the caller to the requested emergency service agency, without further interrogation. Interrogation as to the nature of the emergency would only occur where the caller is uncertain as to which agency he or she requires.

ii. State of Kentucky

The manner in which PSAPs are operated and CALs managed in Kentucky stand in contrast to the more centralized approaches found in Canadian jurisdictions. It is useful to consider, if only to understand how decentralized some systems are and the problems that such decentralization can pose. It should be noted, however, that all 50 American states and the District of Columbia,

137 Ibid., ss. 8(1), 8(2) and 10. 138 Ibid., s. 7(1). 139 Ibid., ss. 7(2), 7(3). 140 Emergency 9-1-1 Public Safety Answering Point Regulation, Manitoba Regulation 60/2005, passim. On alternate locations, see: s. 14; quality assurance and performance reviews, see s. 20; provincial inspections are covered in s. 22. 141 Information provided by Inspector Rick Greenwood, RCMP, based on the Winnipeg Police Service, Communications Manual: 911 Policies and Procedures (2011).

59 impose 9-1-1 CALs on wireless devices and all permit the imposition of CALs on landlines. The CAL fees for wireless range as high as $3.00 per month.142

Kentucky is approximately one-third the area of British Columbia, with a smaller population.143 PSAP operation is primarily a local city and county matter, and has seen very little in the way of consolidation. In 2011, it was reported that Kentucky had 109 certified PSAPs, with an unknown number of additional, unregistered PSAPs located at universities, airports and army bases.144 These noncertified PSAPs are not tracked in any way by the state. 9-1-1 services are a local government responsibility, but the service is optional, as there is no federal or state law which requires it be provided.145

Local governments are authorized to impose landline call answer levies, while the state imposes a levy on wireless service providers. The landline CALs in Kentucky range from no fee to $4.25 per month. While the legislation permitting the imposition of a landline CAL restricts the use of the funds to expenditures on the “911 emergency communications system”, it does not define what is meant by that phrase or prevent local governments from accumulating surpluses.146 In general, revenues from the landline CALs have declined over recent years.147

The State plays a role in collecting and distributing the wireless CAL, which is set at $0.70/month. The revenue from this source appeared to have plateaued. The only right that the State has to regulate PSAP operations relates to establishing standards for handling of 9-1-1 calls from wireless devices, and distributing the funds from the wireless CAL. The State use the funds to help local governments and wireless providers defray some of the costs of providing 9-1-1 services to wireless customers. It also provides funding to local governments on a grant-basis, to help upgrade PSAP equipment and encourage PSAP consolidation.

The fragmented nature of PSAP operation, and separation of local government – which is responsible for the service – from the most readily available source of funding for that service

142 Information from the NENA website: http://www.nena.org/?page=911RateByState, accessed on 6 July 2013. Alaska permits local counties to determine whether to charge a fee on wireless connections. Some states (e.g., California), have established a tax rate based on phone usage. Wisconsin does not have a wireless charge for 9-1-1 services per se, but they do charge $0.75/month per connection as a “police and fire protection fee”, which is used to fund state aid to municipalities and counties for emergency services. See: Wisconsin Legislative Council, Staff Brief: 911 Communications, SB-2012-04 (12 July 2012), at p. 10; http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lc/publications/sb/sb_2012_04.pdf. 143 The population of Kentucky is approximately 4.0 million, while B.C.’s population is approximately 4.4 million. 144 Legislative Research Commission, 9-1-1 Services and Funding: Accountability and Financial Information Should be Improved (2011) at pp. 5, 9. There are also some unregistered PSAPs operated by local governments. The Federal Communications Commission lists more than 190 PSAPs for the State of Kentucky, which is almost as many as exist in all of Canada. See: FCC Master PSAP Registry, downloadable at: http://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/services/911-services/enhanced911/psapregistry.html accessed on 6 July 2013. 145 Legislative Research Commission, 9-1-1 Services, at p. 13. 146 Ibid., at p. 10 and 61. 147 Ibid., at p. 10.

(wireless CALs), has led to significant financial challenges. These problems also have been exacerbated by the failure at the local level to manage PSAP and related dispatch functions efficiently. The number of PSAPs and dispatch centres greatly exceed the number required to provide efficient and effective services to the public, and necessarily increases the overall cost of the operation of the system. As noted in a 2013 report by Kenton County, Kentucky, examining the financial problems facing its 9-1-1 system:148

“…the Committee unanimously supports the further consolidation of the … dispatch systems. Lives would be saved through improved response times while creating efficiencies that would save tax dollars. It was surprising to many on the Committee to see the amount of time and energy that has been invested in this process over the past 15 years with the taxpayers still not able to enjoy the benefits of county-wide dispatch.” [emphasis added]

The Kenton County report noted that traditional landline levies were declining significantly. To keep pace, local municipal governments had increased the amount of the levy, in some cases to as much as $4.25 per line, per month. Funding from wireless levy raised by the State was limited, and the county was facing a deficit of more than $2 million per year for its 9-1-1 operations.149 The solution proposed by the report was to add an additional levy to electricity meters, to once again broaden the tax base.150

The issues in Kentucky highlight several matters. First, the failure of local governments to manage the delivery of 9-1-1 services efficiently greatly impacts the cost of delivering such services and, ultimately, negatively impacts public safety.

Second, separating the government with responsibility for the service from the most relevant source of funding is problematic. By creating a wireless levy at the state level, but not providing a mechanism either for local government to ensure that the funds were distributed as required or (alternatively) giving the State authority to drive greater efficiency in the system, means that the levy does necessarily translate into better service to the public. The State itself noted the problem: while jurisdictions like Kenton County struggle financially, other counties (which are acquiring PSAP services in a more efficient fashion, by contracting for them through the State police), were able to claim wireless funding and were accumulating large surpluses.151

148 Funding Review Panel, Funding 911 Services: A Report and Recommendation by the Kenton County 911 Funding Review Panel (May 2013), at p. 6. The report noted that even greater benefits could be enjoyed if they moved to a three-county 9-1-1 service and dispatch function. 149 The report somewhat blurred the distinction between 9-1-1 services narrowly defined and the broader issue of emergency dispatch and emergency communications, and the committee reported problems separating out how much was spent on 911. Nevertheless, it had three dispatch centres serving approximately 160,000 people and they estimated that the service was costing some $5 million annually to deliver. Ibid., at p. 7; on the “breadth” of the services covered, see p. 8. Notwithstanding the committee’s “surprise” at what was funded, only one item noted seemed broader than usual: the provision of mobile display terminals in police vehicles. 150 Ibid., at p. 12 151 Legislative Research Commission, 9-1-1 Services, at pp. ix, 27, 42-43.

8. Issues, Challenges and Options for Introduction of a Provincial CAL Legislative Responsibility

a. Legislative Approach and Issues

i. Legislation/Regulation

The introduction of a CAL, along with any corresponding system for managing and allocating funds and regulating the operation of PSAPs (and possibly other elements of the emergency communication system) will require senior legislation and regulations. There are no obvious statutory structures into which these types of provisions easily could be inserted, and the legislation is sufficiently particular and potentially complex, that it will be better to have a standalone statute. That is the approach taken in each of the other Canadian jurisdictions examined (with the possible exception of Québec, which has a very different legislative structure to that of the common law provinces).

The legislation and related regulations will need to deal with a range of issues. Based on the legislation implemented in other Canadian jurisdictions, the following non-exhaustive list of matters will need to be considered as part of the legislative drafting process:152

The scope of the CAL, including: o Defining what the CAL covers (i.e., the devices/connections against which the CAL is charged) and providing a process for updating the list of covered devices and connections. In general, it is recommended that all services (and attendant devices) which connect to 9-1-1 services should be subject to a CAL, including landlines, wireless devices and VoIP connections; and o Defining the scope of permissible services and costs which may be funded by the CAL. The amount of the CAL (which should be set in the regulations) and the process for amending or reviewing same. The process for collecting and remitting the CAL, including: o Frequency of remittance; o Issue of bad debt (note that not all Canadian jurisdictions permit telecommunication companies to make allowances for bad debt); o Amount of the administration fee to be permitted; o Telecommunication companies’ reporting requirements; and o Confidentiality of sensitive economic information. Level and extent of regulation of the system (and definition of what can be regulated) in terms of PSAP operations (including standards, training, equipment, infrastructure, etc.). This will also require a specified process for developing, overseeing and implementing such regulation. The system/process for holding, managing and allocating the CAL funds, and managing any regulation of the system, including:

152 Other issues include penalties for misusing the 9-1-1 system, requirements for civic addressing,

o Appropriate metrics / formula for allocation and a process for revising same; Note that the complexity of the allocation will vary materially depending on the scope of the CAL (in general, the broader the CAL scope, the more complex the allocation system); o A process for allocating funds not covered by any set formula (i.e., if the distribution process includes a granting component); o The system for managing this allocation should be intrinsically connected to any regulation of the operation / function of PSAPs; o A clear definition of the roles and responsibilities of the various stakeholders, including a well-defined process for obtaining technical and operational guidance to inform decision-making; and o Responsibility for undertaking educational initiatives in relation to 9-1-1 services.

The principal issues which need to be addressed are closely interconnected. The scope of the CAL (what devices are covered, and what the funds may be used for) impacts the amount of the CAL. The scope also impacts the complexity of the allocation process and system needed to manage and distribute the funds: the broader the range of activities which are permissibly financed or subsidized through the levy, the more complex the approach required for allocating the funds.

Similarly, the broader the scope of the CAL (in term of what can permissibly be funded), the more important it will be to ensure that there is centralized oversight and control of the operation of the relevant aspects of the emergency communication system, to ensure that its public safety objectives are being met in a manner which is both effective and efficient. These interconnected issues are considered in greater detail in sections 8(b), (c) and (d) below.

For the purposes of this paper, based on discussions with the project sponsors it is assumed that the legislation would seek to impose a CAL on all devices which can connect to 9-1-1 services.

ii. Managing Liability

Five of the seven Canadian jurisdictions surveyed established some form of statutory liability protection for the operation of the 9-1-1 system in their jurisdictions. No such general protection exists in British Columbia, with the exception that E-Comm, as an “emergency communications corporation,” enjoys a broad immunity from liability under section 10 of the Emergency Communications Corporation Act (B.C). The exemption enjoyed by E-Comm provides as follows:

10 (1) In this section, "protected person" means the following:

(a) an emergency communications corporation;

(b) a current or former member of an emergency communications corporation;

(2) No action lies and no proceedings may be brought against a protected person, and a protected person is not liable for any loss or damages suffered by any person, in relation to anything done or omitted to be done by the protected person in relation to the provision of or failure to provide emergency communications services by an emergency communications corporation.

(3) As an exception, the immunity from legal action otherwise provided to a person by subsection (2) does not apply if the person has been guilty of malice or wilful misconduct in relation to the subject matter of the action.

If liability protection is to be extended to PSAP operations, a decision will need to be made if that protection should be more broadly cast (akin to that provided to E-Comm), or limited to the 9-1-1 call answer / transfer function. If the narrow approach is taken, then a very clear definition of the 9-1-1 function will need to be included.

If a broader approach is taken (and each PSAP’s related dispatch function is also protected), then the further issue of whether such protection would also be extended to other SSAPs in the province would need to be considered.

Regardless of whether a narrow or expansive approach is taken, granting such protection raises the issue of establishing and enforcing consistent standards and procedures. In each case where other jurisdictions have granted such protection from liability, they have established a corresponding set of standards and requirements for PSAP operations. In some respects, it may almost be seen as being a trade-off: in exchange for receiving liability protection, there is a need to accept centralized standards and oversight.

This question raises a number of broad policy issues and potential concerns (not all of which are addressed here) which would require more detailed analysis than is possible in this paper. It is an issue of concern, however, both to PSAPs and local governments, and one which should be examined closely as part of this process.

b. Scope of Services to be Funded by a CAL

The scope of the services to be funded by a province-wide CAL is a policy decision to be made by local governments and the province.153 Determining the scope will impact a series of other decisions, including the quantum of the CAL, the allocation methodologies required, the governance and oversight systems needed to manage the process, and the issue of establishing recognized standards of service and operational requirements for recipients of CAL funding.

153 For the purposes of this section, references to the “scope” of the CAL refers exclusively to the services which permissibly may be funded under such levy, and not to the types of devices or connections against which such a CAL would be charged.

As noted in the discussion of comparable Canadian jurisdictions, there is a range of approaches to the question of the appropriate scope for a CAL. Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick permit the funding to be used for a broader range of services than what may narrowly be considered “9-1-1 services”. Conversely, Prince Edward Island and Alberta are more restrictive in how CAL funds are utilized, and define the scope using a narrow definition of 9-1-1 services. Québec utilizes an agreed formula for allocating CAL funds, but does not statutorily prescribe how those funds are to be spent.154

The options to be considered for the scope of a CAL include:

Funding only a narrowly defined concept of 9-1-1 services; and Funding 9-1-1 services and funding some portions of the other components of the emergency communications continuum, such as: o Emergency service dispatch functions; o Wide-area emergency radio networks; and/or o Emergency service agencies’ radio connections.

In each case, the relevant capital, administrative and operational costs are assumed to be included in what potentially is being funded, though obviously distinctions could be made depending on the defined scope and related allocation model.

A caveat should be noted here. No attempt has been made to assess the aggregate cost of dispatch and radio network services in the province. The amounts, however, are substantial and, in the unlikely event that the CAL was to provide full funding for all aspects of the emergency communications continuum, the impact on the required quantum of the CAL would be significant. To put this in perspective, the cost of just E-Comm’s operation (which includes 9-1-1 services, fire and police dispatch services and a wide-area emergency radio network) is in the range of $43.7 million per year.155 The aggregate cost of operating all 9-1-1 services, dispatch and emergency radio systems in the province would likely be at least several times that figure. It is assumed, therefore, that if a decision is made to provide any funding to other aspects of the emergency communications system, that funding would only be partial.

Within the context of what would need to be funded to provide 9-1-1 services (narrowly conceived), based on other Canadian jurisdictions’ legislation, the following matters are generally considered directly “in scope”:156

154 Though, as noted in section 7(b)(vi) above, in practice the money is directed to the PSAPs. What is not clear is whether the CAL monies are also being used to fund or subsidize dispatch operations by those centres. 155 E-Comm, 2011 Annual Report to the Community (2012), at p.12. The cost of the BCAS dispatch system, with its four inter-connected SSAPs, is a further approximately $23 million per year. There are more than 70 dispatch centres in the province. 156 This is based on a review of the Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Saskatchewan legislation and regulations. It omits reference to services – such as poison control in Nova Scotia and the wide-area radio network in Saskatchewan – that falls outside of the narrow conception of 9-1-1 services. PEI does

the capital and operating costs directly attributable to providing 9-1-1 services, including, staffing, training, equipment, IT systems and related software, and allocations for infrastructure; the costs of establishing and operating any committees formed to advise on the operation of the 9-1-1 system or any aspect of it (including participation as required at the federal level, with the relevant CRTC committees); the costs related to the development of any standards, guidelines or operational procedures related to 9-1-1 services, and of providing oversight of the operation of the system; the costs of public education initiatives in relation to the 9-1-1 system (e.g., to address the problem of Abandoned Calls, etc.); some or all of the costs related to civic addressing; and some or all of the costs related to developing and maintaining accurate digital maps.

It is worth observing that the Province has looked at the issue around developing a resilient, interoperable provincial emergency radio network, to replace the patchwork of provincial, federal and local government networks currently in place. Similar radio systems have been established in both Saskatchewan and Alberta. When this issue was considered within Emergency Management British Columbia, the possibility of funding some or all of this undertaking through a CAL was raised at that time.157

If a decision is made to broaden the scope of the CAL, the range of permissible undertakings will need to be carefully considered and properly identified. Care also should be taken to ensure that, when such new source of funding is made available, any new expenditures represent efficient use of the funds.

c. Allocation and Management of CAL funding

The process for allocating and managing the funds raised from a province-wide CAL will require careful consideration. Clearly, the broader the scope of the CAL, the more complex the allocation process will become as there will be more considerations in determining an appropriate allocation.

As a precursor to this discussion, however, it should be noted that some concerns were expressed during the information gathering process that the CAL funding should not become an undirected source of revenue for any level of government. In other words, that it should remain focused on its defined intent. Concerns were also expressed that primary control of the funds should remain with local government, which is principally responsible for the provision of the service.

There are a number of different approaches that can be taken to distributing CAL funds, including: not provide a detailed description of what can permissibly be funded from its CAL, outside of saying that it relates to “E911 services” for which the province is responsible. 157 Based on discussions with Mike Webb, Vice-President Technology Services, E-Comm.

1. A metric-driven formula, where relevant cost drivers and other factors are used to divide the available funding amongst either the various PSAPs or the local governments (e.g., as in Québec); 2. A grant-based system (e.g., as in Alberta); 3. A negotiated amount, based on either arm’s length negotiation with private parties (PEI), or negotiations between government entities (e.g., as in New Brunswick, Nova Scotia158 and Saskatchewan). 4. A hybrid model that blends two or more of the above approaches.

Given the situation in British Columbia, a hybrid model, combining a metric-driven formula and grant based system, is probably most appropriate for distributing the CAL. There will still be negotiated arrangements between local governments and PSAP service providers (e.g. with the RCMP OCCs, or with E-Comm), but the numbers generated through those negotiations could become one of the metrics in the allocation formula.

Use of a Fixed, Metric-driven Formula. The PSAPs in British Columbia vary in size and relative cost efficiency. On a per call or per capita basis, larger centres generally tend to be financially more efficient. The largest PSAP in the province provides service to nearly 2.4 million people, handling between 900,000 – 1,000,000 9-1-1 calls per year. It costs approximately $1.55 per capita or a little over $4.00 per 9-1-1 call, to operate E-Comm’s PSAP function. Operations in smaller centres do not match this cost profile. Costs for other centres varied widely (and the numbers which were generated need to be treated with caution, given the uncertainty about how some centres reported the total number of calls, and the difficulty in separating out the cost of 9-1-1 services from dispatch). Still, E-Comm’s 9-1-1 services cost approximately 1/3 less on a per capita or per call basis, than the operation of the second least costly PSAP. The unweighted average “cost per call” across all 12 PSAPs was approximately $10; the unweighted average cost per capita for delivering 9-1-1 services was approximately $3.50.159 The median cost for 9-1-1 services was $9.08 per call and about $3.55 per capita.

The difference in cost structures makes it challenging to develop a fixed, metric-driven formula that covers each PSAP’s current cost of operations, without creating a significant surplus in some centres. At the same time, a fair argument can be made that cost efficiencies should be sought, which will reduce the relative cost gap. It needs to be recognized, however, that this gap will never entirely be eliminated. As noted above, regional district governments have already worked to aggregate service delivery to increase efficiency. This process should be further encouraged and supported through any system that emerges from this process.

158 Nova Scotia actually operates a hybrid system, since they have an allocation process for covering or subsidizing certain local government costs related to municipal addressing, and for funding poison control services. The primary PSAP funding, however, is based on a contract with the province, which establishes a “cost per qualified 9-1-1 call” and makes the province responsible for training PSAP operators. 159 The “unweighted average” here means the sum of the average cost per capita, or average cost per call, for each centre, divided by the number of centres. Where more than one PSAP served the same regional district (i.e., in the Capital Regional District and the Fraser Valley Regional District), the results for the PSAPs were aggregated before the calculation was made. This calculation does not include any figures for the City of Nelson.

While a system based solely on a metrics-driven formula may not be the entire answer, it could provide the cornerstone for the bulk of the funding of the 9-1-1 service itself. The metrics that should be considered include:

1. Call volumes. Call volumes are one of the principal drivers of staffing requirements and therefore the cost of operating a PSAP. Call volumes are largely a function of population, though it is probably a better measure than permanent population, as a number of regional districts have sizeable summer and holiday population booms that impact service delivery requirements. Even use of this metric, however, needs to be carefully considered. The Kelowna OCC, which handles calls for nine regional districts in the province’s central interior, sees 60% more calls during August (its peak month) than it does in February.160 The realities of PSAP operation make it challenging to staff up only for one or two months, which means that the overall costs for the Kelowna OCC are impacted by having to maintain somewhat higher staffing levels year round. 2. Historical Amounts Raised from Landline CALs.161 One criterion established by local governments when undertaking this process was that a province-wide CAL should provide net “new” revenues. Given the disparity in populations, call volumes and resulting cost structures, some allowance will therefore need to be made to ensure that, at a minimum, the funding received is not less than currently is obtained by those jurisdictions which use a landline CAL. A similar approach was used in Québec when its allocation model was established – historical amounts raised through each municipality’s landline CAL forms part of the formula used to distribute funds from Québec’s province- wide CAL. 3. Actual Cost of Operation. If there is a disparity between the actual cost of operating the PSAP function, and the amount raised from a metric such as call volume (or population, or the number of devices in a region) or historical CALs, there may need to be method of adjusting for such additional costs. This does flag the cost efficiency issue noted earlier and it may be advisable to put upper limits on this type of adjustment. 4. Cost of Improvements. The cost of improvements to the PSAP system, particularly if these are mandated through any process established by the CAL legislation, might be treated as a separate item.

Grant-based System. The model used by Alberta for its grants-based system appears overly complex. Nevertheless, blending an appropriately designed granting system with a metric- driven formula would offer great flexibility. It would allow adjustments to be made on an individual case basis in relation to 9-1-1 services. It also would provide an appropriate methodology for using some of the CAL funding for broader support of the emergency communications system, if it is decided that such an extended scope is appropriate for the CAL.

A grant system will require that appropriate parameters be developed regarding the basis on which grants will be made. For matters which fall outside of the narrow conception of “9-1-1

160 Based on call answer statistics supplied by the Kelowna RCMP OCC: Email from B. Figgitt, SE District Deputy Leader, 13 June 2013. 161 In the case of Prince Rupert, this would also have to take into account that city’s wireless CAL.

68 services”, for most undertakings it should probably be approached on a “cost-sharing” basis with the relevant local jurisdiction(s).

Some of the undertakings that could be considered for funding assistance through a grants process would include:

upgrading of dispatch centres to manage NG911; upgrading the emergency radio communication system in the province; improving interoperability between different PSAPs and SSAPs and emergency response agencies; developing appropriate connections between the Provincial Regional Emergency Operations Centres and local government Emergency Operations Centres to the 9-1-1 system; assisting with the cost of consolidating PSAP or SSAP operations to improve overall system efficiencies; and assisting with the costs associated with improving the overall resilience and robustness of emergency communications centres and related systems in the province.

Managing CAL Funds.

The management and allocation of CAL funds will require some form of regular and consistent oversight. If a grants-based allocation system is included as part of the structure, a process for reviewing and approving grants will also be required.

As noted in the introduction to this section, the composition of this entity should reflect the predominant responsibility that local governments have in delivering the services. Care also should be taken to ensure that the monies raised through the CAL can only be used to fund the objects defined by the legislation.

Conceptually, the approach taken by Québec is worth consideration. In that province, a separate agency, the board of which comprises local government representatives and a non- voting provincial appointee, is responsible for overseeing allocation of the CAL funds and certifying the operation of PSAPs. The province acts as agent for this organization when collecting the CAL funds (so, such funds do not form a part of the provincial revenues).

A comparable structure could be considered for British Columbia. It may be that a new organization should be created; alternatively, some success in the past has been enjoyed using the UBCM as a mechanism through which such structures have been created in the past (e.g., as in the original creation of the Municipal Insurance Association). One important limitation imposed on the Québec agency, is that its administration costs are limited to 3% of the net funds collected. Again, this is a good concept, which will inhibit the creation of a large bureaucracy which can so often attract negative attention.

To ensure that overall administration costs remain low, a single point of remittance should be created for the CAL. To the extent that this can be done inexpensively through an existing function of the provincial government, as is done in Québec, that approach would likely be the

69 most straightforward. In this case, the Province would collect the funds as agent on behalf of the entity established to, or charged with, managing the allocation of the CAL and overseeing the operation of the PSAPs.

d. Governance and Oversight Issues

This section examines the need for appropriate governance and oversight of the emergency communications system in the province, and roles that should be considered for each of the principal stakeholders, including the province, local government, the PSAPS, SSAPs and the emergency services.

i. National Participation Issues

The introduction of NG911 will substantially affect how the emergency communications system operates. It will significantly impact capital and operating costs for PSAPs, SSAPs and front line emergency services. There is still great uncertainty surrounding the specification of NG911 and how it will be rolled out. At a recent CITIG conference in Ottawa,162 the issue of governance in relation to the development and introduction of NG911 was discussed extensively, though no ready solution or approach appears to have been adopted.163 It was suggested at the conference that governance issues relating to NG911 might best be managed at the SOREM164 level.

There is a need for the provincial government to take an active and leading role at the SOREM level, to ensure that the province’s interests are properly represented and protected in relation to the introduction of NG911.

ii. PSAP Regulation, Standards and PSAP Operational Role

Every Canadian jurisdiction that has introduced a province-wide CAL has also introduced (or established a process for creating) standards applicable to PSAP and related SSAP operations. While the extent of regulation varies, in some cases it extends to detailed requirements relating to infrastructure, equipment, staffing levels and operational procedures. Standards and procedures are enforced principally through regulation and the development of binding standard operating guidelines and procedures.

As noted at the outset of this paper, appropriate standards are essential to the safe, effective and efficient operation of emergency services. The introduction of a province-wide CAL offers the opportunity to establish a process for setting standards for PSAP operation in the province. Ideally, that process would be consensual, based on input from affected stakeholders, including the province, local government, PSAP and SSAP personnel and the telecommunications

162 CITIG is the Canadian Interoperability Technology Interest Group. The conference was entitled, “NG9-1-1 National Governance and Coordination Workshop”, held on 10-11 June 2013. 163 Based on discussions with Mike Webb of E-Comm, who attended the conference, and highlighted the need for there to be active provincial involvement at a senior level. 164 SOREM means “Senior Officers Responsible for Emergency Management” and is a cooperative federal-provincial body that considers emergency management issues.

70 industry. Such standards should be based on those developed by organizations such as NENA and NFPA, and which are widely used throughout North America. Any standards established should reflect minimum requirements.

Operational issues – such as the challenge of dealing with Abandoned Calls, appropriate quality assurance and quality improvement processes, the definition of the role of 9-1-1 call takers, and addressing problems arising from unregistered cell phones – also would be within the purview of this committee’s consideration. As new developments emerge which impact PSAP operations specifically or the operation of the emergency communication system generally, this group also could advise on appropriate policies for dealing with such issues (including whether any required changes should be funded, in whole or in part, from the CAL).

At present, the Association of 911 Providers of British Columbia offers the principal forum through which issues affecting British Columbia PSAPs and SSAPs are considered.165 Any user/stakeholder committee established under or through the CAL legislation would have a similar role, but also would be responsible for developing recommendations that potentially would be translated into binding requirements. This user committee should report to and advise the entity established to manage and allocate CAL funds. The operation of this user committee should be supported by funding from the CAL.

Where the implementation of consensus standards impacts the cost of providing PSAP services, such additional costs would need to be factored into CAL funding arrangements. In some cases, the costs may be transitional in nature and would best be handled through a grants-based process. In other cases, if the requirements changed the cost of on-going PSAPs operations, those additional costs would need to be covered through operational funding increases.

e. Amount of the CAL and Administration Fee for CAL Collection

The amount of the CAL will depend on the scope of services to be funded by it. Estimating the amount that can be raised requires knowing how many landline, wireless and other connections exist in the province. While we do not have definitive numbers for either wireless or landline connections, we can make a reasonable estimate. The UBCM was advised that there is an estimated 3.4 – 3.5 million wireless devices in the province.166 The 2012 Telus annual report indicates that it has a total of 3.4 million network access lines,167 the vast majority of which will be in British Columbia and Alberta (though they do provide some residential voice service in eastern Québec and business network access services nationally168). With the bulk of Telus’s

165 The Association is principally focused on bringing education and knowledge of issues to its members. It does not act as an advocacy group for its membership. 166 Email from Ken Vance, UBCM Senior Policy Advisor, 14 May 2013, relaying information from the Canadian Wireless Telecommunications Association. 167 Telus, 2012 Annual Report, at p. 3. 168 Ibid., at p. 67

71 landline business being in the west, it is reasonable to estimate that there are probably about 1.6 – 1.7 million landline connections in British Columbia.169

These two categories will represent the vast bulk of connections. Assuming, therefore, that there are approximately 5.1 – 5.2 million devices which would be paying a CAL, the following revenue would be generated:

Net CAL Net CAL Approximate number Approximate Revenue charge/month170 charge/year of connections

$0.21 $2.52 5.1 – 5.2 million $12,852,000 – $13,104,000 $0.25 $3.00 5.1 – 5.2 million $15,300,000 – $15,600,000 $0.30 $3.60 5.1 – 5.2 million $18,360,000 – $18,720,000 $0.40 $4.80 5.1 – 5.2 million $24,480,000 – $24,960,000 $0.50 $6.00 5.1 – 5.2 million $30,600,000 – $31,200,000

These estimates should be treated as indicative. It will be necessary to determine from discussions with the telecommunication providers the number devices in the province that would be covered by the CAL.

As a reminder, the monthly CALs in other provinces, before deduction of the collection fee permitted to be charged by the carriers, range from a low of $0.40 in Québec (less a $0.04 collection fee) to a high of $0.70 in PEI (less a $0.07 collection fee). Alberta is proposing to charge a fee of $0.44 / month per wireless device – the permitted collection fee has not yet been publicly released. Existing landline CALs in British Columbia range from $0.47 per line per month to $2.72 per line per month.

It should be noted that the number of landline connections can be expected to decrease over coming years. British Columbia also already has a relatively high penetration of the wireless market (approximately 82%, according to the Canadian Wireless Telecommunications Association). Individuals who currently have both types of connections may increasingly drop their landline connections, which could result in the total revenue dropping over time if landlines are dropped faster than new wireless connections are added. That may require that the CAL be adjusted in subsequent years.

The final issue that will need to be considered is the administration or collection fee that telecommunication companies will be permitted to charge for collecting and remitting the CAL. As noted earlier in this report, landline CALs were rejected by some jurisdictions – most notably

169 British Columbia’s population is 55% of the aggregate population of BC and Alberta (~4.4 million of ~8.0 million in total). Alberta also has a higher penetration of wireless (approximately 87% in 2010), which suggests it may have a lower overall number of landlines per capita than British Columbia. On the penetration of wireless in Alberta, see: http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/110405/dq110405a- eng.htm . 170 References to “net” CAL means the amount received after deduction of any administration fee by the telecommunication companies.

Metro Vancouver – on the grounds that the tariffed administration fee of $0.07/month/landline was excessive.

As a general principle, any administration fee that is permitted to be charged should be limited to the actual cost of collecting and remitting the CAL. Under the existing system, arrangements for a landline CAL are made on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis. The amount of the CAL varies from area to area in the province, and remittance is to each relevant jurisdiction. This particularization undoubtedly increased the related administration costs of the telecommunication companies.

With a province-wide, uniform CAL, and a central point for remittance of the funds, the administration costs for telecommunication companies will be minimal. While discussion with the industry on this question should be undertaken, a significantly lower administration fee seems warranted.

Appendix A: Glossary

The following are the principal abbreviations or acronyms used in the paper:

Abandoned Calls means calls received by a PSAP which have been prematurely terminated before the call can be assessed and transferred to a dispatcher or to an SSAP.

BCAS means the British Columbia Ambulance Service.

CAL means call answer levy, being a levy on devices or connections which enable a person to contact 9-1-1 services.

Central Coast means the Central Coast Regional District.

CLEC means a competitive local exchange carrier, being a Canadian carrier providing local exchange services and who fulfills all the local competition entry obligations and requirements as defined in CRTC Decision 97-8 and subsequent decisions that have modified the requirements set out in CRTC Decision 97-8.

CRTC means the Canadian Radio-television Telecommunications Commission.

DND means Department of National Defence.

E-Comm means Emergency Communications for Southwest British Columbia Incorporated, a corporation which manages a combined 9-1-1, dispatch and emergency radio network located in Vancouver, B.C.

EMO means the Nova Scotia Emergency Management Office.

ESWG means the Emergency Services Working Group, a committee which was formed by and reports to the CRTC.

ILEC means “Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier” which, in British Columbia, is Telus.

NB-OPD means the New Brunswick Operating Procedures Directive, which are the mandatory operational procedures established by the Province of New Brunswick in relation to the operation of that province’s PSAPs.

NENA means the National Emergency Number Association, an organization which examines operational, technological and procedural issues affecting emergency communications centres and which has established certain consensus standards applicable to PSAP operations.

NFPA means the National Fire Protection Association, a consensus-based standards-setting organization which has established standards for various aspects of the operation of fire and other emergency services.

NFPA 1221 means Standard for the Installation, Maintenance, and Use of Emergency Services Communications Systems (2013 Edition), issued by the NFPA, which is a standard for the operation of emergency communication centres, including 9-1-1 services.

NG911 means Next Generation 9-1-1 services, which will be an IP-based system that will permit a greater range of connections to emergency communication centres by the public, and enable the uploading of additional data types, such as text, pictures and video.

NRRM means the Northern Rockies Regional Municipality.

OCCs means the operational communication centres operated by the RCMP. There are six OCCs in British Columbia, each of which operates as a PSAP.

PEI means the Province of Prince Edward Island.

PPSTN means the Provincial Public Safety Telecommunications Network, a province-wide emergency radio system operated by a partnership comprising the Province of Saskatchewan, SaskPower and the RCMP.

PSAP means Public Safety Answering Point, which is the entity responsible for receiving 9-1-1 calls from the public.

RDCK means the Regional District of Central Kootenay.

RDCO means the Regional District of Central Okanagan.

SLRD means the Squamish-Lillooet Regional District.

SSAP means a Secondary Safety Answering Point, which is responsible for police, fire, ambulance or other emergency service dispatch, to which 9-1-1 calls are transferred from a PSAP.

Steering Committee means the steering committee comprising representatives from the province and local government formed to consider the issues regarding the implementation of a province-wide CAL.

UBCM means the Union of British Columbia Municipalities.

VoIP means Voice over Internet Protocol which is a communications protocol that allows for telephonic communication via the Internet.

Appendix B: Forms of Survey

Local Government Survey

15 May 2013

Local Government 9-1-1 Services Questionnaire

Introduction & Background

UBCM in cooperation with the Province has established a Steering Committee to examine the delivery of 9-1-1 emergency call handling services and develop a plan for implementing a call answer levy to support and improve 9-1-1 services in British Columbia.

The purpose of this survey is to collect information on where 9-1-1 services currently are being delivered and the cost of providing such services through Public Safety Answering Points (“PSAPs”) from the perspective of local government. The goal is to assess how these services are being delivered throughout the province and to understand the costs and issues associated with them.

We would ask for your cooperation and assistance in providing this information. UBCM has retained Ian MacDonald, of Dave Mitchell & Associates Ltd., to collate and assess the responses.

The goal is to include the data from this survey in a background paper for the Steering Committee. To ensure that your responses can be included, please reply by 28 May 2013.

Directions and Contact Information

This form uses Microsoft Word. For text, simply click where the words “Click here to enter text” appears, and begin typing. Where a “yes” or “no” option is given, clicking in the appropriate box will insert an “X”.

Please return all forms to Ian MacDonald at the email address below. If you have any trouble with this form or any questions about the survey, please contact:

Ian MacDonald

Email: [email protected]

Phone: 604 885 9588

Questionnaire

Note: For the purposes of this questionnaire “9-1-1 call handling services” are defined as follows:

9-1-1 call handling services involve a central answer point – the PSAP – which handles emergency calls and, in simplest terms, determines:

(1) The (approximate) location of the caller; (2) The nature of the emergency; and (3) The appropriate emergency service (police, fire or ambulance) required.

The PSAP then connects the caller to the relevant local emergency service or its dispatch agency for assistance.

1. Person completing this questionnaire a. Name: Click here to enter text. b. Position: Click here to enter text. c. Contact telephone number: Click here to enter text. d. Contact e-mail: Click here to enter text.

2. Name of the Local Government: Click here to enter text.

3. Type of Local Government a. Regional District ☐ b. Municipal Government ☐ c. Other – specify Click here to enter text.

4. Does your Local Government provide or contract for 9-1-1 services in its area of jurisdiction? a. Yes ☐ b. No ☐

If you answered “NO”, you do not need to complete the rest of this questionnaire. You may add any additional comments you have in question 16.

5. Approximate population under the direct jurisdiction of your local government served by 9-1-1 services, and date of population estimate a. Population served: Click here to enter text. b. Date of estimate: Click here to enter text.

6. Under what bylaws and/or supplementary Letters Patent are you authorized to provide and fund 9-1-1 services. Please list: Click here to enter text.

7. What is the approximate geographic area covered by the 9-1-1 service (in square kilometres)? Click here to enter text.

8. Does your entire jurisdiction have access to 9-1-1 services, where there is either landline or wireless coverage? a. Yes ☐ b. No ☐ i. If no, have the areas without coverage been mapped or otherwise identified? Click here to enter text.

9. Are there any First Nations lands within your jurisdiction that do not have access to 9-1-1 services?

a. No ☐ b. Unsure ☐ c. Yes ☐ i. If yes, please list the First Nations lands which are not covered (to the extent known) Click here to enter text.

10. How does your government provide the service (select from the following choices, as appropriate):

a. Directly (i.e., through staff and equipment owned and operated by you) ☐ b. Under contract to a PSAP (e.g., with the RCMP and/or E-Comm) ☐ i. If so, specify the PSAP(s) Click here to enter text. ii. Does the contract include any specifications as to the standard of service to be provided (e.g., call answer by 9-1-1 staff within 15 seconds, 95% of the time, etc.) 1. No ☐ 2. Yes ☐ a. If yes, what are the standards? Click here to enter text.

c. Under contract to or through another local government (e.g., another regional district). ☐ i. If so, specify the other local government. Click here to enter text. ii. Does the contract include any specifications as to the standard of service to be provided (e.g., call answer by 9-1-1 staff within 15 seconds, 95% of the time, etc.) 1. No ☐ 2. Yes ☐ a. If yes, what are the standards? Click here to enter text.

d. Other arrangement (e.g., with local government staff at a facility operated by another entity) ☐ i. If so, specify the other arrangement. Click here to enter text. ii. Does the arrangement include any specifications as to the standard of service to be provided (e.g., call answer by 9-1-1 staff within 15 seconds, 95% of the time, etc.) 1. No ☐ 2. Yes ☐ a. If yes, what are the standards? Click here to enter text.

11. What was your total cost of providing 9-1-1 services for your local jurisdiction in 2012? Click here to enter text.

12. If you are receiving 9-1-1 services from the RCMP, what is the estimated approximate price increase for coming years (as a percentage of 2012 costs)? Click here to enter text.

13. What funding sources are used to pay for 9-1-1 services? a. Property taxes ☐ i. if yes, at what rate Click here to enter text. b. Landline phone call answer levy ☐ i. if yes, at what rate Click here to enter text. c. Wireless call answer levy ☐ i. if yes, at what rate Click here to enter text. d. Other sources – specify (including rate) Click here to enter text.

14. How much money was raised from each funding source for 2012, to pay for 9-1-1 services? a. Property taxes – Click here to enter text. b. Landline call answer levy – Click here to enter text. c. Wireless device call answer levy – Click here to enter text. d. Other sources (specify source and amount) – Click here to enter text.

15. Do you provide, or coordinate the provision of, 9-1-1 services for other local governments which are not within the ordinary jurisdiction of your local government? a. No ☐ b. Yes ☐ i. If yes, specify the jurisdictions involved Click here to enter text. ii. Is the service provided under an agreement or an extra-territorial bylaw? 1. Agreement ☐ 2. Bylaw ☐ iii. List any relevant authorizing bylaws and agreements by which you provide services: Click here to enter text.

16. We recognize that local governments have a variety of methods for delivering 9-1-1 services. If you wish to add any details regarding how your local government manages this service, or refine any answer given above, or comment about any issue regarding the establishment of a 9-1-1 call answer levy, please do so here. If you are refining an answer to any of the questions from above, please clearly indicate which question you are referring to. Click here to enter text.

Form of PSAP Survey

22 May 2013

9-1-1 Services Questionnaire

Introduction & Background

The purpose of this survey is to collect information from Public Safety Answering Points on how 9-1-1 services are operated, managed and delivered, including applicable standards, call handling processes, infrastructure, staffing, training and similar operational issues. A separate questionnaire is being sent to the local governments which have responsibility for the service to their residents. The overall goal of the two surveys is to assess how these services are being delivered throughout the province and to understand the costs and issues associated with them.

We would ask for your cooperation and assistance in providing this information. UBCM has retained Ian MacDonald, of Dave Mitchell & Associates Ltd., to collate and assess the responses.

The aim is to include the data from this survey in a background paper for the Steering Committee. To ensure that your responses can be included, please reply by 3 June 2013.

Directions and Contact Information

Please return all surveys to Ian MacDonald at the email address below. If you have any trouble with this form or any questions about the survey, please contact:

Ian MacDonald

Email: [email protected]

Phone: 604 885 9588

Questionnaire

Note: for the purposes of this questionnaire, the 9-1-1 call taking function (and 9-1-1 call-taker role) is defined as follows:

(d) Call answer on the incoming 9-1-1 line. (e) Caller interrogation to determine: that it is an emergency; what jurisdiction it relates to; and to which emergency agency or Secondary Safety Answer Point the call should be directed. (f) “Transfer” of the call to the appropriate agency/dispatch centre in the indicated jurisdiction. This third step may involve any one of the following: the call taker notionally switching roles, and undertaking a caller interrogation/dispatch function for either fire or police; the call being transferred across the room to a police or fire dispatcher position; or the call being transferred to an external agency – such as to BC Ambulance, or to a fire or police dispatch agency such as Surrey Fire Dispatch or North Island 911, or to an RCMP Operational Communications Centre.

The 9-1-1 function ends when the “transfer” is complete, either through a call hand-off to another agency or the notional transfer occurs and the call taker commence agency-specific call evaluation and/or dispatch functions.

17. Person completing this questionnaire a. Name: Click here to enter text. b. Position: Click here to enter text. c. Contact telephone number: Click here to enter text. d. Contact e-mail: Click here to enter text.

18. Name and location of the Public Safety Answering Point: Click here to enter text.

19. Nature of relationship with local governments a. Owned and directly operated by local government ☐ b. Separate legal entity providing service under contract to local government ☐ c. Other – describe Click here to enter text.

20. Approximate population served by the PSAP: a. Population served: Click here to enter text. b. Date of estimate: Click here to enter text.

21. What is the approximate geographic area covered by the PSAP’s 9-1-1 service (in square kilometres)? Click here to enter text.

22. The number of external Secondary Safety Answer Points or agencies to which you “transfer” or “downstream” calls (not including internal transfers):

a. Fire Click here to enter text. b. Police Click here to enter text. c. BC Ambulance Click here to enter text.

d. Other (specify) Click here to enter text.

Nature and Operation of the PSAP

23. Number of 9-1-1 calls handled by the PSAP in 2012:

a. Total of all 9-1-1 calls Click here to enter text. i. Landline Calls Click here to enter text. ii. Wireless or other devices Click here to enter text.

b. Breakdown of 9-1-1 call types: i. Police Click here to enter text. ii. Fire Click here to enter text. iii. Ambulance Click here to enter text. iv. Other emergency (e.g., Coast Guard, Wildfire Management Branch, etc.) Click here to enter text. v. Abandoned calls: 1. Abandoned “in queue” Click here to enter text. 2. Abandoned “pre-switch” (very short duration calls which are not presented to an operator) Click here to enter text.

24. Does your communication centre track the number of misdialed and prank/malicious calls? a. No ☐ b. Yes ☐ i. Number of calls categorized as misdials Click here to enter text. ii. Number of calls categorized pranks/malicious Click here to enter text.

25. Does your call centre have TTY/TDD capabilities: a. No ☐ b. Yes ☐ i. If Yes, how many calls were received using a TTY and/or TDD system in over the past 3 years: 1. 2010 Click here to enter text. 2. 2011 Click here to enter text. 3. 2012 Click here to enter text.

26. Does your communication centre have access to translation services? a. No ☐ b. Yes ☐ i. What service is used? Click here to enter text. ii. Approximately how many calls annually do you direct to this service? Click here to enter text.

27. In addition to the 9-1-1 call handling function, what other services does your communications centre provide (check all that apply) a. Police Dispatching ☐ i. For how many jurisdictions? Click here to enter text. b. Fire Dispatching ☐ i. For how many jurisdictions? Click here to enter text. c. Alarm Response Monitoring ☐ i. For how many customers? Click here to enter text. d. Operation of emergency services radio network ☐ e. Monitoring services for “work alone” local government employees ☐ f. Monitoring or other services for commercial customers ☐ i. For how many customers? Click here to enter text. g. Other services (e.g., distributed records management services, etc.) (specify) Click here to enter text.

28. How many call taker positions are there for 9-1-1 call handling (please specify/describe). Click here to enter text.

29. Are the 9-1-1 call takers: a. Employed directly by local government ☐ b. Employed by another agency (e.g., RCMP, E-Comm) ☐ c. Other (specify) Click here to enter text.

30. What best describes the role of your 9-1-1 call takers: a. 9-1-1 call answer positions are fully dedicated to that function and do not perform agency-specific call evaluation or dispatching duties ☐ b. 9-1-1 call answer positions may also handle some agency-specific call evaluation or dispatching functions, depending on workloads ☐ c. Individuals in the 9-1-1 call answer position are also the regular call evaluators/dispatchers for either police or fire ☐ d. Other (please specify) Click here to enter text. e. If desired, please add any further explanation of the model you use. Click here to enter text.

31. Do you have a back-up centre – that is, a second communications centre to which your staff would move to continue operations – in the event that your communications centre becomes non-functional for any reason? a. No ☐ b. Yes ☐

32. If you have a back-up centre, how often do you test or practice its use? a. Not applicable (no back-up centre) ☐ b. Monthly ☐ c. Quarterly ☐ d. Semi-annually ☐ e. Annually ☐ f. Less frequently than annually ☐

33. Do you have arrangements with another communications centre to manage your 9-1-1 call handling function in the event there is a temporary loss of operations at your centre? a. No ☐ b. Yes ☐ i. If yes, please identify the communication centre(s) you have these arrangements with. Click here to enter text. ii. Are these arrangements set out in a written agreement and/or written protocols: 1. No ☐ 2. Yes ☐ iii. How often do you test or practice its use? 1. Monthly ☐ 2. Quarterly ☐ 3. Semi-annually ☐ 4. Annually ☐ 5. Less frequently than annually ☐ c. If desired, please add any further description of the arrangements you have in place Click here to enter text.

34. Do you have arrangements with another communications centre to handle overflow work, in the event that your 9-1-1 call handling function is impacted by a sudden surge in call volumes? a. No ☐ b. Yes ☐ i. If yes, please identify the communication centre(s) you have these arrangements with. Click here to enter text. ii. What events will trigger the overflow (please specify). Click here to enter text. iii. How often has this arrangement been activated in the period 2010 – 2012? Click here to enter text. c. If desired, please add any further description of the arrangements you have in place Click here to enter text.

Call Handling Standards

35. Does your centre have established standards for: a. Call answer times for 9-1-1 calls (e.g., answer 90% of calls within 10 seconds or less): i. No ☐ ii. Yes ☐ 1. If yes, what is your standard (specify – e.g., NENA, NFPA 1221 or the specific metric used) Click here to enter text. b. Call handling times – being the time taken to interrogate the caller and initiate the transfer to a dispatch agency): i. No ☐ ii. Yes ☐ 1. If yes, what is your standard (specify – e.g., NFPA 1221 or the specific metric used)? Click here to enter text. c. Any other call answer/handling metrics (e.g., average total length of 9-1-1 calls): i. No ☐ ii. Yes ☐ 1. If yes, please specify what is measured and what standard is applied. Click here to enter text.

36. Do you regularly report call handling metrics to local governments which use your service? a. No ☐ b. Yes ☐

37. Does your communication centre have express protocols addressing: a. How the 9-1-1 operator answers the call? i. No ☐ ii. Yes ☐ 1. If yes, please describe/specify. Click here to enter text. b. How the 9-1-1 operator interrogates the caller? i. No ☐ ii. Yes ☐ 1. If yes, please describe/specify (or attach description when returning the survey). Click here to enter text. c. Requiring the 9-1-1 operator to stay connected to the call until the downstream agency answers and accepts the call? i. No ☐ ii. Yes ☐

38. Does your communication centre have express protocols addressing how 9-1-1 operators handle: a. Abandoned calls? i. No ☐ ii. Yes ☐ 1. If yes, briefly describe the protocols, distinguishing if relevant between Abandoned “in queue”/“incomplete” calls and those abandoned “pre-switch”/“very short duration” calls. Click here to enter text. b. Silent calls (no voice communication on interrogation)? i. No ☐ ii. Yes ☐ 1. If yes, briefly describe the protocol. Click here to enter text. c. Malicious or Prank calls? i. No ☐ ii. Yes ☐ 1. If yes, briefly describe the protocol. Click here to enter text.

Infrastructure and Equipment

39. Is your communication centre in a stand-alone, purpose built communication facility (as opposed to being integrated as part of an emergency service or other building): a. No ☐ b. Yes ☐ i. If yes, does this facility meet current provincial standards for post-disaster construction? a. No ☐ b. Yes ☐

40. Is your communication centre integrated in a larger building, which serves other purposes: a. No ☐ b. Yes ☐ i. If yes, what other services are provided out of this building (check all that apply) a. Police ☐ b. Fire ☐ c. Other Government services ☐ d. Other (please specify) Click here to enter text.

ii. Does this facility meet current provincial standards for post-disaster construction? a. No ☐ b. Yes ☐ c. Unsure ☐

41. Does your communication centre have a back-up power supply? a. No ☐ b. Yes ☐ i. If yes, please provide a general description of the back-up power supply. Click here to enter text. ii. Is the switchover to the back-up power supply automatic or does it have to be initiated manually? 1. Automatic ☐ 2. Manual ☐ iii. How often do you test the power supply unit (specify)? Click here to enter text. iv. How often do you test switching over from the regular power supply to the back-up power supply (specify)? Click here to enter text. c. If desired, please add any further description of the back-up power supply arrangements you have in place Click here to enter text.

42. Are your critical call-handling and related IT systems equipped with uninterruptible power supply back-ups? a. No ☐ b. Yes ☐ c. If desired, please add any further description of the UPS arrangements you have in place Click here to enter text.

Training, Supervision and Quality Assurance

43. Does your communication centre have a formal, documented training process for new 9-1-1 call takers? a. No ☐ b. Yes ☐

44. Does your communication centre have a formal, documented program to provide 9-1-1 call takers with on-going skills training and education? a. No ☐ b. Yes ☐

45. Does your communication centre have a minimum number of annual hours of skills training and/or education for existing 9-1-1 call takers? a. No ☐ b. Yes ☐ i. If yes, how many hours per year (specify). Click here to enter text.

46. Does your communication centre have a formal, documented quality assurance program which regularly reviews the overall performance of 9-1-1 call handling (whether alone, or in combination with other call-handling functions performed by the centre)? a. No ☐ b. Yes ☐ i. If yes, how frequently are these reviews conducted (specify)? Click here to enter text.

Other

47. We recognize that there are a range of possibilities for how different centres operate and/or are equipped. If you wish to clarify or refine any of the answers given above, please do so below (or on a separate sheet). Identify clearly which question you wish to refine/clarify, and the additional detail that you believe is necessary or relevant. Click here to enter text.

EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE DELIVERY IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

Police Communication Centres and 911 Public Safety Answering Points

STRATEGIC VISION SUMMARY OF CONSULTATION COMMENTS

JULY 2015

This material is owned by the Government of British Columbia and protected by copyright law. It may not be reproduced or redistributed without the prior written permission of the Province of British Columbia.

EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGIC VISION - SUMMARY OF CONSULTATION COMMENTS 1

Contents

Highlights ...... 3

Part 1: Background to the Consultation Process ...... 4 Background ...... 4 Consultation Process ...... 4

Part 2: What we Heard – Themed Responses and Comments ...... 5 Service Delivery ...... 5 Governance ...... 6 Call Answer Levy (CAL) on Wireless Devices ...... 7 Other Comments ...... 8

EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGIC VISION - SUMMARY OF CONSULTATION COMMENTS 2

Highlights

Since the 911 system was implemented in the late 1980s, local governments have continuously worked on improving service delivery. However, times and technology have changed and there is now an opportunity to revisit and renew the overall approach to 911 service delivery given the number of challenges related to: o Migration of households from landline to wireless telephone service; o Implementation of Next Generation 911 (NG911) technologies; o Gaps in the provision of 911 service; o Ensuring resilience of the 911 system amid major catastrophic events. The Ministry of Justice distributed a Discussion Paper in April 2015 and held an in-person consultation forum in Vancouver on June 1, 2015, seeking feedback from key stakeholders on the Ministry’s strategic vision for emergency communications in British Columbia. The Ministry’s strategic vision includes a consolidated 911 Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) and police communications service delivery model, with enhanced support from new revenue raised through a provincial Call Answer Levy (CAL) on wireless devices. Feedback on the Discussion Paper was requested by May 15, 2015. In total 15 responses were received and 40 participants attended the one day consultation forum. The Ministry heard from Regional Districts and municipalities that operate their own 911 PSAPs, First Nations Emergency Services, RCMP, BC Association of Chiefs of Police, BC Association of Police Boards and the BC Police Association, E-COMM and CREST, TELUS and other wireless service providers, BC Emergency Health Services, Fire Chiefs Association of BC, Industry Canada, DND and others. Stakeholders were requested to comment on the 3 components to the strategic vision: service delivery, governance and the CAL on wireless devices. There was general support for service delivery consolidation and implementation of a provincial CAL. Key themes raised, and outlined in this summary report, include: Approach consolidation in a thoughtful manner by considering the particular needs and attributes of individual jurisdictions, including variances between rural and urban areas; Ensure costs for consolidation can be addressed through any future funding model; Develop a set of minimum standards for all functions in the emergency communications system to reinforce consistency while being flexible enough to accommodate local nuances; Ensure the new governance model represents a diverse group of stakeholders including, but not limited to: local authorities, provincial government, federal government, police and emergency services, regional district authorities, E-COMM, and telecommunication service providers; Put a CAL on all devices capable of triggering a 911 response, this includes landlines, wireless devices and new and emerging technologies; Establish greater clarity and understanding of the scope of components within the emergency communications system to be governed and funded by the new CAL; Delegate responsibility to a central body/agency to collect, administer, and dispense CAL revenue and clarify the roles of the provincial government, local authorities and other key stakeholders in this process; and Engage and communicate with the public as changes to the system are agreed to and implemented.

EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGIC VISION - SUMMARY OF CONSULTATION COMMENTS 3

Part 1: Background to the Consultation Process

Background

The current 911 system was implemented in the late 1980s, when technology was predominantly landline telephone services (landlines). Today, more households are abandoning landline services in favor of wireless services, and Next Generation 911 (text and images) is expected to be complex and costly. In the recently released Earthquake Consultation Report, consultation chair Henry Renteria raised the need for the provincial government, local authorities and key partners to assess opportunities to enhance the resiliency and capacity of the 911 system. System resiliency, that is the ability to function effectively regardless of adverse circumstances, is critical to public safety.

Given these challenges, the Ministry of Justice (the Ministry) reached out to key stakeholders for input to inform the future of emergency communications across the province involving 911 and police communication centres. By modernizing the current approach to a more streamlined, equitable and resilient emergency communications system, services and public safety will be enhanced province- wide.

The Ministry provides overall direction respecting police services in the province and ensures there are adequate and effective levels of policing. Although 911 Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) is a local government responsibility and not a policing function, dispatching of police related calls is and the two functions are inextricably linked. Local governments have worked to manage and improve service over the years, and the Ministry values the role of local government as a key stakeholder in the provision of 911 PSAP.

Consultation Process

On April 17 and 20, 2015, the Discussion Paper was distributed to key stakeholders and experts inviting them to provide feedback and input on the future state of emergency communications in British Columbia. At the same time, stakeholders were invited to attend a consultation forum. The morning of the session provided a number of subject matter expert presentations which focused on providing stakeholders with context and a common language to support the afternoon discussions. Input to the consultation process was therefore received by way of: Written feedback – stakeholders were asked to provide a written response to a list of questions by May 15, 2015.

Verbal feedback – stakeholders participated in the one-day emergency communications stakeholder consultation forum on June 1, 2015 held in Vancouver.

EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGIC VISION - SUMMARY OF CONSULTATION COMMENTS 4

Profile of Respondents

All feedback submitted, through written submissions and in person at the consultation forum, was documented for review and consideration by the Ministry*.

1. Written Submissions Local governments 7 Police agencies/PSAP 3 Telecommunications companies 2 Federal organizations 2 Universities 1 Total 15 2. Forum Participants Local governments 20 Police agencies 9 First Nations 2 BC Emergency Health Services 1 Fire Chiefs Association of BC 1 BC Search and Rescue Association 1 E-COMM 6 CREST 1 Independent (Consultants) 2 Federal government 1 Total 44

*Ministry staff also met with the UBCM Community Safety Committee on April 16, 2015 and the Association of 911 Service Providers of BC on May 13, 2015.

Part 2: What we Heard – Themed Responses and Comments

This section provides a high level overview of the themed responses from the perspectives of the stakeholders who responded in writing to the discussion paper or who attended the consultation forum.

Service Delivery

Current model Some stakeholders believed that the current system is effective, ensures necessary redundancy and provides unique 911 PSAP and police dispatch services based on local needs. The current system allows for communities to set unique service levels and control the tone and culture of the callers’ experience.

EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGIC VISION - SUMMARY OF CONSULTATION COMMENTS 5

Consolidation The majority of stakeholders believed that consolidation was the best option for the future of emergency communications services, resulting in increased efficiency and the ability to address challenges facing the system.

For example, consolidation of PSAPs could provide the economies of scale required to make Next Generation 911 more affordable. Stakeholders noted that rolling out any new 911 features would be more difficult when there are many different centres each requiring updated equipment, technology, testing, training, and funding.

Other challenges to be addressed through consolidation were noted as follows:

Lack of redundancy and back up; Inconsistent standards across the province; Inability to access new and better technology; and Finding sustainable funding sources, which is especially difficult in rural and remote areas where there are small populations.

There was a sense that PSAPs serving larger geographical areas and populations were going to be more efficient than PSAPs serving smaller areas and populations. Geographic differences and local needs would need to be considered in a consolidated model. Others noted that consolidation does not necessarily mean that that individualized and specialized service has to stop. The specific requirements of individual jurisdictions can be addressed with appropriate training of staff and the use of technology.

It was mentioned that the consolidated service delivery model will require a consistent set of minimum standards, and will have to be aligned with telecommunications service providers and system integration partners to ensure success. In emergency situations, designated back up PSAPs will be able to better support each other if they have similar standards, equipment, and training. The need for consistent procedures in responding to abandoned calls and “pocket dials” was also mentioned.

Some stakeholders also noted that cost effectiveness of moving to a consolidated model would need to be ensured.

Public expectations Implementation of a consolidated service delivery model and new technologies needs to be aligned with the public needs and wants. It will be important to have an effective communications strategy to help the public better understand the limitations and benefits of consolidation to ensure their expectations are aligned with what is realistic.

Governance

Scope and structure Stakeholders noted that the scope, structure, and roles and responsibilities of a governance body would

EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGIC VISION - SUMMARY OF CONSULTATION COMMENTS 6 need to be clear to ensure a consistent understanding. The role of local government versus the provincial government should be clear.

An advisory committee structure was cited as an option. Stakeholders mentioned a number of considerations for successful governance implementation, as follows: The governance model should include representation from a diverse group of key stakeholders working within a collaborative decision-making environment; The implementation of the governance model needs to be incremental – if too much is undertaken at once, it will be difficult to implement; Best practice alternatives should be explored by investigating what is working well in other jurisdictions.

Standards The majority of stakeholders noted that minimum standards should be established by the Provincial Government with local stakeholder input taken into consideration. Minimum standards will ensure consistency to meet public expectations and enhance public safety. Some stakeholders also suggested that a central regulating body could set standards and policies for PSAPs. One stakeholder suggested Emergency Management BC would be the ideal body for setting standards and policies.

It was noted that standards should include the equipment and infrastructure required for PSAPs to operate. Some stakeholders noted that despite established standards, there should be flexibility to address local needs and differences between urban and rural areas (i.e., minimum standards may not apply to remote areas of the province).

Funding model Some stakeholders noted that the funding model in a consolidated system must be seen as equitable to avoid any perceptions of inequity, particularly between urban and rural jurisdictions. Local governments should have some degree of control in the funding model. Some stakeholders also mentioned their jurisdictions would like to have flexibility in selecting the services they will be paying for. Additionally, the administration of funding should be conducted by an existing group, and not through the creation of a new organization. An overall principle of the funding model was identified as transparency in how funds are collected and distributed.

E-COMM A number of stakeholders noted that they were already in a contract, or moving towards a contract, with E-COMM (Emergency Communications for BC Inc). These stakeholders were comfortable with this arrangement and believed that it would retain the benefits of stand-alone communication centres.

Call Answer Levy (CAL) on Wireless Devices

CAL administration The majority of stakeholders support a provincial CAL, particularly given the decline in landline use and revenue and the increase in 911 calls from cell phones. Stakeholders also noted that the most efficient and

EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGIC VISION - SUMMARY OF CONSULTATION COMMENTS 7 effective process for administering the CAL would be through the provincial government, with revenue distributed equitably to local governments.

Devices to be covered by the CAL A number of stakeholders felt the CAL should cover all devices capable of connecting to 911 - wireless, landlines, and future technologies. It was felt this would create more of a user-pay environment, which fairly allocates the cost across all users.

CAL model Stakeholders noted that BC should model the new levy after CALs already in place in other provinces. Currently wireless service providers collect 911 fees province-wide from their subscribers on behalf of the provincial governments that have a CAL. It was noted that wireless service providers should be allowed to keep an administration fee, while others mentioned that the amount of the administration fee should be negotiated to a lower rate.

CAL scope Stakeholders noted that the CAL should fund more services than just 911 PSAP. Some stakeholders mentioned only the operations of emergency communications centres, not first responder costs, should be funded using CAL. Others stated that the use of the CAL funds should be the decision of each PSAP.

Potential services identified which could be included within the funding allocation included radio networks, civic addresses, Secondary Safety Answering Point enhancements, or GIS mapping & technology. Some stakeholders noted human resources were one component which should not be funded through the CAL.

Stakeholders in northern regions of the province noted that CAL revenue would address the present, longstanding concern over the absence of any 911 service. First Nations stakeholders also noted the issue of lack of 911 service on some First Nations territories.

Other Comments

One written submission expressed concern with the process of the discussion paper and the deadline for submitting feedback, and requested clarification on whether the Province’s proposal is to assume responsibility for 911 PSAP services. In response to these concerns, the Ministry clarified that the timelines were set to assist in preparations for the June 1, 2015, Emergency Communications Forum and that submissions were accepted after the deadline. It was also clarified that it is not the intention of the Ministry of Justice to assume the responsibility from local government for the provision of emergency communications services in British Columbia.

Thank you to all the stakeholders who participated in the consultation. The feedback is being considered as part of the analysis of the Emergency Communications Strategic Vision, and will help to inform next steps.

EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGIC VISION - SUMMARY OF CONSULTATION COMMENTS 8 British Columbia Earthquake Preparedness Consultation Report PREPARED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND MINISTER OF JUSTICE

HENRY RENTERIA | DECEMBER 2014 B.C. EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS: CONSULTATION REPORT

December 19, 2014

Dear Minister Anton:

I am pleased to submit my ﬁnal report for your consideration, in accordance with the terms of reference for the BC Earthquake Preparedness Consultation.

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to meet and confer with a wide variety of B.C. Stakeholders regarding their earthquake preparedness concerns and priorities. It was my honour and pleasure to be involved in this important initiative.

Through your leadership and vision, the Ministry has already begun the initial work towards a comprehensive earthquake preparedness program. Lori Wanamaker, Deputy Solicitor General, and Pat Quealey, Assistant Deputy Minister, are providing excellent executive management to guide Emergency Management BC (EMBC) in the oversight of existing strategic programs. I am thoroughly impressed with the level of expertise and professionalism exhibited throughout the EMBC organization and especially the staﬀ. They are truly committed and take their responsibilities very seriously.

The focus of the report calls for a development of a culture of preparedness in British Columbia. Collaboration and cooperation among government, the private sector and the general public is the formula for success. Additionally the speciﬁc agencies responsible for leading preparedness eﬀorts must have the necessary authority and resources to accomplish their goals.

It is my sincere hope that this report and the speciﬁc recommendations prove to be of value to you and the people of British Columbia.

Yours truly, Henry R. Renteria, The Renteria Group B.C. EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS: CONSULTATION REPORT B.C. EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS: CONSULTATION REPORT

Contents

Introduction ...... 2

Executive Summary ...... 4

About the Earthquake Preparedness Consultation ...... 6

Emergency Management in B.C...... 9

Recommendations ...... 11 Recommendation #1: Leadership, Authority and Responsibility ...... 11 Recommendation #2: Funding and Accountability ...... 15 Recommendation #3: Intergovernmental and Inter-Agency Coordination ...... 18 Recommendation #4: Public Education, Awareness and Engagement ...... 23 Recommendation #5: Private Sector and Non-government Organizations ...... 26 Recommendation #6: Training and Exercising ...... 28 Recommendation #7: Provincewide Risk Analysis ...... 31 Recommendation #8: Emergency Management Capability Priorities ...... 34

Conclusion ...... 37

Earthquake Consultation Report – Appendices ...... 38 Appendix A: Henry Renteria Bio...... 39 Appendix B: The Risk to B.C. (Earthquake and Tsunami) ...... 40 Appendix C: Previous Reports ...... 46 Appendix D: Earthquake Consultation – Terms of Reference ...... 48 Appendix E: Stakeholders Engaged ...... 50 Appendix F: Earthquake Consultation – Community Session Schedule ...... 58 Appendix G: Earthquake Consultation Summary – Recommendations and Key Actions ...... 59 Appendix H: Emergency Management Structures ...... 64 B.C. EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS: CONSULTATION REPORT

Thus, B.C. faces a challenge. The earthquake threat Introduction has been studied and adequately assessed. Further, actions needed to mitigate an earthquake’s impact The existence of active earthquake faults in the have been adequately identified in numerous Pacific Northwest is well documented. While we previous reports by organizations such as the Office cannot predict when, where, or how large an of the Auditor General (OAG) of BC (See Appendix earthquake will be, the probability is high that C for a list of previous reports). But on the whole, a major earthquake will cause damage to highly British Columbians, and the majority of their populated areas of B.C. within 50 years. (Appendix B institutions, have either not made earthquake describes the types of earthquake B.C. is subject to preparedness a priority, or have been unable to and the risk these represent). make significant progress on addressing this issue Based on significant earthquakes that have occurred within existing systems and with existing resources. throughout the world, there are many documented In the course of consultations this summer, after-action reports and an abundance of research stakeholders voiced a wide variety of preparedness regarding their effects on cities and populations. needs and put forward a multitude of Additionally, there are numerous reports and recommendations, many of which are reflected testimonials from public safety officials to remind in this report. However, action on a selection of us that efforts put in place prior to such disasters these needs in isolation will not make B.C. prepared. can go far in minimizing an earthquake’s impacts. What is required is a holistic approach with all parties In B.C., the lack of significant seismic activity recognizing that they have a role to play. Achieving near highly populated areas has resulted in progress through such an approach will depend widespread apathy. This has meant that earthquake upon creating a culture of preparedness in B.C., preparedness has not received the day-to-day and ensuring that the emergency management attention that other pressing needs have received. system empowers all parties both inside and outside Consequently, earthquake and disaster preparedness of governments and provides for leadership where programs have been cut or restricted in growth it is required. and resources have been devoted to other priorities It is for this reason that this report’s and programs. Certainly, there are preparedness recommendations focus on getting the successes and strengths in B.C. that should be overall emergency management system right, recognized, and there are numerous stakeholders and institutionalizing a culture of preparedness. who are highly committed to this issue. Overall Motivating, empowering, and leading individuals though, it seems that progress on earthquake and agencies to tackle the many necessary preparedness has been limited. Simply put, preparedness enhancements must be our goal. sufficient resources and priority have not been Among the many pressing issues put forth by devoted to this effort. stakeholders, this is the crosscutting need and the pre-condition for action on all other preparedness gaps. It is this pre-condition which has been lacking historically.

2 B.C. EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS: CONSULTATION REPORT

While this report was commissioned by and is submitted to the Attorney General and Minister of Justice, representing the provincial government, its recommendations are not for the provincial government alone. No one agency or any one level of government can prepare B.C. for a catastrophic event. Having said that, there are opportunities for governments to show integrated leadership on this issue, and the recommendations pay particular attention to the resources and authority of the provincial government’s lead emergency management agency, Emergency Management BC (EMBC). Addressing the full scope of earthquake preparedness needs for a jurisdiction the size of B.C. is not an inexpensive proposition. Meaningful progress will require integrated leadership and additional resources. The roadmap to greater preparedness is understood by EMBC. The main obstacles are funding, staﬃng, and empowerment for lead agencies, such as EMBC, and a wide range of strategic partners. Five, 10 and 20 years from now, B.C.’s state of earthquake preparedness will be more dependent on its success at moving towards a culture of preparedness and setting the conditions for action than on any speciﬁc preparedness enhancements selected for investment in the short- or medium-term. It is with this in mind that this report’s recommendations are put forth for consideration.

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The concerns of stakeholders, and the long Executive Summary history of relative apathy regarding earthquake preparedness in B.C., speak to the need for The Earthquake Preparedness Consultation systemic and cultural changes on this issue. was announced by B.C.’s Attorney General and Driving such change is the focus of this report’s Minister of Justice on March 11, 2014. Chaired by recommendations. Henry Renteria, former head of California’s Office of Emergency Services and a member of the As reflected in the recommendations, governments Governor’s Cabinet in that capacity, its objective at all levels must provide their agencies with was to engage with B.C. stakeholders to gather the authority and resources required to fulfill feedback regarding earthquake preparedness issues their disaster preparedness responsibilities and priorities (See Appendix A for a short biography and provincial and federal governments must of Henry Renteria). As Chair, Henry Renteria provide further funding assistance to help was instructed to consider this feedback, empower local authorities. Organizations outside and provide recommendations to government of government as well as the public also have by Dec. 31, 2014 on how British Columbians could preparedness responsibilities which they must improve their preparedness for a catastrophic come to understand, accept and fulfil. System- earthquake. wide, the expectations of different agencies and organizations must be identified, and accountability Consultations, conducted during the April to measures must be implemented. Further, enhanced July 2014 period, engaged with a wide variety plans, training and exercising need to be pursued of stakeholders both within and outside of to ensure that all elements of the system can work government. Overall, stakeholder feedback reflected together seamlessly. serious concerns regarding B.C.’s preparedness for a catastrophic earthquake, public and institutional The recommendations in this report address these apathy, a lack of resources devoted to the issues and suggest a path forward. They do not issue, and the need for additional leadership. suggest a multitude of investments in specific These stakeholder concerns support the findings emergency management capabilities (though of other reports on earthquake preparedness several are noted). Rather, they are designed to which have been completed over the last 20 years, set the systemic and cultural conditions for long- including the recent March 2014 report “Catastrophic term change and allow British Columbians to work Earthquake Preparedness” by the OAG of BC. successfully towards greater preparedness. While progress has been made on earthquake A list of recommendations is provided on the preparedness, and significant work is underway next page. Key recommended actions in support currently for which involved parties should be of each recommendation are delineated in the applauded, the majority of the preparedness gaps “Recommendations” section, and are summarized and recommendations outlined in previous reports in Appendix G: Summary of Recommendations and appear to remain valid today. Key Actions.

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LIST of RECOMMENDATIONS:

RECOMMENDATION #1: LEADERSHIP, AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY The provincial government must provide EMBC with additional resources and the authority required to effectively deliver emergency management leadership to provincial crown agencies and local authorities. Further, EMBC must be positioned within government in such a fashion that its authority is greatly enhanced. RECOMMENDATION #2: FUNDING AND ACCOUNTABILITY The provincial and federal governments must implement a funding program to support local authority preparedness efforts, and leverage emergency management funding to: } Increase emphasis on planning and mitigation; and, } Increase local authority accountability. RECOMMENDATION #3: INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND INTERAGENCY COORDINATION Federal, provincial, and local authorities, as well as other entities, such as those in the private sector, must ensure that they have the integrated plans and capacities in place to deal with a catastrophic event. RECOMMENDATION #4: PUBLIC EDUCATION, AWARENESS AND ENGAGEMENT EMBC, together with significant agencies at all levels of government and private sector partners, must launch a long-term and coordinated earthquake preparedness public education and awareness campaign. New funding and staff will be required. RECOMMENDATION #5: PRIVATE SECTOR AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS The Province must prepare and resource a strategy for further engagement of the private sector in emergency management planning, including mandated requirements for private sector entities. RECOMMENDATION #6: TRAINING AND EXERCISING The provincial government must resource EMBC with additional staff and funding to develop and implement comprehensive training and exercise strategies with partners. RECOMMENDATION #7: PROVINCEWIDE RISK ANALYSIS In the long-term, EMBC and its partners must develop a strategy for enhanced hazard risk and vulnerability analysis and for increasing the availability of emergency management risk data for use by local authorities, the private sector, First Nations and the public.

RECOMMENDATION #8: EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY PRIORITIES Federal, provincial, and local governments must invest in emergency management capability enhancements in such areas as alerting, logistics, urban search and rescue, rapid damage assessment, and 911.

5 B.C. EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS: CONSULTATION REPORT

Henry Renteria, former director of California’s Office About the Earthquake of Emergency Services (OES), and a member of Preparedness Consultation the Governor’s Cabinet from 2003 to 2009, and now head of the Renteria Group of consultants, was appointed the Chair of this Earthquake PURPOSE and SCOPE Preparedness Consultation initiative. As Chair, he was On March 25, 2014, the OAG of BC released a report tasked with leading an extensive consultation with titled “Catastrophic Earthquake Preparedness” a wide range of B.C. stakeholders on improving which focused on EMBC planning and reporting with the ability of British Columbians to prepare for and respect to the eventuality of a damaging earthquake. respond to a catastrophic seismic event. As an The report concluded that EMBC, the lead agency expert in the field of emergency management at the provincial level for emergency management, and leadership, Renteria was further tasked with was not adequately prepared for such an event. providing concrete recommendations on how The report included nine recommendations to the British Columbians’ preparedness for such an event provincial government, all of which were accepted. could be improved, taking into account stakeholder priorities. It is worth noting that the 2014 OAG report focused only on one part of B.C.’s emergency management The Terms of Reference for the Earthquake system – EMBC. In B.C., emergency management is Preparedness Consultation (see Appendix D: a shared responsibility between the public, all levels Terms of Reference) created a wide scope of inquiry, of government, and numerous stakeholders. Thus, allowing the Chair to draw in feedback from enhancing B.C.’s preparedness for a catastrophic as wide a range of organizations on as wide a earthquake, or any catastrophic event, necessarily range of earthquake preparedness issues as time involves all parties, not just EMBC. permitted. Further, as the consultation was initiated, it became clear that while the focus would remain Government’s March 2014 response to the 2014 on earthquake preparedness, broader disaster OAG report noted that action was already underway preparedness issues would also necessarily be on a number of the report’s recommendations, considered due to the extensive overlap between but that long-term efforts would have to be preparedness requirements for a catastrophic informed by broader stakeholder input, consistent earthquake and those for other disasters. with the principle of shared responsibility noted above. On March 11, 2014, the Province announced STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTED that between April and July, there would be extensive consultation with B.C. stakeholders As noted above, the Earthquake Preparedness regarding issues, priorities, and opportunities in the Consultation canvassed a wide range of stakeholders area of catastrophic earthquake preparedness. over the April to July 2014 period. Stakeholders engaged fell into two broad categories: } Local government and First Nations. } Additional stakeholders, such as federal agencies, the private sector, non-governmental organizations, neighbouring jurisdictions, etc.

6 B.C. EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS: CONSULTATION REPORT

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND FIRST NATIONS ADDITIONAL STAKEHOLDERS

The largest category of stakeholders invited to Consistent with the concept of shared responsibility, meet with the Chair was that of local authorities the Chair sought to engage with a wide range and First Nations. Seventeen community of stakeholders, both within and outside of sessions on earthquake preparedness were government. Thus, meetings were arranged not organized with meeting locations focused only with representatives of provincial ministries on those regions at highest risk from seismic and federal agencies, but also private sector entities, events (See Appendix F: Earthquake Preparedness professional associations, non-governmental Consultation: Community Sessions Schedule). organizations, representatives from emergency In a May 2014 letter, Attorney General and Minister management and science organizations in other of Justice Suzanne Anton informed all local jurisdictions (e.g. U.S. states), etc. (See Appendix E: authorities (189) and First Nations (200) in B.C. Stakeholders Engaged). about the Earthquake Preparedness Consultation As consultations began, stakeholders meeting with and invited their participation. EMBC subsequently the Chair were frequently able to provide additional followed up with a written invitation for all local stakeholder contact information, thus adding to the authorities and First Nations in B.C. to attend one range and fulsomeness of the consultation process. of the 17 community sessions scheduled. In most cases, in-person or teleconference meetings These community stakeholder sessions provided with the Chair were possible. However, in cases invaluable access to local authorities and First where this was not possible, staff from the small Nations with approximately 300 representatives from over 100 local authorities and First Nations EMBC Earthquake Preparedness Consultation attending at least one session (See Appendix E: team supporting the Chair met with stakeholders Stakeholders Engaged). separately. In these cases, the Chair was provided with briefings along with staff notes and any written While the community sessions provided valuable material from stakeholders. in-person opportunities for the Chair to engage directly with stakeholders, written submissions At the completion of the consultation process, to the Earthquake Preparedness Consultation over 200 stakeholders had met with the Chair and/ were also welcomed, and numerous local authority or the earthquake preparedness consultation team. and First Nations representatives contributed in this Combined with the local authority and First Nations fashion, frequently as an augmentation to in-person sessions, this meant that over 500 individuals meetings. engaged in the consultation process.

7 B.C. EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS: CONSULTATION REPORT

STAKEHOLDER FEEDBACK Performance benchmarking and accountability: The need for standards, guidelines, and The Earthquake Preparedness Consultation was accountability measures across the structured to provide maximum latitude for emergency management system. stakeholders to raise and address those issues Regional planning: The need for more formal they felt were of top priority. By design, the process disaster planning to happen at the regional level. was not organized to yield a formal assessment of capacities, or rigidly structured feedback Training and exercising: The need for enhanced appropriate for comparison across organizations. and/or more coordinated training and exercising A variety of questions and/or facilitation tools to support disaster preparedness. were used in the course of the consultation process, SPECIFIC THEMES but typically, stakeholders were asked the following high-level questions: Emergency alerting and warnings: The need for 1. What are the key earthquake preparedness additional technologies and processes to alert challenges for B.C.? and communicate with the public. 2. What are some of the successes, or strengths, Risk mapping and data availability: The need for to build upon? stakeholders to have access to additional information on risks in their areas. 3. What recommendations can you provide to government? Urban search and rescue: The need for additional funding and coordination for Urban Search and Given the number and diversity of stakeholders Rescue capabilities. engaged, it is impossible for any one report to adequately reflect the wide range of issues identified Rapid damage assessment: The need for additional and recommendations offered to government. resources and coordination for assessment of However, despite the diversity of stakeholders damaged structures following an earthquake. who contributed to the process, distinct themes Logistics: The need for plans and processes for did emerge from the feedback. These themes can how to get food, water, and supplies to areas of be broken down into two broad categories which need during a disaster. might be termed “Strategic” and “Specific.” Feedback on each of these issues is discussed STRATEGIC THEMES further under “Recommendations.” In some cases, this report’s recommendations align directly with Public education: The need for the public to be specific themes above. In other cases, these themes more aware of earthquake risks and to take action have informed aspects of several recommendations. to prepare themselves. In all cases, however, stakeholder feedback provides the foundational basis for the recommendations Provincial and federal leadership and contained in this report. All stakeholders that coordination: The need for senior governments contributed to the Earthquake Preparedness to provide funding, direction, and coordination. Consultation should be commended for their contributions of thought, time and energy. Without them, this report would not have been possible, and an opportunity to influence enhancements to B.C.’s disaster preparedness would have been lost.

8 B.C. EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS: CONSULTATION REPORT

need to prepare for emergency events. As B.C. Emergency attempts to evolve towards a culture of Management in B.C. preparedness and resilience, one objective should be for more and more organizations and agencies When considering a widespread disaster event to learn more about how they can fulfill these such as a catastrophic earthquake, it is natural to responsibilities and act on that information. turn one’s attention to government. Ultimately, As noted above, government of course has a central it is government agencies which will coordinate role in all phases of emergency management. a response, and governments also have a central The BC Emergency Response Management System role in planning, mitigating, and recovering from (BCERMS) is the system the provincial government, such events. Thus, it is justified that efforts to crown agencies, and local authorities use to enhance preparedness place significant emphasis coordinate emergency management. Currently, on government action. However, emergency BCERMS is also being expanded to recognize the management, and particularly preparedness, critical role of multi-agency coordination for recovery is truly a shared responsibility which starts with the activities following emergency events. individual and the family. As noted in the 2014 OAG report, this framework During a disaster, local and provincial government is based on an escalating support model. resources will be overwhelmed. In such an event, Local authorities (e.g. municipalities, regional one’s family and neighbours are likely to be the districts, and treaty First Nations) have lead only available first responders. Individuals and responsibility for emergency management. families have a responsibility to be prepared for The majority of emergency events are resolved at the such eventualities by being aware of hazards, local level, and the majority of planning, mitigation taking action on a personal level to mitigate their and recovery activities must necessarily happen risks where appropriate (e.g. household mitigations), at the local level. The escalating support model maintaining emergency supplies, and developing provides support when local and regional resources a personal/family emergency plan. Prepared families are not sufficient to address a given emergency. will put less pressure on overwhelmed government This model consists of the following levels: agencies following an earthquake and/or tsunami, allowing available resources to go where they Site Level: The vast majority of emergency incidents are most needed. As is discussed under “public in the province are dealt with at what is called education”, there appears to be significant room for the site level. For such events (e.g. structure fire, improvement with respect to the preparedness of vehicle incident, etc.), first responding emergency British Columbians on a personal and family level. personnel and resources from nearby agencies and jurisdictions represent the response level required. In addition to individuals and families, groups such as private sector corporations, non-governmental Site Support Level: When the site level response organizations, and others, have a responsibility to requires off-site support, an Emergency Operations plan and prepare appropriately for disasters. Whether Centre (EOC), frequently operated by a local this responsibility is to shareholders, employees, authority such as a municipality or a regional district, the broader community, those dependent upon may be activated to provide direction, coordination, their services, or all of the above, all organizations and access to additional resources.

9 B.C. EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS: CONSULTATION REPORT

Provincial Regional Coordination Level: When the Consistent with the provincial central coordination site support level (EOC) requires off-site support, level responsibilities, EMBC is also responsible often during an event with impacts beyond a for maintaining B.C.’s international emergency single local authority, the provincial government management mutual aid agreements such as: activates one of its Provincial Regional Emergency } The Pacific Northwest Emergency Management Operation Centres (PREOCs) operated by Emergency Arrangement with Alaska, Washington, Oregon, Management BC. PREOCs coordinate the activities of Idaho, and the Yukon. provincial agencies in support of one or more EOCs, assist with situational awareness, and provide access } Canadian Council of Emergency Management to additional resources as required. Organizations Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) re: Inter-jurisdictional Emergency Provincial Central Coordination Level: When Management Assistance. the PREOCs require support and coordination, the Province activates its Provincial Emergency } Emergency Management Mutual Aid agreement Coordination Centre (PECC), in Victoria. Like the with all provinces and territories. PREOCs, the PECC provides higher level } B.C. -/Alberta MOU on Interprovincial Emergency coordination, situational awareness, and access Management Assistance. to additional resources. The PECC is also the link to senior provincial decision makers at the provincial As is discussed further under “Recommendations”, level and to federal and international resources. a consistent message received from stakeholders This linkage to federal and international resources during the Earthquake Preparedness Consultation is critical in a catastrophic event. is that responsibility for emergency management is shared, and that for all parties to effectively fulfil their At all levels – from site support to the provincial responsibilities in a coordinated fashion, integrated central coordination level – emergency managers leadership is required. maintain linkages to media, private sector and non- governmental organizations, as appropriate. See Appendix H: Emergency Management Structures for additional information. EMBC, which operates the PREOCs and PECC, is responsible to British Columbians for leading the management of provincial-level emergencies and disasters, and supporting other authorities within their areas of jurisdiction. Consistent with this mission, EMBC has a lead role at the provincial level for coordinating multi-agency preparedness efforts with respect to catastrophic earthquake and tsunami.

10 B.C. EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS: CONSULTATION REPORT

Recommendations STAKEHOLDER FEEDBACK During the stakeholder consultation process, B.C. faces several disaster preparedness challenges. there was wide acceptance that emergency First, the majority of individuals and institutions in management involves shared responsibility across B.C. remain apathetic with respect to the risk of a all partners. That said, there was also the desire for catastrophic earthquake. Second, despite the fact the provincial and federal governments to show that preparedness needs have been adequately enhanced leadership. For example, stakeholders delineated in the past, emergency management spoke to the need for EMBC to set overall direction systems and resources have not been conducive with respect to catastrophic planning and to play to effectively addressing these needs. a leadership role in coordinating the activities of the As noted throughout this report, emergency many partners involved. A number of stakeholders management is a shared responsibility. Stakeholders also argued that EMBC required the authority to set at all levels in B.C. appear to be willing to accept standards and establish accountability measures this responsibility. It is incumbent upon those in if it was to lead effectively. Stakeholders were also leadership positions to do their part to provide the explicit that EMBC required additional resources necessary motivation, leadership, and resources to fulfil its mandate. Stakeholders also noted that to empower them to do so. the federal government (primarily Public Safety Canada and Aboriginal and Affairs and Northern The recommendations in this report build upon Development Canada) needed to provide additional the feedback submitted by stakeholders. These funding and leadership. recommendations aim to both foster a culture of preparedness in B.C., and alter the emergency DISCUSSION management system in such a way that individuals, EMBC is the lead agency within the provincial agencies, and governments can effectively address government for emergency management. B.C.’s preparedness challenges together. EMBC is responsible to British Columbians for leading the management of provincial level emergencies and disasters and supporting other RECOMMENDATION #1: authorities within their areas of jurisdiction; however, Leadership, Authority it is apparent that EMBC does not have the authority and Responsibility or the resources to effectively fulfill its mandate. The 2014 OAG report explicitly referenced the RECOMMENDATION resourcing aspect of this issue, and both resources and authority were issues clearly identified by The provincial government must provide EMBC with additional resources and the authority required stakeholders during the consultation process. to effectively deliver emergency management This desire for additional resources and authority leadership to provincial crown agencies and local for EMBC is linked to a desire for additional authorities. Further, EMBC must be positioned leadership from EMBC. It appears that several within government in such a fashion that its factors have contributed to the desire for authority is greatly enhanced. additional provincial leadership. First, there are

11 B.C. EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS: CONSULTATION REPORT

some areas in emergency management where Stakeholders also acknowledged that any standards leadership from senior levels of government is which may be established will mean that some natural. An overarching high-level provincial local authorities or other entities will have to plan for response and recovery with respect to a devote resources to meeting those standards. catastrophic earthquake is one relevant example. For their part, local authorities and others are very Further, numerous stakeholders noted that the wary of any additional regulation or standards federal government had recently reduced its which may be developed, given the potential involvement in, and funding of, emergency for additional costs. Local authority stakeholders management activities (e.g. cancellation of the frequently communicated that the solution to B.C.’s Joint Emergency Preparedness Program grants, preparedness challenges should not involve the the cessation of emergency management training “downloading” of responsibilities to local authorities; program delivered by the Canadian Emergency however, if there is to be a change in how B.C. Management College, and the reduction of prepares for a catastrophic event, local authorities Public Safety Canada and Aboriginal Affairs and must also recognize their own responsibilities and Northern Development Canada regional staff in accept the concept of shared responsibility for B.C., etc.). This has understandably placed additional catastrophic planning. pressure on the provincial government to play a Several initiatives are underway which demonstrate leadership role in support of local authorities. Lastly, leadership on the part of EMBC. Progress on these resource constraints throughout the emergency appears promising, and a newly-formed partnership management sector have resulted in stakeholders with other agencies (e.g. an integrated Earthquake looking for ways to leverage the capacities of other Planning Team) suggests that EMBC has been organizations, including the provincial government. increasingly successful in leveraging additional The desire for additional provincial leadership resources towards preparedness enhancement manifested itself in a wide variety of stakeholder efforts. However, in the long run, it appears likely, comments and submissions. Among these many based on evidence from reports dating back to comments, two key stakeholder messages stood out. 1997, that historical obstacles faced by EMBC (and First, in preparation for catastrophic events its predecessor, the Provincial Emergency Program) with widespread implications, such as a major in trying to encourage minimum preparedness earthquake, stakeholders need the provincial efforts by other ministries and agencies will remain government to develop and communicate its a significant impediment to increasing B.C.’s overarching plan before local authorities and others preparedness. can effectively complete their own plans that will While EMBC is able to make use of sweeping integrate with the provincial plan. powers (through the Minister of Justice) during a Secondly, some stakeholders, particularly provincially declared State of Emergency by virtue professional emergency managers, voiced the of the Emergency Program Act, its ability to compel opinion that the Province, and specifically EMBC, action from other agencies and authorities prior may need additional powers to enforce minimum to a declaration of an emergency is very limited. emergency management standards if B.C. is to This applies even within the provincial government move toward a greater state of preparedness. with respect to other ministries. This is important

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because just as the provincial government 1.1.1 The provincial government must support alone cannot prepare B.C. for a catastrophic EMBC in the establishment of preparedness earthquake, nor can EMBC alone prepare the requirements for other ministries and crown provincial government for this eventuality. agencies, and establish mechanisms to track Emergency preparedness must be integrated and enforce these requirements. into the operations of all ministries and agencies. Examples of such requirements may include Ultimately, B.C. requires a unified strategy that brings preparation of ministry-specific response and together the prevention, preparedness, response, recovery plans, cooperation on broader provincial and recovery capacity of all partners. A starting plans, designation and training of staff for place is the ministries and agencies of the provincial emergency management support functions, etc. government. Unfortunately, EMBC does not appear A variety of tools already used within government, to have the resources and authority (formal or such as ministerial accountability letters, executive informal) it requires to achieve full cooperation from salary holdbacks, and the Business Continuity Planning Scorecard, each provide potential other provincial agencies and local authorities. examples of how other agencies could be held In the case of local authorities, although legislative accountable for their emergency management and regulatory tools do exist which call upon local responsibilities. Unless mechanisms such as authorities to plan appropriately for emergencies, these are used to drive cross-agency disaster a lack of regulatory clarity, constraints on preparedness efforts, substantial progress may enforcement, and practical resource limitations for be limited, as evidenced by progress between some communities have limited EMBC’s ability to the 1997 and 2014 OAG reports on earthquake require minimum preparedness standards. This issue preparedness. was also highlighted in the 2014 OAG report. 1.1.2 The provincial government must also The solution to this problem appears to have address EMBC’s ability to “task” or require action several elements: of other ministries and crown agencies during an emergency response. Key Actions in Support of While the existing collaborative model works RECOMMENDATION #1 during most response actions, clarity of EMBC’s command function on behalf of the Crown will 1.1 The provincial government must augment be needed during a catastrophic event. EMBC’s authority to require action of other 1.1.3 The provincial government must position provincial crown agencies in the realm of emergency EMBC within government in such a fashion that management. its authority is greatly enhanced. For example, Across government, there is a need for accountability EMBC could be moved to report directly to the mechanisms which could contribute to unity of Office of the Premier. effort between crown ministries and agencies. In government, emergency management cuts A government-wide culture of preparedness and across multiple departments and agencies, completion of integrated emergency management as it does in non-governmental organizations, plans will not become a reality based on purely local governments and the private sector. voluntary participation by crown agencies. Success requires emergency management

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goals and a shared responsibility for meeting available to guide planning, promote improvement them to be embraced by all. It also requires and monitor outcomes, as is the case in a number of powerful leadership. EMBC needs to be U.S. jurisdictions. seen across government as reflecting top 1.3 The provincial government must provide objectives of the government and the Premier. additional resources to EMBC in order for it to Ultimately, EMBC requires the kind of positional meet its earthquake preparedness mandate. authority adequate to effectively lead a cross- government agenda of increased preparedness The 2014 OAG report noted that EMBC does not and accountability. This strategy to increase appear to have adequate resources to fulfill its the effectiveness of emergency management existing mandate. As the report notes, EMBC’s organizations has been successfully employed budget has remained largely unchanged since 2006, in numerous states and major cities within despite increased populations, increasing frequency the United States. For example, in California, of emergency events, and an expanded mandate. the Office of Emergency Services reports directly If the provincial government sets new objectives to the Governor and benefits from the increased for EMBC with respect to catastrophic earthquake influence and authority of this placement. Florida preparedness, further resources, both staff and has also used this approach, as have cities such funding, will be required. Stakeholder feedback was as New York and Oakland. consistent with the Auditor General’s conclusions. 1.2 The provincial government must augment In addition to highlighting their own funding EMBC’s authority, staffing and budget to set challenges, numerous local authority and other minimum standards for local authority emergency stakeholder representatives independently pointed management programs. to the need to address EMBC’s funding challenges. EMBC should set minimum standards for local Clearly, there is not only broad agreement across authority emergency management programs. stakeholders that the emergency management While it may not be practical or desirable for EMBC system as a whole is underfunded, but there also to “audit” the performance of every local authority appears to be a common understanding that with respect to preparedness, EMBC must provide EMBC specifically is underfunded. The provincial government should undertake a formal assessment more clarity regarding the expectations of local of EMBC’s resource requirements in light of the authorities in the area of emergency management. 2014 OAG report recommendations, and the EMBC requires increased funding and new staff recommendations of this report. to move communities towards meeting a set emergency standard. An initiative to accomplish 1.4 The provincial government must provide for this would likely involve a combination of regulatory EMBC’s emergency operations centres in seismically requirements, incentives (e.g. qualifying for other active areas to be housed in post-disaster facilities. local authority funding sources, etc.), and/or new If EMBC is to provide a lead emergency coordination tools or templates, supported by new funding and role in the province following a major earthquake, staff for EMBC. To this end, measures should be put it will require its operations centres to be functional in place to ensure that local authorities document and safe for occupation. This requires that these and report their performance on emergency facilities be located in post-disaster rated buildings, management. Standards and benchmarks should be which they are not currently.

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1.5 The federal government must provide additional respects feedback communicated that funding regional resources to Public Safety Canada, structures could support this concept of shared Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development responsibility more effectively. This feedback applied Canada, and other applicable agencies, in order to all hazards, and was not specific to earthquake for them to meet their emergency management preparedness. mandates to support emergency management in B.C. DISCUSSION Numerous stakeholders indicated that these Local Authority Resource Constraints agencies require more resources to provide for It is common across all sectors for stakeholders the necessary level of emergency management to feel that more public funding (or tax relief) associated with their mandates and responsibilities. is warranted for the issues of most concern to them. Thus, it was no surprise to hear from the stakeholders who contributed to the Earthquake Preparedness RECOMMENDATION #2: Consultation, that the emergency management Funding and Accountability system in B.C. is underfunded at all levels. However, although the Earthquake Preparedness RECOMMENDATION Consultation did not undertake a rigorous analysis The provincial and federal governments must of funding and capacities, public and institutional implement a funding program to support local expectations of the emergency management authority preparedness efforts, and leverage system in B.C. legitimately do not appear to match emergency management funding to: the resources available. Indeed, previous reports } Increase emphasis on planning and have pointed to this resource challenge. Discussion mitigation; and, under Recommendation #2 addresses the consistent feedback from stakeholders regarding the need for } Increase local authority accountability. additional funding for EMBC, but stakeholders also STAKEHOLDER FEEDBACK argued strongly that additional support was required from senior levels of government for local authority Stakeholders that took part in the Earthquake emergency management activities. In many cases, Preparedness Consultation expressed their particularly for smaller communities and regional perspective that emergency management structures districts, local authorities have limited resources and are underfunded in B.C. at all levels of government. capacities to draw upon to undertake emergency Further, some stakeholders noted that in many management activities. This limits their ability to respects, the way funding is structured, particularly plan for events within their areas of responsibility, funding to local authorities, places undue emphasis between neighbours and across their regions, and to on response activities at the expense of much undertake mitigations, etc. Even when funding needed efforts centred on planning and prevention/ is available, such as during response operations, mitigation. Stakeholders recognized and supported smaller local authorities frequently find that they the concept of broadly shared responsibility for have not had the resources to put appropriate emergency management, but in a number of structures in place to take best advantage of

15 B.C. EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS: CONSULTATION REPORT

this funding (e.g. establishing relationships with 2.2 The federal government must increase contractors, implementing robust volunteer emergency management funding and personnel management structures, developing robust mutual available to support First Nations emergency aid plans, etc.). management. Local authority emergency management programs, Response Focus and Accountability already stretched, were further constrained by Numerous stakeholders pointed to the fact that the elimination of the federal Joint Emergency emergency management structures are unduly Preparedness Program in 2012. This program response focussed. This is almost a universal feature provided small grants to local authorities in support of emergency management systems and is not of selected emergency management priorities specific to the seismic hazard. The immediacy and such as buying equipment, establishing Emergency visibility of response activities generate greater Operations Centres, etc. The program also supported public, political, and institutional support for Heavy Urban Search and Rescue (HUSAR) capacity response activities than for most preparedness (federal cutbacks are also discussed under “Specific activities. Indeed, these same factors influence Emergency Management Capabilities.). funding for police and fire services versus Resource challenges are also a critical challenge funding for broader emergency management for many First Nations communities. Emergency and mitigation. The provincial government has management for First Nations communities on invested substantially in mitigation (e.g. schools reserve lands is the responsibility of the federal seismic mitigation, the flood protection program, government. First Nations communities which took strategic wildfire prevention program) but these part in the Earthquake Preparedness Consultation programs are hazard-specific, are necessarily funding cited a lack of funding, training, and guidance as key constrained, and only modestly counterbalance factors in their state of preparedness. the system’s response focus. It is instructive that in Local authorities are ready and willing to fulfill their B.C. there is little or no funding from senior levels emergency management responsibilities, but for of government for local authorities to undertake many communities, direct provincial and federal planning, yet response activities are funded at 100 financial support is required. per cent (i.e. local authorities are reimbursed by the province for 100 per cent of eligible cost incurred Key Actions in Support of responding to emergency events). Recovery costs RECOMMENDATION #2 for local authorities and private sector claimants, for specifically designated disaster events only, 2.1 The provincial and federal governments must are funded after the first $1,000 at 80 per cent implement a funding program to support emergency for non-insurable, and otherwise eligible losses. management preparedness efforts at the local For private sector claimants the maximum claim authority level. is $300,000. This funding of response activities at 100 per cent of costs incurred, combined with a lack of funding for planning and mitigation, is problematic in a number of respects. First, it is not cost-effective.

16 B.C. EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS: CONSULTATION REPORT

Properly administered mitigation can provide These aspects of the current system virtually ensure significant cost benefits. For example, research on that avoidable expenditures are made year after year flood mitigation cited in Canada’s Natural Disaster on response, while critical planning and prevention/ Mitigation Strategy document cites flood mitigation mitigation needs are ignored. cost benefit ratios of between 3:1 and 5:1. Opportunities may exist to adjust B.C.’s emergency Thus, in the long-term, funding of mitigation management funding system to correct this activities can significantly reduce response costs, situation. For example, while it would be yet resource-constrained local authorities have controversial, response costs reimbursement for minimal incentive to undertake mitigation efforts local authorities (currently 100 per cent) could be since there is only modest mitigation funding adjusted so that local authorities bear an initial available, and 100 per cent of response costs are “deductible” while still ensuring that no community covered by the provincial government, even in is forced to bear an unreasonable financial cases where these response costs may have burden due to any emergency event. Federal been avoidable. reimbursement of provincial emergency response costs for example, requires the Province to absorb Further, as several stakeholders noted, the first $1 per person (based on population census local authorities have incentives to promote data) for an emergency event. Federal cost sharing land uses and developments in areas at risk begins to kick in after the $1 per person level has from natural hazards. The primary revenue from been reached.1 such development accrues to local authorities, Provincial reimbursement of local authority costs while response and recovery costs primarily accrue could perhaps use this model also, though any to the provincial government. adjustments to the existing model would have to be Lastly, current provincial funding mechanisms for tailored to ensure that the available federal transfers local authorities do not require that local authorities are fully accessed. Any savings from response costs meet any minimum criteria with respect to could be forwarded back to local authorities to assist emergency management plans, exercises, mitigation with planning and mitigation initiatives. efforts, etc. Local authorities are compensated for It should be noted that with respect to the seismic 100 per cent of eligible response costs and 80 per hazard in particular, structural mitigation efforts cent of eligible recovery cost regardless of whether for public infrastructure are extremely expensive. they have completed appropriate plans, etc. For example, the estimated cost of upgrading dikes Some provisions exist to restrict recovery payments in the Lower Mainland to meet both projected sea for structures built in a flood plain, multiple claims level rise estimates and seismic design criteria is in a disaster prone area, or obvious failures to $9.5 billion. At the local authority level, more modest protect property but other than these provisions, preparedness measures, such as plans, mapping, accountability measures (in terms of appropriate building inventories, and non-structural mitigations plans etc.) are weak. may be top priorities with limited available funding.

1 In February 2015, Public Safety Canada announced changes to the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements. Changes include the fact that provinces are now responsible for one hundred percent of the ﬁrst $3 in eligible provincial expenses per capita.

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Ultimately, the B.C. government should investigate agencies and stakeholders can link into and support what opportunities exist to align funding so that with their own plans. all partners have incentives to plan appropriately, undertake reasonable mitigation measures, DISCUSSION and spend wisely. The current system does not The need for robust disaster plans, and particularly appear to create these incentives, and opportunities plans which are well integrated between partners, to enhance B.C.’s preparedness for a catastrophic is well understood. Such plans provide the basis event are likely being lost as a result. for coordinated mitigation, response, and recovery 2.3 The provincial government must link new and efforts. Additionally, the process for the development existing local government emergency management of plans and procedures is invaluable in that it funding to accountabilities, brings together key agencies and individuals leading such as planning and mitigation efforts. to strong professional relationships and ongoing 2.4 The provincial government must formally assess communication among players. mechanisms for local authorities to share in the costs Emergency managers the world over look to for emergency responses, while ensuring that no catastrophic events which have taken place in other community bears an undue burden. jurisdictions for lessons which can be applied to their own areas of responsibility. For example, hurricane Katrina, and the resulting devastation in New Orleans RECOMMENDATION #3: provided dramatic lessons for emergency managers Intergovernmental and across the developed world with respect to inter- agency communication. Key among these lessons Inter-Agency Coordination was that the devastation of New Orleans was not primarily a natural disaster, but a failure of RECOMMENDATION human institutions. The failure of various levels of Federal, provincial, and local authorities, as well as government and multiple agencies to work together other entities, such as those in the private sector, effectively on planning and mitigation efforts before must ensure that they have the integrated plans and the storm were key factors that led to so much capacities in place to deal with a catastrophic event. damage to that city and to ineffective response and recovery efforts. STAKEHOLDER FEEDBACK B.C. does not suffer from the intergovernmental and During the consultation, stakeholders voiced inter-agency dysfunction that New Orleans did. B.C. the expectation that the plans and capabilities has structures that provide for integration of plans of all levels of government, and other entities, and actions between the many agencies involved adequately account for catastrophic events, and that in emergency management. The increased inter- they be effectively integrated with one another. agency planning and integration that occurred Stakeholders accepted that this is an area of a shared during preparations for the 2010 Winter Olympic responsibility, but stressed that they expect the and Paralympic Games show that agencies and provincial and federal governments to provide all organizations in B.C. recognize the value of high-level emergency management plans that other this integration. That said, there are cross-agency,

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and intergovernmental gaps and challenges that and to the capacities that implementation of the must be addressed if B.C. is to be adequately plans will require. prepared for a catastrophic event such as a major earthquake. Key Actions in Support of RECOMMENDATION #3 A number of these challenges are outlined below. Provincewide Catastrophic Response 3.1 EMBC, in concert with stakeholders, and Recovery Plans must complete provincewide catastrophic response and recovery plans. This work is already underway. A milestone in B.C.’s progress towards preparedness will be completion of provincial level catastrophic Organization-Specific Emergency Management response and recovery plans. Plans and Capacities Development of a comprehensive catastrophic The roles and responsibilities of all ministries and response and recovery plan for B.C. is long overdue. crown agencies are being identified as part of The need for such planning was evident in the provincial-level response and recovery planning 1997/1998 Auditor General’s report, and is equally currently being coordinated by EMBC. A society’s evident in the more recent 2014 OAG report. ability to respond to and recover from a catastrophic As numerous stakeholders noted during the event depends upon the preparations of a multitude 2014 consultation, broad provincewide plans and of agencies, not just the preparations of lead expectations are required to align and guide the emergency management organizations such as planning of all parties involved. EMBC. All public and private entities need to devote To its credit, in 2014, EMBC launched a dedicated adequate resources to their own preparations. This is Earthquake Planning Team with representation not happening consistently at present. from several other agencies, and has produced a For example, numerous stakeholders had concerns roadmap for development of high-level immediate regarding the health sector’s capacity to handle and sustained response plans for catastrophic surge requirements in response to a catastrophic earthquakes. A recovery plan will follow. Likely, event. This represents just one example of how this work will also provide the vast majority of broad provincial plans must be backed by agency- the guidance required for response and recovery specific plans and capacities. While it appears that operations in response to other events. significant progress has been made on emergency EMBC’s current planning efforts are well thought out management and business continuity issues within and appropriately scoped to the resources available, the health sector, frequently with the leadership of but the value of the plans under development the Ministry of Health, the remaining preparedness will depend upon resource commitments from all needs for this sector are daunting. stakeholders. These provincial-level plans will need Emergency management is an important functional to be exercised and maintained, and development area in several ministries. They will require of numerous sub-plans will likely be required. resourcing to enhance their catastrophic event Other ministries, and agencies at all levels, not just plans and capacities. Also, a variety of ministries those currently working with EMBC on these plans, and agencies that may not have traditionally had will require new resources to devote to this effort, active emergency management roles will also need

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to become more active in developing plans for government has a consistent cross-government catastrophic events. For example, ministries and approach to business continuity planning and other agencies will have to adequately address the EMBC tracks cross-ministry maintenance of plans; post-event needs of vulnerable populations such as however, most ministry plans have undergone only the elderly, disabled, those facing language barriers, modest exercising, and anecdotally, it appears that etc. In many jurisdictions, partnerships with non- the robustness of business continuity plans among governmental charities and faith-based groups have the wider population of public agencies at all levels proven helpful in the development of robust plans of government, and the private sector, vary widely in for such populations. A further example is the need B.C. This is not unexpected. for planning to adequately address the significant As noted elsewhere in this report, emergency implications of pets, livestock, animals in zoos, management related functions system-wide are etc. Additionally, ministries with other capabilities, underfunded. Overall, without cross-government such as logistics, must consider how their capabilities commitment of new resources to complete would support broad provincial government disaster ministry and agency-specific plans, and without the planning, response and recovery efforts. resources to exercise and implement these plans in The issues of vulnerable populations and animals practice, preparedness will not increase substantially. were issues specifically raised by stakeholders during A parallel situation appears to exist in the private the consultation, but catastrophic event planning sector. The provincial government should lead by requirements exist across most ministries or agencies example and ensure that all crown agencies have at all levels of government. realistic business continuity plans in place that have The need for organization-specific plans and been fully exercised. This would require additional capacities is one that exists across all levels of funding across ministries and agencies. government, the private sector, and among non- 3.3 All provincial crown agencies must complete governmental organizations. In the short term, and exercise realistic business continuity plans. the Province should lead by example, and ensure that all provincial crown agencies develop and Provincial Coordination Teams exercise catastrophic event plans that link to Effective management of catastrophic events provincial-level plans. frequently requires senior levels of government (e.g. 3.2 All provincial crown agencies must develop a provincial or territorial government in Canada or and exercise catastrophic event plans that link to a state government in the U.S.) to deploy teams of provincial-level plans. staff to provide direct assistance in support of local authorities, particularly in smaller communities. Agency-specific Business Continuity Plans and Capacities Such teams can provide emergency coordination, Government and private sector agencies also have a communication, technical, or other expertise within responsibility to undertake appropriate organization- a local authority. EMBC is currently in the early specific business continuity planning. Business process of planning for how such teams could be continuity planning ensures that organizations deployed, but new resources at EMBC and other delivering critical services can continue to deliver agencies would have to be identified to support those services following disruptions. The provincial such deployments.

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3.4 The provincial government must implement shared understanding of how such assistance mechanisms, such as Provincial Coordination Teams, is administered. This includes, among other to support all authorities during emergency events. considerations, a shared awareness of operational processes, prioritization criteria, reimbursement Out-of-Province Assistance provisions, and liability coverages. B.C. has numerous agreements in place which While policy and processes supporting such provide for outside assistance to B.C. following a resource sharing and allocation is well understood catastrophic event. In some cases, the procedures in some areas, it appears that some policy development and exercising required to effectively development and communication work remains capitalize on these agreements has not been to establish clarity among all key stakeholders undertaken. As with gaps identified elsewhere, regarding how such resource allocation would be EMBC, other ministries, and local authorities do not undertaken, who would reimburse whom under appear to have sufficient resources to undertake this what circumstances, and how the liability exposures work currently. would be managed for those providing and 3.5 EMBC, and other provincial government receiving assistance. partners, must be provided with additional funding 3.6 EMBC and partners must complete the work and staff to complete work required to operationalize required to clarify procedures with respect to and exercise out of province assistance agreements provincially directed mutual aid between local and associated procedures. authorities, and allocation of out-of-province aid to Mutual Aid and Provincially Allocated Resources local authorities during a catastrophic event. When a local government or community becomes Regional Emergency Management overwhelmed and cannot respond on its own to Stakeholders stressed the importance of regional a major incident, assistance from neighbouring planning for catastrophic event preparedness, local authorities, local authorities elsewhere in but noted that progress on such region-wide the region, and/or the Province will be requested. planning in some areas has been limited. In larger events especially, coordination and Across the board, there appeared to be no allocation of additional outside assets and resources stakeholders that disagreed that region-wide can be required of the Province. Such assets and planning was appropriate, though no consistent resources may be drawn from other local authorities, recommendations emerged regarding how it should other crown agencies (provincial or federal), private be accomplished. sector suppliers, or even international jurisdictions. It has become a truism of emergency management Seamless sharing and allocation of limited resources that natural disasters do not respect jurisdictional is critical across a wide variety of capabilities, boundaries. Neighbouring jurisdictions must such as police, fire, EMS, public works, Critical work together if plans, mitigations, responses Infrastructure (CI), as well as goods such as food, and recovery actions are to be effective. water, and medical supplies. Ensuring efficient This is particularly true for catastrophic events. distribution and/or reallocation of resources Unsurprisingly then, the desire for increased region- during a catastrophic event, requires a strong wide coordination on emergency management was

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a strong theme within the stakeholder feedback Particularly acute challenges exist with integration during the consultation. of many First Nations communities into regional Currently, regional coordination frameworks appear planning. Emergency management on First to be established in some areas and weak in others. Nations reserves is the responsibility of the federal Metro Vancouver, for example, participates in the government; however, First Nations consistently Integrated Partnership for Regional Emergency reported that they did not have the resources, Management (IPREM) along with the provincial the training or the support to implement effective government. While not fully tested by a significant emergency management programs and the regional emergency, IPREM does provide for the capability to link effectively with neighbouring local identification of regionally relevant emergency authorities. A lack of federal funding for mitigation management priorities and coordinates joint efforts on reserve lands has also frequently action on those priorities between the provincial hampered broader mitigation efforts which must be government, the regional district, the region’s done on a regional basis. municipalities, and other entities as necessary. To date, EMBC appears to have pursued a voluntary Other areas, such as some parts of Vancouver Island, and flexible model in pursuit of additional regional have implemented mechanisms that allow for both emergency management coordination. While a coordinated planning and some coordination during flexible approach is likely still warranted, as different larger response operations. models will work for different areas of the province, Despite some successes, challenges still remain if B.C. is to make significant progress on catastrophic with respect to regional coordination in emergency preparedness, additional regional coordination management. Additional progress on planning may need to be mandated at the provincial level. coordination would be desirable in some areas, Consideration should also be given to the utility of and for most areas, there has been limited progress “disaster councils” at the regional level, such as have on concepts of operations for regional coordination been used in some U.S. jurisdictions. These councils during response and recovery, or for regional are one mechanism of pulling together multiple communication of priorities to PREOCs with respect stakeholders, both public and private, to coordinate to allocation of scarce resources. planning activities. In some respects, it is not surprising that regional 3.7 The provincial government must mandate that coordination is not more advanced in all areas. all local authorities participate in regional planning, There are a number of challenges which have likely training and exercises. slowed progress. For one, regional coordination has 3.8 The provincial government must support not been mandated by the Province, as it has been regional planning efforts directly through funding in some U.S. states. Resource challenges, such as lack to local authorities, and indirectly through creation of staff and time, to support such planning efforts of additional EMBC positions to guide and support also appear to have been a factor for municipalities, this work. regional districts, and at EMBC. 3.9 The federal government must ensure that First Nations communities on reserves have adequate resources to effectively participate in regional planning efforts.

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Overall, B.C. has good foundational elements in DISCUSSION place that provide a basis for inter-ministry and Likely because B.C. has not experienced a inter-governmental coordination, and coordination major damaging earthquake in recent memory, between governments, the private sector and there seems to be a sense among the public that non-governmental organization; however, as noted it is not an immediate concern. This apathy is previously, adequate planning for a catastrophic problematic. When a serious earthquake happens event has not taken place, and the frameworks for in British Columbia, response resources will likely inter-organizational cooperation have not been fully be overwhelmed. A public that is aware and matured. The provincial government should lead by prepared can put less pressure on scarce resources. example, and ensure that new resources are devoted A prepared public is also part of a broader system of to undertaking this work within all provincial preparedness. Evidence from other jurisdictions and agencies and entities (e.g. crown corporations). other public safety initiatives speaks to the value of public education. Done well, public education can:

RECOMMENDATION #4: } Save lives and reduce suffering; Public Education, Awareness } Reduce response and recovery burdens on and Engagement governments; } Improve community resiliency following RECOMMENDATION emergency events; and, EMBC, together with significant agencies at all } Build broad support for public and volunteer levels of government and private sector partners, sector safety initiatives. must launch a long-term and coordinated The key to achieving these benefits is a public earthquake preparedness public education and education program that not only increases awareness campaign. New funding and staff will be required. awareness, but drives actual behavior and cultural change among members of the public. Such actions STAKEHOLDER FEEDBACK may include preparing family plans, participating When asked what B.C. could do to improve its in emergency neighbourhood plans, preparing preparedness for a catastrophic event such as a earthquake kits, and volunteering in emergency major earthquake, the majority of stakeholders management roles. An engaged public can also stressed additional and improved public education help drive improved preparedness at workplaces as a key priority. Indeed, it was the single highest and within the private and Non-Governmental priority put forth in the course of the Earthquake Organizations (NGO) sector broadly. Preparedness Consultation. Many felt that the Stakeholders provided quite specific and consistent general public, the business community and many feedback on how they felt earthquake (and broader public officials, were apathetic or uninformed when it came to the risk of a catastrophic earthquake, and emergency management) public education should that increased public education efforts, coordinated be delivered in B.C., noting that: across multiple partners, was needed.

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} Additional public education is required. In parallel with the Earthquake Preparedness } Messaging should be consistent between the Consultation, EMBC conducted a specific needs assessment focused on public education during the many agencies involved. spring and summer of 2014. This effort included a } Messaging should be consistent over time. scoping of EMBC’s current public education needs } Multiple different methods and media should be and practices, interviews with B.C. stakeholders used, including social media. having specific involvement with public education, and a review of the scientific/academic literature } Campaigns and initiatives from various agencies on the topic. In reviewing the findings of that study, should be integrated and/or coordinated. it is encouraging to note that the feedback from } Strategies should be based on empirical the broader population of stakeholders engaged evidence, and success at changing preparedness during the Earthquake Preparedness Consultation behavior (as opposed to simply increasing aligns well with best practice and academic research awareness) should be formally measured. on public education. This needs assessment should } School-age children should be engaged through serve not only to support the feedback from stakeholders, but can also offer additional tools and the Kindergarten to Grade 12 school system. findings which EMBC and partners will undoubtedly } The specific message regarding 72 hours of find useful in the development of future initiatives. public self-reliance should be clarified and The above stakeholder feedback and the findings reassessed. Originally, the 72 hours of being on of the EMBC public education needs assessment your own message was based on moderate- provide a useful package of actions which could sized events and intended to communicate be included in any coordinated public education to the public that first responders may not campaign. Based on experiences in California and be available for the first 72 hours due to other U.S. states, several other factors are also worthy overwhelming response needs. However, of consideration as planning progresses: in recent years, the 72 hours message seems Accounting for community specific hazards to be understood more as a recommendation in conjunction with wider public education that households maintain 72 hours worth of campaigns. While consistent messaging is key to supplies. Recent disasters around the world successful public education campaigns, special have shown that victims can and will be largely attention will need to be paid to ensuring that local on their own for days or even weeks following considerations are accounted for effectively. catastrophic events. Additionally, any message Engaging school children and their that encourages the public to be self-reliant families. Informed children can become aware should also include the need to customize their adults, and frequently children can act as preparedness needs to the makeup of their ambassadors to carry public safety messages home families (i.e. special needs, medication, pets, etc.). to parents and neighbors. In B.C. and elsewhere, Thus, current preparedness messaging should the fire service has engaged children and families be clarified with the public. effectively in this way. This may provide a useful model in some respects for broader public safety

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education initiatives. As an added benefit, programs convergent volunteers. Models and materials from in secondary schools in other jurisdictions have at other jurisdictions such as the neighborhood based times also contributed to individuals becoming emergency response teams based throughout public safety volunteers or entering public safety California and now available through the United professions. To enhance school curriculum, States’ Federal Emergency Management Agency consideration should also be given to developing (FEMA) as CERT (Community Emergency Response resources related to general knowledge of Teams), may provide useful examples for application the threats that exist in B.C., basic emergency in B.C. preparedness, and an understanding of how the In summary, it appears that many of the stakeholders emergency management planning and response and agencies involved in earthquake preparedness operates in B.C. Schools should be encouraged to public education are supportive of a change in provide opportunities for basic First Aid and CPR approach. EMBC, with partners, is currently planning training for teachers, students and other personnel. Development of curriculum resources to support new public education activities which would start curriculum would likely involve the Ministry of to capitalize on the findings of the recent needs Education in partnership with key education assessment and feedback from stakeholders during partners and emergency management stakeholders. the Earthquake Preparedness Consultation. This is to be commended. For long-term change to be Capitalizing on high-profile individuals such as effective however, and for partners to jointly launch elected officials or celebrities. Recruitment of high- a successful long-term public education campaign, level government officials or celebrities from the arts additional action and commitment of resources from and sports fields can provide visibility and longevity the provincial government and other partners will to preparedness campaigns. This model has been be required. used successfully in some other jurisdictions, and is one technique worthy of consideration in B.C. Key actions in support of Citizen training. While not always considered an RECOMMENDATION #4 element of public education per-se, consideration should be given to increasing the take-up of 4.1 All partners, with EMBC leadership, basic training such as first aid and community must establish a mechanism to jointly develop and emergency preparedness among citizens in B.C. deliver long-term and coordinated earthquake The true first responders in many emergency preparedness public education. situations are coworkers, neighbors, family and 4.2 All partners must contribute to developing and people in the general vicinity of an emergency. implementing resources in support of curriculum in Resources devoted to improving the basic skills of this area for kindergarten to grade 12. citizens can be expected to save lives and reduce suffering significantly during a major event. B.C. 4.3 All levels of government, and involved partners also requires a more robust program for recruiting, outside of government, must devote additional coordinating, insuring, and organizing available resources to support coordinated earthquake emergency management volunteers, including preparedness public education.

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4.4 Senior elected officials, at all levels, DISCUSSION must demonstrate visible and vocal support for a A consistent theme throughout this report has been culture of preparedness. Inclusion of earthquake that of shared responsibility. Where the individual preparedness initiatives in a Speech from the Throne, and various levels of government are concerned, for example, would be an excellent example of this shared responsibility is relatively intuitive. We are such support. all responsible to undertake reasonable precautions for our homes and families, and governments have an explicit responsibility to help communities RECOMMENDATION #5: prepare for, respond to, and recover from emergencies and disasters. Private Sector and While less front of mind, other entities such as Non-government Organizations private sector corporations and NGOs also have emergency management responsibilities. Entities RECOMMENDATION such as companies that provide critical goods and The Province must prepare and resource a strategy services (e.g. food, fuel, and telecommunications) for further engagement of the private sector in have a responsibility to those that depend upon emergency management planning, including those services. It is incumbent upon all such organizations to appropriately plan for, and have the mandated requirements for private sector entities. capacity to address, emergency situations, (including STAKEHOLDER FEEDBACK business continuity planning) and to coordinate with other partners in their planning. Stakeholders in B.C. expect all partners to fulfill It is also incumbent upon government to their emergency management responsibilities. provide leadership and frameworks that facilitate Stakeholder feedback included the theme that engagement by private sector (and not-for-profit) owners of Critical Infrastructure (CI), including entities in government’s emergency management those in the private sector, should be planning for preparedness efforts. catastrophic events. The term “Critical Infrastructure” Involvement of the private sector in emergency refers to those physical and information technology management offers numerous benefits for all facilities, networks, services and assets, which, partners. Private sector entities benefit from a if disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious more thorough understanding of government’s impact on the health, safety, security or economic plans, opportunities to influence those plans, well-being of Canadians or the effective functioning and participating in systems which can offer timely of governments in Canada.” For their part, private resources to protect or restore impacted private sector CI asset holders noted government needs to assets. Governments benefit through a better be clear regarding government’s expectations of understanding of CI vulnerabilities and capabilities, them, and that they have resource constraints that and more seamless coordination among both public restrict their activities, just as do governments. and private asset holders.

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In some jurisdictions, private sector companies } Uneven participation by private sector such as large retailers have also partnered with partners. For example, not all 10 of the federally governments to provide private sector expertise designated CI sectors are represented on the and products in direct support of government’s Province’s CI Steering Committee. emergency operations (e.g. logistics capacity, } Information sharing and confidentiality barriers. and much needed products such as water, tarps, For example, CI organizations are frequently etc.). In some U.S. jurisdictions, retailers such as reluctant to share proprietary data if they lack Home Depot have also taken an active role in public confidence in government’s ability to keep this education efforts and resiliency facilitation through information confidential. free home preparedness instruction and prominent } Lack of clarity regarding the Province’s display of preparedness materials within stores. emergency powers following a catastrophic Work by EMBC to date with CI partners outside of event (e.g. the Province’s ability, under a direct government has been sensible, and appears Provincial Declaration of Emergency, to direct to have been appropriately scoped to available the service restoration priorities of private sector resources, particularly considering a system-wide corporations). reduction in attention to CI following completion of the 2010 Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games. B.C., INSURANCE INDUSTRY consistent with federally established frameworks, Along with traditional CI asset holders, such as has established a formal system of connections with utilities and transportation companies, the insurance private and public entities across a variety of “CI” industry also has a critical role in any jurisdiction’s sectors (e.g. transportation, communications, etc.). preparedness efforts. Working to ensure that A CI Provincial Steering Committee, with numerous insurance providers can remain solvent following a key CI asset holders represented helps oversee this catastrophic event (a current issue being worked on linkage between EMBC and industry. EMBC also by British Columbia and federal regulators), working includes explicit objectives with respect to CI towards high uptake of insurance coverage for planning and engagement within its Strategic Plan. individuals and businesses, and ensuring that the There are also promising examples of operational public understands the role of government versus linkages to the private sector such as those insurance are all areas where the insurance industry outlined in the EMBC PECC and PREOC guidelines, can productively partner with government. In some and demonstrated during the 2014 wildfire season. jurisdictions, government has even partnered with However, if B.C. is going to significantly enhance its the insurance industry in the delivery of insurance. preparedness for a catastrophic event, a number of Insurance industry submissions to the Earthquake challenges related to engagement of the private Preparedness Consultation highlighted numerous sector will have to be tackled. These include: such areas where there are opportunities in B.C. and Canada for the insurance industry to further } CI planning and coordination resource contribute to disaster resilience such as public limitations at EMBC (technology systems education, innovative provisions for post-disaster and staffing). insurance deductible loans, a strata property strategy, enhanced resiliency for the industry, etc.

27 B.C. EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS: CONSULTATION REPORT

Thus, additional engagement of the insurance 5.7 The provincial government, and the federal industry with respect to disaster preparedness government, must engage with the insurance appears to be warranted at the national and the industry to determine how this industry can provincial levels. contribute further to disaster resilience and to identify how governments can enable insurers to Key actions in support of expand their participation without jeopardizing RECOMMENDATION #5 their continued existence.

5.1 The provincial government must augment EMBC’s resources for CI coordination and expand the Provincial CI Steering Committee’s coverage RECOMMENDATION #6: to include all 10 federally designated (recognized) Training and Exercising CI sectors. 5.2 EMBC must conduct focused discussions with RECOMMENDATION CI partners to determine mechanisms for enhanced The provincial government must resource EMBC coordination (e.g. addressing confidentiality barriers with additional staff and funding to develop and to information sharing). implement comprehensive training and exercise 5.3 The provincial government must provide strategies with partners. guidance and templates for the preparation of STAKEHOLDER FEEDBACK emergency and business continuity plans for crown agencies and critical private sector services. Training: Stakeholders voiced support for emergency management training that was 5.4 As a backstop to voluntary engagement, accessible, integrated across delivering institutions, the provincial and federal government must and based on agreed-upon standards. Stakeholders mandate appropriate private sector preparedness, also supported delivery of training to as broad an including sharing of CI information and engagement audience as possible, given that individuals in a wide in joint planning with emergency management variety of roles can have a role to play in supporting organizations. emergency management activities. 5.5 EMBC must clarify and communicate its powers Exercising: Stakeholders evidenced wide agreement to direct actions by CI asset owners (e.g. restoration on the importance of exercises, and just as wide priorities) during and following a catastrophic event, agreement that most organizations do not have and clarify provincial expectations of CI asset owners. adequate resources to exercise adequately. 5.6 Existing and future contracts executed by the Stakeholders supported a provincial exercise Province with private sector vendors must reference framework building towards increasingly complex services, materials and equipment that may be exercises, but noted that additional support needed and used during response and recovery (financial and staff assistance) would be required activities. in order for many partners to participate.

28 B.C. EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS: CONSULTATION REPORT

DISCUSSION sponsored training delivered through the Justice Institute of BC (JIBC). In addition, the JIBC and Training and exercising are cornerstones of effective other key academic and educational institutions emergency management, whether preparing for day-to-day minor events, or rare, catastrophic ones. collectively offer a wide variety of emergency management training for emergency management Training that is well-designed, matched practitioners that support degree, diploma and appropriately to organizational functions, certificate programs. During the Earthquake and delivered effectively must be a priority for any Preparedness Consultation, stakeholders did note emergency management organization. While this that there is a significant amount of emergency may verge on common sense for conventional management training available in B.C. However, roles such as police and fire, it can sometimes be system-wide, there are training challenges and overlooked or given lower priority with respect to opportunities for enhancements, including: general emergency management functions such as planning, emergency co-ordination, or recovery. Access: While stakeholders noted that, on the whole, there is a significant amount of training available in Like training, opportunities to engage in exercises the province, some practitioners have experienced are absolutely critical for an effective emergency challenges in accessing training, whether due management program. Exercises give individuals, to limited time or travel budgets. EMBC has also agencies, and broader multi-agency systems the been constrained by limited numbers of regional opportunity to test operational procedures and staff available to deliver training and limited travel plans, identify gaps and weaknesses, and perhaps most importantly, strengthen inter-agency working budgets. Stakeholders were very supportive of relationships by building a common operating alternative modes of training delivery such as the picture essential for clear communication and webinars hosted by EMBC, but noted that face-to- coordination of actions among emergency response face training was also essential. and other organizations. Integration: It appears that there are opportunities Without appropriate training and exercising, to better integrate the training that is available from no jurisdiction can achieve an appropriate level various agencies and institutions. EMBC already of preparedness. participates in advisory committees in cooperation with individual training delivery institutions, but a Given the importance of training and exercising provincewide integrated approach to emergency then, it came as little surprise that the need for management training has not yet been fully realized. a focus on training and exercising came through Courses and programs (including degree programs) loud and clear from stakeholders. offer materials for entry level emergency managers, Training for senior officials, and for specific functions covering There are a variety of ways that emergency all phases of emergency management, but taken as managers can access training in B.C. For example, a whole, the training and educational opportunities with respect to local authorities, training for available across the province do not represent an emergency management professionals, as well as integrated curriculum. A more cooperative and elected officials and other staff, is available both in integrated training network would be a key tool in person and on-line from EMBC and through EMBC- achieving this.

29 B.C. EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS: CONSULTATION REPORT

Standards and guidelines: Training standards Exercises and guidelines need to be more fully developed. As important as training is, it is incomplete before While standards and guidelines are well established it has been exercised. Training, combined with in some areas (e.g. Incident Command System exercising is perhaps the single most reliable strategy training, Emergency Social Services training, etc.), to ensure preparedness and an effective response. in many cases there are no broader standards or guidelines that clarify what training is required EMBC-led exercising is on the increase. For example, to fulfill a given function. For example, guidelines EMBC is in the process of filling two positions that are required to demonstrate what minimum will be dedicated to organizing and implementing requirements are needed for individuals whose exercises. Also, EMBC’s strategic plan released in job it is to manage emergencies at the local Spring 2014 includes explicit objectives related level, such as those in the critical role of a local to exercising. These objectives appear to be authority Emergency Program Coordinator (EPC). appropriate given the available resources. The increasing scope and scale of emergency However, if B.C. is going to substantially enhance events and demographic pressures, among other its preparedness for a catastrophic event, additional factors, are necessitating increased professionalism funding and staff will be required. Jurisdictions in emergency management. Additional rigor is elsewhere which have made a concerted effort needed to assess the qualifications and experience to address earthquake and disaster preparedness of candidates for emergency management roles, have developed and implemented robust exercise to guide career development (e.g. what formal strategies that involve increasing numbers of courses/training are expected for increasing levels partners in exercises that increase over time in of responsibility) and determine what criteria should size and complexity. A well-planned schedule of be used to judge the quality of training. exercises, including drills, tabletop and functional exercises over a multi-year timeframe is essential. Functional exercises should, for example, be scheduled once a year. Full-scale exercises which To address these challenges, B.C. requires an are more labor intensive and costly should be emergency management training strategy that scheduled every 3 years or so. features an integrated approach among training providers. Training, like all aspects of emergency High-level exercise strategies (e.g. for a province or management, is also an area of shared responsibility. a state) necessarily include all levels of government However, the provincial government is in a position and key elements of the private and non- to bring multiple involved parties together to governmental sectors, and include participation address some of the issues above and further by senior officials as well as community members. improve emergency management training. Such strategies also account for recovery and mitigation considerations, in addition to response operations. Ultimately, full participation in these exercises must be mandatory for all key public sector, private sector and NGO partners.

30 B.C. EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS: CONSULTATION REPORT

While an absolutely critical element of preparedness, robust exercise programs are expensive. Dependent RECOMMENDATION #7: on the diverse scale of stakeholder engagement, Provincewide Risk Analysis the cost of a single full-scale, multi-day integrated exercise can cost millions of dollars. For example, RECOMMENDATION the Washington State Evergreen Exercise held In the long-term, EMBC and its partners must in 2012 cost approximately $2.5 million (not develop a strategy for enhanced hazard risk including in-kind support). This exercise included and vulnerability analysis, and for increasing the participation from local, county, state and federal availability of emergency management risk data governments, First Nations, corporate stakeholders for use by local authorities, the private sector, and cross-border engagement, in a multi-day, First Nations and the public. multi-site exercise event. Adequate ﬁnancial support from senior levels of government to emergency STAKEHOLDER FEEDBACK management organizations, all involved ministries/ Stakeholders participating in the Earthquake departments and local authorities is essential. Preparedness Consultation communicated a Local governments and others, consistent with their desire for greater availability of risk data for their shared responsibility for exercising, will also have to geographic areas. In many cases, the required data devote additional resources to exercising. was of a mapping/geospatial nature. For example:

Key actions in support of } Tsunami wave height and inundation modelling. RECOMMENDATION #6 } Building stock and vulnerability analysis. } 6.1 The provincial government must work with Slope stability data. partners to develop an emergency management } Micro-zonation for earthquake risks such training strategy that improves access, increases as liquefaction. integration between delivery organizations, } Earthquake fault locations. and includes consistent training guidelines. In other cases, stakeholders such as local authorities Federal participation and funding will be required expressed concerns regarding assessments of risks to ensure adequate training opportunities for all and vulnerabilities with respect to less geospatial- regional federal staﬀ in B.C., as well as First Nations speciﬁc factors such as vulnerable populations, communities. aging infrastructure, or disrupted supply routes. 6.2 The provincial government, with partners, Smaller, remote communities in particular frequently must develop and implement a robust, provincial voiced concerns regarding vulnerabilities around exercise strategy that includes full-scale exercises. supply chains and isolation following a major event. Additional provincial resources (funding and people) will be required. Federal funding and people will be required to ensure adequate participation by national and regional federal assets, in addition to First Nations.

31 B.C. EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS: CONSULTATION REPORT

It was also clear during the consultation process that All local authorities in B.C. are required to prepare even on an individual and family level, there was a plans that account for the hazards in their specific desire for greater data accessibility. At the individual areas. Thus, to varying degrees of specificity, level, access to such data may influence actions such local authority plans are intended to account as selection of a home to purchase, or development for specific local needs and associated response of a basic family emergency plan. actions/resources. However, many local authorities, and some other stakeholders such as private sector DISCUSSION CI owners, voiced the desire for either greater access The 2014 OAG of BC Report titled “Catastrophic to data, or additional assistance in assessing hazards, Earthquake Preparedness” specifically speaks to risks, and vulnerabilities. the regulatory and good practice requirements With respect to access to risk data (whether for for emergency management organizations in B.C., professionals or families), there are a number of such as local authorities and EMBC, to prepare related issues. In some cases, risk data exists, but its detailed Hazard Risk and Vulnerability Analyses availability may not have been communicated (HRVAs) to guide emergency management widely (e.g. Lower Mainland liquefaction risk plans. HRVAs help planners identify what hazards mapping was one such data set which was (e.g. floods, interface fires, earthquakes) need to discussed during the consultation). In other cases, be considered for specific areas within their information may be held confidentially due to jurisdictions, what impacts these hazards may cause, legitimate competitiveness concerns. Many private and what people or infrastructure are most at risk. sector companies have already conducted internal As also noted in the 2014 OAG report, the last all- hazards identification processes to identify hazards provincewide HRVA for B.C. was in 1997. vulnerabilities within their own infrastructure. No HRVA specific to catastrophic earthquake has The sharing of this information, while ensuring been completed. confidentiality for proprietary matters, will be very An appropriate understanding of hazards, risks, important and relevant to life safety and rapid and vulnerabilities is a cornerstone of appropriate recovery in the event of a catastrophic earthquake planning, not only for emergency management or other disaster. In further cases, the desired data organizations, governments, and CI asset owners, may have to be created, though at a substantial cost but also for individuals. For example, emergency (e.g. tsunami inundation modelling for additional planners and the public in Greater Victoria can areas of B.C.’s coast). Lastly, publicly available data access a detailed online map of tsunami hazard from various sources may not be consolidated into planning areas in the region. Resources such a format which can be easily accessed by those as this can assist governments, private sector who require it for planning. entities, and homeowners to plan appropriately. In the long-term, more extensive use of emergency HRVAs combine information such as this, across management information management systems all hazards, together with other sources of data, may offer some solutions. Examples of such to create a comprehensive assessment of hazards, systems include ETeam, already in use by EMBC, risks, and vulnerabilities. and Hazus. Hazus, a Geographic Information System-enabled risk assessment software package

32 B.C. EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS: CONSULTATION REPORT may offer opportunities to consolidate, analyze, Key Actions In Support of and communicate risk data. A staged approach RECOMMENDATION #7 where data regarding earthquake, tsunami, CI, and landslides are incrementally added to this, or a 7.1 All partners must assess opportunities to similar system, may be a practical option, though develop, consolidate and share sources of risk data. implementation funding would be required. Such work could include development and sharing Implicitly, stakeholders’ desire for enhanced risk data of additional tsunami inundation modelling, availability, and assistance with identifying hazards inventories of public essential services facilities, for their local areas, seems to support the need building stock inventories, mapping of hazardous for an updated HRVA for B.C. or HRVAs done at the materials locations, etc. regional level (e.g. for the six EMBC regions). 7.2 Governments must provide additional funding Ideally, a provincewide HRVA would identify to support the enhanced use of geospatial data potential hazards and vulnerabilities within within emergency management information different planning areas. Local plans could then systems, and assessment of unique issues such incorporate these findings and managers can as vulnerable populations, hazardous materials, design scenarios for their training and exercise or animals. Often, these unique risks and programs. HRVA enhancements would require vulnerabilities can be overlooked or inadequately additional funding. considered in emergency plans due to lack of data, complexity, confidentiality concerns, etc. However, a formal HRVA may add little value if it simply re-formats and consolidates existing analyses 7.3 The Province must fund a small, dedicated EMBC which are already informing planning, and which are team to lead HRVA efforts at the provincial level and of a general, provincewide nature. Further, no single assist local authorities with local HRVA needs. HRVA will ever address all the geographically or Note: Key action 5.4 also supports vulnerability specific issues of each community or recommendation 7: stakeholder. 5.4 As a backstop to voluntary engagement, A provincewide HRVA will, however, add value if it the provincial and federal governments must is part of a wider strategy to assist local authorities mandate appropriate private sector preparedness, and other stakeholders to access the data they need including sharing of CI information and engagement to plan appropriately. Ultimately, local authorities in joint planning with emergency management and other stakeholders are the experts on their organizations. own geographic areas, their operations, and their vulnerabilities. They do, however, need to know what data is available, be able to access it, and in some cases, be provided with assistance or partnerships to develop it.

33 B.C. EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS: CONSULTATION REPORT

To effect real change in the area of disaster RECOMMENDATION #8: preparedness, system-wide and cultural change Emergency Management need to be the top priorities for B.C. However, as opportunities present themselves for greater Capability Priorities commitment of time and resources to specific functions, the following capabilities should be given RECOMMENDATION early consideration. Federal, provincial, and local governments must invest in emergency management capability Key Actions In Support of enhancements in such areas as alerting, logistics, RECOMMENDATION #8 urban search and rescue, rapid damage assessment, and 911. Emergency Alerting: A very common theme heard from stakeholders STAKEHOLDER FEEDBACK during the consultation was the desire for enhanced In the course of the consultation, stakeholders emergency alerting. Stakeholders spoke to the need pointed to numerous specific emergency both for improved alerting of local authorities and management capabilities which require additional those with emergency response responsibilities, investment. Some of the most commonly and improved alerting for the public. Desired functionality included an improved Provincial referenced were rapid damage assessment, Emergency Notification System (PENS), smart- alerting, urban search and rescue, and logistics. phone alerting applications, broadcast interruption Additionally, several key emergency management alerts, community sirens, use of social media, etc. agencies spoke to the need for additional situational The issue of alerting appears to have been a long- awareness tools. standing one in B.C. For example, PENS, the tsunami notification system used by EMBC, has been the DISCUSSION subject of several Union of BC Municipalities (UBCM) Previous reports on the topic of earthquake resolutions in past years which have called for the preparedness in B.C. have pointed to the need for system to be improved. EMBC currently has several additional emergency management capacity in a initiatives underway or planned which could multitude of important areas. This report has focused improve emergency alerting in B.C. An upgrade to on the emergency management frameworks PENS is one such initiative. As noted by stakeholders, and culture in B.C. rather than highlighting those having effective alerting mechanisms in place is a key element of catastrophic preparedness, specific capabilities in need of additional resources, and a key factor in empowering the public to take support, or coordination. However, the emergency responsibility for their own safety. management capabilities highlighted in the next section are several of the specific capabilities which While the consultation process did not include were of primary concern for stakeholders, in addition an assessment of resources being earmarked for future alerting initiatives, any new functionality in to very broad capability areas such as the health care this regard will require additional resources at the system, transportation infrastructure, etc. provincial level. Certainly, involved stakeholders in B.C., including the provincial government, need to be assessing existing and emerging technologies and their applicability to the alerting need. 34 B.C. EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS: CONSULTATION REPORT

8.1 EMBC, and other partners, must select Urban Search and Rescue (USAR): and implement improved emergency alerting While deﬁnitions and understanding of what mechanisms for British Columbians including both constitutes “urban search and rescue” may vary, new technologies and operational practices. numerous stakeholders expressed the desire for Logistics: enhanced and coordinated urban search and rescue Broadly speaking, logistics is the management of the capacity in B.C. movement of goods. In an emergency management B.C.’s HUSAR capacity was reduced when and catastrophic event planning context, it normally federal funding was cut to the Vancouver Task refers to the movement of critical resources (e.g. Force 1 HUSAR team at the end of 2012, but a food, fuel, water, medicine) into the impact area, as partnership between the City of Vancouver and well as distribution of those resources to where they EMBC have enabled this team to continue, albeit are needed. While stakeholders did not necessarily at a reduced capacity. Federal funding was also use emergency management terminology such eliminated for the other HUSAR teams in Canada, as “logistics,” concern over how much-needed along with funding for HUSAR exercise and resources would be brought into communities coordination functions. The reduction in B.C.’s following a major earthquake was one of the most HUSAR capacity was commonly referred to as a commonly heard concerns from stakeholders during the consultation process. concern by stakeholders during the consultation. All stakeholders in B.C. should insist that the As of Fall 2014, EMBC is already taking steps towards federal government reinstate HUSAR funding addressing this issue with the creation of several and coordination resources. new dedicated logistics positions within EMBC. This is a very sensible and encouraging development In a variety of ways, a number of stakeholders also that is appropriately scaled to current plan maturity expressed the desire for greater leadership and and available resources. In the medium to longer coordination with respect to what might be termed term though, any logistics plans developed by this light urban search and rescue, which may include team will require the commitment of partners, the use of Ground (Wilderness) Search and Rescue and will need to be exercised. Ultimately, for British volunteers, or specially trained USAR volunteers. Columbians to have conﬁdence that logistics plans While there are a variety of groups providing and capacity can address a catastrophic event, USAR capability in B.C., approaches, training, additional resources will be required. Logistics and governance is varied. An opportunity may exist planning and exercising undertaken by Washington for EMBC to work with partners to achieve additional State, which faces similar earthquake and tsunami coordination and enhanced capacity in the USAR hazards to B.C., provides a good example of the realm. Additional federal funding and engagement resource requirements of a more fully matured will also be required to achieve optimal linkages emergency management logistics capability. These resource requirements are substantial. to HUSAR capacities and standards, and enhance HUSAR capacity. 8.2 The provincial government and other partners must establish and resource a framework and 8.3 The provincial government and other partners capacity for post-disaster logistics. At the provincial must establish and resource a framework and government level, such a framework will need capacity for urban search and rescue, with particular to include ministries and agencies well beyond emphasis on light and medium urban search and EMBC alone. rescue capacity. 35 B.C. EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS: CONSULTATION REPORT

Rapid Damage Assessment (RDA): immediately following a major earthquake a large Following a major earthquake, a significant portion of the data required for situational awareness determinant of how effective the response and early will come from calls to 911 dispatch centres. EMBC, recovery activities are will be the efficacy of RDA, like most emergency management organizations, the process of coordinating structure assessment has no direct access to aggregated 911 data. In the efforts and consolidating and disseminating long-term, this situational awareness gap and the the results of those assessments for emergency overall capacity and resiliency of the 911 system managers. This process can save lives, reduce the during a catastrophic event is something EMBC draw on other resources, and improve resiliency should explore with partners. when done well. Numerous stakeholders cited Of note, the Ministry of Justice is considering RDA as a key catastrophic event preparedness opportunities to increase functionality and challenge. B.C. currently has frameworks in place efficiencies in the network of facilities that accept for RDA, but these frameworks have not been 911 calls (Public Safety Answer Points). Such an explored, resourced or exercised to the point initiative should offer opportunities to build where they could be fully utilized in a catastrophic additional resiliency for the 911 system, and establish event. Substantial work is required to fully develop improved linkages between the 911 system and and then implement RDA standards, training, and policies. Further, organizations to lead the emergency management structures. program and technology to support RDA have not 8.5 The provincial government, local authorities, been fully determined. EMBC’s planning accounts for and key partners must assess opportunities to this gap but like other preparedness gaps, closing enhance the resiliency and capacity of the 911 it will require new funding and staff as well as the system, and establish situational awareness commitment of partners. linkages between the 911 system and emergency 8.4 The provincial government and other partners, management structures. must establish and resource a framework and As noted above, the specific gaps, capabilities and capacity for rapid damage assessment, including issues highlighted here by no means constitute use of appropriate technology. a complete list of the issues that catastrophic Immediate Response Situational Awareness: planning must address or the capabilities that EMBC and/or its partners must develop or enhance. The immediate response plan currently under Numerous others abound, and indeed stakeholders development will cover the initial several days following a catastrophic event. During this initial identified a number of them (e.g. EMBC’s radio period, assessing the scope of the impacts, saving communications capabilities). Further, EMBC’s lives, and setting the conditions for a sustained existing earthquake planning roadmap considers response and recovery will be the primary many more issues than have been discussed above. objectives. At the provincial level, priorities will be However, the above items have been noted here in determined by the PECC based on information order to provide specific examples of catastrophic provided through PREOCs, from local authorities, response and recovery plans and capabilities that and/or directly from certain large agencies. must be covered off and which will unavoidably As has been the experience in other jurisdictions, require additional resources to address.

36 B.C. EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS: CONSULTATION REPORT

As noted, stakeholders in B.C. expect governments Conclusion and other organizations to prepare for disasters. However, stakeholders in B.C. also accept the The same location and geography that makes B.C. concept of shared responsibility for emergency so beautiful, also makes it subject to numerous management. This report has highlighted a number natural hazards such as a catastrophic earthquake, of the priorities identified by those stakeholders. which could cause significant loss of life, damage It also sets out recommendations designed to to property, and lasting economic impacts. Events pivot B.C.’s culture and its emergency management around the world offer a glimpse of what B.C. structures towards a situation where stakeholders could expect from an event within its own borders. are empowered and accountable, and where Understandably, British Columbians have an agencies, such as EMBC, have the resources and expectation that governments at all levels, and other authority to deliver the integrated leadership for providers of critical services, have planned and which stakeholders voiced a need. prepared for such disasters. Leaders at all levels must demonstrate the political As a number of reports have highlighted previously, will necessary to elevate and highlight the governments and other agencies are not adequately importance of preparedness for a catastrophic event. prepared for an event like a catastrophic earthquake. Political and other leaders must use every means Further, despite the fact that this issue has been available to them to communicate the importance publicly reported on previously, significant of preparedness and provide the leadership which preparedness enhancements provincewide seem to stakeholders communicated was lacking. The path have been elusive. to greater preparedness is relatively clear. The key Efforts at widespread preparedness improvements is ensuring that agencies with preparedness can only be successful when there is a clear vision, responsibilities, importantly but certainly not sufficient resources and strong political will. All too exclusively EMBC, have the empowerment, frequently, these factors are present only after a staff and resources to undertake and complete this significant emergency event has already taken important work. place. At present, British Columbians have the While this report was commissioned by, and has opportunity to tackle preparedness improvements been delivered to, the provincial government, before a catastrophic earthquake is experienced ultimately, B.C.’s commitment to these here. This report was commissioned to gain a better recommendations and to preparedness in general, understanding of stakeholder priorities as this work is a responsibility shared by all. is undertaken.

37 B.C. EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS: CONSULTATION REPORT

Earthquake Consultation Report – Appendices

Appendix A: Henry Renteria Bio ...... 39

Appendix B: The Risk to B.C. (Earthquake and Tsunami) ...... 40

Appendix C: Previous Reports ...... 46

Appendix D: Earthquake Consultation – Terms of Reference ...... 48

Appendix E: Stakeholders Engaged ...... 50

Appendix F: Earthquake Consultation – Community Session Schedule ...... 58

Appendix G: Earthquake Consultation Summary – Recommendations and Key Actions ...... 59

Appendix H: Emergency Management Structures ...... 64

38 B.C. EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS: CONSULTATION REPORT

Appendix A: Henry Renteria Bio HENRY R. RENTERIA Chair, Earthquake Preparedness Consultation

Henry Renteria is an emergency management and Prior to his state appointment, Mr. Renteria served public safety consultant. He works with government, as the Director of the City of Oakland Office of private industry and non-profit agencies to promote Emergency Services for 18 years. While in Oakland and implement preparedness, response, recovery he managed the City’s response to six Presidential and mitigation programs. He has expertise in Declared disasters including the 1989 Loma Prieta Emergency Operations Centers, Incident Command Earthquake and the 1991 Oakland Hills Firestorm. Systems, Crisis Intervention and disaster related As a result of legislation from the Firestorm, he served legislation and funding. on the coordinating committee that created the California Standardized Emergency Management He served as the Director of the California Governor’s System (SEMS). Office of Emergency Services (OES) from 2003 to 2009 and was a member of the Governor’s Cabinet in Additionally, he coordinated the state’s first that capacity. As OES Director he managed the State Emergency Manager’s Mutual Aid program in response and recovery to numerous local, regional response to the 1994 Northridge Earthquake. He was and state disasters, including the 2007 Southern in Japan in 1995 when the Kobe Earthquake struck. California wildfires, the largest in California’s history. He remained in Kobe for 10 days and personally As a member of the Governor’s Cabinet, he was witnessed the response and early recovery efforts. responsible for coordinating all state agencies Additionally, Mr. Renteria served as Executive and resources in preparing for, responding to and Director of Crisis Intervention of Houston, a United recovering from human-caused and natural disasters. Way Agency providing 24-hour crisis intervention He helped coordinate the merger of the OES with and suicide prevention programs. He is a current the Office of Homeland Security to create the new member of the Board of Directors for Crisis Support California Emergency Management Agency. Services of Alameda County and a former member of the Board of Directors for American Red Cross of the San Francisco Bay Area. He is also a past recipient of the Jefferson Award, presented by the American Institute for Public Service.

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Appendix B: The Risk to B.C. EARTHQUAKES in B.C. B.C. is a very seismically active area, and has the (Earthquake and Tsunami) highest earthquake risk in Canada. Areas near the Emergency planners in B.C. must know the risks coast are at greater risk though it should be noted to their jurisdictions and plan for a wide variety that nowhere in B.C. is immune from earthquakes. of hazard types. It is illustrative that provincial While it may be common knowledge that B.C. planning documents identify 57 separate hazards for is earthquake country, understanding of the causes consideration. However, relatively few hazard types of earthquakes and tsunamis is less widespread. hold the potential to overwhelm B.C.’s collective At the most basic level, earthquakes are caused ability to respond. Earthquakes and tsunamis are where moving tectonic plates that make up the perhaps the primary two hazards that do hold this earth’s surface come into contact and create friction. potential and thus must be considered in B.C.’s That friction causes energy to build up until it is catastrophic planning. It is for this reason that media released as “stuck” plates become “unstuck.” stories, emergency planning scenarios, and the The energy released in this process is what causes Earthquake Preparedness Consultation initiative the ground to shake. Numerous factors affect how focus on earthquakes and tsunamis. strongly this shaking is felt by individuals and the To contextualize discussion on earthquake and damage caused to structures: the depth of the tsunami preparedness, it is helpful to describe what earthquake, the distance from the event’s epicentre, earthquakes and tsunamis are, the different types of the type of soil or rock in a given location, and the earthquakes, what damage they can cause, how they duration of the shaking. Earthquakes are measured are measured, and what the specific risk is to B.C. by magnitude and intensity. Magnitude is a measure of physical energy released or the strength of an earthquake and is commonly described using the Richter scale. Seismic activity is also described by an intensity scale — the Modified Mercalli Intensity scale — that describes the effects of an earthquake on people and buildings (See table below).

MMI INTENSITY PERCEPTION DESCRIPTION I Instrumental Not felt II Just Perceptible Felt by only a few people on upper ﬂoors of tall buildings III Slight Felt by people lying down, seated on hard surfaces, or in the upper ﬂoors of tall buildings IV Perceptible Felt indoors by many, by few outside, and windows rattle V Rather Strong Generally felt by everyone; sleeping people may be awakened VI Strong Trees sway, chandeliers swing, bells ring, some damage from falling objects VII Very Strong General alarm; walls and plaster crack VIII Destructive Felt in moving vehicles, chimneys collapse, poorly constructed buildings seriously damaged

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TYPES OF EARTHQUAKES

The land mass of B.C. exists on top of the North American Plate. Oﬀ the west coast of Vancouver Island and extending down to Northern California is the Cascadia Subduction Zone – a giant fault approximately 1,100 km long. This plate interface has the Juan de Fuca Plate colliding with the North American Plate – with the former being forced beneath the latter in a process called subduction. The geology and geometry of the plates and the collision of these plates causes several types of earthquakes: } Shallow earthquakes in the North American plate (e.g. M7.3 in 1946 near Courtenay) } Deep earthquakes in the subducting oceanic plate (e.g. 2001 M6.8 Nisqually earthquake near Olympia, Washington, that was felt in Victoria and the lower mainland) } Large subduction zone earthquakes that occur between the interface of the Juan de Fuca plate and North American plate. (The Big One) (e.g. M9 Cascadia earthquake in 1700).

THE CASCADIA SUBDUCTION ZONE IN CROSS SECTION

} Adapted from Riddihough, 1978 and provided by Natural Resources Canada at the Pacific Geoscience Centre

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HOW BIG AND HOW OFTEN? EARTHQUAKE PROBABILITIES IN B.C.

Our region experiences hundreds of small B.C.’s largest known earthquake was the magnitude earthquakes each year, but the vast majority of these 9.0 Cascadia subduction zone earthquake in 1700. are too small to be detected without specialized However, there have been numerous earthquakes instruments. However, approximately once per of magnitude 7.0 or higher since 1900, the most decade, the movement of the tectonic plates recent being a magnitude 7.7 in Haida Gwaii in 2012. beneath the surface can produce shaking strong There have also been more modest earthquakes enough to cause damage. Luckily, most of these such as the April 2014 magnitude 6.5 earthquake earthquakes occur in remote areas. These relatively 117 km west of Gold River. Thankfully, recent frequent earthquakes originate in the North America earthquakes have not resulted in any fatalities, Plate and the Juan de Fuca Plate. often due to their remote locations. Earthquakes originating in the North America Plate Taking all of this into consideration, what is the are shallow and can reach magnitudes of 7.5. At this risk of an earthquake and/or tsunami causing magnitude, shaking could be expected to last 20-60 significant damage to a densely populated area in seconds and aftershocks should be anticipated. B.C. in the coming years? While earthquakes cannot Earthquakes originating in the Juan de Fuca Plate be predicted, certain areas have a higher probability are deeper underground, and can also reach of experiencing damaging ground motions caused magnitudes of 7.5. At this magnitude, shaking could by earthquakes. be expected to last 15-30 seconds and aftershocks The Geological Survey of Canada has produced would be less likely. a simplified seismic hazard map for Canada (see Much rarer than the above are Cascadia subduction next page) that provides an idea of the likelihood zone earthquakes. These earthquakes occur of experiencing strong earthquake shaking. approximately every 300-800 years, but can 2010 SEISMIC HAZARD MAP FOR CANADA reach magnitudes higher than 9, making them among the largest in the world. Such earthquakes The map illustrates that the west coast and produce shaking for several minutes, over a wide south Vancouver Island, and the southwest tip geographical area. Hundreds of aftershocks can of mainland B.C. have a 30 per cent probability also be expected. The last one to be recorded every 50 years of experiencing strong shaking was in 1700. Seismologists have determined that to cause significant damage in buildings (http:// there is a high probability that the next Cascadia www.earthquakescanada.nrcan.gc.ca/hazard- event will occur within the next 200 years. Such an alea/simphaz-eng.php). So, while risk varies by earthquake can be expected to be especially location in B.C., the risk of a serious earthquake damaging because the shaking can last for several is real. Further, a catastrophic earthquake impacting minutes, although the most intense shaking for an urban coastal area such as Victoria or Metro B.C. would be approximately 150km off the coast. Vancouver would have short- and long-term When a Cascadia subduction zone earthquake does implications for all British Columbians. occur, it is also expected to create a destructive tsunami (see the following section).

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DAMAGE CAUSED BY EARTHQUAKES drains are all possibilities. Earthquakes can also cause significant landslides (rockslides, debris slides, debris While it is intuitive that earthquakes can cause torrents, land slumps, etc.) which can cause direct building damage or even collapse due to ground damage and hamper response efforts. Yet another shaking, there are a variety of other effects secondary effect of earthquakes is liquefaction, associated with earthquakes. First, even in a building which is the process of soils losing their strength which is not seriously damaged, falling and flying and becoming more fluid. This can dramatically objects can cause serious injuries. Second, ground impact the foundations of buildings and other shaking can damage other assets or impact the land structures. in unexpected ways. For example, damaged gas lines and power lines can contribute to fires. Flooding is Lastly, perhaps a more well-known secondary effect also an issue. Damaged dams and dikes, blocked of earthquakes, and certainly a serious risk for B.C., rivers, broken water mains and ruptured storm is that of tsunami.

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TSUNAMI height and the inundation area of a tsunami. Where the necessary data is available, scientists Earthquakes are by far the most common cause and emergency planners use sophisticated of tsunamis. A large earthquake beneath the ocean models to predict safe and unsafe areas for floor can push water upwards, creating a series specific coastal locations. of these potentially large ocean waves. Damaging The most significant tsunami risk for B.C. is a tsunamis are a rare, but serious risk for many coastal tsunami from the next Cascadia Subduction areas in B.C. The graphic on the next page shows the Zone earthquake discussed previously. The tsunami BC Tsunami Notification Zones. Areas A, B, and C are from such an event could be expected to cause at greatest risk from tsunami. Area D has some widespread destruction along the west coast of moderate risk. Area E is considered to have low risk. Vancouver Island. In geographic areas at risk, beaches open to the It is noteworthy that tsunamis can also be caused ocean or by bay entrances, as well as tidal flats and by a large earthquake in a distant location the shores of coastal rivers or inlets exposed to the elsewhere in the Pacific Ocean (tele-tsunamis). open ocean are especially vulnerable to tsunamis. While recent significant earthquakes in Japan, Chile, The destructiveness of a tsunami can depend and Indonesia have resulted in relatively small wave on a wide variety of factors related to both the heights for coastal areas of B.C., risk is still present associated earthquake such as depth, magnitude to the province from tele-tsunamis, especially with and duration of shaking, as well as the specific the effect of resonances within bays and inlets coastal area impacted. The topography of a bay that can increase tsunami amplitude significantly. or inlet, the topography of the land, the tide height, More modelling is needed to fully understand this and numerous other factors can influence wave aspect of tsunami risk.

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Appendix C: Previous Reports

OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL OAG OF BC REPORTS:

Catastrophic Earthquake Preparedness (March 2014) } The OAG report focused on EMBC’s role with respect to earthquake preparedness. } Report includes nine recommendations to government, all of which have been accepted by government (Ministry of Justice). } Link to OAG report: OAG Catastrophic Earthquake_FINAL.pdf

Earthquake Preparedness Follow Up Report (May 2005) } Report on the results of the OAG’s second follow up review of the Select Standing Committee on Public Accounts’ 4th Report of the 3rd Session of the 36th Parliament: Earthquake Preparedness. } This PAC report includes and endorses the recommendations made in the OAG’s 1997/1998 Report 1: Earthquake Preparedness. } Link to OAG report: 2005 Earthquake Preparedness Follow Up Report

Follow-up of Performance Report 1: Earthquake Preparedness Report (June 2002) } An OAG follow-up report on the recommendations contained in the Select Standing Committee’s 4th report of the 3rd Session of the 36th Parliament: Emergency Preparedness in BC. } The OAG report concluded that both the provincial and local governments in B.C. were not yet adequately prepared for a major earthquake. } Link to OAG report: 2002 Follow Up Report – Earthquake Preparedness

1997/1998 Report 1: Earthquake Preparedness – Progress Report (November 1997) } The OAG audit examined the state of preparedness of not just the Provincial Emergency Program but also the provincial government overall, and local governments. } The audit concluded that governments in B.C. were not well prepared for a major earthquake. } Link to OAG report: 1997 Earthquake Preparedness Report

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INTERNAL AUDIT AND ADVISORY SERVICES, Report on Emergency Management Preparedness and Response (June 2007):

Report on Emergency Management Preparedness and Response of the Internal Audit and Advisory Services } The Report on Emergency Management Preparedness and Response evaluated only preparedness planning (including testing and training), and response. Prevention, mitigation and recovery activities were out of scope for this review. } The review found that B.C.’s emergency management response capability to be in varying stages of maturity, with the hazard-speciﬁc response plans the most developed programs and the non pro-active communities that have less comprehensive plans at the other end of the spectrum. } Link to the Internal Audit & Advisory Services Report: http://www.fin.gov.bc.ca/ocg/ias/ pdf_Docs/Emergency%20Management%20Report%20Release.pdf

STANDING COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ACCOUNTS FOURTH REPORT: Third Session, Thirty-sixth Parliament (June 7, 1999):

Fourth Report of the Select Standing Committee on Public Accounts } The Fourth Report covers the work of the PAC on the matter of Earthquake Preparedness: Performance Audit. } The PAC had a further 28 recommendations in addition to OAG’s 1997/98 recommendations. } A summary of the recommendations (OAG and the SSCPA) can be found in appendix C and D of the March 2014 OAG Report: Catastrophic Earthquake Preparedness. } Link to the Select Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SSCPA) – Fourth Report: https://www.leg.bc.ca/cmt/36thParl/cmt12/1999/4report/index.htm

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Appendix D: Earthquake Consultation – Terms of Reference

BRITISH COLUMBIA EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE CONSULTATION PROJECT

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Purpose Key Topics Within Scope The goal of this consultation is to provide Roles and Responsibilities of all Levels of recommendations, through discussion with Government to Plan for and Respond to Catastrophic key stakeholders, on improving the ability of Seismic Events British Columbians to prepare for and respond to To determine if the roles and responsibilities are a catastrophic seismic event. clearly set out and understood by all levels of Guiding Considerations government, and if necessary, to recommend methods to improve clarity and understanding. Guiding considerations in the development of recommendations will include: Roles of Individuals and Families } Overall public safety impact To gauge the preparedness of individuals } Aﬀordability and families for catastrophic events (e.g. family plans, earthquake kits, insurance, etc.) and recommend } Practicality (e.g. implementation requirements, approaches to improving individual and family ability of partners to participate, timelines, etc.) preparedness as required. Scope Risk Assessment Processes This emergency management consultation To identify key issues and opportunities with respect regarding catastrophic seismic events will directly to risk assessment processes, relevant to catastrophic involve all levels of government. seismic events, and provide recommendations for The Province will also seek the input and improvements as appropriate. engagement of additional stakeholders, including: individuals and families, the media, Response Planning for Catastrophic Seismic Events business, local authorities including First Nations, To identify key issues and opportunities with adjoining provincial, federal and state jurisdictions, respect to response plans, capacities, and processes, as well as non-governmental organizations. and provide recommendations for improvements Community consultation activities will focus on as required. those regions at highest risk from seismic events.

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Response Capacity Public Communications To identify key issues and opportunities with respect To identify key issues and opportunities with to response capacity and provide recommendations respect to public communications before, during, for improvements as appropriate (e.g. targeted and after a catastrophic seismic event and provide investments within B.C., mutual aid arrangements recommendations for improvements as appropriate. with other jurisdictions, etc.). Training and Exercising Programs Mitigation Strategies for Catastrophic Seismic Events To identify key issues and opportunities with To identify key issues and opportunities with respect to training and exercising for response to respect to mitigation strategies and provide catastrophic events, and provide recommendations recommendations for improvements as appropriate. for improvements as appropriate.

Coordination Structures Volunteers To identify key issues and opportunities with respect To identify key issues and opportunities with respect to the utilization of volunteers in response to existing coordination structures for response to to a catastrophic seismic event and provide catastrophic events and provide recommendations recommendations for improvements as appropriate. for improvements as appropriate. Timelines Technical Emergency Communications and } Announcement of consultation, including Terms Warning Systems of Reference & Chair ...... March 11, 2014 To identify key issues and opportunities with respect to emergency management technical } Information gathering complete . . . July 31, 2014 communications and warning systems and provide } Final report to be delivered to recommendations for improvements as appropriate. Ministry of Justice ...... December 31, 2014

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Appendix E: Stakeholders Engaged STAKEHOLDER ORGANIZATION

BRITISH COLUMBIA CROWN ORGANIZATIONS Ministry of Natural Gas Development: BC Safety Authority } Office of Housing and Construction Standards Insurance Corporation BC (ICBC) Ministry of Health Ministry of Advanced Education Ministry of Jobs, Tourism and Skills Training Ministry of Justice: } BC Coroners Service Ministry of Agriculture } Office of the Fire Commissioner } Police Services Ministry of Social Development Ministry of Children and Family Development and Social Innovation Ministry of Technology, Innovation Ministry of Education and Citizens’ Services Ministry of Energy and Mines Ministry of Transportation and Infrastructure Ministry of Environment Office of the Clerk and Sergeant-at-Arms Ministry of Finance WorkSafeBC Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT Security and Emergency Management Advisory Committee (SEMAC): } Aboriginal Aﬀairs and Northern } Joint Task Forces (Paciﬁc) Development Canada (AANDC) (Canadian Forces) } Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) } Natural Resources Canada } Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) } Public Health Agency of Canada } Canadian Coast Guard } } Department of Fisheries and Public Safety Canada Oceans (DFO) } Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) } Industry Canada } Transport Canada Defense Research Development Canada (DRDC)/ Resiliency Working Group

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OTHER STATES AND PROVINCES Alberta Western Regional Emergency Management Advisory Committees (WREMAC) / Paciﬁc Northwest Emergency Management Arrangement: } State of Alaska } State of Idaho } State of Oregon } State of Washington } British Columbia } Yukon Territory Cascadia Region Earthquake Workgroup (CREW)

EDUCATION  K TO 12 BC Association of School Business BC Teachers’ Federation (BCTF) Oﬃcials (BCASBO) BC School Superintendents Federation of Independent Schools’ Association (BCSSA) Association (FISA) BC School Trustees’ Association (BCSTA) Ministry of Education

EDUCATION  UNIVERSITIES AND OTHER POSTSECONDARY INSTITUTIONS British Columbia Institute University of the Fraser Valley (UFV) of Technology (BCIT) Ministry of Advanced Education University of Victoria (UVIC) Okanagan College Vancouver Community College (VCC) Simon Fraser University (SFU) Vancouver Film School (VFS) University of British Columbia (UBC) Vancouver Island University

HEALTH SECTOR BC Centre for Disease Control Health Emergency Management BC BC Emergency Health Services: Lower Mainland Health Authority } BC Ambulance Service Courtenay Medical Health Oﬃcer VIHA Medical Health Oﬃcers Ministry of Health First Nations Health Authority (Emergency Management Unit) Fraser Northern Health Authority Public Health Agency of Canada Vancouver Coastal Health Authority Health Canada, Vancouver Island Health Authority First Nations Inuit Health Branch

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HOUSING SECTOR Aboriginal Housing Management Association Homeowner Protection Office Applied Science Technologist and Technicians Managers of Strata & Rental Owners and Technologists of British Columbia Architectural Institute of British Columbia Manufactured Home Park Owners’ Alliance of BC BC Housing Ministry of Natural Gas Development: } Office of Housing and Construction Standards BC Non-Profit Housing Association New Chelsea Society Canadian Condominium Institute – Tenant Resource and Advisory Centre Vancouver Chapter Condominium Home Owners Association (CHOA) of BC

ANIMAL WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS Society for Prevention of Cruelty Canadian Disaster Animal Rescue Team to Animals (SPCA) Canadian Veterinary Medical Association Ministry of Agriculture

RECOVERY NGOS Canadian Red Cross Integrated Disaster Recovery Council of BC: } BC Housing } Ministry of Justice - EMBC } Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu Chi } Ministry of Social Development Foundation Canada and Social Innovation } Canadian Disaster Animal Response } PHAC Oﬃce of Emergency } Community Living BC Response Services } Ending Violence Association of BC } Police Victim Services of BC } Health Canada & Public Health Agency of } Public Health Agency of Canada Canada – BC /Yukon Region } Samaritan’s Purse } Justice Institute of BC } St. John Ambulance } Mennonite Disaster Service } St. Vincent de Paul } Ministry of Children and Family } The Canadian Red Cross Society Development } The Salvation Army } Ministry of Health } World Renew

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MULTICULTURAL AND FAITHBASED ORGANIZATIONS: Multicultural and Faith-based Organizations: (Note: An invitation to provide input was shared with over five hundred multicultural and faith-based organizations/contacts through the Multiculturalism Office within the Ministry of International Trade.) } Affiliation of Multicultural Societies and Services Agencies of BC } FOCUS Humanitarian Assistance Canada } Ismaili Muslim Community } Ismaili Muslim Council for BC } Multicultural Advisory Council } Salvation Army } Tzu Chi Foundation (Buddhist Compassion Relief)

GROUPS INVOLVED IN VULNERABLE POPULATIONS ISSUES: BC Coalition of People with Disabilities Greater Vancouver Association of the Deaf (GVAD) BC Poverty Reduction Coalition Ministry of Health, Emergency Management Unit, Population & Public Health Council of Senior Citizens Organizations The Salvation Army of British Columbia

RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS BC Association of Chiefs of Police (BCACP) Fire Chiefs’ Association of British Columbia BC Association of Municipal Chiefs of Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Police (BCAMCP) ECOMM

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTOR Canadian Banking Association: Media (Radio, Print, TV, Other): } BNP Paribas Bank } Bell Media } CIBC } Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) } Citibank } CityTV’s Breakfast Television (Rogers) } CTFS } Newspaper Association of Canada } Desjardins Group } Rogers Media: Radio } HSBC } The Jim Pattison Broadcast Group: } Laurentian Bank Victoria/Island Radio } National Bank } Times Colonist } Royal Bank } Scotiabank } TD Bank

53 B.C. EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS: CONSULTATION REPORT

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTOR Provincial Critical Infrastructure Steering Committee: } Finance – Ministry of Finance } Transportation – BC Ferries } Government – Ministry of Agriculture } Transportation – BC Transit } Government – Ministry of Finance } Transportation – Coast Mountain Bus } Government – Ministry of Forests Lands } Transportation – Ministry and Natural Resources of Transportation } Health – PHAC } Transportation – Seaspan } Safety – Canadian Forces } Transportation – YVR } Safety – RCMP } Utilities – BC Hydro } Safety – Transit Police } Utilities – Fortis BC } Telecommunications – Rogers } Utilities – Spectra Energy Vancouver Board of Trade

INSURANCE INDUSTRY British Columbia Automobile Association Insurance Bureau of Canada (BCAA) Insurance Insurance Corporation Credit Union Insurance Services Association of British Columbia (ICBC) Insurance Brokers Association of BC Wawanesa Mutual Insurance

ACADEMIC/RESEARCH COMMUNITY Disaster and Emergency Management – RRU Oceans Network Canada School of Community Earth and Ocean Science – SFU and Regional Planning – UBC Engineering – UBC

ENGINEERING Association of Professional Engineers UBC – Earthquake Engineering Institute and Geoscientists of BC (APEGBC) of BC (EERI) Association of Consulting Engineering SEABC (Structural Engineers Association of BC) Companies of BC (ACEC-BC )

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VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATIONS BC Amateur Radio First Nations Emergency Services Society Emergency Social Services Advisory Forum BC Search and Rescue Association (BC SARA) (& Mobile Support Teams) EPICC (Emergency Preparedness for Industry Business Continuity Institute (BCI) and Commerce Council) EMBC Radio Room Volunteers Seismic Safety Council: } Natural Resources Canada (NR Can) } University of Victoria (UVic) } Ministry of Education } Canadian Forces } Public Safety Canada } Ministry of Transportation & Infrastructure } Simon Fraser University (SFU) } Canadian Red Cross } Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) } Ministry of Health BC Earthquake Alliance VanCity Business Continuity

STAKEHOLDER COMMUNITIES FIRST NATIONS Adams Lake Indian Band Nisga’a Nation Bridge River Indian Band Nisga’a Valley Health Authority Gitga’at First Nation Nuchatlaht Band Gitlazt’aamiks Village Govt Pauquachin Indian Band Gwa’sala-Nakwaxda’xw Indian Band Snuneymuxw First Nation K’ómoks First Nation Songhees First Nation Kwikwasut’inuxw Haxwa’mis Sts’ailes Band Mamalilikulla-Qwe’qwa’sot’em Tseshaht First Nation Namgis First Nation Band Westbank First Nation Nanoose First Nation Band Xaxli’p Indian Band

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LOCAL AUTHORITIES Bowen Island Municipality District of North Cowichan Central Coast Regional District District of North Vancouver City of Abbotsford District of Oak Bay City of Burnaby District of Port Hardy City of Chilliwack District of Saanich City of Colwood District of Sechelt City of Coquitlam District of Sooke City of Coquitlam Fire Rescue District of Squamish City of Courtenay District of Summerland City of Duncan District of Taylor City of Fort St. John District of Toﬁno City of Kamloops District of Ucluelet City of Kamloops Fire Rescue District of West Kelowna City of Kelowna District of West Vancouver City of Langford Fraser Valley Regional District City of Langley Juan de Fuca Emergency Program City of Merritt Kimberly City of Nanaimo Metro Vancouver City of New Westminster Regional District of Alberni-Clayoquot City of North Vancouver Regional District of Bulkley-Nechako City of Parksville Regional District of Central Kootenay City of Penticton Regional District of East Kootenay City of Pitt Meadows Regional District of Fraser-Fort George City of Port Alberni Regional District of Kitimat-Stikine City of Port Coquitlam Regional District of Mount Waddington City of Port Moody Regional District of Nanaimo City of Prince Rupert Regional District of North Okanagan City of Prince Rupert Fire Rescue Regional District of Okanagan-Similkameen City of Quesnel Regional District of Powell River

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LOCAL AUTHORITIES City of Richmond Resort Municipality of Whistler City of Surrey Saanich Fire Department City of Terrace Skeena-Queen Charlotte Regional District City of Terrace Fire Department Squamish-Lillooet Regional District City of Trail Strathcona Regional District City of Vancouver Sunshine Coast Regional District City of Victoria Thompson-Nicola Regional District City of White Rock Town of Comox Columbia Shuswap Regional District Town of Gibsons Comox Valley Emergency Program (CVEP) Town of Princeton Comox Valley Regional District Town of Qualicum Beach Cowichan Valley Regional District Town of Sidney District of Central Saanich Town of View Royal District of Delta Township of Esquimalt District of Elkford Village of Anmore District of Hope Village of Cumberland District of Kent Village of Gold River District of Kitimat Village of Harrison Hot Springs District of Lake Country Village of Keremeos District of Lantzville Village of Pemberton District of Maple Ridge Village of Port Alice District of Metchosin Village of Port Clements District of Mission Village of Queen Charlotte District of New Hazelton Village of Tahsis

OTHER Integrated Partnership for Regional Emergency Union of BC Municipalities (UBCM) Management (IPREM)

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Appendix F: Earthquake Consultation – Community Session Schedule

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Appendix G: Earthquake Consultation Summary – Recommendations and Key Actions

RECOMMENDATIONS and KEY ACTIONS:

RECOMMENDATION #1: Leadership, Authority and Responsibility The provincial government must provide EMBC with additional resources and the authority required to effectively deliver emergency management leadership to provincial crown agencies and local authorities. Further, EMBC must be positioned within government in such a fashion that its authority is greatly enhanced. KEY ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF RECOMMENDATION #1: 1.1 The provincial government must augment EMBC’s authority to require action of other provincial crown agencies in the realm of emergency management. 1.1.1 The provincial government must support EMBC in the establishment of preparedness requirements for other ministries and crown agencies, and establish mechanisms to track and enforce these requirements. 1.1.2 The provincial government must also address EMBC’s ability to “task” or require action of other ministries and crown agencies during an emergency response. 1.1.3 The provincial government must position EMBC within government in such a fashion that its authority is greatly enhanced. For example, EMBC could be moved to report directly to the Office of the Premier. 1.2 The provincial government must augment EMBC’s authority, staffing and budget to set minimum standards for local authority emergency management programs. 1.3 The provincial government must provide additional resources to EMBC in order for it to meet its earthquake preparedness mandate. 1.4 The provincial government must provide for EMBC’s emergency operations centres in seismically active areas to be housed in post-disaster facilities. 1.5 The federal government must provide additional regional resources to Public Safety Canada, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, and other applicable agencies, in order for them to meet their emergency management mandates to support emergency management in B.C.

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RECOMMENDATION #2: Funding and Accountability The provincial and federal governments must implement a funding program to support local authority preparedness efforts, and leverage emergency management funding to: } Increase emphasis on planning and mitigation; and, } Increase local authority accountability. KEY ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF RECOMMENDATION #2: 2.1 The provincial and federal governments must implement a funding program to support emergency management preparedness efforts at the local authority level. 2.2 The federal government must increase emergency management funding and personnel available to support First Nations emergency management. 2.3 The provincial government must link new and existing local government emergency management funding to accountabilities such as planning and mitigation efforts. 2.4 The provincial government must formally assess mechanisms for local authorities to share in the costs for emergency responses, while ensuring that no community bears an undue burden.

RECOMMENDATION #3: Intergovernmental and Inter-Agency Coordination Federal, provincial, and local authorities, as well as other entities such as those in the private sector, must ensure that they have the integrated plans and capacities in place to deal with a catastrophic event. KEY ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF RECOMMENDATION #3: 3.1 EMBC, in concert with stakeholders, must complete provincewide catastrophic response and recovery plans. This work is already underway. 3.2 All provincial crown agencies must develop and exercise catastrophic event plans that link to provincial-level plans. 3.3 All provincial crown agencies must complete and exercise realistic business continuity plans. 3.4 The provincial government must implement mechanisms, such as Provincial Coordination Teams, to support all authorities during emergency events. 3.5 EMBC and other provincial government partners must be provided with additional funding and staﬀ to complete work required to operationalize and exercise out of province assistance agreements and associated procedures. 3.6 EMBC and partners must complete the work required to clarify procedures with respect to provincially directed mutual aid between local authorities, and allocation of out-of- province aid to local authorities during a catastrophic event.

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RECOMMENDATION #3: Intergovernmental and Inter-Agency Coordination 3.7 The provincial government must mandate that all local authorities participate in regional planning, training and exercises. 3.8 The provincial government must support regional planning efforts directly through funding to local authorities, and indirectly through creation of additional EMBC positions to guide and support this work. 3.9 The federal government must ensure that First Nations communities on reserves have adequate resources to effectively participate in regional planning efforts

RECOMMENDATION #4: Public Education, Awareness and Engagement EMBC together with significant agencies at all levels of government and private sector partners must launch a long-term and coordinated earthquake preparedness public education and awareness campaign. New funding and staff will be required. KEY ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF RECOMMENDATION #4: 4.1 All partners, with EMBC leadership, must establish a mechanism to jointly develop and deliver long-term and coordinated earthquake preparedness public education. 4.2 All partners must contribute to developing and implementing resources in support of curriculum in this area for kindergarten to grade 12. 4.3 All levels of government and involved partners outside of government must devote additional resources to support coordinated earthquake preparedness public education. 4.4 Senior elected officials at all levels must demonstrate visible and vocal support for a culture of preparedness. Inclusion of earthquake preparedness initiatives in a Speech from the Throne, for example, would be an excellent example of such support.

RECOMMENDATION #5: Private Sector and Non-Government Organizations The Province must prepare and resource a strategy for further engagement of the private sector in emergency management planning, including mandated requirements for private sector entities. KEY ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF RECOMMENDATION #5: 5.1 The provincial government must augment EMBC’s resources for Critical Infrastructure (CI) coordination and expand the Provincial CI Steering Committee’s coverage to include all ten federally designated (recognized) CI sectors. 5.2 EMBC must conduct focused discussions with CI partners to determine mechanisms for enhanced coordination (e.g. addressing conﬁdentiality barriers to information sharing). 5.3 The provincial government must provide guidance and templates for the preparation of emergency and business continuity plans for crown agencies and critical private sector services.

61 B.C. EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS: CONSULTATION REPORT

RECOMMENDATION #5: Private Sector and Non-Government Organizations 5.4 As a backstop to voluntary engagement, the provincial and federal governments must mandate appropriate private sector preparedness, including sharing of CI information and engagement in joint planning with emergency management organizations. 5.5 EMBC must clarify and communicate its powers to direct actions by CI asset owners (e.g. restoration priorities) during and following a catastrophic event, and clarify provincial expectations of CI asset owners. 5.6 Existing and future contracts executed by the Province with private sector vendors must reference services, materials and equipment that may be needed and used during response and recovery activities. 5.7 The provincial government and the federal government must engage with the insurance industry to determine how this industry can contribute further to disaster resilience and to identify how the governments can enable insurers to expand their participation without jeopardizing their continued existence.

RECOMMENDATION #6: Training and Exercising The provincial government must resource EMBC with additional staﬀ and funding to develop and implement comprehensive training and exercise strategies with partners. KEY ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF RECOMMENDATION #6: 6.1 The provincial government must work with partners to develop an emergency management training strategy that improves access, increases integration between delivery organizations, and includes consistent training guidelines. Federal participation and funding will be required to ensure adequate training opportunities for all regional federal staﬀ in B.C., as well as First Nations communities. 6.2 The provincial government, with partners, must develop and implement a robust, provincial exercise strategy that includes full-scale exercises. Additional provincial resources (funding and people) will be required. Federal funding and people will be required to ensure adequate participation by national and regional federal assets, in addition to First Nations.

62 B.C. EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS: CONSULTATION REPORT

RECOMMENDATION #7: Provincewide Risk Analysis In the long-term, EMBC and its partners must develop a strategy for enhanced hazard risk and vulnerability analysis, and increasing the availability of emergency management risk data for use by local authorities, the private sector, First Nations and the public. KEY ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF RECOMMENDATION #7: 7.1 All partners must assess opportunities to develop, consolidate and share sources of risk data. Such work could include development and sharing of additional tsunami inundation modelling, inventories of public essential services facilities, building stock inventories, mapping of hazardous materials locations, etc. 7.2 Governments must provide additional funding to support the enhanced use of geospatial data within emergency management information systems, and assessment of unique issues such as vulnerable populations, hazardous materials, or animals. Often, these unique risks and vulnerabilities can be overlooked or inadequately considered in emergency plans due to lack of data, complexity, conﬁdentiality concerns, etc. 7.3 The Province must fund a small, dedicated EMBC team to lead HRVA eﬀorts at the provincial level and assist local authorities with local HRVA needs.

RECOMMENDATION #8: Emergency Management Capability Priorities Federal, provincial, and local governments must invest in emergency management capability enhancements in such areas as alerting, logistics, urban search and rescue, rapid damage assessment, and 911. KEY ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF RECOMMENDATION #8:

8.1 EMBC and other partners must select and implement improved emergency alerting mechanisms for British Columbians including both new technologies and operational practices. 8.2 The provincial government and other partners must establish and resource a framework and capacity for post-disaster logistics. At the provincial government level, such a framework will need to include ministries and agencies well beyond EMBC alone.

8.3 The provincial government and other partners must establish and resource a framework and capacity for urban search and rescue, with particular emphasis on light and medium urban search and rescue capacity. 8.4 The provincial government and other partners must establish and resource a framework and capacity for rapid damage assessment, including use of appropriate technology.

8.5 The provincial government, local authorities, and key partners must assess opportunities to enhance the resiliency and capacity of the 911 system, and establish situational awareness linkages between the 911 system and emergency management structures.

63 B.C. EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS: CONSULTATION REPORT

Appendix H: Emergency Management Structures British Columbia Emergency Response Management System (BCERMS)

The BCERMS is the system the provincial government, crown agencies, and local authorities use to coordinate emergency management. BCERMS has four operational levels: Site; Site Support; Provincial Regional Coordination and Provincial Central Coordination.

PREMIER AND CABINET

PROVINCIAL MINISTERS-DEPUTIES CENTRAL EMERGENCY COMMITTEE COORDINATION (HAZARD BASED)

CENTRAL COORDINATION FEDERAL GOVERNMENT GROUP (CCG) PROVINCIAL EOC/LIAISON MINISTRIES/AGENCIES PROVINCIAL EMERGENCY COORDINATION CENTRE

PROVINCIAL PROVINCIAL REGIONAL REGIONAL EMERGENCY COORDINATION OPERATIONS CENTRE (S)

LOCAL AUTHORITY / SITE PRIVATE SECTOR SUPPORT EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTRES (EOCS)

SITE SITE

64 B.C. EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS: CONSULTATION REPORT

SITE LEVEL

First responding emergency personnel and resources from nearby agencies and jurisdictions represent the response level for most incidents. As such, the majority of incidents occurring within the province are resolved at this level.

SITE SUPPORT LEVEL

When the site level response requires oﬀ-site support, an Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) may be activated. The EOC: } provides communication with the site level; } provides policy guidance to site; } manages multi-agency support to the site level; and } acquires and deploys local and external resources required by site.

PROVINCIAL REGIONAL COORDINATION

When the site support level (EOC) requires oﬀsite support, the Provincial Regional Coordination level: } activates one or more Provincial Regional Emergency Operations Centres (PREOCs); } acquires and deploys resources at the request of the site support level; } maintains situational awareness; } provides emergency response services if required; and } coordinates with ministry regional centres when they are established.

PROVINCIAL CENTRAL COORDINATION LEVEL

The Provincial Central Coordination level activates in support of Provincial Regional Coordination. This level is comprised of the Provincial Emergency Coordination Centre (PECC), Central Coordination Group (CCG) and Ministers-Deputies Emergency Committee (M-DEC).

65 B.C. EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS: CONSULTATION REPORT

Provincial Emergency Coordination Centre (PECC) The PECC is an operations centre which: } manages the overall provincial government support for the regional level; } obtains authority of the Minister of Justice for a declaration of a provincial emergency; } manages provincial emergency public information activities; } manages the acquisition and deployment of provincial, federal, inter-provincial and international resources; and } provides coordination and other support services as required.

Central Coordination Group (CCG) The CCG is a temporary cross-government committee which: } provides strategic and policy guidance to the Director of the PECC; } evaluates the emergency situation (or potential emergency) and assesses provincial involvement; } briefs senior government oﬃcials and seeks their direction when appropriate; } oversees the provincial emergency public information strategy; } validates the need for a declaration of a provincial state of emergency and any extensions; and } authorizes the deactivation of the provincial emergency response structure.

The make-up of the CCG is determined by the nature of the emergency. Core ministries and agencies consistently represented on the CCG include: } EMBC (Ministry of Justice) } Ministry of Environment } Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations } Ministry of Health } Ministry of Transportation and Infrastructure } Government Communications and Public Engagement } RCMP “E” Division (Provincial Police)

The chair and co-chair are responsible for communication between the M-DEC and the CCG.

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Ministers-Deputies Emergency Committee (M-DEC) The M-DEC convenes when a disaster or emergency event could result or has resulted in: } a significant impact to life safety, health or economic well-being of the province; } a requirement for coordinated cross-government direction; } significant public or media attention; } a challenge to the public confidence in government; and } the need for national and international support.

The M-DEC: } provides high-level policy decisions and direction on behalf of the Province; } ensures the full support of B.C. ministries, crown corporations and agencies; } ensures suﬃcient provincial resources are committed in support of government response; } participates in preparing for developing or imminent emergency events; } oversees event-speciﬁc provincial communications; and } makes formal requests for inter-provincial, federal or international support.

The structure and composition of the M-DEC reﬂects the nature of the emergency event. Core ministries and agencies consistently represented on the committee include: } EMBC (Ministry of Justice) } Ministry of Environment } Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations } Ministry of Health } Ministry of Transportation and Infrastructure } Government Communications and Public Engagement

Role of the Deputy Minister of Justice The Deputy Minister of Justice: } chairs M-DEC when required; } provides brieﬁngs to the Attorney General and Minister of Justice; } communicates provincial policy direction.

A Report on Matters Related to Emergency 9-1-1 Services

Prepared for the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission By Commissioner Timothy Denton Inquiry Officer

July 5, 2013

Table of Contents I INTRODUCTION ...... 3 A. Background ...... 3 B. Purpose of the inquiry and report ...... 3 C. Methodology ...... 3 D. Organization of the balance of the report...... 3 II INITIAL THOUGHTS ...... 4 A. Importance, context, and jurisdictions ...... 4 B. Relationship of 9-1-1 to emergency response and public security ...... 5 C. Institutions and governance ...... 5 D. NG 9-1-1 ...... 7 III BACKGROUND ...... 8 A. Origins ...... 8 B. How does 9-1-1 work? ...... 9 C. Reverse 9-1-1 ...... 12 D. Coverage of the 9-1-1 emergency calling system in Canada ...... 12 E. Current funding model...... 13 F. Current governance model in Canada ...... 14 G. Current governance model in the United States ...... 18 H. Europe ...... 21 I. Technology and coordinating bodies ...... 23 IV KEY ISSUES RAISED BY PARTICIPANTS ABOUT THE CURRENT 9-1-1 SYSTEM ...... 24 A. Issues for Canadians ...... 24 B. Issues for PSAPs ...... 25 C. Issues for incumbent telephone companies...... 30 V NEXT-GENERATION 9-1-1 ...... 32 A. The public switched telephone network is in transition ...... 32 B. Vision...... 33 C. Transition to NG 9-1-1 ...... 34 D. Operations ...... 35 E. Data collection ...... 36 F. Questions raised by participants about NG 9-1-1 ...... 36 VI FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS...... 37 A. Findings ...... 37 B. Recommendations ...... 52 C. Conclusion ...... 59 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... 62 APPENDICES ...... 64 Interviews for the 9-1-1 inquiry conducted by the Inquiry Officer...... 65 9-1-1 coverage map ...... 75 9-1-1 governance in Canada...... 76 Governance/coordination charts ...... 78 List of acronyms ...... 79 9-1-1 Team ...... 80

I INTRODUCTION

A. Background 1. On 17 December 2012, the Commission issued Telecom Notice of Consultation 2012-686,1 announcing my appointment as Inquiry Officer to conduct a review of matters related to emergency 9-1-1 services.

B. Purpose of the inquiry and report 2. As described in the Notice of Consultation, the purpose of the review was to focus on three broad areas: a. The performance and adequacy of the technology currently employed by 9-1-1 services, such as that used to locate a caller using a cellphone; b. The issues related to the provision of 9-1-1 services on next-generation networks, including how systems should be designed and the appropriate institutional arrangements; and c. Policy considerations on 9-1-1 matters. 3. The purpose of this report is to convey the results of the inquiry that I carried out on behalf of the Commission.

C. Methodology 4. This inquiry began with one-on-one and small group meetings with key stakeholders here in Canada, as well as with regulatory and industry experts in the United States and Europe. A listing of interviews that I conducted is included in Appendix 1. 5. In addition, I requested public comment on a number of questions that had been included in the Notice of Consultation. In response, on 1 March 2012, comments were received from various individuals, groups, telecommunications service providers, and government organizations with reply comments being received on 15 March 2012. The full record of these responses can be found on the CRTC’s Interventions web page. 6. The information that was obtained through my meetings with stakeholders and experts, as well as the comments that were received in response to the Notice of Consultation, were then reviewed, analyzed and summarized for this report in order to form the basis for the recommendations found further in this document.

D. Organization of the balance of the report 7. The balance of this report is divided into five sections. In Section II, I summarize some of my initial thoughts. Section III provides general background information on 9-1-1, both here

1 Appointment of an Inquiry Officer to review matters related to 9-1-1, Telecom Notice of Consultation CRTC 2012-686, 17 December 2012 3

in Canada and in other jurisdictions. Section IV is a discussion of the current state of our 9-1-1 system, and contains descriptions of a number of issues raised during the course of the inquiry. Section V addresses expectations surrounding the implementation of a next- generation 9-1-1 system (NG 9-1-1). Finally, Section VI contains my findings and recommendations for the Commission’s consideration.

II INITIAL THOUGHTS 8. Based on the comments that I received during the course of my inquiry, there are a number of shortcomings with the current 9-1-1 system that should be addressed: There is a wide gap between Canadians’ expectations and the reality of the 9-1-1 system, or put another way, there is no 9-1-1 brand with consistent features throughout Canada. Data collection about the 9-1-1 system can be significantly improved. The governance structure for 9-1-1 in Canada is fragmented and inconsistent. The funding of the 9-1-1 system in Canada is uneven, likely mismatched with respect to costs, and inadequately measured. Wireless and voice over Internet protocol (VoIP) caller location accuracy remains a serious unresolved issue. NG 9-1-1 is not the solution to all of our problems. 9. I will address these issues in more detail further on in my report, but I note that not all of them can, or should, be addressed by the Commission itself. 10. However, first, I would like to offer some initial thoughts.

A. Importance, context, and jurisdictions 11. 9-1-1 has become one of the most important ways the citizen calls upon government services, and arguably the most vital. The decision to summon help engages a series of actors, all of whom are in the service of the public: first responders; carriers; and public safety answering points (PSAPs), which dispatch first responders to the scene. 12. When we talk about 9-1-1, our discussion can in general terms include Reverse 9-1-1: a public alerting system that allows public safety organizations to deliver recorded emergency notifications to people in defined geographic areas. In addition, nearly every comment about the 9-1-1 system’s deficiencies can with equal justice be applied to search and rescue, which is outside the scope of this paper, but whose problems became evident in the interviews conducted for my report. 13. From the point of view of the user, 9-1-1 service is one thing, not several. The person calling for help has no interest or concern that one part of the service is under federal jurisdiction and the other is under his or her province’s or territory’s jurisdiction. He or she cares only about help arriving in a timely fashion. 14. Accordingly, governments themselves need to consider 9-1-1 from the citizen’s point of view first; namely, that it is one thing, not several, and that the whole needs to work

seamlessly. The organization of 9-1-1 and policy development in regard to 9-1-1 should follow from this fundamental reality. 15. Regulating the communications portion of 9-1-1 is within the Commission’s jurisdiction. Other aspects of public security and emergency response are within the federal government’s powers, while some are exclusively provincial/territorial. Certain provinces and territories have taken a hands-off approach and allowed responsibility for 9-1-1 to reside with municipalities. My report is not confined to the boundaries of the Commission’s telecommunications jurisdiction for this reason, because to focus exclusively on that aspect, important though it is, would be to miss the other parts of the elephant in the room. 16. In that sense, 9-1-1 is like a brand, but unlike a commercial brand, the actual product – police, fire and ambulance assistance when you need it – is delivered different ways in different provinces/territories, and at different service levels. Sometimes, it is not available at all. This reflects the differing approaches adopted by the provinces and territories, and the fact that first responders must be based locally. But, though 9-1-1 has evolved by scales appropriate to driving distances, the common identifier (9-1-1), and the possibilities of modern computer communications, work in the other direction, from the brand outward. The 9-1-1 brand cuts across jurisdictions and, therefore, solutions to problems with 9-1-1 service delivery must do the same.

B. Relationship of 9-1-1 to emergency response and public security 17. During the course of my inquiry, it also became apparent that 9-1-1 is included in a broader set of concerns along with emergency response and public security. 18. Emergency response is usually seen as the government responding to natural and broad- scale civil emergencies, whereas 9-1-1 connotes agencies of government responding to personal emergencies. Yet personal and public emergencies can blend into one another, and sometimes the distinction between public emergencies and 9-1-1 rests on the number of vehicles dispatched to a given area. 19. 9-1-1 and its responders fit into a broader context of emergency response and public security. This being so, there are reasonable grounds for the departments and agencies that concern themselves with 9-1-1 to be in contact with each other and to coordinate with other agencies concerned with public safety, as and where appropriate. My inquiry found that there was a lack of coordination of 9-1-1 with emergency preparedness and public security because the institutions and relationships that would allow it are not yet in place. I have also observed that there is no forum whereby the Commission can meet with provincial/territorial 9-1-1 and emergency management officials on 9-1-1 policy as opposed to technical standards. Nor has the Commission dedicated a single individual to 9-1-1.

C. Institutions and governance 20. The following table gives a high-level summary of the government institutions involved in providing public security and emergency response services to Canadians. Table 1: Government institutions

Institution Responsibilities

Federal government

- CRTC Regulates the telecommunications carriers that provide the necessary network infrastructure to direct and connect 9-1-1 calls to the PSAPs.

- Industry Canada Makes radio spectrum available for first responders.

- Public Safety Canada Coordinates across federal departments and agencies responsible for national security and the safety of Canadians. Also works with other levels of government, first responders, community groups, the private sector and other nations.

- Royal Canadian Mounted Provide first responder services (police). Police

Provincial/territorial In some cases, collect and distribute funding for PSAPs, as governments well as play an oversight and coordination role in establishing province-wide/territory-wide PSAP standards and policies. Provide first responder services (fire, ambulance and police).

Municipal governments Responsible for establishing and managing PSAPs. Provide first responder services (fire, ambulance and police).

21. Improved governance is the key to getting better results. Only when the appropriate institutional relationships are established can we start to solve some of the technical and performance issues in 9-1-1 service delivery, and in related areas. These issues cannot be solved unless we notice them. They will not be noticed until we measure them, and they will not be measured until we have decisions about who measures what, and which institutions carry out these measurements. 22. A comprehensive view of the 9-1-1 system is missing. It is something that has grown organically from a series of decisions over time. Now, through this report, the 9-1-1 complex of institutions is undergoing its first general review. The paper submissions I received and the oral interviews I conducted have led me to the conclusion that the 9-1-1 system is working because of the good faith of its participants, but not because we have the appropriate institutions of governance. 23. Accountability to whom, and for what, is unclear. Provinces/territories and the Commission authorize money to be collected for 9-1-1 purposes from various sources, but the efficiency with which it reaches its targets is unknown. By all accounts, and to my observation, carriers diligently carry out their duties, but no one is measuring the details. The

Commission sets national policies in relation to 9-1-1 telecommunications requirements and functionality, and receives consensus technical advice from its Emergency Services Working Group (ESWG) of the CRTC Interconnection Steering Committee (CISC). However, there exists no pan-Canadian body gathering all the players, including the PSAPs; police, fire and ambulance services; and relevant provincial/territorial and federal authorities, that works out issues of policy regarding 9-1-1. In the absence of a multi- stakeholder forum at which cross-agency multi-jurisdictional issues can be discussed, technical advice substitutes for policy discussion. 24. Given that there is an oncoming tsunami of technical change, as we migrate to all-Internet protocol (IP) communications systems, these somewhat haphazard arrangements will be extremely stressed. The change in communications technologies is completely foreseeable; it is happening now. Unfortunately, there does not exist a policy forum adequate to the task of coordinating and anticipating the changes that are coming. 25. The main thrust of this report is to the effect that institutions concerned with 9-1-1 need to be developed and, where they exist, improved. Institutional improvements need to be made in at least two areas: the establishment of a national policy forum for 9-1-1, and increased focus by the Commission on matters related to 9-1-1. It is the only place in telecommunications regulation where lives are at stake. The current arrangements are inadequate and we can do better.

D. NG 9-1-1 26. Finally, a word about NG 9-1-1. The transition plan and end state of NG 9-1-1 has yet to be completely specified, and it cannot be specified under existing institutional arrangements. We are evolving towards a world where everything travels on IP. In this world, assumptions of the former technological regime will be in question. Indeed, there may not be telephone or cable companies as we have come to understand them, or they may share space with a myriad of other organizations that communicate through new addressing schemes, without the use of telephone numbers or even IP addresses. Thus, if current governance arrangements for 9-1-1 are inadequate under the existing telephone numbering regime, they are even more inadequate under the assumptions of IP everywhere. Decisions will need to be made about who does what, and they are not primarily engineering issues. The companies which are assumed to be the backbone of the current system will not be using the same technologies, and new ways of integrating databases, locating people and reaching help will prevail. The worst assumption we could make in moving to NG 9-1-1 is that things will continue as they are. Yet, in order to get there, a process of modernization has to take place, for which appropriate institutions need to be devised or improved. In the word of Henning Schulzrinne, Chief Technology Officer of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), “the really difficult problems are organizational,”2 not technological.

2 In interview at the FCC on November 29th, 2012. 7

III BACKGROUND 27. The availability of a reliable and consistent response to emergency calls has become a common expectation in modern societies. Given that callers could be in a situation where life or property is at risk, a key attribute of any emergency service response system is that calls are never abandoned and the callers can be located. Meeting this basic requirement presents a serious challenge from a logistical, organizational and technical perspective. 28. People typically call for help using special numbers, usually a three-digit code, designated within a country’s public telephone system numbering plan that can be easily remembered and quickly dialled. 29. Emergency numbers can vary between countries, and some countries have different emergency numbers for each type of emergency service. In North America, 9-1-1 is the adopted standard that became widespread in the 1980s. In the European Union, Russia, Switzerland, Ukraine and others, 1-1-2 was introduced as a common emergency call number during the 1990s. Parts of Asia, such as China and Japan, use 1-1-9.

A. Origins 30. Early systems for emergency call numbers in Europe date back to as early as 1913. Currently, many members of the European Union use 1-1-2 as a common emergency call number. Some members use country-specific emergency call numbers in addition to 1-1-2.3 31. In North America, the first city to introduce a three-digit emergency number to access police, fire and ambulance services was Winnipeg, Manitoba, in 1959. The number used at the time was 9-9-9, the same number that had been in use in the United Kingdom for many years. 32. The 9-1-1 emergency call number was used for the first time in the United States in 1968. In 1973, the United States adopted a national policy to encourage the nationwide use of 9-1-1 as an emergency call number. Canada adopted 9-1-1 as its common emergency call number in 1972, but this number was not used until 1974, when it was activated in London, Ontario. Since 1974, the use of 9-1-1 has spread across Canada, and 9-1-1 is currently available to the majority of the Canadian population. It is estimated that 98% of the population of Canada currently has access to 9-1-1 service.4 33. As time has passed, public notification has become important, and Reverse 9-1-1 is a topic that should be included in any discussion related to public safety. Reverse 9-1-1 is used by public safety organizations to notify residents in certain geographic regions of emergency situations. For example, police in Watertown, Massachusetts, used Reverse 9-1-1 and asked residents to remain indoors while they conducted a search for one of the suspects involved in the Boston Marathon bombing.5

3 For example, Great Britain uses 9-9-9, in addition to 1-1-2. 4 See Appendix 2 for a map depicting where 9-1-1 is available in Canada. 5 The Independent news website 8

B. How does 9-1-1 work? 34. When a Canadian dials 9-1-1, the call is routed through the telephone company’s network to a PSAP. In Canada, PSAPs are operated by municipal or provincial/territorial governments and, in most cases, are managed by the local police force. When a 9-1-1 call arrives at a PSAP, the PSAP operator is responsible for assessing the call and dispatching the appropriate emergency response resources. 35. When 9-1-1 was first rolled out, it was on the basis of arrangements that are now referred to as Basic 9-1-1. If a Canadian dialed 9-1-1, the local telephone company’s central office switch would translate 9-1-1 to a regular telephone number assigned to the PSAP serving the area where the Canadian lived. This approach allowed 9-1-1 to be implemented with minimal modifications to the telephone company’s network, and 9-1-1 calls were essentially handled as normal telephone calls. 36. However, there were limitations. For a PSAP operator, calls were nothing more than ordinary incoming telephone calls. PSAP operators were not provided with a callback telephone number for the caller in case, for whatever reason, a call was disconnected. Furthermore, the caller had to verbally provide their location. In situations where a caller was unable to provide their location or a call was disconnected before the caller could provide their location, the PSAP operator had no idea where to send help. 37. In addition, the telephone company’s network layout did not necessarily line up with the areas for which PSAPs were responsible. For instance, a single PSAP could be responsible for serving a large geographic area, but the telephone company required multiple central office switches to provide service in the same area. The opposite was also possible; an area to which the telephone company could provide service from a single central office could be covered by multiple PSAPs. 38. To overcome these limitations, a number of modifications were made so that 9-1-1 calls would be forwarded to the specific PSAP responsible for a given area, and so that a caller’s name, telephone number and location information would automatically be provided to the PSAP operator. The result of these modifications was an arrangement that is referred to as Enhanced 9-1-1, or E9-1-1. Furthermore, there is now a movement towards a next generation of 9-1-1 services that will give additional capabilities.

Table 2: Comparison of Basic, Enhanced and NG 9-1-1

Basic Phone call is directed to a local PSAP by a carrier

Enhanced Incoming call is directed to the correct PSAP and transmits to the responder the caller’s name; callback telephone number; street address in the case of wireline phones; and

latitude and longitude in the case of cellphones.

NG Capacities as yet undefined, but likely means multimedia capacity; and delivered by an IP device, not necessarily a telephone.

Figure 1: 9-1-1 is a brand with different outcomes across the country

39. An Automatic Location Identification, or ALI, database was installed by the telephone company in its network. Equipment at the PSAP was then connected to the telephone company’s ALI database using data circuits. In addition, the telephone company added what is called selective routing functionality to its 9-1-1 network. 40. The purpose of the ALI database was to correlate existing telephone numbers with individual Canadians’ names and addresses. Information for new customers would be added to the ALI when they subscribed to a new telephone service. Customer information is updated every time a customer changes telecommunications service providers or moves within the same exchange, all while keeping the same telephone number. 41. Selective routing overcomes the problem of the variance between the telephone company’s network and the PSAP response areas. The telephone company upgraded certain switches to create 9-1-1 tandem switches, and installed a Selective Routing Database (SRDB). The purpose of the SRDB was to map telephone numbers to street addresses, and then link street addresses to the particular PSAP that covered the area. The network was then re-configured so that 9-1-1 calls originating from multiple central office switches would be aggregated at the 9-1-1 tandem. The 9-1-1 tandem could also route calls to multiple PSAPs.

42. With these changes, a 9-1-1 call was routed to the 9-1-1 tandem switch, along with the originating telephone number. Using the originating telephone number, the 9-1-1 tandem first queried the SRDB to determine the appropriate PSAP for the caller’s location, and then routed the call to that PSAP. At the same time, the 9-1-1 tandem queried the ALI, and the ALI automatically “pushed” the caller's name, telephone number and location information over the data circuits connecting the ALI to the PSAP’s equipment. 43. With the introduction of local competition in 1997, arrangements were put in place that allowed competitors to connect to the incumbent telephone companies’ E9-1-1 network platforms.6 The Commission required that emergency calls from a competitor’s customers be dealt with exactly the same way as calls from the customers of the incumbent telephone company. 44. Telephone calls from wireless telephones posed a new and ongoing set of challenges for the 9-1-1 emergency calling system. Cellular telephone service was first introduced in Canada in the mid-1980s. Initially, the level of access to 9-1-1 service that wireless companies provided to their customers was equivalent to Basic 9-1-1. A customer would make a 9-1-1 call, the wireless company would transfer it to the local telephone company’s central office switch serving the area where the call originated, and it, in turn, would connect the call to the PSAP serving that area. A callback telephone number was not provided and the caller had to verbally provide their location. 45. As the number of Canadians using wireless telephones increased, it became clear that improvements were required to the way emergency calls were dealt with. The ability to carry your telephone and place calls from nearly anywhere in Canada posed a major challenge for the 9-1-1 emergency calling system. 46. To address this issue and to provide a level of service to Canadian wireless customers comparable to what was available to wireline customers, significant changes to the 9-1-1 emergency calling system were required. The Commission mandated wireless telephone companies to adopt Wireless E9-1-1.7 Wireless E9-1-1 was implemented in two phases: Phase I – Wireless companies were to provide PSAPs with a callback number, the location of the cell site where a 9-1-1 call originated, and the sector of that cell site receiving that call. Phase II – Wireless companies were to provide PSAPs with the location of a caller based on longitude and latitude coordinates for all wireless 9-1-1 calls. 47. Notwithstanding the implementation of Wireless E9-1-1, the location of the wireless customer provided to the PSAP can still be far from precise, and determining the accurate location of a wireless customer remains a significant issue. 48. Voice communications over the Internet present an even greater challenge for 9-1-1. With nomadic VoIP service, Canadians can typically obtain telephone numbers from different cities (for example a Canadian in Gatineau could have a Miami telephone number), and

6 See Telecom Decision 97-8. 7 See Telecom Decision 2005-53 and Telecom Regulatory Policy 2009-40. 11

they can make telephone calls (including 9-1-1 calls) from anywhere they have access to a high-speed Internet connection. 49. From a technical perspective, under the current system it is not possible, at this time, to reliably identify a caller's location when the call is made using VoIP technologies. Consequently, service providers cannot determine the appropriate PSAP to which a given call should be routed. In addition, existing 9-1-1 systems cannot handle out-of-territory telephone numbers. In order to ensure that Canadians using these services can at least contact a PSAP, an interim arrangement was put in place that effectively provides a level of service equivalent to Basic 9-1-1. 50. VoIP service providers connect 9-1-1 calls to a third-party operator, who verbally confirms the caller’s location. The operator then determines the appropriate PSAP and transfers the call.

C. Reverse 9-1-1 51. Reverse 9-1-1 is provided through a service named Enhanced Community Notification Service (eCNS). 52. In 20078 the Commission determined that it was in the public interest to allow the incumbent telephone companies to provide enhanced information for a telephone-based community notification service, subject to certain limitations and safeguards. The result was that eCNS would be made available by the incumbent telephone companies to give government authorities responsible for emergency services access to the telephone service subscriber information in the ALI database. 53. The limitations and safeguards that were put in place included: a. The role of authorized administrator for eCNS was limited to PSAPs operated by municipalities or other public authorities responsible for the provision of emergency services; b. An emergency for eCNS was defined as an imminent or unfolding danger that threatens the life, health or security of an individual; c. The information provided by the incumbent was only to be used in response to the specific eCNS alert that required the use or disclosure of that information; and d. The information provided by the incumbent was to be deleted or destroyed once the notification related to a specific emergency had been completed. 54. In a next-generation environment, Reverse 9-1-1 could assist PSAPs to better manage emergency scenes. It is also an important link for public safety in general.

D. Coverage of the 9-1-1 emergency calling system in Canada 55. As stated above, it is estimated that 98% of the population of Canada has access to 9-1-1 service. PSAPs that support E9-1-1 services serve about 95% of the population, while the rest only support Basic 9-1-1 service. Where 9-1-1 service is not available, Canadians in

8 See Telecom Decision 2007-13. 12

those areas dial a regular telephone number to reach emergency responders. The areas still without 9-1-1 service include some rural, remote and sparsely populated parts of the country.

E. Current funding model 56. Funding for the current 9-1-1 emergency calling system comes from several sources: Canadians; service providers; and government coffers. 57. The costs and funding of the current system is not, so far as I can tell, tracked in a systematic way at a national level, nor is the information about funding and costs made available to the public and decision-makers in an organized fashion. 58. Three sets of agents are involved: a. Retail telecommunications service providers put the necessary arrangements in place to provide individual Canadians with access to 9-1-1 services; b. Organizations or agencies are responsible for PSAP operations; and c. In between are the incumbent telephone companies that operate and maintain the network that connects 9-1-1 calls to the PSAPs. Incumbent telephone companies 59. The incumbent telephone companies collect a Commission-approved monthly fee from their own retail wireline customers for the provision of access to 9-1-1 service. This monthly fee has been set based on each company’s costs incurred to provide access to 9-1-1 service, and is reviewed on an annual basis.9 The Commission does not regulate the rates of wireless service providers, including the wireless arms of the incumbent telephone companies, and consequently has not required the incumbents to charge their wireless customers for 9-1-1 service, despite the fact that about 70% of 9-1-1 calls are made from wireless devices. 60. In addition to collecting fees from their own retail wireline customers, the incumbent telephone companies are entitled to collect a Commission-approved wholesale fee from other wireline and wireless providers that operate in the incumbents’ territories. These other telecommunications service providers deliver their customers’ 9-1-1 calls to the PSAPs via the incumbent telephone companies’ networks, and the wholesale fee compensates the incumbent telephone companies for that use of their networks. Other retail telecommunications service providers 61. Other telecommunications service providers may or may not choose to charge an explicit fee to their customers for 9-1-1 service. The Commission does not regulate the rates of these providers. If they choose to charge an explicit fee, Commission approval is not required. If an explicit fee is not charged, it is safe to assume that the other telecommunications service providers recover their 9-1-1 costs through general pricing for their services.

9 See Telecom Order 2000-630. 13

PSAPs 62. PSAP costs are primarily funded by provincial/territorial and/or municipal governments. However, local government authorities can enter into agreements with telecommunications service providers in their locality to collect a 9-1-1 levy to local telephone subscribers, provided that there is valid provincial/territorial or municipal law authorizing such a levy. The Commission requires wireline telecommunications service providers to act as billing agents to assist the local government authorities. While not required by the Commission, any provincial/territorial legislation that imposes a 9-1-1 levy on wireless customers to fund PSAPs will require that billing and collection arrangements be put in place between the wireless provider and the provincial/territorial government. 63. The following table provides a summary of the current levies:10

Table 3: Government 9-1-1 levies to fund PSAPs Government levy Province (per line) Alberta $0.44 (see note)

British Columbia $0.44 to $0.75 (see note)

Quebec $0.40

Saskatchewan $0.62

Prince Edward Island $0.70

New Brunswick $0.53

Nova Scotia $0.43

Note: This service is optional and is only collected at the specific request of a local government authority. Not all local government authorities in the province participate in the call answer levy. In Alberta, 350 municipalities participate in the call answer levy, while in British Columbia, 13 municipalities participate.

F. Current governance model in Canada 64. 9-1-1 service requires the collaboration of a number of stakeholders, including various levels of government, 9-1-1 advisory boards and associations, and 9-1-1 standards-making bodies.11

10 From comments prepared by TELUS Communications Company 14

Figure 2: The Public Safety Elephant

CRTC 65. The Commission is an independent administrative tribunal that regulates and supervises the Canadian broadcasting and telecommunications systems. Its mandate is to ensure that both the broadcasting and telecommunications systems serve the Canadian public. 66. The Commission, under the Telecommunications Act, regulates the telecommunications carriers that provide the necessary network infrastructure to direct and connect 9-1-1 calls to PSAPs. 67. The Commission has made a number of decisions in relation to 9-1-1, including the requirements that: a. Telecommunications service providers make 9-1-1 service available for Canadians, wherever a PSAP has been established by the municipality or provincial/territorial government; b. The incumbent telephone companies allow their competitors to connect to the 9-1-1 network, so that the competitors can provide 9-1-1 services to their own customers; c. Wireline carriers bill and collect any 9-1-1 levies from their subscribers, on behalf of municipal or provincial/territorial governments, where such levies are authorized by provincial/territorial or municipal law; and d. Wireless and VoIP service providers provide customer notification regarding the availability, characteristics and limitations of their 9-1-1 services.

11 See Appendix 3 for a chart depicting governance related to 9-1-1 in Canada, and Appendix 4 for a chart depicting the relationships between various organizations/institutions. 15

CISC 68. CISC was established by the Commission to assist in developing information, procedures and guidelines, and technical solutions that may be required in various aspects of the Commission's regulatory activities; initially in 1996 in support of introducing local competition in Canada. 69. CISC is composed of a Steering Committee, which is chaired by Commission staff, and a number of working groups. CISC is an open public forum where any interested party can participate in the various working groups. One such group is the Emergency Services Working Group (ESWG). 70. The ESWG undertakes tasks that are, for the most part, triggered by Commission requests for investigation of various technological, administrative and/or operational issues relating to access to 9-1-1 service. Upon completion of a task, the ESWG submits a report to the Steering Committee for review and acceptance. Once accepted, the Steering Committee forwards the report to the Commission. The only exception would be when the Commission requests the ESWG to submit a document directly to the Commission. The Commission, generally, reviews the ESWG’s recommendations, conducts further process as it deems necessary, and issues a decision on the recommendations. 71. Depending on the case, if the Commission issues a decision approving ESWG recommendations, it may include implementation directives for telecommunications service providers. It may also request the ESWG to coordinate any implementation activities. 72. The ESWG is currently working on a number of tasks, including: implementation of the wireless text messaging to 9-1-1 service; the wireless 9-1-1 in-call location update feature (rebid);12 ongoing evaluation of NG 9-1-1 architecture and standards; and the ongoing review of the wireless 9-1-1 location identification specifications. Provincial/territorial and municipal governments 73. In Canada, municipal governments are responsible for establishing and managing PSAPs, with the provincial/territorial governments playing a direct role in this regard only in some instances. 74. In recent years, a number of provincial governments have become more involved, particularly in the collection and distribution of funding for PSAPs, as well as taking on an oversight and coordination role in establishing province-wide PSAP standards and policies. These include: Manitoba, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Quebec and Saskatchewan. Alberta is in the process of creating a single provincial authority for 9-1-1 services. Newfoundland and Labrador is also currently in the process of creating a provincial 9-1-1 framework. 75. Quebec ensures that PSAPs which meet the standards set by the Ministry of Public Security of Quebec are adequately funded by collecting a 9-1-1 levy from Canadians, and distributing the funds to the various PSAPs, through a not-for-profit organization governed

12 Will enable 9-1-1 call takers to request additional updates of a wireless caller’s location, after the initial caller location has been automatically provided. 16

by a board of directors comprised of representatives of l'Union des municipalités du Québec, la Fédération québécoise des municipalités, and la Ville de Montréal. The government of Alberta has also announced that it intends to introduce similar measures in order to fund PSAPs and to enable them to transition to NG 9-1-1. 76. In contrast, the provincial governments in British Columbia and Ontario have played no direct role in the provision of 9-1-1 services or in providing any coordination or oversight of PSAPs. These two provinces have many municipalities with populations large enough to support the funding, establishment and maintenance of a PSAP on their own. Public Safety Canada 77. Public Safety Canada was created in 2003 to ensure coordination across all federal departments and agencies responsible for national security and the safety of Canadians. It coordinates and supports the efforts of federal organizations ensuring national security and the safety of Canadians. It also works with other levels of government, first responders, community groups, the private sector and other nations. 78. Public Safety Canada is also responsible for Canada's National Disaster Mitigation Strategy, established to develop sustainable, disaster-resilient communities across Canada. This strategy has been developed collaboratively by the federal, provincial and territorial (FPT) governments, and sets out a comprehensive, multi-dimensional approach that anticipates joint contributions, community-based partnerships and national-level initiatives. Through the FPT Senior Officials Responsible for Emergency Management (SOREM) committee, all stakeholders work to promote and facilitate disaster mitigation initiatives within their own jurisdictions.13 79. Public Safety Canada has been tasked to develop an implementation strategy related to using a portion of the 700 MHz14 spectrum for public safety. 80. In addition, there are potential linkages between NG 9-1-1 and other information technology platforms currently under development, such as the Canadian multi-agency situational awareness system (MASAS). MASAS enables near real-time sharing of location-based situational awareness information and alerts within the emergency management community. 81. As a side note, I believe that Public Safety Canada and the Commission need to remain in regular communication and work together (possibly through a formal arrangement captured in a memorandum of understanding), as appropriate, in the provision of communication systems and services meant to enhance public safety.

Figure 3: 9-1-1 includes many actors

13 Public Safety Canada's website 14 The 700 MHz spectrum was previously used by television broadcasters, but became available for alternate uses following the transition to digital television broadcasting. 17

G. Current governance model in the United States 82. The United States has demonstrated a degree of seriousness about public safety in general, and 9-1-1 in particular, that Canada would do well to emulate. Starting with Dale Hatfield's 2001 report, the FCC has conducted or sponsored a series of studies of 9-1-1. In the legislature, the United States Congress maintains a caucus (a bipartisan group of interested senators and congressmen) devoted to 9-1-1 issues, which has been successful in moving forward legislation regarding several topics associated with 9-1-1. The FCC, being an agency of the Congress, has reported to its overseers on the state of 9-1-1 financing by the states. The FCC has its own Public Safety and Homeland Security branch, in which about one-third of the work concerns 9-1-1 issues, and public alerting and 9-1-1 are considered together. 83. The 9-1-1 system in the United States is made more complicated than Canada's by the existence of 50 state jurisdictions in telecommunications. The federal telecommunications regulator has jurisdiction over interstate communications and wireless communications. Intrastate wired telephony is within state jurisdiction. The federal government has, through the Department of Transport (DoT), provided a variety of capital grants to state and local authorities to ensure the uniformity of the 9-1-1 system as well as to provide ongoing support for high-cost areas, principally in rural areas. The DoT assists state 9-1-1 programs in the following ways: a. There is a national United States planning capacity for 9-1-1 in the DoT; b. The DoT is actively engaged in monitoring and improving 9-1-1, and considering NG 9- 1-1; c. The DoT maintains a federal grant program for improving state 9-1-1 delivery capacities;

d. Federal assistance concerns model language for state legislation concerning 9-1-1, covering governance, liability, a state 9-1-1 coordinator's office and privacy/confidentiality; e. Federal assistance also concerns generic advice on service delivery issues; f. There is a pilot program for the assessment of state-wide 9-1-1 delivery; and g. A blue ribbon panel has been convened to study funding models for NG 9-1-1. FCC 84. The FCC has broad responsibility for regulating the 9-1-1 system, which is provisioned by carriers that are subject to its jurisdiction. The United States Congress specifically empowered the FCC to "promote the safety of life and property through the use of wire and radio communications." The FCC has been given the goal of "obtaining maximum effectiveness from the use of radio and wire communications in connection with safety of life and property" and charged with "investigating and studying all phases of the problem and the best methods of obtaining the cooperation and coordination of these systems."15 In addition, the FCC was required to "designate 9-1-1 as the universal emergency telephone number for reporting an emergency to appropriate authorities and requesting assistance."16 85. The evidence indicates that the FCC considers 9-1-1, public alerting, disaster response, and resilient communications systems to be related subjects, and assigns them significant resources. Conversations with many people in and around the FCC and the United States government confirmed this impression. 86. The FCC has recently been tasked by law with reporting to Congress how much states collect for 9-1-1-services, and where the revenues end up. Two such reports have been issued. Cooperation from the states has generally been good, with usually 48 out of 50 states reporting. The reports are on the public record and provide an accountability snapshot, as they highlight which states have chosen to divert revenues arising from 9-1-1 levies to general revenues. Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, and the Communications Security Reliability and Interoperability Council 87. The FCC's Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) is responsible for developing, recommending and administering the agency's policies pertaining to public safety communications issues. These policies include 9-1-1. The Bureau also coordinates forward-looking technical advice from the public, the industry and the public safety community through its Communications Security Reliability and Interoperability Council (CSRIC). CSRIC is a federal technical advisory committee constituted under the Federal Advisory Committee Act.17 88. The head of the PSHSB is a director, who stands on an equal footing with the directors of the other six bureaus of the FCC. The PSHSB launches proceedings, conducts inquiries such as that on the outage at the Fairfax County PSAP caused by tropical storm Derecho,

15 47 U.S.C. § 154(o). 16 47 U.S.C. § 251(e)(3). 17 U.S. General Services Administration website 19

and generally plays an active role in assuring that the incumbent carriers serving PSAPs maintain service levels. Citing a recent speech by David Turetsky, head of the PSHSB, to the National Emergency Number Association (NENA) March 2013 conference:18 "Those recommendations were that the Commission consider action to ensure that service providers conduct periodic physical audits of 9- 1-1 circuits; maintain adequate backup power and follow regular maintenance and testing procedures at relevant central offices; and have adequate network monitoring links. Of particular note for this audience, because notification to PSAPs of outages was a problem in the Derecho, the Bureau also recommended that service providers take on a more specific obligation to notify 9-1-1 call centres of breakdowns of 9-1-1 communications.”

89. The Bureau has made liberal use of technical advisory committees in the planning of policy surrounding 9-1-1 over the past decade. Of note is the manner in which these committees are established. 90. These committees are organized and chartered for limited periods of time with different agendas and a rotating membership structure. Memberships are generally limited to two- year terms. Participants are not paid and there is no compensation for travel or reimbursement for expenses. Committee personnel may include academics and people from public interest groups, in addition to people from the industries directly involved. 91. Once nominations are collected, participants are selected and FCC staff develops a formal agenda of questions to be investigated, and the work proceeds, with regular quarterly meetings of the whole advisory committee and ongoing conference calls of task groups organized to address specific agenda items. Members are free to select specific items of interest to themselves, subject to the approval of FCC staff. The CSRIC model, which essentially involves tight mandates, fixed deadlines and carefully selected chairpersons, has been viewed by American observers to have been a significant success. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 92. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration of the United States DoT provides extensive coordination of 9-1-1 activities. It also hosts the 911.gov national resource centre and provides model state legislative language concerning 9-1-1, technical assistance to public safety officials, and a limited grant program. The extent of the DoT's program has been described more fully above. No equivalent has been found to exist in the Canadian federal government. Department of Homeland Security 93. The Department of Homeland Security Office of Emergency Communications coordinates public safety through its SAFECOM program.19 The Department also developed the National Emergency Coordination Plan,20 to be implemented and coordinated in part by the

18 FCC website 19 SAFECOM Program (Homeland Security website) 20 National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP) Goals (Homeland Security website) 20

Federal Emergency Management Agency. These programs offer state and local governments a variety of services, including interoperability coordination, planning assistance, a limited grant program for hardware, and software training or consulting services.

H. Europe 94. 1-1-2 is managed and financed in the European Union by each member state (country), which also decides on the organization of the emergency call centres. 95. Evidence is anecdotal, but my investigation into the European 1-1-2 emergency service revealed that it is generally believed that some of the newer members of the European Union, from former East Bloc countries, have taken the provision of emergency services to their populations to be one of the key services that governments can deliver, and that they do so in the belief that the provision of effective emergency services builds confidence in nascent national institutions. European Emergency Number Association (EENA)21 96. EENA is a Brussels-based non-government organization, set up in 1999, that is dedicated to promoting high-quality emergency services using 1-1-2 throughout the European Union. EENA serves as a discussion platform for emergency services, public authorities, decision makers, associations and solution providers in view of improving emergency response in accordance with citizens' requirements. 97. The EENA memberships include emergency services representatives from European countries, solution providers, and international associations/organizations, as well as members of the European Parliament. 98. In addition to gathering politicians, associations, international organizations and solution providers with a view to improving the entire 1-1-2 chain, EENA gathers individuals working for emergency services or relevant public authorities to foster sharing experience and best practices. EENA promotes 1-1-2 in the media, and has created a foundation that focuses on educating citizens about the existence and use of 1-1-2. It also organizes an awards ceremony each year to congratulate individuals and organizations contributing to the improvement of 1-1-2 and emergency communications. 99. From my perspective, two things should be noted about EENA. First, it is a model of an open, transparent organization. Its website (www.eena.org) is comprehensive and self- explanatory, and is kept up-to-date. It shows financial information, budgets, by-laws, committee structure, personnel, how to join, and the projects in which it engages. It keeps track of and shows the European legislation and directives that affect it. Many other Internet-based organizations do this as well. 100. More significantly, EENA is privately owned. It is a not-for-profit company. Its board of directors remains formally independent of its advisory boards, so that the organization retains freedom to act in advance of whether a consensus exists among the many

21 EENA website 21

members and European Community member states. The particular structure of EENA allows its management to say that they are working for the citizen, and not for the carriers or the first-responder community. I am not recommending such a structure for Canada necessarily, but as an organization acting effectively in the emergency-response field, it has been a genuine success. Sweden 101. In December 2011, the Swedish Government appointed a special investigator to review the current emergency services system in Sweden. The special investigator’s report was presented to the Government in April of this year. 102. Much of the report deals with the current emergency infrastructure in Sweden, and national legislation. 103. The overall assessment was that there were problems with the current system, including fragmented notification systems and increased levels of complexity that hamper collaboration between emergency services agencies. There is a risk to society’s ability to ensure peoples’ safety, and communities' ability to deal with major incidents and emergencies. 104. The special investigator included a number of recommendations in his report. Of note are the following: a. An increased government commitment for emergency services is required. b. Fundamental provisions concerning emergency services should be regulated by law. c. A national emergency operation should be established by 1 January 2015, with the mission to ensure a fast, safe and effective emergency treatment. i. Operations would be conducted under government authority to meet the needs of long-term stable conditions, to provide better opportunities for collaboration amongst emergency service agencies, and to allow the Government to monitor and review the operations. ii. The new agency would be financed through a redeployment of appropriations within the state budget, as well as adjustments between the central government, municipalities and local authorities. d. There should be fewer and more robust emergency service centres in order to reduce costs and improve the efficiency and harmonization of services. e. A common technology platform should be developed for emergency treatment, information sharing, and information coordination. 105. The inclusion of this report to Sweden’s Riksdag (parliament) in my inquiry report serves to emphasize that: a. European states take emergency response issues seriously; b. Nationwide standards are actively under development, even where jurisdiction is shared between municipalities and the central government; c. A national agency is advocated to overcome the problems of 1-1-2; and

d. A major European state, whose 1-1-2 system was voted by EENA to be the best in Europe in 2012, considers that more money and closer coordination of municipal and national efforts is required.

I. Technology and coordinating bodies The National Emergency Number Association (NENA) 106. NENA (www.nena.org) is the leading public safety industry organization in the United States and Canada for defining technical issues and recommending solutions for technology service providers, equipment manufacturers and industry-related standard- setting bodies such as the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)22 and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). NENA has established itself as an industry leader in recommending technical solutions and standards that will: enable compatibility of 9-1-1 technologies; minimize costs involved in provisioning and maintaining public safety communications; increase the effectiveness of 9-1-1 call handling and emergency response; and promote teamwork among industry providers of public safety products and services. 107. In general, the development work at NENA is undertaken within standing or special committees established to address the complex operations and technology issues related to the provision and management of emergency communications services in specific topical areas. One of these committees is the NG 9-1-1 Transition Planning Committee. The primary objective of this committee is to identify technical and operational gaps in the transition to NG 9-1-1 and make recommendations on how to mitigate those gaps. As part of the work of this committee, a detailed blueprint known as NENA i3 was developed and continues to evolve to serve as the model for the end-state of an NG 9-1-1 system. 108. As discussed later on in my report, a number of Canadian companies have been involved in NENA's work to define and specify NG 9-1-1 building blocks. 109. The existence of the NENA i3 “standard” is spoken of by those within the public safety community as if it had a specific content, or as if it were agreed upon like a standard or protocol emerging from the IETF. This is not the case. The NENA i3 is a vision or a conception rather than a worked-out set of standards. The location of various functions within the NG 9-1-1 system has not been decided upon because, in reality, NENA is not the body that can make those decisions for Canada. Only governments can. Some functions could be housed within the incumbents, or they could be devolved to other organizations capable of maintaining databases. Should these databases be national, local or provincial/territorial? Should they be commercial or not-for-profit? Should they be maintained by incumbents or by third-party contractors? How should they link to other organizations in the 9-1-1 complex? Who should pay for them? These are open questions, and as I have maintained throughout, the institutions and processes whereby they could be answered have to be decided upon first, before the actual implementation takes place. The idea that NENA has a set of standards ready for us Canadians to implement is a fiction, for

22 IETF website 23

two reasons. First, NENA is a standards-development body, but the standards are not yet ready to be implemented because they are still under active discussion. Second, the relevant decision-makers are governments, as far as the strategic questions are concerned. 110. Governments may adopt the views of those most concerned, but in Canada, those most concerned – the members of the ESWG – seem to have said that NENA will decide, and NENA is not the body that can make many of the largest decisions for Canada. These can be made only by the CRTC on matters within its jurisdiction, or by some 9-1-1 policy body on matters that straddle jurisdictions. The Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials (APCO) 111. APCO is the world's largest organization of public safety communications professionals. It is a voluntary, not-for-profit organization dedicated to the enhancement of public safety communications. APCO Canada has been a charter member since 1987. 112. APCO Canada members come from various public safety organizations in the country, including PSAPs and police, fire and emergency medical agencies, as well as emergency management, disaster planning and federal search and rescue personnel. APCO Canada's Public Safety Communications Programs Committee was established to guide and direct the development of recommended minimum standards for Public Safety Communications Programs within Canada. In addition, APCO establishes ongoing partnerships with public safety organizations to deliver education and information, and with educational institutions to promote the minimum training standards for emergency communications programs. 113. APCO's standards development activities have a broad scope, ranging from the actual development of standards to the representation of public safety communications in other standards development areas. APCO has endorsed the architecture of NG 9-1-1 as described by NENA.

IV KEY ISSUES RAISED BY PARTICIPANTS ABOUT THE CURRENT 9-1-1 SYSTEM

A. Issues for Canadians 114. In the course of this inquiry, I heard from many Canadians who raised concerns about the adequacy of 9-1-1 service for those with disabilities. 115. While people with disabilities should have multiple modes of communication at their disposal, the current 9-1-1 emergency calling system does not always accommodate this. 116. For example, Canadians with hearing or speech disabilities presently have two methods of communicating: teletypewriter (TTY) or IP relay.

117. Direct access to local PSAPs by dialing 9-1-1 is currently available for some TTY users, but is not available for IP relay users. Direct access to PSAPs by dialing 9-1-1 is available by TTY only if the local PSAP is equipped with a TTY. 118. If the appropriate PSAP is not equipped with a TTY, the call is routed through the TTY relay call centre, where the operator then connects the caller to the appropriate PSAP. 119. 9-1-1 calls processed through IP relay are routed to the relay call centre, where an operator then connects the call to the identified PSAP, based on the user's location as listed in their personal profile, and then relays the conversation back and forth from text to speech and vice versa. When a Canadian registers for a relay service, their address, associated phone number, and personal information is collected by their telecommunications service provider (TSP). The problem is that it is the Canadian who is responsible for maintaining up-to-date information with their TSP for their personal file. The TSP, in turn, is responsible for ensuring that this information is up-to-date in the database. 120. It should be noted that a text messaging service that will improve access to 9-1-1 for hearing- or speech-impaired persons is currently being implemented.23 121. I also heard from some individual Canadians who had concerns about the level of training of 9-1-1 operators. Specifically, concerns about a lack of bilingual operators, better training on assessing emergency situations and identifying and requesting pertinent information from the caller to better inform emergency responders, and better training on handling calls from persons with a disability who may not be able to effectively communicate over the phone. 122. Finally, access to 9-1-1 services is not yet universal in Canada, and there are still parts of Canada that have no service or a low degree of service.

B. Issues for PSAPs 123. I have spoken to many organizations or agencies responsible for PSAP operations across the country, as well as individuals directly involved in this area . They have provided me with enormous insight into the challenges they face on a daily basis. Their message is clear: there are problems/limitations with the current 9-1-1 system. I have set out below some of the more significant issues they raised with me. Caller location 124. PSAPs indicated to me that as Canadians are increasingly turning to wireless and VoIP services for their everyday communications, the accuracy of the information they receive about caller location is of increasing importance. According to PSAPs, despite system changes that have been incorporated and intended to identify a wireless caller’s location, the information is not always provided and, when it is, sometimes it is too inaccurate to be

23 See Telecom Decision 2013-22. 25

useful.24 In addition, while latitude and longitude coordinates may be provided for wireless calls (referred to as the ‘x’ and ‘y’ coordinates), there is no elevation information (referred to as the ‘z’ coordinate) available to effectively locate a caller within high-density buildings within urban areas. Furthermore, with nomadic VoIP services, there is no method for automatically relaying caller location information to the PSAP. The system relies on users providing that information verbally and updating their location information with their VoIP service providers. 125. At this point, it is worth exploring the notion of caller location as it pertains to the provision of emergency services. In my view, it is obvious that the ability to accurately locate the geographic source of an emergency is critical to saving both lives and properties. Specifically, the rising use of mobile technologies can be both a boon and a bane. A boon because situations can be reported and reacted to quickly. A bane because determining the location of a caller can be problematic. 126. By way of background, a caller's location is determined using different techniques, depending on how the call is received at a PSAP. The diagram below illustrates the components that are used by PSAPs to determine caller location when the caller is using a traditional phone, as compared to a cellphone.

127. In a traditional landline-based call, the PSAP operator can determine a caller's location based on entries in the ALI database, which in Canada is maintained by the incumbent telephone company. Note that nomadic VoIP phone services currently rely on manual entries in the VoIP service provider’s customer information database, and on users to inform their service provider if they change locations. 128. When it comes to determining the location of a caller using a cellphone, there are two principal methods employed:

24 Submissions based on PSAP data from Mr. Ken Sluman, a now-retired policeman associated with the Peel Regional Police PSAP. Mr. Sluman estimated that 59% of wireless 9-1-1 calls are lacking complete location information. 26

a. Radiolocation (trilateration or triangulation), which relies on the cellular base stations to determine the location of a handset using various techniques. Accuracy here depends in part on how many towers can be used to determine the location. The more towers that can ‘see’ the handset, the more accurate the location (see image below).

b. Handset location technologies, principally the Global Positioning System (GPS) chips which exist in most modern handsets; these yield much more accurate locations, enabling better response. However, not all cellphones have GPS chips embedded in them. This situation is improving as people replace older handsets with newer ones. 129. The two location techniques mentioned above will essentially send location information to the PSAP operator in the form of a latitudinal and longitudinal coordinate. This information will also include an estimate of the 'uncertainty radius' as well as the confidence level of this information. However, one of the problems remaining is that there is no provision made for a 'z coordinate' or altitude, which becomes problematic when responding to emergencies within cities. While a PSAP operator may have information on the rough location, they will not be able to automatically determine what floor of a building a call originates from. 130. The standards applied to caller location information vary by jurisdiction throughout the world. Below is a simple table outlining the level of accuracy which is expected in different jurisdictions.

Table 4: Accuracy standards for caller location

Region Authority Accuracy standards for caller location information provided to the PSAP

Canada CRTC 90% confidence level that the caller is located within location provided is required. The radius in metres (uncertainty) of the area is provided: no maximum or accuracy requirement on radius.

Time to determine location: 30 seconds. System testing requirements: none.

United States FCC No set confidence level that the caller is located within location provided is required. The radius in metres (uncertainty) of the area is provided: no maximum or accuracy requirement on radius. Time to determine location: no limit. System testing requirements: for outdoor test calls only. Using network information: 67% of caller location accurate to within 100m; in at least 60% of counties, or PSAP areas accounting for 70% of population covered by carrier. Using handset information: 67% of caller location accurate to within 50m in all counties; 80% of caller location accurate to within 150m, in 85% of counties.

Europe European No specified accuracy requirements for Commission wireless operators. Legislation states that and mobile operators should use their “best efforts” national to locate wireless 1-1-2 calls. authorities

131. To put the information above in perspective, the following picture will give the reader an idea of what the United States guidelines on location accuracy actually mean in an urban setting.

132. With respect to calls originating from nomadic VoIP services, PSAPs indicated that calls to 9-1-1 need to be processed by a third-party call centre, and the lack of automated information creates delays in connecting callers to the proper PSAP. Location information is only as good as the information provided by the caller, which may not be accurate. 133. It is undeniable that calls from IP phones and IP-enabled devices will grow in importance. They pose very significant technical challenges for PSAPs. The very thing that makes IP addresses so useful, their independence of geographic location, makes them unsuitable as location-finding devices. Standard telephone numbers are undergoing the same process of becoming detached from geographic location. Consequently, how to deal with VoIP calls to 9-1-1 is becoming a matter for urgent discussion and debate. Of all the issues on which neutral and dispassionate inquiry is urgently needed, the problems of location-finding in an IP environment are probably highest on the list. Pocket dials, misdials, disconnected calls 134. PSAPs indicated that unintentional calls to 9-1-1 are time-consuming and reduce a PSAP’s ability to deal with legitimate emergency situations. 135. PSAPs also indicated that calls made to 9-1-1 but subsequently disconnected are a problem. There are four types of disconnected calls: a. Calls made to 9-1-1 that disconnect before they are forwarded to the PSAP; b. Calls that are forwarded to the PSAP, but are disconnected before they are answered by a call taker or before they can be placed in the 9-1-1 queue; c. Calls made from a wireless device for which cell site location information is received, but the call disconnects before latitude and longitude are received; and

d. Calls that disconnect before a call taker can obtain all the information from the caller, but for which all the anticipated callback and location information has been received at the PSAP. Funding 136. PSAPs indicated to me that the lack of a common funding model within the provinces/territories and regions has led to regional differences in the 9-1-1 service provided. 137. PSAPs were concerned that the financial contribution levied by provincial/territorial governments on wireless service providers’ customers for the funding of PSAPs is insufficient. In their view, this is particularly troubling when the majority of 9-1-1 calls originate from mobile devices, and these calls take longer to handle due to inconsistent and/or unreliable general location data provided. This is further compounded by the volume of pocket dials mobile devices cause.25 138. PSAPs indicated to me that some of the current practices of wireless service providers themselves can have significant impacts on their resources. For example, PSAPs indicated that 9-1-1 test calls from wireless devices create a significant demand on staffing resources and may impede a PSAP’s ability to respond to other calls. 139. PSAPs also indicated that some wireless service providers have inaccurate or inadequate subscriber records, which in many situations can impede the ability of the PSAP to locate a caller in the case of a silent, hang-up or no-voice-contact 9-1-1 call. Inaccurate information arising from cell towers is also a significant problem in determining where callers are.

C. Issues for incumbent telephone companies 140. The incumbent telephone companies generally indicated to me their view that the current 9-1-1 network is a highly robust, diverse and redundant network that provides secure and reliable access to 9-1-1 features and systems to interconnecting carriers as well as PSAPs. 141. In contrast to the submissions provided by the PSAPs, the incumbent telephone companies indicated that, in their view, there is a high level of accuracy of the location information provided with wireless 9-1-1 calls. According to the incumbent telephone companies, in 2012, the system provided valid location information for 94.7% of Phase II Wireless E9-1-1 calls processed. Their sample data from December 2012 indicated that the level of accuracy provided was within a 500-metre radius for 60% of the calls. According to at least one incumbent telephone company, the industry standard is established at a 90% confidence level with the range of uncertainty varying based upon several factors.26 142. In addition to the information provided on caller accuracy, incumbent players noted that the location information in any case was being provided to PSAPs in a format and accuracy

25 In his comments, Mr. Sluman concluded that wireless devices represent the vast majority of calls made to 9-1-1, and that they also generate a disproportionately high number of disconnected calls. Mr. Sluman estimates that the total number of disconnected 9-1-1 calls represents 39% of the total calls made to 9-1- 1, and that the majority of these are initiated accidentally or unintentionally. 26 From comments prepared by Saskatchewan Telecommunications. 30

level equal to, and in most cases superior to, the prescribed standards that have thus far been mandated. The Bell companies,27 in their submission, further discussed work that is ongoing at CISC with respect to this challenge. In particular, they referred to CISC ESWG TIF [Task Identification Form] 69.28 As part of this task identification form, there has been ongoing dialogue regarding whether or not location accuracy standards should be revisited by the CRTC. 143. Notwithstanding their generally positive view of the current 9-1-1 system, the incumbent telephone companies raised concerns around VoIP 9-1-1 calls. For example, in relation to information provided for VoIP 9-1-1 calls, there could be cases that involve spoofing29 which result in new VoIP 9-1-1 challenges, the most serious being a phenomenon known as swatting.30 144. Incumbent telephone companies indicated to me that VoIP 9-1-1 service currently requires the involvement of a third party to determine the caller’s location before conferencing and ultimately transferring the call to the appropriate PSAP, a much slower and less efficient process than for traditional 9-1-1 calls. The incumbent telephone companies also noted that if there is a problem communicating a caller’s physical address during a call, the operator will rely on the caller’s last known address. For this system to work, VoIP callers must provide updates to their location when travelling. While service providers can provide customers the ability to update their location information, the onus is ultimately on the customer to do so.31 145. The incumbent telephone companies submitted to me that no other country has successfully put in place an automatic location solution for VoIP calls. While, in their view, Canadians are therefore no worse off than customers in other countries, it is evident that more work needs to be done to determine viable solutions to this issue. 146. Similar to the concerns raised by Canadians, the incumbent telephone companies noted that 9-1-1 service is currently not universal. Telephone service operates in a number of towns and regions where local or regional governments do not provide 9-1-1 service. Callers in these areas need to know that they must call local numbers to obtain assistance in emergencies. If the caller dials 9-1-1, the call is not routed to any local emergency agency.32

27 Bell Aliant Regional Communications, Limited Partnership; Bell Canada; Bell Mobility Inc.; DMTS; KMTS; NorthernTel, Limited Partnership; Northwestel Inc.; and Télébec, Limited Partnership. 28 Location of document: CRTC website 29 The modification or alteration of the calling line ID. 30 Swatting involves calling 9-1-1 and faking an emergency to draw a response from law enforcement agencies, usually a SWAT team. 31 From comments prepared by Saskatchewan Telecommunications. 32 From comments prepared by MTS Allstream. 31

V NEXT-GENERATION 9-1-1

A. The public switched telephone network is in transition 147. One of the key drivers for the implementation of an NG 9-1-1 system is the change in technology being used to deliver communications services. At the crest of the wave of change is a move towards IP technologies. This section of my report will briefly touch on the effect this move toward IP technology will have on the ubiquitous telephone network. 148. Just as wireless services grew in popularity, so too did Internet services, which were introduced on a large scale at the end of the 20th century. These services, and the associated networks used to support them, were developed using IP technologies. They also used different system identification resources, namely IP addresses, which are administered by neutral third parties rather than by any carrier. 149. As IP networks and technologies grow and gain importance, there is a corresponding reduction in the use of traditional technologies such as public switched telephone network (PSTN) switching equipment. The major equipment manufacturers are no longer supporting these ‘legacy’ products, and as equipment is eventually retired, its replacement is most often based on IP technologies. 150. Indeed, at the heart of most telephone company networks is an IP backbone. In addition, carriers are increasingly interconnecting their networks using IP technology. While much of the last-mile phone services (i.e. the connection to the customer) may still be provided using legacy equipment, the communication is often ultimately translated and carried over IP networks. 151. However, the challenges posed by migration to an all-IP architecture go beyond technical deployments and upgrades. The shift also opens questions as to the political and regulatory implications of such a move. In the United States, there are clear calls that, with a transition to all-IP networks, regulatory obligations imposed by the FCC should be lessened in terms of: a. Universality of service (ensuring that it is available to all); b. Interconnection and competitive availability (ensuring that all carriers can connect to one another); c. Network reliability (ensuring that the system can handle a range of problems and continue to deliver reliable service, e.g. during natural disasters); and d. Public safety (ensuring that services such as 9-1-1 are fully available over new infrastructures). 152. The Canadian regulatory environment does not completely mirror that of the United States, but we do nonetheless share these concerns. While the transition here in Canada is already largely happening absent heavy regulatory oversight, there are some aspects which have been explored in Canada to some degree. These include emergency service obligations related to VoIP services, examined by the Commission in 2005;33 the question

33 See Telecom Decision 2005-21. 32

of universality of service, examined by the Commission in 2011;34 and network interconnection, which was examined in 2012.35 153. Despite the fact that there is no consensus on exactly when the PSTN will have fully migrated to IP, there are clear indications that much of the growth in communications is moving to IP platforms that offer far richer features, and the added benefit of mobility. These new features and mobility are precisely the reason there is a change in Canadians’ expectations and, therefore, a need to talk about solutions to the issues that are being experienced now and will continue into the future, as the system moves to supporting 9-1-1 over IP-based networks.

Figure 4: Defining what NG 9-1-1 will mean is the main task ahead

B. Vision 154. As to the future, the principal problem being faced by PSAPs is the large and widening gap between what they can do and what people expect they can do. 155. In general, with NG 9-1-1, Canadians will be able to communicate with PSAPs in new ways, such as instant messaging and social media, or in new formats, such as picture and video. In addition, PSAPs will enjoy the benefits of other capabilities, such as accessing and relaying electronic building schematics. The negative side of this development is cost. I was informed by several PSAPs that for a time, the addition of IP capabilities will add to costs, such as investment in new equipment, procedures and training. PSAPs have referred to the widening gap between expectations and existing capabilities as ‘unfunded liabilities.’ In some of my interviews, PSAPs likened themselves to pushing against the door to hold back these new developments, because every innovation was going to make things worse, more complicated and more expensive, would involve more training and would generate new legal liabilities.

34 See Telecom Regulatory Policy 2011-291. 35 See Telecom Regulatory Policy 2012-24. 33

Figure 5: What technological change looks like to PSAPs

156. The unfunded expectations will need to be addressed either through cost-reducing efficiencies or an increase in direct funding. The transition to NG 9-1-1 will create new costs but will also provide opportunities for operational savings. In the United States, efficiencies have been introduced in some individual states that have taken a lead in rationalizing their 9-1-1 service, with a reduction in the number of PSAPs, particularly smaller PSAPs. There are also instances of smaller municipalities contracting out their PSAP requirements to larger municipalities or third parties. But for PSAPs and the authorities who pay for them, the onrush of technological change is a challenge, and there is as yet no comprehensive, high-level forum for collective discussion and consideration of what should be done.

C. Transition to NG 9-1-1 157. The path to NG 9-1-1 will be comprised of a series of newly implemented technologies that will transition how 9-1-1 calls are originated, carried and received. It will not be done at the flick of a switch or at the same time across all jurisdictions. 158. One could argue that the transition has already started with the rollout of a text messaging service for hearing- or speech-impaired persons. In addition, the incumbent telephone companies are in the process of planning the replacement of PSAP data circuits with IP technology to support the wireless text messaging to 9-1-1 service and the wireless in- call location update feature, and as a first step in preparation for NG 9-1-1. 159. NENA has developed its i3 roadmap for NG 9-1-1 standards and architecture. NENA i3 has a great deal of support in Canada. A number of Canadian companies have been involved in NENA's work to define and specify all the building blocks of an NG 9-1-1 system, from both a technical and an operational perspective. 160. However, based on the material gathered as part of this report, it is my belief that it is still too early to say that there is an industry consensus in Canada that NENA i3 is the way

forward. My impression is that some in the industry are of the view that NENA's work, while substantially United States-oriented, can and should be leveraged for designing a similar and fully interoperable architecture for Canada. Given the inherent differences in structures, regulations, infrastructures and size, some members of the industry believe that Canadian NG 9-1-1 can be achieved through a simplified solution tailored to Canadian needs.36 161. Other members of the industry warned that Canada should not risk implementing a Canadian-specific solution that isolates Canada’s 9-1-1 system, increases costs and limits equipment solutions.37

D. Operations 162. The Canadian Interoperability Technology Interest Group (CITIG)38 expressed the concern that the need to transfer data downstream (and the quantity of data) will increase significantly in the coming years, and that the digital assets that may go with a given call will put a strain on existing equipment and technical resources. 163. For example, if Canadians can submit videos, pictures or other digital assets in conjunction with 9‐1‐1 calls, the resources required to manage 9‐1‐1 calls will increase significantly. While in some cases videos or pictures may provide valuable information, too much information could be a danger. If multiple videos show up regarding a fire call or a major traffic accident, the PSAP may not have the time or resources to view all videos in a timely way. 164. In addition, the lack of resources to view multiple videos in real time may create legal liability for PSAPs, particularly in cases where serious injury or death occurs in the incident. If PSAPs accept the videos, they may very well be accepting the liability that goes with it. CITIG noted that provinces such as New Brunswick and Manitoba have created legislation that limits the liability of PSAPs in such situations, so that they cannot be sued for not having sufficient staff to view the number of videos that may come in on a given call. 165. CITIG also identified secondary impacts to the above, including: increased data storage requirements; an increase in PSAP technical resources to manage the increased storage and network demands; and the traumatic impacts on dispatchers who view graphic scenes (accidents, fires, suicides, etc.). In addition to the technological challenges of introducing NG 9-1-1, there will be operational challenges, such as increased call handling time, standard operating procedures, liability protection and perhaps even legal challenges. The flow of multimedia information between the public, PSAPs and first responders will put a strain on networks. These ideas and observations were broadly shared among respondents and interviewees who work in PSAPs.

36 From joint comments prepared by the Bell companies. 37 From comments prepared by Shaw. 38 CITIG represents the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, the Canadian Association of Fire Chiefs and the Paramedic Chiefs of Canada. 35

E. Data collection 166. While most PSAPs, if not all, gather data and prepare reports, it seems that the input to these reports requires information collected by the PSAPs themselves and by the telephone companies that operate the underlying network. 167. However, it is evident from a number of the comments that currently, data collection capabilities in relation to 9-1-1 calls are limited. To my knowledge, we do not even know how many 9-1-1 calls are made in Canada each year. This is not an acceptable situation. 168. PSAPs may be equipped with call management systems capable of tracking the number and the timing of calls received, answered and/or sent into a queue. However, details beyond that, such as type of incident, type of device used, whether caller information and/or location was available, or the proportion of false 9-1-1 calls, do not seem to be available. 169. It should be noted that what is or is not measured always sends a clear signal to employees as to the relative importance of any task to be completed or service to be provided.39 In other words, what is not measured does not matter.

F. Questions raised by participants about NG 9-1-1 170. In the course of this inquiry, various participants have raised with me a number of questions, to which I offer my initial reaction: a. Can enhancements be introduced on an incremental basis without reducing the level of service provided to, or jeopardizing the safety of, any customers? My answer – not without more funding. b. Are open industry standards required to ensure the interoperability of equipment from different vendors, prevent incorporation of proprietary elements as critical components of the overall service, and allow third-party vendors to develop their own ways of interfacing with NG 9-1-1 systems? My answer – yes. c. Is there a need to provide increased liability protection for companies providing NG 9-1-1 services because of the challenge of operating IP-based systems at the same robust service levels expected from current 9-1-1 services? My answer – yes. d. Should standards be adopted, as the United States has done, for address databases and addressing in general? My answer – yes. e. How can the public’s expectations be managed? My answer – through public education. f. Given the increased data flow to the PSAPs under an NG 9-1-1 system, do there need to be increased privacy protections around what a PSAP can collect and what it can share with other agencies? My answer – privacy protectors must be factored in. g. Does there need to be a consolidation of 9-1-1 rulings of the CRTC into a coherent body of rulings in the manner of the Civil Code of Quebec, as the Quebec association proposed? My answer – such a consolidation would be useful.

39 Statement made by Mr. Ken Sluman. 36

171. Not all of these questions are matters that fall within the jurisdiction of the Commission under the Telecommunications Act. However, all of these questions are important and will need to be grappled with by the Commission, federal and provincial/territorial governments, PSAPs, first responders, the telecommunications industry and the Canadian public at large.

VI FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Findings 172. Today, the 9-1-1 system is working because first responders, PSAPs and telecommunications service providers make it work, not because the technology is flawless or its governance system adequate. 173. From my discussions with various individuals, groups and organizations involved in operating and maintaining the current 9-1-1 system, as well as the documented comments submitted to my inquiry, it is evident to me that there are a number of issues that need to be considered as we move forward. There is a disconnect between Canadians’ expectations and the reality of the 9-1-1 system 174. In an online survey conducted by Intrado Canada in May 2010,40 there appeared to be a definite disconnect between what Canadians expect from 9-1-1 and what 9-1-1 can actually deliver. As a reminder, of the people surveyed at that time: a. 98% knew about 9-1-1; b. 76% believed the PSAP would know where they are calling from; and c. 73% believed 9-1-1 technology had the ability to find them if they could not speak. 175. When asked whether it would be more important for a PSAP to receive text messages, receive pictures or pinpoint the caller's location, respondents overwhelmingly ranked pinpointing location as the most important. 176. Also, more recently in 2012, the Canadian Red Cross commissioned Ipsos Reid to explore how Canadians use social media and mobile technology during emergencies, and their expectations around the use of social media by emergency responders.41 Based on the results: a. 64% of Canadians said that they participate in online communities or social media networks, such as Facebook or Twitter; b. 63% said emergency responders should be prepared to respond to calls for help posted on social media; c. 55% thought that emergency responders currently monitor social media sites; and

40 The survey conducted by Intrado was discussed in a 30 March 2012 report by Pomax Inc. on a feasibility study for a 9-1-1 and/or E9-1-1 system in the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador: A Final Report on A Feasibility Study for a 9-1-1 and/or Enhanced (E-9-1-1) System in the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador 41 Social Media During Emergencies, Canadian Red Cross Factum 37

d. 35% thought that posting a call for help on social media would result in assistance from emergency services, of which 74% believed help would arrive within an hour. 177. From the results of the Canadian surveys set out above, it is clear to me that Canadians have a high degree of misperception about the current 9-1-1 system and its capabilities. These survey results and the information I have received in this inquiry demonstrate: a. The public assumes that PSAPs automatically know their location when they call; b. The public assumes that responders are qualified to handle their situation; and c. The public assumes that PSAPs have the ability to accept multimedia information. Education 178. There is no question that educating Canadians is vital. Standardized education would help the general public learn how 9-1-1 works and how the system deals with emergency calls.42 179. For example, pocket dials and misdials continue to strain resources because, for each call, the caller must be contacted to determine the nature of the emergency.43 Public education initiatives could be used in an attempt to decrease the number of these types of calls. 180. One of the principal issues is that the public’s perception of location accuracy is derived from television shows, which present a science-fictional portrayal of the degree of accuracy actually attained. Until technology improves, the public needs to be educated as to what they can expect with cellphone accuracy and what actions they can take to increase their chances of being located. Merely stepping outdoors can increase cellphone location accuracy significantly. People should be aware of these facts. Best practices 181. Those responsible for providing 9-1-1 services across Canada do not share amongst themselves, at a national and perhaps even a provincial/territorial level, information that could be used to develop best practices. This is not necessarily because they don’t want to, but rather, because there is no existing forum through which they could do so. 182. In the United States, the ENHANCE 911 Act of 200444 required, among other things, that a National E9-1-1 Implementation Coordination Office be created. Now simply referred to as “the National 9-1-1 Office,” its responsibilities include improving coordination and communication among federal, state and local emergency communications systems, emergency personnel, public safety organizations, telecommunications carriers, and telecommunications equipment manufacturers and vendors. 183. Other responsibilities include development, collection and dissemination of information concerning practices, procedures and technology used in implementation of E9-1-1 services. A national 9-1-1 profile database was established that can be used to help accurately measure and depict the current status and planned capabilities of 9-1-1 systems across the United States. Data collection about the 9-1-1 system can be significantly improved

42 From comments submitted by Northern911. 43 From comments submitted by the Toronto Police Service. 44 108th Congress Public Law 494 (U.S. Government Printing Office) 38

184. One of the most useful submissions the inquiry received was from Mr. Ken Sluman, a retired Peel Region policeman, PSAP manager and former member of the ESWG. His view was: “You cannot manage what you do not measure, and you cannot expect what you do not inspect.”45 185. It should be possible to capture information such as call and incident type, location and duration, as well as resources allocated and agencies involved. While the availability of specific data will depend on many factors, including the capabilities of devices and networks, the point is that the absence of coherent national standards allows vital information to go unmeasured. 186. Depending on the ultimate solution, the collection of baseline data could be used to develop statistics for review on a national, provincial/territorial, regional or municipal level. There would be benefit in establishing a data collection system as a foundation for collecting and analyzing 9-1-1 operational information. Over time, the data could be used to identify trends and display hot spots of activities. 187. The nature of the data that could be collected will be a matter for further development in whatever policy body for 9-1-1 that may emerge. The automatic collection of data is not limited in its application to 9-1-1 systems, though this is justification enough. Every minute of time taken to reach a heart attack victim greatly affects the outcome. Performance metrics in 9-1-1 can save lives for sure, but the same system that collects relevant data for 9-1-1 can also be used to collect data in such a way that they can be useful for public security as well. The lack of feedback between data measurement and performance improvement is a notable feature of the current 9-1-1 system. 188. Further, under appropriate privacy safeguards, it is evident that some data can be collected and aggregated on a national basis. Provincial/territorial emergency response officials might not be concerned with some 9-1-1-related data, but might be concerned with others, while national authorities might need another layer of abstraction, or a slightly different set of indicators. The point is, for want of appropriate governance, we cannot currently define what needs to be measured, and if it could be defined, we need the technical means to carry it out. One of the major points of this report is that we need to consider how a new technical system, that goes under the name of NG 9-1-1, can be so configured that efficiencies in service delivery can be gained, while the same system can be used to measure things relevant for emergency management and disaster relief. 189. One of the really important ideas that emerged from my inquiry is that the collection and use of data generated from 9-1-1 presents governments at all levels, and society as a whole, with unparalleled opportunities. Think of the efficiencies that could be created through analysis of 9-1-1 information on a national or even a provincial/territorial basis. About a third of 9-1-1 calls result in a vehicle being dispatched, representing significant taxpayer expense. In 9-1-1 we have one of the most expensive, tax-absorbing complexes of capital and personnel deployed in modern society. Is it measured? It is scarcely measured at all, and if so, at a local level appropriate to the PSAPs’ range of responsibility.

45 Statement made by Mr. Ken Sluman. 39

Imagine, if you will, what data collection on a national scale could do. This is the realm of what has come to be called Big Data. California has been gathering comprehensive data on a statewide scale for many years.46 My point is that in Canada, data is collected, if at all, on a small scale of the individual PSAP, and not on a provincial/territorial or national scale. Some provincial/territorial 9-1-1 authorities engage in limited performance measurement, but the kinds of data that could be collected from automated linked computers has, to my knowledge, scarcely begun to be explored. If no one is measuring, there can be no accountability for results. 190. Yet my point goes well beyond accountability, however worthy that objective is. A comprehensive national or provincial/territorial picture of 9-1-1 calls, suitably analyzed, would present decision-makers with a rich source of information on where trouble occurs, when, and what it takes to resolve it. More importantly, data thus gathered would provide a rich source of correlations, the uses of which cannot now be imagined, but which will be able to guide effective public policy. Emergency preparedness and disaster relief are only the most obvious examples. The integration of data collected by PSAPs on a provincial/territorial or national scale would be a useful beginning. Once again I am struck by the gap between the dispatch mode of 9-1-1, which is governed by driving distances, and the communications/database/policy level, which can work across time zones. There is no justification for the communications/database/policy level to be stuck in the early 20th century.

Figure 6: 9-1-1 dispatch is at driving distances; communications can be across time zones

The governance structure for 9-1-1 in Canada is fragmented and inconsistent

46 Presentation of Public Safety Networks of Sacramento, California, to the inquiry by its owner, Kurt Warner. 40

191. In Canada, we deal with 9-1-1 in a fragmented and inconsistent manner. Why is there a fragmented approach? Simply put, because there is no single authority responsible for 9-1- 1 on a national basis. 9-1-1 grew up locally, and is naturally a provincial/territorial responsibility. Driving distances are appropriate to its service delivery end, since service is predicated on driving times. By contrast, telecommunications and the databases that support 9-1-1 can be on a provincial/territorial or national scale. 192. As we look to the future, we should, at a minimum, discuss whether a different approach might result in delivery of this service to Canadians in a more efficient and effective manner. 193. The development of IP-based public emergency service networks will require considerable capital and maintenance funding, which may be burdensome for smaller PSAPs or agencies. Further, examination may be required to determine if there could be benefit to shared or consolidated facilities accessible to multiple agencies. A unified vision and approach to the implementation of NG 9-1-1 in Canada is required, and further discussion must occur at all levels to determine whether or what funding, governance models and migration planning are required. Such cross-agency multi-jurisdictional issues are best addressed in the multi-stakeholder forum I propose later in this document. 194. In my opinion, 9-1-1 has become the most vital point of contact between the citizen and the government. Viewed from inside government, jurisdiction over the system is divided. However, from the citizen's point of view, our jurisdictional issues are irrelevant. 195. Provincial, territorial and/or municipal governments are responsible for the service delivery portion (i.e. PSAP operations). The result is a difference in approach, depending on where you live. The extreme – in some locations, 9-1-1 is not available. 196. At the federal level, the telecommunications carriers that provide 9-1-1 dialing to their customers and the networks that deliver emergency calls to PSAPs fall within the Commission’s jurisdiction, as do other telecommunications service providers that are required to provide arrangements to support 9-1-1 for their customers. We also have Public Safety Canada, which is responsible for national security and the safety of Canadians. While it is currently working on issues peripherally relevant to 9-1-1, in particular the creation of a situational awareness software system and redeployment of 700 MHz spectrum to create a national public safety broadband network (PSBN), it is not directly involved with other aspects of 9-1-1. 197. If I look within the Commission itself, we have not, to my knowledge, undertaken a detailed review of 9-1-1 until now. In contrast, the United States has been treating 9-1-1 issues with a commendable degree of resolution and energy for the past many years, which is attested to by a series of FCC inquiries, proceedings, legislation, reports to Congress and funding of initiatives out of the Department of Transport. The FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau has about 134 people, of whom almost one third work on 9-1-1 issues at various times. David Furth, assistant Bureau Chief, responded to our inquiries as follows: “We have a group of about 6 people that work on core 911 and NG911 matters, but we also have other people that work on network resiliency and reliability issues that

are sometimes 911-specific (e.g., the Commission’s recently initiated rulemaking on 911 reliability stemming from last year’s Derecho Report) and are sometimes more general but still have important 911 implications. 911 issues also tend to receive more attention at the Bureau front office and Commission level than other matters that are more operational in nature.”47

198. The Commission has, for the most part, dealt with 9-1-1 matters through the CISC ESWG. CISC was created by the Commission in the early stages of local competition in Canada. It was intended as a forum to bring participants of the industry together in working groups in order to develop the administrative and operational systems required to implement the Commission’s mandated interconnection and number portability. Today, the ESWG includes representatives from telecommunications service providers and PSAPs, as well as some 9-1-1 industry specialists. The ESWG addresses issues that relate to the technical and operational implementation of 9-1-1 services, as assigned to it by the Commission or as requested by stakeholders. 199. The incumbent telephone companies and other telecommunications providers play a major role at ESWG. The incumbents are the 9-1-1 network providers with which the PSAPs interface. This is not necessarily by the incumbents’ design. In general, the PSAPs’ desire is to only connect to the incumbent, with other providers tying their networks into the incumbents’ in order to provide 9-1-1 to their own customers. 200. The PSAPs and other first responders are in essentially the same position that monopoly subscribers were in before the introduction of competition. The representatives of the telephone companies are highly technically competent and remain in place for long periods of time; the PSAPs and first responder representatives are rotated through 9-1-1 at the pace set by their parent organizations, which can be two or three years. The incumbents hold the technical expertise; there is no basis for arguing basic technical decisions that they may make. If a circuit-switched box is to be replaced by a certain date by an IP-enabled box, then that is done, and the other side must adjust. However, timing and implementation can be argued, and the technical dominance of one side is not a barrier to cooperative and mutually beneficial relationships. 201. On the subject of NG 9-1-1 standards, the ESWG defers to NENA, primarily because most parties do not want a made-in-Canada solution. However, the result is that NG 9-1-1 standards and design architecture have been externalized to a large degree from Canada to a North American technical/business body with Canadian representation. 202. A former Chairman of ESWG observed that he was “astounded at the level of cooperation” between first responders and carriers within the Working Group. I hope that any reforms of the 9-1-1 policy process that emerge from this report – which I believe are needed – will leave that spirit of cooperation intact. The funding of the 9-1-1 system in Canada is uneven and inadequately measured

47 Email from David Furth to Richard Shockey of 20 May 2013, quoted with permission. 42

203. It is possible that the primary issue facing the 9-1-1 system across Canada is establishing consistent, equitable funding models that meet not only the demands presented by today’s wireless world, but also the issues of tomorrow. However, without adequate existing data on what money is coming into the system and what that money is being spent on, it is impossible to determine with certainty whether and to what degree the current funding model is inadequate.

Figure 7: The 9-1-1 elephant has grown since its inception

Where does the money come from, and where does it go? 204. We have a fairly good understanding of what the incumbents collect to maintain and operate their networks, as well as what they collect and remit in the way of government levies. On a national level, this amounts to something in the area of $213 million annually, of which government levies account for $65 million. Tables 5 and 6 below provide an aggregated breakdown of these amounts.

Table 5: Incumbents – 9-1-1 revenues in 2012 ($M)

Revenues (national) Funding $M

Collected 44 from wireline customers

Collected 67 from wireless customers

Collected 37 through wholesale charges

Total 148

Table 6: Incumbents – Government levies in 2012 ($M)

Government levies (national) Funding $M

Collected 45 from wireline customers

Collected 20 from wireless customers

Total 65

205. However, what we do not have a good handle on is how much it costs to run the PSAP operations. Table 7 provides the information that is currently available.

Table 7: Provincial governments – PSAP operating costs in 2012 ($M)

New Nova Saskatchewan Quebec48 Brunswick Scotia

9.37 37.1 5.3 4.20

206. Let us assume that the cost of running PSAPs in the other provinces is similar to the cost for those identified above, so that we can understand how much money we could be talking about nationally. 207. Taking the sum of the total operating costs above, divided by the sum of the 2012 populations for the four provinces,49 the average annual cost per person required to operate PSAPs is approximately $5. Applying this to the sum of 2012 populations for Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, Newfoundland and Labrador, Ontario, and Prince

48 From the Rapport d'activité 2012 published by l'Agence municipale de financement et de développement des centres d'urgence 9-1-1 du Québec (available in French only) 49 Population by year, by province and territory (Statistics Canada) 44

Edward Island, it is possible that the total annual cost of operating PSAPs in these provinces would be in the order of $120 million. 208. For all 10 provinces combined, the annual cost of operating PSAPs could be $131 million. Combine this with the $148 million that the incumbents collect to maintain and operate their networks, we are talking about $279 million; more than a quarter of a billion dollars annually is spent to provide 9-1-1. 209. Regardless, the PSAPs have clearly indicated that funding is a concern today, and NG 9-1-1 will bring new challenges. Equipment will need to be replaced and/or upgraded, additional personnel could be required, new operational process developed, and training required. Wireless location accuracy remains a serious unresolved issue 210. Wireless location accuracy, or more to the point, the lack of accuracy or reliability, is a major issue for the PSAPs. Simply put, if they do not know where you are, they do not know where to send help. I note that the ESWG has indicated that ongoing work on this matter is underway, but at this stage, this issue does not appear to be a priority with the ESWG membership in light of other activities they are working on. 211. Location information is not provided for all wireless calls, and even when it is, we can be talking about search areas of 1 square kilometre or more for a significant portion of calls. Approximately 6 out of every 10 calls from cellphones have an accuracy radius given as being greater than 100 metres, which means they are very challenging in terms of locating people in many situations.50 212. As part of this process, TruePosition submitted a presentation regarding a testing initiative that they undertook in the Canadian marketplace to better understand the quality of information being received by PSAPs with respect to location accuracy in different Canadian cities. Roughly speaking, the methodology involved placing calls to selected PSAPs from outdoor and indoor locations, and using three different mobile providers in each region to validate data. Below is an illustration of the results from placing test calls from an indoor location in Fredericton. The different-coloured dots indicate the different carriers, and the three circles represent a 100-metre, 300-metre and 1,000-metre radius from the actual call location.

50 From comments prepared by Mr. Ken Sluman. 45

213. Additionally, the test results that TruePosition gathered from the three tested PSAPs can be summarized in the following table:

Table 8: Accuracy of caller location

PSAP examined Caller location info. Accuracy of location for 33% of calls

Ottawa Identified 70% of the time Within 107m

New Brunswick Identified 95% of the time Within 856m

Calgary Identified 100% of the time Within 230m

214. TruePosition provided views on what it felt would be the ideal set of criteria when setting location accuracy standards. These included: establishing what percentage of call locations would be accurate within certain distances; identifying different standards for calls from indoor and outdoor locations; identifying the relevant geographic area over which performance standards would be measured; and establishing a high-yield (say 90% or 95%) factor. 215. Another vocal proponent for action on this subject in the course of my investigation was Mr. Ken Sluman, who provided extensive views on the challenges and technologies related to location accuracy. As part of his submission, Mr. Sluman provided extensive statistics regarding the operations of one particular PSAP in Canada (unnamed), meant to illustrate the quality of information related to the calls received. From the results shown, complete

location information was only received 41% of the time at a PSAP when a call was received from a wireless device. 216. With respect to the actual data that was received at the PSAP, below is a table reproduced from the submitted comments showing the reported 'radius of uncertainty' for the location information received. These ranges represent a 90% confidence interval that the caller’s location will be within that range (i.e. 9 times out of 10, the caller would fall within the stated radius).

Table 9: Range of radius

Range of radius reported in ALI database Percentage 0 to 99 metres 37.45 100 to 199 metres 5.95 200 to 299 metres 7.00 300 to 399 metres 4.80 400 to 499 metres 8.31 500 to 599 metres 6.97 600 to 699 metres 6.35 700 to 799 metres 5.00 800 to 899 metres 2.75 900 to 999 metres 1.69 1,000 metres or more 13.73

Figure 8: What 200 and 800 metres mean – An aerial overview of Parliament Hill

217. While 37% of calls were reporting a location within a 100-metre radius, results also indicated that nearly 14% of calls were reporting location information with a confidence interval with a radius of 1,000 metres or more. 218. By way of comparison, MTS Allstream, in its comments, submitted that for 70% of calls, the 90% confidence interval for the location is 50 metres or less – roughly the size of a football field – and for 8% of calls, the 90% confidence interval is one kilometre or greater. It further commented that the calls with larger areas originate, for the most part, from older devices which do not have GPS capability, or from devices lacking battery strength to obtain GPS data or which do not support the technology used to estimate the caller's distance from a cell tower. In contrast to this data, the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) noted in its comments that only 33% of wireless calls are accurate to within 100 metres of the call origination. 219. Several parties, such as the Coalition pour le 9-1-1 au Québec, suggested that the Commission should play a more active role in ensuring that the situation improves with respect to determining caller locations. 220. In my opinion, there are a number of actions that could be taken to improve the situation with wireless location accuracy in Canada. Perhaps there is an opportunity for the Commission to hold hearings, examine the state of technology, see at what price and in what time frame reasonable improvements would be possible, and, where improvements are not likely or possible, what steps could be taken to at least make the public more aware of these challenges. 221. While the above information pertains specifically to caller location accuracy from wireless devices, it should be noted that the problem is even more complex when dealing with nomadic VoIP services, which provide no automatic location information. While the absolute proportion of calls originating from such services has not been determined in this investigation, it is nonetheless a growing phenomenon, which will undoubtedly become more worrisome as all communications converge to an all-IP architecture. 222. Similarly, to the extent that social media is contemplated as a way to contact PSAPs, there would be no call location provided now or into the foreseeable future. Why is there no integration of information arising from 9-1-1 calling? 223. In the absence of appropriate institutions governing 9-1-1, which would link 9-1-1 with public security and public alerting, the technical possibilities are underdeveloped too. 224. The occurrence of many 9-1-1 calls in a pattern can signal to the government that emergencies are occurring on a scale that should summon forth a larger coordinated response, such as floods, fire or riots. 9-1-1 calling can and should be analyzed for what it tells emergency responders about the scale and scope of the trouble. There is, so far as I know, no large-scale integration of information arising from 9-1-1 calling. PSAPs function in relative isolation from one another, another legacy of their original purpose, which was to link to citizens – downwards and outwards – rather than be part of provincial/territorial or national networks of public safety.

What about ESWG itself? 225. The ESWG is an entirely voluntary organization. It is composed, in general, of first responder organizations (police, fire and ambulance) and the incumbent telephone companies, and other telecommunications provider representatives, occasional vendors of equipment to PSAPs. Occasionally, some technology entrepreneurs have participated. 226. Observation of the ESWG at work revealed the following facts and trends: a. The absence of any funding sources means that it meets in places donated by the participants, or the Commission. b. Absence of funding means the ESWG has no independent ability to establish mailing lists and websites. The publication of its minutes and proceedings takes place at a pace determined by the Commission’s own Web hosting and updating schedules, which are slow. Its website is buried in the Commission’s many pages, so that if you searched the web for Canadian 9-1-1-related sites, the ESWG does not readily appear at the top of the list. The ESWG’s minutes and records of decisions are late, in some cases missing, and its notices of meeting are equally hard to find. c. The carriers are represented by technologically informed people who have had years, some decades, of experience in telecommunications in general and 9-1-1 issues in particular. By contrast, representatives of the first responder side frequently rotate at a faster pace through the ESWG because their employers rotate them through 9-1-1 call centre work at that pace. This may be in part because the ESWG has a low profile and the importance of its work may not be sufficiently appreciated by governments, PSAP providers and other agencies. The result is a complete disparity between the technological capacities of the people involved. d. In consequence, technological change is driven by what the carriers tell the PSAPs they are able or willing to deliver. If the incumbents say they are discontinuing datapac (an older circuit-switched) service and going to an IP platform, that is what happens. If the carriers determine that they are now only delivering service to the PSAP/incumbent demarcation point, rather than to the screens inside the PSAP, then that is what happens. PSAPs have to adjust to the pace of change, and the nature of change, that the incumbents are able and willing to deliver. This is not necessarily wrong, but it illustrates the broader issue that PSAPs are in the same monopoly customer situation that the rest of Canadian society was before competition was introduced. e. The ESWG works by subject matters, called TIFs – Task Identification Forms. Each TIF is chaired by a volunteer member of the ESWG. However, if someone wishes to promote a particular technological solution, the promoter could become the chairperson of a TIF. The natural conflict of interest between promotion of a technological solution and chairing a volunteer committee could potentially lead to fractious workings in committee. f. The length of time required to work an issue through the ESWG means that only the well-funded can play in the standards game. g. The ESWG works well within its limits. It gathers the relevant players charged with actually carrying out day-to-day 9-1-1 work: the carriers and the first responders. Its response to the text-to-9-1-1 issue has generally been thought to be better than the

United States decision on the same subject.51 Where consensus has been achieved, the ESWG allows for rapid and cooperative implementation of technical change. NG 9-1-1 is not the solution to all of our problems 227. Will NG 9-1-1 address the issues that we are currently faced with? The short answer is no. 228. First, the problem we are currently faced with in relation to wireless location accuracy is not an NG 9-1-1 issue. That we do not have one single authority responsible for 9-1-1 is not an NG 9-1-1 issue either. 229. Canadians will expect to be able to call for help using whatever device is in their hand, in whatever manner they choose. PSAPs will want to maintain the single point of interface for all types of communications, and they will want to be able to determine exactly where a call is coming from. 230. NG 9-1-1 will allow Canadians to communicate with PSAPs in ways that will go well beyond simple voice communication. The infrastructure will support the transmission of a vast amount of information, and will also allow the collection of various data related to 9-1-1 calls. 231. There is no doubt in my mind that the final outcome will be based on industry standards, whatever they may be. That being said, though, without some serious discussion, it is not clear that the final solution will be based on the most efficient and effective system architecture. The incumbents are going forward with their own individual business and network modernization plans on the basis that all 9-1-1 functions currently located within them will continue to be located within them in the future as we transition to NG 9-1-1. 232. The computer communications portions of 9-1-1 are not driven to be as local as the fire station and the ambulance. Rather, they could be organized on the same scale and with the same scope as telephone systems, domain name systems and other Internet-based things upon which modern society relies. They could be as extensive as is consistent with effective Canadian control. Modern technologies allow portions of the communications of 9-1-1 to be organized more like the Internet and less like the old telephone system. Some back-office functions, such as databases linking personal addresses to telephone numbers, could be organized provincially/territorially or nationally. 233. 9-1-1 responders will always be relatively close to the points where they are needed, but the PSAPs, and in particular the databases that supply information to PSAPs, if any, do not have to be organized on an exclusively local basis. A system could be logically united but physically distributed. Thus, databases that supply location information to the PSAPs may achieve economies of scale if they are organized according to ideas and systems that govern the Internet’s naming and addressing systems, for instance. However, for a number

51 The text messaging to 9-1-1 service in Canada is initiated by the subscriber dialling 9-1-1, the benefit of which is that the 9-1-1 caller’s telephone number, wireless Phase II location and other information are provided to the PSAP. The implementation of text messaging to 9-1-1 in the United States varies, with it being either similar to the approach in Canada or initiated by texting directly to the PSAP, the downside of which is that some of the 9-1-1 caller’s information and wireless Phase II location are not provided to the PSAP. 50

of reasons, we cannot yet optimize the back-office functions of 9-1-1 before we have the right institutions in place. 234. As discussed above, the incumbents currently own, operate and control the customer information and call routing databases. 235. One of the important design decisions that will be required as Canada moves to an IP- based 9-1-1 communications system is the placement and operation of databases. Databases of addresses and other useful information could be maintained by organizations other than the incumbents. Moreover, the databases could be maintained on a national scale, in the same way that domain names are, or on a province-wide or territory-wide basis. The money to be made in a new system may well reside in who holds the databases and how much can be charged for a “dip,” the term used for a machine looking into a database for information.

Figure 9: It is not clear what NG 9-1-1 will mean, or who will define it

236. For example, the telephone industry relies on various databases which allow telephone calls to be routed appropriately, when numbers no longer correspond to specific service providers. The Local Number Portability Consortium is a not-for-profit corporation recognized by the Commission and organized by the telephone industry. Similarly, the assignment of telephone numbers is handled by a consortium created by the telephone industry, whose status is recognized by the Commission. In the future, other organizations may be permitted to operate databases in the 9-1-1 space. There is no longer an essential rationality to assigning all 9-1-1 database functions exclusively to incumbent carriers in an Internet-based system. In the case of NG 9-1-1, who shall manage databases is an open question. The design of the databases; who will own the data; who will manage the look- ups, the rights to look-ups and the prices for doing so: these are not technical questions. It

will be important for the Commission, in making fundamental decisions about the shape of a future Internet-based 9-1-1 system, to treat the design of the system as a policy matter. There will be a tendency, absent this realization, to treat the design of the future system as merely a technical matter. A 9-1-1 policy body would gather appropriate stakeholders, which includes a broader set of actors than just the carriers and first responder organizations. Incumbents have an incentive to ensure that policy matters, including the nature and wording of future databases, appear as technical matters best left to their expertise. 237. It is one of the principal concerns of this report that an informed debate occur about the design of the future 9-1-1 system. It is my principal observation that the current machinery of discussion and policy formation is not adequate for this task, and that new institutions are needed to engender a discussion of sufficient depth involving a sufficient range of interested stakeholders.

B. Recommendations 238. It was not feasible or appropriate within this inquiry to sort out the entire engineering architecture of NG 9-1-1, deal with technical aspects of location accuracy or address jurisdictional issues. Indeed, as can be seen from my findings, the vast majority of the issues which the Commission and Canada face with respect to NG 9-1-1 are not technical problems, but instead are problems of policy development, monitoring and implementation. What I offer below are five recommendations for the Commission’s consideration, with regard to an approach that it could follow to address the issues that have been raised through this inquiry.

Recommendation #1: The CRTC needs to participate in the establishment of a national policy forum for 9-1-1 239. The basic problem with all of 9-1-1 in Canada at this time is institutional, not technical. 9-1- 1 in Canada lacks a policy forum that gathers the appropriate people and agencies in a multi-stakeholder institution. Everyone grasps their part of the elephant, and even if they know intellectually that they are only grasping a part, the means of coming to grips with the whole of the beast is made impossible by the various silos in which everyone is forced to operate: the Commission, the provinces and territories, the PSAPs, the carriers, Public Safety Canada, the first responder organizations (police, fire and ambulance). That is just the public sector side. There are also the carriers and the suppliers of other equipment and services to PSAPs to consider. Some kind of multi-stakeholder institution where the relevant discussions can take place needs to be created.

Figure 10: A multi-stakeholder forum

240. The foremost recent example of a multi-stakeholder institution is ICANN, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (www.icann.org). ICANN was established to deal with a comparable institutional problem. By the late 1990s, the Internet had grown too big for the United States government. The Internet's very success had made what was once a largely university-based data exchange network into a global phenomenon. The Internet has three main attributes: it is not constituted by states, though its policy management has residual relationships to the United States government; its carriers exchange traffic on a voluntary basis; and it has two central points of control or coordination, i.e., domain name policy and assignments, and IP address policy and assignments. The need for some form of debate, and decision-making, in relation to these two centralized points of control has necessitated the creation of an organization to do so. 241. ICANN maintains three mini-parliaments under the general supervision of a board of directors of a not-for-profit company. These parliaments concern themselves with: 1) address policy, 2) top-level domains (.com, .net, .org and their successors) and 3) country codes (.ca, .fr, .jp, etc.). Registrars of domain names, registries, intellectual property owners, businesses and governments each have special interest groups or ways of influencing the Board of Directors of ICANN. The organizational chart is set out at http://www.icann.org/en/groups/chart. 242. While I am not holding up ICANN's every detail as something to be emulated, I maintain that multi-stakeholder organizations for complex issues of governance, such as are found in 9-1-1, are completely normal in the Internet world.

What are the issues we face in 9-1-1? 243. We face: Multiple forms of expertise or communities of practice (telecommunications carriers, PSAPs and first responders); Many jurisdictions (federal, provincial, territorial, municipal); Siloed mandates within and between jurisdictions;

Lack of accountability for, and inadequate data on, money flowing through the system; Lack of a policy forum for discussing fundamental questions, such as who shall run the databases, who measures what, where does the money go, how do we evolve coherent standards, and so forth; An oncoming rush of technological change, which, unless addressed intelligently, will be directed as incumbents see fit; New training requirements for PSAP operators in a new technological environment; A wide gap between what citizens expect the 9-1-1 system to be capable of handling and what it can actually handle; A balkanized system of PSAPs, with widely differing capabilities from rural areas to urban centres, and no sense that they could form part of a national or even province- wide/territory-wide system of emergency response; In the two largest provinces by population, British Columbia and Ontario, the absence of an agency charged with coordinated oversight of 9-1-1 policy and delivery at the provincial government level; For want of national standards, a fragmented market for equipment and services to PSAPs; A lack of any system of coordinated, agreed-upon metrics, including a lack of an institution that would decide upon the metrics and another system that would carry out the metrics for that institution; and A lack of money flowing directly into the institutions that engage in the governance of 9-1-1 in Canada. 244. The list could be readily extended.

What should a multi-stakeholder organization deal with? 245. The proposed organization is not intended to replace appropriate provincial/territorial or federal authorities. The problems it would be best suited to address concern the development of consensus and advice as to what provincial/territorial and federal authorities should do in relation to the problems set out in this report, those for which the ESWG or its successor are not the most appropriate forums. Training standards for PSAP operators. Technology standards for systems integration and interconnection. Monitoring money flows and the efficiency of various collection and distribution mechanisms. Devising performance metrics for carriers, databases, and other networked participants, including levels of service to PSAPs. Public education campaigns. Considering reports that the CRTC and other authorities might seek its advice on. Devising common standards for legal liabilities for carriers, PSAPs and first responders. Public alerting and emergency response issues, as may be appropriate.

Other issues within the fields of 9-1-1, public safety and emergency response as the corporation may decide to advise on. Considering NG 9-1-1 issues and proposals, and advising governments on the order in which issues could be addressed. 246. The multi-stakeholder forum is an attempt to overcome the various silos that keep 9-1-1, public alerting, search and rescue, and emergency response separate and uncommunicative. It is not my desire to over-specify a solution at this stage, but to open up the possibilities of rational discussion on the basis of common perceived problems.

Why would a multi-stakeholder institution be appropriate for addressing this long list of issues? 247. There are at least two reasons: jurisdictions and expertise. We have ten provinces, three territories, and one federal government, each with a portion of the jurisdiction necessary to address the issues. Only a multi-stakeholder institution that gathers enough of the interests has the legitimacy to make the necessary systemic decisions. Such decisions cannot be made by coercion; they can only be made and implemented cooperatively. No one jurisdiction has the legal right to go beyond its jurisdiction and make changes in another's arrangements. 248. The second reason is just as fundamental. No one body combines all the expertise required to make the whole 9-1-1 system work. Carriers know their business very well; though of course they have no monopoly on technical knowledge. Suppliers of equipment to PSAPs have legitimate interests in standardization, consistency and being heard. First responders have different areas of expertise, and PSAPs have different areas of expertise yet again. Provinces and territories have responsibilities for money collection and 9-1-1 delivery policy, as well as emergency management. The Commission regulates networks and interconnection, and Public Safety Canada regulates public alerting and disaster response. 249. Then why could not the ESWG, or some successor as envisaged by this report, act as the multi-stakeholder agency? I see two reasons. The first is that technical advice limited to the Commission’s telecommunications jurisdiction is but one part of a major cross- jurisdictional set of issues. The second is that the ESWG lacks representation at the right levels, and in many cases from the appropriate parties, that would engage provincial/territorial authorities in 9-1-1 policy. The ESWG is a technical body suitable for technical decisions. In that capacity, it might well turn into an advisory body incorporated into the overall 9-1-1 multi-stakeholder institution. The kinds of decisions that need to be made by the provinces and territories, the municipalities, and the federal government regarding 9-1-1 constitute policy decisions about the evolution of the whole system and cannot be made in an organization of the limited scope of the ESWG. 250. There will be resistance in some quarters to seeing the 9-1-1 system as a whole, let alone as one which is linked to emergency response and other related issues, such as search and rescue. Second, some participants in the current system will feel that new players and

greater attention to 9-1-1 are unwelcome intrusions into currently working arrangements. The thrust of this report has been that current arrangements are inadequate in relation to the importance and scope of 9-1-1, and to the evolution of 9-1-1 in the public interest.

Does a multi-stakeholder institution need to be created by the CRTC? 251. Not necessarily. Summoning into existence a pan-Canadian 9-1-1 policy organization, predicated on multiple stakeholders, will involve more players than the Commission itself. 252. The Commission has a large measure of choice in how it proceeds. In fact, the institution – let us call it “Canada911.ca” – is probably best formed by a collective decision on the part of most of the current stakeholders to proceed along these lines. In this situation, the Commission is a highly important stakeholder among several. The Commission has several important advantages, however. It is the one player with unquestioned authority over the networks that tie citizens to PSAPs, and it has comparable authority over how databases would be linked to a future 9-1-1 system. It can lead, it can encourage, it can cajole, and it can regulate telecommunications carriers and network interconnection. It can define access to 9-1-1 as a part of basic service. It can go further; it can define what 9-1-1 consists of, though it should act on appropriate advice in making this decision. It can act with a measure of independence as a regulatory agency, if it wants to and if the subject matter is within its jurisdiction. 253. Nor is the idea of recognizing and cooperating with an outside corporation an innovation in how the Commission conducts business. The pattern established in the past has been that the telecommunications industry established the corporation and the Commission recognized it, but each party acted in the reasonable expectation that the other would cooperate. The Canadian LNP Consortium, the Canadian Numbering Administration Consortium and the Commissioner for Complaints for Telecommunications Services were established at various times by portions of the telecommunications industry to govern various inter-carrier functions that are best handled cooperatively: interconnection among rival cellular carriers, telephone number assignment and allocation, and complaints against the industry. 254. Each of these arrangements has been blessed over time by the Commission as an effective vehicle for devolving important aspects of techno-policy to relevant players. The Commission has been more than a passive bystander in their creation; it continues to sanction the recommendations of the Canadian Numbering Administration Consortium about area code splits and overlays, for example.

Does the 9-1-1 multi-stakeholder organization (Canada911.ca) need to be a corporation? 255. It would be helpful. A corporation is the normal path for establishing an artificial legal personality capable of representing itself, of being governed by a board of directors, of disbursing money and of being accountable.

What steps should the CRTC take in relation to the proposal for a national 9-1-1 policy body? 256. The premise of the foregoing is that the first responder community, the provinces/territories or some other group will take the lead, but that the Commission can and should signal encouragement of the concept of a multi-stakeholder organization for 9-1-1 policy development. The Commission can signal to the other communities in the 9-1-1 world that it is aware that a number of policy considerations are engaged in 9-1-1. It can also indicate that it is aware that a multi-stakeholder organization is the most appropriate format for joining the relevant players. The exact form of consent that the Commission might give to this idea is an open question. The degree to which the Commission accepts the principal recommendations of this report, and the manner in which it pursues the issues raised here, is for the Commission to decide. There are many ways of saying yes. 257. Nevertheless, I am confident that the Commission has the means at its disposal to advance the way in which policy matters in 9-1-1 will be pursued, if it so chooses.

Recommendation #2: The Commission should focus more on matters related to 9-1-1 through a dedicated staff group 258. Here we address matters fully within the Commission’s telecommunications jurisdiction. The Commission does not have a single individual who is dedicated solely to 9-1-1. Compare that to the situation in the United States. 259. As discussed previously, the FCC has a group of about six people dedicated to work on core 9-1-1 and NG 9-1-1 matters. The last PSHSB Chief before the current one was a retired United States Navy admiral, Jamie Barnett. The recently retired FCC Chairman, Julius Genachowski, placed considerable emphasis on 9-1-1 and the development of capacity in the Commission to address 9-1-1-related matters. 260. In my view, the Commission’s policy-making on matters relating to the 9-1-1 emergency calling system could be enhanced by a dedicated staff group working on such matters. 261. Such a group could focus on: Understanding the policy implications of continuing to have the incumbent telephone companies manage parts of the 9-1-1 system (e.g. databases) versus having those elements of the 9-1-1 system managed elsewhere, in independent organizations, as would be consistent with Internet practices; Understanding the total money flows into and out of carriers for 9-1-1 services; Cooperating with other federal (in particular Public Safety Canada) and provincial/territorial entities, as appropriate, for the advancement of 9-1-1 capabilities; Devising a uniform code of 9-1-1 regulation and best practices so that the body of the Commission’s regulation on the subject is found in one place and regularly updated; Publishing regular reports on 9-1-1 metrics; Devising suitable 9-1-1 metrics and holding parties to account for same;

Devising and creating a better structure of advice giving; and Encouraging broad participation of first responder organizations and provincial/territorial 9-1-1 authorities in our advisory body or bodies. 262. This dedicated Commission staff group could also cooperate with other participants in the 9-1-1 system to enhance Canadian education on 9-1-1. Standardized education would help the general public learn how 9-1-1 works and how to deal with emergency calls. Further, the growing demand for use of mobile devices and social media in an emergency will require public education campaigns to educate the public on the capacities and limitations of the 9-1-1 emergency calling system. 263. In my view, work conducted by a dedicated group of Commission staff on the above-noted items could only serve to enhance the Commission’s expertise and policy-making ability on 9-1-1 emergency call system matters that fall under the Telecommunications Act.

Recommendation #3: The Commission should assign a high priority to location accuracy work at the ESWG for both wireless and VoIP services 264. The ESWG currently has an active task dealing with wireless 9-1-1 location information in Canada. However, in my view, this task has not been given the priority that it should have received. Additionally, the problem of determining caller location when using VoIP technologies has not been widely examined to date, but no viable alternative to the existing approach has been found. 265. While the ESWG has indicated that there will be a renewed focus on this activity, I suggest that the Commission reinforce the importance of this work, possibly requesting completion by a specific date with periodic status updates.

Recommendation #4: Reform of the ESWG is required, in the following ways: 266. It needs a budget For meeting places independent of carriers' facilities; For a web address separate from the Commission’s, and the maintenance of a publicly visible website; To maintain discussion lists on e-mail; and For a secretariat to prepare minutes and records of decisions, to make announcements of meetings, to establish and reserve meeting places, and to maintain the appearance and substance of an open, participant-driven, citizen-oriented, advice- generating system for the Commission in 9-1-1 matters. 267. It needs neutral chairpersons of its subcommittees. Proponents of technological changes not emanating from the incumbents are forced, by the nature of who is or is not interested in technological change, to chair ESWG sub-committees, with the consequent conflict between the role of chairperson and the role of advocate for change. I recommend that

Commission staff act as chairpersons of ESWG subcommittees. It would demonstrate the seriousness with which the Commission is taking 9-1-1 matters. 268. The ESWG needs to be taken out of the CISC framework entirely. The 9-1-1 system is of sufficient importance that a steering committee of the ESWG would need to encompass a broader range of interests than carriers and the CRTC. Its steering committee should include first responder associations, PSAPs, provinces and territories, and others concerned with the evolution of 9-1-1. Its board of directors (steering committee) could be, in time, the multi-stakeholder organization proposed above. In any case, it will require little effort for the CRTC to take the ESWG out of its current framework and establish a steering committee for it on a broader basis, directed towards 9-1-1 systemic problems, and less dominated by the technical expertise of incumbent carriers.

Recommendation #5: For certain issues, the CRTC can create particular committees along the lines of the FCC’s advisory structure 269. The FCC has had considerable success in using advisory committees based on the following: The Chairman of the CRTC would select the chairperson of the advisory committee, with input from staff; The advisory committee would be given a tightly defined mandate and time frame in which to work and report; The advisory committee would be composed of a broad range of practitioners, suppliers, interest groups and academics; Their work would be entirely voluntary; and They would report, and then the committee's existence would be terminated. 270. The success of this model has been predicated on the careful selection of a chairperson, his or her success in attracting interesting people, and the openness of the committee’s membership, but most of all, on the committee not continuing for years. Membership would be unpaid.

C. Conclusion 271. My perspective changed in the course of this inquiry. I became persuaded that NG 9-1-1 is not a finished state but a series of actions that will replace some older equipment with more capable equipment. But that is akin to saying we will replace electric typewriters and telephones with computer networks receiving data from a blizzard of new devices. Every technical assumption of the old 9-1-1 is giving way. Moreover, the transition to NG 9-1-1 is the microcosm of the transition from the old telephone system, with its hundred years of obligations and rules, to an Internet-driven world. 272. While it is my firm conviction that lawyers should not devise technologies, it is also true that engineers need to be able to explain why the particular systems they propose for 9-1-1 are

in the public interest. The transition to a computer-driven 9-1-1 system changes every technical assumption of the old telephone system. This is obviously the time and place for the public to concern itself with what they want out of public safety. The Commission can proceed, by way of a series of public hearings, to define the issues and gather evidence. This is a plausible course of action, but it should not be the exclusive way forward. It has been my experience as a Commissioner that the hearing format, for all its virtues in condensing arguments, may not gather a wide enough set of interests to be effective in this case, nor are Commissioners necessarily qualified to make the decisions that will be required without some outside help. Moreover, the kinds of decisions required may include both general policy decisions, of a kind only Commissioners can make, and a highly detail- oriented set of standards and implementation plans that engineers and technologists should be making. The length of time needed to argue through the various technological issues may require a measure of pre-digestion and prior agreement in a technical discussion forum. By the same token, the ESWG also fails several tests of inclusivity and openness, and is characterized by disparities of specialized technical knowledge among its participants. What is to be done? 273. My attempt at answering these questions is to encourage the creation of a multi- stakeholder organization that can begin to sort through the problems which cannot be addressed as effectively by the Commission or its technical advisory committee structure alone. Institutional innovation is required.52

Figure 11: The well-governed 9-1-1 elephant

52 It is worthy to note that on 13 June 2013, during a presentation at the annual conference of the Paramedic Chiefs of Canada, CITIG announced a new initiative, "Action NG9-1-1," an outcome of its NG 9-1-1 national governance and coordination workshop that was held on 10 and 11 June 2013. Action NG9-1-1 will encompass a wide range of communications and marketing efforts, including a new website, with strategic resources such as a one-pager, briefing notes, sample presentation and FAQs. CITIG stated that it will also leverage social media, regional presentations and related communications efforts. 60

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My first obligation is to thank all the people who kindly consented to talk to me and to make helpful submissions. The names and positions of those to whom I managed to speak are given in the interview list. You made the report, and to all of you, I am deeply indebted. I fear that if I singled out everyone who spoke, the acknowledgments would take as long as the report itself. The cooperation from the Federal Communications Commission and Laurie Flaherty of the United States Department of Transport was a model of U.S.-Canadian relations. I am above all thankful for the people at the Fairfax County PSAP – Roy Oliver, Cynthia Bird Shrout, Brenda Edmundson – for spending a good morning with us to explain the truth of the situation of PSAPs in a time of technological change and shrinking budgets. Brian Fontes and his staff at NENA took lots of time to help. Likewise a tip of the hat to Admiral Barnett, Dale Hatfield, Glenn Richards, George Heinrichs and others for sharing their valuable time with me. In Canada, the report of Ken Sluman, formerly of Peel Regional Police, to the inquiry was comprehensive and invaluable. It was he who put his finger on the measurement problem. Provincial officials responsible for 9-1-1 and emergency management were as cooperative as could be asked. To the folks at ESWG, and particularly Chris Kellett, chairman, a debt of thanks is owed by me and the Canadian public for their good-natured cooperation in the dull business of making things work, and for letting me observe the committee in action. The cooperation of the major carriers was appreciated, for they make a major part of the system work reliably. In that regard, a tip of the hat to Fadi Dabliz of Bell and David Watt of Rogers for the straight talk. To my colleagues at Public Safety Canada, you have cooperated and been helpful throughout. To the Canadian first responder community, I come away impressed that such good people can be found to do the jobs they do. I am especially indebted to Mike Sullivan of the City of Ottawa and Lance Valcour of CITIG, and the Ottawa and Toronto PSAP people, for enlightening me in many dimensions of the work. My staff at the CRTC were of great help. Without Bob Martin’s great writing abilities, this report would not be the crisp read that it is. To Stephen Delaney, my advisor and guide, thank you for keeping me focused and for guiding me through bureaucratic thickets, and for being great company in our travels. Richard Shockey, our American consultant, opened doors everywhere in Washington. Stephan Meyer did a great job on location accuracy, and Brian Parkin’s, Imen Arfaoui’s, Kay Saicheua’s, and James Ndirangu’s briefings helped greatly. To my lawyers Mssrs. James Wilson, Joshua Dougherty and Daniel Finestone, you three kept me out of an unnecessary trouble. To all of my staff, many thanks for your work, your advice, your interest, and your many kindnesses. Finally, my thanks go to the Chairman and my fellow Commissioners for assigning me this task. I confer the report to your good hands.

Figure 12: The helpful unseen elephant

APPENDICES

Appendix 1

Interviews for the 9-1-1 inquiry conducted by the Inquiry Officer

Organization City of Ottawa Date 14 November, 2012 People Mike Sullivan, Program Director, Emergency and Protective Services Coordinates [email protected]; 613 580-2424 ex. 15431

Organization AT&T Date 26 November 2012 People Robert Quinn, EVP; Eric Loeb, Joseph Marx, Michael Goggin, Hank Hultquist, Frank Simone Coordinates Suite 1000 Washington, DC 20036 202-457-3821

Organization Canadian Embassy in Washington Date 27 November 2013 People Eric Miller, Senior Policy Advisor, Canadian Department of Industry Coordinates Since taken a new job

Organization Federal Communications Commission Date 27 November 2013 People Ajit Pai, Commissioner; Mathew Berry, Chief of Staff; Courtney Reinhard, Legal Advisor; David Furth, deputy director, Public Safety Bureau, FCC Coordinates 445 12th Street NW, Washington DC, [email protected]; 202-418-2016

Organization National Telecommunications Cooperative Association (NTCA – The Rural Broadband People) Date 27 November 2012 People Mike Romano, Jill Canfield, Joshua Seideman, Steve Pastorkovich and others Coordinates 4121 Wilson Blvd, 10th Floor, Arlington, VA 22203,(703) 351-2016 www.ntca.org

Organization True Position, Inc. Date 27 November 2012 People Michael Amarosa, Peter Barnes, in Washington DC Coordinates www.trueposition.com 1230 Avenue of the Americas, Suite 810, New York, NY

Organization United States Department of Transport Date 29 November, 2013 People Laurie Flaherty, Coordinator, National 911 Program Coordinates 202-366-2705, [email protected] United States DOT / NHTSA Office of EMS,1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, NTI-140, Washington DC 20590

Organization Neustar Date 29 November2012 People Tom McGarry, VP, Advanced Services, Richard Fruchterman, Associate4 General Counsel; Scott Harris, SVP and General Counsel; Scott Deutchman, Vice President, Legal and External Affairs Coordinates www.neustar.org, 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.,4th Floor, Washington DC 20006, +1 (202) 533–2917

Organization VON (Voice over Net) coalition Date 28 November 2012 People Glenn Richards, counsel, executive director Coordinates [email protected], 202-663-8215

Organization Federal Communications Commission Date 29 November, 2012 People Henning Schulzrinne, CTO, Walter Johnston, chief, electromagnetic compatibility division Coordinates 445 12th Street, South West, Washington DC, 20554 [email protected], 202-418-0807 Schulzrinne - http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~hgs/ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henning_Schulzrinne

Organization Federal Communications Commission Date 29 November, 2012 People David Turetsky, Chief, Public Safety and Homeland Security Division, David Furth, Deputy Chief Coordinates 445 12th Street, South West, Washington DC, 20554 [email protected]; [email protected], 202 418 0632

Organization Federal Communications Commission Date 29 November, 2012 People Julie Veach, Chief, Wireline Competition Bureau, Travis Litman, legal advisor Coordinates 445 12th Street, South West, Washington DC, 20554

Organization National Emergency Numbering Association (NENA) Date 30 November 2012 People Brian Fontes, CEO, Trey Fogarty, Legal Counsel, Ron Bloom, Roger Hixson, Ty Wooten Coordinates 202-466-4911 1700 Diagonal Road, Suite 500 Alexandria, Virginia 22314 Rick Galway Tel: 905-637-0072 Cell: 905-515-8306

Organization Emergency Services Working Group Date 3 December 2012, 11 February 2013, 19 March 2013 People Chris Kellett, Chairman Coordinates 1 780 720 5696, 1 250 869 0100, [email protected]

Organization IETF, Microsoft, Internet Architecture Board Date January 15, 2013 People Bernard Aboba Coordinates http://aboba.drizzlehosting.com/

Organization Public Safety Canada Date January 18, 2013 People Serge Beaudoin, Emilie Brown, Jeff Boyczuk, Claudio Lucente, Richard Moreau, Tyler Andrews Coordinates 269 Laurier Avenue, 17th floor; Beaudoin (later replaced by Pierre Trudel) 613- 991-2944, [email protected], 613 949 3995; [email protected], [email protected], 514 442 2357.

Organization University of Colorado, Faculty of Engineering Date 24 January 2013 People Prof. Douglas Sicker, former CTO of the FCC Coordinates 1 303 735 4949; http://spot.colorado.edu/~sicker/

Organization NG9-1-1institute.org Date 29 January 2013 People Gregory Rohde Coordinates http://www.ng911institute.org/, 202 292 4603, 317 Massachusetts Ave., Suite 300, Washington DC 20002

Organization CITIG Competitive Interoperability Technology Interest Group Date 29 January 2013, 12 March 2013 People Lance Valcour Coordinates 613 371 7808; http://www.citig.ca/

Organization University of Colorado Date 30 January 2013 People Professor Dale Hatfield Coordinates 303 449 1706; http://lawweb.colorado.edu/profiles/profile.jsp?id=397

Organization Carnegie Mellon University Date February 1, 2013 People Professor Jon Peha, former CTO at the FCC Coordinates 202 276 1245; [email protected]; http://users.ece.cmu.edu/~peha/

Organization TELUS Date February 4, 2013 People Ted Woodhead, VP Regulatory Affairs Coordinates 613 597 8368;

Organization Government of Alberta, Date February 5, 2013 People Craig Mahovsky, Manager, Strategic Initiatives Coordinates 780-415-4758

Organization Government of New Brunswick Date February 6, 2013 People Diane Pelletier, Director, Public Safety, NB-9-1-1 Bureau Coordinates (506) 453-5307, [email protected]

Organization Government of Nova Scotia, Department of Justice, Emergency Management Office Date February 7, 2013 People Joan Mahoney, 911 Operations Manager Coordinates [email protected]; 1-902-424-5539

Organization Bell Canada Date 11 February 2013 People Philippe Gauvin Coordinates [email protected]

Organization Venable LLP, former Bureau Chief, Public Safety and Homeland Security Division Date 13 February 2013 People Rear Admiral Jaimie Barnett, United States Navy, ret’d Coordinates http://www.venable.com/jamie-barnett/; 202.344.4695

Organization Fairfax County, Virginia, Department of Public Safety Communications Date 14 February, 2013 People Roy Oliver, Cynthia Bird Shrout, Brenda Edmundson Coordinates 1 571 350 1710

Organization Public Safety Network, Inc. Date 14 February 2013 People Kurt Warner, Don Reich Coordinates [email protected]; 805 642 5267

Organization Government of Manitoba, Emergency Measures Service, Date 18 February, 2013 People Don MacKinnon, Director of Planning Coordinates 204 945 8855. [email protected]

Organization Government of Canada, National Search and Rescue Secretariat, Date 18 February 2013 People Ron Kroeker, Michael Donald, Jae-Sang park, Major Geoff Lowe Coordinates www.nss.gc.ca, 275 Slater St. Ottawa 4th floor, 996-3590

Organization Prince Edward Island Date 21 February 2013 People Pat Kelly, Provincial 9-1-1 Coordinator Coordinates (902) 894-0299, [email protected];http://www.gov.pe.ca/jps/csajp- info/dg.inc.php3

Organization Barkwell Holland Group Date 19 February 2013 People Holly Barwell-Holland, consultant Coordinates 905 852 1064; [email protected];

Organization Centre for Security Science Date 22 February 2013, 1 March 2013 People Philip Dawe, Portfolio Manager, Emergency Management Coordinates 613 943 0745; [email protected]

Organization Telecommunications Systems, Inc. Date 25 February 2013 People Bob Gojanovich, Sales Director Next Generation 9-1-1 Coordinates [email protected], 610-438-4061

Organization Agence Municipale de développement et du financement des systèmes 9-1-1 du Québec Date 26 February, 2013 People Serge Allen, executive Director Coordinates 418 653 3911; http://www.agence911.org/en/theagency

Organization Industry Canada Date 25 February 2013 People Marc Dupuis, Director General, Spectrum Engineering; Louis Lepage, Acting Director, Industry Framework Policy Coordinates [email protected]; [email protected], 613 990 4820

Organization Rogers Communications Inc. Date 27 February 2013 People Simon-Pierre Olivier, Director, Regulatory Affairs Coordinates 514 350 6595

Organization Office of the Privacy Commissioner Date 28 February 2013 People Dr. Tara Whalen, IT Research Analyst Coordinates Since moved to Google in San Mateo, Ca.

Organization Canadian Internet Registration Authority Date 1 March 2013 People Alan MacGillivray, Policy Analyst Coordinates www.cira.ca,

Organization E-Comm 9-1-1 Date 5 March 2013 People Mike Webb, VP Technology Coordinates 604-215-5003; [email protected]

Organization Public Safety Canada Date 8 March 2013 People Pierre Trudel, Emilie Brown, Bernard St. Laurent, Julie Cranton Coordinates 269 Laurier Avenue, Ottawa; Trudel-613-991-7030

Organization Ottawa Paramedic Service, City of Ottawa Date 18 March, 2013 People Greg Furlong, Strategic Initiatives Project Officer; Jennifer Bionda, Assistant Chief Communications Coordinates 613-580-2424 x12995, [email protected]; 613-580- 2424x22450, [email protected] 2465 Don Reid Drive, Ottawa, Ontario K1H 1E2

Organization Ottawa Fire Department, Dispatch Office Date 18 March, 2013 People Ruth King, Pauline Woolsey Coordinates 1423 Randall Ave, Ottawa On K1h 7r5,Canada

Organization Ottawa Police Service Date 18 March 2013 People Inspector Paul Gallant,9-1-1 Communications Centre; Eric Janus, Operations Manager, 9-1-1 Communications Centre, Sgt. Roch Lavigne Coordinates 474 Elgin Street, Ottawa, Ontario 613-316-2258 x 5556 (Gallant)

Organization Rogers Communications Inc. Date 19 March 2013 People David Watt, VP Regulatory Affairs, Telecom; Gerry Thompson, Senior Manager, CLEC Affairs; Simon-Pierre Olivier, Glen Freer, Sr. Manager, Intercarrier Relations Coordinates 8200 Dixie Road Brampton, Ontario; [email protected]

Organization City of Brandon Date 19 March 2013 People Ross Robinson, Director of Emergency Communications Coordinates [email protected]; 204-729-2406

Organization City of Winnipeg Date 19 March 2013 People Cindy Kirby Coordinates [email protected], 204-226-2075

Organization Bell Canada Date 21 March 2013 People Bruce Rodin, Vice President, Wireless Technology, Tony Hui, Senior Associate Director, Bell Mobility Coordinates 5099 Creekbank Road, Mississauga, Ontario; [email protected]; [email protected]

Organization Bell Canada Date 21 March 2013 People Fadi Dabliz, 9-1-1 subject matter expert; Guy Caron, 9-1-1 subject matter expert, Philippe Gauvin, Counsel Coordinates 76 Adelaide Street West, Toronto; Dabliz- 416-709-9057, [email protected]; Caron – 418-691-111, [email protected]

Organization The Senate of Canada Date 26 March 2013 People Senator Vern White, former chief of police, Ottawa Coordinates (613) 996-7602, [email protected]

Organization Intrado Date 28 March 2013 People George Heinrichs, President and CEO; Craig Donaldson, SVP, Regulatory and Government Affairs Coordinates [email protected], 720-494-6501; [email protected], 720-494-6506

Organization Bell Canada Date 2 April 2013 People Philippe Gauvin Coordinates [email protected]

Organization Toronto Police Date 21 March 2013, 3 April 2013 People Tracy Finn, 9-1-1 Emergency Services Voice Coordinator; Sandy Briell, Coordinator CAD/Integrated Field Services Coordinates [email protected], 416-808-8899; [email protected] 416 808 8827

Organization VOIP Solutions Date 16 April 2013 People Peter Woodford Coordinates 902-488-7225; http://www.voips911.com/people.php

Organization European Emergency Number Association Date 16 and 17 April 2013 People Garry Machado, Executive Director Coordinates [email protected]; 32 2 534 9789 Avenue de la Toison d’Or 79, 9th floor, 1060 Brussels, Belgium

Organization European Emergency Number Association Date 16 April 2013 People Cristina Lumbreras, Technical Director Coordinates [email protected], 32 02 534 97 89

Organization European Emergency Numbering Association Date 19 April 2013 People Jerome Paris, membership services director Coordinates [email protected], 011 32 2 644 0608

Organization ANCOM, National Authority for Management and Regulation in Communications of Romania Date 16 April 2013 People Florin Dragomir, Head of Department, technical regulation Coordinates 4 0372 845 313, [email protected]

Organization Cassidian Communications Date 16 April 2013 People David Warren, Director of Sales Coordinates [email protected], 790 699 8849

Organization Nokia Siemens and Internet Architecture Board Date 18 April 2013 People Hannes Tschofenig Coordinates [email protected], 011 358 50 4871 445

Organization Mobile Arts (Sweden) Date 18 April and 29 April People Dr. Paul Martlew, VP Channel Sales Coordinates 011 44 77 99 640 190, [email protected]

Organization Commonwealth of Massachusetts Date 26 April 2013 People Geoffrey Why, Commissioner, Department of Telecommunications and Cable Coordinates 1 617 367 1109, [email protected]

Organization NENA and ESWG Date 1 May 2013 People Rock Galway, past president of NENA, past president of ESWG Coordinates [email protected]

Organization Defence Research, Centre for Security Science Date 7 May 2013 People Dr. Mark Williamson, Director General; Chris Hough, Acting Deputy DG; Col.Lt. Colin Murray, Jack Pagotto; Andrew Dawe, John Neily Coordinates 222 Nepean Street, 11th floor; [email protected], [email protected], 613 943 0745

Organization TELUS Date 8 May 2013 People Bob Collins, Sr. Product Manager; Juss Smith; Andy Brauer, director, product management; Eric Edora, director, regulatory affairs; Greg Howard Coordinates Eric Edora - 613 597 8313, [email protected]; [email protected], 604 695 3275

Organization NENA Date 15 May 2013 People Ty Wooten, Director of Education and Operational Issues Coordinates [email protected], 202 618 4408

Appendix 2

9-1-1 coverage map

Appendix 3

9-1-1 governance in Canada

Provinces that have enacted Provincial 9-1-1 legislation

Province Administration Department Legislation Regulations Scope Funding Saskatchewan Office of the Ministry of The Emergency 911 The Public Safety Identifies Rates set by Fire Government System Act Answering Point PSAPs Province Commissioner Relations Regulations, 2011 Saskatchewan Limitations of Sask911 Telecommunications Sask911 Fees liability Account Act Regulations, 2003 established

Saskatchewan Telecommunications Fees Manitoba Manitoba Manitoba The Emergency 911 Emergency 911 Limitations of Silent Emergency Emergency Public Safety Public Safety liability Measures Measures Answering Point Answering Point Organization Organization PSAP standards

and procedures Quebec Agence Municipal Civil Protection Act Regulation PSAP Rates set by municipale de oversight Respecting standards Province financement et An Act Respecting Standards, and de Municipal Taxation Specifications and procedures développement Quality Criteria des centres An Act Respecting Applicable to 9-1-1 Limitations of d’urgence 911 the Exercise of Emergency Centres liability du Québec Certain Municipal and to Certain Powers in Certain Secondary Urban Emergency Centres Agglomerations Regulation Governing Municipal Tax for 9-1-1 New NB 9-1-1 Department Emergency 911 Act NB 911 Service Fee Limitations of Rates set by Brunswick Bureau of Public Regulations liability Province Safety PSAP NB 911 standards Service and Fund procedures established Nova Scotia Emergency Department Emergency “911” Emergency 911 Limitations of Rates set by Management of Justice Act Cost Recovery Fee liability Province Office Regulations E911 Cost Rates set by Recovery Province Fund established

Fund administered by E911 Cost Recovery Committee Prince Edward 9-1-1 Department Emergency 911 Act General Regulations Civic Rates set by Island Administration of Justice addressing Province Office and Public Safety PSAP boundaries

Limitations of liability

Appendix 4

Governance/coordination charts

Appendix 5

List of acronyms

APCO - the Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials

CISC - the CRTC Interconnection Steering Committee

CSRIC - the Communications Security Reliability and Interoperability Council

ESWG - Emergency Services Working Group

ESInet - emergency services IP network

E9-1-1 - Enhanced 9-1-1

IP - Internet protocol

MASAS - multi-agency situational awareness system

NENA - the National Emergency Number Association

NG 9-1-1 - next-generation 9-1-1

PSAP - public safety answering point

PSBN - public safety broadband network

PSTN - public switched telephone network

SOREM - the Senior Officials Responsible for Emergency Management committee

TSP - telecommunications service provider

VoIP - voice over IP

Appendix 6

9-1-1 Team

Timothy Denton, Commissioner, Inquiry Officer

Stephen Delaney, Advisor to the Chairman

Bob Martin, project manager

Imen Arfaoui, engineer

Stephan Meyer, engineer

James Ndirangu, technology analyst

Brian Parkin, analyst, Europe

Kay Saicheua, social policy

Richard Shockey, U.S. analyst

James Wilson, chief counsel

Joshua Dougherty, counsel

Daniel Finestone, counsel

March 2014 CATASTROPHIC EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS

www.bcauditor.com

NigelSpiers / Shutterstock.com 8 Bastion Square Victoria, British Columbia Canada V8V 1X4 Telephone: 250-419-6100 Facsimile: 250-387-1230 Website: www.bcauditor.com

Te Honourable Linda Reid Speaker of the Legislative Assembly Province of British Columbia Parliament Buildings Victoria, British Columbia V8V 1X4

Dear Madame Speaker:

I have the honour to transmit to the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia my Catastrophic Earthquake Preparedness report.

We conducted the audit in accordance with Section 11(8) of the Auditor General Act and the standards for assurance engagement established by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants.

My Ofce frst looked at this topic 17 years ago in our Earthquake Preparedness report and arrived at the same conclusion. Progress has been made in some areas over this intervening period, but overall, the province is still at a signifcant risk if a catastrophic earthquake were to occur today.

One of the main causes for this lack of progress is that preparing for a catastrophic earthquake has not been made a priority. Since my Ofce’s report in 1997, successive governments have decided to allocate scarce public resources to meet more immediate pressing demands, rather than to adequately prepare the province for a catastrophic earthquake that may or may not occur. As a result, Emergency Management BC (EMBC), the government organization tasked with leading the Province’s response to a catastrophic earthquake, has not fulflled this part of its mandate.

We concluded that EMBC cannot demonstrate that it is adequately prepared to manage the efects of a catastrophic earthquake and it is not reporting publicly on the Province’s preparedness.

While the recommendations from this audit are directed at EMBC, I urge all readers of this report to look at their own situation and ask themselves whether they are ready and if they have done everything they should to prepare themselves, their families, and their communities for an earthquake.

I would also like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to EMBC and Ministry of Justice staf for their cooperation during this audit.

Russ Jones, MBA, CA Auditor General Victoria, British Columbia March 2014 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Auditor General’s Comments 4

Executive Summary 6

Summary of Recommendations 8

Response from the Ministry of Justice 9

Detailed Report 12

Background 12

Audit Objectives and Scope 16

Audit Conclusion 17

Key Findings and Recommendations 17

Looking Ahead 34 Appendix A: Types of Earthquakes in the Cascadia Subduction Zone 35

Appendix B: Earthquake statistics 36 Appendix C: Summary of recommendations - OAG’s 1997 report 37 Appendix D: Summary of recommendations - Select Standing Committee on Public Accounts 1999 report 41 AUDITOR GENERAL’S COMMENTS 4

Emergency Management BC (EMBC) is not adequately prepared for a catastrophic earthquake. This came as a surprise given that my Office first looked at this topic 17 years ago in our Earthquake Preparedness report and arrived at the same conclusion. Progress has been made in some areas over this intervening period, but overall, the province is still at a significant risk if a catastrophic earthquake were to occur today.

One of the main causes for this lack of progress is that preparing for a catastrophic earthquake has not been made a priority. Since this Office’s report in 1997, successive governments have decided to allocate scarce public resources to Russ Jones, MBA, CA meet more immediate pressing demands, rather than to adequately prepare the Auditor General province for a catastrophic earthquake that may or may not occur. As a result, EMBC, the government organization tasked with leading the Province’s response to a catastrophic earthquake, has not fulfilled this part of its mandate.

EMBC staff has demonstrated great dedication in attempting to meet the competing demands of its broad mandate, which includes coordinating government’s response to floods, fires, avalanches, and other emergencies throughout the year. In 2013, EMBC responded to approximately 6,000 incidents related to dangerous goods spills, search and rescue events, major floods, fires, landslides, and avalanches. However, given the frequency and demands of these “regular” emergencies, catastrophic earthquake planning has become a lesser priority within EMBC. AUDIT TEAM

While government has stated that it is committed to providing a world-class Malcolm Gaston response to British Columbians, EMBC is still not adequately prepared for a Deputy Auditor General catastrophic earthquake. Furthermore, this lack of preparedness has not been publicly disclosed. Public reporting on EMBC’s level of preparedness is necessary Paul Nyquist to allow individuals, organizations and local and federal governments to make Director informed decisions on what they need to do to be prepared. Two recent studies Ardice Todosichuk have identified that the effects of a catastrophic earthquake in the southwest Manager region of BC could be far more devastating than previously estimated. This makes EMBC’s preparedness and public reporting even more important. Evan Machin Assistant Manager Preparing for a catastrophic earthquake is a shared responsibility. Local and federal governments, industry, non-profit organizations, and individuals living Tanya Wood in earthquake zones all have important roles and responsibilities and need to Analyst be prepared. Given the Province’s current level of preparedness, a sustained commitment by all stakeholders is needed if we are going to minimize the loss of life and other devastating impacts expected from a catastrophic earthquake. While

Auditor General of British Columbia | March 2014 Catastrophic Earthquake Preparedness AUDITOR GENERAL’S COMMENTS 5

the recommendations from this audit are directed at EMBC, I urge all readers of this report to look at their own situation and ask themselves whether they are ready and if they have done everything they should to prepare themselves, their families, and their communities for an earthquake.

I would also like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to EMBC and Ministry of Justice staf for their cooperation during this audit.

Russ Jones, MBA, CA Auditor General March 2014

Auditor General of British Columbia | March 2014 Catastrophic Earthquake Preparedness EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6

In recent years, catastrophic earthquakes and tsunamis have occurred in many regions of the world, particularly in the Pacifc Rim region wherein British Columbia (BC) lies. Te devastating human and economic impacts resulting from these seismic events will require years, and in some cases, decades of recovery.

In BC, the majority of the population resides in an earthquake hazard area. Annually, a few thousand earthquakes occur in and adjacent to BC. According to experts, an earthquake capable of causing structural damage can be expected to occur somewhere in the province about once every 10 years. Tese earthquakes are large enough to cause signifcant damage if they occur in a highly populated area.

“Catastrophic” earthquakes are much less frequent, but are capable of resulting in a high number of injuries, casualties, and extensive infrastructure damage. A recent report by the Insurance Bureau of Canada estimates that if such an earthquake were to occur of the densely populated south coast of the province and be followed by a tsunami, damages and losses could amount to nearly $75 billion. Experts have recently estimated a 12% probability of a catastrophic earthquake afecting BC in the next 50 years.

No jurisdiction in the world can be fully prepared to manage all the efects from a catastrophic earthquake. However, some level of preparedness must be achieved to reasonably protect the population, infrastructure and economy of the province and the country from the predicted impacts of such an event. It takes a conscious decision by government, along with a long-term commitment and the capacity to achieve a predetermined, desired level of preparedness.

Te provincial government has charged Emergency Management BC (EMBC), within the Ministry of Justice, with preparing and leading the provincial government’s response to such an event. In 1997, we carried out our frst audit on this topic which assessed the degree to which governments in British Columbia were carrying out the four pillar approach to emergency management: mitigation/prevention, preparation, response and recovery. For this current audit, we focused exclusively on EMBC’s preparedness activities and not on other provincial ministries or local governments. We developed our criteria and expectations anticipating that in the intervening 17 years, EMBC had sufcient time to signifcantly improve its level of preparedness. We also expected EMBC to be reporting to the public and the Legislative Assembly about the state of readiness it has achieved in this time, and the state that it is working towards.

We carried out this audit to answer the following questions:

1. Can EMBC demonstrate that it is prepared to manage the efects of a catastrophic earthquake? 2. Is EMBC publicly reporting on the Province’s preparedness for a catastrophic earthquake?

Auditor General of British Columbia | March 2014 Catastrophic Earthquake Preparedness EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7

We concluded that EMBC cannot demonstrate that it is adequately prepared to manage the efects of a catastrophic earthquake and it is not reporting publicly on the Province’s preparedness.

Catastrophic earthquake planning has not been made a priority by government or EMBC. Funding the planning work for a catastrophic earthquake that may or may not occur in the short-term competes with funding requests for more immediate needs, such as health care and public education. EMBC’s current operating budget for emergency activities is about the same as it was in 2006, despite the increases in BC’s population, the near doubling of BC’s property values and knowledge of the devastating impact of recent earthquakes in Chile, Japan and New Zealand.

Many of EMBC’s defciencies in its earthquake response capabilities were highlighted in their 2012 response to a potential tsunami in Haida Gwaii. EMBC’s internal report on this incident found that EMBC did not have sufcient personnel with the experience, knowledge and training to efectively respond to an earthquake and tsunami event, and their standard operation procedures were inadequate. EMBC is concerned that without additional resources and program enhancements communities will continue to be at risk.

Planning for a catastrophic earthquake is challenging for EMBC staf given the organization’s mandate and capacity issues. EMBC’s mandate is very broad and day-to-day emergencies such as foods and fres consume the majority of staf time. Furthermore, EMBC is lacking critical positions, such as a logistic planner, which constrains the organization’s ability to deliver on its catastrophic earthquake mandate. Tat said, EMBC could improve its catastrophic earthquake planning by applying a more rigorous management framework to identify and help achieve its desired results.

Te Province’s response to a catastrophic earthquake will depend largely on the efectiveness of the plans and procedures that EMBC and other stakeholders have in place and how well they are implemented. Our audit identifed a number of areas that require atention. We found that EMBC’s hazard, risk and vulnerability analysis is not sufciently detailed or up-to-date and that EMBC’s plans and procedures do not consistently refect best practices. We also found that EMBC’s catastrophic earthquake training, exercise and public education programs are inadequate. EMBC’s plans and procedures do not clearly describe all the actions that the Minister may need to undertake in a provincial state of emergency. Furthermore, we found that EMBC is not adequately monitoring stakeholder readiness and capacity and is not adequately ensuring that all the various stakeholder plans are integrated into a coordinated provincial response. Finally, we concluded that neither EMBC, nor the ministry it resides within, the Ministry of Justice, report publicly on the state of catastrophic earthquake preparedness in the province.

EMBC is not adequately prepared for a catastrophic earthquake; however, this information has not been made public. As a result, individuals and other key stakeholders do not have sufcient information to understand fully the risks they are facing or to determine the resulting level of preparedness that they must achieve to protect themselves, their families and their communities.

Auditor General of British Columbia | March 2014 Catastrophic Earthquake Preparedness SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 8

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

WE RECOMMEND THAT:

1 government develop long-term goals for catastrophic earthquake preparedness, including the level of preparedness it expects EMBC to achieve in the next 5, 10 and 15 years.

2 government ensures EMBC has the capacity necessary to address identifed critical gaps and achieve government’s expected level of preparedness.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT BC RECOMMENDATIONS WE RECOMMEND THAT:

3 EMBC develop a strategic plan to meet the Province’s long-term goals. Te plan should clearly demonstrate how EMBC will evaluate the efectiveness of its activities against its goals.

4 EMBC identify, rank and prioritize completion of its own key plans and procedures to ensure it meets its mandate to prepare and respond to a catastrophic earthquake.

5 EMBC regularly review its earthquake program to identify signifcant gaps and risks to a coordinated and integrated response, and develop actions to address them.

6 EMBC regularly review and evaluate its stakeholders’ emergency plans and procedures to assess stakeholder readiness and capacity.

7 EMBC conduct regular catastrophic earthquake exercises with its stakeholders to ensure it can deliver an efective, comprehensive and integrated government-wide response to a catastrophic earthquake.

8 EMBC measure the efectiveness of its public preparedness initiatives at regular intervals.

9 EMBC report annually to British Columbians on the state of its catastrophic earthquake preparedness. Te report should include an assessment of the overall state of earthquake preparedness, risks and capacity, and describe the plans and achievements of the Inter-Agency Emergency Preparedness Council (IEPC).

Auditor General of British Columbia | March 2014 Catastrophic Earthquake Preparedness RESPONSE FROM THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE 9

The Ministry of Justice acknowledges the conscientious and thorough work carried out by the audit team during its review of Emergency Management British Columbia’s (EMBC) preparedness for a catastrophic earthquake and would like to acknowledge the eforts of the people, both inside and outside of the ministry, who have been involved with this review.

Te Auditor General has recognized that preparing for a catastrophic earthquake is a shared responsibility. EMBC accepts its key role in this regard. Staf are continually working with local governments, regional districts, provincial ministries, Crown agencies, volunteers, non-governmental organizations, the Federal Government, First Nations and governments from other jurisdictions, to ensure that BC is well prepared to respond to a catastrophic event.

Te ministry and EMBC accept the Auditor General’s fndings regarding catastrophic earthquake preparedness.

As a leader in the province’s emergency management services, EMBC must balance the need to respond to immediate emergencies, including fre, fooding, avalanches, spills and landslides, with its mandate to ensure preparedness for a catastrophic incident of provincial signifcance. EMBC responded to approximately 6,000 such emergencies in 2013 alone. Tese types of events contribute to learning that is applied to EMBC’s evolving catastrophic event preparedness.

Immediate actions are being taken to address many of the key issues identifed by the audit. Furthermore, a long-term plan for catastrophic earthquake preparedness is being developed that will ultimately address all of the fndings contained in this report.

In responding to the audit report, the ministry has grouped some of the related recommendations. Te frst two recommendations of the Auditor General are directed to the Provincial Government. With respect to these recommendations, Emergency Management BC will work with its colleagues across government to ensure that appropriate actions are taken.

RECOMMENDATION 1: We recommend that the government develop long- term goals for catastrophic earthquake preparedness, including the level of preparedness it expects EMBC to achieve in the next 5, 10, and 15 years.

EMBC will develop a long-term plan that articulates provincial goals regarding catastrophic earthquake preparedness, and a phased approach for achieving these goals.

RECOMMENDATION 2: We recommend that the government ensures EMBC has the capacity necessary to address identifed critical gaps and achieve government’s expected level of preparedness.

Auditor General of British Columbia | March 2014 Catastrophic Earthquake Preparedness RESPONSE FROM THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE 10

EMBC will continue to use its existing resources as efciently and efectively as possible. At the same time, it will continue to work with partner agencies and stakeholders to promote alignment of eforts. Te ministry will embark on a consultative review with other partners to ensure that a more complete understanding of overall stakeholder preparedness is achieved.

RECOMMENDATION 4: We recommend that EMBC identify, rank and prioritize completion of its own key plans and procedures to meet its mandate to prepare and respond to a catastrophic earthquake.

Te spring 2014 update to EMBC’s overall strategic plan will identify preparation for catastrophic seismic events as a priority. Further, EMBC’s long-term plan for catastrophic earthquake preparedness, will include goals, prioritized activities and an evaluation framework to assess how those goals are being achieved.

RECOMMENDATION 5: We recommend that EMBC regularly review its earthquake program to identify signifcant gaps and risks to a coordinated and integrated response, and develop actions to address them.

A key element of EMBC’s long-term plan for catastrophic earthquake preparedness will be regular assessment of risks, gaps, and opportunities for program improvement.

RECOMMENDATION 6: We recommend that EMBC regularly review and evaluate its stakeholders’ plans and procedures to assess stakeholder readiness and capacity.

Te ministry will formally engage with stakeholders to determine what processes would be most efective to promote mutual awareness and alignment of plans and capacities. Tis will be part of the ministry’s consultative review.

RECOMMENDATION 7: We recommend that EMBC conduct regular catastrophic earthquake exercises with stakeholders to ensure an efective, comprehensive and integrated government-wide response to a catastrophic earthquake.

Te catastrophic earthquake preparedness plan that is referenced in other responses will include regular earthquake exercises with stakeholders. Tis plan will adopt a measured and progressive approach, characterized by appropriately phased increases in exercise scope and complexity.

RECOMMENDATION 8: We recommend that EMBC measure the efectiveness of public preparedness initiatives at regular intervals.

EMBC’s long-term plan for catastrophic earthquake preparedness will include public education activities and monitoring of these activities. In addition to ongoing public education eforts, a focused campaign will be conducted to bridge gaps in knowledge and encourage behaviour that will improve the province’s overall resiliency.

Auditor General of British Columbia | March 2014 Catastrophic Earthquake Preparedness RESPONSE FROM THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE 11

RECOMMENDATION 9: We recommend that EMBC report annually to British Columbians on the state of earthquake preparedness including an assessment of the overall state of earthquake preparedness, risk and capacity, and describe the plans and achievements of the Inter-Agency Emergency Preparedness Council (IEPC).

EMBC’s long-term plan for catastrophic earthquake preparedness will include an annual report to British Columbians. Tis will provide an opportunity to keep emergency preparedness at the forefront of priorities for individuals, families, stakeholders and government partners.

Auditor General of British Columbia | March 2014 Catastrophic Earthquake Preparedness DETAILED REPORT 12

Exhibit 1: The destructive power of earthquakes

BACKGROUND

In recent years, destructive earthquakes and tsunamis have occurred in many regions of the world. Te devastating human impact and economic loss resulting from these seismic events means years, and in some cases, decades of recovery (see Exhibit 1). The majority of BC’s population lives in a highly active earthquake zone

Southwestern British Columbia is situated in the Pacifc Ring of Fire, an area where some of the world’s largest earthquakes occur. Most of the areas at highest risk in the province are also the areas with the highest population density (see Exhibit 2). Debris crushed a car outside the Christchurch Exhibit 2: Earthquake hazard map Catholic Cathedral afer a 6.3-magnitude earthquake hit Christchurch, New Zealand, Feb. 22, 2011.

Source: New Zealand Press Association

FORT NELSON

FORT ST. JOHN DAWSON CREEK

PRINCE RUPERT MASSET PRINCE GEORGE

WILLIAMS LAKE Relative Hazard

High PORT HARDY KAMLOOPS

COURTENAY KELOWNA CRANBROOK VANCOUVER Low NANAIMO VICTORIA Source: Natural Resources Canada

Every year, a few thousand earthquakes occur in and adjacent to BC, but most result in litle or no damage. According to experts, however, an earthquake capable of causing structural damage can be expected to occur somewhere in the province about once every 10 years.

Auditor General of British Columbia | March 2014 Catastrophic Earthquake Preparedness DETAILED REPORT 13

Catastrophic earthquakes are less frequent but would result in a high number of casualties and evacuees. In this category of earthquake, response capabilities and resources of the local governments will likely be overwhelmed, life saving support from outside the area will be required, and the event would likely have long-term impacts within the incident area as well as, to a lesser extent, on the nation (see Exhibit 3).

Exhibit 3: Effects of earthquakes of varying strengths

Category Effects Richter Scale I. Instrumental Not felt 1-2

II. Just Perceptible Felt by only a few people on upper foors of tall buildings 3

III. Slight Felt by people lying down, seated on hard surfaces, or in the upper foors of tall buildings 3.5

IV. Perceptible Felt indoors by many, by few outside, and windows ratle 4

V. Rather Strong Generally felt by everyone; sleeping people may be awakened 4.5

VI. Strong Trees sway, chandeliers swing, bells ring, some damage from falling objects 5

VII. Very Strong General alarm; walls and plaster crack 5.5 Felt in moving vehicles; chimneys collapse; poorly constructed buildings seriously VIII.. Destructive 6 damaged IX. Ruinous Some houses collapse; pipes break 6.5

X. Disastrous Obvious ground cracks; railroad tracks bent; some landslides on steep hills 7 Few buildings survive; bridges damaged or destroyed; all services interrupted (electrical, XI. Very Disastrous 7.5 water, sewage, railroad); severe landslides XII. Catastrophic Total destruction; objects thrown into the air; river courses and topography altered 8

Source: SMSTsunamiWarning.com

Te strength of an earthquake does not necessarily equate to the corresponding efects shown in Exhibit 3. For example, the 2012 Haida Gwaii earthquake was a magnitude 7.7; yet, there was litle damage associated with this earthquake. However, the 2011 earthquake in New Zealand was a magnitude 6.3 and it resulted in 183 deaths and approximately $35 billion in economic loss due to the close proximity of the earthquake’s epicentre to Christchurch. Te damage that occurs is also related to the type of earthquake that can occur. BC’s earthquake profle includes three types of earthquakes: mega-thrust, deep-focus and shallow-focus. Each of these types creates a diferent patern of damage (See Appendix A for more details).

March 27, 2014 marks the 50th anniversary of the 9.2 magnitude “Great Alaskan Earthquake”, one of the largest earthquakes recorded in recent history. Energy released from an earthquake of this magnitude is equivalent to the explosion of over 1,800 megatons of TNT or over 30,000 combined Hiroshima-Nagasaki atomic bombs (See Appendix B for other recorded earthquakes).

Auditor General of British Columbia | March 2014 Catastrophic Earthquake Preparedness DETAILED REPORT 14

Tat 1964 mega-thrust quake triggered a powerful tsunami that resulted in structural Exhibit 4: Results of the tsunami that struck damage and human causalities as it travelled down the North American coast and west Port Alberni in 1964 to Japan. Locally, the tsunami seriously impacted the west coast of Vancouver Island. At least four waves hit Port Alberni, washing away 55 homes and damaging 375 others. Surprisingly, no deaths were reported in BC, but damage in the province was estimated at over $60 million in current dollars (see Exhibit 4). Experts estimate there is a 12% probability of a similar catastrophic earthquake and tsunami afecting BC in the next 50 years. A recent report by the Insurance Bureau of Canada estimates that if such an earthquake were to occur of the south coast of the province and be followed by a tsunami, damages and losses could amount to nearly $75 billion. As populations and infrastructure continue to grow in these earthquake vulnerable areas of BC, the severity of the economic impacts – in addition to the serious potential for loss of life – will only increase. Emergency management is a shared responsibility

Emergency management in BC is a shared responsibility and is founded on an escalating response model (see Exhibit 5). At the basic level, individuals are responsible for taking actions to protect themselves. Source: Iain McKain, Province files When an emergency extends beyond individual capabilities, local authorities are expected to lead the response, with regional coordination necessary where impacts are multi-jurisdictional. When local authorities are overwhelmed, the provincial government needs to take a strong leadership role to mitigate the efects of the emergency. In this situation, the Province will be responsible for acquiring and deploying the necessary resources to help afected areas and for coordinating and leading a multiple agency response to meet established provincial priorities. Finally, if the provincial government requires resources beyond its own capacity, it can ask the federal government or other jurisdictions for assistance.

Exhibit 5: Emergency management is a shared responsibility

GOVER L NM R E E N D T E F

OVINC PR IA L G L O

A V

U E

D R

M I

D E

N N I Shared

Responsibility T

Y P

R T

I I V R A O T H E T S U EC L A TOR OCAL

Source: Adapted from EMBC Training Manual

Auditor General of British Columbia | March 2014 Catastrophic Earthquake Preparedness DETAILED REPORT 15

Provincial roles and responsibilities during a catastrophic earthquake In BC, emergency management is based on four interconnected areas of responsibility (“pillars”)(See Exhibit 6): 1. mitigation and prevention; 2. preparedness; 3. response; and 4. recovery.

Exhibit 6: Four pillars approach to comprehensive emergency management

N TIO N P VE R E EP PR A O R & p E isk Co e D N R o ra N O e rd t I c i io E u n n T a S d t a S A e e l R d R G e I A a p T d p I i r n o e M

a s

c s

e s t o r INCIDENT o e f d O / e R C s p n E e o o th C r n i a t sp s O ti in e W e o u R e ti V ns ity ted nc ri E Integra da io R cor Pr E Y In Ac ic S rateg N St O SP RE Source: Adapted from Public Safety Canada’s Emergency Management Planning Guide

Te authority and responsibility for three of these areas is established in the Emergency Program Act and the Emergency Program Management Regulation. Te fourth area, mitigation and prevention, is currently not recognized in the Act. Te Provincial Emergency Program (PEP) is the agency charged with meeting the requirements set out in the Act and Regulation which includes creating provincial emergency plans and responding to or alleviating the efects of an emergency or disaster. In 2006, the responsibilities of PEP were folded into Emergency Management BC (EMBC). EMBC is also the coordinating agency for the provincial government’s emergency management activities and includes the duties for the Provincial Emergency Program, the Ofce of the Fire Commissioner and the Coroners Service. Te vision of EMBC is to ensure public safety and save lives through excellence in emergency management leadership. Te diversity of BC’s climate and geography creates a number of natural hazards including earthquakes, blizzards, wildfres, foods and landslides to which EMBC is tasked to respond. In addition, there are a number of human-caused hazards for EMBC to deal with including oil spills, motor vehicle accidents and electrical power outages. To respond to the numerous hazards that BC is subject to, EMBC adopted an “all-hazard” approach to emergency management and developed an All-Hazard Plan in 2012. Tis approach recognizes that most disasters ultimately result in similar impacts and risks that need to be dealt with. Tis “all-hazard” approach is considered good practice because it allows governments and organizations to efciently develop a single set of plans and procedures to deal with as many of these common impacts and risks as possible.

Auditor General of British Columbia | March 2014 Catastrophic Earthquake Preparedness DETAILED REPORT 16

Previous audit work in this area

To date, the provincial government has invested considerable resources in assessing BC’s level of preparedness for a catastrophic earthquake, identifying gaps in preparedness, and suggesting areas of improvement.

In an audit of this topic by our Ofce in 1997, we investigated the level of BC’s preparedness for a catastrophic earthquake and what actions were needed to raise the level of preparedness to an adequate standard. In that report, the Auditor General concluded that the provincial government, the Provincial Emergency Program (now EMBC) and local governments were not well prepared for a catastrophic earthquake, and made 60 recommendations (see Appendix C).

Following that report, the Select Standing Commitee on Public Accounts issued its own report in 1999, supporting the Auditor General’s 1997 conclusions, and made an additional 28 recommendations (All recommendations have been summarized in Appendix D).

In 2007, the Province’s Internal Audit and Advisory Service evaluated EMBC’s emergency management preparedness and response, reaching some similar conclusions to these two earlier public reports and made 13 recommendations. AUDIT OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE

We conducted this audit to answer the following questions:

1. Can EMBC demonstrate that it is prepared to manage the efects of a catastrophic earthquake? 2. Is EMBC reporting publicly on the Province’s preparedness for a catastrophic earthquake? As stated earlier and shown in Exhibit 6, emergency management is built on 4 pillars: mitigation and prevention, preparedness, response and recovery. For the purposes of this audit, we focused solely on EMBC’s preparedness to plan for an efective response to a catastrophic earthquake. Unlike our 1997 audit which had a much broader scope, mitigation and prevention, response and recovery were out of scope for this audit, and we did not audit other provincial ministries or local governments. However, it is important to note that other stakeholders and the other three pillars are critical and should be part of EMBC’s overall strategy.

We developed our criteria and expectations for this audit based on the assumption that in the 17 years since our 1997 audit on this topic, EMBC had sufcient time to signifcantly improve its level of preparedness. We also expected to fnd that EMBC has been reporting to the public and the Legislative Assembly about the state of readiness achieved in this time, and the future state of preparedness that it is working towards.

We carried out interviews between March and November 2013, and the audit team reviewed relevant documentation primarily for the years 2008 through 2013.

We conducted the audit in accordance with Section 11(8) of the Auditor General Act and the standards for assurance engagement established by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants.

Auditor General of British Columbia | March 2014 Catastrophic Earthquake Preparedness DETAILED REPORT 17

AUDIT CONCLUSION

We concluded that:

EMBC cannot demonstrate that it is adequately prepared to manage the efects of a catastrophic earthquake; and EMBC is not reporting to the public and the Legislative Assembly about how prepared it is for managing the efects of a catastrophic earthquake. KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In summarizing our key fndings and recommendations below, we also note recommendations that our Ofce made in 1997 on earthquake preparedness that are still relevant. Our purpose is to show that many of the issues we identifed then remain unaddressed. EMBC is not adequately prepared to manage the effects of a catastrophic earthquake

Catastrophic earthquake preparedness has not been made a priority

British Columbia (BC) has never experienced a catastrophic earthquake in a densely populated urban centre and may not for many years. Experts have noted that this has led to public apathy and a lack of urgency for decision makers. Given the human casualties and economic impact sufered from other jurisdictions in recent years (see Exhibit 7), this complacency is worrisome and unwarranted.

Government representatives are elected to make policy decisions and must regularly make choices between which initiatives to fund and which to decline. Funding for a catastrophic earthquake that may or may not occur in the short-term competes with funding requests for more immediate needs, such as health care and public education.

Exhibit 7: Earthquake/tsunami impacts

Reported Casualties Estimated Economic Impact (not including impacts Region Magnitude and Injuries to neighboring countries) in Current Dollars

185 deaths Christchurch, New Zealand (2011) 6.3 $35 Billion Cdn 1,500-2,000 injuries 15,853 deaths Tohoku, Japan (2011) 9.0 $200 Billion Cdn 6,023 injuries

Chile (2010) 8.8 525 deaths $15-30 Billion Cdn

Anchorage, Alaska (1964) 9.2 143 deaths $2.3 Billion Cdn

Source: Prepared by the Office of the Auditor General of British Columbia

Auditor General of British Columbia | March 2014 Catastrophic Earthquake Preparedness DETAILED REPORT 18

EMBC’s operation centre, stafed 24 hours a day seven days a week, receives about 300,000 calls annually. EMBC responded to approximately 6,000 incidents related to dangerous goods spills, search and rescue events, major foods, fres, landslides, and avalanches in 2013. While only a fraction of these emergencies may require an extensive response by EMBC, they consume the majority of staf time. At the same time, EMBC’s lack of critical resources such as a logistics planner and its limited funding constrain the organization’s abilities. EMBC’s current operating budget for emergency activities is approximately $6.2 million.1 Tis budget is about the same as the budget provided to PEP in 2006, despite a 10% population increase over the same time period, a near doubling of BC’s property values, and knowledge of the devastating impacts of recent earthquakes in Chile, Japan, and New Zealand. EMBC’s mandate is very broad and includes emergency coordination and the planning and mitigation of all hazards in BC including catastrophic earthquakes. In the context of this broad mandate and the lack of critical positions and no new funding, EMBC’s planning and preparation for a catastrophic earthquake ofen occurs as a side-of-desk activity. Many of EMBC’s defciencies in its response capabilities were highlighted following the 7.7 magnitude earthquake that occurred in Haida Gwaii on October 27, 2012. Te event triggered a tsunami warning. Fortunately, there was no tsunami, no reported injuries and only limited damage. As per good practices, EMBC drafed an “afer action” report of the event that identifed shortcomings in the Province’s response and actions to address these issues. In this report, EMBC noted that it did not have sufcient personnel with the experience, knowledge and training to efectively respond to an earthquake and tsunami event and its standard operation procedures were inadequate. EMBC also noted that:

some local governments identifed that their plans were not adequate; a number of communities lacked information and education on what to do and what local responders should do; and the use of the Provincial Emergency Notifcation System is cumbersome, resource-consuming and prone to errors. EMBC included strategies to improve its performance based on its current capacity. It also identifed that risks to communities would continue without additional resources and program enhancements.

Although government ofcials continue to state that catastrophic earthquake preparedness is a priority, government has not provided clear direction regarding the degree of preparedness it is commited to atain or what level of risk is acceptable. In our view, given the scope of preparation that will be required to adequately prepare BC for a catastrophic earthquake, government should be planning for 5, 10 and 15 years rather than the typical 1 to 3 year plans.

[Audit 1997 – Recommendation 2 – Te provincial government should develop long-term goals for earthquake preparedness.]

1 The Province also contributes approximately $14 million dollars to a joint federal and provincial initiative to fund infrastructure projects that will provide flood protection to communities across BC. Auditor General of British Columbia | March 2014 Catastrophic Earthquake Preparedness DETAILED REPORT 19

[Audit 1997 – Recommendation 6 – Te provincial government should provide the Provincial Emergency Program with a reasonable level of resources to meet the government’s expectations.] RECOMMENDATION 1: We recommend that government develop long- term goals for catastrophic earthquake preparedness, including the level of provincial preparedness it expects EMBC to achieve in the next 5, 10 and 15 years.

RECOMMENDATION 2: We recommend that government ensures EMBC has the capacity necessary to address identifed critical gaps and achieve government’s expected level of preparedness.

EMBC has not implemented a managing-for-results framework in preparing for a catastrophic earthquake

As was evidenced in Japan in 2011, no government can be completely ready to respond to a catastrophic earthquake (see Exhibit 8). However, we expected EMBC to have a system in place to track and demonstrate how it is improving the Province’s level of preparedness.

Managing-for-results provides an organization’s leadership with tools to measure its success and identify areas for improvement so goals can be achieved. Te general principles of this framework are part of the planning requirements under the Province’s Core Policy and Procedures Manual. Te managing-for-results framework is valuable because it embodies the old adage that “what gets measured gets done.”

Exhibit 8: Being totally prepared is not possible

Despite Japan’s investment of billions of dollars in earthquake and tsunami mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery, the scale of destruction during the March 11, 2011 tsunami quickly overwhelmed authorities.

Source: BBC News

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Te managing-for-results framework can be conceptualized as a simple four-step process known as Plan-Do-Check-Adjust (PDCA) (see Exhibit 9). Tese steps are the foundation for International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 9000. Te ISO 9000 family of standards represents an international consensus on good management practices.

Exhibit 9: The Plan-Do-Check-Adjust (PDCA) model that underpins the managing- for-results approach

N A nize D L rga O P O C nd an o a d m te I m a m u re p n l i C e c m a t e e n

t Continual Improvement

e v i e w a t n c d re A r D R o J ev C U ise nd S or a T Monit K EC CH

Source: Adapted from W.E. Deming approach

We expected EMBC management, using this four-step process, to have undertaken the following key initiatives:

PLAN: Establish the objectives and processes necessary to deliver results in preparing for a catastrophic earthquake. Establish key performance indicators and targets to evaluate success.

DO: Implement the plan and collect information on performance.

CHECK: Evaluate results and identify areas for improvements.

ADJUST: Revise work plans as necessary throughout the year to ensure results are being achieved. Annually review overall performance and adjust objectives, strategies, key performance indicators and work plans as needed for the following year.

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We found that EMBC has made progress in some areas; however, overall EMBC is not applying a rigorous managing-for-results framework and has gaps in the following areas:

PLAN: A goal in EMBC’s 2012–2015 Strategic Plan is to “enhance BC’s ability to manage large scale and catastrophic events.” Five objectives for achieving this goal have been identifed (see Exhibit 10).

Exhibit 10: Extract from EMBC Strategic Plan 2012–2015

Goal 4 - Enhance British Columbia’s ability to manage large scale and catastrophic events

Align EMBC staf resources to support major event response and recovery capacity Build and support local, provincial, national and international liaison agreements and networks Build public/private sector agreements and partnerships Monitor stakeholder readiness and capacity Coordinate provincial support to local authorities and First Nations engaged in emergency management

Source: EMBC’s Strategic Plan 2012–2015

We found that EMBC could not demonstrate that these objectives were based on a systematic assessment of areas of highest risk or signifcant gaps in its program.

In addition, EMBC does not have a catastrophic earthquake work plan that defnes the strategies for how these objectives will be realized, nor have they identifed key performance indicators and related annual targets to measure its progress.

DO: Although EMBC does not have a catastrophic earthquake annual work plan, the agency has undertaken actions to improve the Province’s preparedness for a catastrophic earthquake. However, we found that implementation of these actions has ofen had to be secondary to other operational activities, so progress has been slow.

CHECK: Because of the absence of key performance indicators and associated annual targets for improving EMBC’s preparedness for a catastrophic earthquake, the agency is not objectively evaluating whether its actions are improving its preparedness. We did fnd, however, that EMBC recently created status reports for its top three priority projects. Tese reports could be expanded so EMBC can monitor its progress once it determines the key outcomes that it is working to achieve.

ADJUST: EMBC does not regularly evaluate the efectiveness of its earthquake preparedness activities and adjust its programs, plans and procedures. However, we did note that the agency adjusted some of its plans and procedures in response to recent evaluations. Notably, EMBC identifed opportunities for improvements afer atending a large-scale earthquake exercise in Washington State, and in relation to the tsunami threat following the 2012 Haida Gwaii earthquake.

RECOMMENDATION 3: We recommend that EMBC develop a strategic plan to meet the Province’s long-term goals. Te plan should clearly demonstrate how EMBC will evaluate the efectiveness of its activities against its goals. Auditor General of British Columbia | March 2014 Catastrophic Earthquake Preparedness DETAILED REPORT 22

Gaps exist in EMBC’s preparedness

1. are based on a detailed hazard risk and vulnerability analysis; 2. are refective of best practices; 3. include the actions that the Minister may undertake in a state of emergency; 4. include the review of ministry and local government plans and procedures to ensure they are integrated and coordinated; 5. include monitoring of key stakeholders readiness and capacity to carry out their plans; 6. include catastrophic earthquake training and exercises; and 7. include maintaining an efective public education program. Following are our fndings for each of the above seven areas. 1. EMBC’s hazard, risk and vulnerability analysis is not sufficiently detailed and not up-to-date

We expected EMBC to have developed a detailed hazard risk and vulnerability analysis (HRVA) based on a scenario of a catastrophic earthquake that would then be used to guide the development of its response plans and procedures. An HRVA is a critical part of every emergency program. An HRVA assists emergency managers in prioritizing their mitigation and planning eforts, and in determining where to focus their resources during the initial response to a catastrophic earthquake.

Consistent with the requirements of the Emergency Program Management Regulation and international good practice, EMBC is required to prepare and update annually an HRVA that identifes potential emergencies and disasters, and to assess the potential impact of these events on people and property. EMBC’s own guidance states that an HRVA should be completed before a strategic plan or an emergency response plan is writen, as an HRVA guides response actions. However, EMBC’s HRVA, developed in 1997, has not been updated since this time and is general in its content. It was anticipated in our 1997 report that this general HRVA would be developed into an area- specifc HRVA that would model, in detail, the hazards, risks and potential impacts of a catastrophic earthquake on the BC population, tourists, critical facilities, disaster routes and industry. EMBC has made litle progress in this area. However, EMBC recently applied for funding from the federal government to work on the development of a model that could identify regions of high seismic risk and highest potential losses. Te proposed project will require a more comprehensive and centralized inventory and mapping of the province’s critical infrastructure than is currently available.

[Audit 1997 – Recommendation 4 – Provincial Emergency Program should work with regional and local governments to refne the development of specifc, regional earthquake planning scenarios.] [Audit 1997 – Recommendation 16 – Te provincial government should develop an inventory of key provincial infrastructure.]

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2. EMBC’s plans and procedures do not consistently reflect best practices

We expected EMBC’s catastrophic earthquake plans and procedures to refect best practices; however, we found defciencies in several areas.

Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan – Consistent with international good practices, EMBC is developing a Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan which consists of an All-Hazard Plan; support appendices; and hazard-specifc appendices. However, while EMBC has recently completed the All-Hazard Plan, it has not developed a hazard-specifc appendix for a catastrophic earthquake or key support appendices related to issues that would arise following such an earthquake (for example, the need for mass evacuation and shelter, critical infrastructure, and food and water). A timetable has not been set for completing these documents. BC Emergency Response Management System (BCERMS) – EMBC has successfully developed and implemented the BCERMS. Tis system, based on best practices, provides a standardized process for organizing and managing a response to any emergency or disaster in BC. Earthquake Response Plan – Building on the BCERMS model, EMBC developed a draf Earthquake Response Plan in 2008 which describes a general operational concept for a provincial response to a damaging earthquake. However, we found that this plan does not meet EMBC’s own good practice expectations. Te plan does not: • identify vulnerable geographic locations, populations and facilities/infrastructure; • specify public warning/information requirements; • identify special resource requirements and procedures for locating resources; and • refer to other emergency-related plans. Furthermore, the plan includes the assumptions that all BC residents in earthquake- prone areas of the province know what to do in an earthquake – for example, that all families have emergency kits, family reunifcation plans, and the ability to sustain themselves for a period of time until help is available. Te plan also assumes that local governments have adequate plans and will survive to coordinate their own local response and recovery eforts. We noted that EMBC has not confrmed that these assumptions are realistic. Recent studies indicate that a majority of the population in BC’s earthquake hazard area do not know how to prepare their homes and themselves for a catastrophic earthquake.

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3. EMBC’s plans and procedures do not articulate clearly the actions that the Minister may undertake in a provincial state of emergency

We expected EMBC’s plans and procedures to include the actions that the Minister of Justice can take in a provincial state of emergency.

A catastrophic earthquake resulting in signifcant structural damage and human casualties will most likely require the declaration of a provincial state of emergency. Section 10 of the Emergency Program Act sets out the extraordinary powers available to the Minister following such a declaration.

Tose powers include:

control or prohibition of travel; demolition of structures; restoration of essential facilities; distribution of essential supplies; mass evacuation and shelter; price seting; and rationing of supplies for the duration of the state of emergency. EMBC is responsible for emergency management under the Act, so it has an important role in supporting the Minister’s enactment of these powers. Because an immediate emergency response is critical to minimizing loss and damage from a catastrophic earthquake, it is essential that EMBC has necessary information and defned procedures in place to empower the Minister to make fully informed decisions and execute his/her powers in a timely manner.

We found, however, that EMBC has not compiled the necessary information and procedures to address all the powers granted to the Minister under a provincial state of emergency. Tis creates the risk that the personal, structural and fnancial losses following a catastrophic earthquake could be greater than necessary due to a delay in implementation of these powers.

RECOMMENDATION 4: We recommend that EMBC identify, rank and prioritize completion of its own key plans and procedures to ensure it meets its mandate to prepare and respond to a catastrophic earthquake.

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4. EMBC has not adequately ensured plans and procedures of other stakeholders would result in an integrated and coordinated response

One of EMBC’s primary objectives in preparing for a catastrophic earthquake is to ensure that the Province undertakes a coordinated and integrated response to the event. Tis objective refects one of the basic principles of emergency management: coherency of action (see Exhibit 11). Taking this approach means EMBC would help coordinate and lead government and non-government agency assistance with local, provincial and even national resources to ensure provincial priorities are achieved and communities in need receive the help that they require as quickly as possible.

Exhibit 11: Principle 5 - coherency of action

Emergency management requires collaboration, coordination and integration by all partners in order to most efectively apply emergency management resources and execute activities. Coherency of action relies on clear roles, responsibilities, authorities and capacities of all partners.

Source: Principles of Emergency Management, EMBC Reference Manual

For this approach to work properly, the response eforts and plans of all these diferent stakeholders must be integrated and coordinated. However, we found that EMBC does not systematically review these plans and procedures and, therefore, cannot ensure that they are integrated and coordinated.

4.1 Local authorities’ plans are not reviewed by EMBC to ensure integration and coordination

EMBC’s legislation and regulation defne a number of mandatory and discretionary powers and duties of the Minister. Te mandatory actions state that the Minister “must” do something; the discretionary actions state that the minister “may” do something. In either case, the legislation empowers the Minister to do whatever is necessary to prevent, respond to or alleviate the efects of a catastrophic earthquake.

Under the Act, the Minister may promote the development of integrated plans and “require local authorities … to prepare, in cooperation with designated ministries, integrated plans and programs, satisfactory to the Minister, to deal with emergencies.” We found that EMBC has not exercised this power to ensure that local government plans are coordinated and integrated with other local authority plans and the Province’s plans.

Integration between local authorities and with other provincial government plans is necessary for an efective government response to a wide-scale disaster. Without integration and coordination, critical rescue and response eforts could be delayed and inefective. Such a situation was apparent in the independent review by the Atorney General following the 1996 blizzard on Vancouver Island and the Lower Mainland. Te review found that there was no coordinated approach to clearing major transportation arteries. Some major roads were plowed up to the municipal border, but remained impassable beyond that.

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One method to address integration and coordination across multiple local authorities is regional coordination. Our Ofce’s 1997 report on earthquake preparedness and the Atorney General’s report on the 1996 blizzard both recommended that regional coordination be strengthened. [Audit 1997 – Recommendation 2 – Te earthquake preparedness program should provide an integrated and cohesive approach to earthquake preparedness that supersedes the assignment of specifc jurisdictional responsibilities.] In April 2009, the Ministry of Public Safety and the Solicitor General entered into a partnership with the Greater Vancouver Regional District (Metro Vancouver) to form the Integrated Partnership for Regional Emergency Management (IPREM). IPREM’s objective is to improve regional emergency management in the Metro Vancouver region. Tis has been an important step in establishing the formal commitments and structures necessary to ensure that provincial and local authority plans are integrated and coordinated in Metro Vancouver. IPREM could become a model for cooperation between local governments elsewhere in the province. To date, this model has not been extended outside of Metro Vancouver.

We have been advised that IPREM is about to release its frst product: the Regional Disaster Debris Management Plan; however, a number of deliverables still need to be completed for IPREM to achieve its vision of a disaster resilient region with a coordinated emergency management strategy.

[Audit 1997 – Recommendation 9 – Te provincial government should strengthen regional emergency planning and coordination.]

4.2 Provincial ministries and Crown corporations’ plans are not reviewed by EMBC to ensure integration and coordination Under the Emergency Program Management Regulation, ministers and Crown corporations are required to maintain emergency plans and procedures, and to ensure that these are coordinated and consistent with the emergency plans and procedures of every other minister. To help facilitate this coordination, the Emergency Program Management Regulation established the Inter-Agency Emergency Preparedness Council (IEPC), with representatives from each key ministry and co-chaired by EMBC. Te regulation specifes that the IEPC must provide each minister with “the assistance necessary to ensure that the minister’s emergency plans and procedures are coordinated and consistent with the plans and procedures of all other ministers and with the government’s overall emergency preparedness strategies.”

Given this requirement, we expected either the IEPC, or EMBC, to be systemically reviewing ministry and Crown corporation plans periodically to ensure they are integrated and consistent with the plans and procedures of all other ministries and with the Province’s overall plans and strategies. Tis review would help ensure that ministry plans are integrated and coordinated. We found no such systematic reviews by either IEPC or EMBC.

[Audit 1997 – Recommendation 8 – Deputy Minister and Crown corporations’ chief executives should take steps to increase the profle and efectiveness of the IEPC.]

RECOMMENDATION 5: We recommend that EMBC regularly review its earthquake program to identify signifcant gaps and risks to a coordinated and integrated response, and develop actions to address them. Auditor General of British Columbia | March 2014 Catastrophic Earthquake Preparedness DETAILED REPORT 27

5. EMBC is not adequately monitoring stakeholder readiness and capacity

We expected EMBC to be monitoring the response readiness of all its major stakeholders and their capacity to carry out necessary activities in the event of a catastrophic earthquake.

Plans and procedures are efective only if everyone knows what to do, and there are enough people and resources to fully execute the plans.

Following a catastrophic earthquake, EMBC will need to coordinate the eforts of a vast number of diferent players including: local authorities (defned under the Act as being municipalities and their municipal councils; regional districts and their boards; and national park superintendants); provincial ministries and Crown corporations; the Temporary Emergency Assignment Management System (TEAMS) personnel; and the federal government. Key to EMBC’s coordination will be a realistic understanding of these organizations’ readiness and capacity before such an event. Te importance of this is refected in one of the objectives in EMBC’s Strategic Plan: “monitor stakeholder readiness and capacity” (See Exhibit 10).

Overall, we found that EMBC is not adequately monitoring the readiness and capacity of its key stakeholders which include local authorities, provincial ministries, Crown corporations, TEAMS volunteers, First Nations, and the federal government.

5.1 Local authorities’ plans and capacity to carry out their plans are not adequately reviewed by EMBC

Te Emergency Program Act and accompanying Local Authority Emergency Management Regulation set out the responsibility of local authorities to prepare a local emergency plan, provide details about the broad content of that plan, and make clear the expectation that the plan will be periodically reviewed and updated. EMBC has the authority under the Act and this regulation to review and evaluate: local emergency plans, local government’s capacity to carry out this plan, and its training and exercise programs. We found that EMBC is not doing this. Te lack of such review and evaluation exposes the province to the risk that provincial emergency plans may be founded on unrealistic assumptions of local government capacity and that, overall, the province may not have the resources it expects to be available to respond to and mitigate the efects of a catastrophic earthquake. As a result, residents of some communities could be put at increased risk following a catastrophic event.

[Audit 1997 – Recommendation 27 – Te provincial government should play a stronger role in…monitoring to ensure that all municipalities plan to a certain standard.]

5.2 Provincial ministries and Crown corporations’ plans and procedures and business continuity plans are not being adequately monitored

We found weaknesses in the monitoring of this stakeholder group in two main areas: plans and procedures and business continuity planning.

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Plans and procedures Under the Emergency Program Management Regulation, each minister must develop emergency plans and procedures in the event of an emergency or disaster. As noted above, we expected that these plans and procedures would be integrated and coordinated. Furthermore, we expected that EMBC would be reviewing them to ensure that ministries and Crown corporations have achieved a required state of readiness and have the capacity necessary to implement their plans in a catastrophic earthquake. Because EMBC is not conducting a systematic review of these plans, we concluded that there is a risk that ministry’s and Crown corporations’ planned responses to a catastrophic earthquake may not be meeting a necessary standard, and that they may not have the capacity to carry out their plans. Tis concern was raised in BC’s Legislature during discussions of BC Hydro’s December 2012 internal audit report where legislators noted that: “BC Hydro is not adequately prepared to react, respond, and recover from a widespread catastrophic event such as an earthquake.”

[Audit 1997 – Recommendation 23 – Te provincial government should take a stronger, more proactive role than it is now doing to ensure that supporting ministries keep their earthquake preparedness plans current.] Business continuity planning EMBC’s All-Hazard Plan states that “provincial ministries will mobilize to deliver emergency and critical services during emergencies and disasters. Te ability of ministries to carry out their critical services is enhanced by the creation and maintenance of business continuity plans.” Government’s Core Policy and Procedures Manual places importance on ensuring ministries can carry out their services (see Exhibit 12). We expected EMBC to be monitoring and reporting on ministry business continuity plans, identifying defciencies, and working with ministries to address any issues in a remediation plan. Instead, we found that EMBC only requires government corporations, that are considered critical, to prepare a self-assessment of their business continuity plans and does not verify the accuracy of statements in these documents. Furthermore, EMBC is not publicly reporting on the state of ministry business continuity plans.

Exhibit 12: Extract from the Core Policy and Procedures Manual

Te Ministry of Finance’s Core Policy and Procedures Manual states that ministries shall: report the status of ministry-wide business continuity to EMBC semi- annually and on an ad-hoc basis, as requested; conduct a risk assessment to identify and analyze threats to ministry business and services and submit them to EMBC; and complete a Business Impact Analysis for each business unit or program area utilizing EMBC templates.

Areas identifed by ministries or EMBC as defcient or non-compliant will require the development of a remediation plan identifying the actions, target dates and individuals responsible. Te progress of the plan will be monitored until the required actions are complete.

Source: Province of British Columbia, Ministry of Finance

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[Audit 1997 - Recommendation 38 –Te provincial government should…assign responsibility for maintaining a business continuation planning program and establish accountability for success; monitor the status of such planning; and audit ministry planning programs.] We also found signifcant gaps in EMBC’s own business continuity plan. For example, although Kamloops has been identifed as an alternative site for the Provincial Emergency Coordination Centre (PECC), in the event that its locations on Vancouver Island are afected, the transfer of the PECC responsibilities and stafng to the alternative site has not been tested. In addition, EMBC is not reviewing and updating its own business continuity plan annually, as required by the Core Policy and Procedures Manual.

[Audit 1997 - Recommendation 26 –Te provincial government should take steps to identify, equip and test an alternate site for its Provincial Emergency Coordination Centre.] 5.3 Temporary Emergency Assignment Management System may not be sufficient to staff EMBC’s response centres

Temporary Emergency Assignment Management System (TEAMS) is a stafng system that maintains a resource pool of highly skilled provincial employees from various ministries in BC, who train regularly and have the appropriate skills and experience to manage provincial emergency operations centres. Tese volunteers are a critical resource for EMBC to ensure it has the capacity to adequately staf its response centres. However, EMBC has noted a decline in the availability of trained experienced TEAMS members and has been challenged to fnd an adequate number of TEAMS personnel to deploy during emergencies.

5.4 The federal government’s capacity creates challenges

During the audit, we identifed three major challenges in the Province’s coordination and integration with the federal government:

1. funding; 2. logistics; and 3. responsibility to First Nations. Funding Te Government of British Columbia and the Government of Canada signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on emergency preparedness in 1988. Te MOU includes a cost sharing agreement in support of a Joint Emergency Preparedness Program (JEPP) for developing and maintaining emergency plans. Under the JEPP program, local authorities were eligible to apply for federal funding to help enhance their emergency preparedness and response capacity. In March 2013, the federal government eliminated JEPP funding. EMBC has noted that the loss of JEPP funding will likely impact the ability of local authorities to purchase equipment, and conduct training and exercises for emergency preparedness. Although the Ministry of Justice formally expressed its concern to the federal government about this cut, federal funding for the program has not been reinstated. As noted above, any loss of capacity and capability by local authorities could impact local governments’ and EMBC’s response to a catastrophic earthquake.

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Logistics In the afermath of a catastrophic earthquake, it is expected that the provincial government will need to call on the federal government for assistance. One of the primary resources that the federal government can deploy is the Canadian Armed Forces. Te Canadian Armed Forces brings expertise in logistics management and the movement of food, water and medical equipment. Signifcant readily available military resources exist in BC, but even these will likely be overwhelmed initially in a catastrophic earthquake. Te Canadian Armed Forces have told EMBC that it could take several days before they could support the afected area. EMBC has not yet been able to mitigate this risk, especially in ensuring there is an efective fow of essential goods and supplies to afected communities.

Developing private partnerships for supply chain management could be one answer for overcoming this issue. EMBC has stated that development of these partnerships is a high priority, but none have been established to date. EMBC is working with the Red Cross to develop a plan for the timely and efective deployment of the Red Cross’s national and international resources into BC following a catastrophic earthquake. Even afer these planning details are fnalized, current logistics challenges will still need to be addressed.

Responsibility to First Nations We also noted an inconsistency in the roles and responsibilities of the provincial and federal governments in terms of providing First Nations assistance in the event of a catastrophic earthquake. EMBC’s 1998 draf earthquake response plan identifes that assistance for First Nations will be federally provided by Indian and Northern Afairs Canada. However, a 1993 leter of understanding between the provincial and federal governments states, “When immediate action is required to preserve life or property on Indian Reserves and when local bands so request, the Provincial Emergency Program (now EMBC) will assist, support or arrange for such required emergency measures.”

EMBC has advised our Ofce that it does not have the dedicated capacity to assist First Nations during a catastrophic earthquake. Further discussions with the federal government will be necessary to resolve this issue.

[Audit 1997 - Recommendation 28 –Te provincial government should review on a regular basis the status of the National Earthquake Support Plan. As well, the Canada-BC Memorandum of Understanding on Emergency Preparedness should be reviewed and, where appropriate, updated.]

RECOMMENDATION 6: We recommend that EMBC regularly review and evaluate its stakeholders’ emergency plans and procedures to assess stakeholder readiness and capacity.

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6. Earthquake response training and exercising is inadequate

We expected EMBC’s plans and procedures to include a robust training and disaster response exercise program. Tese activities are valuable in preparing emergency managers and stakeholders to respond successfully following a catastrophic earthquake.

Currently, EMBC provides emergency management training for volunteers and local governments through the Justice Institute of British Columbia. However, we found that this training does not specifcally cover a catastrophic earthquake scenario and is dependent on discretionary funding which can afect its ability to be delivered consistently.

Although EMBC has carried out some disaster exercises, we found that these only tested a limited range of roles and responsibilities and did not include a scenario where a provincial state of emergency is declared. Also, it is unclear whether these exercises are working towards an overall objective to ensure EMBC could coordinate an integrated and efective response.

[Audit 1997 – Recommendation 32 – Te provincial government should provide more exercises at the province-wide and regional level to ensure that the liaison between emergency response eforts of diferent levels of government work efectively.]

RECOMMENDATION 7: We recommend that EMBC conduct regular catastrophic earthquake exercises with its stakeholders to ensure it can deliver an efective, comprehensive and integrated government-wide response to a catastrophic earthquake. 7. EMBC’s education program is not adequate to prepare the public for a catastrophic earthquake We expected EMBC’s plans and procedures to include an efective public education program. One of the goals of EMBC’s Strategic Plan is “increased safety and resilience for individuals and communities.” An objective associated with this goal is delivering an efective public education program. Good practice dictates that public education is an important aspect of mitigating the impacts of a catastrophic event. For each person who is prepared and knowledgeable about what to do in an earthquake, there is one less person who may need basic assistance afer the event. Tis means that limited government resources can then be stretched further. We found that EMBC has only a limited public education program where one of its initiatives is assisting with an annual earthquake drill (“ShakeOut”) where participants “Drop, Cover and Hold On.” EMBC has also worked with some coastal communities on tsunami readiness. While EMBC does track information on the number of annual participants in the “ShakeOut” initiative, it does not track the efectiveness of its public education programs (i.e., whether families have emergency kits, reunifcation plans and the ability to sustain themselves for a period following a catastrophic earthquake as assumed in the Province’s 2008 draf earthquake response plan). A recent survey by the British Columbia Automobile Association indicated that while 75% of respondents noted that they would expect their home could be damaged by an earthquake, only 35% knew how to “drop, cover and hold on” if an earthquake were to hit. Te survey raises concerns that EMBC’s assumptions of the level of individual and family preparedness may be fawed. Auditor General of British Columbia | March 2014 Catastrophic Earthquake Preparedness DETAILED REPORT 32

RECOMMENDATION 8: We recommend that EMBC measure the efectiveness of its public preparedness initiatives at regular intervals. EMBC is not reporting to the public and the Legislative Assembly about how prepared it is for a catastrophic earthquake As we noted earlier, EMBC’s plans and strategies are based on a model where preparing for and responding to a catastrophic earthquake require individuals, industry and not- for-proft organizations and local, provincial and federal governments to work together to address the challenges faced by everyone in the afected area. Embedded in this “community response” model are important assumptions of what roles, responsibilities, and level of preparedness exist before and after a catastrophic earthquake. Tese assumptions must be realistic and all stakeholders must understand and agree to comply with them for this model to function efectively. Stakeholders have diferent levels of resources and risk acceptance, so it is essential that each stakeholder understand the actual level of preparedness achieved by all the others and what that means for him/her. Provincial spending on catastrophic earthquake preparedness is ultimately a policy decision made by government, afer it has weighed the competing needs and priorities of its constituents. As a result, it is essential that government is open about its state of catastrophic earthquake readiness if the public is to hold government accountable for its policy decisions.

Our 1997 audit reached similar conclusions about the value of public reporting on the Province’s state of catastrophic earthquake preparedness, noting that “the general public needs to appreciate the extent of their vulnerability if they are to be convinced to support public mitigation eforts and develop personal strategies for earthquake preparedness.” Te report went on to recommend that the Provincial Emergency Program (PEP) report annually on the state of earthquake preparedness. Tis recommendation was endorsed by the Select Standing Commitee on Public Accounts in its 1999 report. We therefore expected to fnd that EMBC is:

tracking the public’s actual level of catastrophic earthquake preparedness as part of the agency’s evaluation of the efectiveness of its public education eforts; and reporting publicly its own level of preparedness as part of its eforts to be transparent and accountable to the public. We found that neither EMBC, nor the ministry it operates within (Ministry of Justice), publicly reports on the state of catastrophic earthquake preparedness in the province. Te Ministry of Justice included performance indicators in its 2012 Annual Service Plan that refected a narrow aspect of the Province’s catastrophic earthquake preparedness – “Performance Measure 17: Te percentage of critical Temporary Emergency Assignment Management System (TEAMS) positions flled by qualifed government employees.” Tis measure was subsequently dropped from the planned performance measure listing for the 2013/14–2015/16 Service Plan under the rationale that it was not an outcome- based measure. Te current service plan includes the performance measure “Timeliness of Disaster Financial Assistance private sector claim adjudication.”

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In our view, neither of these indicators provide key stakeholders or the public with sufcient information to understand fully how well prepared the province is for a catastrophic earthquake, the risks that they are facing, or the level of preparedness that they must achieve to protect themselves, their families and their communities. Government’s preparedness includes an understanding of how well all ministries are prepared to respond to a catastrophic earthquake. Te Emergency Program Management Regulation specifcally sets out that the Inter-Agency Emergency Preparedness Council (IEPC) facilitates the coordination of ministry plans and procedures. Tis role is critical to support EMBC’s mandate. With such an important role in ensuring that emergency preparedness is coordinated and integrated across ministries, it was recommended in our 1997 audit that the IEPC report annually on its plans and achievements. However, this recommendation has never been implemented.

[Audit 1997 – Recommendation 6 – Te provincial government should report annually on the state of earthquake preparedness in British Columbia. Te report should include an assessment of the overall state of earthquake preparedness, a report on plans and achievements of the Inter-Agency Emergency Preparedness Council, and accountability information regarding Provincial Emergency Program`s own performance in relation to its annual objectives.]

RECOMMENDATION 9: We recommend that EMBC report annually to British Columbians on the state of its catastrophic earthquake preparedness. Te report should include an assessment of the overall state of earthquake preparedness, risks and capacity, and describe the plans and achievements of the Inter-Agency Emergency Preparedness Council (IEPC).

Auditor General of British Columbia | March 2014 Catastrophic Earthquake Preparedness LOOKING AHEAD 34

As this audit only looked at one of the four pillars (preparedness) of emergency management, future work by our Ofce may include the other three pillars: mitigation and prevention, response and recovery. All four pillars are critical to ensuring the Province can manage the efects of a catastrophic earthquake. For example, while planning for a response is challenging, it is fnite. Post disaster recovery ofen takes years, even decades. Appropriate recovery planning can improve resiliency by reducing recovery time and economic losses.

Auditor General of British Columbia | March 2014 Catastrophic Earthquake Preparedness APPENDIX A: TYPES OF EARTHQUAKES IN THE CASCADIA SUBDUCTION ZONE 35

Exhibit A1: Types of earthquakes in the Cascadia subduction zone

Affected Max. Source Area Size Recurrence Subduction W.WA, M 9 500-600 yr Zone OR, CA Deep Juan de W.WA, M 7+ 30-50 yr Fuca plate OR Crustal faults WA, OR, M 7+ Hundreds CA of yrs

Source: United States Geological Survey

In BC, a mega-thrust earthquake (“the Deep-focus earthquakes occur on faults Shallow-focus earthquakes occur within big one”) could occur ofshore when one at depths of 48-60kilometres in this region. the earth’s crust along fractures, generally piece of the earth’s crust (oceanic plate) at depths less than 35 kilometres. Tis class Because the faults break so deeply, the is pushing beneath another (continental afects a smaller area than a deep earthquake wave energy spreads over a much larger plate). Stress builds and eventually of the same magnitude, but the shaking is the two pieces slip rapidly, generating area than from a shallow-focus quake. usually more intense and afershocks more earthquakes as large as magnitude 9. Strong shaking generally lasts a few numerous. Tsunamis are unlikely, but could seconds to a minute, but can be longer. occur if a shallow earthquake occurred Quickly following an earthquake like Few if any afershocks occur. under the Strait of Georgia. this in British Columbia, a destructive Afer a deep earthquake in this region, the tsunami – a series of waves up to 10 Because of the abundance of shallow heaviest damage will be likely concentrated metres high – will hit the coast while faults in this region, small earthquakes on Vancouver Island and along the Strait of also travelling across the Pacifc Ocean of this type are recorded every day, Georgia. No tsunami is expected. toward Alaska, Hawaii and Asia. Tere and damaging quakes occur every few would be widespread damage, including Tese earthquakes strike, on average, decades. Te probability of a shallow thousands of injuries and fatalities and every 30 years, with the latest in 1949, crustal earthquake causing considerable the destruction of hundreds of buildings. 1965 and 2001. Te probability of a deep damage in British Columbia has been Afershocks up to magnitude 7 could earthquake causing considerable damage estimated at approximately 12% in the occur, causing even greater damage. of a magnitude 6.5 or greater is around next 50 years. To beter understand these 12% in the next 50 years. quakes, more information is needed about Tis type of quake occurs, on average, where the active faults are. every 500 to 600 years, but the intervals Notable deep-focus earthquakes: between events have been as short as Haida Gwaii, 1949, M 8.1; Nisqually, Notable shallow-focus earthquakes: short as 100 to 300 years. Te last major Washington, 2001, M 6.8 Vancouver Island, 1946, M 7.3 mega thrust quake occurred in 1700 and was approximately a magnitude 9. Scientists have estimated that there is about a 12% chance of a similar magnitude quake in the next 50 years.

Notable mega-thrust earthquakes: Alaska, 1964, M 9.2; Indonesia, 2004, M 9.1-9.3; Chile, 2010, M 8.8; Japan, 2011, M 9.0 Auditor General of British Columbia | March 2014 Catastrophic Earthquake Preparedness APPENDIX B: EARTHQUAKE STATISTICS 36

Exhibit B1: Earthquake statistics

Efects Earthquakes Energy Equivalents Energy Release 10 15,000,000,000,000 Chile (1960) Largest recorded earthquakes Alaska (1964) Sumatra (2004) 9 Destruction over vast area <1 476,000,000,000 Massive loss of life Japan (2011) Chile (2010) Krakatoa Eruption Great earthquake San Fransico, CA (1906) World’s Largest Nuclear Test (USSR) 8 Severe economic impact 1 15,000,000,000 Large loss of life New Madrid, MO (1812) Mount St. Helens Eruption Charleston, SC (1886) Major earthquake Haiti (2010) 7 Damage ($ billions) 18 476,000,000 Loss of life Northridge (1994) Hiroshima Atomic Bomb 6 Strong earthquake 120 15,000,000 Property damage Long Island, NY (1884) Magnitude 5 Moderate earthquake 1,500 476,000 Some property damage Average Tornado (equivalent kilograms of TNT) 4 Light earthquake 10,000 15,000 Noticeable shaking Large Lightning Bolt 3 Minor earthquake ofen felt 100,000 Oklahoma City Bombing 476 Moderate Lightning Bolt 2 Generally not felt 1,000,000 15

Number of Earthquakes per year (worldwide)

Source: Adapted from Incorporated Research Institutions for Seismology

Te lef side of the fgure above describes the efects of an earthquake by magnitude. Te larger the number, the bigger the earthquake. Signifcant earthquakes are noted on the lef side of the shaded tower. Te shaded area indicates how many earthquakes of each magnitude occur every year. Te events on the right side of the tower show equivalent energy release.

Auditor General of British Columbia | March 2014 Catastrophic Earthquake Preparedness APPENDIX C: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS -

OAG’S 1997 REPORT 37

Summary of recommendations

Recommendation # Recommendation Description

1* Te provincial government should establish a Seismic Safety Commission.

2* Te provincial government should develop long-term goals for earthquake preparedness.

3* Te provincial government should provide more focus to its earthquake preparedness program.

4* Te provincial Emergency Program (PEP), regional, and local governments should extend the development of earthquake planning scenarios.

5* Te provincial government should reposition the Provincial Emergency Program.

6* Te provincial government should increase funding for the Provincial Emergency Program.

7* Te provincial Emergency Program should report annually on the state of earthquake preparedness in British Columbia.

8* Te provincial government should raise the profle of the Inter-Agency Emergency Preparedness Council (IEPC).

9 Te provincial government should strengthen regional emergency planning and coordination.

10* Te provincial government should ensure that the seismic elements of the Provincial Building Code are applied to all provincial buildings.

11* Te provincial government should maintain an advisory capability to help municipalities work with the Provincial Building Code.

12 Te provincial government should determine the role that insurance should play in mitigation, and defne the most appropriate regime through which it can be ofered to the public.

13 Te provincial government should continue discussions with the insurance industry and, where appropriate, the federal government, with a view to reaching agreement on how best to create an environment for an afordable insurance regime within the industry’s capacity.

14* Provincial Emergency Program (PEP) should measure the extent of public preparedness. (Tis should be done now, to help decide how and where to focus public awareness activities and to provide a baseline for future measurement and, at regular intervals in the future, to help assess the efectiveness of the initiatives.)

15* PEP should work with key stakeholders (such as Emergency Preparedness Canada, provincial government agencies, local governments, utilities and private sector organizations) to develop and implement a coordinated public awareness communication strategy.

* This OAG audit recommendation was endorsed in the Select Standing Committee on Public Accounts’ 1999 Earthquake Preparedness in British Columbia report. Auditor General of British Columbia | March 2014 Catastrophic Earthquake Preparedness APPENDIX C: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS -

OAG’S 1997 REPORT 38

Recommendation # Recommendation Description 16* PEP should, in conjunction with the development of earthquake planning scenarios (see Recommendation 2), develop an inventory of key provincial infrastructure. Based on the detailed vulnerability analysis the planning scenarios would provide, options for dealing with areas of vulnerability should be considered, the cost of upgrading estimated, and programs proposed to carry out the upgrades on a priority basis over, for example, the next 20 years.

17* Te Ministry of Health and PEP should give immediate atention to reviewing and, where appropriate, strengthening the ability of the health system to respond to a major earthquake.

18* All ministries assigned key support functions should complete, without delay, plans detailing how they will carry out their assigned responsibilities afer a major earthquake.

19* Te Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks should develop a response plan, test it and train staf accordingly, in order to be able to meet its responsibilities under the provincial earthquake response plan.

20* PEP should update the British Columbia Earthquake Plan to refect the current situation, and take steps to have the Emergency Program Management Regulation amended as necessary.

21* PEP should develop a new communication strategy to ensure that the provincial response plan is known and understood by local authorities and response agencies.

22* PEP should take a stronger, more proactive role than it is now doing, to ensure that supporting ministries keep their earthquake preparedness plans current.

23* PEP should continue to work with Emergency Preparedness Canada at the national level to develop further heavy urban search and rescue capability.

24* PEP should take a leadership role with respect to the development of systems standards, protocols, guidelines and coordination for resource management.

25* PEP should identify a number of potential Provincial Field Response Centre sites at strategic locations throughout the province, test them for suitability, and communicate the details to those agencies likely to be involved in the response eforts.

26* PEP should take steps to identify, equip and test an alternative site for its Provincial Emergency Coordination Centre.

27* PEP should play a stronger role in providing to local governments advice and assistance regarding response planning, and in monitoring to ensure that all municipalities plan to a certain standard.

28* PEP should review on a regular basis with Emergency Preparedness Canada the status of the National Earthquake Support Plan. As well, the Canada-British Columbia Memorandum of Understanding on Emergency Preparedness should be reviewed and, where appropriate, updated.

29* PEP should continue to work with its counterparts in Alberta to ensure that the Alberta Support Plan is operational for a real event.

30* PEP should remain in contact with the Canadian Armed Forces to ensure that it has current information about the resources and capabilities available, and disseminate this information to municipalities.

31* PEP should discuss with Emergency Preparedness Canada the possibility of conducting regular exercises around the National Earthquake Support Plan and its relationship to British Columbia’s plans.

OAG’S 1997 REPORT 39

Recommendation # Recommendation Description 32* PEP should develop provincial initiatives to encourage municipalities to test key components of their individual plans sufciently, and to provide more exercises at the province-wide and regional levels to ensure that the liaison between the emergency response eforts of diferent levels of government works efectively.

33* PEP should prepare a matrix of emergency planning and response positions at both provincial and local government levels, and identify the appropriate training regime needed for each position.

34* PEP should obtain from provincial and local government agencies, at least annually, information about the training they have provided to emergency planning and response personnel.

35* PEP should develop a clear and practical plan seting out roles, responsibilities and processes for carrying out initial damage assessment immediately following a major earthquake, and communicate the plan to all who will have a role in damage assessment.

36* PEP should develop a coordinated plan for upgrading the Province’s communication equipment to a more reliable system, and update, fnalize and distribute its communications plan.

37* PEP should develop and issue a current emergency public information plan as soon as possible, and test the plan on a regular basis.

38* Te provincial government should implement the recommendations made by the Risk Management Branch regarding business continuation planning. Tese recommendations include: assigning responsibility for maintaining a business continuation planning program and establishing accountability for success; monitoring the status of such planning; and auditing ministry planning programs. Also recommended was that the Risk Management Branch act in a training and coordinating role and provide status reports to the Deputy Ministers’ Council.

39 Te provincial government should give serious consideration to how best to coordinate the roles of the Risk Management Branch and PEP, as this area of emergency preparedness is closely related to the other aspects of preparedness for which PEP is responsible.

40* Te provincial government should discuss with the federal government options for dealing with the fnancial ramifcations of a catastrophic disaster. In addition, it should develop its own options paper on ways of dealing with and mitigating its own fnancial liabilities in the event of a major earthquake.

41* Ministries and Crown corporations should give immediate atention to completing business continuation plans.

42* PEP should establish and provide to local governments guidelines for the development of business continuation plans.

43* PEP should pursue the recommendations made in an interim report of the Joint Emergency Liaison Commitee regarding structural assessment. Tese recommendations include: assigning volunteer engineers to pre-designated fre halls; providing accessible storage of necessary equipment and supplies at pre-designated fre halls; identifying volunteer engineers and registering them with PEP; having PEP coordinate the registration of all types of volunteers prior to a disaster; and having PEP develop an education strategy for professionals and the public to inform them about building inspection and posting.

44* PEP should advise local governments as to the steps they should take to develop sound plans to inspect and post buildings afer an earthquake (helpful in this regard3particularly in establishing priorities for post-earthquake inspections3will be the inventories of hazardous buildings and critical response facilities suggested in Recommendations 50 and 51.)

OAG’S 1997 REPORT 40

Recommendation # Recommendation Description 45* PEP should, working in conjunction with local governments, ensure that plans are developed to inspect all key infrastructures (whether it is owned provincially or locally).

46* PEP should establish and provide to local governments guidelines for dealing with debris removal.

47* PEP should establish and provide to local governments guidelines for planning for reconstruction.

48 Local governments should take steps to apply the seismic elements of the building code to all new critical response facilities.

49* Local governments should, in conjunction with the development of earthquake planning scenarios (see Recommendation 4), develop an inventory of key infrastructure. Based on the detailed vulnerability analysis the planning scenarios would provide, options for dealing with areas of vulnerability should be considered, the cost of upgrading estimated, and programs proposed to carry out the upgrades on a priority basis over, for example, the next 20 years.

50* Local governments should develop programs to identify and inventory hazardous buildings and to upgrade the seismic robustness of buildings based on the relative magnitude of risk to the public.

51* Local governments should assess all critical response facilities, estimate the cost of upgrading them to a standard that would ensure their operability in a post-earthquake situation, and establish priorities for upgrading.

52* Local governments should ensure they have current, complete earthquake preparedness plans, prepared in accordance with guidelines issued by PEP.

53* Local governments should develop schedules for testing their plans and ensuring that recommendations arising from the tests are dealt with.

54* Local governments should develop plans for carrying out initial damage assessment immediately following a major earthquake, and ensure the plans are consistent with the provincial plan.

55* Local governments should continue to test their ability to communicate with each other and, where signifcant problems are identifed, take steps to correct the problems.

56* Local governments should develop emergency public information plans, and test them on a regular basis.

57* Local governments should give immediate atention to completing business continuation plans.

58* Local governments should, working in conjunction with PEP, ensure that plans are developed to inspect all key infrastructures (whether it is owned provincially or locally).

59* Local governments should develop plans for debris removal.

60* Local governments should establish strategies for long-term reconstruction.

Te following recommendations were made by the Select Standing Commitee on Public Accounts in addition to the recommendations that they endorsed which can be found in Appendix C.

Summary of recommendations

Recommendation # Recommendation Description

1.2 Your commitee recommends that the PEP, in developing a coordinated public awareness communication strategy, take advantage of marketing expertise and work closely with local governments, neighbourhood programs and non-proft agencies.

1.3 Your commitee recommends the provincial government encourage the incorporation of earthquake preparedness issues and emergency frst aid certifcate programs into school curricula throughout British Columbia.

3.2 Your commitee recommends that the provincial government work with local governments to ensure that micro zonation mapping is completed in high-hazard areas of British Columbia.

4.2 Your commitee recommends that the Provincial Emergency Program fnalize its B.C. Earthquake Strategy by March 31, 2000, and provide public access to the strategy by making it available on the Internet.

5.1 Your commitee encourages the provincial government to consider repositioning the PEP within the Premier’s Ofce in order to raise its profle and increase its efectiveness.

5.2 Your commitee recommends that the annual report by PEP include, but not be limited to a discussion of the following topics: the progress of earthquake planning and preparedness in provincial ministries and Crown corporations; federal-provincial coordination of earthquake planning and preparedness measures; the work and progress of Treasury Board (Capital Division) with respect to seismic upgrading of provincial infrastructure.

6.2 Your commitee recommends that the IEPC work with non-government emergency response organizations to achieve beter coordination of response eforts.

8.1 Your commitee recommends that the provincial government, in consultation with the general insurance industry and other stakeholders, determine the type of regime that would best ensure afordable earthquake insurance continues to be available, to compensate British Columbia policyholders who sufer earthquake related loss to their property and/or its contents, and encourage the adoption by those policyholders.

8.2 Your commitee recommends that the provincial government, in consultation with the general insurance industry and other stakeholders, clarify the issues with respect to scope of insurance coverage for damages resulting from earthquakes, and in particular with respect to fre damage following earthquake.

8.3 Your commitee recommends that the provincial government require insurers to take appropriate steps to draw to policyholders’ atention, on the face of insurance policies, the scope of coverage available with respect to damages resulting from earthquake.

Auditor General of British Columbia | March 2014 Catastrophic Earthquake Preparedness APPENDIX D: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS - SELECT STANDING COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ACCOUNTS 1999 REPORT 42

Recommendation # Recommendation Description

9.2 Your commitee recognizes the work of Treasury Board (Capital Division) in evaluating, costing and prioritizing seismic upgrading of British Columbia’s infrastructure. Your commitee encourages the provincial government to make the seismic upgrading of provincial infrastructure a priority in British Columbia and, in doing so, to recognize its moral and legal responsibility for the safety of the province’s school children.

9.3 Your commitee recommends that seismic upgrading projects in schools include a consideration of non- structural damage mitigation measures, such as seismic restraint systems.

9.4 Your commitee recommends that the provincial government ensure that all buildings that are designated as emergency centres meet current seismic standards.

10.1 Your commitee recommends that the provincial government encourage and promote tie-down programs for gas appliances and mobile homes, and examine the feasibility of mandating tie-downs in the applicable codes.

10.2 Your commitee recommends that the provincial government encourage and promote public education with respect to earthquake-related natural gas hazards.

12.2 Your commitee recommends that the provincial government encourage earthquake response planning and testing in all British Columbia schools, and consider providing funding assistance for emergency supplies in all schools.

12.3 Your commitee notes the steps taken by the Ministry of Health to review and strengthen the ability of the health system to respond to a major earthquake, and encourages the ministry to continue its eforts in this regard and in particular, to consider the adequacy of British Columbia’s ambulance services capacity.

12.4 Your commitee recommends that the provincial government encourage local government initiatives, as well as cooperation between industry and governments, with respect to hazardous material planning.

12.5 Your commitee recommends that the provincial and local government take steps to ensure adequate consideration is given to women’s services in earthquake response planning.

13.1 Your commitee recommends that the provincial government recognize the important role neighbourhood programs have to play in earthquake preparedness planning and response, and take steps to promote the development of more such programs in British Columbia.

14.2 Your commitee encourages the PEP to complete its upgrading and updating eforts as soon as possible, and to ensure these plans are updated on a regular basis. Your commitee also encourages local governments to implement the Auditor General’s recommendations with respect to emergency communications and public information plans.

15.2 Your commitee acknowledges the Provincial Emergency Program’s eforts in coordinating the “Tunderbird 4 – Cascadia Response” exercise in March 1999, and recommends that the provincial government encourage more joint earthquake response exercises by the Provincial Emergency Program, Emergency Preparedness Canada and the Canadian Armed Forces, including regular exercises around the National Earthquake Support Plan and its relationship to British Columbia’s plans.

Auditor General of British Columbia | March 2014 Catastrophic Earthquake Preparedness APPENDIX D: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS - SELECT STANDING COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ACCOUNTS 1999 REPORT 43

Recommendation # Recommendation Description

15.4 Your commitee recommends that future testing of earthquake response plans involve participation by urban search and rescue teams.

16.2 Your commitee recommends that the provincial government review relevant legislation and policies to ensure that there are no legislative, regulatory or other impediments to the provision of adequate emergency training and certifcation to enable emergency medical assistants to provide efective assistance in the event of a major earthquake.

18.2 Your commitee recommends PEP work cooperatively with local governments to develop guidelines for local government business continuation plans.

19.2 Your commitee recommends that the provincial government educate British Columbians about the fact that public funds will generally not be available to compensate for losses to private property resulting from earthquake, and that public funds will only be available to restore and replace public infrastructure.

20.1 Your commitee recommends that the provincial government, in particular the Provincial Emergency Program, move with dispatch in developing strategies to address the recommendations contained in this report.

20.2 Your commitee recommends that representatives of the Provincial Emergency Program re-atend before the commitee no later than December 31, 1999, in order to provide information regarding progress made in implementing the recommendations contained in this report.

Auditor General of British Columbia | March 2014 Catastrophic Earthquake Preparedness Location: 8 Bastion Square Victoria, British Columbia V8V 1X4 Office Hours: Monday to Friday 8:30 am – 4:30 pm

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