Air University Review: July-August 1980, Volume XXXI, No. 5
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AIR U N I V E R S I T Y rcuicwJULY-AUGUST 1980 The Professiona/ Journal of the United States Air Force the big battalions mass, accuracy, and the uses (and misuses) ofhistorical aphorisms Professional concern with weapons employment has traditionally centered on qualitative issues: What can the system do? What are the operational constraints? How can it best be employed? Recently, however, concern with the accelerating Soviet arms buildup, manifested in debate over the SALT treaties and the MX program—witness our first two artides—has focused increasingiy on questions of sheer size and gross numbers. The term throw- weight, buried in the obscurity of engineering jargon a few years ago, is now a well- established buzz word, familiar to anyone even remotely interested in national defense. This quantitative emphasis brings to mind an aphorism usually attributed to Napoleon and often repeated in just this context: "God is on the side of the big battalions"; uttered by a master of warfare and sanctified by repetition, that says it all. Or does it? In fact, the saying goes back at least to Marshal de Turenne, whose military career ended a century before Napoleon's began. A presumed divine preference for big battalions makes more sense for Turenne's day, when battalions were the basic tactical tool of commanders and varied enormously in composition and quality, than for the large and relatively homogeneous armies of Napoleon's era. Voltaire, who carne along in the ínterim, repeated the saying on occasion, but with an important caveat: "/f is said that God is on the side of the big battalions." He also said—without qualification—"God is not on the side of the big battalions, but of the best shots." When applied in the context of increasing throw-weights and shrinking CEPs (circular error probable), Voltaire's version makes at least as much sense as the misattributed original. What did Napoleon really say when asked about divine preference for the larger battalions? He replied, "Nothing of the kind; Providence is always on the side of the last reserve." That makes even more sense. AIR UNIVERSITY rcvicw July-Augustúri 1980 Vol. XXXI No. 5 artides__________________ T he Case for thf. M X ................................................................... Dr. LawrenceJ Korb The MX-Basing Mode Müddle Issuesand Alternatives 11 Dr Donald \1. Snow U.S Strategic Force Requirementsin a N uclear- Proliferated World............................................................ 26 Dr. Lewis A. Dunn THE SCORPION A PiCTORIAL REPORT............................................................. 34 Jay Miller departments History and the Profession of Arms T he Battle of M arathon ........................................................ 46 Maj. Gen. I.B Holley. Jr.. USAFR Sun Pin\s A rtof War. A Summary................................................. 50 Dr.John VV Killigrew T he Strategic Dimensio na of G lobal W ar............................ 58 Dr. Theodore Ropp Mililarv Affairs Abroad StrjkeagainstT error! T hf. Entebbe Rmd.............................. 65 Capt. E. Douglas Menarchik. USAF Commentarv: P rjnciplesofDeterrence.............................................. 77 In My Opinion M il it a r y Str.ategy.thf. Forgotten Art................................... 85 Lt Gol. William T Rudd, USAF ClVILIANS IN ÜN1FORM........................................................................ 93 Dr Thomas H. Et/.old Books and Ideas Individuausm and Mil it a r y Leadership................................... 96 Dr. Stanley L. Falk Getting a J umpon O ur N uclear Future................................. 102 Et Gol. John ] Kohout III. USAF Energy Spa r k of Future Conflict? .......................................... 107 Capt. Charles A. Royce, USAF Structural Flawsor Internal Cohesion?............................... 111 Dr. Dennis E. Showalter Shah Mat-T he Rjseand Fali oi Muiiammad Rf./a Pahlavi Dr. Ix*wis VVare 114 otpourri P .............................................................. 117 ontributors C . ............ 126 EVELOPMENT ofthe MX mobile missile began approximately a decade ago when the THE Strategic Air Command documented the need foran advanced intercontinental ballistic missile CASE D(ICBM). The primary impetus for developing this new system was to provide a hedge against Soviet FOR THE MX development of a countersilo potential. Secondary but important considerations included increasing the hard-target kill potential and overall firepower and Dr LawrenceJ. Korjj accuracy of our own land-based missile force to balance predicted Soviet gains in those areas. The original timetabie called for beginning production of the missile in FY 1978 and initial deployment in FY 1984. Had this timetabie been followed, the MX Dugway PG H VN CASE FOR TUF. MX 3 wouid have been deployed 15 years after alternative with a plow out launch mode; that Minuteman II and 10 years after Minuteman is, the missile will be deployed in a series of III. straight roads in a grid pattern and will be At the time the Soviets were not expected moved out of its protective shelter prior to to develop a countersilo potential until the being raised into a launch position and fired. late I970s or earlv I980s. However, strides by This alternative will reduce the miles of road the Soviets in that area more rapid than an- that have to be built by 20 percent and reduce ticipated led former President Gerald R. Ford the cost by $2 billion. Assuming no further to move up both the production and deploy- delays causecl by funding reduetions, unfore- ment schedules by a year. Had the Ford seen technological problems, or environmen- program been implemented, more than 100 tal difficulties, the First MX will become N1X missiles vvould have been in place by the operational sometime in FY 1986. Within the mid-seventies and approximately 300 by the next two years, approximately 100 of these end of the decade at a total cost of S35 billion. missiles will come on-line. and the entire This schedule wouid have solved the short- 200-missile force should be operational by term vulnerability problems of our IGBM the end of the decade. force and arrested the rapid deterioration of In order to evaluate the Presidenfs deci- the strategie balance that has occurred over sion on the MX, there are at least five inter- the past decade. related questions that must be addressed: Shortiy after coming into office, President Carter decided to reserve judgment on • Do we need a new mobile ICBM? whether to procure such a weapon system • Is the MX the most cost-effective option pending the Soviet reaction to his proposal to for a mobile ICBM? ban mobile missiles. In addition, he reduced • Is the linear grid concept the most feasi- the funding levei for the development of the ble basing mode for the mobile ICBM? MX by 85 percent, thus effectively slowing • Can we afford MX? the program down by at least three years. • Is MX viable without SALT II limits on However. two and one-half years later, in Soviet missile development? June 1979. the President announced that he wouid now support building the system. To each of these questions, the answer ap- Three months later. on 7 September 1979, pears to be in the affirmative. Mr. Carter revealed that he had approved a plan for building 200 MX missiles on public Do we need a mobile ICBM? land in Nevada and Utah in a horizontal racetrack basing mode, that is, in horizontal If we do not make our ICBM force mobile, it shelters surrounding separate circular run- will not be able to withstand a preemptive ways, at a cost of S33 billion in FY 1980 dol- first strike by the ICBM force of the Soviet lars. The following spring. on 6 May 1980, Union. Presently, 15 percent of our fixed silo Secretary of Defense Harold Brown ruled out Minuteman force may be able to survive a the racetrack basing mode in favor of a linear *1 Soviet attack that targets each silo with two warhcads. (See Table I.) Within the next few vears, the number of surviving silos could Editor'* Note drop to about 5 percent. Not even the current 1 hc prefcrrrd MX <lcpl«>\mcni mode changed from rat ctrat k to linear Air Force program of hardeningour Minute during artitlc pr«x <r.s*»ing Sim c drtails of the linear dcploymenl option had not been rcleased b\ prcvairnc. our Icad-m art depicts the original man silos to withstand pressures up to 2000 roceira* k depl«i> ment psi can alter this situation. Moreover, the 4 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW Soviets can inflict this vast damage upon our strategy, the whole idea of deterrence would ICBM force by firing only one-third of their be in jeopardy. Third, we set the dangerous own supply of ICBM warheads. Therefore, precedent of allowing the enemy to dictate unless one is willing to adopt the destabiliz- our force posture and strategy. We now know ing launch on warning or launch under at- that as far back as 1962, the Soviets em- tack strategy, the ICBM force must be made barked on a policy of building up their forces mobile if it is to survive a preemptive Soviet to be able to launch a preemptive attack strike. Mobility will make it impossible for against U.S. intercontinental ballistic mis- the Soviets to destroy the entire ICBM force siles.1 Abandoning the ICBM in effect even if they use all their warheads with hard- rewards the Soviets for this policy. target kill capabilities. If we allow our ICBM force to remain th is vulnerable, we in effect give up the most ac- Is the MX cost-ejfective? curate, reliable, ready, and powerful portion Many of those who agree with the idea of of our strategic triad. Such a course of action maintaining the ICBM portion of the triad would have three undesirable effects. First, argue that there are alternatives which are by eliminating diversity in our strategic deter- more cost-effective than the MX. specifically rent, it would weaken the bomber and sub- the modified Minuteman III orTrident II or rnarine portions of the triad.