A Theory of Political Organization Joseph Luna∗ April 19, 2015 Abstract Party finance shapes political organization. Drawing from fieldwork across Ghana, I identify four sets of actors|politicians, bureaucrats, construction contractors and political{party chairs|who collude to extract financial resources from the state. These resources are extracted through the public{procurement process and legitimized by the bureaucrat's monopoly over expertise. Party chairs demand rents from political incum- bents and aspirants in exchange for mobilizing party operatives during the electoral season. Politicians and bureaucrats oversee procurement committees across the coun- try, and award contracts to favored contractors who return kickbacks. Failure to pay rents unleashes a chair's credible threats against a politician. Ultimately, this system diminishes the quality of development. This paper details a political equilibrium and the practices that sustain it. ∗Author email:
[email protected]. I express tremendous gratitude to Robert Bates, Daniel Car- penter, Arthur Spirling, Lucie White, Kojo Asante, Ebenezer Offei–Ansah, Mohammed Awal, Jonathan Phillips, Leah Rosenzweig, Mauricio Fernandez Duque, Matthew Stephenson, Daniel Franklin, Anna Pers- son, Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg and colleagues at Northwestern, Harvard and MPSA for fruitful dis- cussions on previous versions of this work. I am grateful to the hundreds of Ghanaian public servants and private individuals who contributed their time and warm hospitality, as well as the support of the National Science Foundation and Harvard University's Frederick Sheldon Fellowship. This research is authorized under Harvard IRB Protocols F21566: 101{104. This piece is adapted from my dissertation{in{progress. Please do not circulate. 1 I. The Importance of Political Organization \Organization is the road to political power, but it is also the foundation of political stability and thus the precondition of political liberty.