A Theory of Political Organization Joseph Luna∗ April 19, 2015 Abstract Party finance shapes political organization. Drawing from fieldwork across Ghana, I identify four sets of actors|politicians, bureaucrats, construction contractors and political{party chairs|who collude to extract financial resources from the state. These resources are extracted through the public{procurement process and legitimized by the bureaucrat's monopoly over expertise. Party chairs demand rents from political incum- bents and aspirants in exchange for mobilizing party operatives during the electoral season. Politicians and bureaucrats oversee procurement committees across the coun- try, and award contracts to favored contractors who return kickbacks. Failure to pay rents unleashes a chair's credible threats against a politician. Ultimately, this system diminishes the quality of development. This paper details a political equilibrium and the practices that sustain it. ∗Author email: [email protected]. I express tremendous gratitude to Robert Bates, Daniel Car- penter, Arthur Spirling, Lucie White, Kojo Asante, Ebenezer Offei–Ansah, Mohammed Awal, Jonathan Phillips, Leah Rosenzweig, Mauricio Fernandez Duque, Matthew Stephenson, Daniel Franklin, Anna Pers- son, Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg and colleagues at Northwestern, Harvard and MPSA for fruitful dis- cussions on previous versions of this work. I am grateful to the hundreds of Ghanaian public servants and private individuals who contributed their time and warm hospitality, as well as the support of the National Science Foundation and Harvard University's Frederick Sheldon Fellowship. This research is authorized under Harvard IRB Protocols F21566: 101{104. This piece is adapted from my dissertation{in{progress. Please do not circulate. 1 I. The Importance of Political Organization \Organization is the road to political power, but it is also the foundation of political stability and thus the precondition of political liberty. The vacuum of power and authority which exists in so many modernizing countries may be filled temporarily by charismatic leadership or by military force. But it can be filled permanently only by political organization. Either the established elites compete among themselves to organize the masses or dissident elites organize them to overthrow the system. In the modernizing world, he controls the future who organizes its politics." |Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies Without political organization, the demands of citizens for public goods and services would be difficult to realize. Political parties are the central units of a state's overall political organization, but parties do not exist within a vacuum: bureaucracies, private businesses, civil society and traditional leaderships interact with parties in the governance of a state. Such entities can provide popular support for political parties while also chan- neling the demands of citizens. But most parties are not merely receivers of support and citizen demands. Most parties desire to win political offices. To do so, they must raise money, and how that money is raised defines a party's relationship with the other political entities and, ultimately, how it rules. Early political sociology explored the nature of political parties. For Michels [1915], political parties were paradoxical: despite their democratic beginnings, they developed specialized bureaucracies that doomed them to become oligarchical organizations (see also Ostrogorski [1895]). Weber [1919] noted the traditional and charismatic characteristics of political parties and the role parties play in inserting partisan ideology into state systems.1 While Michels' [1915] \iron law of oligarchy" is found in numerous examples, Lipset et al. [1956] detail conditions underlining the exceptional case of the International Typographical Union. Political parties can deliver the goods and services that the state is failing to provide. Riordon [1905] describes New York's Tammany Hall machine. Such a machine represented immigrant interests and ensured that supporters were rewarded with patronage jobs in the civil service or with construction contracts. The machine's leaders controlled important 1See Mudge & Chen [2014] for an overview of the early political sociology of parties. These authors also describe a resurgence in the political sociology of parties following a hiatus that started in the late 1960s. 2 political offices that allowed for the funneling of contracts|or, \honest graft". I argue below that similar dynamics|goods provision and political enforcement|exist in my case country. Rational{choice theorists examine parties from the perspective of office{seeking politi- cians. Aldrich [1995, 2011] argues that office–seeking politicians form parties to solve collective{action problems, namely electoral mobilization and the formation of long leg- islative coalitions. Being attached to a party cues voters to a particular \brand name" that can be useful in deciding one's vote. A long coalition allows groups of politicians to pass legislation that serves their interests (see also Weingast [1979]). Moving away from rational{choice, candidate{centered theories of parties, Bawn et al [2012] theorize that parties in the United States are better understood as coalitions of inter- est groups seeking to capture the government for their own purposes. These authors assert that interest groups influence parties most at the nomination stage, a stage which most voters ignore (see also Cohen et al [2008]). As evidence, the authors point to shifts in party position as a result of interest{group pressures; notable policy examples include the pivots towards civil{rights protections (Democrats) and anti-abortion legislation (Republicans). Beyond candidate{centered and interest{group{centered theories of political parties lies another issue. Whether parties and politicians are most concerned with providing tangi- ble goods to their citizens or whether they serve business interests, methods of financing campaigns shape ultimate actions. In the American context, Heberlig & Larson [2012] describe the upending of the seniority advancement system (for committee chair positions) in the US House of Representatives in favor of a pecuniary system where candidates who contribute the most to party campaign committees from their own political{action commit- tees (PACs) receive their top committee choices.2 Since the 1990s, candidate fundraising through PACs for this purpose has increased substantially as incumbents work harder to rally their donors. Whom a politician owes, defines how she will behave. The theory I derive centers on political finance. While its framework borrows from the sociology described above, the interactions between individual actors within that framework can be thought of from a rational{choice perspective. This theory seeks to answer the question of \who organizes politics?", which also entails identifying who enforces the rules to maintain the equilibrium. I will identify how politicians and parties are financed, and how that process is legitimized 2These donations can help the party receive a majority in the House, which is a necessary condition for awarding chair positions. 3 to prevent prosecution and voter unrest. Policy implications will also be discussed. Who controls the financing of politics, organizes it. II. The Case of Ghana The theory below is derived from fieldwork conducted over several years in Ghana. A developing country in West Africa, Ghana provides insights into political finance and or- ganization that are relevant for other developing countries.3 A. Political Background Formerly a British colony, Ghana established a democratic constitution in 1992 and main- tains a strong{presidential system of government.4 Administratively, the country comprises 10 regions, which are subdivided into 216 districts. There are numerous entry points into politics for Ghanaians. According to Schlesinger [1966], political ambitions are shaped by the structure of available offices. In Ghana, the lowest political offices are unit committees, which correspond to ward aldermen (FES 2010). Just above the unit committees are District Assembly members, who form the deliberative body at the district level.5 The highest office in a district is the District Chief Executive (DCE), similar to a mayor. The DCE is appointed by the President and serves at the President's pleasure|her term is not fixed. This person is almost always a member of the President's party. As a result, the governing party holds the highest office in each district, even in areas that are opposition strongholds. The DCE's official task is to ensure that the government's policies are implemented in the district, and she also oversees the allocation of local contracts and the monitoring of projects. Beyond the district, the local Member of Parliament is the other significant political official. Members are elected from 275 single{member constituencies, and they serve fixed four{year terms.6 According to the 1992 Constitution, at least half of the President's Cab- inet must be comprised of MPs. Presidents are elected from a single national constituency, 3I would further argue that there are numerous parallels between political–finance behavior seen in Ghana and in the United States. 4Between being a colony and a democratic state, Ghana was ruled by various military and civilian governments. 5In each district assembly, approximately 70% of members are elected by the district's citizens, while the rest are government appointees. 6Most