Sierra Leone and Conflict Diamonds: Establshing a Legal Diamond Trade and Ending Rebel Control Over the Country's Diamond Resources

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Sierra Leone and Conflict Diamonds: Establshing a Legal Diamond Trade and Ending Rebel Control Over the Country's Diamond Resources SIERRA LEONE AND CONFLICT DIAMONDS: ESTABLSHING A LEGAL DIAMOND TRADE AND ENDING REBEL CONTROL OVER THE COUNTRY'S DIAMOND RESOURCES "Controlof resourceshas greaterweight than uniform administrativecontrol over one's entire comer of the world, especially in places such as Sierra Leone where valuable resources are concentratedand portable.' I. INTRODUCTION Sierra Leone2 is in the midst of a civil war that began in 1991, when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) invaded the country from neighboring Liberia.3 RUF rebels immediately sought control over one of the country's richest resources--diamonds.4 Since gaining control over the most productive diamond fields, the rebels have at their fingertips an endless supply of wealth with which to fund their insurgencies against the Government of Sierra Leone.' The RUF rebels illicitly trade diamonds for arms in open smuggling operations. 6 Diamonds sold by the RUF, in order to fund the rebel group's military action in opposition to Sierra Leone's legitimate and internationally recognized government, are called "conflict diamonds."7 1. WIulIAM RENO, WARLORD POLITICS AND AFRICAN STATES 140 (1998). 2. Sierra Leone is located on the west coast of Africa north of Liberia and south of Guinea. The country has 4,900,000 residents, almost all of whom belong to one of 13 native African tribes. Country: Sierra Leone, Sept. 3,2000, availableat LEXIS, Kaleidoscope File. One of the primary economic activities in Sierra Leone is mining of its large diamond deposits that are a major source of hard currency. Countries that predominantly import goods from Sierra Leone include Belgium, the United States, and India. Sierra Leone is also a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). See id. 3. See Ibrahim Abdullah & Patrick Muana, The Revolutionary United Frontof Sierra Leone, in AFRICAN GUERRLAS 172, 178 (Christopher Clapham ed., 1998). 4. Mineral wealth is the core foundation of economies throughout African states. See JOHN READER, AFRICA: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE CONTINENT 16-17 (1997). Since gaining independence from the British, Sierra Leone's economic development has been dependent upon the output of its diamond mines. See id. 5. See Conflict Diamonds: Sanctions and War, at http://www.un.org/peaceafrica /Diamond.html. (last visited Oct. 14, 2000). 6. See READER, supra note 4, at 576 (explaining that smuggling is a continent-wide activity of great proportions and accounts for a large share of diamonds mined in Sierra Leone and nearby countries). See also NIC CONFERENCE REPORT, AFRICA: THE ECONOMICS OF INSURGENCY IN ANGOLA, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, AND SIERRA LEONE 6 (1999) (statement of a diamond industry expert explaining that smuggling diamonds in Sierra Leone and other African countries is a low-risk, high-return venture because diamonds are small, easily concealed, and extremely valuable). 7. See Conflict Diamonds: Sanctions and War, supra note 5. IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. [Vol. 11:3 Today, the rebels control nine-tenths of Sierra Leone's diamond mines.' The Government of Sierra Leone urgently needs to regain control of these mines and develop a system by which it will be able to legitimately exploit the country's diamond resources.9 At stake is not only Sierra Leone's fragile democracy, which is continually threatened by RUF attacks, but also the lives of thousands of civilians who are repeatedly subjected to gross human rights abuses committed by the rebels.'0 This Note analyzes the efforts taken thus far by the international community to develop a sustainable and well-regulated diamond industry in Sierra Leone. Part II explores the political landscape in Sierra Leone from the late eighteenth century to present. Part Ill outlines the history and current state of Sierra Leone's diamond trade. Part IV examines various international responses to Sierra Leone's illicit diamond trade, including an in-depth analysis of pertinent United Nations resolutions and pending United States .legislation on the matter. Part V outlines influential members of the global diamond industry and the steps taken by them and by the industry in general to stop trading in conflict diamonds. Part VI provides specific recom- mendations for establishing a legitimate diamond industry in Sierra Leone. II. POLITICAL LANDSCAPE INSIERRA LEONE A. Leadership and History In the late eighteenth century, 1200 freed slaves founded Freetown," Sierra Leone's capital.'2 The African country gained legal status, through a 8. Hearingson Endingthe Trade in Conflict Diamonds(Testimony of Holly Burkhalter, Physicians for Human Rights), Before the House Ways and Means Subcomm. on Trade (2000). Sept. 13, 2000, available at http:lwww.phrusa.orglresearchlsierra_leone /sierraLdiamd_091400.htmi. [hereinafter Holly Burkhater] 9. See PreparedTestimony ofChairman Gooch, Director of Global Witness, Before the Subcomm. on Africa of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations Subcomm. on Africa, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, May 9, 2000, available at LEXIS, Federal News Service File [hereinafter Chairman Gooch]. 10. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCI, GETrING AWAY wrrH MURDER, MUTILATION, AND RAPE: NEW TESTIMONY FROM SIERRA LEONE, Vol. 11, No. 3 (A), 9-42, June 1999 (noting that during a three week occupation of Sierra Leone's capital by the RUF rebels in January 1999, 7335 corpses were registered in a single day by the senior government pathologist as a result of the incursion. Id. at 9. The report goes on to cite the various types of human rights abuses for which RUF rebels are infamous including burning civilians alive, using civilians as human shields, mass mutilation, and amputations, rape, and abduction). See id. at 15, 23-25, 27-40. 11. READER, supra note 4, at 379, 426. "Freetown is so named because it was the port at which slaves were set ashore as free men by the English fleet which patrolled the shipping lanes off West Africa and seized slaving vessels after England and America abolished the slave trade in 1807 and 1808 respectively." Id at 379. Sierra Leone abolished slavery in 1896. Id. at 426. 12. See Ian Smillie et al., The Heartof the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamondsand Human Security. This study was produced in January 2000 by a non-governmental agency in Canada, known as Partnership Africa Canada, which has been at the forefront in examining the 2001] SIERRA LEONE AND CONFLIcT DIAMONDS Royal Charter, as a British colony in 1799.'" British departure in 1961'" marked the start of Sierra Leone's independence, as well as the beginning of a "checkered political experience."' 5 Politically ambitious military personnel in the 1967 general elections soon overtook the pluralistic political system that Sierra Leoneans established after gaining independence in 1961. 6 In 1967, the Sierra Leonean Army took power under the title "National Reform Council,"' 7 and handed power to Siaka Stevens'8 who was the presumed winner of the general elections.'9 By the end of the, 1970s, Stevens declared Sierra Leone a one-party state which he ruled as its dictator until his retirement in 1985, at which time he seeded power to his former army chief Joseph Mamoh. 2° Mamoh, characterized as politically weak,2' fled the country in 1992 due to a military coup instigated by young officers revolting against poor work conditions, a lackluster economy, and the country's desire to restore multi-party democracy.? Twenty-seven year old army captain Valentine Strasser led the military coup that succeeded in ousting President Mamob's government.? In 1996, another military coup, this time led by Strasser's second in command, Julius Maada Bio, expelled Strasser from power.24 Bio's reign was even more short-lived than his predecessor's however; as within three months, democratically elected Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, head of the same Sierra Leone People's Party that led the country to independence in 1961, replaced Bio.25 relationship between diamonds and guns in Sierra Leone. See id. at 1. The study includes excellent background information on Sierra Leone's development as a country in relation to its diamond resources. See id. at 4-7. The section entitled "Key Events in Sierra Leone's History," provides a chronology of important historical events from 1787 to 1999. See id. at 14-16. 13. See id. 14. See RENO, supra note 1, at 69. 15. Alahji Bah, Exploring the Dynamics of the Sierra Leone Conflict, PEACE KEEPING AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Jan.-Apr. 2000, at 1. 16. See id. 17. See Smillie et al., supra note 12, at 14. 18. After becoming Prime Minister in 1968, Siaka Stevens immediately turned diamonds into a political issue. See id. at 5. He encouraged illegal mining, at times involving himself in criminal activities. Three years into his reign of power, Stevens nationalized the Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST) through his creation of the National Diamond Mining Company (NDMC). See id. 19. See Bah, supra note 15, at 1. 20. See Smillie et al., supra note 12, at 15. 21. See RENO, supra note 1, at 116. 22. See Abdullah & Muana, supra note 3, at 181. The revolting military officers took the name "National Provisional Ruling Council" (NPRC). The young officers soon became seduced by their positions of power in the government and started neglecting their duties as soldiers. See id. Some officers abandoned important posts outside Freetown, which allowed the RUF to strengthen its recruits and to capture from the government the main town in Sierra Leone's rich diamond district, Kono. See id. at 182. 23. See RENO, supra note 1, at 174. 24. See Smillie et al., supra note 12, at 15. See also RENO, supra note 1. at 221 (noting that Bio was, ironically, Strasser's "anti-insurgency military commander"). 25. RENO, supra note 1. at 134. See also Jeremy Levitt, HumanitarianIntervention by Regional Actors in Internal Conflicts: The Cases ofECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, 12 IND.
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