Lessons Learned from Power-Sharing in Africa

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Lessons Learned from Power-Sharing in Africa 8/2008 Lessons Learned from Power-Sharing in Africa Håvard Strand, Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW) Scott Gates, Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW) Several power-sharing agreements have been reached in Africa over the last decades. This project has compared the experiences of various forms of power-sharing in five countries, Bu- rundi, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. The cases differ significantly both with regard to the implementation of power-sharing and the rationale for adopting such institutions. Our conclusions is that power-sharing institutions have proven themselves useful in some countries and less so in others. The most positive experiences have been in the peace processes of Sierra Leone and Liberia, where power-sharing played a vital role in securing peace. There are less clear support for power-sharing institutions with regard to good governance. Introduction tions. Inclusive institutions work towards inte- This project describes power-sharing efforts in grating as many voices as possible into the deci- five conflict-prone and ill-governed African sion-making body, whereas exclusive institutions countries: Burundi, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, and create autonomous political spheres. Sierra Leone. While these five countries are The rationale for inclusive institutions as- unique in many important ways, some overar- sumes that exclusion is a key to violent conflict, ching conclusions can nevertheless be drawn and is therefore very focused on not excluding from these studies. Our studies support the any relevant group. The inclusive answer is to conclusion that power-sharing can be a useful provide some guarantees to all parties, so that remedy under certain conditions. P o w e r - they will prefer to participate within the system sharing institutions aim to integrate all groups in rather than challenge it. the political debate through an extensive set of In contrast, the rationale for exclusive constraints on decision-making bodies. Examples institutions is that one must cherish political are grand coalitions, supermajority require- competition rather than view it as a source of ments, proportionality (or over-representation problems. The aim of these solutions is to pre- of minorities) in both political and administrative vent monopoly control over political institu- bodies, and segmental autonomy, such as federa- tions. Political monopolies can create opportuni- lism. ties for abuses of power. The answer to the Such institutions are used to promote bet- problem of bad governance is therefore to force ter governance as well as to solve protracted political parties to cater to the needs of the vo- conflicts. The actual implementation differs from ters through competition and accountability. case to case, and an important difference is the time dimension. Is the arrangement a temporary The Evidence: Burundi or a permanent one? Typically, power-sharing Burundi suffers from both distrust between the arrangements that primarily seek to establish a two major ethnic groups, the Hutu and the Tut- durable peace will have a sunset clause, whereas si, and a substantial spoiler problem in the form those focusing on the governance aspect are of splinter groups that have rejected the peace more permanent. process. The pre-war situation was that a southern Inclusive or Exclusive? Tutsi-dominated faction held a monopoly of po- Gates & Strøm (2007) distinguish is between wer. Following atrocities in the previous deca- inclusive and exclusive power-sharing institu- des the Tutsi UPRONA party had opened up for a transition to democracy, which failed and effectively sharing was more and more tailored to fit the rebel started a civil war in 1994. organizations rather than society. Several power-sharing agreements have been The Liberian agreements all outlined transitional negotiated and implemented, but failed to provide pea- governments, focusing on the next election. The first ce and stability, chiefly because they failed to include election that was carried out was won by warlord the main rebel organizations. In 2004, an advanced Charles Taylor in 1997, but lack of trust in his lea- power-sharing accord was reached. This led to de- dership prompted two rebel factions to restart the mocratic elections and the installment of a new go- war. vernment in 2005. Taylor’s political exile in 2003 opened the way The power-sharing provisions are very inclusive, for renewed negotiations. The 2003 agreement resul- with a grand coalition, including all parties with more ted in a very broad grand coalition government, in than 5% of the vote, supermajority requirements in which both warring parties and civil society were re- both government and parliament and an extensive set presented. This arrangement culminated in the de- of regulations aiming to provide an overrepresentation mocratic election of the current government, but it of the minority Tutsi population. did so with the assistance of the UNMIL peace-keeping Power-sharing has succeeded in incorporating force, which managed to both pacify spoilers and rein- both the major ethic groups in the country. However, tegrate former soldiers. the situation is still unstable. While civil society is quite The final power-sharing arrangement has proven strong, there are few protections available for dissi- itself a success as a transitional vehicle, but in Liberia dents and others trying to exercise a check on the no such arrangement has been viable without third- government, and although the government was de- party guarantees. mocratically elected, it has not led the country in a very democratic fashion. The Evidence: Nigeria Nigeria consists of a large number of small minorities, The Evidence: Kenya and three regional majorities. In addition, there is a In Kenya elections have come to be associated with religious divide between Christians and Muslims, and a violence. Since the re-introduction of multi-party poli- general geographic divide between Northerners and tics in 1991, three of the four subsequent elections Southerners. These rifts resulted in the 1967–70 Biafra have been marred by significant ethnic conflict. war. Following the most recent election, held in De- Various forms of power-sharing institutions have cember 2007, widespread inter-communal violence been introduced in Nigeria after the civil war, but they erupted after the Electoral Commission named the have seldom been implemented in a meaningful way. incumbent as the winner of the presidential race de- Through their failures, these attempts may even have spite significant irregularities in the vote counting pro- exacerbated the problems they in theory should solve. cess. In January and February 2008 over 1,000 people Nigeria has been a federal state since before were killed and at least 300,000 displaced from their independence, but what started out as three states are homes. now 36 states. The increase in the number of states is A power-sharing agreement between Kenya’s allegedly done to better integrate minorities, but the two main political parties was reached in March 2008. fact that many of these increases happened during mili- The accord called for the creation of a grand coalition tary governments point to another plausible cause: a government in which both parties would share power “divide and rule”-strategy. on an equal basis. It is otherwise a minimalist and pu- First, while some small minorities gained repre- rely inclusionary power-sharing agreement. sentation through a state more or less of their own, The agreement had the immediate effect of their influence remained insignificant. Second, the restoring peace and stability in Kenya. Yet, the ac- larger ethnic groups were split up into several states, cord’s long-term durability is far from certain. which tended to dilute the influence of these groups. The fundamental causes of the conflict – inequa- As a consequence of their inferior position, se- lities in access to power and resources – have not veral smaller groups and fringe organizations have been addressed. These issues remain latent sources of used violent means in Nigerian politics. In order to conflict that have the potential to derail the current oppose this tendency, a number of inclusive power- grand coalition government and lead to renewed con- sharing laws have been passed. These take statehood flict. as a point of departure, and work towards securing each state a say in the political process. The Evidence: Liberia These measures fail to address the most impor- During its fourteen-year civil war, Liberia was domina- tant issue for these minorities: the allocation of the oil ted by a number of rebel groups. Power-sharing was income. Wealth sharing is administrated according to a an important aspect of most peace agreements signed number of contradictory principles, which leaves all to end the conflict, and initially, these power-sharing groups more or less aggrieved. institutions were set up according to consociational principles. But the problem of spoilers meant that as The Evidence: Sierra Leone one peace arrangement failed after the other, power- Power-sharing in Sierra Leone served one specific pur- pose: to produce peace. This end was reached, In Nigeria, power-sharing has been used to keep although power-sharing as a system of governance the country together and to discourage secessionist. failed. While the effort has to some extent failed, the country The civil war (1991-2002) was prolonged since neither has not slid back intofull-scale civil war. It is also no- party had the military capacity to win, but third-party table that the power-sharing institutions have not been pressure forced the parties to negotiate. These talks well implemented. If better implemented, it is possible eventually resulted in two power-sharing agreements. that Nigeria would have been less violent. The first peace agreement was signed in 1996, The most important lesson from Nigeria is per- and allowed for RUF representation in the army and haps that power-sharing necessitates effective civilian other official institutions.
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