Organized Crime and Armed Spoilers in Times of Transition Executive Summary
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ORGANIZED CRIME AND ARMED SPOILERS IN TIMES OF TRANSITION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 2 The Fundación Ideas para la Paz (Ideas for Peace Foundation), in its search to comprehend the phenomenon of organized crime –or what some sectors call “paramilitarismo”- and its impact in a scenario of transition like the one that Colombia it’s experimenting after the signature of the peace accords between the Government and the FARC, took on the challenge of studying “organized crime and armed spoilers in transition times” with the idea of delivering a more focused balanced on the changing environment of armed conflict, the impact of the many expressions of violence that make it up, just like the expressions that are in a process of formation and have had greater visibility with the clearing out of the oldest guerrilla in the country. During the last five years, FIP has studied the evolution of organized crime and criminal economies, as well as the challenges that different spoilers present in terms of direct competition to the implementation of the peace accords, especially for their disrupting capacity. During the course of the negotiations with the FARC, FIP insisted on showing that some criminal economies, in some regions, were evolving, with new agreements between the guerrillas and the criminal organizations in charge. The question that arises is, if this evolution or change is a result of the adaptation by criminal structures to State actions which focus on the dismantling of these structures, and not on the transformation of the territories. To this respect, FIP believes that the armed forces’ operations that go in and out of these territories do not have an effect in the conditions that allow for the reproduction of illegal activities and the control that organized crime groups have over them. In addition, organized crime and illegal economies have created criminal institutions that fluctuate in an armed conflict setting and that exercise authority and coercive measures as well as some kind of taxation that doesn’t involve the Colombian State. One of the conclusions of this investigation is that the strategy of striking the leaders or the weaker links of organized crime structures, at least in the Colombian case, results in a transformation of the criminal structure but not its total dismantling. Today it is more localized, organizationally and territorially fragmented, and even more difficult it’s disbanding due to its long legacy and the territorial vulnerabilities of each region of study. The structures are hit, but the conditions associated with illegal markets and the deficiencies of the State continue to be present and they favored the reproduction of organized crimes structures under different forms. The transformation of organized crime also implies significant changes to its organizational structure and the way it functions. It has gone from vertical integration of the big cartels to a more horizontal structure based on networks and with multiple autonomous actors. The latter, search for alliances, or they confront each other for the territorial control of areas conditioned for drug trafficking and other illegal businesses, among them illegal mining, contraband, extortion, micro-trafficking, local drug dealing, gambling and prostitution. One of FIP’s conclusions –one that is agreed on by other organizations- is that areas where the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) had a presence in the past and currently there is activity by different armed illegal groups, coincide with the territories where activities related to drug- 2 3 trafficking and illegal mining have fester. The evolution of this process it’s crossed by the accumulation of violence’s in which both activities are the key elements. The analysis also highlights that even after the dismantling of the FARC guerrilla group, there is still other types of armed spoilers even more difficult to characterize but with the capacity of coercion and to jeopardize the stability of the implementation of the Peace Accord in the middle of the transition period. This document was done between august 2016 and May 2017, period in which FIP took on arduous field work with short visits to the Catatumbo, Buenaventura, Putumayo, Cauca, Llanos Orientales, Urabá and Tumaco. Similarly, 100 interviews and group conversations with public servants, local authorities, international organization employees, members of the armed forces, judicial operators, journalist, local leaders, university professors, non-governmental organizations at the regional and local level, victims associations, individuals in a process of demobilization and reintegration, middle and small businessmen and merchants, were conducted. The analysis also relies on field work done in different regions before august 2016, the review of secondary sources and of two important FIP databases: The conflict database that groups together events from 1986 to 2016, and the press database that groups together the daily review of 36 national and regional news sources. The interviews and secondary source content was classified and codify by significance units that serve as bases to sustain each hypothesis, and structure the contents of this document. For example, in some conversations there was a consistent mentioning of what is understood today as a “presence” of the aforementioned groups. In turn, this allowed FIP to make an approximation to the different types of presence and analytical challenges presented by these groups, and not to fall in exaggerations about their location in x or y number of municipalities or departments. On the other hand, the significance units call attention to the need of developing an investigation agenda for the construction of micro data that helps to comprehend more accurately the dynamics and variations of the trajectories of the different expressions that persist in the medium and short term in Colombia. With all of the inputs, the FIP initially called for an identification of some of the challenges in classifying, not only what the State calls Organized Armed Groups (GAO in spanish), but also other criminal and armed groups classified as Criminal Organized Groups (AGC in Spanish). There is a reference to the Autodefensas Gaitanistas of Colombia (AGC), also called Clan del Golfo; to the Puntilleros, Bloque Meta and Bloque Libertadores del Vichada; to the Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL), also known as the Pelusos; the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN); the Rastrojos; the dissidents of the FARC and some more groups. Similarly, the explanation of why these groups have entered an organizational and territorial fragmentation process is found on this document in which we intend to show that the realities of the transition are not comparable to the criteria employed by the State to determine the threat level, important aspect to be taken 3 4 into consideration at the local level, overall, in the physical security of the population and its communities. Thesis on transition, armed conflict and organized crime Above and beyond the discussions on the existence of “paramilitarismo”, FIP believes that Colombia is facing a conflict in transformation and a differentiated transition that cannot be limited to the irreconcilable discussion on the presence or not of this phenomenon, and if it really is facing a post conflict era. To that effect, the document proposes three theses on transition, armed conflict and organized crime. The first thesis refers to the transition, the environmental character of conflict and what’s local. FIP considers that is imperative to position the language of the end of armed conflict. Today, the realities of the different regions of the country, with most structures of the FARC deactivated, demand that our focus concentrates on the continuities of conflict and its ties to organized crime. This requires a monitoring of their dynamics, of the trajectories of the armed groups that persist, and how the new armed forms and the types of violence they excerpt, just like those less visible, but with the capability to affect the population. Some international experiences and the national context call for a critical look to this respect. Various studies suggest that in transitional contexts there is a juxtaposition of dynamics, times and historical processes that do not correspond to just one end, meaning, to a closer technological look at the implementation of peace. This overlap is characterized by a progressive transformation of armed conflict in the middle of the continuity of different types of “violence in times of peace”, less visible, but that call into question the scope and significance of the word “transition”. At the same time that the conflict deactivates in a general manner, it concentrates or increases in more limited territories where other guerrilla and organized crime groups persist. There is also a surge of other armed expressions, under temporary alliances, disputes and frameworks of coexistence. It’s because of this that the analytical part of this document highlights the importance of the local dimension. This is where we can find concrete conflict interactions from the transition and implementation of the Peace Agreement. Contrary to “macro” visions that emphasize, with just cause, the generalized reduction of the armed conflict, this document explores the way in which transition and the rearrangement of different armed groups and spoilers continues to generate a more reduced but not less relevant impact. In this sense, it also important to know what options the State