PRISM VOL. 5, NO. 1 2014 A JOURNAL OF THE CENTER FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS PRISM About VOL. 5, NO. 1 2014 PRISM is published by the Center for Complex Operations. PRISM is a security studies journal chartered to inform members of U.S. Federal agencies, allies, and other partners on complex EDITOR and integrated national security operations; reconstruction and state-building; relevant policy Michael Miklaucic and strategy; lessons learned; and developments in training and education to transform America’s security and development EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS Ross Clark Ben Graves Caliegh Hernandez Communications Daniel Moore Constructive comments and contributions are important to us. Direct communications to: COPY EDITORS Dale Erickson Editor, PRISM Rebecca Harper 260 Fifth Avenue (Building 64, Room 3605) Christoff Luehrs Fort Lesley J. McNair Sara Thannhauser Washington, DC 20319 Nathan White Telephone: (202) 685-3442 DESIGN DIRecTOR FAX: Carib Mendez (202) 685-3581 Email: [email protected] ADVISORY BOARD Dr. Gordon Adams Dr. Pauline H. Baker Ambassador Rick Barton Contributions Professor Alain Bauer PRISM welcomes submission of scholarly, independent research from security policymakers Dr. Joseph J. Collins (ex officio) and shapers, security analysts, academic specialists, and civilians from the United States and Ambassador James F. Dobbins abroad. Submit articles for consideration to the address above or by email to [email protected] Ambassador John E. Herbst (ex officio) with “Attention Submissions Editor” in the subject line. Dr. David Kilcullen Ambassador Jacques Paul Klein Dr. Roger B. Myerson This is the authoritative, official U.S. Department of Defense edition of PRISM. Dr. Moisés Naím Any copyrighted portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted MG William L. Nash, USA (Ret.) without permission of the copyright proprietors. PRISM should be acknowledged whenever material is quoted from or based on its content. Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering Dr. William Reno The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are LtGen John F. Sattler, USMC (Ret.) those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department Dr. James A. Schear of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government. Dr. Joanna Spear Dr. Ruth Wedgwood PUBLISHER Dr. Joseph J. Collins ISSN 2157–0663 FEATURES 2 A Better Approach to War Powers By Tim Kaine 8 Governing for the Future: What Governments Can Do By Peter Ho & Adrian W. J. Kuah www.ndu.edu 22 To Build a Network ndupress.ndu.edu By John Arquilla 34 Intervention in Intrastate War: The Military Planning Problem By William Gregor 52 Merging Competing Militaries After Civil Wars By Roy Licklider 62 The Organized Crime - Peace Operations Nexus By Wibke Hansen 80 Tackling Nuclear Terrorism in South Asia By Feroz Khan & Emily Burke 100 Hezbollah’s Syrian Quagmire By Matthew Levitt 116 The Terror Crime Nexus: Hezbollah’s Global Facilitators By Celina Realuyo BOOK REVIEWS 132 Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God Reviewed by Thomas F. Lynch III LESSONS LEARNED 136 Establishing a Conceptual Framework for Interagency Coordination at U.S. Southern Command By Joanna Gutierrez Winters INTERVIEW 154 An Interview with Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III John Trumbul’s painting , Declaration of Independence, illustrating the Committee of Five presenting their draft of the Declaration of Independence to the Congress on June 28, 1776. A Better Approach to War Powers BY TIM KAINE he hardest call during my first year in the Senate was my vote to authorize military force in Syria to punish President Bashar al-Assad for using chemical weapons against his citi- T zens. When I was sworn in on January 3rd, 2013, I expected difficult votes. But I did not anticipate such a profound vote within my first nine months. Only the 18 Senators who serve on the Foreign Relations Committee had to take that vote on September 4, following President Barack Obama’s decision to ask Congress to formally authorize a military response. But as tough as the vote was, I am glad the President brought it to Congress instead of proceeding on his own. The framers of the Constitution had a clear view. Congress must formally approve the initia- tion of significant military action and the President, as Commander-in-Chief, is responsible for the day-to-day management of a military action once initiated. The framers understood that a President might need to act before Congressional consideration to defend against attack or protect vital American interests. This made particular sense in the days when Congress frequently recessed for lengthy periods and transportation and communication technology made mustering the body for decision-making very time-consuming. But, even in the instance when a President unilaterally acted to defend the nation, it was still assumed that Congress had to formally ratify the decision to begin military action. While the constitutional language is clear, the American practice has been anything but con- sistent. Congress has only declared war five times while Presidents have initiated military action well over 120 times. In some of these instances, Congress subsequently ratified a Presidential decision either by formal approval or some informal acquiescence such as appropriating funds for the effort. But in other instances, a President has acted without concern for Congressional approval. Most recently, President Barack Obama committed military forces to NATO action against Libya in 2011 without Congressional approval. He was formally censured by the House of Representatives for doing so. Senator Tim Kaine was elected to the Senate in 2012. He serves on the Armed Services, Budget and Foreign Relations Committees as well as being Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on the Near East, South and Central Asian Affairs, overseeing American foreign policy in this critical region. PRISM 5, NO. 1 FEATURES | 3 KAINE The variance between constitutional lan- Congress passed the War Powers Resolution, guage and our historical practice is not just purporting to solve this tough policy issue by about executive overreach. Congress has often creating a process for consultation between the wanted to avoid accountability for a tough executive and legislature. It was a hyper-parti- decision. san time and the emotions of the ongoing Letting the President make the decision Vietnam War made the act controversial. allows members to have it both ways—appear President Nixon vetoed the Resolution and supportive so long as the operation is success- Congress overrode the veto. Subsequent ful or be critical if the operation does not work Presidents of both parties have generally out as planned. This abdication hurts the pub- asserted that the act is unconstitutional and it lic by depriving them of the opportunity to has not been followed by either the legislative witness, and learn from, meaningful or executive branches. Congressional debate about whether military I entered the Senate with a personal obses- action is in the national interest. sion over war powers questions. Virginia is the In the summer of 1973, angered by most military state in the country, with a huge President Richard Nixon’s secret expansion of population of active duty, guard, reserve, vet- the Vietnam War into Laos and Cambodia, erans, DoD civilians, military contractors, President Woodrow Wilson asking Congress to declare war on Germany on 2 April 1917. 4 | FEATURES PRISM 5, NO. 1 A BETTER APPROACH TO WAR POWERS national security professionals, diplomats and Within weeks after commencing our all their families. With nearly one in three effort, we were confronted with a real test case: Virginia citizens directly connected to the mil- the Syrian civil war and Syrian President itary, decisions about when to initiate war Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons affect us very deeply. And especially at the end against civilians. After World War I, the nations of nearly 13 years of war in Iraq and of the world convened to ban chemical weap- Afghanistan, we owe it to our warfighters to ons. The international community decided clear up any confusion in how we make these that because chemical weapons are indiscrim- critical decisions. We could hardly commit a inate, nearly indefensible, and kill civilians more immoral public act than requiring a vol- and soldiers alike, their use would be forbid- unteer military force to risk their lives in battle den. And in the 90 years since the interna- without a clear political consensus supporting tional ban, the ban has protected citizens and their mission. service members in conflicts around the globe. With my own personal passion on the Since joining the Senate, I have been issue, I was aware of the constitutional intent, involved in dialogue about the Syrian civil war the inconsistent history of the executive and and what the U.S. should do about it. We are legislative branches and the failed 1973 effort the largest provider of humanitarian aid to to create a more workable process. I was also Syrian refugees who are currently streaming aware of very strong work done by the into Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq. And, University of Virginia’s Miller Center National we are working with other nations to get the War Powers Commission on this very issue. Syrian government and opposition to discuss The Commission, chaired by former Secretaries a negotiated end to the civil war. But the use of State James Baker and Warren Christopher, of chemical weapons, against a clear and was composed of a bipartisan roster of tal- important international norm, raised the ented leaders from Congress, the executive stakes. And the question became—would branch, the military, the diplomatic corps and America go so far as to respond with military academia. In 2008, they proposed a War force? Powers Consultation Act designed to allow the Many Presidents would have acted unilat- President and Congress to each exercise their erally to do so.