i

ABSTRACT

WAR AND LEGITIMACY: THE SECUREMENT OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE

During the post-revolution period, the newfound constitutional government of the faced a crisis of sovereignty and legitimacy. The Old Northwest region, encompassing what is now , and Illinois, was disputed between several groups. The U.S. government under George claimed the region and sought to populate the land with white settlers, British officials in North America wished to reestablish British hegemony in the valley and Native-Americans wished to protect their ancestral homeland from foreign invasion. In the , war broke out between a British backed alliance of Native tribes and the United States of America. Historians have named this conflict the Northwest Indian War. Examining government records, personal correspondences between Washington administration officials and military commanders, as well as recollections of soldiers, officials and civilians this thesis explores the geopolitical causes and ramifications of the Northwest Indian War. These sources demonstrate how the war was a reflection of a crisis which threatened the legitimacy to American sovereignty in the West. Furthermore, they also demonstrate how the use of a professional federal standing army was used by

Washington’s government to secure American legitimacy.

Michael Anthony Lipe August 2019 ii

WAR AND LEGITIMACY: THE SECUREMENT OF SOVEREIGNTY

IN THE NORTHWEST INDIAN WAR

by Michael Anthony Lipe

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History in the College of Social Sciences California State University, Fresno

August 2019

APPROVED For the Department of History:

We, the undersigned, certify that the thesis of the following student meets the required standards of scholarship, format, and style of the university and the student's graduate degree program for the awarding of the master's degree.

Michael Anthony Lipe Thesis Author

Bradley Jones (Chair) History

Ethan Kytle History

Lori Clune History

For the University Graduate Committee:

Dean, Division of Graduate Studies

AUTHORIZATION FOR REPRODUCTION OF MASTER’S THESIS

X I grant permission for the reproduction of this thesis in part or in its entirety without further authorization from me, on the condition that the person or agency requesting reproduction absorbs the cost and provides proper acknowledgment of authorship.

Permission to reproduce this thesis in part or in its entirety must be obtained from me.

Signature of thesis author:______

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would first like to thank my thesis advisor Dr. Bradley Jones of the History

Department at the California State University of Fresno, for his continued support, feedback and patience. Dr. Jones was always there with advice on how to best organize my research and where to begin my search for answers. He has helped me become a better researcher, a better writer and a better historian. In addition, to my committee members Dr. Ethan Kytle and Lori Clune, I thank you for your feedback on my research. I will forever be grateful to you all for all you have done for me throughout my time creating this thesis. I would like to thank the rest of the staff of the History Department at Fresno State, for without them I would not have the understanding and appreciation for historical research, writing and teaching I have today. From my committee members to those whose classes I have been fortunate enough to take, I give my sincere thanks. Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends who have supported me throughout my years of study. I would like to acknowledge Jaime Montana Cook as the second reader of this thesis, and I am forever indebted to her for her comments and criticisms of my writing and research. I would like to thank Leslie Martin for her emotional support during times of stress and anxiety while compiling this thesis. I would like to thank my parents for their continued emotional and financial support throughout my time in university. And last but not least, I would like to dedicate my research to my late sister Anastasia Marie Gonsalves. Throughout her life she always supported me, looked out for me and encouraged me. Without her I would not be the historian I am today.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

CHAPTER 1: THE CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY ...... 8

The Threat of Pan-Indianism ...... 8

Settler Discontent and Federal Authority on the Frontier ...... 14

Provocation by British Agents ...... 19

Chapter Conclusion ...... 24

CHAPTER 2: FAILED ATTEMPTS AT LEGITIMATION ...... 26

The First Failure of the : Harmar’s Defeat ...... 26

The Second Failure of the Militia: St. Clair’s Defeat ...... 32

Chapter Conclusion ...... 40

CHAPTER 3: SECURING LEGITIMACY ...... 42

The Success of a Professional Standing Army ...... 42

The Crisis Resolved ...... 46

Chapter Conclusion ...... 51

CONCLUSION ...... 53

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 63

INTRODUCTION

When most Americans recall United States military history, certain events and images come to mind. The of the Revolution, Union and Confederate soldiers fighting against their fellow countrymen during the Civil War, American soldiers fighting against fascist tyranny and genocide during the Second World War, harsh and unpopular quagmires in Vietnam or the Middle East. What does not often come to mind, however, is a conflict fought within the final decade of the eighteenth-century. A conflict that albeit neglected from the public memory had a monumental impact upon U.S. history: the Northwest Indian War of the 1790s. The Northwest Indian War was a conflict in the Ohio region between an alliance of Native American tribes and the United States. The conflict culminated in three military campaigns undertaken by the U.S. Army, the first two militia-based and the final composed of a federal army. The last of these campaigns resulted in an American victory.1

War and Legitimacy argues that the Northwest Indian War was a reflection of a wider crisis of American sovereignty and legitimacy, and that though the initial attempts to end the war exacerbated this crisis, the final victory through use of a standing army resolved it. This hydra-like crisis bore three heads: the discontent of frontier settlers and the lack of de facto federal authority in the west, British disregard for U.S. territorial claims and interference with U.S.-Native relations, and the threat of a Pan-Indian movement. To counter this crisis, the Washington administration used several methods to legitimize the young federal republic. First the Washington administration prioritized the use of diplomacy in the hopes of avoiding a war, and when this failed used a militia- based army against the Northwest Natives. When both methods ultimately failed to

1 John Grenier, The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607-1814. (: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 193. 2 resolve the crisis, the administration established a formalized standing army, whose victory secured the legitimacy the crisis had threatened.

But first, just what was the Northwest Indian War, and why did it occur? Though the war proper began in 1790, tension between the Native Americans of the Old Northwest region and white settlers had been building for many years. The young republic viewed the Ohio region as a land of opportunity. For the wealthy merchants and the new government, it was a land of resources and strategic importance. Congress under the Articles of Confederation viewed the region as a source of relief, for the sale and granting of land brought in much needed revenue for the indebted government as well as providing a buffer separating the Union from foreign threats. The region also served as one of economic importance for it was not only a fertile land prime for settlement and cultivation, but the Ohio River would allow U.S. merchants and traders access to the .2 The West was also a land of promise to the poor white settlers who sought to make it their home. These Americans moved to the frontier for numerous reasons, from economic to ideological. Many farming settlers traversed over the Appalachian Mountains to find land that was becoming expensive, limited, and infertile in the East; in the of being able to provide for their families. They also sought dignity, for it was a time when land ownership determined a man’s status as member of a society. By cultivating the land, they were securing their rights and performing their duty as citizens.3 In addition, there were the many thrill seekers who sought adventure either out of a desire to explore the supposed untamed wilderness or to establish a legacy for themselves.4

2 Wiley Sword, President Washington’s Indian War. (Norman: University of Press, 1985), 3-4. 3 David Andrew Nichols, Red Gentlemen & White Savages: Indians, Federalists, and the Search for Order on the American Frontier. (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2008), 59 4 Dale Van Every. Ark of Empire: The American Frontier, 1784-1803. (New York: William Morrow and Company. 1963), 120. 3

At the same time, the original Native inhabitants valued the region. The territory now claimed by the United States had been their traditional hunting grounds: hunting grounds that were being destroyed as white settlers transformed the countryside into domesticated farmlands. Though the Natives had also used the land for farming, it was never to the extent which White settlers did, nor at such a cost to the environment. As more white settlers set down roots, the more wild game they hunted, depleting the animal population at tremendous speed. Domesticated livestock and the clearing of land to accommodate them proved disastrous for the ecosystem and deprived Natives a significant amount of the food they often gathered. The construction of mills along waterways disrupted their flow, hampering Native fishing and travel.5 Yet, above all else, the land which the Natives inhabited was of monumental cultural significance. Though they did value the land in terms of its resources, they more greatly cherished what the land signified to the tribes as a people and culture. Many Native nations in the region believed that the land was where the Almighty had given life to their ancestors. The manner in which they inhabited the region was always driven by the balance between respecting the spiritual and sacred significance of the environment around them and surviving off of the resources it provided them.6 Not only had the transformation of the land at the hand of the settlers upset this balance, but the settlers claiming the land as theirs was an affront to the Native’s beliefs as well. Even setting aside the cultural importance of the Ohio region, Natives had a legal and secular right to the land. The territory disputed between the Natives and the Americans had been promised to the former by the British in decades past. The Proclamation of 1763, the Treaty of of 1768, and the Act of 1774 all guaranteed Native rights to the land northwest of the Ohio. Though the

5 Alan Taylor, The Divided Ground: Indians, Settlers, and the Northern Borderland of the . (New York: Random House Inc. 2006), 140-141. 6 Nichols, Red Gentlemen & White Savages, 26, 40. 4 in 1783 had officially ceded the territory to the United States, the British would later dispute the validity of the treaty and assured the Native tribes that their previous agreements were still valid and in effect.7 In response to the influx of white settlers into the region, delegates of numerous tribes met in council in November 1786. They created an alliance that would come to be known as the Western Indian Confederacy, which included the Huron, Wyandot, Delaware, , , Chippewa, , Miami and tribes, as well as the Nation and Wabash Confederacy. With the unofficial support of the British, the Confederacy was prepared to defend their lands and their ways of life.8 What followed was a series of raids into U.S. territory, where white settlers were killed and settlements destroyed. White vigilantes and mobs retaliated against the Natives, prompting more raids, leading to a vicious cycle. Before long, even tribes unaffiliated with the Confederacy were assaulted by white vigilantes, sometimes out of misplaced anger or as a preemptive strike.9 Unable to control their own unruly citizens along the frontier, and unable to convince the Confederacy to find a peaceful compromise, the United States made the decision to wage war against the Ohio natives in 1790. The war initially proved disastrous for the U.S. forces. There were two failed campaigns. Brevet Brigadier General led the first of these campaigns in 1790 and was defeated by a Pan-Indian army. Arthur St. Clair led a second campaign in 1791, only to meet disaster at the when they too were defeated by the Native forces. St. Clair’s defeat would go down in history as the worst defeat in American military history at the hands of Native Americans.

7 Every. Ark of Empire, 11. 8 Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 41-43. 9 John Grenier, The First Way of War, 194-195. 5

Despite these two disasters, the war would ultimately conclude with an American victory after one final campaign in 1795, commanded by Major General .10

Despite being the first military conflict involving the official U.S. Army, the non- academic public has largely forgotten about the Northwest Indian War. This is not to say that academics or historians have neglected it, for there have been many who have analyzed the conflict itself. Many historians have studied and discussed the Northwest Indian War, but most of these works only dedicate a small portion of their world to the conflict while focusing on a wider theme or topic. For example, military historians such as Randolph Adams and Howard Peckham have argued that the Northwest Indian War was the final phase of the birth of the proper, a process that had begun with the Revolutionary minutemen.11 Historians like Fairfax Downey and John Grenier acknowledge the importance of the war in the development of white hegemony over the continent, but only as a small chapter in the wider story of Native-European warfare.12 Some, like Armstrong Starkley, argue that the war was the conclusion of an era of Native-White hostilities that had reached back over a century, while others, like Harrison Bird, instead see the war as a prelude to nineteenth-century clashes.13 Numerous historians who specialize in Amerindian studies have also discussed the Northwest Indian War and its impact on Indigenous-Colonizer relations. However, yet again they only do so as a small part of their wider studies. Robert Owens briefly analyzes the role that the war played in growth of white fears of Pan-Indianism.14 The

10 Armstrong Starkey, European and Native American Warfare, 1675-1815, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 143-155. 11 Randolph G. Adams and Howard H. Peckham, Lexington to Fallen Timbers, 1775-1794: Episodes from the Earliest History of our Military Forces, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1942), 41. 12 Fairfax Downey. Indian Wars of the U.S. Army: 1776-1865, (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1962), vii; John Grenier, The First Way of War. 4. 13 Harrison Bird, War for the West: 1790-1813, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 15-64; Starkey, European and Native American Warfare, 1675-1815, 137-165. 14 Robert M. Owens, Red Dreams, White Nightmares: Pan-Indian Alliances in the Anglo-American Mind, 1763-1815. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 2015), 12. 6 works of David Nichols and Alan Taylor both touch on themes discussed in this thesis, such as the connection between Native policy and the establishment of a new central government. However, Nichols studies Native policy as a whole, with the Old Northwest merely forming a small piece of the puzzle, and Taylor’s work exclusively focuses on the Iroquois Six Nation.15 In addition, there are a plethora of historians who mention or discuss the Northwest Indian War in their studies of President . From John Ferling to Ron Chernow, the Northwest Indian War appears but on a few pages in various stories of Washington’s presidency. In all the research for this thesis, only two full works could be found which focus entirely upon the Northwest Indian War. However, both of these works view the conflict from a predominately military standpoint. Wiley Sword argues that the Northwest Indian War demonstrated that Native Americans of the era could form an effective military force, and Alan D. Gaff’s work is strictly an analysis of General Anthony Wayne as a commander.16

As opposed to these military and cultural histories, War and Legitimacy is an analysis of the geopolitical history of this period. It is not an analysis of military tactics or commanders of the war, nor does it examine the social or cultural history of the Native Americans. Instead, it considers the following questions. What did President George Washington and his cabinet have in the forefront of their mind throughout the conflict? What were the political motivations behind major policies and decisions? How did the concept of national sovereignty and legitimacy shape the stakes at hand? As War and Legitimacy will demonstrate, through the use of a standing army, the Washington administration sought to legitimize the sovereignty of the United States in the wake of a western crisis.

15 Nichols, Red Gentlemen & White Savages, 10-12. 16 Alan D. Gaff. Bayonets in the Wilderness: Anthony Wayne’s Legion in the Old Northwest. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004), xix; Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, xiv. 7

The first chapter of War and Legitimacy will lay out how the Northwest Indian War was a reflection of a crisis to American sovereignty and legitimacy in the form of a

Pan-Indian movement, white settler discontent, and British interests. The second chapter of War and Legitimacy will detail the administration’s initial attempts to end the war, and how their failure exacerbated the crisis. Finally, the third chapter of will demonstrate that the final use of a professionally trained standing army not only ended the war with an American victory, but that victory resolved all three aspects of the crisis.

CHAPTER 1: THE CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY

The Northwest Indian War represented a crisis of legitimacy for the sovereignty of the United States. Though the immediate spark of the war was a land dispute between the U.S. and the Native tribes, the wider elements surrounding the conflict reflected this crisis. This first chapter will explain what the crisis was and why the Washington administration feared it. Once this has been established, subsequent chapters will demonstrate how the administration attempted to resolve the crisis. Each section of this chapter will lay out one of the three major elements of the crisis. Those elements were the rise of a Pan-Indian movement, a lack of Federal authority over the white settlers in the West, and foreign interference and meddling in the old Northwest.

The Threat of Pan-Indianism As officials in the Washington administration looked to the west, they saw a rising Native force in the form of the Northwest Indian Confederacy. They feared that if open warfare were to erupt between the United States and a united Native American front, there was no guarantee of an American victory. To the white populous of the United States, the concept of a united Pan-Indian movement along their frontier was a very legitimate threat. Although many whites had long believed that the Natives were undisciplined and simplistic, others recognized the very serious military threat a united Native force could be. James Smith, a captive of many years, noted that Native warriors followed orders from competent commanders, used tactical strategies to outthink and out maneuver their enemies, and practiced discipline and respect of command. Rather than the random mob of angry savages many envision, Native armies were as disciplined and used the same 9 tactical mindset as any armed force found in Europe.17 According to contemporary estimates, by the the Native population in U.S. claimed land west of the

Appalachians numbered at least one hundred thousand. Of this, roughly one fifth, or a minimum of twenty thousand, were warriors; and these warriors had very good reason to oppose American expansion westward.18 When the founding fathers established the United States, they took into consideration how the government would handle Native relations. and George Washington turned to the works of Swiss legal theorist and author of The Law of Nations, Emer de Vattel. Vattel’s work was respected throughout Europe as a basis for international law and an understanding of the concept of sovereignty, and the founding fathers sought to apply his legal philosophy in the new world. Vattel’s definition of a sovereign nation was an entity that possessed ultimate control over a specific territory. By this definition, according to the founding fathers, the Native inhabitants of the land east of the Mississippi River were subject to the sovereignty of the United States of

America.19 As Alexander explained, the Native inhabitants of the continent were not “a great or respectable nation…[but] vagrant Indian tribes.”20 This interpretation of Native rights became official when the Confederated Congress passed the Ordinance of 1783. Under the land ordinance, Native titles and claims to the land were deemed extinguished; the Natives were not treated as sovereign, but as a defeated and conquered people under the rule and wisdom of the newfound American republic.21 Needless to say, Native tribes across the entire region rejected this

17 James Smith, “A Narrative of the Most Remarkable Occurrences in the Life and Travels of Col. James Smith During His Captivity Among the Indians From the Year 1755 Until 1759” In The Patriots of North America, ed. Samuel L. Metcalfe, Pages 125-195. (New York: William Abbatt, 1913), 204-205. 18 Nichols, Red Gentlemen & White Savages, 24. 19 Colin G. Calloway. The Indian World of George Washington: The First President, the First Americans, and the Birth of the Nation. (: Oxford University Press, 2018), 324. 20 Charles R. Ritcheson, Aftermath of Revolution: British Policy Towards the United States 1783-1795. (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1969), 246. 21 Every. Ark of Empire, 12. 10 interpretation, and repeatedly stated in no uncertain terms to both white settlers and government officials that the West was Native owned, Native occupied, and Native defended.22 These Native warriors, it is important to remember, were not merely defending physical territory, but were fighting for the survival of their very race and their way of life. For years, white settlers who ventured westward sought not simply to drive the Natives off of the land which they desired, but took the extra steps to eradicate them in what some described as genocide. Entire villages were burned to the ground, and Natives were executed in cold blood with no distinction made between ally or enemy, man or woman, warrior or child. Native warriors retaliated with equal measure, targeting white villages for attack and torture. It is important to realize that the realities of the West supported such accounts, and that accounts of Native retaliations were not purely racial paranoia or propaganda. Torture was often seen by Native Americans as a justified and expected means of expressing grief in the face of injustice or communal misery.23 During the Revolution, pro-British tribes committed a series of hit and run raids along the frontier which resulted in the death of thousands of white settlers, and in the one year after the wars conclusion, another two hundred were killed. The fear of such attacks and the number of casualties was a contributing factor in New York and Virginia’s agreeing to cede their western claims to the national government, leading to the eventual creation of the Northwest Territory.24 In addition to the literal survival of their race, many Native Americans feared for the fate of their culture and traditions. Those white settlers who did not seek violence or eradication did wish to change the Natives in their image, particularly by introducing and

22 Nichols, Red Gentlemen & White Savages, 38. 23 Nichols, Red Gentlemen & White Savages, 67. 24 Every. Ark of Empire, 10 11 converting them to Christianity. However, many Christian ideas and beliefs ran contrary to how the Native tribes saw the universe. In particular, the Oneidas tribe of upper New

York rejected the idea of a God who was both all-powerful and all-good at the same time, not to mention the hypocrisy of white Christians who partook in alcohol, violence, and thievery. In time, some Natives turned to their traditional faiths, and ironically became just as evangelical and radical as the missionaries they decried. Many Natives saw the presence of white settlers, and their own culture, as a threat fundamentally opposed to their own traditions.25 With so much on the line, it was obvious that tribes would take action to counter the encroachment on their land. As previously stated, by the time the Washington administration came to power, Native tribes along the Ohio region had already united to form the Western Indian Confederacy. At its establishment, of the Mohawks proclaimed “The Interests of any one [Indian] nation should be the welfare of all the others.”26 The American government feared that if tribes from other regions, such as the southern Creek Nation, of which several would take part in the conflict and attempt to bring in the support of the wider tribe, were to join the Confederacy, then they would become a force to be reckoned with.27 As the various Native tribes began to realize that they were stronger together than divided, both white settlers and leaders came to fear the potential might of such a union. Even more frightening to both white settlers and U.S. officials was the prospect that a Pan-Indian front could seek to ally with another supposed threat: the African- American slaves in the South. To many, the idea of a slave revolt was a nightmare scenario. It was initially feared that the slaves would become targets of a Pan-Indian

25 Taylor, The Divided Ground, 210-211. 26 Randolph G. Downes. Council Fires on the Upper Ohio: A Narrative of Indian Affairs in the Upper Ohio Valley until 1795. (, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1940), 300. 27 Gaff. Bayonets in the Wilderness, 81 12 army seeking to disrupt American settlement and agricultural production. Over time these fears evolved, and slave owners began to wonder what would happen if a Pan-Indian confederacy sought to ally with African-Americans against a common enemy. Slave owners feared a repeat of the Haitian Revolution, in which the enslaved populous of the Caribbean island rebelled against the oppressive white populous. A joint Pan-Indian and African army, some believed, could threaten the very survival of the United States.28 Americans was certainly not alone in fearing the ideas of a Pan-Indian army. Even British officials feared such a prospect if they lost influence over their Native allies. With memories of ’s War in mind, the British backing of the Confederacy was just as much an action based on fear as a move in power politics. The idea was that if the British sided with the Confederacy and protected Native interests, then the British stationed in the frontier forts would need not worry for their lives.29 Both the government under the Articles of Confederation and the Washington Administration acknowledged the potential threat of a Pan-Indian union and tried to appease the Natives in spite of settler demands. In 1787, a Congressional committee recommended compensating Native tribes for lands acquired by the United States, in effect purchasing the land in a legal transaction. The proposal failed, as the policy did not appeal to the Natives, since the United States would dictate what was to be bought and for what price with no regard to their wants or need. However, the proposal indicated that the white Congress considered the Natives’ tribes as sovereign entities with some legal claim to the land. Given previous and future stances on tribal legitimacy, this proposal’s significance speaks for itself.30

28 Owens, Red Dreams, White Nightmares, 117-119. 29 Owens, Red Dreams, White Nightmares, 88. 30 Journals of the , 1774-1789, Volume 33, 1787 July 21-December 19, ed. Roscoe R. Hill. (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1936), 477-481. 13

In 1790, Secretary of War similarly proposed a policy in which sought to appease the Natives via an alliance based on a series of payments and gifts.

This strategy was similar to what the United States already done with the pirates of the Barbary Coast. Knox sought to divide the Native Confederacy and deal with each tribe on an individual basis. Again, those in power sought numerous alternatives in the face of a Pan-Indian war.31 Tensions in the Northwest escalated forced Secretary Knox to consider the cost of a potential war with the Confederacy, in terms of both man power and money. If the United States were to fight the Wabash alone, being the largest tribe of the West Indian Confederacy with roughly two thousand warriors, then at least $200,000 would be needed to fund such a campaign. Adjusted for inflation, that would equal $5,345,382. However, this was the lowest estimate. It was further estimated that a potential pan-Indian alliance, including the Western Confederacy, Iroquois Six Nations, and tribes from the south, could form a force of over twenty thousand warriors.32 In comparison, in 1790, there were only one thousand two hundred and sixteen soldiers in the U.S. Army.33 After the commencement of hostilities, government officials discussed the threat of the Confederacy growing beyond the northwest. In a conversation with President Washington, expressed concern that the Iroquois Six Nations might be inclined to join the Northwest cause and wage war against the Americans in New York, which would effectively create a two front war.34 Governor of argued that once Anthony Wayne was finished fighting in the Ohio, then he should lead his army into the southern frontier to “chastise” the and Creeks and prevent them from forming a similar alliance as the one in the old Northwest.35

31 Nichols, Red Gentlemen & White Savages, 100, 113-114. 32 Owens, Red Dreams, White Nightmares, 97. 33 Adams and Peckham, Lexington to Fallen Timbers, 35. 34 Taylor, The Divided Ground, 240-241. 35 Owens, Red Dreams, White Nightmares, 159-151. 14

The natives themselves were well aware of the fear U.S. settlers and leaders felt, as well as their own power in the West. Joseph Brant himself estimated that if all the nations that had assembled the Confederacy were to commit all of their fighting men, they could form an army ten thousand strong.36 In addition, contrary to popular belief both contemporary and in the present day, the racially stereotypical idea of the Native fighting force as either a mass of savage fighters or a warrior race is woefully inaccurate. As demonstrated in the account of a U.S. veteran of the war, the Native soldiers…”[had] all the essentials of discipline. They are under good command, and punctual in obeying orders; they can act in concert, and when…they go into battle…each man is to fight as though he were to gain the [victory] himself.”37 In short, a Pan-Indian force had the potential manpower, discipline and tactics of a contemporary modern military force. This became more than apparent once the wider conflict truly began.

Settler Discontent and Federal Authority on the Frontier The government viewed the West as a potential source of national wealth, so it is unsurprising that private citizens sought to settle the land and earn some of that wealth for themselves. From families wishing to establish a life on the edge of the frontier to those thrill seekers seeking to build a fortune, settlers moved out west in large numbers. The first wave of this migration began even before the United States had come into being. On the eve of the American Revolution, white settlers from the North American British colonies travelled west to the region now known as Kentucky.38 Throughout the next two decades, thousands of whites crossed the Ohio River and into the backcountry. By the year 1788, over eighteen thousand people had moved west the Ohio River, and by 1790 the Kentucky region had grown to a population of over seventy three thousand.39

36 Every. Ark of Empire, 48 37 Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 182. 38 Bird, War for the West, 17. 39 Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 4. 15

At first glance, this mass migration seems beneficial for the United States, as the land ceded to the republic by Great Britain in 1783 was being settled and cultivated by . Yet as more and more Americans settled on this land, the issue of establishing the rule of law became apparent. By 1784, Congress showed concern. The Committee Indian Affairs reported that white settlements past the Appalachians had become “feeble, disorderly and dispersed” and that white settlers had committed “depravity of manners which they have a tendency to produce…[and commit] calamites of frequent and destructive wars with the Indians.”40 White settlers however saw the situation in a different light. With the federal government under the Articles of Confederation having done little to settle the issue, at least from the perspective of the settlers, many on the frontier decried federal authority for their failure to protect its people.41 Western white settlers felt as though the federal government placed their own eastern interests and even the interests of the Natives ahead of and at the expense of the citizenry of the United States. When the new Constitution had first been adopted, many white settlers hoped that a new stronger government could defend them from Native attacks; however, once the Washington administration attempted to negotiate a peace with the Natives, settler wrath was again ignited.42 According to the ideals of the Revolution, the federal government’s authority was not something inherent or ordained, it must be earned, and western settlers believed that the United States had done anything but. For those in the West, the question of nationality was of little importance. The American settlers of the West were a hardy and determined people. These Americans felt that if national authorities could or would not assist them, then said authorities were not

40 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, Volume 25, 1783 September 1-December 31. Ed. Roscoe R. Hill. (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1936), 690. 41 Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 77. 42 Nichols, Red Gentlemen & White Savages, 94, 97. 16 needed or wanted. What’s more, they were not just willing to live as they pleased, but were capable of doing so as well. A group of white settlers could, and often did, establish democratic societies capable of defending against Native attackers and settling the needs of the populous. The western settlements were made by settlers, for settlers with little regard to national sovereignty.43 The day to day lives of the white frontier populous were mostly unaffected by, and few noticed or cared, about the shift from British subject to American citizen. Even those who moved west after the establishment of the United States were apathetic in regards to national allegiance, many of them having failed to earn a living in the east and others being immigrants from Europe who simply considered the eastern states as a brief stopping point on their journey westward.44 By the 1780s, the quarter of a million white settlers living on the West had begun to see themselves as their own people, with their own culture, political system, economy and most importantly their own preferred ways of dealing with the Natives Americans than that of their eastern “brethren.”45 It comes as little surprise that President

Washington would later state that he greatly feared unchecked and unguided migration of people to the West.46 Though the federal government claimed dominion over the frontier territory, establishing de facto authority and legitimizing U.S. sovereignty would prove to be a difficult task, and nowhere was this more apparent than in regards to relations with the Natives. While the official policy of the American government both before and during the initial years of Washington’s presidency sought to negotiate a peaceful coexistence with the Natives, for reasons to be addressed later, hostile white sentiments towards Native Americans led to a conflict of interests between the government and the white settlers.

43 Every. Ark of Empire, 27-28, 37. 44 Bird, War for the West, 18. 45 Every. Ark of Empire, 200; Nichols, Red Gentlemen & White Savages, 64. 46 John E. Ferling, The First of Men: A Life of George Washington, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 403-404. 17

This was in a large part due to the Revolution-era depiction of Native Americans as British allied, subhuman and barbaric savages who could not be trusted. As the U.S. government came to realize that the situation was far more complex, with both anti- British and neutral tribes willing to cooperate with the Americans, settlers still subscribed to the view that all Natives were the enemy47. Such animosity felt by the white settlers was also in response to the reality of differing standards and practices of war between European and Native American societies. Where European felt that captives of war and civilians were entitled to have had certain rights, Natives Americans on the other hand believed that prisoners of war forfeited such rights and were therefore subject to brutal treatment such as torture and scalping.48 Such actions were more than simple acts of barbarism committed by warriors in the heat of battle, but reflected the importance of community and honor in the Native’s culture. The torture of captives was often done to either allow the tribe at large to purge their anger and animosity, or even to allow the tortured captives to prove their courage and fortitude in the face of death.49 As survivors of Native violence spread word of their experiences, the conflict of territorial rights between the tribes and the U.S. became one of human justice and vengeance. Therefore, white settlers cared little for the wants and needs of the United States’ government and its native policy. This vendetta came to compromise United States native policy and authority in the West in a number of instances. Where representatives of the U.S. attempted to secure American sovereignty by enforcing law and order between Natives and white settlers, the latter often refused to cooperate. For example, when the government attempted to bring about an end to Native raids through negotiation. Major John Hamtramck was ordered

47 Robert M. Owens, Red Dreams, White Nightmares: Pan-Indian Alliances in the Anglo-American Mind, 1763-1815. (OK: University of Oklahoma Press. 2015), 90. 48 Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 8-9. 49 Nichols, Red Gentlemen & White Savages, 67. 18 occupy the town of Vincennes, keep order amongst its inhabitants and prevent anyone, native or white, from escalating the already tense situation. Twice Major Hamtramck was unable to fulfill this duty. In August of 1788, following a Native raid on the river, one Patrick Brown led over sixty Kentuckians and retaliated against a Native village. Major Hamtramck ordered the vigilantes to disperse, but these orders were openly and defiantly ignored.50 Even in the face of the law of the United States, the white settler’s animosity would not abate. Almost a year later was yet another incident that demonstrated American settler undermining federal sovereignty. , a former Major during the Revolutionary War, led a volunteer force of over two hundred settlers on a violent campaign against Native villages. It is important to note that a majority of these villages were at the time unaffiliated with the hostile tribes. Again, the vigilantes acted in direct violation of Major Hamtramck’s orders. To make matters even worse, the assault came at around the same time when Major Hamtramck had successfully convinced leaders of the Wabash

Confederacy to halt attacks on U.S. settlers. Upon learning of the assault, the Wabash went back on this agreement, and a number of once neutral or U.S. friendly tribes became convinced that attempts by the government to negotiate were lies and tricks.51 Such animosity at the expense of federal peace efforts and Indian policy was not limited to literal warfare and fighting between Native raiders and settler vigilantes. Even events as mundane and solemn as a funeral were sights of conflict. In 1792, a chief of the Wawiachtenos, or Eel River Miami tribe, passed away while visiting . The Eel River Miami was one of the moderate tribes still willing to negotiate for coexistence with the white settlers. To honor the American-friendly chief, and promote U.S.-Native relations, General ordered military honors and a proper funeral

50 Starkey, European and Native American Warfare, 1675-1815, 140. 51 Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 77-78. 19 procession through the town. The very next night, settlers tore down the symbolic white flag erected at the gravesite, exhumed the body and desecrated it by dragging it through the town.52 This blatant disregard for federal authority in the West was a very serious crisis for the United States government. Not only did such disregard compromise relations between the Native tribes and the United States, but it threatened the legitimacy of U.S. sovereignty in the West itself. Members of Congress described the hostile frontiersmen as “lawless banditti.” Some even predicted that unless a strong central government affirmed its rule and laws over the West, then frontier anarchy would spread to the eastern states.53 Congress was right to worry, for white settlers openly embraced Revolutionary idea which stated that when a government becomes negligent or destructive to the rights of the citizens, then it was the duty of the people to break the bonds of rule and declare independence. As the crisis worsened, more and more American settlers began to believe that the federal government had failed in their duty to defend those rights.54 Officials in

Philadelphia were well aware of this fact, and began to fear that their western citizens might throw aside their allegiance to the United States, and either declare a republic for themselves or even drift into the dominion of a foreign power such as Spain or Great Britain.55

Provocation by British Agents Those in the United States government were well justified in their fear of British influence in the western frontier. Imperial officials still had their eyes on the territories they had lost in the American Revolution. The 1783 Treaty of Paris, which not only

52 “John Heckewelder’s Journey to the Wabash in 1792”. The Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 12, No. 1. (: The Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1888), 46 53 Nichols, Red Gentlemen & White Savages, 56-57. 54 Nichols, Red Gentlemen & White Savages, 68. 55 Starkey, European and Native American Warfare, 1675-1815, 140-141. 20 recognized the United States of America as an independent nation, had also ceded all British territory east of the Mississippi River and south of to the new republic. In exchange the United States was also to compensate Loyalists who sided with the crown for their financial losses as a result of independence. These terms were not honored by the United States, which in turn resulted in the British refusing to vacate the forts they occupied in the Ohio region.56 In addition to keeping troops stationed on the frontier, the British also encouraged the Native Confederacy to challenge U.S. claims to their lands. Some British officials even provided gifts of weapons and ammunition before and throughout the conflict.57 This blatant disregard for U.S. sovereignty reflects a carefully orchestrated agenda intended to promote British interests. The interests and policies of Imperial officials however did not always align with those on the fringes of the Empire. Frontier British agents wished to use the Natives as tools against U.S. expansion but officials in were more cautious and did not wish to provoke a war with the United States.58 In fact, while agents worked tirelessly on the frontier to stoke the flames of war, those in Great Britain were far more concerned over relations with their European neighbor, France.59 Due to the failure of the U.S. to honor the 1783 Treaty, the British government saw the Ohio region as rightfully theirs and it was not be until the 1795 that London relinquished the claim. Yet they did not wish for a war that could potentially get out of their control. For it is important to note that fear of the Natives influenced British interests in the region. With memories of the bloody Indian conflicts of previous generations in mind, the British government greatly feared a general Indian war, and

56 Owens, Red Dreams, White Nightmares, 86-87. 57 Bird, War for the West, 24. 58 Nichols, Red Gentlemen & White Savages, 150. 59 Ritcheson, Aftermath of Revolution: British Policy Towards the United States 1783-1795, 243; Charles H. Ambler, George Washington and the West (New York: Russel & Russel, 1936), 198 21 many recognized that a war between the Natives and the United States could easily escalate to include Great Britain.

However, British frontier agents found ways to both obey their orders from above and encourage their own desire to use the Natives against the United States. These agents continued to encourage the Confederacy to defend their land and resist U.S. encroachment, all while British Forts provided the food, weapons, and ammunition necessary for such resistance.60 British agents ignored the views of Imperial officials because of distance and time. Due to the sheer distance between Britain and the North American interior, communication between Whitehall and British frontier agents in Canada and the Ohio could take an entire year’s time.61 The officials in North America, who were supposed to execute Imperial policy dictated by London, began to create their own policies. After all, time was a precious commodity.62 The policies implemented by these colonial officials and agents greatly threatened the sovereignty of the United States in the West and was one of the sources of the crisis. No individual better exemplifies this than Alexander McKee, a man who Anthony Wayne would later describe as “the principle stimulator of the War…between the United States & the savages.”63 McKee was the “actual administrator of Britain’s Indian policy” serving as representative of the Indian Department and a merchant who often traded with the Ohio natives.64 His ties to the Native nations, particularly the Shawnee, were also of a personal nature. His mother was an adopted member of the Shawnee, and he himself had a Native wife and children.65

60 Every. Ark of Empire, 42-43. 61 Taylor, The Divided Ground, 116-117. 62 Ritcheson, Aftermath of Revolution, 244. 63 “General Anthony Wayne to Secretary of War Henry Knox”, August 28, 1794. Anthony Wayne, A Name in Arms. Ed. Richard C. Knopf. (PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. 1960), 354. 64 Every. Ark of Empire, 43. 65 Taylor, The Divided Ground, 281. 22

Like others, McKee feared an Indian war with Great Britain but his solution to the issue differed greatly. Rather than urge peace and the status quo, McKee advocated for

Native antagonism with the U.S. in the hope that the Northwest Confederacy both serve as a buffer between the United States and the northwest lands that the British desired, and to keep the Natives occupied and unable to wage war against the British themselves66, McKee considered the Native cause as vital to the survival of Britain’s interests in North America, and used several tactics to embolden the Native drive for war. This included reassuring the Confederacy that the 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix, which set boundary between Native and white land at the Ohio River, was still in effect. Of course, the ceding of territory to the United States at the end of the Revolution contradicted and nullified the Treaty.67 This not only demonstrates the British agent’s disregard for U.S. sovereignty but also the lengths they would go to embolden the Natives. In addition to this support of sentiment, McKee arranged for physical support as well. Several times throughout the conflict McKee arranged for the shipment of arms, munitions and supplies to the Native forces from British forts and Canada, such as a shipment so large that the river boat used in the transportation was christened The Indian Feeder.68 McKee was more than merely a supplier of goods, he had a personal role in the conflict, and would observe Confederacy assemblies and even offered his own tactical advice by taking part in Native war councils.69 For example when moderates within the Confederacy proposed a compromised boundary, the boundary which divided the land between that already settled by whites and those still unsettled, McKee personally urged the assemblage not to give up the Ohio River boundary.70 McKee even

66 Every. Ark of Empire, 43. 67 Every. Ark of Empire, 45-46. 68 Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 254. 69 Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 278. 70 “Captain Brant’s Journal of the Proceedings at the General Council Held at the Foot of the Rapids on the Miamis,” , 1793. The Correspondence of Lieut. Governor . Volume II. ed. E.A. Cruikshank and A.F. Hunter, (: Toronto Historical Society. 1923), 16. 23 went so far as to sabotage the peace efforts made by the United States, such as when he openly accused Hendrick Aupaumut, a Mohican native who had agreed to negotiate on behalf of U.S. interests, of being a U.S. spy and discrediting him among his peers.71 Though the most influential and renown, McKee was not the only British official who promoted war between the Confederacy and the United States. There was the Governor-General of the Canadas, Guy Carlton, First Baron of Dorchester, and the Lieutenant-Governor of , John Graves Simcoe. Both officials, who have been described by some historians as “militant [and] aggressive”, contributed in some way to the Native war effort, thus undermining American sovereignty.72 Initially Carlton struggled to handle both the desires of British agents in the field and the Native Confederacy on one hand, and the desires of his superiors in the metropole on the other. Wishing to remain loyal to Britain’s Native allies but recognizing his lack of authority, he both offered his support to the Natives in the form of munitions, but advised against furthering antagonism between the parties involved.73 In time however, the

Governor-General became more radical in his approach. In a 1794 speech to the Seneca, Carlton stated that American actions had voided the Treaty of Paris, and urged the warriors to wage war.74 Even more militant than Carlton, Lieutenant-Governor Simcoe saw the United States not as a nation whom unfortunate circumstances had turned into a wartime foe, but as a mortal enemy of His Majesty’s empire. Having served in the during the American Revolution, Simcoe continued to view the Americans as rebels and traitors and pined for the day when he could “restore [the] King and his Family to their just

71: Aupaumut, Hendrick. "A Narrative of an Embassy to the Western Indians from the Original Manuscript of Hendrick Aupaumut" Memiors of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania. Volume II. ed. G.H. Coates, (Philadelphia: Historical Society of Pennsylvana. 1827), 128-129. 72 Forest McDonald, The Presidency of George Washington. (Lawrence: The University Press of . 1974), 148. 73 Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 122-123. 74 ”From Lord Dorchester to the Seven Nations of ”, February 24, 1794. The Correspondence of Lieut. Governor John Graves Simcoe. Volume II, 149-150. 24

Inheritance and to give [his] Country that fair and natural accession of Power” and argued that “such a renewal of Empire can be desirable…[and] even now, this Event may take place [sic].”75 Simcoe repeatedly called for an invasion of the United States, stating that that it was impossible to defend the Canadian colonies from American aggression with the border established in 1783.76 It would not be until the southern tribes showed interest in joining the Confederacy, potentially making it a force that not even the British Empire could control while at war with France, did Simcoe fear reprimand from London and moderate his stance.77 Thus, British agents continually promoted British interests in the West at the expense of the sovereignty of the United States, thereby rejecting its legitimacy. Furthermore, this rejection intensified the other elements of the crisis. British elements, though worried about potential U.S. expansion, recognized the fact that the republic was but a young, small and untested nation that could just as easily collapse as well as grow. The hope among those wishing for conflict was that should the American federal government fail in securing U.S. sovereignty, either by failing to answer to disgruntled American settlers or falling victim to the hostile acts of the Natives, then the Northwest would revert back into British hands. With control of the Northwest, the British would have the upper hand on the continent and secure the continuation of fur trade.78

Chapter Conclusion By the time George Washington was sworn in office as the first President of the United States, he and his administration was faced with a true crisis. As tensions between the Ohio Natives and American settlers grew, the legitimacy of U.S. sovereignty in the

75 ”From Lieutenant-Governor J.G. Simcoe to Sir Joseph Banks”, January 8, 1791. The Correspondence of Lieut. Governor John Graves Simcoe. Volume I. ed. E.A. Cruikshank and A.F. Hunter, (Toronto: Toronto Ontario Historical Society. 1923), 17-19. 76 The Correspondence of Lieut. Governor John Graves Simcoe. Volume II, 336, 383. 77 Owens, Red Dreams, White Nightmares, 151. 78 Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 13, 15. 25

West was under threat on three fronts. Unruly and hostile white settlers disregarded U.S. policy concerning Native American relations, and openly defied both military and federal authority. British interests, as well as the fear of direct British hostility, threatened to undermine the sovereignty of the United States in the West. All while the Pan-Indian ideals of a united Native front drove fear into the hearts of white settlers and leaders. In spite of the daunting nature of this crisis, the Washington administration rose to the challenge and sought to legitimize the sovereignty of the United States in the West. First through means of both diplomacy and a militia-based military campaign, and then ultimately through the establishment and use of a large standing army.

CHAPTER 2: FAILED ATTEMPTS AT LEGITIMATION

In order to settle the crisis of sovereign legitimacy, the Washington administration needed to prove to their citizens out West, the European empires and their Native adversaries that the United States could in fact protect their interests in the old Northwest. This included assuring Western citizens that the U.S. federal authority could and would defend them and thus earn their loyalty, demonstrating to the British that the U.S. could handle their own affairs in the region, and eliminating the threat of a frontier assault by a united Native force. President Washington first attempted to resolve this crisis through the use of . This attempt would fail and worsen the crisis, prompting Washington to establish a professional standing army to finish the job. The purpose of this chapter is to detail the initial attempts by the administration to resolve the crisis of legitimacy, show why these attempts failed and how those failures worsened the crisis. Once it has been demonstrated how and why the militia-based campaigned failed, the following chapter will explain what the professional standing army did differently and how it succeeded. The first section of this chapter will detail the campaign, failure and ramifications of Josiah Harmar’s campaign, and the second will detail that of Arthur St. Clair’s.

The First Failure of the Militia: Harmar’s Defeat During the led up to the military campaigns, Secretary of War Henry Knox proposed two solutions to President Washington in June 1798:

In examining the question how the disturbances on the frontiers are to be quieted two modes present themselves, by which the object may be effected - The first of which is raising an army and extirpating the refractory tribes entirely - or 2dnly [sic] By forming treaties of peace with them, in which their rights and limits should 27

be explicitly defined and the treaties observed on the part of the United States with the most rigid justice.79 Following Knox’s advice, President Washington first attempted to find a diplomatic solution. At times the administration invited tribal leaders to Philadelphia, and others they send representatives to the West. However, while offering the olive branch with one hand, President Washington prepared the nation’s sword with the other. When negotiations ultimately failed, the President unleashed a military campaign against the Northwest Confederacy. Unfortunately, the first two of these campaigns would end in disaster. Despite efforts of the Washington administration to seek a diplomatic solution, they remained willing to defend the Northwest militarily if the need arose. But they did not want a war which the United States was unprepared. In a letter to Governor of New York George Clinton, after listing a plethora of reasons to avoid conflict, Washington clarified his belief that “there [were] however bounds to the spirit of forbearance which ought not to be exceeded.” Washington believed that if a war with the Ohio natives was unavoidable or truly necessary, then the United States must make the decision to do so on their terms rather than be dragged unwillingly into a conflict due to “an accidental or hasty collision.”80 The administration refused to allow the United States to lose its hold on the Northwest without a fight. Within a year of entering office as President, Washington ordered Governor St. Clair to summon the militia and Bvt. Brig. Gen. Harmar to prepare them for combat.81 This initial use of force failed to end the crisis of legitimacy, Indeed, it made it worse. A key factor to why the initial use of force failed is that it was compiled

79 “Secretary of War Henry Knox to President George Washington”, June 15, 1789. The Papers of George Washington: Presidential Series 2, April-June 1789. ed. Dorothy Twohig and Mark A. Mastromarino: (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1999), 490-491. 80 “President George Washington to Governor George Clinton”, Sep. 14, 1791. The Papers of George Washington: Presidential Series 8, March-September 1791. ed. Dorothy Twohig and Mark A. Mastromarino: (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1999), 528. 81 Ron Chernow. Washington: A Life, (London: The Penguin Press, 2010), 665. 28 mostly of militiamen and untrained levies, and not a professionally trained army of regulars.

The decision to initially rely on militia units was made in large part due to the Anti-Federalist response to the Harmar campaign. Almost immediately after President Washington called upon the militia, Anti-Federalists began to accuse the administration of a nefarious plot to establish a national army capable of subjugating the American populace on behalf of the elite. Senator Pierce Butler of South Carolina argued that the use of military force against the Natives would set a dangerous precedent. Even worse, he argued, the administration exaggerated the strength and capabilities of the Northwest Confederacy in order to justify both Alexander Hamilton’s bank proposals and the establishment of a military elite. The Senator even went so far as to claim that even if the threat were real, a Pan-Indian force on the frontier was a lesser threat to the republic than a federal national army.82 Amid such fears Harmar set out in 1790 with a mere 320 regulars, supplemented by 1,133 militia.83 Awaiting him was the Pan-Indian army commanded by two of the most experienced and determined Native warriors of that generation. Mihsihkinaahkwa, more commonly known by the British as Little of the Miami who had held off French forces hoping to take during the Revolution. Weyapiersenwah, known as , was the undisputed war chief of the Shawnee noted among white captives as one of the greatest of Native leaders.84 In October 1790, after a month of setting up posts and destroying Native villages along the way, Harmar’s forces came face to face with the enemy on the banks of the Maumee River. It was during this battle that sprung a cleverly devised trap.

82 Owens, Red Dreams, White Nightmares, 109. 83 Fairfax Downey. Indian Wars of the U.S. Army: 1776-1865, (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1962), 53. 84 Calloway. The Indian World of George Washington, 383. 29

After first encountering the enemy, the native warriors feigned retreat to draw the inexperienced militia Americans into an ambush. By the battle’s climax, Natives and

Americans fought hand to hand combat, using their weapons as blunt instruments. The Native warriors retreated into the forest as their foes divulged into chaos and retreat. By the end of the day, up to eighty three percent of the regular federal forces were loss, in addition to twenty seven percent for the Kentucky militia.85 The militia-based units play a significant role in Harmar’s failure. The failures of both the Harmar and later St. Clair campaigns convinced Washington that the only way to resolve the crisis was through the use of a professional federal army. For the army of Harmar, who was neither professional nor federal, was woefully inadequate for the task. To begin with, the forces assigned under General Harmar were untrained, unprofessional and utterly incompetent. Even before the battle itself the militia demonstrated on several occasions a complete disregard for military order, often breaking ranks in order to scavenge and plunder. During a later inquiry into the failed campaigned,

Captain Thomas Doyle testified that the militia had acted “disgracefully…[as] they ran from town to town in pursuit of plunder, contrary to orders.”86 Worse still the militiamen were a hesitant to fight in battle. A few days prior to the Battle of the Maume, Colonel Hardin’s forward scouting unit encountered a Native war party. After the encounter, a furious Hardin discovered that just about all of the militia under his command had fled once battle commenced. While the militiamen literally threw down their arms and ran, the regulars stood their grounds and fought the Natives, many to their dying breath. This demonstrated the fortitude and skill of the professionally trained regulars.87 Something similar occurred at the Battle of Maumee

85 Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 1113-115. 86 Quoted in American State Papers: Military Affairs, Volume 1. (Washington D.C., From , American Memory collection, 1832), 26 87 Nichols, Red Gentlemen & White Savages, 117; Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 107-108. 30

River. Major John Montaine was in command of a number of Kentucky militia. When the first volley of Native musket fire erupted from the forest brush, Major Montaine drew his weapon, called for his men to charge and spurred his horse. When he met the foe, the Major realized too late that only one militiaman, George Adams, had followed him. The rest of the militia was either frozen in fear or were fleeing the battle. Both the Major and Adams were quickly overwhelmed, with Adams barely escaping with his life while Montaine was killed.88 Harmar did not bring up charges of desertion against the unruly militia out of fear that doing so might result in a mutiny. The fear was so great that the General was forced to order regulars to march with their bayonets at the ready to deter any thoughts of insubordination or desertion during the long march back east.89 The behavior of the militia during Harmar’s campaign became so infamous that regulars of later expeditions often did not trust the militiamen in battle.90 President Washington had ordered for Harmar’s campaign in the hopes of quelling the crisis of sovereignty and legitimacy that faced the young nation. If the Northwest army were to be defeated, it would prove that the government could protect its settlers, demonstrate that the United States could handle its own affairs in the west and deter Pan-Indianism. Yet with the defeat at Maumee River, all Harmar had accomplished was to poke the proverbial bear with a stick. As the news spread throughout the frontier of Harmar’s defeat, the discontent and frustration of the settlers began to intensify. In Cincinnati, John Cleves Symmes noted “many persons are much mortified at the issue of the expedition…the settlers at [Western settlements] are very much alarmed at [the army’s] situation. …I expect that the panick

88 Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 113. 89 “Court of Inquiry of General Harmar” September, 1791, American State Papers: Military Affairs, Volume 1, 21-29. 90 Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 160-161. 31

[sic] running through the country will reach Jersey.”91 Symmes prediction proved quite accurate, as settlers feared that the federal government could not hold off the Pan-Indian alliance. There was even talk of secession of the Northwest Territory from the United States. In the mind of the white settlers, if the U.S. could not protect its citizens, then they would have to do so themselves.92 Meanwhile, the opposite affect occurred among the Natives as word of their victory spread far and wide. At the time of Harmar’s campaign, the Wyandot and Delaware tribes had not yet joined the Northwest Confederacy, with most members preferring to remain neutral in a conflict that could mean their destruction. Yet the Native victory against Harmar convinced these hesitant tribes that they could in fact stand against the Americans. It was not long after that they officially joined the Confederacy, adding their numbers and resources to the Pan-Indian cause. Native raids against white settlements in the Ohio region jumped during the winter of 1790-1791, as emboldened Confederate chiefs led bands of eager warriors on a campaign that struck several towns and settlements, resulting in the deaths of over a dozen civilians.93 Even worse, a new potential fourth branch of the crisis was beginning to emerge in the form of Anti-Federalists in Congress. Once Congress learned of the campaign’s defeat, Anti-Federalist sentiment grew like an open flame. Senator William Maclay of Pennsylvania suggested that the loss had not been the result of militia incompetence, but had in fact been intentional. The Senator suspected that “Hamilton’s people” had orchestrated the war with the Natives, and hoped to orchestrate war with Great Britain and Algiers.94 Maclay believed the Federalists wished for such a war to justify a standing

91 “John Cleves Symmes to ”, November 4, 1790. The Correspondence of John Cleves Symmes: Founder of the Miami Purchase. Ed. Beverley W. Bond Jr., (New York: The MacMillan Company. 1926), 133-136. 92 Smith, Patriarch: George Washington and the New American Nation, 74. 93 Nichols, Red Gentlemen & White Savages, 118. 94 Journal of William Maclay: United States Senator From Pennsylvania, 1789-1791. Ed. Edgar S. Maclay., (New York. D. Appleton and Company. 1890), 380, 406-407. 32 army, which would then be used against the citizenry. It is important to note that yes, the establishment of a federal standing army was one of Washington’s goals, however only as a tool to secure legitimacy and protect American sovereignty. Anti-Federalists feared that the creation of such an army was the end goal in and of itself, and that such an army would be used to keep the nation’s elite in power over the populous. The Senator was not the only Anti-Federalist to believe that President Washington had ulterior motives. Even expressed suspicions that Harmar’s defeat had been preordained.95 After a quick but merciful court of inquiry into the disaster, Harmar resigned his post in the army, and returned to civilian life. He is noted by one Major to have remarked that unless the army accounted for the mistakes of his campaign, then the second would similarly face utter defeat.96 Harmar’s grim prediction ultimately proved true.

The Second Failure of the Militia: St. Clair’s Defeat Despite the first failure, Washington ordered a second campaign, this time under the command of Governor Arthur St. Clair himself. Though President Washington’s distrusted an untrained militia, given their performance at Maumee River, the force was again made up of mostly non-regulars. This was due to a desire to appease Anti- Federalist concerns. This decision would ultimately contribute to a disaster that would dwarf the previous campaign. St. Clair set off for Ohio with a much larger force than Harmar’s, numbering 2,000 in total, which included 600 federal regulars, 600 militia men, and 800 levy draftees. These non-regulars quickly developed a reputation for being unfit for duty and being among the lowest in society. They were described by one Northwest Territory

95 Calloway. The Indian World of George Washington, 385. 96 “‘The Campaign in the Indian Country’ from the Diary of Major Ebenezer Denny,” Sept. 7, 1791. The St. Clair Papers. Volume II. ed. William Henry Smith. (Freeport: Books for Library Press. 1881), 151-152. 33 judge as coming from “the prisons, wheelbarrows and brothels of the nation.”97 St. Clair’s Adjutant Winthrop Sargent similarly described them as “offscourings of large towns and cities, enervated…by every species of vice.”98 On November 4, 1791, St. Clair and his forces engaged in their first, and only, battle. Yet again, Little Turtle was in command of the Native army, a force of over 1,000 warriors from the Chippewa, Delaware, Miami, , Ottowa, Potawatomi, Shawness, Wyandot, and even the southern Cherokee tribes.99 These warriors had further been supplied with both arms and rations by British agents, which they absolutely depended on.100 Yet again, evidence that British agents undermined America’s claim to the region by providing support to the Pan-Indian movement. On the night of November 3, the American forces made camp, unaware that Little Turtle’s army lay in wait not several miles ahead. The next morning, while the Americans ate their breakfast, the Native forces attacked. Using Little Turtle’s preferred crescent formation, the Natives quickly over ran the Kentucky militia which had been stationed ahead of the regulars, and quickly surrounded the entirety of St. Clair’s army. Harmar’s earlier predictions came true. The American line collapsed, the militia abandoned their posts, and St. Clair was forced to call a rushed retreat. By the time the army had reached safety, the losses were staggering. Over 600 Americans were dead, including thirty seven officers.101 In addition to the dead, several hundred more had been seriously injured, leaving only 500 able bodied. Furthermore, in the rush to retreat tens of thousands of dollars worth of weaponry, equipment and

97 Ferling, The First of Men: A Life of George Washington, 406-407. 98 Nichols, Red Gentlemen & White Savages, 140. 99 Gaff, Bayonets in the Wilderness, 9. 100 Calloway. The Indian World of George Washington, 390; Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 158-159. 101 Calloway. The Indian World of George Washington, 391. 34 supplies had been left behind. They were now in the hands of the victorious Natives. It was the single greatest Native victory against the American military in history.102

Like with Harmar, St. Clair’s largely militia-based army was incompetent in the face of battle, and unprepared for the hardships of war. The campaign was a disaster from the start, and there are numerous accounts of the militia’s cowardice. Before even arriving at their destination, over six hundred militiamen and levies had deserted, bringing St. Clair’s forces down to 1,400.103 In fact, the risk of mass desertion was so great that an entire regiment of the regular Army was assigned to police them. This played had an impact on the battle, as this regiment was elsewhere searching for deserters when the battle began.104 Stace McDonough, a soldier at the battle, would later state that after the first volley of musket fire from the Little Turtle’s forces “[The militiamen] were so panic stricken, that they rushed about from one side of the camp to the other, like a herd of cattle, without the least attempt to fight or defend themselves.” McDonough even made a point of describing the militia as “a crowd of men, not soldiers.”105 Major Ebenezer Denny recalled “The men, being thus left with few officers, became fearful, despaired of success, gave up the fight, abandoned entirely their duty and ground.”106 The fearful militiamen not only failed in their own duty and performance in battle, but actually hampered that of their compatriots. The forward camp of St. Clair’s forces consisted of 270 militiamen, all of whom broke the line and fled within minutes of the Indian assault. While this was occurring, three battalions some distance behind them fell into formation to repel the expected Native warriors. Instead, they were met with a sea of

102 Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 195. 103 Downey. Indian Wars of the U.S. Army, 54-55. 104 Starkey, European and Native American Warfare, 1675-1815, 145. 105 John Reynolds. The Pioneer History of Illinois: Containing the Discovery in 1673 and the History of the Country to the Year 1818, When the State Government Was Organized. (: Fergus Printing Company, 1887), 217 106 ”The Campaign in the Indian Country: From the Diary of Major Ebenezer Denny, Aid-de-Camp to Major-General St. Clair”, The St. Clair Papers. Volume II, 160-161. 35 fleeing militiamen. In their panic, the forward militia slammed into the line, compromising it beyond repair. Yet the militia continued to run, breaking through a further second line. In the time it took Winthrop Sargent to gather his men back in formation, the Native warriors were already within sight and firing range.107 Congress also held the militia’s actions at least partially responsible for the defeat that day. In the aftermath of the failed campaign, the House of Representatives inquired into just how St. Clair had failed so miserably. By the end of the hearing it was determined by committee that the campaign had failed in part due to the actions of the militia disrupting the main army.108 President Washington also provided an explanation for the embarrassing defeat. In a letter to Senator Benjamin Hawkins of North Carolina, he stated that the short enlistment period for levies was the primary cause of defeat. Washington argued that only regulars who trained for years could handle the hardships of war. According to Washington, the loss was arguably the result of the country’s lack of a full-fledged regular standing army.109

The defeat also fueled Washington’s worries and fears. For while St. Clair had been marching into the Ohio, trouble was brewing in Pennsylvania. The people of the western region of that state were protesting the new tax on whisky. Though not directly connected to Northwest Indian War, the Whisky Rebellion was a manifestation of what Washington feared could result in the west: a rejection of United States legitimacy and sovereignty by American citizens.110 Harmar and St. Clair not only failed defeat the Native Confederacy in the Ohio region, they also failed to resolve the crisis of legitimacy that the republic was facing. In fact, the defeats of Harmar and St. Clair only intensified

107 Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 178-179. 108 “Causes of the Failure of the Expedition Against the Indians, in 1791, Under the Command of Major General St. Clair. Communicated to the House of Representatives”, May 8, 1792. American State Papers: Military Affairs, Volume 1, 36-39. 109 “President George Washington to Senator Benjamin Hawkins”, 1792. The Writings of George Washington, Vol. XII. 1790-1794. ed. Worthington Chauncey Ford. (New York City: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1890), 71-73 110 Smith, Patriarch: George Washington and the New American Nation, 145. 36 the crisis, in all three of its forms: settler distrust in their government, British manipulation in American territory, and the threat of a Pan-Indian movement.

What little faith the settlers had in the federal government before the campaigns was quickly lost along the length of the frontier. White settlers became utterly terrified that their government could not protect them from an army of Native warriors. According to accounts from the time, along the frontier borders of New York and Pennsylvania settlers were so fearful that they could not harvest their crops, sleep or even enjoy a meal without fear of attack at a moment’s notice.111 They had lost faith in the United States, and the administration feared that this could lead to secession and disloyalty. Meanwhile, the defeat of St. Clair further fueled the ambitions of British agents seeking to reassert British hegemony in the region. McKee’s compatriot, the Pennsylvania native , had in fact been present at the battle. Officially he had accompanied the Native forces in order to observe and then report the battle’s outcome to his superiors. Yet according to accounts, the loyalist veteran of the American

Revolutionary War sought ‘fiendish’ revenge and decided to take part in the fighting personally.112 Alexander McKee was elated upon hearing the news of the Native victory. The battle had been in such favor for the Native forces that McKee had initially dismissed the first reports as exaggerated stories. Once he verified the reports, McKee immediately began planning in anticipation of a widening of the Pan-Indian alliance. In a letter sent to the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs in , Sir John Johnson, McKee requested a year’s worth of supplies to be delivered from Canada to the Ohio Natives. He

111 Gaff. Bayonets in the Wilderness, 10. & Taylor, The Divided Ground, 270. 112 Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 176. 37 argued that “the Provisions & Supplies which Government have allowed…are most apparently useful and advantageous to Great Britain [sic].”113

McKee’s dreams of British dominance in the Ohio through their Native allies began to spread to other officials within the Empire. Captain Charles Stevenson, a confidant of Lieutenant-Governor Simcoe believed that that the United States was poised to collapse in the wake of losing a war against the Natives. He also tried convince Simcoe that both New York and Vermont could be annexed and incorporated into the Canadian colonies in such a scenario.114 Yet above all else the defeat of St. Clair had the greatest impact on the Pan-Indian movement and emboldened the threat is posed to American sovereign legitimacy. To use the words of the soon to be commander of the army, Anthony Wayne, the Northwest Confederacy Natives “have become confident haughty & insolent from reiterated success; which they have evinced by a Wanton & deliberate massacre of our flags [sic].”115 Just as tales of St. Clair’s defeat spread through the frontier and struck fear among settlers, tales of Little Turtle’s victory spread among the Native nations and inspired many a warrior.116 In September 1792, war chiefs of the Confederacy met in council to discuss whether or not to continue the campaign against the United States. A chief from the Shawnee named Painted Pole claimed that St. Clair’s defeat was the will of the “who looks at us [the Natives] with as much or perhaps more compassion than those of a fairer complexion [emphasis added].”117 In the immediate aftermath of the

113 “Colonel Alexander McKee to Sir John Johnson”, December 5, 1791. Historical Collections: Michigan Pioneer and Historical Society, Vol. 24. Ed. Michigan Historical Commission. (Lansing: Robert Smith & Co. State Printers and Binders. 1894), 335-337. 114 “Captain Charles Stevenson to Lieutenant-Governor J.G. Simcoe” May 8, 1792, The Correspondence of Lieut. Governor John Graves Simcoe. Volume I, 155-156. 115 “General Anthony Wayne to Secretary of War Henry Knox”, August 24, 1792. Anthony Wayne, A Name in Arms, 71-72. 116 Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 191. 117 “Indian Council at the Glaize” 1792. The Correspondence of Lieut. Governor John Graves Simcoe. Volume I, 227. 38 battle, emboldened warriors sought to punish the deceased American soldiers for their greed and to warn any future American forces against moving against them. These warriors were reported to have filled the mouths and throats of American bodies with the very soil which they had fought and died over.118 The Confederacy’s victory also threatened to draw in more tribes who had previously remained neutral or on friendly terms with Washington’s government. In the months following the Battle of the Wabash, rumors began to spread throughout the country that the U.S. allied Seneca tribes were seeking entry into the Northwest alliance. The administration considered such a change of allegiance a dangerous development for U.S. sovereignty on the frontier. When a delegation of Seneca chiefs later arrived in Philadelphia to discuss relations, both government officials and city residents enthusiastically greeted them in an attempt to keep the tribe in America’s good graces.119 Even more frightening and dangerous than the rumored defection of the Seneca, was the possibility that either the Iroquois Six Nations or the southern Cherokee and

Creeks would join. Until now, only some individuals in these tribes had taken part in the movement. If the nations proper joined the Pan-Indian Confederacy, it would stretch from upper New York to the Deep South. In the aftermath of St. Clair’s defeat, word spread that the Confederacy was courting their fellow Native nations, seeking to draw them into their alliance.120 Confederate attempts to convince the Iroquois proved fruitless however, for the leaders of the Six Nations were inclined towards peace. Despite this, the state of Confederate-Iroquois relations still demonstrate that Little Turtle’s dual victory had emboldened the Pan-Indian movement. Specifically, the Northwest Confederacy attempted to intimidate and shame the Six Nations into joining them. After the battle,

118 Chernow. Washington: A Life, 667. 119 Owens, Red Dreams, White Nightmares, 108. 120 Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 208-209. 39

General ’s heart had been divided among the tribes which took part in the battle as a sign of victory and honor. Additionally the General’s scalp was removed, preserved and then delivered to Joseph Brant with a message that the Iroquois leader should be careful and that “it is not good for you to lie still any longer.”121 The so-called gift served as both a sign of cowardice and shame, and as a warning not to disappoint the Northwest Confederacy. Several other Non-Confederate nations were similarly intimidated both with subtlety and direct threats.122 Such tactics were not necessary when it came to the southern nations of the Cherokee and Creek. At the Miami town of Auglaize, arguably the de facto capital of the Confederacy, chiefs boasted to British agents that representatives of the Creek and Cherokee had agreed to meet with the Confederate council as a result of Little Turtle’s victories. By the summer of 1792, Cherokee and Creek chiefs sat on the grand council at Auglaize, and by 1793 they attached their names to a Pan-Indian declaration to President Washington’s government, stating that they would not negotiate for peace.123

In the first months following St. Clair’s hasty retreat eastward, Little Turtle and his colleagues seriously considered capitalizing on their victory. They planned to chase after the defeated American army, destroy their under-fortified forts, and expel the white settlers who had encroached upon their land. The only reason they did not follow through with the plan was an abnormally wet fall and cold winter, which dwindled the Native army’s crops and supplies.124

121 Samuel K. Lothrop. Life of : Missionary to the Indians. (: Charles C. Little and James Brown. 1847), 366-367. 122 Nichols, Red Gentlemen & White Savages, 145-146 & Taylor, The Divided Ground, 270. 123 Reginald Horseman. Mathew Elliott, British Indian Agent. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1964), 89 & Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 223. 124 Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 195-198. 40

Chapter Conclusion President Washington had attempts to resolve the crisis of legitimacy and sovereignty had failed. Josiah Harmar marched westward with only fourteen hundred men, with less than a fourth being federal regulars. He was defeated. Arthur St. Clair marched westward with twice the number of regulars, but again they made only a fraction of the fighting force. He too was defeated. These defeats not only failed to end the crisis, they served to make it worse. The consequences of these failures were immediate and dire. The crisis reached its height as the forces that threatened to destroy U.S. legitimacy in the West grew even stronger. Washington’s government had failed to protect their citizens, even after sending an army to face the enemy. As a result dissatisfaction with the government among white settlers intensified. The fear, animosity and distrust among the settlers reached a boiling point. Washington’s territorial claim to the Old Northwest was further undermined as British agents intensified their efforts to restore the Empire’s influence. British officials who were moderate before the campaigns became eager to reestablish British hegemony in their former territory. British officials interpreted the defeats as evidence that the U.S. could not enforce its claim to the region, allowing Britain to swoop in. Finally, Harmar and St. Clair failed to defeat the Pan-Indian movement on the battlefield, thus emboldening and strengthening said movement. Tribes who had before been neutral or U.S. allied threw their lot in with the Confederacy, and the radical pro- war factions in the alliance became even more confident that their cause was both just and within grasp. This situation was truly a crisis that threatened the very legitimacy and sovereignty of the United States in the West. The use of militia had utterly failed. And so, 41 the Washington administration turned to their last resort at resolving the crisis: the formation of a professionally trained and federal standing army. CHAPTER 3: SECURING LEGITIMACY

By 1792, attempts to resolve the crisis of legitimacy could be best described as “a well-meaning failure.”125 President Washington recognized the primary cause of the abysmal failure of the militia and volunteer based forces under Harmar and St. Clair. All attempts end the three-pronged crisis of white settler discontent, British meddling and Pan-Indian sentiment, had failed due to one root cause: the absence of a strong professionally-trained standing army capable of enforcing the nation’s laws, defending its territory and defeating its enemies. Washington now decided that it was the time to establish such an army. This chapter will first establish how the professional standing army differed from the militia forces, and how those differences secured victory at Fallen Timbers. Then, the following sub-chapter will establish how that victory ended the crisis by establishing American legitimacy in the West.

The Success of a Professional Standing Army Even before the crisis, those who would form President Washington’s cabinet knew of the need for a standing army. Washington himself had proposed in the immediate aftermath of the Revolution that a force of 2,630 soldiers be retained in peacetime to secure the borders with the Natives, British Canada, and Spanish Florida, but the suggestion amounted to nothing.126 However, in the aftermath of Shay’s Rebellion in the late 1780s, Henry Knox came to fear the fate of an American republic without a strong central government backed by a professional army: a country torn asunder by anarchy and left open to foreign invasion, dictatorship, or secession.127 To Knox, Harmar

125 Chernow. Washington: A Life, 668, 126 Downey. Indian Wars of the U.S. Army. 50. 127 “Henry Knox to George Washington”, October 28, 1786. Memoir and Correspondence of Henry Knox: Major General in the American Revolutionary Army, and First Secretary of War of the United States during Washington’s Administration. Ed. Francis S. Drake. (Boston: Samuel G. Drake. 1873), 91-93. 43 and St. Clair’s failures, and the subsequent settler animosity and British hubris, likely invoked a cruel sense of déjà vu. The Washington administration knew that if they were to resolve the crisis at hand they would need to build a professional army. Such a task would not be easy, however, given Anti-Federalist fears that standing armies were always tools of tyranny. However the Federalists still controlled Congress, and after St. Clair’s defeat they authorized President Washington and Secretary Knox to establish what came to be known as the “Legion of the United States.” The Legion was the brainchild of Secretary Knox, and named for the ancient Romans. Composed of four sub-legions, each serving as its own miniature army complete with infantry, artillery, and cavalry, the Legion reflected the latest in military organization and tactics. Knox incorporated the theories of successful military strategists such as Maurice de Saxe. Each sub-legion served as an independent force within the larger army, allowing for the flexibility to engage in offensive or defensive maneuvers as the situation called for, a trait vital for a campaign in the wilderness. The Legion was truly ahead of its time, predating the similarly organized units used in the later Napoleonic Wars. Major General Anthony “Mad Dog” Wayne was chosen to command this Legion.128 Wayne served as the commander of the light brigade during the Revolutionary War, was experienced in combat and was a military man through and through. He had earned a reputation and sense of respect from both his fellow Americans and his British adversaries during the war.129 Politics played a small role in the appointment. Wayne was a Federalist and was very much in favor of creating of a standing army. Also, he was from Pennsylvania, which appealed to Anti-Federalist sentiment.130

128 Bird, War for the West, 45 & Starkey, European and Native American Warfare, 1675-1815, 150. 129 Starkey, European and Native American Warfare, 1675-1815, 150. 130 Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 205-206. 44

Under Wayne’s command, the Legion totaled more than five thousand soldiers. Unlike the untrained and undisciplined militia, He was given two years to turn his recruits into soldiers, far more than the three months afforded to the militia units.131 Target practice was the daily norm, both to hone the riflemen’s accuracy as well as accustoming the cavalry to the sounds of gunfire. The militia cavalry had been unable to control their panicked horses during battle, and Wayne wanted to prevent a third defeat. During bayonet charge drills, Wayne began to stage war games by having half of the Legion play the role of Native warriors. Not only did these mock battles help the Legion practice their speed and accuracy, but it also prepared them for the psychological aspect of Native warfare. During the failed campaigns, militiamen fled in terror at the site of painted warriors charging with tomahawks and rifles all while shouting war cries. Wayne wanted his men desensitized to such tactics.132 By summer’s end of 1792, Wayne reported that “discipline [has begun] to make its appearance.”133 Mass desertion from the militia under Harmar and St. Clair had been a major factor in their defeat, and Wayne sought to prevent it within the Legion. Attempted deserters were given up to a hundred lashes, and repeat offenders were publicly executed by firing squad. Wayne requested that President Washington not pardon anyone found guilty of the crime, and publicly announced as much to his men.134 By the late spring of 1793, Wayne had succeeded in creating a professional army of 1200 soldiers, which included future President William H. Harrison. Pittsburg residents marveled their exercises, and many recounted cavalrymen capable of leading a

131 Bird, War for the West, 47 132 John R. Alden. George Washington: A Biography. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1984), 256. 133 “General Anthony Wayne to Secretary of War Henry Knox”, July 27, 1792. Anthony Wayne, A Name in Arms, 49. 134 “General Wayne’s Orderly Book” April 15, 1793. Collections and Researches Made by the Michigan Pioneer and Historical Society, Vol. XXXIV. Ed. C.M. Burton. (Lansing: Michigan Pioneer and Historical Society. 1905), 407-409. 45 charge at gallop, musket men with precision to impress lifelong marksmen, and a fighting force that both feared and respected their General.135

In October, General Wayne’s Legion began their campaign westward. Unfortunately as the Legion was preparing to head out, an Influenza outbreak swept through the army, leaving many soldiers bedridden. In response, Wayne ordered Major General to call in the Kentucky Mounted Militia. Despite his continued distrust of militiamen whom he believed did not have “relish to meet this Hydra [the enemy].”136 The Legion marched to the West for several months, building forts along the way and even reclaiming those abandoned during St. Clair’s defeat. Then on , 1794, Wayne’s Legion fought against Little Turtle and Blue Jacket’s Pan-Indian army at Fallen Timbers, near present day Maumee, Ohio. At first, it looked as though the Natives would again force an Americans retreat just as they had at the Battle of Maumee. Yet again, the mounted militia nearly compromised the line of regulars after losing control of their horses.137 However, where before the untrained militia outnumbered the professional regulars, drowning the forward line in a mass of bodies and leaving the front undermanned, now the two were of even size. The line reformed following the mounted militia’s confusion and General Wayne gave the order to set bayonets and charge. The soldiers did so flawlessly, forcing the Native warriors back and keeping up enough musket fire to prevent the enemy from loading their own weapons. Unlike the haphazardly and untrained militia of previous campaigns, these were professional regulars trained to carry out such maneuvers with textbook precision.138 It was not long before the Native were forced to retreat. Those who attempted to take cover and ambush

135 Gaff. Bayonets in the Wilderness, 98, 306 & Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 232.

137 Bird, War for the West, 54 & 61. 138 “General Anthony Wayne to Secretary of War Henry Knox”, August 28, 1794. Anthony Wayne, A Name in Arms, 352. 46

Wayne’s infantry were pushed out by mounted dragoons who trapped them between saber and bayonet. What started as an attempt by the Pan-Indian forces to pull back and regroup became a chaotic race to escape. General Wayne would not allow his enemy to retreat, and ordered his men to continue the charge and even fire upon those who hoped to flee the battle. One Native commander recalled that “[our] moccasins trickled blood” as they ran.139 The victory at Fallen Timbers was more than a military triumph, but also fulfilled President Washington’s goal to secure the legitimacy and sovereignty of the United States in the West. Where Harmar and St. Clair failed, Wayne brought a decisive end to the three headed crisis. After the battle was over and won, Wayne ordered his men to begin construction of a fort near the battle sight. The construction of , completed in October, was a physical representation of both General Wayne’s military victory and President Washington’s political victory over the crisis.140

The Crisis Resolved When President Washington ordered his generals to march against the Northwest Confederacy, he did so hoping that he could rid the republic of a three-headed hydra. With the U.S. victory at Fallen Timbers, that crisis which threatened the sovereign legitimacy of the United States in the West evaporated. The victory brought an end to the Pan-Indian Northwest Confederacy. It proved to the White settlers that the federal government could protect them, thus attaining their loyalty and safety. It forced British agents on the continent to pull back their involvement and interests in the Old Northwest. Though these issues would continue in some form over the next several decades, such as

139 “The As Told By Chief Kin-Jo-I-No”, n.d. Northwest Ohio Quarterly, Vol. XX. Ed. Dresden W.H. Howard. (Maumee: Maumee Valley Historical Society. 1948), 46-48 140 “Journal Entry by unidentified soldier, signed ‘Randolph’” October 24, 1794. Journal of General Wayne’s Last Campaign in the Year 1794 Against the Western Indians. Ed. Richard C. Knopf. (Worcester: American Antiquarian Society. 1954), 297. 47

Tecumseh’s war, it did put an end to the immediate crisis as it existed in the Old Northwest.

The defeat was a crushing blow to the Pan-Indian Confederacy, and their previous alliance with British forces in the West. The battle occurred only a few miles from the British post, , but their allies refused to offer assistance or to protect their Native friends. The commanding officer, Major William Campbell, did not wish to engage His Majesty’s troops with Wayne’s Legion, for fear of sparking an international incident. Joseph Brant later cited this betrayal as a key grievance against Britain’s mistreatment of and “injury” to the Native Americans.141 Word of the Battle of Fallen Timbers spread quickly among Native tribes, Members of tribes who had fought against the United States fled further westward to save themselves from the coming American military and settlers.142 Even war chiefs such as Shawnee Captain Tommy gave up the Northwest Confederate cause. Having just barely survived the battle himself, and having witnessed the Fort Miami betrayal, the warrior quickly gathered his family and fled north by canoe until they reached Canada.143 Colonel McKee and Little Turtle attempted to reignite the Pan-Indian spirit of resistance against the Americans, but in the end most Native leaders admitted defeat. Chief Masass of the Chippewa rebutted against Little Turtle specifically that whatever claim their nations might have had before were now nullified by General Wayne’s right of conquest.144 Even those who had argued that the Pan-Indian cause was divinely ordained by the Great Spirit lost their will to fight. They were motivated in part by an incident during the battle when Ottawa Chief Turkey Foot was killed by an American

141 “Joseph Brant to Sir John Johnson” April, 1799. Life of Joseph Brant (Thayendanegea). Ed. William L. Stone. (Albany: J. Munsell. 1865), 389-390. 142 “Captain Thomas Pasteur to Major General Anthony Wayne” November 3, 1794. American State Papers: Indian Affairs, Volume 1, (Washington D.C., From Library of Congress, American Memory collection, 1832), 550. 143 Gaff. Bayonets in the Wilderness, 326. 144 “Minutes of a Treaty with the tribes of Indians”, American State Papers: Indian Affairs, Volume 1, 577. 48 while attempting to rally the retreating warriors by invoking the name of the Great Spirit.145 At the meeting between Wayne and tribal representatives to formalize the surrender, the Natives credited Wayne’s victory with the will of the Great Spirit.146 Wayne’s actions after the battle dealt the final blow to the Northwest Confederacy’s Pan-Indian movement. In a war rooted in obtaining legitimacy and sovereignty, Wayne would offer neither to the Confederacy. The general refused to negotiate with a united Confederate council, as doing so would acknowledge the union as sovereign and legitimate. Instead, throughout the negotiations and signing of the , he treated each individual tribe as its own entity.147 This was a deliberate move, and for the next decade it worked. The United States was not threatened by another Pan-Indian movement until ’s movement in the 1810s. Meanwhile, American citizens who had been dissatisfied with George Washington’s government celebrated Wayne’s victory. Nineteenth-century reverend Ezra Ferris, who lived in the West as a child, recounted settler reactions. Ferris remembered the news as having “spread almost with the rapidity of lightning.”148 He described white settlers as a community terrified of Native raids, locked in their homes and hypervigilant to where danger may come from and where they may flee to safety. According to Ferris, news of Fallen Timbers burst this bubble of fear. As Wayne’s Legion marched homeward, settlers greeted them as heroes and saviors. Their joy grew when they learned that during the treaty negotiations Wayne demanded that the tribes of the Confederacy release any and all prisoners they had captured over the years. White settlers flooded to Fort Greenville hoping to find loved

145 “The Battle of Fallen Timbers As Told By Chief Kin-Jo-I-No”, n.d. Northwest Ohio Quarterly, Vol. XX, 47. 146 “Minutes of a Treaty with the tribes of Indians”, American State Papers: Indian Affairs, Volume 1, 564.

147 Taylor, The Divided Ground, 293. 148 “Ezra Ferris to a Mr. Hibben” January 1852. The Early Settlement of the Miami Country. Ed. Ezra Ferris & Oliver B. Torbet. (Indianapolis. The Bowen-Merril Company. 1897), 348-353. 49 ones among the former captives. Wayne, a representative of Washington’s government, had not only secured protection for these western settlers but for many families he returned to them what they thought was forever lost.149 Wayne’s victory at Fallen Timbers also had an impact on the Whisky Rebellion of western Pennsylvania. Dissatisfied settlers, protesting taxes they viewed as tyrannical, had risen up in armed rebellion against Washington’s government. As word of Fallen Timbers reached the East, those sympathetic to the rebellion reconsidered their support. Just as the standing army proved that the federal army could protect frontier settlers from Native American attacks, so too did it demonstrate what Washington could do to enemies of the Republic. In the end, most of the insurgents surrendered without a fight. By having demonstrated the ability of the standing army in the West, Wayne helped Washington resolve settler discontent in East.150 The victory at Fallen Timbers also opened the Ohio region to further white settlement. The edge of white civilization shifted further into the continent. Settlers on the previous edge, such as those who took part in the Whisky Rebellion, could now benefit from the securities and comforts of society, while still remaining separate from the eastern urban centers. As a result, the fear and animosity felt towards the new government diminished.151 Within a few years of the victory at Fallen Timbers, American rule of law became a reality in the West. By the year 1800, over 45,000 Americans had settled in the Old Northwest, and Congressional legislation had begun to regulate commerce. Meanwhile, the standing army not only protected the white settlers from Natives, but also enforced the treaties between Natives and the U.S. It was the federal army which maintained federal rule of law in the West. In fact, it was only once the

149 Gaff. Bayonets in the Wilderness, 365. 150 Richard Brookhiser. Founding Father: Rediscovering George Washington. (New York: The Free Press, 1996), 88-89; Smith, Patriarch: George Washington and the New American Nation, 219. 151 Thomas P. Slaughter. The Whisky Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American Revolution. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1986), 224 50 standing army was removed from the Ohio region that widespread settler disregard for federal Indian policy returned to the region.152

Finally, Wayne’s professional standing army effectively ended the influence which of British agents among the Natives in the region, perhaps more so than the 1795 Jay Treaty. The treaty did not reach Washington until March 1795, in fact a full seven months after Fallen Timbers. For British agents and officials on site in the West and in Canada, Wayne’s regular army ended their Northwest agenda.153 General Wayne himself also took the steps to convey the importance of his military force when he decided to march his men towards Fort Miami. Though he stopped short of attacking the British fort, he made it clear to Major Campbell that he was well within his right to do so. In a series of back and forth letters between the two commanders, General Wayne described Major Campbell’s presence in the Ohio valley as a “hostile act” and tantamount to an act of war. He then demanded, dramatically invoking the name and office of the President of the United States of America, that Campbell withdraw his troops from American soil post haste.154 This was more than just boastful talk by Wayne, for when Major Campbell refused to abandon his post, the general ordered his men to raid and burn every building within sight of Fort Miami. Abandoned Native settlements along the Miami River, corn fields, and even Alexander McKee’s personal home and stores were all destroyed. It did not matter to the General if homes he destroyed were those of the enemy or civilians. The ruthless “Mad Dog” ensured that all structures in the vicinity were burned to the ground as a violent yet effective show of America’s claim to the region.155

152 Gaff. Bayonets in the Wilderness, 368-369 & Nichols, Red Gentlemen & White Savages, 176-177, 185. 153 Ferling, The First of Men: A Life of George Washington, 454-455. 154 “Correspondences between Major William Campbell to General Anthony Wayne” August 21-22, 1794. The Correspondence of Lieut. Governor John Graves Simcoe. Volume II, 405-408. 155 “General Anthony Wayne to Secretary of War Henry Knox,” August 28, 1794. Anthony Wayne, A Name in Arms, 354-355. 51

The greatest impact of Wayne’s victory was that it shattered Britain’s alliance with the Natives. The British decision to not engage the Americans or assist the Natives undercut the longstanding support they had offered Natives in the region. Guy Carleton had assured the Northwest Confederacy earlier that year that the British forces would provide support if the Americans attacked. The construction of Fort Miami was, in fact, intended to demonstrate Britain’s commitment, to the alliance. The incident at Fort Miami was more than a mere indication of Britain’s unwillingness to help, it was a direct violation of the agreement between the Canadian governor and the Confederacy.156 This had a long-lasting effect on Britain’s influence over the Northwestern Natives. Chiefs from numerous tribes, such as leaders of the Delaware, condemned the British, accusing them of having tricked the Northwest Natives into provoking the United States and then sitting back and allowing them to be wiped out.157 During peace negotiations, Blue Jacket bitterly lamented that placing their trust in the British had been a mistake that costed them dearly. Even a decade later, Native chiefs spoke of the Fort

Miami betrayal with scorn for the British.158

Chapter Conclusion The defeats of Josiah Harmar and Arthur St. Clair’s militia army were disastrous for the administration. Yet President Washington learned from their mistakes, and decided to raise up a federal standing army. He entrusted the task to Anthony Wayne, who spent nearly two years training them to shoot, engage the enemy and resist Native war tactics. He did so through arduous exercises and draconian discipline, both of which transformed the recruits into a professional fighting force.

156 Alden. George Washington: A Biography, 257-258. 157 . October 15, 1794. Diary Entry. From Diary of David Zeisberger: A Moravian Missionary Among the Natives of Ohio, Vol. 2, 378. 158 Gaff. Bayonets in the Wilderness, 364; Nichols, Red Gentlemen & White Savages, 165. 52

The test of this new army came at the Battle of Fallen Timbers, where they met Blue Jacket and Little Turtle’s Pan-Indian army. The Pan-Indian movement, was struck down. This defeat demoralized the Northwest Natives, prompting many to flee either further west or north to Canada to escape Wayne’s infamous military. Wayne’s handling of the peace negotiations further undermined Pan-Indian sentiment. He dealt with the tribes on an individual basis, refusing to grant legitimacy to the Confederacy. The second branch of crisis, the discontent of White settlers, was also resolved. The United States government was able to establish the rule of law in the West, and opened the West to further white settlement. White settlers, who had resented their government for being unable to hold off the Pan-Indian threat, now celebrated the government’s standing army. Finally, Wayne’s victory destroyed the British influence in the region. The British abandoned their allies at a vital moment, irreversibly damaging their influence. Four years of warfare, over a decade of tension, and a three-headed crisis had threatened the legitimacy and sovereignty of the United States in the Western frontier.

And with one army, an army of professionals and regulars, that legitimacy and sovereignty was secured. CONCLUSION

When President Washington first took the reins of the young nation, he faced a three-headed crisis in the Northwest Territory that threatened the legitimacy and sovereignty of the United States of America. The crisis was the combined threat of a Pan- Indian movement at the outer-edge of the republic, the threat of secession and anarchy from dissatisfied settlers, and the threat of foreign interference by British officials in the West. While American settlers wished to claim the western frontier for themselves, the Native inhabitants and British imperialists sought to keep the Old Northwest for themselves. This dispute ultimately erupted into the Northwest Indian War. War and Legitimacy has successfully argued that the Northwest Indian War was a manifestation of the three-headed crisis to American legitimacy and that President Washington first tried, and failed, to resolve this crisis through the use of militias and finally succeeded with the use of a professional standing army. War and Legitimacy has laid out the crisis to American legitimacy in the West in its three forms, and explained how it led to the Northwest Indian War. First, the threat of Pan-Indianism. The tribes of the Ohio region united to form the Northwest Confederacy and formed an army of warriors under the command of brilliant tacticians Blue Jacket and Little Turtle. With this army’s string of victories, support for the Confederacy grew among tribes along the frontier. Washington’s government feared that such a movement could repel America’s presence in the Old Northwest. So, the administration chose to fight to repel the Confederate forces. The second form was the threat of settler discontent. As the Pan-Indian movement grew in size, settlers became dissatisfied with the government’s handling of the situation. Attempts by the administration to peacefully coexist with the indigenous nations were dismissed as foolish at best and betrayal at worst. Before long settlers took up vigilantism, and even talks of secession from the republic. The decision to use military force was largely a result of both settlers 54 compromising of peace efforts, and efforts to appeal to the masses. Finally, there was the threat of British meddling in the region. British agents on the frontier sought to reestablish British presence in the Old Northwest, and did so by establishing an alliance with the Northwest Confederacy. It was the hope of these agents that by strengthening the Pan-Indian movement they could push the United States out of the region they believed was rightfully theirs. The administration wished to prove to the British that they could settle their own affairs in the territory they claimed, and did so through military force. The first attempt by the administration through the use of militia not only failed to resolve the crisis but served to intensify it. President Washington hoped that by defeating the Northwest Confederacy, then the crisis would dissipate. The Pan-Indian alliance would be crushed, the government would demonstrate that it could protect its citizens, and the United States would prove to European powers that it could secure control over its claimed territory. The first two campaigns, led by Josiah Harmar and Arthur St. Clair, both failed to defeat the Pan-Indian army, and by extension failed to resolve the crisis.

The reliance on a militia-based fighting force spelled doom for these commanders, as the militiamen proved incompetent, cowardly and undisciplined in the heat of battle. The defeat served to intensify the three pronged crisis, as the Natives and British became emboldened to carry on the war and the settlers became even more fearful of attack and dissatisfied with their government. The second attempt, which relied on a professional standing army, finally succeeded in dismantling the crisis facing Washington’s government. After the use of militias had failed, President Washington decided to form a professional standing federal army. He picked Anthony Wayne to command the Legion of the United States. Unlike the militias, the Legion was composed of soldiers trained in combat and prepared for the horrors of battle. When Wayne’s army defeated the Northwest army at the Battle of Fallen Timbers, he brought a decisive end to the crisis. The Pan-Indian Confederacy 55 shattered as the tribes surrendered to the United States and gave up their claim to the land. The victory proved to unruly settlers that the government could both protect them and enforce rule of law. The British alliance with the Natives was abandoned and British agents were forced to abandon their plans for British hegemony. Historians have treated the Northwest Indian War as a footnote of President Washington’s legacy. Those who have studied the conflict extensively have only done so in one of two ways. First, historians have studied the war’s importance to the military history of the U.S. Army. Secondly, historians have analyzed the war’s impact on Native- American history. Meanwhile, those who have studied the war in relation to President Washington and his government have only done so in the briefest of passing. War and Legitimacy has demonstrated that the Northwest Indian War was a before and after moment for Washington’s presidency. Before the conflict, the three- headed crisis threatened the fate of the United States in the West. After, America’s claim to the frontier was legitimized. Whether or not the new republic could enforce its claim to sovereignty in the region had once been uncertain, but the victory at Fallen Timbers settled the matter. Historians have argued the importance of the Jay Treaty in this regard, but this thesis has successfully argued that the treaty only affirmed what Wayne’s army had already achieved. Historians have also argued that Washington’s ultimate goal as President was to establish a strong federal government, and this thesis has successfully demonstrated that Washington formed and used a professional standing army to end a crisis which threatened the legitimacy of that government. When the Northwest Indian War began, President Washington had been faced with a true crisis, a crisis that threatened the legitimacy of the United States in the eyes of Native Americans, European powers and its own citizens. Washington’s primary goal was to end that crisis and establish beyond a doubt the legitimacy of his new government. He aimed to secure America’s sovereign claim to Old Northwest and its right to enforce 56 law and order. After two disastrous attempts, President Washington finally succeeded in accomplishing that goal through the use of a professional standing army. An army whose legacy remains to this day.

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