Some Perspectives on Its Purpose from Published Accounts Preston E

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SOME PERSPECTIVES ON ITS PURPOSE FROM PUBLISHED ACCOUNTS PRESTON E. PIERCE ONTARIO COUNTY HISTORIAN DEPARTMENT OF RECORDS, ARCHIVES AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT ERVICES CANANDAIGUA, NEW YORK

2019 (REPRINTED, UPDATED, AND REVISED 2005, 1985)

Front cover image: Sullivan monument erected at the entrance to City Pier on Lake Shore Drive, Canandaigua. Sullivan-Clinton Sesquicentennial Commission, 1929. Bronze tablet was a common feature of all monuments erected by the Commission. Image from original postcard negative, circa 1929, in possession of the author.

Above: Sullivan-Clinton Sesquicentennial Commission tablet erected at Kashong (Yates County), Rt. 14, south of Geneva near the Ontario County boundary. 1929. Image by the author. 2004

Gen. John Sullivan. Image from Benson J. Lossing, Pictorial Field Book of the Revolution. v. I. 1860. p. 272.

Sullivan-Clinton Campaign monument (front and back) erected in 1929 in Honeoye. Moved several times, it commemorates the location of Ft. Cummings, a temporary base established by Sullivan as he began the final leg of his march to the Genesee River. Images by the author.

Forward

1979 marked the 200th anniversary of the Sullivan-Clinton expedition against those Iroquois nations that allied themselves with Britain and the Loyalists during the American Revolution. It is a little-understood (more often misunderstood) military incursion with diplomatic, economic, and decided geo-political consequences. Unfortunately, most people, including most municipal historians, know little about the expedition beyond what is recorded on roadside markers. In 1929, during the sesquicentennial celebrations of the American Revolution, the states of New York and Pennsylvania established a special commission that produced a booklet, sponsored local pageants, and erected many commemorative tablets in both states. Pageants were held to celebrate Sullivan’s success and tell the story of the frontier warfare of the 1770’s. Several booklets and journal articles on the subject were produced that year and a commemorative postage stamp was issued. In 1979, little was done to commemorate the expedition or interpret its significance. A few local publications were produced as well as a small number of articles in journals such as New York History. Hardly any of those publications provided any real insights into the reasons for the expedition or the way in which it was carried out. The New York State American Revolution Bicentennial Commission published a booklet written by historian, William T. Hagen. That publication reviewed the events of the campaign within the context of the frontier warfare. A group of twelve New York County Historians also produced a booklet solely on the Sullivan- Clinton Campaign. Well-illustrated, it shows almost every historical marker related to the subject; relates the facts of the campaign; and provides a bit more insight than the Bicentennial Commission publication that was much broader in scope. There was a small body of literature produced about the Sullivan expedition during the Bicentennial Era even though there has been a virtual information explosion in the social sciences; publications are more easily published than ever before; and the public seemed to thirst for anything related to the war. Expedition observance gatherings numbered even fewer than publications in 1979. The only postal commemorative of the frontier warfare in New York honored General Herkimer and the parrticipants in the battle at Oriskany—where the local militia “won” by enduring the bloodiest losses of the war and left the field after the British-Loyalist-Indian force that ambushed them. There are few facts to support any contentions about the true reasons for the lack of interest in the Sullivan expedition in 1979. It is probably safe to assume that several factors played a role in every local decision. By 1979, most of the American public was no longer willing to celebrate a military victory over Native Americans. The expedition was seen then, and now, as a tragedy as well as a triumph. In fact, the title of a 1997 book by Joseph Fischer labels the campaign A Well- Executed Failure. Indeed, scholars such as Barbara Graymont have documented the fact that although the economy of the Iroquois was dealt a severe blow by Sullivan’s troops, their military might re-bounded almost immediately. The state Bicentennial Commission, undoubtedly mindful of the political consequences, seemed to steer clear of any publications or celebrations that seemed to pit one group of citizens against another. Local committees had a difficult time finding authors willing and able to produce new

5 local histories. Then too, by 1979, money to support commemorations was getting scarce and any pageantry seemed like an after-thought compared to the nationwide activity just three years earlier. Indeed, pageants were a much less popular way to celebrate historical events than they had been a half-century earlier. The Sullivan expedition, nevertheless, needs to be understood. At the time of this writing, we are looking forward to another period of remembrance; the “semiquincentennial” (250th anniversary in 2026) as the New York State Education Department now calls to it. There will be many new opportunities to explore the story of our revolution during this period. As a possible part of those opportunities, the Sullivan expedition needs to be placed within the context of the times and accepted as part of the process by which a new nation-state was created. At a time when Indian land claims are still sometimes front page news in western New York; and past treatment Native people is a subject of frequent discussion and condemnation; it is important to have a deeper understanding of Indian-white relations at the start of our national history. This publication is an attempt to enhance our understanding. This publication is a brief review of the literature on the Sullivan expedition. It is not an in- depth examination of primary sources supporting a particular historical thesis. Its purpose is to broaden the perspectives of local residents, historical society members, and municipal historians. The original version of this publication was written in 1979. It has been revised and updated several times since then. Readers’ contributions of newly published sources are welcome and encouraged.

Route of march of Sullivan’s army, late summer 1779. The Susquehanna River valley near Wyalusing, PA, looking north toward the Iroquois homeland. This river had long been a transportation route for diplomats, warriors, and Moravian missionaries. It was also a route used by patriot militia, Loyalist refugees and rangers. Image by the author.

Setting the Stage

The Sullivan campaign was, in reality, only an episode in the “border,” or frontier, wars of the Revolution. While it is not given a great deal of attention in the general histories of the Revolution, there exists a sizeable literature on the expedition. A thorough bibliography on the campaign would not list almost 200 entries. Some of these, particularly the primary sources, are well done and valuable. Much of the writing is heroic and nationalistic, however. Most of the Sullivan material available falls into two general categories: narratives of the expedition, and explanations of its effect.1 A third dimension, the rationale for the campaign, has been strangely unexplored until recently. An examination of the motives for the Sullivan expedition is, therefore, the subject of this essay. It is my purpose, moreover, to offer some explanations rarely discussed in previous work. Such an undertaking in an essay of this size is difficult at best. It is my hope that this effort will provide the impetus for more lengthy discussion and scholarly research. In 1975, Donald R. McAdams, writing for the New York Historical Society, clearly stated the need for studies of this kind: “A study of the setting of the expedition within the larger strategic picture of the Revolutionary War, a study of the immediate events that convinced Washington of the need for an expedition, as well as careful consideration of Washington’s goals and objectives are all necessary for understanding the scope and importance of the expedition.”2 Taking our cue from McAdams, we must examine three things. First, we will look at the strategic picture up to 1779. Second, we will examine the events of the years preceding 1779. Lastly, we will discuss Washington’s goals for the operation, and, necessarily, the goals of others. That should make it possible for local historians, in particular, to synthesize a broad explanation for the campaign against the Iroquois. While a broad explanation may sound like no real explanation, it must be remembered that neither Sullivan, nor any of the other people involved in the expedition, acted in a vacuum. The expedition was the product of many motivating factors interacting. A continuing problem, nevertheless, is the dearth of sources on the subject from either the Iroquois or British perspective. [That has improved somewhat since this essay was originally written in 1985.] By 1779, the British command had shifted its focus to the southern states. Cornwallis, Tarleton and Sir Henry Clinton were devastating Georgia and the Carolinas. They were encouraging the rise of numerous loyalists in that area and threatening Virginia (which they did, eventually

1 The most complete treatment of expedition narratives can be found in the three editions of the “Journals” published after 1887. Both narrative and effects were covered well by Graymont and Whitmore. Short and long-range effects were discussed at length by Wallace (1972) and McAdams (1975). An excellent essay on the Sullivan campaign historiography was written by Butterfield (1970) for the New York State Historical Association.

2 McAdams. “The Sullivan Expedition: Success or Failure.” pp. 305-306.

7 devastate on their way to Yorktown in 1781). Driven from New England early in the war, the British captured Long Island and New York City in 1776, pushing Washington across New Jersey and into the upper Delaware Valley.3 In the spring and summer of 1777, Philadelphia fell and the Americans suffered disasters at Brandywine and Germantown, retreating at last to Valley Forge. To the north, Britain’s ill-fated 1777 invasion of New York had yielded little and cost a great deal. Fort Schuyler (Stanwix) held; an army was lost at Saratoga; and the Hudson River above West Point was securely in American hands. The British made an important gain, however, in 1777. They induced the Iroquois to “take up the hatchet” that year. Not all of the Six Nations accepted the advice Loyalists like John Butler, the Johnsons and Mohawk war chief, Joseph Brant, however. The Oneidas, and the newly arrived Tuscaroras, cleaved to the Americans and their agent Philip Schuyler. Later a few Onondagas joined them.4 The Senecas, Cayugas, Mohawks and most of the Onondagas “held fast to the covenant chain” with the king. They had good reason for this action. The Onondagas and Mohawks had already lost much of their land to white encroachment.5 The well supplied British agents lost no opportunity to point out the Americans’ inability to supply Indian needs such as blankets, powder and lead.6 Liberal gift-giving was an important ingredient in Indian diplomacy. The lack of gifts was interpreted as prima facie evidence of inability to give.7 Those Indians who had accompanied St. Ledger and Burgoyne had suffered unexpected humiliation. The Mohawks, almost entirely surrounded by whites, and tied by kinship to the Loyalist Johnson family, were especially susceptible to the entreaties of their own Joseph Brant. The Oneidas, long under the influence of Presbyterian missionary Samuel Kirkland, were the staunchest supporters of the American cause. When the council fire at Onondaga was extinguished, the Iroquois Confederacy was split.8 The next year, 1778, was a turning point in Britain’s northern strategy. With the majority of its armies in the south, Britain could make little headway in the north. For similar reasons,

3 British forces held the important base at Newport, RI for a long time. The American commander assigned the ill- fated task of driving them out in 1778 was Gen. John Sullivan. The main problem for Sullivan’s force was poor communications and lack of cooperation between American commanders and the newly arrived French navy.

4 Graymont. Iroquois in the American Revolution. pp. 192-193.

5 It is interesting to note that while rebels like the Klocks and others had fraudulently taken Indian land, much of it, in white eyes as least, was legitimately sold. Many of the sales were under duress of one kind or another. More interesting is the fact that the British, with the support of many Indian leaders, portrayed themselves as protectors of Indian land. Such was not the case, as other Indians pointed out. The Johnson family, their friends and agents, claimed hundreds of thousands of acres of Indian land all the while officially protecting the Indians. See: Namock, Higgins, Billington, and Abernathy.

6 Graymont. pp. 89-90.

7 Jacobs. Diplomacy and Indian Gifts. Passim.

8 A concise account of similar factors at work among the Cherokee, Shawnee and other allied Indians, as well as the Iroquois, can be found in Sossin. The Use of Indians in the War of the American Revolution. pp. 104-105.

Washington could do little more than defend in place. The British, then, began using their Indian allies to harass the American rear, destroy American supplies, and wage a kind of psychological warfare. They also liberated hundreds of loyalists. 1778 was the “year of massacres.”9 In July, British, Loyalists and Indians fell upon Wyoming, Pennsylvania. They wiped out its ill-led garrison and devastated that part of the fertile Susquehanna valley. They also liberated about twenty loyalists from that area already seething with internal dissension. Partly in retaliation for American raids on Oquaga and Unadilla [Not far from present Binghamton.], the Iroquois and Butler’s Rangers attacked Cherry Valley, New York, in November. They had previously ravaged the country along the upper Mohawk and its tributaries. The British-Indian tactics were always the same, as described by Anthony F. C. Wallace: “…immobilize the armed militia in their forts, capture a small number of men, women, and children, drive off the horses, cattle, and oxen, and take whatever movable plunder might be carried. The soldiers were kept busy in the fort answering sniping fire from the Tories, while the Indians killed people, burned barns, houses, and haystacks, drove off horses and cattle and looted goods.”10 This border warfare terrorized the population.11 It depopulated whole areas and deprived Washington’s army of needed supplies. The politicians in Congress, heeding the cries of their constituents, forces Washington to detach needed troops to frontier posts.12 Worst of all, it created a crisis of confidence in the American government. Perhaps most aggravating for the Congress and Washington was the fact that a crisis of confidence was not entirely warranted. France had concluded an alliance with the United States in 1778. French naval and materiel support was even then available to Washington. French gold was underwriting the weak American economy. Best of all, a new British ministry agreed to start peace negotiations by the end of the year. These and other considerations set the stage for the Sullivan expedition.

9 Graymont. Ch VII; Wallace. pp. 134-141.

10 Wallace. p. 139.

11 Although battle deaths were often comparatively small, many people fled in terror spreading exaggerated stories. Most of those who died at Wyoming died of exposure after fleeing into the wilderness. Chapman. History of Wyoming. pp, 127-128.

12 On June 10, 1778, the Continental Congress proposed sending a major expedition into the Seneca country and on to Detroit. Three thousand men were to be raised and the Board of War recommended giving command to General Gates. Graymont. p. 167.

Monuments erected on the hill above the Newtown battlefield site. The Battle of Newtown was the only organized military opposition mounted by the Iroquois and Loyalist forces opposing Sullivan. Sullivan’s commanders outflanked and outnumbered the force arrayed against him and easily won the battle. The first monument was erected in 1879 by a private association. It is shown in this postcard shortly before it collapsed in 1911. The current monument (right) was erected in 1912 by the State of New York. The site today is a New York State Park, off Rt. 17 (I-86) just east of Elmira, NY and northeast of the marked site of the native town of Chemung. Both markers were attended by triumphal and celebratory events, including a model military camp established by the US Army and the 29th Regiment Band.13 Image of modern monument by author.

13 “Two Battalions May Come Army Band for Dedication.” Elmira Star-Gazette. Aug. 10, 1912. p. 7; “National Guard Men Leave Visit Here Much Enjoyed.” Elmira Star-Gazette. Aug. 30, 1912. p. 11.

Motives and Goals

What were the Americans trying to accomplish by sending Sullivan into the Indian country? There is no definitive answer. Writers then and since have identified several motives. Other factors can be inferred from what we know. What is plain is that there were several goals, most of which were complementary. The most obvious motivation was revenge. Both the Congress and military leaders wanted to retaliate for Wyoming, Cherry Valley, Schoharie, and dozens of smaller skirmishes. This motive has been identified by nearly every writer concerned with the expedition.14 Washington’s letter to General Sullivan, April 15, 1779, makes the point clear; “…this expedition is intended to cut off these Indian nation. It will be necessary that the blow be sure and fatal…”15 Pacification of the border area was a natural complement to the revenge motive. It was not enough to strike back. The destructive raids and counter raids had to be stopped or made less frequent. Washington was well aware that strategic forts alone would not secure the interior.16 His experience in the colonial wars had made that point clear. The efficacy of punitive military expeditions had long been conventional wisdom among those who dealt with Indians. The French had dealt with the Iroquois this way in 1687 (DeNonville expedition). The English had done the same with the western nations. Even the Iroquois had used the principle in their “beaver wars.”17 By Indian custom, and for good reason, Washington had inherited his great- grandfather’s name, “Town Destroyer.”18 Another immediate goal for the Sullivan expedition was a demonstration of the power of the United States. The expedition was to convince the Indians that the United States had it in its power to carry the war into their own country whenever they commenced hostilities.19 British agents made much of the Americans’ inability to secure their frontier. British and Indian raiders could strike with impunity. This was a telling point when British agents rallied the Delaware, Mingo, Wyandot, Cherokee and others to their cause.20 In addition, the raids depopulated the fertile frontier causing a loss of supplies and confidence for the American government. The Indians and American settlers had to be convinced that the national government could and would secure the border. More than that, the Indians had to be convinced that their own territory could

14 A representative sample would include Flick, Turner, Graymont, Clarke, A.F.C. Wallace and Whitmore.

15 Hammond. Letters and Papers of Major General John Sullivan. V. 3. p. 4.

16 Stone. Life of Brant. V. II. p. 1.

17 Hunt. The Wars of the Iroquois. Passim.

18 Ambler. George Washington and the West. p. 6; Calloway. The Indian World of George Washington. pp. 69-70, 256.

19 Hammond. V. 3. P. 4.

20 Stone. II. p. 3n.

11 be violated at will. Clayton Mau’s sources led his to state, “Thus reduced to submission or driven from their territory, the enemy Iroquois would no longer be willing to submit to British influence and the Indian forays would be terminated.”21 Washington wanted the Indians to see that the British could no protect them. Sullivan was to be his “rod of correction.”22 Congress had tried to mount offensives before, but circumstances had prevented their coming to fruition.23 Now, for logistical, tactical, and political reasons, the time was right. The destruction of Indian crops was a fourth motivation for the Sullivan campaign. Sullivan’s final report on the expedition indicates the size of Iroquois agricultural production. 160,000 bushels of corn and untold vegetables and fruit were put to the torch in the fall of 1779.24 While Sullivan’s troops may have been surprise, strategic planners, and those who knew the Iroquois, were not. Thomas J. Clark Summed up the situation, “…just as the Mohawk and Wyoming valleys were the granaries of the American army, the Seneca country was the chief food supply of the British forces at Niagara.”25 Washington was explicit in his instructions to General Sullivan, “It will be essential to ruin their crops now in the ground, and prevent their planting more.”26 In the vicinity of Newtown (Elmira), at the start of the campaign, it took an army of more than 4000 men almost two days to destroy the ripening corn.27 Clearly, the strategic outpost at Niagara figured in Washington’s plans for the Sullivan campaign. Constructed in the 1600s, Ft. Niagara was a key to control of the Great Lakes basin. There a thriving trade was carried on. There also the Iroquois and their brethren from the Ohio country could be consulted, harangued, and persuaded.28 Beyond the reach of Continentals or militia, surrounded by loyal Iroquois and a growing settlement of white Loyalists, Ft. Niagara became the base of operations for the Tory ranger regiments of Sir John Johnson and the Butlers. It was also a gathering point for Loyalists driven from their homes in the interior of New York and Pennsylvania. Recruiting officers from Ft. Niagara spread out as far as the Susquehanna, Delaware and Mohawk valleys. By 1779, a loyalist settlement had begun at Niagara and hundreds of refugees had settled there permanently.29 Taking Ft. Niagara would be difficult, but

21 Mau. Development of Central and Westeern New York. p. 47.

22 Mau. p. 58.

23 James. George Rogers Clark Papers. p. xlvii, n1; Journals of the Continental Congress, entry for Oct. 22, 1778.

24 Cook. Journals of the Military Expedition of Major General John Sullivan. p. 303.

25 Clarke. The Bloody Mohawk. p. 259.

26 Amory. Military Services and Public Life of Major General John Sullivan. p. 104.

27 Cook. p. 296.

28 Stone. II. p. 3n; see also Graymont, A.F.C. Wallace, and Swigett.

29 Siebert. “the Loyalists and Six Nations in the Niagara Peninsula.” pp. 83ff.

Washington considered it a worthy goal. Presumably, Congress agreed. It had given that post special attention as early as 1776.30 Striking so important a post would demonstrate American ability, impress the Indians, discourage the Loyalists, and perhaps even encourage a rebellion by disenchanted French Canadians.31 For those reasons, Washington’s instructions to General Sullivan were explicit. “The Indians may possibly be engaged, by address, secrecy, and stratagem, to surprise the garrison of Niagara and the shipping on the lakes and put them into our possession… Should Niagara fall into your hands in the way I have mentioned, you will do everything in your power towards preserving and maintaining it…”32 Washington’s words betrayed his doubts, and those of Congress, that Niagara could be taken.33 Seized only once, by Sir William Johnson with Iroquois assistance (1759), Ft. Niagara was a worthy goal but one which would divert large numbers of troops and supplies with doubtful promise of success. It was, then, only a target of opportunity. These were the varied short range goals of the Sullivan campaign. From its inception, the expedition served several purposes. All of those previously examined have as their common thread effective prosecution of a vicious civil war. Three other, more transcendent, goals may be deduced from the record, however. These go beyond prosecution of the war and are, perhaps, the most important motivations for the expedition. The first of these was to break the power of the Iroquois. The second motivation was to secure a trans-Allegheny territorial claim for the new United States. Lastly, the Sullivan expedition, but its very composition, as well as its goals, may have been used to lessen the divisive inter-state rivalry for conquered lands. Breaking the power of the Iroquois involved more than demonstrating the ability of the United States to carry the war to the Indians’ homeland. The Iroquois were powerful diplomatically as well as militarily. Their influence extended as far west as Detroit and was felt throughout the Ohio basin. If the Iroquois could be defeated, humiliated in the eyes of their lesser allies to the west, several advantages might accrue to the United States. By such a move the Iroquois might be deprived of their diplomatic power. No longer could they claim to be His Majesty’s foremost holders of the Covenant Chain.34 Thus, the Iroquois would lose prestige and their post-war

30 Journals of the Continental Congress. IV. p. 294. In May, 1776, Congress was attempting to induce the Iroquois to take Ft. Niagara for them, as they had seized it from the French a quarter of a century earlier.

31 Flick. History of the State of New York. IV. p. 210.

32 Amory. pp. 14-15.

33 Whitmore. A General of the Revolution. p. 124. See also: Fitzpatrick. XIV. p. 6 where Washington explicitly rejects Niagara as a primary goal.

34 The “Covenant Chain” was a diplomatic allusion first created by the Iroquois and the Dutch in the 1600s. It signified the strength of their alliance first with the Dutch, then with the English. The Iroquois claimed, and were allowed to believe, that they were its senior bearers among the Native people. (See: Jennings. “The Constitutional Evolution of the Covenant Chain.”)

13 claims would be weakened. Humiliation of the Iroquois might also cut loose the western Indian nations from their allegiance to the Six Nations and the British.35 It was hoped that the western nations would then be more pliant. (This proved to be a forlorn hope. After the war, the western nations rejected the Iroquois but adhered more closely than ever to the British who armed and supplied them. After the Treaty of Paris (1783), British Indian agents hoped to erect an Indian barrier state in the Northwest Territory. Ironically, the truncated Iroquois nations remaining in New York played an important role in the dissolution of this project.)36 The Native people along the Allegheny and upper Ohio were related to the Iroquois. Many of the nations in the area had accepted protectorate status in the Confederacy. Iroquois military might had long ago shown itself to be a reality on the Illinois and the western Great Lakes. American planners, then, had every reason to believe in the success of a diplomatic coup. Breaking the power of the Iroquois would be a major step in solidifying an American claim to the trans-Allegheny west. Of all the long-range purposes of the Sullivan-Clinton campaign, this one is probably the most significant.37 There was scarcely a man in Congress or the military that did not have an interest, intellectual if not financial, in western lands. In the years before the war, several land speculation companies were formed. Among the proprietors of the Ohio, Mississippi, Vandalia, Illinois, Wabash and Indiana Companies could be counted the Franklins, Lees, Washington, Morrises, and Whartons. They had often been associated with many of their erstwhile enemies, including the Johnsons and several British government officials.38 The lure of western lands had made an early impression on a young Virginian initially made landless by primogeniture. Early in his career George Washington wrote: “…see what fortunes were made…how the greatest estates in this colony were made; was it not by taking up and purchasing at very low rates the rich back lands…”39 Washington’s sentiments had changed little when he wrote to Congressman James Duane on September 7, 1783.

35 Hammond. Vol. 3. p. 4. Sullivan wrote to Washington, Apr. 15, 1779: “As this expedition is intended to cut off these Indian nations, and to convince others that we have it in our power to carry the war into their own country whenever they commence hostilities, it will be necessary that the blow should be sure and fatal…”

36 Ibbotson. “Samuel Kirkland, the Treaty of 1792, and the Indian Barrier State.” Passim.

37 It received some attention by Flick (1929). Boardman (1972), p. 40, also made this a major motive for the expedition.

38 Ambler. Pp. 32, 134, 174ff. Abernathy indicates that a large majority of the members of the Congress had interests in western lands; mostly financial. James Wilson, President of Congress, was also President of the Illinois- Wabash Company.

39 Fitzpatrick. II. pp. 458-459.

“At first view, it may seem a little extraneous, when I am called upon to give an opinion upon the terms of a Peace proper to be made with the Indians, that I should go into the formation of new states; but the Settlement of the western country and making a peace with the Indians are so analogous, that there can be no definition of the one without involving considerations of the other.”40 Washington traveled into the Ohio country five times.41 He was well informed about Virginia’s plans and claims to the old northwest. He was also convinced that acquisition of land was essential to the development of personal and national wealth. Colin Calloway’s book, The Indian World of George Washington (2018), draws on a wide variety of sources to make Washington’s ideas about Native land, its value and acquisition, abundantly clear; for the Iroquois and all others. Flick (1929), Ambler (1936) and others have suggested that a major purpose of the Sullivan- Clinton campaign was to assist in rolling back the boundaries of the United States to absorb the trans-Allegheny west.42 While the substantive evidence is sparse, the circumstantial evidence seems conclusive. A major force directed against the Iroquois could lay claim to the western parts of New York and would hasten the diplomatic or military conquest of the whole northwest.43 There was more to securing western lands, however, than a conquest of the Indians. If a claim to the trans-Alleghany region were to be made good, it would have to be made good against the claims and devious maneuverings of America’s grudging allies. In late winter, 1779, the negotiations that resulted in the Treaty of Paris four years later had already begun. With peace in the air once more it was imperative that the United States solidify its territorial claims. An expedition against the Indians would give the new nation a claim to press against the Iroquois, the other northwest Native nations, and their British allies. It would also provide a basis for a more forceful position with France and Spain, both of which were showing an increasing willingness to hem in the United States at the crest of the Alleghenies. In the peace negotiations that began in Paris in 1779, boundaries were a prominent point of discussion. In previous peace initiatives, the central issue had been unqualified independence of the new United States. British strategic failure, opposition to the war in Parliament, and the entry of France into the war brought about a profound change. Complete independence was no

40 Fitzpatrick. II. p. 139.

41 Washington’s journeys into the west, prior to the Revolution, took place in 1748, 1753, 1754, 1758, and 1770.

42 Ambler suggests that the Sullivan campaign was an opportunity to act in concert with the Virginia-sponsored George Rogers Clark expedition in a major roll-back of the frontier. Ambler. (1936). P. 166.

43 Clarke (1940) rejects this theory stating that Washington was too busy with the war to take such an interest. I believe the evidence in contrary to this view as Abernathy (1936) and Calloway (2018) show.

15 longer a major point of discussion. The preeminent points of debate centered on the questions of boundaries, land cessions, Loyalist compensation, fishing and commercial rights.44 Spain, France and Britain each had their own reasons for opposing expansion of the United States. Britain had already approved the Quebec Act (1774) as a means of placating its French Canadian population and protecting its western tradition interests. The British also had to save face among the Natives whose domain they purported to secure by the Proclamation of 1763 and the Treaty of Fort Stanwix (1768). Both acts clearly placed Sullivan’s theatre of operations in the same category with the Ohio country. Behind this protective line, while restricting colonial expansion, the crown had granted hundreds of thousands of acres to white speculators.45 The Indians, who thought they were sovereigns of their domain, did not realize that the British government claimed sovereignty over the same area. The American leadership did realize that and intended to secure a claim to as much of the area as possible. With peace in the air early in 1779, and decisive military action propitious, the expeditions of Sullivan; Daniel Brodhead out of Fort Pitt; and George Rogers Clark; would serve the purpose of establishing a sovereign claim.46 Spain and France presented a different problem. France, upon entering the alliance, disavowed any speculation that she wanted more than revenge and fishing rights.47 Spain, for its part, had initially supported American proposals for a western boundary at the Mississippi.48 Late in 1778 all of this changed. Both nations began an increasingly less subtle campaign to place the western boundary of the United States along the Alleghany Mountains. This was done, not in cooperation with Britain, but in a concerted effort to secure new French and Spanish empires on the Mississippi.49 France and Spain saw distinct possibilities for gain in the political quarrels at Philadelphia. The states with large land claims, based on their colonial charters, wrangled constantly with the landless states. By 1779 internal political revolution was wrenching the American body politic. The radicals who had nurtured the revolution were being replaced in the leadership by more moderate politicians. These men were more interested in financial matters; in putting the nation

44 Franklin, who was appointed to the Peace Commission in 1781, after the successful expeditions, was an intimate of Lord Shelburn, the British Prime Minister. Together with the Johnsons, George Croghan, the Whartons, and others, they tried to secure millions of acres in the Ohio country before the war. It can only be assumed, then, that the leadership of both sides understood their mutual interests in western land.

45 Higgins. Expansion in New York. pp. 93-95; Hinsdale (1887), Billington (1944), Abernathy (1959), Alvord (1908), Wolweiler (1922) passim.

46 Flick (1933). IV. p. 210; Swiggett. p. 184.

47 Murphy. “The Compte de Vergennes, the Newfoundland Fisheries, and the Peace Negotiations of 1783: A Reconsideration.” pp. 33-34.

48 Bemis. Diplomacy of the American Revolution. p. 99.

49 Ambler. P. 167; Bemis. “The Reynaval Memoranda of 1782 on Western Boundaries.” pp. 30-31; Bemis. Diplomacy of the American Revolution. pp. 95ff.

16 on a sound footing; than in territorial conquest.50 There ensued heated debate in Congress over the issue of western land claims fueled by the debates on the Articles of Confederation. Many Congressmen were more than willing to accede to Franco-Spanish boundary suggestions in return for governmental, and personal, financial assurances.51 Sensing a propitious division, the Spanish and French hardened their positions. In February, 1779, Gerard, the French envoy to Congress, received specific instructions. He was to convince that body to limit its territorial demands at the Paris talks. France, Congress was told, would support only those claims over which the United States had control.52 Spain agreed with that principal.53 Sensing a betrayal, members of Congress began to re-think their positions. Congressman James Lovell wrote to General Gates on March1, 1779: “There will be no puzzle about the south bounds, but neither shall Canada, Nova Scotia nor the [Fishery] be in the ulti [matum for the peace treaty.]”54 Canada, by the terms of the Quebec Act, included the Ohio country. Shortly after this letter was written, General Sullivan received his orders. George Rogers Clark had already entered the Illinois country. The western expeditions discussed in the past were finally under way. Congress did not complete its specific peace proposals until September, 1779. By then, both Sullivan and Clark had successfully laid the basis for an American territorial claim. There can be little doubt that military considerations had a significant effect on this timing.55 While the short term reasons for the Sullivan-Clinton expedition are more commonly accepted, the association of the western expeditions with the Paris negotiations is more than coincidental.56 It must be said here, also, that a desire for territorial expansion was not confined to the high and mighty. Orsamus Turner, who interviewed many former soldiers, or their children, wrote in 1850: “There had come along with Sullivan to the regions of western New York a great number of those who, looking forward to the end of the war, converted the expedition to the two-fold purpose of quelling the disturbances of the border

50 Stinchcombe. American Revolution and the French Alliance. p. 62.

51 Abernathy. Western Lands and the American Revolution. p. 366.

52 Stinchcombe. pp. 63-65.

53 Bemis. Diplomacy of the American Revolution. p. 172.

54 Stinchcombe. p. 65.

55 Stinchcombe. p. 64.

56 It is interesting to note that the United States secured its Mississippi boundary partly through a trade-off with the British unknown to France. Jay and Franklin proposed dropping American claims to lower Canada in exchange for British accession on the western boundary. The British agreed, preferring to block Franco-Spanish expansion; a more serious threat. This was made possible by a achange int eh British envoy’s commission issued by Franklin’s old friend, now Prime Minister, Lord Shelburn. See: Bemis. “The Rayneval Memoranda…” pp. 15, 40.

settlers, and viewing the country they inhabited, with an eye to future enterprises.”57 Benjamin Lodge, surveyor, mapmaker, and assistant to Washington’s Surveyor General, Robert Erskine, was assigned to the expedition. He charted the hitherto unmapped Iroquois country in voluminous detail.58 The extent of the information included in the journals kept on Sullivan’s soldiers, in particular, was unprecedented leading one historian to conclude that Sullivan’s troops had more than average interest in their work.59 The prominent geographic notations in the journals fully support Turner’s and Butterfield’s analysis.

Routes of the main force and detachments commanded by Generals Sullivan and Clinton as well as the separate expedition of Colonel Brodhead up the Allegheny River from Ft. Pitt. Image available at several source locations including: https://greensleeves.typepad.com/.shared/image.html?/photos/uncategorized/2007/08/22/sullivan_clinton_brodhead_ campaign.gif (Aug. 8, 2019)

57 Turner. Pioneer History of the Holland Purchase. p. 284.

58 Whitmore. pp. 266-267.

59 Butterfield. Passim.

Nation Building

There is one last purpose the Sullivan campaign may have served. To examine it, we must, once more, speculate in the absence of concrete evidence. By 1779, the ratification debate over the Articles of Confederation had entered its third year. Of all the points of disagreement, the greatest was the surrender of the western land claims of the states and boundary arbitration by the national government. Virginia, most intractable le of claimant states, also had the largest claims. In fact, the George Rogers Clark campaign was authorized and financed by Virginia partly to solidify those claims. Maryland, on the other hand, led the opposition supported by New Jersey, Rhode Island and Delaware.60 Neither side would compromise and the debate dragged on. By 1779, Congressional inaction on national unity not only jeopardized European loans, but was also having an impact on the battlefield as well.61 Pressured by the delegates representing states with little or no claim to western land, Congressional feeling began to bend in the direction of national sovereignty over western land as Cornwallis invaded the South and American finances deteriorated.62 The idea that land taken in common should be kept in common began to enjoy some acceptance.63 The Iroquois country, while not part of the main debate over state claims to western land, was associated with the controversy. The claim of New York to the area was always tenuous and Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania were even then claiming portions of the Six Nations’ country. It was in this atmosphere that Sullivan’s force was assembled. The troops marching into the Iroquois country in August, 1779 formed a truly national force. Sullivan, a veteran officer from New Hampshire, chose them personally with the advice and consent of Washington64 Maxwell’s First Brigade consisted of four New Jersey regiments. The Second Brigade under General Poor consisted of three New Hampshire regiments and one from Massachusetts. Hand’s Third Brigade consisted of two Pennsylvania regiments; a German Battalion (four companies of German settlers each from Maryland and Pennsylvania); Proctor’s Pennsylvania Artillery; a detachment of Morgan Rifleman (a multi-state elite unit); and three companies of Pennsylvania militia from the Susquehanna valley. The Fourth Brigade under General James Clinton (brother of the New York Governor) consisted of our New York regiments; a New York artillery unit; and a volunteer New York militia corps led by Colonel John Harper.65

60 Abernathy. p. 365; Jensen. p. 27.

61 Jensen. p. 43

62 Abernathy. p. 366.

63 Jensen. p. 43.

64 Whitmore. p. 121.

65 Graymont. Pp. 206-207; Berg. Encyclopedia of Continental Army Units. Passim.

Sullivan’s correspondence from April to June, 1779 clearly indicates that these units were picked more for their proximity to the Susquehanna than for their ability or national composition.66 Swiggett (1933) found it “particularly significant” that Sullivan’s force consisted primarily of regulars sworn into national service, however.67 There has never been an analysis of the background or selection of these troops. It is interesting to speculate, in light of Washington’s preference for national sovereignty over western lands, if Sullivan’s troops were selected to further that goal.68 The regiments chosen heavily represented states supporting national sovereignty over western land. In fairness, however, it should be noted that Virginia, chief among the opposition, was heavily committed elsewhere. The claims of New York were certainly strengthened by its participation, yet New York could claim little separate credit. That state’s primary goas, undoubtedly, was quelling the political unrest precipitated by the devastation of the Mohawk basin. The New York legislature was certainly showing little confidence in its claim when it appointed four commissioners to look out for the interest of New York at any peace negotiations. The appointment was made on October 23, 1779, just a month after Sullivan’s return to Wyoming.69 Much of the discussion surrounding the last few reasons for Sullivan’s campaign has been highly speculative. A great deal of research will have to be undertaken before we can say with certainty whether or not the campaign is directly linked to the western lands debate or a drive for national unity It is no easier to attribute the campaign to any single motivating factor we can support with historical evidence. In the last analysis, perhaps the best rationale for the expedition came from Dr. Arthur C. Parker, a Native American (Seneca Iroquois): “A new group will now arose, which desire to establish a new government and to exercise sovereignty over the land; Indian and Tory forces interposed and must be broken; the will of the Colonist expressed itself in Sullivan’s Campaign; …in the end the will of the Colonists prevailed.”70

66 Hammond. III. pp. 1088.

67 Swiggett. War Our of Niagara. p. 189.

68 Despite his long speculative association with the west, Washington clearly deplored the divisive effect the land claims had on Congress. See: Hammond. III. pp. 278, 280. Fitzpatrick. Passim.

69 Graymond. P. 443. In 1781, New York offered to surrender its claim to the Iroquois country in furtherance of the Confederation Few people then, or now, ever took that claim seriously on legal grounds.

70 Parker. “The Indian Interpretation of the Sullivan-Clinton Campaign.” p. 59. Parker, a former State Historian, was a member of the Seneca Nation.

Caneadea Council House. A typical 18th Century Iroquois structure that is now located at the “Council Grounds” in Letchworth State Park. From the descriptions of Iroquois homes Sullivan’s men noted in their journals, this was typical of those they destroyed. Image by the author.

Mohawk Iroquois war chief, Thayendanegea (Joseph Brant), as he looked in 1776 (three years prior to the Sullivan- Clinton expedition) when noted British painter, George Romney painted this portrait in his London studio. Image in the Public Domain and created prior to 1924. Available on the Internet from Wikimedia Commons at: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Joseph_Brant_painting_by_George_Romney_1776_(2).jpg (Oct. 5, 2019)

Genocide

In recent years, a few historians have focused on a motive for military and civil actions against Native people that might qualify as genocide. There is currently only one broad and widely published study of Indian-white conflict that frames actions like the Sullivan-Clinton Campaign as possible genocide. The author makes clear that genocide is a difficult term to apply in American history. In the introduction to his book, Surviving Genocide: Native Nations and the United States from the American Revolution to Bleeding Kansas, Jeffrey Ostler states his position clearly.71 “As they faced forces of destruction, Native leaders frequently alleged that Americans, or some portion of them, intended not only to take their lands, but to kill them all in order to do so. The title of this book, Surviving Genocide, recognizes this important and neglected perspective. For Native people, in real historical time, all too often this was the challenge before them: to avoid what they perceived as the very real possibility that their communities, their people, their nations would be totally annihilated. That Indians believed that Americans had genocidal intentions toward them does not by itself ‘prove’ that the United States or its citizens actually committed genocide, but it does require us to take the question of genocide in American history seriously. Debates about this question have been contentious and difficult to resolve. In addition to disputing how to define genocide and assess intent, scholars have differed over the relevant facts, such as how many Indians US Military forces actually killed or whether or not Americans gave smallpox-infested blankets to Indians…Not only did the United States establish genocidal warfare as a policy option…American military forces attempted to commit acts of genocide and sometimes succeeded, government officials routinely relied on the threat of genocidal violence to secure agreement to treaties, and the policy of Indian removal had genocidal consequences. As the United States invaded Indian country, Native leaders had good reason to believe that Americans intended to destroy them all.”72 Ostler devotes an entire chapter to “Wars of Revolution and Independence, 1763-1783.” In this chapter, Ostler discusses several incidents of the period that might fall under the rubric of genocide. They include the well-known actions of Pennsylvania’s Paxton Boys (1763) who murdered several groups of peaceful Natives living in towns near the Susquehanna River in central Pennsylvania. Another incident Ostler mentions was the recruitment of Iroquois war parties by Sir William Johnson (Royal Superintendent of Indian Affairs) to attack Cherokee towns in the North Carolina (1766). He also mentions the actions of George Rogers Clark and

71 Ostler is a professor of history at the University of Oregon.

72 Ostler. Surviving Genocide. pp. 7-6.

23 the Gnadenhutten Massacre (1782), carried out by American militia along the Sandusky River. Some of these were official actions taken by local or national military officers. Some, like the murder of two Indians outside Carlisle, PA, were simply mob actions taken in defiance of military and civil officials.73 The litany of the back and forth atrocities prompted by such actions is also discussed in detail by Calloway (2018) in his book about The Indian World of George Washington. In that same chapter, Ostler devotes six pages to “The United States Invasion of Iroquoia, 1778- 1779.” Ostler mentions that the Iroquois were in a strong position at the start of the war, and that they had maintained peaceable relations with their neighbors, on both sides in the brewing revolutionary conflict, and had considerable diplomatic influence. He also points out, however that they land was strategically located between the colonies and Canada, making them a focus for both sides. Moreover, the Oneidas and Tuscaroras were ever more inclined to support the American cause. They were initially encouraged to go to war on the British side by Tory Leader, Col. John Butler and Mohawk chief, Joseph Brant. Ostler reviews the events that led to war including patriot strikes at the Oquaga village along the Susquehanna that were retaliation for the raids on Wyoming, PA and Cherry Valley, NY. That last raid, in particular, was an Indian- Loyalist strike was in retaliation for the American strike on Oquaga. Along the way, Oneida villages were destroyed by other Iroquois war parties and Loyalists in retaliation for that nation’s support of the patriots during the 1777 Mohawk Valley incursion by British Col. Barry St. Ledger and their role in the Battle of Oriskany. Ostler begins his case for the Sullivan-Clinton Campaign possibly being considered a case of genocide on the orders Sullivan received from Congress and General Washington. “The total destruction and devastation of their settlements and the capture of as many prisoners of every age and sex as possible. It will be essential to ruin their crops now in the ground and prevent their planting more…Our future security will be in their inability to injure us [,] the distance to which they are driven [,] and in the terror with which the severity of the chastisement they receive will in spire them”74 Ostler goes on to recount the progress of the campaign; how some soldiers killed a woman; skinned the legs of men to make leggings; destroyed ten (or more) towns and ruined tons of crops; and killed some people of both sexes. All of those incidents are mentioned in the various soldier journals published in Cook (1887) and others. He mentions “a sharpshooter named Murphy” who supposedly killed “at least thirty-three” people. He also quotes Sayengeraghta (Old Smoke) as saying, “We lost our Country it is true, but this was to secure our Women & Children,” a statement that has the sound of a battle against genocide as we now understand it.75

73 Ostler. pp. 44-69.

74 Ostler. p. 72

75 Ostler does not give any indication that he knew the local reputation of Timothy Murphy, a noted “Indian fighter,” and self-promoter who became a legend in the Schoharie Valley. See p. 73.

Toward the end of his discussion of the Sullivan-Clinton Campaign, Ostler mentions the well- known 1790 statement made by Cornplanter that Washington was known among the Six Nations a “the town destroyer.” He does not mention, as Calloway (2018) does, that the title, “town destroyer,” was originally applied to General Washington’s great-grandfather.76 There are several useful appendices to Ostler’s book. The first of them, “The Question of Genocide in US History,” makes clear that the concept of genocide, first enunciated in 1944, does not clearly fit most of the events of American history, including the Revolution and Sullivan’s campaign.77 Ostler explains his thinking in detail. However, genocide as a rationale for the Sullivan-Clinton Campaign is now an inescapable concept that historians and the public must consider.

76 Calloway. Indian World. pp. 248-259

77 “Coining a Word and Championing a Cause: The Story of Raphael Lemkin.” Holocaust Encyclopedia. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Available on the Internet at: https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/coining-a-word-and-championing-a-cause-the-story-of-raphael- lemkin (Oct. 4, 2019)

Sullivan crossing marker on Old Mill Rd. Town of Seneca. Just south of the hamlet of Flint. The bronze tablet understates the size of Sullivan’s force by about half and certainly abbreviates its purpose.

References

Note: Sources with an * are especially recommended for general reading by local historians.

* Abbott, Tim. Blog. “Walking the Berkshires.” Aug. 2007-Feb. 2010. Available at: https://greensleeves.typepad.com/.shared/image.html?/photos/uncategorized/2007/08/22/sullivan _clinton_brodhead_campaign.gif (Aug. 8, 2019). [A good website offering a variety of images and perspectives on the causes, progress, and long-range impact of the Sullivan expedition. The author is not an academic historian, but the scholarship appears very sound.] Abernathy, Thomas P. Western Lands and the American Revolution. New York. D. Appleton-Century. 1937. [Reprint: New York. Russell & Russell. 1959. This is a classic and pioneering work on the broad subject. Difficult to find in local libraries, but available through Interlibrary Loan and from antiquarian book sellers. Abernathy’s discussion was a pioneering effort. However, Colin Calloway’s 2018 book, The Indian World of George Washington covers most of Abernathy’s material and is much more accessible.]

* Alden, Amie (ed/comp). The Sullivan Campaign of the Revolutionary War: The Impact on Livingston County, New York 1779-2004. Henrietta, NY. Pioneer Print & Copy Center. 2006. [This local volume focuses on the campaign in Livingston County where the Sullivan expedition ended its westward march. It considers the impact of the expedition on the county in both the near and long terms. Available in a few public libraries, it is available by Interlibrary Loan. There were fifteen copies available in public libraries of the Pioneer Library System at the time this was written. Contact the Livingston County Historian for more information on availability.] Alvord, Clarence W. “The British Ministry and the Treaty of Fort Stanwix.” Proceedings of the Wisconsin Historical Society. 1908. pp. 156-183. Ambler, Charles H. George Washington and the West. New York. Russell and Russell. 1936.

* Amory, Thomas C. The Military Services and Public Life of Major-General John Sullivan, of the American Revolutionary Army. Boston. Wiggin and Lunt; Albany. Joel Munsell. 1868. [Reprint Kennikat Press. Port Washington, N.Y. 1968.] Bemis, Samuel F. The Diplomacy of the American Revolution. New York. D. Appleton- Century Co. 1935. Berg, Fred Anderson. Encyclopedia of Continental Army Units. Harrisburg, PA. Stackpole Books. 1972. Billington, Ray A. “The Fort Stanwix Treaty of 1768.” New York History. V. XXV. Apr. 1944. pp. 182-194.

Boardman, Fon W, Jr. Against the Iroquois: The Sullivan Campaign of 1779 in New York State. New York. Henry Z. Walck, Inc. 1978. Butterfield, Lyman H. “History at Its Headwaters.” New York History. V. LI. March 1970. pp. 127-146. Calloway, Colin G. The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities. New York. Cambridge Univ. Press. 1995.

* Calloway, Colin G. “The Continuing Revolution in Indian Country.” In Frederick E. Hoxie, Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert (eds). Native Americans and the Early Republic. Charlottesville, VA Univ. Press of Virginia. 1999. pp. 3-33. Calloway, Colin G. Crown and Calumet: British-Indian Relations, 1783-1815. Norman, OK. Univ. of Oklahoma Press. 1987.

* Calloway, Colin G. The Indian World of George Washington: The First President, the First Americans, and the Birth of the Nation. New York. Oxford Univ. Press. 2018. [Excellent coverage of Washington’s life-long interaction with Native nations, including the Revolutionary years.] Campbell, William J. Speculators in Empire: Iroquoia and the 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix. Norman, OK. Univ. of Oklahoma Press. 2012. [An academic study of the impact of the 1768 treaty that purported to bar western emigration by colonists and speculators. It was particularly favorable to the Iroquois, largely because it was negotiated by Sir William Johnson.] Campbell, William W. Annals of Tryon County; or, the Border Warfare of New York During the Revolution. New York. Dodd, Mead & Co. 1924. Chapman, Isaac A. The History of Wyoming. Wilkes-Barre, PA. Sharp D. Lewis. 1830. [Available on the Internet from Google Books at: https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Bloody_Mohawk.html?id=UPwLAAAAYAAJ (Aug. 11, 2019).

Clarke, Thomas W. The Bloody Mohawk. New York. MacMillan Co. 1940. [Reprinted by Ira J. Friedman. 1968.] “The Clinton-Sullivan Campaign of 1779.” National Park Service. Fort Stanwix National Monument. Available on the Internet at: https://www.nps.gov/fost/learn/historyculture/the- western-expedition-against-the-six-nations-1779.htm (Accessed Jul. 6, 2019). [Compiled by the staff of the National Monument. Brief coverage and somewhat celebratory and triumphal. Its view on the long-term effect on the Iroquois does not agree with most scholarship today.] Cruikshank, Ernest. The Story of Butler's Rangers and the Settlement of Niagara. Welland, Ont. Tribune Printing House. 1893. [British/Canadian scholar’s perspective. Difficult to find in original. Recently republished (2016) by CreateSpace and available as an inexpensive paperback on Amazon.com.]

* Fischer, Joseph R. A Well-Executed Failure: The Sullivan Campaign Against the Iroquois, July-September, 1779. Univ. of South Carolina Press. 1997. [A reassessment of the campaign making the case that it was well done according to Sullivan’s instructions and played a critically important role in winning the Revolution. The author is a military historian and a career Army officer who taught at West Point and the Command and General Staff College. Fischer evaluates Sullivan’s campaign from the point of view of improved strategy and operations; tactics; logistics; leadership; and civil-military relations. He concludes that Sullivan’s force represented a vastly improved Continental Army. The book is based on Fischer’s dissertation at Penn State University.] Fitzpatrick, James C. The Writings of George Washington. Washington, DC. Government Printing Office. 1931. Flick, Alexander C. “The Sullivan-Clinton Campaign of 1779.” History of the State of New York. V. IV. New York. Columbia Univ. Press. 1933. pp. 187-216.

* Graymont, Barbara. The Iroquois in the American Revolution. Syracuse, NY. Syracuse University Press. 1972. [Readable comprehensive coverage of the subject with good explanations of how the Six Nations came to be involved in the Revolution and the impact (and non-impact) of Sullivan’s campaign.]

* Hammond, Otis G. Letters and Papers of Major General John Sullivan. V. 3. Concord, NH. New Hampshire Historical Soc. 1939. [Good source of primary source material about Sullivan and the 1779 campaign.] Hardenbergh, John L., William McKendry, and William Elliott Griffis. Narratives of Sullivan’s Expedition, 1779: Against the Four Nations of the Iroquois & Loyalists by the Continental Army. Drifield, UK. Leonaur/Oakpast. 2010. [This book consists of journal entries by the listed authors, together with historical information about the Sullivan campaign. It is a brief version of the kinds of journals found in Cook (above), etc. The book is produced by a UK publisher and has the ISBN number: 978-0-85706-395-3.] Higgins, Ruth L. Expansion in New York with Especial Reference to the Eighteenth Century. Philadelphia. Porcupine Press. 1976. Hinsdale, B. A. “The Western Land Policy of the British Government from 1763-1775.” Ohio Archeological and Historical Quarterly. December 1887. pp. 207-229. Hunt, George T. The Wars of the Iroquois. Madison, WI. Univ. of Wisconsin Press. 1940. Hunt, Gaillard, et al. (ed). Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1789. Washington, DC Government Printing Office. 1922. Ibbotson, Joseph D. “Samuel Kirkland, The Treaty of 1792, and the Indian Barrier State.” New York History. XIX. October 1938. pp. 374-391.

Jacobs, Wilbur R. Diplomacy and Indian Gifts: Anglo-French Rivalry Along the Ohio and Northwest Frontier 1748-1763. Stanford, CA Stanford Univ. Press. 1950. [While this source is concerned with the colonial wars, it is useful in understanding later events.] James, James A. George Rogers Clark Papers 1771-1781. Springfield, IL. Illinois State Historical Library. 1912. Jennings, Francis. “The Constitutional Evolution of the Covenant Chain.” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society. V. 115. April 1971. pp. 88-96. Jensen, Merrill. “The Cession of the Old North West.” Mississippi Valley Historical Review. V. 23. 1936. pp. 27-48. Lossing, Benson J. Pictorial Field Book of the Revolution. v. I. New York. Harper & Bros. 1860. [A classic account of the Revolution. Lossing produced an equally profuse book of text, intereviews, and sketches. Sullivan is discussed in several sections. Considered generally factual and defended the Army’s leadership while decrying the destruction of the Iroquois country. Available on the Internet from several sources including Internet Archive/Open Library at:https://ia802300.us.archive.org/15/items/fieldbookeleven01lossrich/fieldbookeleven01lossrich .pdf (Aug. 11, 2919) McAdams, Donald R. “The Sullivan Expedition: Success or Failure.” Narratives of the Revolution in New York. New York. New York Historical Society. 1975. pp. 304-330. Mau, Clayton. The Development of Central and Western New York. Rev. Ed. Dansville, NY. F. A. Owens. 1958. [While not really a scholarly discussion, this book is a collection of brief primary sources. The author was a long-time professor at SUNY Geneseo.] Murphy, Orville. “The Compte de Vergennes, the Newfoundland Fisheries, and the Peace Negotiations of 1783: A Reconsideration.” Canadian Historical Review. XLVI. March 1915. pp. 32-46. Namock, Georgiana C. Fraud, Politics and the Dispossession of the Indians: The Iroquois Land Frontier in the Colonial Period. Norman, OK. Univ. of Oklahoma Press. 1969. Norton, A. Tiffany. History of Sullivan’s Campaign Against the Iroquois., Being a Full Account of that Epoch of the Revolution. Lima, NY. The Author (Recorder Office). 1879. [A local publication that is a campaign narrative grounded in American journals, but ignoring British/Iroquois sources. Available on the Internet from Internet Archive at: https://archive.org/details/historyofsulliva00nortiala/page/n7 (Aug. 11, 2019) Ostler, Jeffrey. Surviving Genocide. Native Nations and the United States from the American Revolution to Bleeding Kansas. New Haven, CT. Yale Univ. Press (Jeffrey Ostler). 2019. [While this book has wide coverage, it has good chapters on the period of the colonial wars and the war of the Revolution (Ch. 2). That chapter discussed the Sullivan campaign, in particular. It will strike most readers initially as strident and its title may be off-putting. However, the chapter on “Conclusions,” and “Appendix I” provide good perspective on the issue of genocide

30 and the arguments over its application to the treatment of Native Americans. It is well documented and thought provoking and should not be dismissed because of a controversial title.] * Parker, Arthur C. “The Indian Interpretation of the Sullivan-Clinton Campaign.” Rochester Historical Society. Publication Fund Series. VIII. 1929. pp. 45-59. [This source is widely available in local public libraries. Parker was a former State Museum official and a respected Seneca Iroquois man. It is brief and philosophical.] Siebert, Wilbur H. “The Loyalists and Six Nations Indians in the Niagara Peninsula.” Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada. Third Series. IX. 1915. pp. 80-91. Sossin, Jack M. “The Use of Indians in the War of the American Revolution: A Re- Assessment of Responsibility.” Canadian Historical Review. XLVI. June 1915. Pp. 101-121. Stephens, Karl F. Neither the Charm Nor the Luck: Major-General John Sullivan. Denver, CO. Outskirts Press. 2009. [Available from Amazon.com and other on-line book sellers, this book appears to have been self-published. It discussed the whole of Sullivan’s life, as do other biographies. It is light reading with a light bibliography containing no primary sources. The author is a history buff physician.] Stinchcombe, William C. The American Revolution and the French Alliance. Syracuse, NY. Syracuse Univ. Press. 1969. Stone, William Leete. Life of Joseph Brant-Thayendanegea: Including the Border Wars of the American Revolution, and Sketches of the Indian Campaigns of Generals Harmar, St. Clair, and Wayne. 2 vols. New York. Alexander V. Blake. 1838. [The original is available on Archive.org on the Internet at: https://archive.org/details/lifeofjosephbran00stonw/page/n10 (Aug. 8, 2019). There are several modern reprints of this publication.] Swiggett, Howard. War Out of Niagara: Walter Butler and the Tory Rangers. New York. Columbia University Press. 1933. [Reprint by Ira J. Friedman, Inc. Port Washington, N.Y. 1963. Considered a classic and an American apology for Butler’s Rangers.] Turner, O[rsamus]. Pioneer History of the Holland Purchase of Western New York. Buffalo, NY. Jewett, Thomas & Co. 1849. [Reprint Geneseo, NY. James Brunner. 1974. Currently new reprints are available on-line. Also available from Archive.org on the Internet at: https://archive.org/details/pioneerhistoryof00turn/page/n8 (Aug. 8, 2019).] Trussell, John B. B. Jr. “The Forgotten Victory: The Sullivan Expedition of 1779.” US Army War College Quarterly.Parameters. V. 5. 1976. Pp. 40-53. [The author was a well-educated career Army officer whose final assignment was as the head of the Dept. of Research and Studies, US Army War College. He later served on the staff of the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission. His focus is on the professional military operational and tactical aspects of the campaign. Documented with respected secondary sources and many primary source journals. Available on the Internet at: https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/articles/1976/1976%20trussell.pdf (Aug. 11, 2019)

Volweiler, A. T. “George Croghan and the Development of Central New York, 1763-1800.” Quarterly Journal of the New York State Historical Assn. IV. October 1922. pp. 21-40. [Croghan was a deputy to Sir William Johnson and married to a Native woman. A professed, but suspect, patriot later, seems to have played both sides. Croghan played a major role in the Ohio country later. However, as a result of his influence on the New York frontier, he is the subject of a state historical marker in front of the Baseball Hall of Fame in Cooperstown, NY.]

* Wallace, Anthony F. C. The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca. New York. Vintage Books. 1972.

* Whittemore, Charles. A General of the Revolution: John Sullivan of New Hampshire. New York. Columbia University Press. 1961. [One of the two modern biographies of Sullivan whose life has not been given much perspective.]

* Williams, Glenn F. Year of the Hangman: George Washington’s Campaign Against the Iroquois. Yardley, PA. Westholme Pub. 2005. [An award-winning book, the title derives from the name given to the year 1777, a pivotal time in the Revolution when the Iroquois became fully involved in the conflict—on both sides. Incorporates a great deal of information about the events on the frontier that led up to the Sullivan expedition. Winner of the Thomas Fleming Award for the Best Book in American Revolutionary War History.]

* Wingell, Bill. “The Battle Over Newtown Battlefield.” Life in the Finger Lakes. Available on the Internet at: https://www.lifeinthefingerlakes.com/battle-newtown-battlefield/ (Aug. 8, 2019). [The author, a photojournalist, references Glenn Williams (above) is discussing the significance of the battle. He quotes Paul W. Hawke of the National Park Service as saying that Newtown is considered one of the six most important battle sites of the Revolution.]

* Taylor, Alan. American Revolutions: A Continental History, 1750-1804. New York. W. W. Norton & Co. 2016. [Particularly chapters on “Land,” and “Wests,” Including, especially pp. 255-263. Award-winning highly respected academic author of the present generation.]

Compiled Sources on the Expedition

Cook, Frederick (ed). Journals of the Military Expedition of Major General John Sullivan Against the Six Nations of Indians in 1779. Auburn, NY. New York State Commission. 1887. [Widely available in public libraries and historical societies throughout the Finger Lakes area, this book was originally published pursuant to special state legislation. It is now available on the Internet from Internet Archive at: https://archive.org/details/cu31924095654384 (Aug. 12, 2019).] Flick, Alexander C. “New Sources on the Sullivan-Clinton Campaign in 1779.” New York History. XI. Jully, 1929. Pp. 185-224. October 1929. Pp. 265-317. [Outdated list. However, worth reviewing to find sources missed.] Folts, James D. Jr. The Sullivan Campaign: A Bibliography. University of Rochester Library Bulletin. Volume XXXII · Winter 1979. Available on the Internet at: https://rbscp.lib.rochester.edu/3568 (Accessed Jul. 6, 2019) [Dated but still quite comprehensive. Dr. Folts is still a highly respected senior archivist with the New York State Archives.] The Online Books Page. Sullivan’s Indian Campaign, 1779. Available on the Internet at: http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/book/browse?type=lcsubc&key=Sullivan%27s%20 Indian%20Campaign%2C%201779&c=x (Aug. 11, 2019). [List of publications related to the Sullivan campaign, including many that were locally produced and not readily available. In most cases the links provided allow the user to download a publication or read it online.]

This plaque from the rock was lost for several years after the original boulder was removed. It was found in 1979 and mounted on a nearby stone gateway. Image by the author.

Sullivan campaign marker at intersection of Thad Chapin and Bristol Sts, City of Canandaigua. Image circa 1910. The boulder was broken up by the state Department of Transportation and buried in 1968.

Related Sources that May Be of Interest

Forum. “The ‘Iroquois Influence’ Thesis—Con and Pro.” William and Mary Quarterly. 3rd Series. V. LIII. Jul. 1996. pp. 587-636. Available on the Internet as a pdf download at: http://faculty.humanities.uci.edu/tcthorne/colonialhistory/Iroquoisinfluencedebate.pdf (Accessed Feb. 6, 2019). [Published in a highly respected academic journal with a focus on early American history, this is a collection of essays putting forth the scholarly arguments for and against the thesis of Native American/Iroquois influence on the content of the US Constitution. Ch. 14 of Calloway (Indian World) summarizes these arguments well and places them in context. On p. 550 n. 3, Calloway provides this citation to the William and Mary Quarterly as well as several other useful articles. The collection of articles included in “Forum” can be downloaded.]

Ousterhout, Anne M. “Frontier Vengeance: Connecticut Yankees vs. Pennamites in the Wyoming Valley.” Pennsylvania History. V. 62. Summer 1995. pp. 330-363. [The author provides an analysis of the reasons for Tory/Loyalist opposition in the Wyoming Valley (Susquehanna River) of Pennsylvania before and during the years of the Sullivan campaign. She shows through the analysis of primary and early secondary sources that many of the Tories who participated in raids carried out by Butler’s Rangers and Native war parties were really “disaffected” people who took the actions they did because of the on-going conflict between Connecticut and Pennsylvania settlers that often became violent. This article focuses on the reasons that some of the “disaffected” chose to participate in Indian-Loyalist raids that prompted the Sullivan campaign, in part.]

* Pashman, Howard. Building a Revolutionary State: The Legal Transformation of New York, 1776-1783. Chicago. Univ. of Chicago Press. 2018. [This is an important book for anyone wanting to understand the course of the Revolution in New York. It details the origin and impact of the forfeiture law passed by the New York State Legislature on Oct. 22, 1779. It also examines the related bills of attainder passed against Loyalists in New York. While the book does not deal with the Sullivan expedition, it should not be forgotten the many of the Loyalist raiders fighting with Iroquois warriors were attainted men. It should also be remembered that many thousands of ostensibly Indian acres had already been legally transferred to Loyalist interests—many without the knowledge of the Iroquois.

Final burial place of soldiers and Oneida warriors who died in the Groveland ambush (Sep. 13, 1779) near Geneseo. They were originally buried near the ambush site at Groveland Hill, but were reburied in Mt. Hope Cemetery, Rochester, in 1841. Images by the author.

“First Day” cancellation of the Sullivan Expedition commemorative postage stamp. The stamp was first put on sale, June 17, 1929, at post offices throughout the Genesee-Finger Lakes region. They included Auburn, Binghamton, Canandaigua, Elmira, Geneseo, Geneva, Horseheads, Owego, Penn Yan, Perry, Seneca Falls, Waterloo, and Waverly. A “First Day” cancellation also exists for Syracuse, although that city was not on the official list. All “First Day” post offices were in New York.

The request for this stamp issue met with a great deal of resistance from Postmaster General, Harry S New, who objected to new commemorative issues because of their cost. The stamp was finally authorized after political pressure was placed on his replacement, Walter F. Brown, who also felt that new issues were a costly nuisance and might overwhelm the capacity of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing. After the Sullivan stamp was finally approved, the Postmaster General published a “warning” in newspapers around the country that he had received requests for seventy-two stamps recently and that the policy of the Post Office Department was to restrict stamp issues to important national and historical events. The policy, he said, was based on administrative limitations and low appropriations.

The Pennsylvania Historical Commission sent a resolution on the Sullivan Sesquicentennial to that state’s legislature in the spring of 1929. Among other things, it requested that the Post Office issue a stamp to commemorate the Sullivan Campaign and print 100 million stamps. Despite heavy lobbying by state and local agencies in Pennsylvania, all of the cities eventually chosen for “first day” sales were in New York.

Bronze tablet affixed (1929) to the Sullivan-Clinton Campaign stone monument at the intersection of County Roads 4 and 6 (Pre-Emption Rd.), Geneva.