NXP Solutions for Smart Mobility
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TTF Smartcard Ticketing on Public Transport 2010
Tourism & Transport Forum (TTF) Position Paper Smartcard ticketing on public transport July 2010 Tourism & Transport Forum (TTF) is a national, Member‐funded CEO forum, advocating the public policy interests of the 200 most prestigious corporations and institutions in the Australian tourism, transport, aviation & investment sectors. CONTENTS OVERVIEW 2 SMARTCARD TECHNOLOGY 3 ADVANTAGES OF SMARTCARD TICKETING 3 CHALLENGES FOR IMPLEMENTATION 6 SMARTCARD TICKETING IN AUSTRALIA 8 SMARTCARD TICKETING INTERNATIONALLY 10 INNOVATION IN SMARTCARD TECHNOLOGY 12 LOOKING AHEAD 14 CONCLUDING REMARKS 14 FOR FURTHER INFORMATION PLEASE CONTACT: CAROLINE WILKIE NATIONAL MANAGER, AVIATION & TRANSPORT TOURISM & TRANSPORT FORUM (TTF) P | 02 9240 2000 E | [email protected] www.ttf.org.au In short: 1. Smartcard ticketing provides convenience for commuters and efficiency gains for transport service providers. 2. Smartcard systems have been introduced in Australian cities with varying degrees of success. 3. International experience suggests that successful implementation may take many years, and difficulties are commonplace. 4. Overall, the benefits of smartcard ticketing overwhelmingly outweigh the costs and challenges that may arise in implementation. Overview Smartcard technology is being implemented around the world as a substitute for cash transactions in various capacities. When applied to public transport fare collection, smartcards eliminate the need for commuters to queue for tickets and reduce the burden on transport providers to process fare transactions. In recent years, benefits such as decreased travel times and general convenience to commuters have driven a shift towards smartcard ticketing systems on public transport systems in Australia and around the world. As well as providing more efficient transport services to commuters, smartcard ticketing systems enable service providers and transit authorities to collect comprehensive data on the travel behaviour of commuters. -
Smart Card Readers 2021/S 093-245130 Contract Notice
OJ/S S93 14/05/2021 1 / 4 245130-2021-EN This notice in TED website: https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:245130-2021:TEXT:EN:HTML Finland-HSL: Smart card readers 2021/S 093-245130 Contract notice – utilities Supplies Legal Basis: Directive 2014/25/EU Section I: Contracting entity I.1) Name and addresses Official name: Helsingin Seudun Liikenne — kuntayhtymä National registration number: 2274586-3 Postal address: Opastinsilta 6A, PL 100 Town: HSL NUTS code: FI1B Helsinki-Uusimaa Postal code: 00077 Country: Finland E-mail: [email protected] Internet address(es): Main address: http://www.hsl.fi I.3) Communication The procurement documents are available for unrestricted and full direct access, free of charge, at: https:// tarjouspalvelu.fi/hsl?id=335313&tpk=3f2f9827-c11f-4bcc-b4f1-d3b63cdeef62 Additional information can be obtained from the abovementioned address Tenders or requests to participate must be submitted electronically via: https://tarjouspalvelu.fi/hsl? id=335313&tpk=3f2f9827-c11f-4bcc-b4f1-d3b63cdeef62 I.6) Main activity Urban railway, tramway, trolleybus or bus services Section II: Object II.1) Scope of the procurement II.1.1) Title: Contactless validator Reference number: 71/02.08.00/2021 II.1.2) Main CPV code 30233300 Smart card readers II.1.3) Type of contract Supplies II.1.4) Short description: Helsinki regional transport authority (HSL) is looking to procure contactless validators, which are capable of reading and updating ISO 14443 A/B contactless travel cards (such as currently used Mifare DESFire travel cards and Mifare Ultralight single charged cards), reading 1D/2D bar codes and QR codes from mobile applications and paper tickets, and reading contactless EMV cards and support pinless contactless payments 14/05/2021 S93 1 / 4 https://ted.europa.eu/TED OJ/S S93 14/05/2021 2 / 4 245130-2021-EN in transit (Visa and Mastercard MTT rules). -
Mobility Payment Integration: State-Of-The-Practice Scan
Mobility Payment Integration: State-of-the-Practice Scan OCTOBER 2019 FTA Report No. 0143 Federal Transit Administration PREPARED BY Ingrid Bartinique and Joshua Hassol Volpe National Transportation Systems Center COVER PHOTO Courtesy of Edwin Adilson Rodriguez, Federal Transit Administration DISCLAIMER This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of Transportation in the interest of information exchange. The United States Government assumes no liability for its contents or use thereof. The United States Government does not endorse products or manufacturers. Trade or manufacturers’ names appear herein solely because they are considered essential to the objective of this report. Mobility Payment Integration: State-of-the- Practice Scan OCTOBER 2019 FTA Report No. 0143 PREPARED BY Ingrid Bartinique and Joshua Hassol Volpe National Transportation Systems Center 55 Broadway, Kendall Square Cambridge, MA 02142 SPONSORED BY Federal Transit Administration Office of Research, Demonstration and Innovation U.S. Department of Transportation 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE Washington, DC 20590 AVAILABLE ONLINE https://www.transit.dot.gov/about/research-innovation FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION i FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION i Metric Conversion Table SYMBOL WHEN YOU KNOW MULTIPLY BY TO FIND SYMBOL LENGTH in inches 25.4 millimeters mm ft feet 0.305 meters m yd yards 0.914 meters m mi miles 1.61 kilometers km VOLUME fl oz fluid ounces 29.57 milliliters mL gal gallons 3.785 liter L ft3 cubic feet 0.028 cubic meters m3 yd3 cubic yards 0.765 cubic meters m3 NOTE: volumes greater than 1000 L shall be shown in m3 MASS oz ounces 28.35 grams g lb pounds 0.454 kilograms kg megagrams T short tons (2000 lb) 0.907 Mg (or “t”) (or “metric ton”) TEMPERATURE (exact degrees) o 5 (F-32)/9 o F Fahrenheit Celsius C or (F-32)/1.8 FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION i FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION ii REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. -
Cel RFID Digital Lock Application V1.1-021
Carbine CEL 3in1 Touchscreen Locks CEL-RFID RFIC Application List The CEL locks can accept 25 user codes via the codepad In addition to this, the locks can accept another 25 users via RFID card or Smartphone RFID Chip Compatibility CEL-RFID + ISO Card + Chip:13.56MHz NXP Mifare S50 + Dimensions:86*54*0.8mm CEL-RFID-ST-C + Metal Label + Chip:13.56MHz NXP Mifare S50 + Dimensions: Ø 25mm CEL-RFID-WB + Silicone wristband + Chip:13.56MHz NXP Mifare S50 Dimensions D195 x W16 x T7.5mm Material Silicone Operating Temperature -25~85°C Storage Temperature -25~140°C THE Protection Class NEXT IP68 GENERATION IN LOCKING AUSTRALIA HEAD OFFICE 14 John Hines Avenue Minchinbury NSW 2770 1300 722 311 [email protected] CARBINE IS A DIVISION OF DAVCOR GROUP PTY LTD • ABN. 95 003 562 598 SYDNEY • MELBOURNE • BRISBANE • PERTH • ADELAIDE WWW.CARBINE.COM.AU CEL-RFID Carbine CEL 3in1 Touchscreen Locks RFIC Application List Page 2 Credit Cards & Transport Cards Any RFID cards that are using MIFARE (13.56mHz) chips will be compatible with the lock. The MIFARE chips (ISO14443 Type A) are widely used on transport cards, but not credit cards as most credit cards including VISA PayWave & Mastercard Paypass use EMV chips (ISO14443 Type B) which are not compatible with the lock. However, if the credit card can also be used as a transport card (complying to ISO14443 Type A), it is very likely it can be used to operate the lock. The table below lists the transport cards that are equipped with MIFARE chips in Australia. -
Tcrp Report 94
TRANSIT COOPERATIVE RESEARCH TCRP PROGRAM REPORT 94 Sponsored by the Federal Transit Administration Fare Policies, Structures and Technologies: Update TCRP OVERSIGHT AND PROJECT TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 2003 (Membership as of March 2003) SELECTION COMMITTEE (as of October 2002) OFFICERS CHAIR Chair: Genevieve Giuliano, Director and Prof., School of Policy, Planning, and Development, USC, Los Angeles J. BARRY BARKER Vice Chair: Michael S. Townes, Exec. Dir., Transportation District Commission of Hampton Roads, Hampton, VA Transit Authority of River City Executive Director: Robert E. Skinner, Jr., Transportation Research Board MEMBERS DANNY ALVAREZ MEMBERS Miami-Dade Transit Agency KAREN ANTION MICHAEL W. BEHRENS, Executive Director, Texas DOT Karen Antion Consulting JOSEPH H. BOARDMAN, Commissioner, New York State DOT GORDON AOYAGI SARAH C. CAMPBELL, President, TransManagement, Inc., Washington, DC Montgomery County Government E. DEAN CARLSON, Secretary of Transportation, Kansas DOT JEAN PAUL BAILLY JOANNE F. CASEY, President, Intermodal Association of North America Union Internationale des Transports Publics JAMES C. CODELL III, Secretary, Kentucky Transportation Cabinet RONALD L. BARNES JOHN L. CRAIG, Director, Nebraska Department of Roads Central Ohio Transit Authority BERNARD S. GROSECLOSE, JR., President and CEO, South Carolina State Ports Authority LINDA J. BOHLINGER SUSAN HANSON, Landry University Prof. of Geography, Graduate School of Geography, Clark University HNTB Corp. LESTER A. HOEL, L. A. Lacy Distinguished Professor, Depart. of Civil Engineering, University of Virginia ANDREW BONDS, JR. HENRY L. HUNGERBEELER, Director, Missouri DOT Parsons Transportation Group, Inc. JENNIFER L. DORN ADIB K. KANAFANI, Cahill Prof. and Chair, Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of FTA California at Berkeley NATHANIEL P. -
Perth's Urban Rail Renaissance
University of Wollongong Research Online Faculty of Engineering and Information Faculty of Engineering and Information Sciences - Papers: Part B Sciences 2016 Perth's urban rail renaissance Philip G. Laird University of Wollongong, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers1 Part of the Engineering Commons, and the Science and Technology Studies Commons Recommended Citation Laird, Philip G., "Perth's urban rail renaissance" (2016). Faculty of Engineering and Information Sciences - Papers: Part B. 277. https://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers1/277 Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library: [email protected] Perth's urban rail renaissance Abstract Over the past thirty five years, instead of being discontinued from use, Perth's urban rail network has been tripled in route length and electrified at 25,000 oltsv AC. The extensions include the Northern Suburbs Railway (with stage 1 opened in 1993 and this line reaching Butler in 2014), and, the 72 kilometre Perth Mandurah line opening in 2007. Integrated with a well run bus system, along with fast and frequent train services, there has been a near ten fold growth in rail patronage since 1981 when some 6.5 million passengers used the trains to 64.2 million in 2014-15. Bus patronage has also increased. These increases are even more remarkable given Perth's relatively low population density and high car dependence. The overall improvements in Perth's urban rail network, with many unusual initiatives, have attracted international attention. -
NFC/RFID Token Security. Case Study: Estonian Public Transportation Cards
NFC/RFID token security. Case study: Estonian public transportation cards Yauhen Yakimenka Supervised by Jan Willemson December 17, 2016 Abstract This report, prepared for the course Research Seminar in Cryptogra- phy, talks about security of NFC/RFID cards. It first describes the most widely-used type of cards, MIFARE Classic, and then considers a real-life application, namely Estonian public transportation cards. The commu- nication between a real card reader installed in Tartu bus and a Tallinn public transportation card is eavesdropped and analysed on high level. 1 Introduction Radio frequency identification (RFID) cards is a pervasive technology nowadays. More and more systems adopted this technology as replacement for barcodes, magnetic stripe cards and paper tickets for a variety of applications. Contactless cards consist of a small piece of memory that can be accessed wirelessly. Some of them can also have some computing capabilities. RFID cards are of two main classes, low-frequency and high-frequency. The former operates on 125kHz frequency range and do not any cryptographic ca- pabilities. In fact, they can be seen as radio-frequency analogue of bar codes: a card simply transmits pre-coded information. Cards operating on a 13.56GHz frequency range (also known as Near-Field Communication (NFC) cards) can be made to implement more sophisticated protocols. We further talk about one particular type of such cards, MIFARE Classic. 2 MIFARE Classic cards MIFARE Classic is perhaps the most widely used type of high-frequency cards. They were introduce in 1995 by NXP (formerly Philips). The logical structure of MIFARE Classic is shown in Figure 1.1 The card is in principle a memory card with few extra functionalities (read, write, increment and decrement). -
Card-Only Attacks on Mifare Classic Or How to Steal Your Oyster Card and Break Into Buildings Worldwide
Card-Only Attacks on MiFare Classic or How to Steal Your Oyster Card and Break into Buildings Worldwide Nicolas T. Courtois University College London , UK Better Card-only Attacks on Mifare Classic Slides I will cover only 50% and skip the technical parts. Full version: Google “UCL CS Courtois” These slides: www.nicolascourtois.com/papers/mifare_all.pdf My paper: SECRYPT 2009, see also eprint.iacr.org/2009/137/ Hack it at home: step by step instructions: http://www.nicolascourtois.com/MifareClassicHack.pdf 2 Nicolas T. Courtois, 2009 Better Card-only Attacks on Mifare Classic Outline 1. Security in the Smart Card world: • Traditional model vs. disruptive RFID technology • Open vs. Close source models 2. MiFare Crypto 1 cipher: waste of silicon x more than 1 billion copies sold. 3. Barriers to breach: • The need for hacking and reverse engineering • Hardware set-up 4. Early attacks 5. Card-only attacks [NEW] • My own • Dutch researchers from Nijmegen • Combined 6. Inside Oyster Cards + other countries… 7. Who is to blame? 3 Nicolas T. Courtois, 2009 **About Our Job Better Card-only Attacks on Mifare Classic **Key Question: Is actively researching serious security vulnerabilities socially desirable? - Of Course Yes! …will tell you every professional hacker and every academic code-breaker… 5 Nicolas T. Courtois, 2009 Better Card-only Attacks on Mifare Classic **Bruce Schneier [14 May 2008]: Problem: A hacker who discovers one [attack] can sell it on the black market, blackmail the vendor with disclosure, or simply publish it without regard to the consequences. Q: […] is it ethical to research new vulnerabilities? A: Unequivocally, yes. -
Security Analysis of Near-Field Communication (NFC) Payments
Security Analysis of Near-Field Communication (NFC) Payments Dennis Giese, Kevin Liu, Michael Sun, Tahin Syed, Linda Zhang May 16, 2018 Abstract Near-Field Communication (NFC) is a modern technology for short range communication with a variety of applications ranging from physical access control to contactless payments. These applications are often heralded as being more secure, as they require close physical proximity and do not involve Wi-Fi or mobile networks. However, these systems are still vulnerable to security attacks at the time of transaction, as they require little to no additional authentication from the user’s end. In this paper, we propose a method to attack mobile-based NFC payment methods and make payments at locations far away from where the attack occurs. We evaluate our methods on our personal Apple and Google Pay accounts and demonstrate two successful attacks on these NFC payment systems. 1 Introduction Prior to the digital age, physical access control was managed by locks and keys and payments were only made via cash. Today, these are being phased out in favor of digital solutions. Physical access control is now often managed by magnetic, wireless ID cards or biometrics, such as fingerprints, while payments can be made by credit cards or contactless payment methods. The convenience of these new digital methods are making them increasingly popular. However, the greater prevalence of these technologies poses new security risks. Whereas in the past a key or cash might have to be stolen physically, they can now be stolen digitally. Furthermore, rather than just having a key or a few bills stolen, these virtual attacks can wreak havoc on a person’s life, leading to a severe invasion of privacy and identity theft. -
Annual Report 2011-12 Supporting Our Community
Annual Report 2011-12 Supporting Our Community ii Contents Glossary of terms 2 PTA people 62 PTA year at a glance 3 Executive profiles 66 An introduction to your Annual Report 4 Compliance, audits and reporting 72 Organisational chart 7 Compliance statements 79 Cover Part of the PTA’s Overviews 8 Service and financial achievements 80 public art installation Chief Executive Officer 8 at Mount Lawley Managing Director 10 Electoral Act 1907 – Section 175ZE 88 Station. Transperth 12 Explanation of major capital expenditure variations 2011-12 90 Regional Town Bus Services 32 Independent audit opinion 92 School Bus Services 36 Audited Key Performance Indicators 94 Transwa 40 Financial statements 112 Network and Infrastructure 48 Certification of financial statements 113 Statement of comprehensive income 114 Major Projects Unit 52 Statement of financial position 115 Statement of changes in equity 116 Infrastructure Planning and Land Services 56 Statement of cash flows 117 Notes to the financial statements 118 Strategic Asset Management Development 60 To the Hon. Troy Buswell MLA Minister for Transport In accordance with Section 63 of the Financial Management Act 2006, I submit for your information and presentation to Parliament the Annual Report of the Public Transport Authority of Western Australia for the year ended 30 June 2012. The Annual Report has been prepared in accordance with the provisions of the Financial Management Act 2006. Reece Waldock Chief Executive Officer 1 Glossary of terms AM Asset Management OTR On-time running Category B Incident that may have the potential to cause a serious accident. AMP Asset Management Plan PCL Perth City Link Circle A high-frequency bus service ASL Acceptable Service Level PMP Prevention Maintenance Program Route connecting major shopping centres, CAT Central Area Transit PPTA Perth Public Transport Area universities, schools and colleges. -
Dismantling MIFARE Classic
Introduction Reverse Engineering MIFARE Classic Cryptanalysis of MIFARE Classic Conclusions Dismantling MIFARE Classic Flavio D. Garcia Institute for Computing and Information Sciences, Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands. ESORICS 2008 Joint work with: Gerhard de Koning Gans, Ruben Muijrers, Peter van Rossum, Roel Verdult, Ronny Wichers Schreur and Bart Jacobs Flavio D. Garcia Dismantling MIFARE Classic Introduction Reverse Engineering MIFARE Classic Cryptanalysis of MIFARE Classic Conclusions Outline 1 Introduction Timeline RFID MIFARE 2 Reverse Engineering MIFARE Classic Characteristics Authentication Protocol CRYPTO1 Cipher 3 Cryptanalysis of MIFARE Classic Attack 1 Attack 2 4 Conclusions Flavio D. Garcia Dismantling MIFARE Classic Introduction Timeline Reverse Engineering MIFARE Classic RFID Cryptanalysis of MIFARE Classic MIFARE Conclusions Timeline Dec 2007 CCC presentation by Nohl and Plotz March 2008 We recover CRYPTO1 and found attacks. March 2008 We notified the manufacturer and other stakeholders (without disclosure). Jun 2008 NXP tries to stop “irresponsible” publication, via injunction (court order). July 2008 Judge refuses to prohibit, basically on freedom of expression. Also: “University acted with due care, warning stakeholders early on” “Damage is not result of publication, but of apparent deficiencies in the cards” NXP did not appeal Flavio D. Garcia Dismantling MIFARE Classic Introduction Timeline Reverse Engineering MIFARE Classic RFID Cryptanalysis of MIFARE Classic MIFARE Conclusions RFID Tags Flavio D. Garcia -
NRTA Year Round Bus Service Study-Phase 2
,.. _, i ’f“l* I _:: : P,,_, /___ ____":% iiiiiiit ' <-‘Q ;\~__\\"‘,v'-"* -1‘ é 7 _ -' 2:-.*:! _____ _ iii, L ' _2' _ -—- *“§l E ?:7 55,- _ ,_ L L k ¢_ '___._,.i,;,, 1 _;,_; 1 II ‘ Photo by Susan Richards, SR Concepts 94% 1; K / W1 ' u<'§ -7." Q 1!“ '2 '~ ~ W, " \, 1/1 / ‘-\é‘ i 1 ‘ V J if -=) ‘ __ .-. 1; _" _. ‘ ' , ,_ rs. V\_ ‘ \ . \' " £2~.@in _ , H: I ... I 7“ - K ‘ - 5' ‘ <’ _ {ii} __.4;..* ~22” ‘TiIt K ' I \.1\>\ i? gii -Photo by Susan Richards, SR Concepts I . - Photo by SusanK‘ Richards," SR Concepts Photo by Susan Richards, SR Concepts 4 Q , § =\__§__ \ V ‘ I-1‘ 1 llflllilifilfil HODIOMI U888“fllllflfifill NRTA Year-Round Bus Service Study Phase II Report: Fare Policy Review and Development of Innovative Funding Options Nantucket Regional Transit Authority December 2016 NRTA Year-Round Bus Service Study Phase II Report TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary ................................................................................................................ ES-1 Local Outreach ................................................................................................................... ES-1 Innovative Funding Options ................................................................................................ ES-1 Fare Policy Analysis ............................................................................................................. ES-2 Fare Collection Technology Analysis.................................................................................... ES-2 Next Steps .........................................................................................................................