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- 56 - on the left wing of the .irillY GrouPt Nineteenth ..:\rmy was forced to yield ground to 2 Frenoh Armd D1V in tho North and 5 French ..:"..rmd Div in tho South. But the BOSt significant dovelopmont of the day was the rosumJ)tion of largo-scale .~".lliod oporations in the Aachon area. 1fussivo air attacks on lin0s of defenco and sunnly routos ~recodod attacks on a wide front. ~t 1710 hrs O.B. West loarnt from his Chief Intolligence Officor that tho northorn wing of ~\rmy Group B faced an anomy concontration of five armourod and sevon infantry divisions - S080 British, somo P~orican, Concludin6 that tho contro of gravity of tho Allied efforts was now at tho northern wing of Army Group B, O.B West immediatoly authorizod Ittmy G~oup B to coruuit 47 pz Corrys, In addition to this 10 SS rz Div was to ~ovo fron tho aroa oast of !~nhom to the aroa east of Vonlo, and P~my Group H would desryatch 85,245 and 363 VGD's to tho aroa behind tho 1fuas-oast front. Tho consoquent tomporary woakening of l~my Group H was a tolerablo risk and had to bo acce~tod. (Ibid, 16 Nov) 17 Nov 123. Due to IDTIited visibility _\Iliod air activity at tho front of' Army Group B was sOl'lGWhat smaller than on the proceding day, and by cOL~~itting virtually all froG roserves tho l\rmy Group was able to hold tho Allied forces in the greater Aachen area in chock. Developmonts in the aroa of Army Group G woro decidodly unfavourablo; in order to maintain a coherent front First £rny had to fall back to rear positions and loave tho garrison of Metz to its fato. Alliod forces had alroady ontered the southorn suburbs of Matz. At- the southern wing of Ninoteenth tlXflY tho oDponont reached tho area 10 kID ~~Bolfort. Obviously tho !ullod operations against Ninoteonth ~rmy wore lliore than more holding attacks. Rundstedt bolievod that he could not co~o with the situation without making use of the OT~N rosorvos ,.- but his requost in that sense was turned down flatly: DOS9ite all stop gap measuros, reprosonting tho utmost O.B. West could do on his own, a defansive succoss against the onomy's largo­ scale attacks cannot be guarantood. In a telephono convorsation with tho Chief of the :ITmed Forces O:,)erations Staff, C. of S. O. B. West points to the newly arrived SS formations and the desirability of cOLu~itting than before the enemy achievos a stratogical broal~hrough. Chief ~~St doclinod [to consider] the possibility of such a comoitmont and announced that in tho caso of such a dovelopment tho 0I0N Rosorvus concorned would have to bo romov.od from tho aroa. (Ibid, 17 Nov) ":" 57 - 18 Nov 124. Whilo !~ny GrouDs Hand B were undor modurate pressure only, dovelopments in the area of Jxmy Group G were causing mounting concorn at the hoadQuartors of O.B. Wost. The loss of 4~saco and Lorraine had becomo a distinct possibility. The further Alliod advancos in the aroa of First Army had not CODO as a surprise, but a broal~hrough at the extro~o left wing of Ninotoenth ;~my north of the Svliss bordor via DelIo to Courcellos and Grandvillors raised tho spectre of- serious operational repercussions. G.B. West expressed astonishment at the unoxp0ctod developmonts in the Belfort area and domanded energetic countor-neasuros. (Ibid, 18 Nov) 19 Nov 125. /~my Group H was forced to yiold som.e ground at the Venlo bridgehead, Lriny Group Blast Goilonldrohen but on balanco obtained a dofensive success by foiling tho opponent's determined attempt to collapse the saliont north of ~\aehGn. In the area of ~rmy Group G, howovor, tho situation showed further detorioration. _~,.t the southern wing of Nineteonth 4\rmy tho breakthrough at Dolle had boen widonod; and enemy forces had reachod points 20 km l~ and 12 km E Delle. Moreover, the o~?ponont was approaching Belfort. When it becamo known that enemy forces had pushed oastwards to tho Rhine at HUningen, and to nearby Rosenau and Sirentz, the defence of Mulhouso became a matter of immediato urgenoy and 0 B. West instructed Military District No. 5 CUsaco, WUrtom.berg and Badon) to dospatch all availablo foroos undor its command to tho aroa south and southwest of Mulhouso. ~ Ibid, 19 Nov) 20 Nov 126. At the front of l'.XD.Y Group B- Allied forces made only some moderate gains of ground north of Aachen, but the situation at Army Group G was continuing to oause ooncern. In the oentre, .~erican foroes were approaohing Saarburg (a mere 50 km WNW strassburg), further south, French forces ~re getting still closer to Belfort. German counter-attaoks in both areas had been of no avail. In a telephone convers­ ation at 1~45 hrs between C. of- S. O.B. West and Deputy Ohief WFSt, O.B. West asked for permission to use pz Lehr Div at the Belfort gap and 1.2 VGD in the Aaohen area. His oontention was that these forces would go far to restore the situation and could be withdrawn in good time to be available for the Abwehrsohlacht. Both requests were turned down. This left only the forces in the Netherlands as a possible source of formations for the fooal points of the front. South of the - 58 - Maas (resp. Waal) there were now only one British division (on Walcheren), one Polish division, one Canadian armoured division, one armoured brigade and some Dutch volunteers, while the German forces, after all pending withdrawals would still consist of two Corps with a total of five divisions. O.B. West therefore gave" orders for the withdrawal of an additional CorDs Headauarters and two divisions from this front; one division to bo transferred to Army Group G with tho greatost possible snoed. (Ibid, 20 Nov) '. - 21 Nov 127. Headquarters 2 SS :'z CorDs, slated f or a rolo in tho Abwehrschlacht (paras 121 and l2~ abovo), was now being relioved in the area east of Arnhem-Nijmcgen by H.Q. 88 Corps, hitherto at tho 1fuas-north front. The SS Corps H.Q. was to be available in the aroa of ~\rmy Group B, complete with Corps trooDs by 25 Nov at the latest. With regard to current oporations the day was characterized by various local engagomonts in tho Aachen ragion. North of Eschwoiler the opponent gained further ground, and O.B. West granted .l'>Xmy Group B's request for permission to Ehcr.fte;n the" front and give up Eschweiler to save the garrison. Ibid, 21 Nov) . ~ 128. In the aren of Army Group G, howevor, the situation in southeastern Lorraino was worsening. Thore had been a serious break-in astride the Rhine-1furne Canal. A blocking line in process of being established 10 km N Baarburg, had already been pierced. Efforts were made to form a blocking line west of Saverne. In view of this, OIDr now gave pornission for the temporary employnont of pz Lchr Div. O.B. West placed tho Division under ~rmy Group G and gavo orders for its imraediate denarture in the direction Homburg-Saarunion, to be co~~ittGd to an attack from the North against the deep flank of the enemy in the Saarburg aroa. Immediatoly upon arrival of the first infantry division from ~~my Group H, pz Lehr Div would have to revert to OlaV reserve. - In the Belfort area 198 Inf Div soemed to be gaining some measure of defensive success. (Ibid) 22 Nov 129. On its extroille loft wing, ~\rmy Group H was 'oxpecting an attack on the Roermond bridgohead. As a precautionary measure 85 Inf Div and an assault gun brigade were boing moved to the area as an Army Group roserve. In addition, 6 Para Regt was being shifted from the Venlo bridgehead to the area between Venlo and Roermond. But it was toe late to save the bridgohead, and at 1700 hrs it was reported lost. - In the meantime 3 Para Div (en route from Army Group H ~o Seventh -\rmy) was directed to DUren as a - 59 - potential backstop oast of !~chon. Permission for this had beon granted by OIn1 on the roquost of O.B. West despite tho fact that the formation was slated for employment in tho forthcoming offonsive. (Ibid, 22 Nov) 130. In tho area of ...'l:rmy Group G the opponent was making further gains, and operations that had previously served the purpose of trading s')ace for time wero now turning into a des~orate last minute offort to koep the enomy from engulfing ...\lsace and Lorraine. East of Metz tho opponent was advancing in the St. A..,old area, a moro 30 len fron tho western borders of tho lBlatlnate. Further south tho enemy h~d entered Alsace from southeastern Lorraino'snd was reported to havo entered Saverno. The German troops in tho aroa seemed to have disintegrated. :\8 no reports wero being receivm from H.Q. 88 Corps at Saverne, this staff was pr~sumed inca-pacitated, and tho "Highor COIlm18nd Vosges" charged with the task of collecting tho various shattered groups and creating some sort of dofence line.. pz Lehr Div had not yet appea~od and O.B. Wost employed every means to hasten its journey .. Due to the SWl1f'tly changing situation the projectod flank attack now would have to be deliverod against tho !unorican Corps in the Savorno area. (Ibid) . - 23 Nov 131. Army Group H reported meroly renowed attacks against the alroady shrunken Vonlo bridgehoad.

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