Rmy Was Forced to Yield Ground to 2 Frenoh Armd D1V in Tho North and 5 French ..:"..Rmd Div in Tho South

- 56 -

on the left wing of the .irillY GrouPt Nineteenth ..:\rmy was forced to yield ground to 2 Frenoh Armd D1V in tho North and 5 French ..:"..rmd Div in tho South. But the BOSt significant dovelopmont of the day was the rosumJ)tion of largo-scale .~".lliod oporations in the Aachon area. 1fussivo air attacks on lin0s of defenco and sunnly routos ~recodod attacks on a wide front. ~t 1710 hrs O.B. West loarnt from his Chief Intolligence Officor that tho northorn wing of ~\rmy Group B faced an anomy concontration of five armourod and sevon infantry divisions - S080 British, somo P~orican, Concludin6 that tho contro of gravity of tho Allied efforts was now at tho northern wing of Army Group B, O.B West immediatoly authorizod Ittmy G~oup B to coruuit 47 pz Corrys, In addition to this 10 SS rz Div was to ~ovo fron tho aroa oast of !~nhom to the aroa east of Vonlo, and P~my Group H would desryatch 85,245 and 363 VGD's to tho aroa behind tho 1fuas-oast front. Tho consoquent tomporary woakening of l~my Group H was a tolerablo risk and had to bo acce~tod. (Ibid, 16 Nov)

17 Nov

123. Due to IDTIited visibility _\Iliod air activity at tho front of' Army Group B was sOl'lGWhat smaller than on the proceding day, and by cOL~~itting virtually all froG roserves tho l\rmy Group was able to hold tho Allied forces in the greater Aachen area in chock. Developmonts in the aroa of Army Group G woro decidodly unfavourablo; in order to maintain a coherent front First £rny had to fall back to rear positions and loave tho garrison of Metz to its fato. Alliod forces had alroady ontered the southorn suburbs of Matz. At- the southern wing of Ninoteenth tlXflY tho oDponont reached tho area 10 kID ~~Bolfort. Obviously tho !ullod operations against Ninoteonth ~rmy wore lliore than more holding attacks. Rundstedt bolievod that he could not co~o with the situation without making use of the OT~N rosorvos ,.- but his requost in that sense was turned down flatly: DOS9ite all stop gap measuros, reprosonting tho utmost O.B. West could do on his own, a defansive succoss against the onomy's largo scale attacks cannot be guarantood. In a telephono convorsation with tho Chief of the :ITmed Forces O:,)erations Staff, C. of S. O. B. West points to the newly arrived SS formations and the desirability of cOLu~itting than before the enemy achievos a stratogical broal~hrough. Chief ~~St doclinod [to consider] the possibility of such a comoitmont and announced that in tho caso of such a dovelopment tho 0I0N Rosorvus concorned would have to bo romov.od from tho aroa. (Ibid, 17 Nov) ":" 57 -

18 Nov

124. Whilo !~ny GrouDs Hand B were undor modurate pressure only, dovelopments in the area of Jxmy Group G were causing mounting concorn at the hoadQuartors of O.B. Wost. The loss of 4~saco and Lorraine had becomo a distinct possibility. The further Alliod advancos in the aroa of First Army had not CODO as a surprise, but a broal~hrough at the extro~o left wing of Ninotoenth ;~my north of the Svliss bordor via DelIo to Courcellos and Grandvillors raised tho spectre of- serious operational repercussions. G.B. West expressed astonishment at the unoxp0ctod developmonts in the Belfort area and domanded energetic countor-neasuros. (Ibid, 18 Nov)

19 Nov

125. /~my Group H was forced to yiold som.e ground at the Venlo bridgehead, Lriny Group Blast Goilonldrohen but on balanco obtained a dofensive success by foiling tho opponent's determined attempt to collapse the saliont north of ~\aehGn. In the area of ~rmy Group G, howovor, tho situation showed further detorioration. _~,.t the southern wing of Nineteonth 4\rmy tho breakthrough at Dolle had boen widonod; and enemy forces had reachod points 20 km l~ and 12 km E Delle. Moreover, the o~?ponont was approaching Belfort. When it becamo known that enemy forces had pushed oastwards to tho Rhine at HUningen, and to nearby Rosenau and Sirentz, the defence of Mulhouso became a matter of immediato urgenoy and 0 B. West instructed Military District No. 5 CUsaco, WUrtom.berg and Badon) to dospatch all availablo foroos undor its command to tho aroa south and southwest of Mulhouso. ~ Ibid, 19 Nov)

20 Nov

126. At the front of l'.XD.Y Group B- Allied forces made only some moderate gains of ground north of Aachen, but the situation at Army Group G was continuing to oause ooncern. In the oentre, .~erican foroes were approaohing Saarburg (a mere 50 km WNW strassburg), further south, French forces ~re getting still closer to Belfort. German counter-attaoks in both areas had been of no avail. In a telephone convers ation at 1~45 hrs between C. of- S. O.B. West and Deputy Ohief WFSt, O.B. West asked for permission to use pz Lehr Div at the Belfort gap and 1.2 VGD in the Aaohen area. His oontention was that these forces would go far to restore the situation and could be withdrawn in good time to be available for the Abwehrsohlacht. Both requests were turned down. This left only the forces in the Netherlands as a possible source of formations for the fooal points of the front. South of the - 58 -

Maas (resp. Waal) there were now only one British division (on Walcheren), one Polish division, one Canadian armoured division, one armoured brigade and some Dutch volunteers, while the German forces, after all pending withdrawals would still consist of two Corps with a total of five divisions. O.B. West therefore gave" orders for the withdrawal of an additional CorDs Headauarters and two divisions from this front; one division to bo transferred to Army Group G with tho greatost possible snoed. (Ibid, 20 Nov) '. -

21 Nov

127. Headquarters 2 SS :'z CorDs, slated f or a rolo in tho Abwehrschlacht (paras 121 and l2~ abovo), was now being relioved in the area east of Arnhem-Nijmcgen by H.Q. 88 Corps, hitherto at tho 1fuas-north front. The SS Corps H.Q. was to be available in the aroa of ~\rmy Group B, complete with Corps trooDs by 25 Nov at the latest. With regard to current oporations the day was characterized by various local engagomonts in tho Aachen ragion. North of Eschwoiler the opponent gained further ground, and O.B. West granted .l'>Xmy Group B's request for permission to Ehcr.fte;n the" front and give up Eschweiler to save the garrison. Ibid, 21 Nov) . ~ 128. In the aren of Army Group G, howevor, the situation in southeastern Lorraino was worsening. Thore had been a serious break-in astride the Rhine-1furne Canal. A blocking line in process of being established 10 km N Baarburg, had already been pierced. Efforts were made to form a blocking line west of Saverne. In view of this, OIDr now gave pornission for the temporary employnont of pz Lchr Div. O.B. West placed tho Division under ~rmy Group G and gavo orders for its imraediate denarture in the direction Homburg-Saarunion, to be co~~ittGd to an attack from the North against the deep flank of the enemy in the Saarburg aroa. Immediatoly upon arrival of the first infantry division from ~~my Group H, pz Lehr Div would have to revert to OlaV reserve. - In the Belfort area 198 Inf Div soemed to be gaining some measure of defensive success. (Ibid)

22 Nov

129. On its extroille loft wing, ~\rmy Group H was 'oxpecting an attack on the Roermond bridgohead. As a precautionary measure 85 Inf Div and an assault gun brigade were boing moved to the area as an Army Group roserve. In addition, 6 Para Regt was being shifted from the Venlo bridgehead to the area between Venlo and Roermond. But it was toe late to save the bridgohead, and at 1700 hrs it was reported lost. - In the meantime 3 Para Div (en route from Army Group H ~o Seventh -\rmy) was directed to DUren as a - 59 -

potential backstop oast of !~chon. Permission for this had beon granted by OIn1 on the roquost of O.B. West despite tho fact that the formation was slated for employment in tho forthcoming offonsive. (Ibid, 22 Nov) 130. In tho area of ...'l:rmy Group G the opponent was making further gains, and operations that had previously served the purpose of trading s')ace for time wero now turning into a des~orate last minute offort to koep the enomy from engulfing ...\lsace and Lorraine. East of Metz tho opponent was advancing in the St. A..,old area, a moro 30 len fron tho western borders of tho lBlatlnate. Further south tho enemy h~d entered Alsace from southeastern Lorraino'snd was reported to havo entered Saverno. The German troops in tho aroa seemed to have disintegrated. :\8 no reports wero being receivm from H.Q. 88 Corps at Saverne, this staff was pr~sumed inca-pacitated, and tho "Highor COIlm18nd Vosges" charged with the task of collecting tho various shattered groups and creating some sort of dofence line.. pz Lehr Div had not yet appea~od and O.B. Wost employed every means to hasten its journey .. Due to the SWl1f'tly changing situation the projectod flank attack now would have to be deliverod against tho !unorican Corps in the Savorno area. (Ibid) . -

23 Nov

131. Army Group H reported meroly renowed attacks against the alroady shrunken Vonlo bridgehoad. But the enemy was known to be holding close to tho front of the f~ Groap two armoured and five infantry divisions. A similar situation prevailod at Army Group H, where the _Ulies had not nade any further gains but controlled uncommitted reservos amounting . to four armoured and ton infantry divisions. (Ibid, 25 Nov) 132~ In tho area of ArmY Group G, however, a critical situation had dotoriorated to the point where the loss of . Alsace and Lorraine appearod inovitable. Before any German hoadquarters had even hoard of the,approach of enen~ tanks and vehicles, tho opponont appearod at tho gatos of Strasburg, and shortly afterwards entered tho city and demandod its surrender. While Alsaoo Lorraine was being sliced-Up by the many-pronged advances of the enomy, Rundstedt recallod with so~e bitternoss the incident in September (para 65 above) when despite his ropoatod objections the top officers of Army Group G had been reliovod abruptly by OKW and replaced by officers whose lack of comprehension had groatly oontributed' to the present debaole in the South. In a telophone oonvers tion with Jodl, C. of S. O.B West brought up this matter again and criticizod the performanoe of the Chiafs of Staff of ~ Gp G and First /~. (Ibid) 133·. k3 the day went on it became cloar that tho attack of pz Lohr Div would como too late to be effective and the divisions from Army Group H would como too late to save the situation. With this in mind, O.B. West asked ~or tho immodiate despatch of two battloworthy panzer divisions and

• - 60 -

one additional infantry division. In his reply ovor tho tolephone, Jodl acknowlodged the validity of RundstodtTs request, but said that in view of the forthco2ing Abwohrschlacht it had to be turned down. (Ibid)

24 Nov

134. Developments at _'\.rmy Groups Hand B wero not causing i~ediate concorn, but ~rmy Group G was in gravo difficulties and in nurticular the situation of Nineteenth ~rflY was steadily worsening. Close to the Swiss border the opponvntTs armoured convoys were continuing to pass throuGh . the German blocking line; 5000 GerTJIDn soldiers were pinned down and encircled in the fortifications of Strasburg. The big gap which had sprung up in this area betweon First L~my gnd Nineteenth Ixny, as well as tho deep penotrations at the western front of Nineteenth ..\rmy could not be elifolinated with the forces on hand. Most important in the circlliTIstances was the creation of a new cohesive line of defonce at the northern and wGstorn sectors and tho ~~intenanco of a firm line to the Swiss border in order to preclude a double onvelopment of Ninetoonth :~ny. O.B. Wast thorofore gave orders to withdraw to new lines in tho northern and westorn sectors and to make an atte~pt to stand fast in tho South. To prevent a rapid influx of enemy forcos into tho Strasburg area (betweon First and Nineteenth !~my) pz Lehr Div was dirocted to advance towards the Rhine-1hrne Canal and to block the low groQQd at Saverne. As the sudden doterioration in tho situation of ~roy Group G was at least. partly due to comnand mistakes, the FUhror denanded investigation by a court of inquiry. O.B. West requested that his own conduct in the matter be exanined at the sane t~ue. (~, 24 Nov)

25 Nov

135· Army Groups Hand B reported their situation unchanged. In the area of Army Group G the attack of pz Lehr Div had been halted by a barrage of anti-tank f~1e. As the attack in question was no longer offering any proillise and pz Lehr Div would be needed to carry out its assigned task in the Abwehrsohlaoht, Hitler demanded its withdrawal. _ Army Group G had suggested a withdrawal on its left wing but as this would have meant a withdrawal from the area at the Swiss border, O.B. West objected strongly and derllinded to the contrary that the forces in Question be bolstered and the border area be defended by all means. - Fighting in the oity of Metz had oome to an end. (Ibid, 25 Nov) - 61 -

26 Nov

136. In tho aroas of ~rny Groups Hand B thero wore no significant devolopnents. irmy Group G reported local engagements at tho front of First /!J:ny and continuing pressurJ on the western front of Nineteonth .·...r""1.y, whero the opponent had follewed the withdrawal mOVG2Jnts and at soveral points ovortaken tho rear oleDents of tho withdrawing forces. Tho Ger.Clan reginent nearest to tho Svviss border had cuased to report and li~lodiato investigation showod that it had boon destroyed and that heavy Allied traffic was now moving ullflolested along the highway tho rugiBent was supposed to bo blocking. Faced by the facts that the Gor:llin western front was no longer anchorod to tho Swiss border and that the situation was boyond rGfwdy, O.B. West askod OID~ for pernission to shorten the linos by withdrawals in that area. On receiving O~N's concurronce, O.B. West gave ordors to withdraw tho southern wine; of the .\rmy to the line !!Ia.asLlUnster Senthoin-Mulhouse-Rhine noar Hombourg (Ibid, 26 Nov) • On tho sane day tho FUhror issued an order placing all arlilld forces partici]?ating in tho defenco of the Upper Rhino fron the Bien-Wald (excl) to thu Swiss border under the cOL'1.'"J.and of the RGichsf~hrer SS, Heinrich HbLCllor (Dar l1esten, 234).* Hitler must have boon soothing with suspicions to charge a policoman with a difficult military task.

27 Nov

137, Mainly duo to inclenent weather the day was fairly quiet in all sectors. In thJ Vosgos Mountains and furthor east ~z LJhr Div vms serving as a screen behind which a new make-shift line was being established, On the westorn front of Nineteenth ..'l.xny the opponont achieved SO.2e doel) ponetrations. (W.D. O.B. West, 27 Nov)

28 - 30 l'Iov 138. During the last three days of the nonth, French and American forces continued to nibble aVTay at ...Usace and Lorraine, and there was SOJlle pressure against the German Maas-bridgeheads and an incroase in tho ~rGssure on the C~rman linos east of Aachen. Considering tho ~agnitudG of the issue, however, and the size of the forces and cO~L~and facilities in the theatre, it was cloar - or should havo boon -that each . side was engrossed in p1'e')arations for undortal-:ings of vastly greater importanco.

*Him.ul1er assuwod cOI');"land on 30 Nov (Der W'esten, 235) 62

139. While the Gor~an concontTations in the rear areas of Army Group B wore getting roady for offonsive action, the for.:::lations in the line ':'1B.naged to gain llJ.})Ortant tirae at the cost of COf:1Daratively uniI'lportant ground. .:J:F....y Group G, apart fron receiving SOille small infusions of arnour left to its own devicos, was in 1:101"0 serious straits; at Merzis and Saarlautern in the North the opponent achievod doep penetrations, further south Ninotoonth ~rmy w~s forcod to fall back in tho northern and western sGctors and facud tho' prospect of being cut off from its vital bridges and thon surrounded and dostToyod. (!£ig, 28-30 Nov)

1 Dec

140. In the greater Aachen area ."-lliod forces striving to break through in northerly direction alnost succooded in doing so. In addition to the !uliod forcos actually cOhll~itted in this area, thero was now a cloarly recognizable British conoentration so~ewhat furthor to tho North. _~d a GerDan oounter-attack north of ~~achon had bogged down. All this gave tho situation an ominous oharacter, with Rundstodt noting in tho war diary: ;IAll the Horo important thorefore is the continuation of the preparations for the Abwohrschlaoht. a * (C.R.S. - 7.5144/29, W.D. O.B. Wost, (A Gp D), Doc 44, 1 Deo) (981CW(D62))

2 Doc

141. Tho gonoral quiet in the area of .t:.rmy Grou!) H was disturbed to sone extont at 1700 hrs whon W.'3lff !:...rnheI:l tho Noeder-Rijn Dan (7annerdensoho Kanal) was blasted in order to induco the Allied oPDonont to withdraw from his

*With the launching date for the Abwehrschlacht drawing closer, nost deoisions wore taken in tho liBht of the forth coning oJeration. Information on the proDarations for that oDeration will appoar in a forthcoming slli~ary of Gorman inforDlation on tho ..\rdonnes offensivo as a whole. - 63 - forward positions.* ·~t the northern wing of :xr~ Group B the British continued trying for a breakthrouGh on both sidos of Limrich, while furthor south tho right wing of Sevonth Army succoeded in holding on to th0 o::dts of thG Eifel aroa. At the sa~lli tiille the lightly hold loft wing of Seventh )~~~ (66 Corps), where C0.il1:91oto quiot had prevailed, cade suddGnly under heavy artillory fire, O.B. West was a~~ious to learn whether this was a Bore holding 8anoeuvre or a sign of changing eneny dis"9os·itions and intentions. (Ibid, 2 Doc)

3 Doc

142. _\t tho Waal front of }i.r~·lY Group H the inunda- tions nado the desirod progress, but in tho Maas sector the Gornans were ejected froD tho Wanss~l area and cOilyQlled to

*O.B. West's Intelligence Soction had been puzzled by the apparently doceptivo behavior of the Polish and Canadians fornations, which wore advortising thoir continued ~rosence in the formor locations but seo3ed to havo ~oved to tho area of tho Nijflegon bridgehoad. It was thought possible that the expected large attack of Second British ,'.;ray flight be preceded by a thrust from the Nijnogen bridgehead towards the North or froB the area between Waal and Maas towards the East. • .• For such a purpose these would possibly be available in the Nijaogen bridgehead: 1 Pol ..'..rHd Div, 33 Brit ..':..r~,ld Bde, as well as .5 0 and .51 Brit Inf Divs, whereas th~ attack fron the area south of Kij~egon night be carried out by 1 Pol .\r.21d Div, 4 Cdn .ll'..:ld Div, 2 Cdn _ll'nd 30.0 lJlus 2 and 3 Cdn Int Divs. In this connection it was to bo taken into account, how0vor, that the cOITh.:litment of Canadian forces to an o·.Jeration involving high casualtios was likely to be avoided at this tL~e for pelitical reason. (O.B. West, Daily Intreps, op cit, Int No. 787.5/44, 2 Dec 44) (981CW(D34c))" ----- Next day 88 Corps reported gratefully:

..• Due to tho flooding of the area ffi~ !..rnhen between Noeder-Rijn and Waal, a big enewy attack fron tho Nijnegen bridgehoad is not to be expocted in the ncar futuro. (C.R.S. - 63289/4, Y.D. 88 Corps, Vol 11:g11 of ,\pps, Ap]?x B .597,. 88 Corps Ops No. 11.58744. Sitrop for 3 Doc 44, 2140 hrs 3 Dec 44)" '. - 64 -

evacuate tho Vanlo bridgehoad during tho night 3/4 Dec, In the greator _~.achon area )..rIilY Croup B was under ]lressuro in the Wierm and JUlich aruas, whilst southeast of .A.achen "~~orican forces Bade a deop Donetration at Vossenack. At the front of Arny Group G First ~irDY lost Saarlautern, where the bridges had been taken intact by the opponant, and recaptured Saarunion (11 pz Div and pz Lehr Div), while Ninoteonth Army lost Schlottstadt and Ra~poltsweiler and was now roducod to a small bridgehoad west of the Rhino and isolated from tho forces of O.B. West. (Ibid, 3 Doc)

4 Doc

143. .:.'tr::~lY Groups Hand B passod a (~uiot day whilo .....rlJ.1y Group G suffervo. further reverses. First ..:..r;.lY onco again lost Saarunion, belatod offorts to destroy the bridgo at Saarlautern wero of no avail, and the unoDy Dade deey penetra tions in the aroa.south and southwost of Saarbrticxen. In tho wako of O.B. WestTs repoated criticisns on First !~illytS CO~Yland porfor.m.ance, tho ..~:rmy commander was r,yplacod by Gon Inf Hans von Obstfelder, previously in cOIiliJand of 86 Corps (since .::"ugust 1943). In connection with the forthconing offensive, 67 Corps ,Staff and 402 Volks Lrty Corps, as woll as 1.5 and 16 Volks Worfer Brigades wore ordered transferred fron .:.\ Gp H to~':.. Gp B, while A Gp G was instructed to despatch 401 ane!. 404 Yolks ':'..rty Corps to A Gp B, and rOIilindod of the ovordue transfer of 11 Fa Div and pz Lehr Divto }. G·p B. (Ibid, 4 Doc)

.5 Doc

144. In the areas of A Gys Hand B tho situation remained unchanged on the whole. A Gp H receivod orders to dGs)atch 244 and 902 ..'..sslt Gun BdGS to .r.l... GpB' (Ibid., .5 Dec). The aDpearance of .52 Brit Inf Div north of 's"Hortogonbosch and the Drosw~od transfor of 4 Cdn ~r~d Div-to 2 Cdn Cor~s south of~Nijmogon was intorproted as a significant strongthoning of n..~rmy Group MontgOi.'.lery Ts II oastorn front (0. B. Wost, Dail~7 Introps, .£E. cit, Int No. 792.5/44, .5 Doc 44) ...\t the front of A Gp G thoro was increasing dangor of an .~Lillrican breakthrough from the Saarlautorn and Saarbrtickon areas towards tho Woissenburg gap. In consoquence O.B. Wost supported A Gy G's request for perniss ion to retain 11 ?z Div and 404 Yolks ..\rty Corps. OKW consonted with tho proviso that the forl:18.tions would have to be handlodin a .=lanner assuring tho possibility of their Quick transfor in tho evont of ordors to that affect. pz Lehr Div (absorbing .5.59 pz Jg Abt as an organic part) was roaching tho ontraining points for its r.10VODont to :\ Gp B. (W.D. O.B. Wost, .5 Doc) - 65 -

6 Dec

14.5 . !:...t ·~:r!2Y Groups Hand :3 tho day was unGvontful. In connoction with tho )ro)arations for tho :..bwehrschlacht orders Wdre iSSUGd for tho transfor of 8.5 Inf Div f'ron .~ Gp H to A o-p B. In the area of .:"..rmy Group G tho opponent crossod the river Saar at sevoral placos. O.B. West noted thu heavy concontration of Gno.:~.Y forcos in tho aroa S''l ane. S of Saarbrticken. Sonu for~ations previously COLrr~ittGd against Ninet00nth _:lrny SlJo:.lod now to bo at tho front of First _\...rm.y. Relatively speaking tho o'Jurations of Ni.ilotoenth -':.rny woro now of liQitod importance. (Ibid, 6 Doc)

7 Doc

146. In tho ~ijnogon-Roor2ond soctor Socond British P~my and First Canadian .~r~y wero ready and waiting. Tho focal points of )..lliod o":)orations woro still in tho goneral aroas of Aachon and Saarbrfickon. Botwoon those aroas the Alliod front was lightly hold and Quiot. Most critical was tho situation at tho Saar bridgoheads. O. B. ~\Tost E::st L.la too. tho total conbat value of First :'..r:ny as 3i inf divs and l-i ariJ.d divs at best. Thoy woro opposed by eloven infantry divisions and four armourod divisions with a~proxi2atoly 1000 - 1100 tanks. Tho flOSt urgont task was tho dofonce of the l'Vo issenburg gap. In viow of O.B. iYGst's poor opinion of First .~~1J7YS corlmand pGrforBanco, 89 Corps (Gon Inf Gustaf HBhno), with 361, 24.5 and 2.56 Inf Divs was dosignatod as 0 roup Bohne, placed diroctly undor .:.. Gp G and charged with tho dofenco of tho ~Veissonburg aroa. First :..r:'lY rotainod cOT!l~land ovor 82 Cor~s, 13 SS Corps and 90 Corys. (Ibid, 7 Doc)

8 Dec

147. .\ Gn H ronortod no Gvents of consoQuonce. ~ Gp B reportod tho roslli:~tion of onorw attacks at tho front of Fifteenth ..'\.rLly and tho right wing of Seventh _~ay; the bridgohoad at Jtl1ich had to be vacated. .~:;. Gp G roportod localizod fighting at the Saar bridgeheads. In connection with tho proparations for tho ~bwehrsch1acht 79 VGD was moving from tho interior of Gornany to the aroa of .~:~ Gp B. 6 ::?ara Div ViaS directod to coda sono of its vehiclos and woapons to .5 Para Div.(Ibid, 8 Doc)

9 Doc

148. .it tho centro of First Parachuto ).rny' s front, Corps COLh~and Foldt (Gon Cav Kurt Feldt) was insorted as an additional cOmIllind staff. :~BY Groups Hand B roportod no fighting of conse~uonco. Concern was caus()~ by the fact that - 66 -

troop movements and other traffio in oonnuotion with the Abwehrschlacht were groatly iQpudod by the icy condition of th~ roads in thu Eifel area. A Gp C reported that onony fornations proviously at the northorn front of :7inot00nth ;~ny had been reliovvd and woro now pois0d to Darticipato in the thrust to the Palatinatl:. .',.11 told tho OD1JOnont now disY)osod of 14 inf divs and 5 armd divs for that purpose. Tho situation of Group H6hno was becoilling critical, and thore were no formations that could be .~oade available in support of the Group. An even more acute situation Gxisted in tho Hagonau aroa, whoro :tmorican forces outnumberod Gorman forcos by ten to ono. (Ibid, 9 Doc)

10 Dec

149. Following soveral days of prG)aratory aotion, in the area of A Gp B tho onol:J.Y resui":lod his large-soale attacks in tho groater ~achen area and obtainod a penQtration at Langorwohe. Continuation of tho poworful attacks west of DUren and pros~~ably also on both sidos of ~nlioh was to be oxpectod. Tho ronowal of serious fighting in the ~~chen area and tho co~~encCilont of onomy attacks in tho dirootion of the ~~Testwall through the 1'to issonburg gap wore Llaking it imDerative to accelerato preparations for thu ~bwehrachlacht lost enemy thrusts to tho Cologne area or the ?alatinate deprive it of its logical foundation. J ..ttenpts to spoed-up pronarations woro greatly hampered, however, by systonatic .~llied air attacks on traffic installations. Tho novements of at least ton fornations were being delayed by the troops having to detrain farther cast than planned, which longthoned their approaoh marchos by 80-100 kQ. In the aroa of A Gp G, Group H8hne was under growing pressure. At thu extronlo southern cnd of tho -tr.my Group front, Hagonau was lost. (Ibid, 10 Dec)

11 Doc

150.. Armv Group B was undor considorablo pressure in the Dftron aroa;~Army Group G was ox)octing the ca~ly beginning of largo-soalo attacks. Thoru wore new ponotrations and the oneflY was getting closer to the ~estwall. In tho war diary of O.B. ~ost tho following was entored: The dangor of an operativG broak-through into the Palatinato is thoroforo LlOVing ever more into tho roaln of the possible. This makos it all tho moro important to coaploto tho preparations for the ~bwGhrschlacht with the utmost dispatoh....ThG preparations must bo oompletod before tho onomy gains further decisivo successcs at tho two focal ~oints ....Co~oorning all those probloms Lthore is an] activo exchange of idoas with OrN and the FUhrer in person.. ~. ... 67 -

All higher oommanders (div and up) partioipating in the forthcoming operation have been ordered to report to the FUhrer (first half on 11 Deo, seoond half on 12 Dec). (Ibid, 11 Deo)

12 Deo

151. Army Group B reported oontinuing heavy fighting at the DUren bridgehead. Fighting was spreading to the right wing of Seventh Army. A Gp G reported further transfers of enemy foroes from the northern front of Nineteenth ilxmy to the Hagenau area. General uneasiness was oaused by Allied air attaoks that were orippling German telephone and teleprint oommunioations. During the afternoon O.B. West was out of touch with everyone of his Army Groups. In the war diary the following was recorded: The danger of an enemy breakthrough in the greater Aaohen area, as well as through the Weissenburg Gap to the Palatinate is growing by the hour.... The situation reports are stressing the possibility of an attaok . against the right wing of the Parachute ~\r.my, the certainty of oontinuing attaoks at the Rur and, above all, the very tense situation in the Weissenburg area, where the threat to the Palatinate has been inoreased by strong attaoks fram the Saarlautern area. No doubt the s.ituation has beoome even more aoute. (~, 12 Deo)

13 Deo l52~ Due to widespread fogs, Allied air aotivity was quite limited. There were no major developments at the fronts; southeast of Weissenburg the German foroes were forced to fall baok further towards Weissenburg. (Ibid, 13 Deo)

SITUATION ON THE: EVE OF THE ARDENNES OFFENSIVE (14-16 Deo)

14 Deo

153. Seen fram the German side the raoe for time was now in its most critioal stage. In the area of A Gp B all signs were pointing to an imminent ma jor attaok, in the area of A Gp G heavy attacks on Weissenburg and Lauterburg were to be expeoted 68

for 15 Dec or 16 Dec at the latest. In tho 2uantlile the preparations for tho offensive had boon progressing well; tho panzor divisions wore alnost COL1y loto in thoir assonbly areas; it would bo ,ossible to launch tho oporation on 16 Doc. T~QO was of tho essencG; a ~rior ~Uliod thrust into the Palatinate would placo tho entir8-operation in Question; 0.3. Wost advised strongly against any possible postponv~-:0nt of the launching. (Ibid, 14 Dec) .

15 DGC

154. Preparations for the attack wero naldng furthor progross. During tho night 14/15 Doc tho plannod roliofs and movononts had boon carried out. The fuol situation was Hooting oxpoctations, tho indisycnsablo ro~uiro!::.onts for tho attack had boon Hot. A Gp B asl:od for a furthor postpone,:lont, but O.B. West objectod strongly on tho grounds that tho situation on tho left wing of ~ Gp G do~andod the earliost )ossiblo beginning of tho attack, l·10roovor, with the bulk of the attack formations in tho asso;ably aroas, the secrecy of tho oporation was no longer vouchsafed, particularly so as tho ener~ was reconnoitring the Eifol area with photo-flashbonbs. Tho cOIilLlitnent of strong eneny force~ east of -'..Bchon was of ad' ventage to tho Gernans, but tho renowed enomy gains on the left wing of A Gp G werO a sourco of danger. Co of S. 0 B. West was prosent at the FUhrer's situation conferonce and roported in that sonse. ~x 1530 hrs word was roceivod over the telephono from tho FUhror's Headquartors: i1No change) D Day 16 Dec 44 1i O. B. :Vost noted: llThorewith all is docided, a furthor change is no longer poss ible.:r (Ibid, 15 Dec)

16 Duc

155· !i.t 0535 hrs, aftor ton :.linutes of artillory preparation, Sixth ~anzer ;cr~y, Fifth Panzor )~~y and the participating elements of Seventh :-crny launched the big attack. (Ibid, 16 Doc) This oporation has boc08o known as the Battlo-or-the Ardennos. It-was undertaken against forbidding odds at a tlile whon tho outco~o ef the war was a foregone conclusion. hThatovor discomfort it causod on tho Allied side was the prico that had to be paid for the P~lied doc isions in Septcaber to rofrain fron cutting off Fiftoenth Army in tho North, Ninoteenth Army in the South and dolivoring a swift poworful single blow against tho industrial hoart of Gernlany. - 69 -

156. Due to the extremely severe seourity regulations surrounding everything even remotely oonneoted with the planning and preparations for the Ardennes Offensive, the souroe materials used for the present report oarry very little information on that subject. In the more recent past, however, a comprehensive first hand story of Hitler's plans and preparations has come to hand in the form of: O.Cj~.H., F.S.B., MS # A-862, Schramm, The Preparations for the German Offensive in the Ardennes, Sep - 16 Dec 44~ German and English texts, (98oSaM(D273)). A synopsis of this detailed presentation is being prepared by Historioal Section (G.S.). 157. The. present report"has been prepared by Capt A.G. Steiger, Historioal Seotion (G.S.)

1+ - ~ \ ;g/4: g,",' I L-"'1,L

for (C. P. Stacey) Colonel Director----- Historioal Section (G.S.) v

List of Appendioes

~ H.S. Number Document -Para "A" Principal Appointments in the West (Autumn 19411,) 7 "B" 981.04.5(Dl) O.B. West, 1.5 Aug 44 Order of Battle 10 "C" 981AGpB(D2) FUhrer Order to hold or destroy Paris 23 Aug 44 17

"D" 981AGpB (D2 ) FUhrer Order of 2.5 Sep 44 70 "E" 981.04.5(Dl) O.B. West, 13 Oct 44 Order of Battle 86 "F" 981HCN(D16) OI0N/WFSt Directive to O.B. West 29 Oct 44 102 VI

GERM...'\N PERSON.t..L Nl.MES

(See also: List of Principal Appointments, Appx "Nt to present Report

BALCK, Hermann, Gen pz Tps, Crndr A Gp G.. (21 Sep ~ 23 Dec 44) 62, 120

BL.l\.SKOVVIT Z, J ohannes , Col Gent 'Gmdr A Gp G 10 May ... 21 Sep 44) 49, 65, 65f 99 BLUMENTRITT, Guenther, Gen Ini', C. of S'. a.B. West (24 Sep 42 - 9 Sep 44) 41 BUSCH, Ernst, Field Marshal 9 CHOLTIT ZJ Dietrich von, Gen Int, l~ed Forces Crndr Paris 18 CHRIST DlNSEN, Karl Friedrich, General German Air Force, l~ed Forces Cmdr Netherlands 28, 56, 113 DIETRICH, Sepp, SS Col Gen, Gmdr Fifth Panzer Army (9"Aug - 10' Sep 44) Cmdr Sixth Panzer l~my (13 Sep 44 - May 1945) 46, .52 ERDMANN, Wolf. Lt Gen, Cmdr 7 Para Div 34, 35 FELDT, Kurt, Gen Cav, Cmdr Corps Feldt 148 VII

Ffthrer,the: see Hitler, Adolf

GUDERI.AN, Heinz W'11helm, Col Gen, Inspeotor General of Panzer Troops, Acting C. of,S. of the 4tr.my General Staff (a~ of 22 Jul 44) 1.5, 37 HJMMLER, Heinrich, Reiohsf'6hrer SS 47, 136, 136f HITLER, Adolf (Ftlhrer, the) 7, 8, 9, 12, 15, 17, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29f 31, 32-, 38, 39, 41, 43, 45, 46, 49~ .50~ 52, 53, .54, 57, 60, 61, 64, 65-, 69, ~o, Zl, ~§; l4, 76, 81, 2, 5, 9f 90, , 91', 93, 100, 101,

111-, 112. 118' , 119, 134, 13.5, 136, 150, 156 HBHNE, Gustaf, Gen Inf, Cmdr Group H6hne l46, 148 J"ODL, Alfred, Col G€n, Chief WFst 18, 20, , 21~ 32, 112, 123, 132, 133

KEITEL, Wilhelm, Field Marshal, Chief OKW 38, 39, 84 KESSELRING, Albert, Field Marshal, O.B. Southwest 31 KLUGE, GUnther von, Field Marshal, O.B. West (3 J"ul ~ 17 Aug 44) (s.a. O.B. West) 7 VIII

KREBS, Hans,. Lt Gen, C. of S. A Gp B (from Sep 44) 89f 93 MANTEUFFEL, Hasso Ecoard von, Gen pz Tps, Cmdr Fifth Panzer Army (10 Sep 44 - early March 1945) 46 MODEL, Wa1ter~ Field Marshal, (s.a. O.B. West) O.B_ West 17 Aug - 4 Sep' 44 O.B. A Gp B: 17 Aug 44 - 15 Apr 45 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, .17, 18, 19, 20, 22, '24, '26 , 27, 28, 29f 38, 39., 61., 69, 92 O.B. West, (s.a. von Kluge, Model, von. Rundstedt) 14, 18, 30, 30f 31, 38, 39, 41, 43', 44, 48, .51, . 53, 54, 56, 56f 57, 59, 62, 64, 65, 66, 71' 76, 78, 81, 82, 83, 86: 87, 88, 89; 90, 94, 9.5 , 97, 98, 99,100,101, 102, 103f 107, 10&, 109, 110, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 122, 1'24,: 12:5, 126, 121-, 128, 129, 130,: 133, 134, 136, 141.-, 141f 142;: 143, 144, 145, 146, 150, 151; 153, 154 OBSTFELDER, Hans von, Gen Int, Cmdr 88 Corps; Cmdr First Army as of 4 Dec 44 143 RUNDSTEDT, Gerd von, Field Marshal (s.a. O.B. West) O.B. West: 8 Mar 42 ~ 3 Ju1 44, O.B. West: 4 Sep 44 - 10 Mar 45 7, 21, 31, 3-8; 39, 47, 49, 51, 65;f 67, 68,. 69, 74, 82, 86, 99, 103, 108, Ill, 119, 123., 132, 133, 140 SCHRAMM, Percy,. Major, War Diarist OKW/WFSt (from 2 Jun 43) 32, 60, 84, 85 IX

SPEIDEL, Hans, Lt Gen, C. of S. A Gp B (till beginning of Sep 44) 29 STUDENT, Kurt, Col Gen, Cmdr A Gp Student: 31 Oct - 10 Nov 44 Cmdr A Gp H: 10 Nov 44 - 28 Jan 45 34 STUMPFF, Horst, Gen pz Tps West 36, 37, 47 WARLThWNT, Walter, Gen Arty, Deputy Chief WFSt 30, 126

WESTPR~, Siegfried, Lt Gen (Gen Cav) , C. of S. O.B. West 31, 41, 89f 91, 92, 93, 101, 123, 126, 132, 154 ZIMMERMANN, Bodo, Lt Gen, 1 Ops O.B. West (Oct 40 - May 45) Ilf x

GERM.1iN HEiillQ.UI\.RTERS AND FORMATIONS

Armed Forces "High Command (OKW): 13, 21, 27, 45, 58, 64, 65f 68, 69, 71, 75, 76, 84, 85, 87, 89, 93, 95, 98, 101, 103f lOB, 109, Ill, 113, 119, 120, 123, 128, 129, 132, 136, 144, 150, 154 Army High Command (OKH) : 13 Ftlhrer H. Q.' : 89f 91, 92, 93, 154 HQ, O.B. West: 86, 113 HQ, A Gp B: 56, 86 HQ, A Gp H: 108, 115 HQ, Fifth pz Army: 45, 46, 83, 87, 113, 121 HQ, Feldj8ger Kommando z.b.V. (temporary cover name for HQ, Fifth PZ Army): 113 HQ, -Sixth pz Army: 52 HQ, Fifteenth Army: 113, 121 HQ, Armed Forces Cmdr Netherlands: 28, 59, 76, 113 HQ, Armed Forces Cmdr Paris: 18 HQ, Armeegruppe Kleffel: 108 HQ, 2 SS pz Corps: 56, 75, 121, 127 HQ, 12 SS Corps: 75 HQ, 30 Corps: 114, 121 HQ, 47 pz Corps: 83, 92 HQ, 53 Corps: 114 HQ, 58 pz Corps: 107 HQ, 67 Corps: 143 HQ, 85 Corps: 114 XI

HQ, 88 Corps: 127, 130 HQ, Corps Feldt: 148 HQ, Higher Command Vosges: 130 HQ, Military District V: 125 HQ, Military District VI: 56, 57 HQ, Military District X: 57, 58

Army Groups

Army Group B: '7, 10, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23-, 30, 31, 38, 49, 51, 56, 57, 61, 63, 64, 67, 83, 86, 87, 89, 89f 90, 92, 94, 98, 101, 105, 108,, 109, 110, 113, 114, 115, 119 - 127, 131, 134, 135, 136, 139, 141 - 145, 147 - 151, 153, 154 Army Group Centre: 9 Army Group D: 31, see O.B. West Army Group G: 10, lOf 11, 20, 23, 26, 27, 31, 40f 45, 47 - 52, 54, 59, 63, 65, 65f 68, ~o, 78, 79, 81, 83, 85, 7, 96, 105, 107, 119, 120 - 126, 1'28, 130, 132, 134, 135, 136, 139, 142 - 151, 153, 154 Armeegruppe G: 10f 11, 48 Army Group H: 108, 110, 115, 121, 122, 124, 125, 126, 128, 129, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 141, 142 - 145, 147, 148 Armeegruppe IQeffel: 108 Army Group North: 9 Army Group Northern Ukraine: 9, 29f XII

Armies

First Arm.y: 10, 20, 22, 28, 29, 3~. 40, 40f 49, 63, 77, 9 , 107, 119 - 124, 132, 134, 136, 142, 143, 145, 146 First Parachuto ArmY: (also styled Parachute Army) : 13, 14, 30, 34, 36, 40, 42, 44, 45, 47, 49, 51, 52, 59, 63, 64, 67, 68, 69, 70, 75~ 77, 79, 81, 82, 85, 95, 99, 107, 115, 117, 148, 151 Fifth Panzer ArmY: 7, 10, 22, 28, 29, 42, 45, 46, 49, :5-0, 51, 53, 63, 65, 68, 69, 72, 77, 87, 92, 95, 104, 107, 113, 121, 155 Sixth Panzer Army: 46, 52, 81, 85, 87, 89, 103, 103f 108, 109. 155 seventh Army: 7, 10, 22, 32, 36, 39 - 42, 44, 45, 49 - 52, 59, 79, 81, 85, 129, 141, 147, 151, 155 Fifteenth Arniy: 10, 11, 22, 28, 29, 40, 42, 49, 51, 55, 56, 59, 60, 64, 68, 70, 72, 76, 79, 81, . 82, 90, 92, 93, 94, 98 .- 101, 104, 106. 113, 115, 117, 118, 121, 147, 155 Gruppe von Manteuffe1: (temporary cover name for Fifteenth .Army) 113 Nineteenth Army: 10, 20, 23, 26, 40, 49 - 55, 59, 65f 72, 77, 87, 89, 96, 107, 114, 120, 122, 123, 124, 125, 134, 136, 137, 139, 142, 145, 148, 151, 1.55 Armed Forces Command Netherlands: 10, 56, 59, 76, 99, 115 XIII

Corps

1 SS pz Corps: 41, 49 2 Para Corps: .5 9, 74 2 SS pz Corps: .5 6, .5 9, 72, 74, 7.5 , 81, 94, 127 3 pz 'Corps: 29f 12 SS Corps: 61~ 7.5, 92 13 SS Corps: 119, 120, 146 47 pz Corps: 24, 68, 92, 94, 98, 100, 104, 107, 121, 122 .58 pz Corps: 107 64 Corps: 23, 31 66 Corps: 141 74 Corps: 41 81 Corps: 41, 92 82 Corps: 119, 146 86 Corps: 94, 104, 143 88 Corps: 30, 33, 34, 3.5, 141f (s.a. Group HBhne below) 89 Corps: 119, 146 90 Corps: 146 401 Volks Arty Corps: 12O, 143 402 Volks Arty Corps: 143 404 Volks Arty Corps: 143, 144 Corps Feldt: 104, 148 Group HBhne: 146, 148, 149

Divisions

1 SS pz 75 2 Para 34 2Pz 36, 40f 2 SS pz 87 3 Para 30, 36, 114, 129 3 pz Gran 14f 23, 24, .5 0, 77 .5 Para. 30, 36, 147 6 Para 30, 36, 114, 147 7 Para 34, 3.5 9 pz 70, 72, 74, 98, 107

• XIV

9 SS pz 36, 56 10 SS pz 36, 94, 118, 122 11 pz 26, 40, 42, 49, 53, 96, 120, 142, 143, 144 12 Inf 39, 42, 52, 54, 126 15 pz Gran 14f 23, 24, 50, 83, 86, 98, 104, 107 17 SS pz Gran 47, 120 18 VGD 87 21 pz 50, 96. 10.5, 120 2.5 pz Gran 120 26 33 pz 47 27 SS pz 47 36 Gran (VGD) 14f 120 .59 Inf 61 64 In! 64 79 VGD 147 8.5 Inf 33, 122, 129. 145 116 pz 36, 42, 70, 72, 74, 77 176 Trg &: Repl see 176 Inf No. 176 see 176 Inf 176 Inf 33, 34 No. 180 see 180 Inf 180 Inf 57, 58, 61 No. 190 see 190 Inf 190 Inf 57, 58, 61 198 Inf 128 245 VGD 122, 146 246 VGD 77, 81 2.56 VGD 71, 75, 146 347 Int 22, 30, 33 361 VGD 57, 71, 75, 96, 146 363 VGD 75, 118, 122 553 Gren (VGD) 14t 22, 23 559 Gren (VGD) 14t 22 563 Gren (VGD) 14f 712 Int 59 719 Int 30, 33, 34 Erdmann see 7 Para Walther (ad hoc) 35 von Tettau (ad hoc) 59 pz Lehr 4Of 42, 126, 128, 130, 133, 134, 135, 137, 142. 143, 144

Groups

Battle Group Walther 35 Battle Group 9 pz Div 39 Group pz Lehr see pz Lehr Group H6hne see Corps'

Brigades

4 Mortar 95 15 Volks Werfer 95. 143 16 Volks Werfer 143 18 Flak 33 101 pz 14f 102 pz 14f XVI

103 pz 14f 104 pz 14f 10.5 pz 14f 23 106 pz 14f 22, 23, 50, 77 107 pz 14f 61 108 pz 14f 66 109 pz 14f 110 pz 14f III pz 68 112 pz 42, 68 113 pz 42, 68 244 Asslt Gun 144 766 GHQ, 7.5 902 Asslt Gun 144

Regiments

2 Para 34 6 Para 34, 35, 129 Para Repl and Trg Regt llHermann G8ring" 3.5 SS Regt Landstorm Nederland 3.5

Battalions

1 Bn 2 Para Regt (2 Para Div) 34, 3.5 1 En SS Regt tiLandstorm Nederland" 3.5 2 Bn SS Regt "Landstorm Nederland" 3.5 103 pz En (3 pz Gren Div) 77 471 GHQ, A Tk En 61 504 Hy Tk Bn (Tiger) 61 XVII

.5.59 A Tk Bn 33, 144 Reece Bn 1 SS pz Div 7.5 pz Bn 3 pz Gren Div (see 103 pz Bn)

other Services

German Air Foroe: 19, 20, 21 , 48, Luftflotte Reich: 34

German Navy: 21, 48 Naval Operations Staff: 102 Naval Group West: 97 Naval Command West: 9'1

Organization Todt: 48 XVIII

GERMAN SOURCES

A. Primary Sources

B. Seoondary Sources

(Full titles cited in first Reference)

A. Primary Sources

H.S. Number Document -Para 981.045(Dl) OKH, Periodical Schematio 10, 13, 86 Orders of Battle of the German Army, 1944

981HC(D52) OKH, Personnel Files 46 (Selected Photostats)

981HC(D17) Fahrer Directives 27, 30, 54 (U.S. Navy Translation)

98lHC(D204) OKH, Army General Staff, 14f 15 Org Sec, Miso Orders 1943 -- 1945

981HC(D50) JodI, Diary Notes 15, 113

981SOM (DI02) Sohramm, Der Westen, e4, e6, 27, 1 Apr - 16 Dec 44 31, 32, 41. , 50, 52-, 5-3, 54, 56, 60, 73, 80, 82, 84, 85, 111, 112, 118, 136, 136f

• XIX

H.S. Number Document Para-

981S0M(D93) Schramm~ 113 The Western Front, 16 Dec 44 - 28 Feb 45 981S0M(D273) Schramm, 156 The Preparations for the Ardennes Offensive

Sitmaps

981HC(D124 ) mill, Sitmap West, 14f 2 Sep 44

981HC(D125 ) OKH, Sitmap West, 33, 40f 45, 9 Sep 44 46

981HC(D126) DIm, Sitmap West, 56 17 Sep 44

Navy

981HCN(D16) Naval Operations Staff (Skl) 102 File North Sea - Norwa,

O.B. West (A Gp D)

981CW(D82) W.D. Maroh 1944 14

981CW(D32) W.D. August 1944 18, 19, 21

981CW(D59 ) W.D. September 1944 26, -27, 28, -3Of 31, 33, 39, 40, 40f 41, 42, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, ,-6, 51, 61, 6-2, 6-3, 64~ 6-4f -6-5, 6-5f 66~ 68~ 69, 71~ 72, 73-, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78 xx H.S. Number Document .-Para 981CW(D60) W.D. October 1944 79, 86 - 10.5

981CW(D61) W.D. November 1944 103f 107 - 111, 113, 114, 11.5, 117, 119 - 137, 139

981CW(D62) W.D. December 1944 140 - 1.5.5

H.S. Micro-film O.B. West, Appendices Reel No. 69 to W.D. 11 - 20 Sep 44 .5 6, .5 6f

981CW(D.53) O.B. West, Daily Sitreps, 44, .50 .5 9, 69'

981CW(D63) Gen of pz Tps west, 36, 37, 47 Report on' Activities, 22 Aug - 31 Dec 44

981CW(D34) O.B. West; Intreps, 116, 141f 144 26 Sep - 31 Dec 44

Army Group B ~

981AGpB(D2) A Gp B, 14, 17, 18, FUhrer Orders and Misc 21, 23, 27, Docs, Jun - Sep 44 43, .54, 70

981AGpB(D3) A Gp B, 20 , 22, 2-9, Weekly Reports and 38, 39, 67, Mise Docs, 20 May - 81 early Oct 44

Armies

981PA.5(D3) Fifth Panzer' Army, 46 W.D. 10 Sep - 22 Oct 44