Troops and crewmen aboard Coast Guard–manned LCVP as it approaches Normandy beach on D-Day, June 6, 1944 (National Archives and Records Administration/U.S. Coast Guard Collection)

Behind Enemy Plans A Process-Tracing Analysis of Germany’s Operational Approach to a Western Invasion

By Bradley Podliska, Karin Hecox, and Oliver Sagun

No plan survives contact with the enemy.

—Field Marshal Count Helmuth von Moltke the Elder

ixty-four years after Moltke’s observation, two mid-level S German commanders, faced with Dr. Bradley Podliska is an Assistant Professor of Military and Security Studies at the Air Command the herculean task of changing the and Staff College. Major Karin Hecox, USMC, is the Deputy Branch Chief, Operations Division, J32 Intelligence, Reconnaissance Operations, Joint Staff. Major Oliver Sagun, USAF, is Division Chief, C4 course of history on an early June 1944 Systems and Support, Headquarters, United States Forces Japan. morning, failed in their duties. In using

JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 Podliska, Hecox, and Sagun 107 Figure 1 German Chain of Command phenomenon (in this case, German defense of its Western theater) in a sequential manner.7 One such process- Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces tracing test is the hoop test. For a Hitler hoop test, a fact must be able to “jump through a hoop” in order to be consid- ered true. The hoop, in this case, is an OWArmed Force Ouftaffe ONavy OHArmy High Command High Command High Command High Command element of operational design assigned to Keitel Goering Doenit Hitler an individual German leader or general (see figure 1). In other words, a German commander is eliminated as being at fault

OB West Third Air Force Navy Group West for the D-Day loss if the commander did Rundstedt Sperrle Krancke in fact conduct his responsibilities as as- signed in planning.8

Staff, Paner German War Strategy Army Group G Army Group B Group West Blaskowit Rommel Understanding Germany’s war strat- Schweppenburg egy, operational environment, and Personal Access problems is crucial to contextualizing Direct Chain of Command Hitler and his commanders for the Conditional Tactical Control of Certain Elements hoop test.9 Hitler, adhering to his Mein Kampf objective of lebensraum structured and qualitative analysis to West), and Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, (living space) in the East, first secured examine German strategy and opera- Army Group B, contributed to the his eastern flank by invading Poland, tions in the events leading up to and German failure at Normandy.3 next conquered Western Europe, and on D-Day, the loss can be traced to More specifically, the research remains then began his campaign to defeat Admiral Theodor Krancke, commander problematic because it fails to answer Russia.10 The Russian invasion stalled, of Naval Group West, and Field Marshal basic questions: Did the Germans have a and by autumn 1942, the Germans Hugo Sperrle, commander of Luftwaffe plan in place to defeat an Allied Western changed their strategy to focus on a Third Air Fleet. Infighting, conflict- invasion? If so, did Hitler and his com- global war, not a theater war. Several ing authorities, and lack of warfighting manders follow the plan? To put it simply, new factors were at play: First, Hitler capabilities clearly hampered German who lost D-Day? These questions are realized the Eastern Front had become command and control of operations on independent of Allied plans and actions a quagmire. Second, the Allies opened the Normandy coast. The Germans did and cover the events leading up to and on a second front in North Africa. Third, have a plan, however, and Krancke and the day of the invasion. the Germans reached their zenith of Sperrle proved to be the weak links: By organizing German plans into manpower (losses could not be made Both failed to execute when facing an elements to create a cognitive map or up).11 By summer 1943, the German Allied invasion on the Western Front. operational approach, historians may situation worsened. Tunisia in North This failure is counter to the mytho- better understand the German defeat.4 Africa fell. Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz logical story of D-Day. The Allies, with An operational approach is “a broad lost the U-boat Atlantic campaign, and overwhelming force and an overabun- description of the mission, operational a German operation to halt Russian dance of courage, executed a brilliant concepts, tasks, and actions required to advances failed. Moreover, the Allies assault plan and won the longest day. As accomplish the mission.”5 Specifically, it invaded Italy and began a relentless air- the story goes, the Allied invasion was is the plan of how Hitler and his gener- bombing campaign over Germany.12 By so superior and heroic that nothing the als sought to defeat a Western invasion. the fall, with manpower and resources Germans did mattered; the good guys Constructing a German operational becoming scarce, the Oberkommando were bound to win.1 At least superficially, approach post hoc will also help future der Wehrmacht (Armed Forces High this story fails to go beyond some notable joint planners better understand a com- Command, or OKW) issued a directive facts. Adolf Hitler micromanaged tactical mander’s role and responsibilities in requiring all changes in strength to be actions, and given his late wake-up on executing an operational plan.6 approved.13 June 6, the Allies took full advantage.2 The German operational plan can The personal feuds and fights over power, be analyzed with process-tracing, a The Operational especially the one between Field Marshal popular qualitative method for perform- Environment in 1944 Gerd von Rundstedt, Oberbefehlshaber ing within-case analysis. Process-tracing In defending about 1,000 miles of the West (Supreme Commander West, or OB evaluates causal links and describes a Atlantic Wall, the Germans assessed

108 Recall / Behind Enemy Plans JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 Troops wade ashore from LCVP landing craft, off Omaha Beach, June 6, 1944 (National Archives and Records Administration/U.S. Army Signal Corps Collection)

defense of the coastal environment Allies to have a tank superiority ratio of under OKW, and, on paper, had the sub- based on forces available, evaluation of 10 to 1.18 From April to May 1944, the ordinate units of Army Group B, Army the threat, and terrain. In consultation Fremde Heere West (Foreign Armies Group G, and Panzer Group West.22 with the navy, OB West assessed sectors West) reported the number of Allied Rommel was responsible for the for suitability of troop landing, and divisions as 75 to 90 divisions (a misin- defense of Normandy, where he had defensive obstacles were placed accord- formed count due to double agents and the Seventh Army with the 84th Corps ingly.14 Both the OKW and OB West bureaucratic rivalry). The extreme esti- being the forward corps. In total, the expected the Allies to land at a port.15 mates led Hitler to believe there would Seventh Army had 14 infantry divisions, The Oberkommando der Marine (Navy be a diversionary attack first, followed 1 Panzer division, and 47 heavy guns. High Command, or OKM) stated that by the main attack.19 The 716th Division—comprising mainly an attack would occur at high tide.16 To counter this threat, Germany old men, teenagers, convalescents, and The Germans expected to be able to prepared 10 Panzer divisions and 50 ethnic Germans from occupied ter- move and resupply troops rapidly to the infantry divisions to defend against an ritories—covered the British beaches. invasion area via rail.17 invasion.20 These units were organized The 352nd Infantry Division and 726th under a German command and control Regiment covered Omaha Beach. The Defining the Problem structure that was disjointed, convo- 352nd Division consisted of 12,734 veter- The problem Germany faced in 1944 luted, and contradictory.21 Directly ans with modern weapons (for example, was how to defeat enemy forces on under Hitler was the OKW, the OKM, 105-millimeter [mm] and 150mm artil- multiple fronts. For the Western inva- the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe lery pieces). The 709th Infantry Division sion, German estimates varied widely (Luftwaffe High Command, or OKL), covered Utah Beach and the Cherbourg from 10 Allied divisions to as many as and the Oberkommando des Heere port.23 The Luftwaffe Third Air Fleet, 70 divisions. Germany expected the (Army High Command). OB West fell under Sperrle, reported directly to OKL,

JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 Podliska, Hecox, and Sagun 109 Figure 2 German Operational Approach

Problem How to defeat Allied forces on multiple fronts with minimal manpower

Defense of German Paners fortresses and defensive/obstacle engage/defeat COG Termination fortified areas plan landing forces Deny Freedom of Allies denied Political, social, economic, aneuver freedom of and military domination OB est/Army Group B movement over its adversaries

Bomb UK Bomb troop Coastal ports transports defense Deny Allied forces Deny assing of Forces Allied ilitary Endstate rd the ability to mass 3 Air Force forces ISO landing Forces Defeat of Allied Invasion

Bomb U-Boat Mine-laying Defend the Channel beaches Patrols operations and North Sea area Deny Ability to Deny Allied forces Obectives and Forces the ability to land Navy Group est at the beaches Defeat of Allied beach landing under Reichsmarshal Hermann Goering. to assess an individual German leader military endstate was the defeat of an It operated in a “cooperative” relation- or general. The elements of operational Allied invasion.33 ship with OB West.24 Planes employed in design are taken from Joint Publication Hitler believed that the Allies, if coastal defense were under the control (JP) 5-0, Joint Planning, and include: defeated on the beach, would not make of OB West. Otherwise, OB West had to another invasion attempt. He could then center of gravity (COG)—a source request the services of Third Air Fleet,25 • focus on defeating Russian forces.34 As of power that provides strength, which consisted of the 2nd, 9th, and such, he made his strategy clear with freedom of action, or will to act 10th Flying Corps, 2nd Air Division, 2nd Fuhrer Directive 51, dated November lines of operations (LOO)—actions Fighter Corps, and 122nd Reconnaissance • 3, 1943. The directive ordered com- or activities on nodes or decisive Group.26 Sperrle had 319 operational manders to upgrade coastal defenses and points designed to achieve an aircraft under his command at the time mass Panzer divisions.35 Furthermore, on objective of the Allied invasion.27 Notably, a major- December 20, during a situation update decisive points—geographic points, ity of the German fighter aircraft and • meeting, Hitler made clear, “I have stud- events, or factors that allow a com- reserves, some 600, were stationed in ied most of the [reports] now. There’s mander to achieve an advantage Germany for defense of the homeland.28 no doubt that the attack in the West will objectives—what militarily must be Navy Group West, under Krancke, re- • come in the spring; it is beyond all doubt. accomplished to achieve an endstate ported directly to OKM, under Doenitz. . . . If they attack in the West, [then] this military endstate—the point at which As with Third Air Fleet, only naval ele- • attack will decide the war.”36 the military instrument of power is ments involved in coastal defense were Hitler also took extensive steps no longer needed to achieve national under the control of OB West. Naval to turn the war bureaucracy toward objectives artillery, deployed on land, remained these objectives. First, he concentrated termination—the conditions that under navy control, unless a land invasion • his power.37 On March 23, 1943, he must exist at the end of military was occurring.29 Navy Group West assets issued an order stating that higher com- operations.31 included the 5th Torpedo Flotilla, the 15th mands could not prevent subordinate Patrol Boat Flotilla, the 5th Schnellboot Hitler’s Actions Regarding the units from reporting directly to him.38 (S-Boat, or, by the Allied name, E-Boat) Termination Criteria and Military Rommel, for example, appealed to Flotilla, and the 9th S-Boat Flotilla, which Endstate. For Germany, Hitler was clearly Hitler to place the army and labor forces in total consisted of 20 to 30 E-boats, responsible for setting the termination under him for the purpose of defend- 6 torpedo boats, 20 minesweepers, 3 to criteria and for approving, if not crafting, ing against a Western invasion. Hitler 4 destroyers, and 4 to 5 U-boats in the the military endstate. In U.S. joint doc- denied his request.39 Second, and despite English Channel area.30 trine, the President sets the termination claims to the contrary, Hitler moved criteria of every operation, according forces to the West. For example, in A Process-Tracing Analysis to JP 5-0.32 For a hoop test to be ac- March 1944, Hitler ordered the Panzer of Germany’s Operational cepted, Hitler must have failed to set the Lehr (Teach) Division to be removed Approach to a Western Invasion termination criteria or approve a military from the West and used in Hungary. Hitler and his commanders’ plan to endstate. In terms of German operations However, the division was sent back defeat the anticipated invasion can be in the West, the termination criteria were to France in May.40 Hitler also ordered organized into elements of operational political, social, economic, and military light antiaircraft weapons to France, design (see figure 2). Elements are used domination over its adversaries. The even at the expense of protecting the

110 Recall / Behind Enemy Plans JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 Soldiers relax outside French café, in Sainte-Mère-Eglise, France, June 6, 1944 (National Archives and Records Administration/National Museum of the U.S. Navy)

German homeland.41 Most important, Doenitz’s Actions Regarding the By spring 1944, the German navy was Hitler ordered forces comprising troops Military Endstate, Objective, COG, greatly diminished, but in anticipation of from Eastern European countries (for LOO, and Decisive Point. Doenitz was a cross-channel invasion, OKM deployed example, Russia, Latvia, Lithuania) to responsible for helping craft the military its largest and deadliest E-boats (a fast be moved to the West. In total, 72 bat- endstate, identify the enemy operational attack craft), the S-38/100 class, along talions were deployed in France by early COG, prepare the LOO, and determine with minesweepers to the West to defend 1944.42 Third, at the beginning of April the decisive points.45 In addition to the the channel invasion area.47 Moreover, 1944, Hitler believed the attack would already stated military endstate, the OKM planned to send out 40 U-boats come at Normandy.43 objective was the defeat of an Allied at the time of the invasion.48 Fearing Hitler anticipated the Allied attack, landing, and the agreed-upon Allied an invasion, it placed no less than 34 and he was focused intensively on the operational COG was fielded forces, in E-boats in Cherbourg and in Boulogne, Western invasion and how to stop it. In particular those landing on the coast.46 bracketing the future invasion area.49 The fact, Hitler’s intuition was confirmed on The LOOs involved the establishment deployment effectively placed any Allied the afternoon of June 5 from intelligence of the Atlantic Wall and joint operations. landing in “deadly peril.”50 It also had reporting of radio intercepts that the The most important decisive point was radar to help direct forces when the Allies invasion would occur on June 6.44 Thus, the invasion landing site. If Doenitz were detected crossing the channel.51 Hitler performed his planned duties on carried out these assigned elements, the Doenitz, like Hitler, focused on stop- D-Day. hoop test is rejected. ping a Western invasion. The deployment

JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 Podliska, Hecox, and Sagun 111 of the preponderance of naval forces in trust, serving as “the funnel through forces were to withdraw to a defensive the anticipated attack area, which could which Hitler’s orders passed and which line running from the Seine River above have potentially defeated an invasion, received reports, complaints, and ques- Paris southwest to Switzerland. If an at- demonstrates that Doenitz fulfilled the tions.”56 As OKW chief, Keitel did not tack occurred in Normandy or along the military endstate, objective, COG, LOO, have any command authority, but he did channel coast, defensive tactics were to be and decisive point requirements. have the authority to issue directives, used to throw the invaders back into the Goering’s Actions Regarding the prepare operational plans, and coordinate sea. Failing this, defeated forces were to Military Endstate, Objective, COG, joint operations.57 This lack of command withdraw behind the Seine.64 LOO, Decisive Point, and Ordering authority makes it more difficult to pin a Fourth, regarding the decisive Operations. Goering, like Doenitz, was specific failure on Keitel in accepting the point, OKW determined in 1943 that responsible for helping craft the military hoop test. the Fifteenth Army sector, an area from endstate, identify the enemy operational First, regarding the endstate and Belgium south to Rouen, France, would COG, prepare the LOO, and determine objective, OKW took extensive steps to be the decisive point in the expected the decisive points.52 Goering, however, defeat an Allied landing. Beginning in invasion.65 was able to order operations. This addi- 1942, OKW (and OB West) designated Finally, OKW served as an arbiter of tional duty, while giving him more power high-priority harbors as “fortresses” and disputes and established its authority as and authority, also means that Goering lower priority harbors as “fortified areas.” necessary.66 For example, the Germans has a greater chance of passing the hoop Between these harbors was a system of believed the Panzers were key to repel- test of failing to have carried out his strongpoints, which consisted of bat- ling the Allied invaders, and on this responsibilities. teries protected by infantry.58 Then, in Rundstedt and Rommel were in dis- Goering understood the urgency of coordination with Rommel, OKW (and agreement. Rundstedt was clear that the repelling the invasion, and he planned to OB West) established a beach defensive invasion needed to be stopped on D-Day, recall all German fighters defending the system. The Germans, relying on con- not D-Day plus one. He was skeptical homeland and send them to the invasion scripted labor under Organization Todt, that he had the resources to defeat the in- sector. At the commencement of an inva- poured concrete for bunkers and put in vasion; thus, he believed keeping reserves sion, Goering would send out a coded place a multilayered defensive belt, which out of reach of naval artillery and aerial message: “Threatening Danger West.” consisted of Belgian Gates festooned bombardment was key. These reserve Moreover, Goering ordered that 50 per- with mines, Hemmenbalk tripod-shaped forces would then be sent to destroy cent of all units be kept in readiness status ramps, Czech hedgehogs, and 2,000 the Allies on the beach.67 Alternatively, to conduct low-level attacks to support stakes with mines.59 In terms of opera- Rommel shared the view of OKW that the army in defensive measures.53 tional defense, the Germans flooded wide forces, including mobile artillery and Goering, like Hitler and Doenitz, swaths of area to make the terrain impass- Panzer tanks, should be placed as close focused on stopping a Western inva- able.60 In terms of tactical defense and to to the shore as possible. Rommel went so sion. The readiness order and the plan prevent Allied access to road networks, far as to send almost daily requests to OB to defeat a landing demonstrate that beach draws were closed off with ob- West for tactical changes.68 Both generals Goering fulfilled the military endstate, stacles, mines, and gun emplacements.61 appealed to OKW, and OKW effectively objective, COG, LOO, and decisive point Second, regarding the Allied opera- divided up the Panzer divisions between requirements. Goering failed, however, tional COG, on January 28, 1944, OKW the two generals. Rommel was given con- to place additional forces in the West in briefed Hitler that the Allies had 488 trol of three divisions, and the remaining anticipation of an invasion. Moreover, combat vehicle landing ships, a sufficient were kept under the Panzer Group West he retained operational authority, and he number to land 25 divisions in each Commander General Leo Geyr von believed June 5 reports that an imminent wave.62 The critical vulnerability of the Schweppenburg, who reported directly to invasion was a feint. Therefore, Goering fielded forces was the troops, still in naval Rundstedt.69 did not issue “Threatening Danger West” transport from the United Kingdom to As a second example, OKW made the until June 7 and thus partially failed to the beaches of Normandy. decision to disaggregate Eastern troop carry out his responsibilities.54 Third, OKW established plans that units and integrate them into German Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel’s laid the groundwork for LOOs. In its regiments rather than deploy them as in- Actions Regarding the Military planning, it ordered that if an attack oc- dependent units. A “Commander of the Endstate, Objective, COG, LOO, and curred in southern France or in Brittany, Volunteer Units under the Commander- Decisive Point. Keitel, like Doenitz German bombers were to bomb English in-Chief West (OB West)” was created and Goering, helped craft the military ports, as weather permitted, and fight- for coordination of these troops, adding endstate, identify the enemy operational ers were to be kept on call and launched to the bureaucratic confusion.70 As a COG, prepare the LOO, and determine to assault the landing forces.63 German third example, Army Group B Chief of the decisive points.55 Keitel was not a ground forces were to defend the for- Staff General Hans Speidel specifically re- popular general, but he did have Hitler’s tresses at all costs, and then remaining quested an operational directive on April

112 Recall / Behind Enemy Plans JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 1, 1944, and Hitler and OKW Chief of his plan was OKW approved and was take action to deny an Allied massing of Staff General Alfred Jodl rejected his consistent with the approach to deny the forces in Western Europe. In this LOO, request on the grounds that OB West Allies to land and establish a beachhead. Sperrle’s responsibilities involved all and Army Group B bore the mission for Krancke’s Actions Regarding air activities in defending the beaches, defeating the Allies on the beach.71 the LOO. Krancke, as an operational including reconnaissance, acting on Keitel, like his peers and in his role as commander, would also have been intelligence, and bombing the landing a de facto chief of Hitler’s personal staff, responsible for executing his assigned transports and forces.81 focused on stopping a Western invasion. LOO, denying the Allied ability to land Sperrle, like Krancke, grounded The plan for how to defeat an invasion forces. This is a narrowly focused LOO his force due to weather.82 On D-Day, such as bombing English ports, defend- and requires specific action by Krancke. Sperrle had a limited force of 80 service- ing fortresses, and defeating the landing Together, this increases the probability able fighters (out of 319), but he still did invasion at all costs fulfilled the military that a hoop test is accepted. not take the initiative and employ these endstate, objective, COG, LOO, and Krancke did not conduct recon- forces.83 Three bombers were ordered decisive point requirements, exonerating naissance patrols in the days prior to to bomb Allied troop transports, but Keitel of responsibility. D-Day due to weather. Furthermore, the order was inexplicably rescinded at Rundstedt’s Actions Regarding he restricted mine-laying operations to 9 a.m.84 Strafing runs were ordered on the LOO. In JP 5-0, commanders are port.76 Krancke did not believe the Allies Gold, Juno, and Sword beaches after responsible for executing actions, such would attempt a landing and wanted to 9:30 a.m., too late to impact the troop as planned use of LOOs, in order to at- give his men a break, so he issued orders transports.85 tain the objective and military endstate.72 the night prior to D-Day to lower war Like Krancke, Sperrle failed to carry As such, Rundstedt would have been readiness from condition two to condi- out the LOO of denying the Allies the responsible for executing his assigned tion three.77 Furthermore, sailors, using ability to land at the beach. This failure LOO, denying Allied freedom of maneu- position-finding radar, located surface was also one of inaction. Sperrle issued ver. Like Keitel, Rundstedt was limited in ships during the early hours of June 6 but a stand-down order for planes, and he the troops he actually commanded, which did not send out an invasion alert until failed to launch planes at the first sign also lowers the threshold for rejecting the hours later.78 of an invasion. As such, Sperrle failed to hoop test for him. The 15 E-boats of the 5th S-Boat and carry out his responsibilities per the op- Rundstedt was initially distracted. He 9th S-Boat flotillas did depart at 4:30 a.m. erational approach. believed an attack would occur in the out of Cherbourg, but lacking any infor- Rommel’s Actions Regarding the Pas de Calais area.73 Moreover, he got mation on the invasion fleet, the E-boats LOO. As an operational commander, into a political squabble with Rommel. searched north despite the fact that the Rommel, like Krancke and Sperrle, would Fearing Rommel had too much power, invasion fleet was south and east. Given also have been responsible for executing Rundstedt sought to divide and dimin- the late launch of the E-boats, which a specific LOO. With his infantry and ish Rommel’s area of responsibility and were designed to work in the stealth of Panzer divisions, Rommel was to lead received OKW approval in April 1944 for the night, their efficacy against the inva- the main effort of German operations in the creation of Army Group G, consist- sion fleet is doubtful.79 However, 15 denying the Allies freedom of maneuver. ing of the 1st and 19th armies, with an E-boats, if launched based on radar find- If Rommel failed to execute in this effort, area of responsibility of southern France. ings and in the darkness of night, could a hoop test is accepted. Rundstedt named a trusted confidant, have potentially wreaked havoc on the Rommel was responsible for the Johannes Blaskowitz, as commander.74 invasion fleet in a manner similar to the overall defense of Normandy, but the However, Rundstedt attempted to April 1944 Lyme Bay disaster.80 command structure did not lend itself execute his LOO. At 2:30 a.m. on June Krancke failed to carry out the LOO to unity of effort. Rommel’s ability to 6, Rundstedt ordered the 12th SS Panzer of denying the Allies the ability to land execute his LOO was limited, as he could Division and the Panzer Lehr Division at the beach. This failure was based on not make an independent move. This out of operational reserves and into ac- inaction. Despite the fact that he could remained a concern for Rommel leading tion under the command of Rommel. not rely on his radar, Krancke issued a up to the invasion.86 Like Rundstedt, OKW rescinded the order at about 6:30 stand-down order for his boats. As such, Rommel believed an attack would occur a.m., stopping these forces when cloud Krancke failed to carry out his respon- in the Pas de Calais area.87 Rommel cover still obscured their movement.75 sibilities per the planned operational visited his wife on June 6 and was not Rundstedt took action and attempted approach. available to issue orders for 14 hours.88 to carry out his LOO. His political fight Sperrle’s Actions Regarding the The 21st Panzer Division, as a rare ex- with Rommel, especially about how to LOO. Sperrle, like Krancke, would also ception, was directly under Rommel’s place Panzer divisions, did not nega- have been responsible for executing a control. But its commander, General tively impact the LOO or decisive point. specific LOO. For a hoop test to be Edgar Feuchtinger, did not receive orders Rundstedt bears no culpability because accepted, Sperrle must have failed to to move his division until 10 hours after

JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 Podliska, Hecox, and Sagun 113 the start of the invasion. Once Rommel This article answers the question of used. See Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Planning (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, took control, he ordered Feuchtinger who lost D-Day. Despite the common June 16, 2017), IV-19, available at . Rundstedt, did not attack.89 Germans did take significant measures 7 David Collier, “Understanding Process Rommel took action and attempted to defeat an Allied invasion. This Tracing,” PS: Political Science and Politics 44, no. 4 (2011), 823–830. to carry out his LOO. His political research also shows that the dynamics 8 Ibid., 826–827. A hoop test is a qualita- fight with Rundstedt, especially about of infighting and conflict of authorities tive, sequential analysis of an event. In its scope, how to place Panzer divisions, did not in mid-level leadership are critical it must account for commanders who still fol- negatively impact the LOO or decisive elements in understanding strategic lowed the plan, but engaged in unique or cre- point. Moreover, he did what he could; plan implementation. Commanders do ative tactical reactions to battlefield conditions. 9 See JP 5-0, Joint Planning, IV-16. Feuchtinger’s failure to take action not operate in a vacuum, and as found 10 Geoffrey P. Megargee, Inside Hitler’s cannot be blamed on Rommel. in this case, mid-level leaders did not High Command (Lawrence: University Press of follow instructions and plans. German Kansas, 2000), 67. Conclusion pre-invasion efforts were all for naught. 11 Ibid., 189–193. 12 Examined through the lens of the joint This not only makes the adage of Moltke Ibid., 198. 13 Ibid., 206–207. The OKW (Oberkom- planning process, the German strategy the Elder relevant, but it also makes the mando der Wehrmacht), despite consistent bu- and plans to defeat an Allied Western advice of Dwight Eisenhower profound: reaucratic infighting that hampered operations, invasion demonstrate that the popular “Plans are useless, but planning is released an optimistic forecast that Germany arguments—blaming Hitler or Rommel indispensable.”90 JFQ “will win” the war. or bad luck—do not hold up to a hoop 14 The navy concluded that the Normandy coast, due to its reefs, was not likely an inva- test analysis. The results of the hoop sion target. Thus, no defensive obstacles were test demonstrate that individuals failed Notes placed there. Rommel, arriving in winter 1943, to execute their assigned responsibilities immediately ordered construction of defensive 1 in thwarting the D-Day invasion. Spe- Robert Kershaw, Landing on the Edge of obstacles. See Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 40; Eternity: Twenty-Four Hours at Omaha Beach cifically, Krancke and Sperrle failed to Bodo Zimmermann et al., OB West (Atlantic (New York: Pegasus Books, 2018), xxv–xxvi; Wall to Siegfried Line), A Study in Command: execute their LOOs. Goering also failed Mary Kathryn Barbier, D-Day Deception: Op- MS #B-308 GENLT Zimmermann, MS #B-672 to complete all his duties. Unlike Keitel, eration Fortitude and the Normandy Invasion GENMAJ von Buttlar, MS #B-718 GENLT Goering asserted control over forces, (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, Speidel, MS #B-633 GENFLDM von Rundstedt, but he failed to issue a directive—even, 2007), 195. Notably, Kershaw points out that MS #B-344 GEN INF Blumentritt (Washing- the Germans had a formidable force on D-Day as in the case of Keitel, an incorrect one. ton, DC: European Command Historical Divi- within the Normandy theater. In particular, the sion, 1945), 21. The German chain of command was Germans had 14 infantry divisions, a Panzer 15 Kershaw, Landing on the Edge of Eternity, disorganized and contradictory, and the division, and 47 heavy guns to fight an invasion 4; Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 82. commanders seemed unwilling to take force of 6 amphibious divisions and 3 airborne 16 B.H. Liddell Hart, The German Gener- the initiative or think critically once the divisions. In total, Germany could bring 58 to als Talk (New York: William Morrow & Co., 60 divisions from around France to repel the 37 invasion commenced. All of the incom- 1948), 242. divisions of invaders. See Kershaw, Landing on 17 However, 3 weeks prior to D-Day, petence and bad decisions were made in the Edge of Eternity, 34, 67. the Allies began a bombing campaign that 2 spite of Hitler’s order that subordinates Stephen E. Ambrose, D-Day: June 6, eliminated 75 percent of the rail system within could report directly to him. A thorough 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War 150 miles of Normandy. Normandy had been understanding of this disorganization and II (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), effectively isolated. See Barbier, D-Day Decep- 481–482; Barbier, D-Day Deception, 165–167. tion, 178. contradiction and its effect on German 3 David C. Isby, Fighting the Invasion: The 18 Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 78, 82. D-Day operations would help explain German Army at D-Day (New York: Skyhorse 19 OKW maintained control over several German failures, including the inaction of Publishing, 2016), 47–50. military intelligence agencies, including the 4 Krancke and Sperrle. Research generally To be clear, the Germans did not think in Amt Ausland/Abwehr (Office of Foreign focuses on Hitler and the high com- terms of the modern U.S. doctrine of opera- and Counterintelligence). Admiral Wilhelm tional approach. Nonetheless, as a teaching and mand, but a second area would be a more Canaris was chief of the Abwehr. Canaris did learning aid, professional military education not believe the Germans had the forces to win nuanced examination of exactly what instruction structures historical operations and the war, and the Abwehr, based on double Krancke and Sperrle were doing on June battles, such as Operation Torch, into an opera- agents, submitted unreliable reports. Canaris 6. A third area would be to determine tional approach as part of its curriculum. cared only about supplying reports consistently 5 what possibly could have happened if DOD Dictionary of Military and Associ- to Keitel and was considered a poor organizer. ated Terms (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, Krancke and Sperrle did not cancel recon- Hitler lost trust in Canaris and disbanded the June 2020), 159, available at . High Command, 105, 175; Walter Warlimont, 6 ing attack was executed (for example, the There are 13 elements of operational Inside Hitler’s Headquarters: 1939–45 (New April 1944 Lyme Bay attack). design, but not all 13 elements need to be York: F.A. Praeger, 1964), 409.

114 Recall / Behind Enemy Plans JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 20 Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 64. 47 Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 69; Tent, E- OB West, 37; Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 26, 21 Ibid., 19–20. Boat Alert, 51. 63. 22 Rommel and Army Group B were sub- 48 Only 10 to 15 U-boats went out after the 74 Zimmermann et al., OB West, 57–58. ordinate to OB West only on paper. Rommel invasion. See Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 40. 75 Ibid., 72, 75; Isby, Fighting the Invasion, consistently appealed to Hitler directly for op- 49 Tent, E-Boat Alert, 58. 29. erational decision approvals. See Isby, Fighting 50 Ibid. 76 Kershaw, Landing on the Edge of Eternity, the Invasion, 20, 48. 51 Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 69. 42, 74–75. 23 Kershaw, Landing on the Edge of Eternity, 52 JP 5-0, Joint Planning, IV-19–IV-40. 77 Tent, E-Boat Alert, 108. 3–9. 53 Bickers, Air War Normandy, 87. 78 Ibid., 109. 24 Zimmermann et al., OB West, 9. 54 Ibid., 88–89. 79 Ibid., 113. 25 Ibid. 55 JP 5-0, Joint Planning, IV-19–IV-40. 80 In the Lyme Bay disaster, 9 E-boats 26 Richard Townshend Bickers, Air War 56 Brett-Smith, Hitler’s Generals, 189. destroyed 2 landing ship tanks and killed 789 Normandy (London: L. Coopers, 1994), 88. 57 Megargee, Inside Hitler’s High Com- servicemen. See ibid., 9–22. 27 Richard Brett-Smith, Hitler’s Generals mand, 65, 78, 195–196, 198. 81 Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 83–84. (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1976), 125. 58 Zimmermann et al., OB West, 22–23. 82 Kershaw, Landing on the Edge of Eternity, 28 Bickers, Air War Normandy, 89. 59 Kershaw, Landing on the Edge of Eternity, 42, 74–75. 29 Zimmermann et al., OB West, 9; Isby, 128–129. 83 Bickers, Air War Normandy, 89. On D- Fighting the Invasion, 19. 60 Zimmermann et al., OB West, 53. Day, the Allies had an air strength ratio of 25 to 30 Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 86; James F. 61 Kershaw, Landing on the Edge of Eternity, 1. See Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 28. Tent, E-Boat Alert: Defending the Normandy 5. 84 Kershaw, Landing on the Edge of Eternity, Invasion Fleet (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 62 In fact, the Allies could land only a third 219. Press, 1996), 112. of this number; the Germans were falling for 85 Ibid., 259. 31 See JP 5-0, Joint Planning, IV-19–IV-40. Operation Fortitude, a deception campaign de- 86 Ruge, Rommel in Normandy, x, 109, For a variation on center of gravity (COG), the signed to make the Pas de Calais seem to be the 119, 123, 124. German military used the term Schwerpunkt intended target. See Heiber and Glantz, Hitler 87 Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 26, 63. (weight of main effort). and His Generals, 953, 965. 88 Brett-Smith, Hitler’s Generals, 268. 32 Ibid., IV-19. 63 Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 83–84. 89 Ibid., 269. 33 Helmut Heiber and David M. Glantz, The combined air offensive concentrated on 90 Richard Nixon, Six Crises (Garden City, Hitler and His Generals: Military Conferences bombing submarine construction yards, trans- NY: Doubleday, 1962), 235. 1942–1945: The First Complete Stenographic portation systems, manufacturing plants, oil Record of the Military Situation Conferences, refineries, and other war-producing industries. from Stalingrad to Berlin (London: Green- As such, Luftwaffe fighter operations shifted hill, 2002), 311, 314, 918; Isby, Fighting the to protect the homeland. See Albert Norman, Invasion, 71; Megargee, Inside Hitler’s High Operation Overlord: The Allied Invasion of West- Command, 207. ern Europe (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service 34 Heiber and Glantz, Hitler and His Gener- Publishing, 1952), 141. als, 314; Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 92. 64 Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 65. 35 Friedrich Ruge, Rommel in Normandy: 65 Zimmermann et al., OB West, 33, 36. Reminiscences (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 66 Keitel made a series of decisions that, at 1979), 4. best, demonstrated a lack of competence. OKW 36 Hitler was likely reviewing reports on the did not change its 1939–1941 decision model Tehran and Cairo conferences, which finalized that assumed unhindered troop movements, the plans for Operation Overlord. See Heiber despite the reports of subordinate commanders and Glantz, Hitler and His Generals, 311, 314, that the Allies gained air superiority. See Isby, 918. Fighting the Invasion, 35. On June 6, 1944, 37 Megargee, Inside Hitler’s High Com- OKW disapproved of the movement of seven mand, 63. divisions from the Fifteenth Army to Norman- 38 Ibid., 203. dy. See Zimmermann et al., OB West, 85–87. 39 Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 42. A conse- 67 Ibid., 34–35, 50–51. quence of this was that commanders, fearing 68 OKW consistently supported Rommel’s betrayal and severe consequences for failure, requests. See Zimmermann et al., OB West, began to underestimate their strength and 49–50; Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 66. Rund- overestimate enemy capabilities. See Megargee, stedt also disagreed with Rommel in flooding Inside Hitler’s High Command, 204. wide areas of the countryside, believing it was 40 Heiber and Glantz, Hitler and His Gener- too hard on the local population. On this mat- als, 959. ter, OKW stepped in to side with Rommel. See 41 Ibid., 963; Isby, Fighting the Invasion, Zimmermann et al., OB West, 53. 88. 69 Brett-Smith, Hitler’s Generals, 34. 42 These troops were reported to have 70 Heiber and Glantz, Hitler and His Gener- fought well at D-Day. See Heiber and Glantz, als, 970. Hitler and His Generals, 438, 970. 71 Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 37. 43 Ibid., 965; Liddell Hart, The German 72 JP 5-0, Joint Planning, IV-28. Generals Talk, 236–237. 73 Normandy was listed as the third most 44 Isby, Fighting the Invasion, 91. likely invasion target, after the Fifteenth Army 45 JP 5-0, Joint Planning, IV-19–IV-40. English Channel sector and the Fifteenth Army 46 Zimmermann et al., OB West, 41. Seine estuary sector. See Zimmermann et al.,

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