Troops and crewmen aboard Coast Guard–manned LCVP as it approaches Normandy beach on D-Day, June 6, 1944 (National Archives and Records Administration/U.S. Coast Guard Collection) Behind Enemy Plans A Process-Tracing Analysis of Germany’s Operational Approach to a Western Invasion By Bradley Podliska, Karin Hecox, and Oliver Sagun No plan survives contact with the enemy. —FIELD MARSHAL COUNT HELMUTH VON MOLTKE THE ELDER ixty-four years after Moltke’s observation, two mid-level S German commanders, faced with Dr. Bradley Podliska is an Assistant Professor of Military and Security Studies at the Air Command the herculean task of changing the and Staff College. Major Karin Hecox, USMC, is the Deputy Branch Chief, Operations Division, J32 Intelligence, Reconnaissance Operations, Joint Staff. Major Oliver Sagun, USAF, is Division Chief, C4 course of history on an early June 1944 Systems and Support, Headquarters, United States Forces Japan. morning, failed in their duties. In using JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 Podliska, Hecox, and Sagun 107 Figure 1. German Chain of Command phenomenon (in this case, German defense of its Western theater) in a sequential manner.7 One such process- Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces tracing test is the hoop test. For a Hitler hoop test, a fact must be able to “jump through a hoop” in order to be consid- ered true. The hoop, in this case, is an OWArmed Force Ouftwaffe ONavy OHArmy High Command High Command High Command High Command element of operational design assigned to Keitel Goering Doenitz Hitler an individual German leader or general (see figure 1). In other words, a German commander is eliminated as being at fault OB West Third Air Force Navy Group West for the D-Day loss if the commander did Rundstedt Sperrle Krancke in fact conduct his responsibilities as as- signed in planning.8 Staff, Panzer German War Strategy Army Group G Army Group B Group West Blaskowitz Rommel Understanding Germany’s war strat- Schweppenburg egy, operational environment, and Personal Access problems is crucial to contextualizing Direct Chain of Command Hitler and his commanders for the Conditional Tactical Control of Certain Elements hoop test.9 Hitler, adhering to his Mein Kampf objective of lebensraum structured and qualitative analysis to West), and Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, (living space) in the East, first secured examine German strategy and opera- Army Group B, contributed to the his eastern flank by invading Poland, tions in the events leading up to and German failure at Normandy.3 next conquered Western Europe, and on D-Day, the loss can be traced to More specifically, the research remains then began his campaign to defeat Admiral Theodor Krancke, commander problematic because it fails to answer Russia.10 The Russian invasion stalled, of Naval Group West, and Field Marshal basic questions: Did the Germans have a and by autumn 1942, the Germans Hugo Sperrle, commander of Luftwaffe plan in place to defeat an Allied Western changed their strategy to focus on a Third Air Fleet. Infighting, conflict- invasion? If so, did Hitler and his com- global war, not a theater war. Several ing authorities, and lack of warfighting manders follow the plan? To put it simply, new factors were at play: First, Hitler capabilities clearly hampered German who lost D-Day? These questions are realized the Eastern Front had become command and control of operations on independent of Allied plans and actions a quagmire. Second, the Allies opened the Normandy coast. The Germans did and cover the events leading up to and on a second front in North Africa. Third, have a plan, however, and Krancke and the day of the invasion. the Germans reached their zenith of Sperrle proved to be the weak links: By organizing German plans into manpower (losses could not be made Both failed to execute when facing an elements to create a cognitive map or up).11 By summer 1943, the German Allied invasion on the Western Front. operational approach, historians may situation worsened. Tunisia in North This failure is counter to the mytho- better understand the German defeat.4 Africa fell. Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz logical story of D-Day. The Allies, with An operational approach is “a broad lost the U-boat Atlantic campaign, and overwhelming force and an overabun- description of the mission, operational a German operation to halt Russian dance of courage, executed a brilliant concepts, tasks, and actions required to advances failed. Moreover, the Allies assault plan and won the longest day. As accomplish the mission.”5 Specifically, it invaded Italy and began a relentless air- the story goes, the Allied invasion was is the plan of how Hitler and his gener- bombing campaign over Germany.12 By so superior and heroic that nothing the als sought to defeat a Western invasion. the fall, with manpower and resources Germans did mattered; the good guys Constructing a German operational becoming scarce, the Oberkommando were bound to win.1 At least superficially, approach post hoc will also help future der Wehrmacht (Armed Forces High this story fails to go beyond some notable joint planners better understand a com- Command, or OKW) issued a directive facts. Adolf Hitler micromanaged tactical mander’s role and responsibilities in requiring all changes in strength to be actions, and given his late wake-up on executing an operational plan.6 approved.13 June 6, the Allies took full advantage.2 The German operational plan can The personal feuds and fights over power, be analyzed with process-tracing, a The Operational especially the one between Field Marshal popular qualitative method for perform- Environment in 1944 Gerd von Rundstedt, Oberbefehlshaber ing within-case analysis. Process-tracing In defending about 1,000 miles of the West (Supreme Commander West, or OB evaluates causal links and describes a Atlantic Wall, the Germans assessed 108 Recall / Behind Enemy Plans JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 Troops wade ashore from LCVP landing craft, off Omaha Beach, June 6, 1944 (National Archives and Records Administration/U.S. Army Signal Corps Collection) defense of the coastal environment Allies to have a tank superiority ratio of under OKW, and, on paper, had the sub- based on forces available, evaluation of 10 to 1.18 From April to May 1944, the ordinate units of Army Group B, Army the threat, and terrain. In consultation Fremde Heere West (Foreign Armies Group G, and Panzer Group West.22 with the navy, OB West assessed sectors West) reported the number of Allied Rommel was responsible for the for suitability of troop landing, and divisions as 75 to 90 divisions (a misin- defense of Normandy, where he had defensive obstacles were placed accord- formed count due to double agents and the Seventh Army with the 84th Corps ingly.14 Both the OKW and OB West bureaucratic rivalry). The extreme esti- being the forward corps. In total, the expected the Allies to land at a port.15 mates led Hitler to believe there would Seventh Army had 14 infantry divisions, The Oberkommando der Marine (Navy be a diversionary attack first, followed 1 Panzer division, and 47 heavy guns. High Command, or OKM) stated that by the main attack.19 The 716th Division—comprising mainly an attack would occur at high tide.16 To counter this threat, Germany old men, teenagers, convalescents, and The Germans expected to be able to prepared 10 Panzer divisions and 50 ethnic Germans from occupied ter- move and resupply troops rapidly to the infantry divisions to defend against an ritories—covered the British beaches. invasion area via rail.17 invasion.20 These units were organized The 352nd Infantry Division and 726th under a German command and control Regiment covered Omaha Beach. The Defining the Problem structure that was disjointed, convo- 352nd Division consisted of 12,734 veter- The problem Germany faced in 1944 luted, and contradictory.21 Directly ans with modern weapons (for example, was how to defeat enemy forces on under Hitler was the OKW, the OKM, 105-millimeter [mm] and 150mm artil- multiple fronts. For the Western inva- the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe lery pieces). The 709th Infantry Division sion, German estimates varied widely (Luftwaffe High Command, or OKL), covered Utah Beach and the Cherbourg from 10 Allied divisions to as many as and the Oberkommando des Heere port.23 The Luftwaffe Third Air Fleet, 70 divisions. Germany expected the (Army High Command). OB West fell under Sperrle, reported directly to OKL, JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 Podliska, Hecox, and Sagun 109 Figure 2. German Operational Approach Problem: How to defeat Allied forces on multiple fronts with minimal manpower Defense of German Panzers fortresses and defensive/obstacle engage/defeat COG Termination fortified areas plan landing forces Deny Freedom of Allies denied Political, social, economic, Maneuver freedom of and military domination OB West/Army Group B movement over its adversaries Bomb UK Bomb troop Coastal ports transports defense Deny Allied forces Deny Massing of Forces Allied Military Endstate rd the ability to mass 3 Air Force forces ISO landing Forces Defeat of Allied Invasion Bomb U-Boat Mine-laying Defend the Channel beaches Patrols operations and North Sea area Deny Ability to Deny Allied forces Objectives Land Forces the ability to land Navy Group West at the beaches Defeat of Allied beach landing under Reichsmarshal Hermann Goering. to assess an individual German leader military endstate was the defeat of an It operated in a “cooperative” relation- or general. The elements of operational Allied invasion.33 ship with OB West.24 Planes employed in design are taken from Joint Publication Hitler believed that the Allies, if coastal defense were under the control (JP) 5-0, Joint Planning, and include: defeated on the beach, would not make of OB West.