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Contre-Insurrections Les thématiques du Thématique N° 21 – Novembre 2009 Stratégies et politiques de communication des belligérants non-étatiques Marc Hecker et Thomas Rid 1 Centre d’études en sciences sociales de la défense Thématique – No21 Stratégies et politiques de communication des belligérants non-étatiques Introduction La logique stratégique des belligérants non-étatiques Les principaux conflits actuels dans lesquels sont engagés des Etats occidentaux – du théâtre afghan à l‘Irak – sont souvent qualifiés d‘ « asymétriques ». Qu‘on les appelle « guérilla », « insurrection » ou « jihad », ils opposent au moins deux adversaires aux caractéristiques très différentes. D‘un côté, une armée occidentale moderne, formée et équipée principalement pour des affrontements militaires classiques. De l‘autre, un adversaire matériellement plus faible, disposant parfois uniquement de quelques dizaines d‘hommes armés de kalachnikovs et de RPG. Le paradoxe de la guerre asymétrique est que le « fort » ne gagne pas toujours. Les exemples historiques ne manquent pas, à l‘instar de la guerre d‘Algérie ou de l‘intervention américaine en Somalie en 1993. Pour comprendre la façon dont, dans une confrontation armée, le « faible » peut réussir à battre le « fort », il convient d‘analyser les mécanismes sous- tendant les affrontements asymétriques. Ceux-ci sont, schématiquement, de trois ordres. Le « faible » doit tout d‘abord prendre conscience de sa faiblesse. 2 Il lui faut ensuite en tirer les conséquences stratégiques et tactiques en développant une conception de la confrontation différente de celle des théoriciens de la guerre classique. Il doit enfin établir un rapport particulier avec la population afin de tenir jusqu‘à la victoire. Et qui dit rapport à la population sous-tend nécessité de communiquer avec elle. Aussi, avant d‘étudier à proprement parler les stratégies de communication des belligérants non- étatiques convient-il de bien cerner la logique stratégique de ces derniers. En effet, pour les combattants irréguliers comme pour les Etats, une stratégie de communication ne peut être efficace que si elle vient appuyer une stratégie générale claire et précise. L’impératif de lucidité Avant de penser à la victoire, les « belligérants non-étatiques », engagés dans une lutte contre un adversaire étatique matériellement plus fort, doivent d‘abord essayer de ne pas perdre. Pour éviter une défaite prématurée, la première étape consiste à ne pas surestimer leurs propres forces. Au moment de la conquête coloniale, au XIXème siècle, les adversaires locaux affrontant les troupes occidentales avaient tendance à commettre cette erreur. Dépassant de loin, en nombre, les détachements français ou britanniques, les combattants locaux n‘hésitaient pas à s‘engager dans des combats frontaux contre les soldats occidentaux, pourtant mieux équipés et organisés. Le général Bugeaud rapporte ainsi que lors de la conquête de la Kabylie, une bataille opposa moins de 5 000 Français à plus de 20 000 Kabyles. A la fin de la bataille, 1 000 Kabyles avaient été tués, contre 140 Français1. Les tribus arabes rencontrèrent le même type de déconvenues contre les armées ottomanes, au début de la révolte décrite par T.E. Lawrence. A chaque fois qu‘elles tentaient de lancer une offensive contre les Ottomans, elles étaient battues et quand ces derniers attaquaient, ils sortaient victorieux de l‘affrontement. Après plusieurs échecs consécutifs, les tribus Arabes comprirent que la différence matérielle était telle que, sans changement, leur 1 Thomas-Robert Bugeaud, « La bataille d'Isly », La Revue des Deux Mondes, 1845, vol. 9, n° 2, pp. 929-930. 3 lutte était perdue d‘avance. Elles cherchèrent alors à acquérir de l‘artillerie et lorsque les Britanniques envoyèrent quatre vieux canons Krupp aux hommes de Faysal, ces derniers pensèrent pouvoir concurrencer les Ottomans à armes égales. En vain. La bataille suivante fut un nouveau désastre2. La première étape, pour un « belligérant non-étatique », consiste donc à prendre conscience de la supériorité matérielle écrasante de l‘adversaire. Les combattants luttant pour la libération de l‘Indochine l‘avaient bien compris. Ngo Van Chieu écrivait ainsi dans son Journal d’un combattant Viêt-minh : « je sais que nous sommes faibles, que notre armée régulière ne compte pas plus de 32 000 à 35 000 hommes mal armés et mal encadrés »3. Quant au Général Giap, il faisait également le constat de la faiblesse de ses troupes, « récemment organisées, inexpérimentées et mal équipées », opposées aux armées modernes venues de France, « une puissance impérialiste qui conserv[ait] un potentiel économique et militaire considérable […] et qui bénéfici[ait] en outre d‘un soutien actif des Etats-Unis »4. Le constat de faiblesse pourrait conduire les « belligérants non- étatiques » à ne pas se lancer dans la lutte. Tel n‘est pas le cas. Combattre est en effet perçu par ces derniers comme une obligation éthique, résultant de la supériorité morale de la cause qu‘ils défendent. L‘origine de cette supériorité varie selon les situations. Les deux cas de figure les plus fréquents sont les luttes de libération nationale et les soulèvements à caractère religieux. Dans le premier, les insurgés combattent pour l‘indépendance, la liberté et l‘égalité, contre un adversaire étatique décrit comme un tyran impérialiste déniant au peuple son indépendance et ses droits civiques. Dans le second, ils considèrent comme un devoir religieux de mener une guerre contre un ennemi impie. L‘exemple des jihadistes est, à cet égard, éloquent. Abdallah Azzam, perçu par certains comme le père spirituel d‘Oussama Ben Laden, 2 T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, London, Bernard Shaw, 1926, chapitre XIII. 3 Ngo Van Chieu, « Journal d‘un combattant Viêt-minh », in Gérard Chaliand, Stratégies de la guérilla. Guerres révolutionnaires et contre-insurrections. Anthologie historique de la longue marche à nos jours, Paris, Gallimard, 1984, p. 106. 4 Général V. N. Giap, Guerre du peuple, armée du peuple, Hanoï, Editions en langues étrangères, 1961, 1973, p. 32. 4 distinguait ainsi le « jihad offensif » du « jihad défensif ». Le « jihad offensif », qui consiste à « attaquer les infidèles dans leur pays », est considéré comme une « obligation collective » à laquelle il est possible, sous certaines conditions, de déroger. Le « jihad défensif » est en revanche une « obligation individuelle » et même « le plus important devoir individuel » lorsque « les infidèles pénètrent dans l‘un des territoires musulmans » ou encore lorsqu‘ils « font prisonniers des musulmans »5. Que ce soit dans le cadre d‘une lutte de libération nationale ou d‘une confrontation religieuse, le statu quo est si inconcevable pour les « belligérants non-étatiques » qu‘ils sont prêts à mourir pour modifier la situation. L‘importance de l‘enjeu transparaît dans les slogans révolutionnaires. Le bataillon de Ngo Van Chieu avait par exemple choisi comme mot d‘ordre « Mieux vaut mourir pour l‘indépendance que de vivre en esclave »6. Dans le même esprit, Amilcar Cabral, chef de la guérilla en Guinée et au Cap-Vert, ponctua son discours à la première conférence tricontinentale des peuples d‘Asie, d‘Afrique et d‘Amérique latine (janvier 1966) en reprenant une devise chère aux guérilleros cubains : « Patria o Muerte ! Venceremos ! »7. L‘ampleur de l‘enjeu induit une capacité réelle à monter aux extrêmes chez la plupart des belligérants non-étatiques. Dans le vocable des leaders du GIA algérien, le conflit contre l‘Etat algérien impie ne pouvait être qu‘une « guerre totale »8. En utilisant cette expression, Antar Zouabri, émir du GIA, ne faisait pas explicitement référence à l‘ouvrage d‘Erich Ludendorff. Il voulait simplement signifier au gouvernement algérien qu‘aucune négociation n‘était possible et que la guerre engagée était une lutte à mort. 5 Abdallah Azzam, « La défense des territoires musulmans constitue le principal devoir individuel », in Gilles Kepel et Jean-Pierre Milelli (dir.), Al Qaïda dans le texte, Paris, PUF, 2005, p. 147. 6 Ngo Van Chieu, « Journal d‘un combattant Viêt-minh », in Chaliand, Stratégies de la guérilla. Guerres révolutionnaires et contre-insurrections. Anthologie historique de la longue marche à nos jours, p. 108. 7 « La patrie ou la mort ! Nous vaincrons ! ». L‘intégralité de ce discours est disponible sur le site www.marxists.org/subject/africa/cabral/1966/weapon-theory.htm. 8 Bruce Hoffman, La mécanique terroriste, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1999, pp. 118-119. 5 L‘expression « guerre totale » est généralement opposée à celle de « guerre limitée ». Une des clés des affrontements asymétriques est que pour le « faible », l‘enjeu est – au sens littéral du terme – vital, tandis que pour le « fort », il est bien moindre. Le « fort » ne craint en effet pas pour son existence. Le conflit se déroule souvent à des milliers de kilomètres du territoire national et la population ne perçoit pas forcément l‘intérêt de se battre aussi loin. Prenons l‘exemple de la guerre en Irak : aussi longtemps que les insurgés irakiens feront sauter des engins explosifs improvisés (IED) à Bagdad tuant, tout au plus, quelques dizaines de militaires américains par mois, la population américaine ne se sentira pas pleinement concernée. Si des bombes explosaient quotidiennement à New York et Washington, l‘enjeu serait tout autre. De ce fait, alors que le « faible » mène une « guerre totale », le « fort » n‘évolue bien souvent qu‘en configuration de « guerre limitée »9. Le fait de mener une « guerre totale » et non une « guerre limitée » a des conséquences notables. D‘une part, au niveau stratégique, si l‘importance de l‘enjeu est ressentie au-delà du cercle restreint des combattants, ces derniers pourront bénéficier de l‘appui de nombreux secteurs de la société. D‘autre part, au niveau tactique, un combattant – régulier ou irrégulier – qui sait qu‘il n‘a d‘autre alternative que la victoire ou la mort risque d‘être bien plus redoutable. Le Viêt-minh semble d‘ailleurs avoir fait ce constat. D‘après Roger Trinquier, qui a combattu en Indochine avant de partir pour l‘Algérie, les « Viêts » tuaient systématiquement les prisonniers, jusqu‘en 1948, avant de changer de pratique.
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