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Terrorists and Cyberspace: the Digital Battleground

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Terrorists and Cyberspace: the Digital Battleground Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive DSpace Repository Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items 2018-06 TERRORISTS AND CYBERSPACE: THE DIGITAL BATTLEGROUND Urena Figueroa, Alberto Miguel Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/59608 Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS TERRORISTS AND CYBERSPACE: THE DIGITAL BATTLEGROUND by Alberto Miguel Urena Figueroa June 2018 Thesis Advisor: Tristan J. Mabry Second Reader: Robert E. Looney Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Form Approved OMB REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED (Leave blank) June 2018 Master's thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS TERRORISTS AND CYBERSPACE: THE DIGITAL BATTLEGROUND 6. AUTHOR(S) Alberto Miguel Urena Figueroa 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT Monterey, CA 93943-5000 NUMBER 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 10. SPONSORING / ADDRESS(ES) MONITORING AGENCY N/A REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. A 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) This thesis asks why and how terrorist organizations use the Internet to achieve three strategic goals: 1) the dissemination of propaganda, 2) recruitment, and 3) fundraising. It is immediately apparent that the Internet offers a number of advantages, including low cost, global reach, and anonymity. Nonetheless, terrorist organizations vary in their exploitation of these advantages according to their immediate objectives. To explain these variations, this thesis presents a comparative study of Al Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and the Taliban. This study considers how different objectives render distinct narratives and thereby affect how those narratives leverage images and information in the dissemination of propaganda. Similarly, targets of recruitment vary according to the objectives of the respective organizations; this primarily affects their use of social media, including Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and other applications. Fundraising methods also vary, from local means (extortion, narcotics, smuggling) to contemporary exploitation of digital platforms like PayPal and cell phone applications enabling anonymous donations. This thesis concludes that the sophistication of terrorist organizations online requires an equally sophisticated response that is as essential to the fight against violent extremism as kinetic operations. 14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF cyberspace, social media, terrorist group, Taliban, ISIS, Al Qaida PAGES 113 16. PRICE CODE 113 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. TERRORISTS AND CYBERSPACE: THE DIGITAL BATTLEGROUND Alberto Miguel Urena Figueroa Colonel, Dominican Republic Air Force BS, Academia Militar Batalla de las Carreras, 1998 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (COMBATING TERRORISM: POLICY AND STRATEGY) from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL June 2018 Approved by: Tristan J. Mabry Advisor Robert E. Looney Second Reader Mohammed M. Hafez Chair, Department of National Security Affairs iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT This thesis asks why and how terrorist organizations use the Internet to achieve three strategic goals: 1) the dissemination of propaganda, 2) recruitment, and 3) fundraising. It is immediately apparent that the Internet offers a number of advantages, including low cost, global reach, and anonymity. Nonetheless, terrorist organizations vary in their exploitation of these advantages according to their immediate objectives. To explain these variations, this thesis presents a comparative study of Al Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and the Taliban. This study considers how different objectives render distinct narratives and thereby affect how those narratives leverage images and information in the dissemination of propaganda. Similarly, targets of recruitment vary according to the objectives of the respective organizations; this primarily affects their use of social media, including Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and other applications. Fundraising methods also vary, from local means (extortion, narcotics, smuggling) to contemporary exploitation of digital platforms like PayPal and cell phone applications enabling anonymous donations. This thesis concludes that the sophistication of terrorist organizations online requires an equally sophisticated response that is as essential to the fight against violent extremism as kinetic operations. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION ...........................1 B. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................2 1. Why Do Terrorist Organizations Use the Internet and Social Media? .................................................................................3 2. How Do Terrorist Organizations Use the Internet and Social Media? .................................................................................6 C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES .....................18 D. RESEARCH DESIGN .............................................................................20 E. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE ............................21 II. AL QAEDA...........................................................................................................23 A. THE GENESIS OF AL QAEDA ............................................................23 B. AL QAEDA IDEOLOGY, LEADERSHIP AND STRATEGIC GOAL........................................................................................................25 1. Ideology .........................................................................................25 2. Leadership ....................................................................................26 3. Strategic Goal ...............................................................................29 C. INTERNET STRATEGIES ....................................................................29 1. Information Operations...............................................................30 2. Recruiting on Social Media and Digital Platforms ...................35 3. Fundraising on Social Media and Digital Platforms ................39 III. ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA .......................................................45 A. THE GENESIS OF ISIS ..........................................................................45 B. ISIS IDEOLOGY, LEADERSHIP, AND STRATEGIC GOAL.... .....47 1. Ideology .........................................................................................48 2. Leadership ....................................................................................48 3. Strategic Goal ..............................................................................49 C. INTERNET STRATEGIES ....................................................................51 1. Information Operations on Social Media and Digital Platforms .......................................................................................52 2. Recruiting on Social Media and Digital Platforms ...................60 3. Fundraising on Social Media and Digital Platforms ................64 4. Innovative Methods for Fundraising on the Internet ...............69 IV. TALIBAN .............................................................................................................73 vii A. THE GENESIS OF THE TALIBAN......................................................73 B. TALIBAN IDEOLOGY, LEADERSHIP, AND STRATEGIC GOAL ........................................................................................................74 1. Ideology .........................................................................................74 2. Leadership ....................................................................................75 3. Strategic Goal ...............................................................................77
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