This article was downloaded by: [Khatib, Lina] On: 5 April 2011 Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 935808908] Publisher Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37- 41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Survival Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713659919 Hizbullah's Political Strategy Lina Khatib Online publication date: 30 March 2011 To cite this Article Khatib, Lina(2011) 'Hizbullah's Political Strategy', Survival, 53: 2, 61 — 76 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2011.571011 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2011.571011 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. 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The party’s two ministers, and eight others from its March 8 alliance, stepped down, in what was widely seen as an attempt to halt the indictment of Hizbullah members by the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon, set up to inves- tigate the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Saad’s father. But while the party sees the indictments as an existential threat, the move to bring down the government was part of a wider strategy to achieve its long-term political ends. With the formation of a new government led by Prime Minister Najib Mikati (a Sunni who had also served as prime minister for three months in 2005) without the participation of Saad’s March 14 alli- Downloaded By: [Khatib, Lina] At: 17:41 5 April 2011 ance, Hizbullah will for the first time be part of a ruling coalition. In its rise from relatively humble beginnings in the 1980s to its current status as Lebanon’s leading political actor, Hizbullah has followed a sophis- ticated and adaptive political strategy that blends military, social, economic and religious elements. While the party’s day-to-day political decisions revolve around internal Lebanese issues such as guaranteeing more rep- resentation within the parliament or cabinet, its long-term political aim is to be a leader in the Islamic world. From its 1985 Open Letter to its 2009 manifesto, the party has consistently presented its vision as transcending Lina Khatib is Program Manager, Program on Good Governance and Political Reform in the Arab World, Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, Stanford University. Survival | vol. 53 no. 2 | April–May 2011 | pp. 61–76 DOI 10.1080/00396338.2011.571011 62 | Lina Khatib Lebanon. The Open Letter was primarily addressed to Muslims world- wide, and the manifesto frames Hizbullah’s outlook as global in scope: ‘The Resistance in Lebanon has evolved from a Lebanese national value to an Arab and Islamic value and has become today an international value that’s taught all over the world’.1 Despite its participation in the current Lebanese political confessional system, in which power is proportionally distributed between Muslim and Christian communities and divided among various sects within them, the party’s long-term aim is to reach a position of leadership through a change in the system itself. A Hizbullah MP, Mohammad Raad, said in December 2004 that he believed that a referendum would show that the majority of Lebanese supported the continuation of the ‘resistance’, and that one ques- tion should be ‘whether the presidency should still be reserved for the Maronites’.2 Hizbullah Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem said in 2008 that ‘the Party’s final objective, in its political jihadist vision and program of work, is not to reach ultimate ruling power within the current sectarian system’.3 Hizbullah’s 2009 manifesto confirmed the party’s commitment to chang- ing the Lebanese system into a majoritarian democracy: The main problem in the Lebanese political system, which prevents its reform, development and constant updating is political sectarianism ... Downloaded By: [Khatib, Lina] At: 17:41 5 April 2011 The fact that the Lebanese political system was established on a sectarian basis constitutes in itself a strong constraint to the achievement of true democracy where an elected majority can govern and an elected minority can oppose, opening the door for a proper circulation of power between the loyalty and the opposition or the various political coalitions. Thus, abolishing sectarianism is a basic condition for the implementation of the majority–minority rule.4 The manifesto is deliberately vague about the exact nature of the majori- tarian democracy the party is proposing. However, Hizbullah’s declarations since 1985 suggest that it aspires to an Islamic democracy under Iran’s ‘Guardianship of the Jurist’ (wilayat al-faqih) model. This was made explicit Hizbullah’s Political Strategy | 63 in the 1985 Open Letter, which called on the Lebanese people to accept an Islamic state, and in Hizbullah’s August 2004 declaration of identity and goals, which stated that ‘another of its ideals is the establishment of [an] Islamic Republic’.5 Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah declared in a speech on 26 May 2008, that he was proud to belong to the party of wilayat al-faqih, and in a question and answer session with journalists fol- lowing the speech, emphasised that commitment to wilayat al-faqih was an unchangeable value for Hizbullah, not a pragmatic political decision. But the party has been careful to play down in public its commitment to establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon because it knows the prospect is unattractive to at least half the Lebanese population. The lack of reference to wilayat al-faqih in Hizbullah’s 2009 manifesto was interpreted by some as a sign that the party had abandoned this political aim, but the omission is arguably not a sign of abandonment but rather of political pragmatism. Barriers and enablers Hizbullah’s internal organisation follows a top-down model. In the mid-1990s, efforts by new members to reform the party (adopting a dialogue-based approach towards other political entities in Lebanon and a local Lebanese agenda rather than one dictated by Iran) failed as their voices were marginalised in favour of those closer to Iran’s clerical leadership.6 But the secretary-general is accountable to the membership: in 1992, the party’s Downloaded By: [Khatib, Lina] At: 17:41 5 April 2011 first secretary-general, Subhi Tufaili, was effectively removed from his posi- tion because he wanted to boycott the Lebanese parliamentary elections, and the Party’s internal committees believed that participation in the elec- tions would be politically advantageous.7 A number of external enablers and barriers have an impact on Hizbullah’s political strategy, with some playing a dual role. One enabler is the Lebanese conflict-management system, which has always followed a consensus model of no winners and no losers. Hizbullah has used this system to its advan- tage, securing larger and larger gains every time the system has been put to the test. The 2008 Doha Accords, which gave Hizbullah and its allies the right of veto in cabinet despite not having a parliamentary majority, are the latest example. Another enabler is the weakness of the Lebanese state. 64 | Lina Khatib Hizbullah sees its role as a resistance force as unavoidable, as the Lebanese state is unable to defend itself against Israel. It argues that this role, as well as the mere existence of the state of Israel, justifies its weapons.8 On the economic level, Hizbullah criticised then Prime Minister Rafik Hariri’s Beirut-focused economic plan, but would not allow Lebanese state services to directly reach its constituents in southern Lebanon and Beirut’s south- ern suburbs.9 These factors suggest that it is not in Hizbullah’s interest for the Lebanese state to become stronger, unless it is under direct Hizbullah control, with the party functioning both as army and economic provider. Nor is it in Hizbullah’s interest that another entity be able to position itself as a defender of the Lebanese Shi’ites, over Both Israel whom the party has managed to establish a monopoly. A and the US third enabler is Hizbullah’s relative power in Lebanon. Its political opponents, the March 14 camp, have proved unable have aided to constrain the party’s actions. Hizbullah has managed to Hizbullah’s either quell or co-opt any Shia opposition, so it also faces no internal restraints. Finally, Iran and Syria’s support for rise Hizbullah is well documented, though Hizbullah is not an Iranian or Syrian political tool. Rather, it is a product of the Iranian Revolution that has taken a life, identity and autonomy of its own, albeit with Iran’s continued funding and support. The relationship with Syria is a partnership beneficial to both sides. Downloaded By: [Khatib, Lina] At: 17:41 5 April 2011 While Washington characterises Hizbullah as a terrorist organisation, and while Israel poses a potential existential threat for the group, both coun- tries have in fact aided Hizbullah’s political rise.