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An Analysis of Hezbollah's Use of Irregular Warfare (2012)

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An Analysis of Hezbollah's Use of Irregular Warfare (2012) AN ANALYSIS OF HEZBOLLAH’S USE OF IRREGULAR WARFARE STEPHEN KEITH MULHERN Intelligence and National Security Studies Program APPROVED: Larry A. Valero, Ph.D., Chair Charles R. Boehmer, Ph.D. William T. Dean, III, Ph.D. Benjamin C. Flores, Ph.D. Dean of the Graduate School Copyright © by Stephen Keith Mulhern 2012 Dedication To Mom and Dad, Thank you. AN ANALYSIS OF HEZBOLLAH’S USE OF IRREGULAR WARFARE by STEPHEN KEITH MULHERN, B.A. Political Science THESIS Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at El Paso in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE Intelligence and National Security Studies Program THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT EL PASO December 2012 Acknowledgements I would like to thank: Drs. Larry Valero, Charles Boehmer, and William Dean for taking the time to be part of this thesis. Lisa Tomaka, Nicholas Komorowski, and Dr. Dennis Soden for giving me a productive and supportive workplace. And my parents, Michael and Linda Mulhern, for giving me the parental support to finish this work. v Abstract Low-intensity conflicts and insurgencies have been on the rise since the end of World War II. A particularly strong example of these conflicts is the ongoing conflict between the Lebanese Hezbollah and the state of Israel. In the course of the conflict, Hezbollah was able to accomplish what other, more powerful Arab states could not; Hezbollah forced Israel to unilaterally end a conflict. How did Hezbollah accomplish this? This thesis will provide a qualitative analysis of Hezbollah’s use of the instruments of power in their irregular warfare strategy against Israel during the occupation of southern Lebanon. vi Table of Contents Acknowledgements ..........................................................................................................................v Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... vi Table of Contents .......................................................................................................................... vii List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. ix List of Illustrations ...........................................................................................................................x Section 1:Introduction ......................................................................................................................1 1.1 Literature Review...........................................................................................................6 1.1.1 Hezbollah ....................................................................................................................7 1.1.1.2 Islam ..........................................................................................................................7 1.1.1.3 Wali al-Faqih ...........................................................................................................8 1.1.1.4 Jihad .......................................................................................................................11 1.1.1.4.1 Greater Jihad ........................................................................................................11 1.1.1.4.2 Lesser Jihad ..........................................................................................................12 1.2 Hybrid Warfare ............................................................................................................16 1.3 Instruments of Power ...................................................................................................19 1.4 Irregular Warfare .........................................................................................................23 1.5 Research Design and Strategy .....................................................................................30 Section 2: Diplomacy .....................................................................................................................34 2.1 Indicator 1: International Pressue on Israel .................................................................34 2.2 Indicator 2: Status as Violent Non-State Actor............................................................35 2.2 Indicator 3: Lack of International Pressure on Hezbollah ...........................................37 Section 3: Information ...................................................................................................................40 3.1 Indicator 4: Propaganda ...............................................................................................41 3.2 Indicator 5: Maintenance of a Large Recruitment Pool ...............................................46 3.3 Indicator 6: Provision of Social Services .....................................................................50 Section 4: Military .........................................................................................................................54 4.1 Indicator 7: Military Armament ...................................................................................54 4.2 Indicator 8: Operations and Tactics .............................................................................58 4.2.1 Operational Doctrine ....................................................................................................60 vii 4.2.2 Unit Organization and Operational Security ................................................................61 4.2.3 The “Rules of the Game” .............................................................................................62 4.2.4 Martyrdom Operations .................................................................................................64 4.2.5 Kidnappings .................................................................................................................65 4.2.6 The 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War ...................................................................................66 4.3 Indicator 9: Safe Haven ...............................................................................................71 Section 5: Economics .....................................................................................................................79 5.1 Indicator 10: Legal/Illegal Sources of Income.............................................................79 5.1.1 Legal ............................................................................................................................79 5.1.1.1 Charitable Fundraising ..............................................................................................79 5.1.1.2 Zakat .........................................................................................................................80 5.1.2 Illegal ...........................................................................................................................80 5.1.2.1 Shakedowns ..............................................................................................................80 5.1.2.2 Criminal Activity ......................................................................................................81 5.2 Indicator 11: State Sponsorship ...................................................................................82 5.3 Indicator 12: Shi’a Diaspora Donations .......................................................................83 Section 6: Conclusion ....................................................................................................................84 Bibliography ..................................................................................................................................89 Vita…………….. .........................................................................................................................102 viii List of Tables Table 1.1: Indicators of Success. .................................................................................................. 31 Table 4.1: Weapons Used by Hezbollah during July War ............................................................ 78 ix List of Illustrations Figure 1.1: Contrasting Conventional and Irregular Warfare. ........................................................ 4 Figure 1.2: Hezbullah’s Circles of Jihad....................................................................................... 12 Figure 1.3: Hybrid Warfare Concept ............................................................................................ 17 Figure 3.1: Who’s Next? ............................................................................................................... 44 Figure 4.1: Single Katyusha Rockets ............................................................................................ 56 Figure 4.2: Hezbollah Defensive System ...................................................................................... 67 Figure 4.3: Hezbollah Facilities 2011 ........................................................................................... 72 Figure 4.4: Al-Khaim Village. ...................................................................................................... 73 x Section 1: Introduction The end of the Second World War gave rise to a new phase in the history of the world and in the international system—decolonization and the Cold War. These two phenomena created an international situation that produced both ideological
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