Comment on Julien Reitzenstein's Book Himmlers Forscher

H-Net Comment on Julien Reitzenstein’s book Himmlers Forscher (Himmler’s Scientists) on the occasion of the legal dispute over the review by Sören Flachowsky

Page published by Yelena Kalinsky on Thursday, November 16, 2017

From the H-Soz-Kult Editorial Board

By Michael Wildt, chairman of Clio-online e.V., and Rüdiger Hohls, head of the working group H-Soz- Kult

For the first time in its twenty-year history, H-Soz-Kult has decided to take a review offline. The review concerns Julien Reitzenstein’s bookHimmlers Forscher: Wehrwissenschaft und Medizinverbrechen im „Ahnenerbe“ der SS (Himmler’s Scientists: Military Science and Medical Crimes in the SS Ahnenerbe; Paderborn: Schöningh, 2014). The book was reviewed by Sören Flachowsky who, by virtue of his studies about Nazi science policy, was the best qualified reviewer.

The reasons for taking the review offline can be found at the following address: http://www.hsozkult.de/publicationreview/id/rezbuecher-23622

First, Flachowsky states in his review that Reitzenstein’s study is concerned with the evolution of the Institut für wehrwissenschaftliche Zweckforschung (IWZ; The Institute for Military Scientific Research), which emerged from the SS Ahnenerbe and thus focused on the hitherto largely unknown establishment of entgrenzter Wissenschaft (science without moral boundaries). While the Ahnenerbe project has received scholarly attention in recent decades, Flachowsky states that a study of the IWZ has so far been lacking. However, Reitzenstein devotes a considerable part of his research, but without wanting to present a biography, to the rise and wide-ranging activities of the managing director of the Ahnenerbe and the IWZ, Wolfram Sievers, a learned publisher without academic training. From the mid-1930s onwards, Sievers worked with verve on familiarizing and connecting himself with the German research landscape and used his political skill to shift the focus during the war towards war-relevant defense sciences.

Sören Flachowsky notes that although only a small part of the book is dedicated to the origin and structure of the Ahnenerbe, Reitzenstein does present new findings on this topic. Among other things Flachowsky mentions how Reitzenstein disproves the contention that Reichsbauernführer (Reich Peasant Leader) Darré belonged to the founding members of the association (26). Flachowsky adds that especially with regard to the financing of the Ahnenerbe, Reitzenstein shows that it received a large part of its funds from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Foundation, DFG). The revaluation of the Ahnenerbe to Amt A within the staff of the Reichsführer SS in 1942 also meant financial relief, since it was now financed by the SS-Wirtschaftsverwaltungshauptamt (SS Central Economic Administrative Office; 34–5; 267–8). According to Flachowsky, another new feature is the inspection of the Ahnenerbe’s real estate properties in Berlin-Dahlem, which were appropriated partly through dubious business practices that also benefited the Ahnenerbe's “aryanization” (270–87).

Citation: Yelena Kalinsky. Comment on Julien Reitzenstein’s book Himmlers Forscher (Himmler’s Scientists) on the occasion of the legal dispute over the review by Sören Flachowsky. H-Net. 11-16-2017. https://networks.h-net.org/node/513/pages/846473/comment-julien-reitzensteins-book-himmlers-forscher-himmlers Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. 1 H-Net

The Second World War presented the SS Ahnenerbe, which was oriented towards intellectual history, with serious problems, for it now had to prove its “war-relevance.” This is why the managing director of the IWZ, Wolfram Sievers, carried out the development of the Institut für wehrwissenschaftliche Zweckforschung (Institute for Military Scientific Research). However, according to Flachowsky’s interpretation of Reitzenstein’s book, Sievers did not seem to have proceeded systematically in building these new structures, but let himself be guided by coincidences and the personal interests of Himmler. The emphasis on medicine, however, was not unfounded, because in addition to the treatment of war casualties, it was above all hygienic problems at the front and in the concentration camps that demanded new methods of medical prophylaxis. Yet, one can only agree with Flachowsky’s assessment that Reitzenstein does not take the circumstances adequately into account. Flachowsky states that Reitzenstein neglects to mention that Sievers had no other alternatives than to establish himself in the field of medical military science, since research related to war and armor was already in full swing and covered by networks of universities and research departments, and the Ahnenerbe had simply missed the boat due to its one-sided orientation up to that point. At the center of the book are the ten departments of the IWZ, but according to Flachowsky, Reitzenstein concentrates less on the research undertaken at the institute and more on the formation and expansion of its departments, its networks, and the internal decision-making processes of the SS related to it (77–8). Hardly any of the departments—of which only six operated—appear to have produced usable results for NS warfare.

Following recent theoretical concepts of the “new statism” [neue Staatlichkeit] of the Nazi system, Reitzenstein comes to the conclusion that Sievers was one of the “interface managers” of the NS research system who zealously worked for the leadership and developed a partly murderous dynamic. The “structural success” in establishing the IWZ was based on its alignment with the person of Sievers (306), and put the institute “on a good path” to becoming “an established research institution” (303) by the end of 1944. It was through Sievers’ expertise as a special commissar of Himmler, Reitzenstein continues, that his “position of power within the SS” had expanded so much that he was “emancipated” not only from his competitors Oswald Pohl and Ernst-Robert Grawitz, but simultaneously even from Himmler and the SS (304). This, Reitzenstein argues, was not least due to the fact that Sievers had also taken on “influential” posts outside the Ahnenerbe after 1943—such as the Reichsforschungsrat (Reich Research Council, RFR)—and in this way coordinated the “defense research of the German Reich” (261; 302–7).

Like Flachowsky in his review, we are of the opinion that this view requires a clear correction. In his introduction, Reitzenstein already overstates the importance of the Ahnenerbe when he writes that “its ideologization has contributed to the radicalization of an entire generation” (10). In our opinion, Sievers was also no “science manager powerful far beyond the Ahnenerbe” (41). Although Sievers had close relations with the DFG President and department head of science in the Reich Ministry of Education, SS Brigadier general Rudolf Mentzel, it can hardly be inferred from this that he "co- managed" the RFR (256). The appointment of Sievers to Deputy Chief of the RFR—here we agree with the reviewer Flachowsky—was more likely a concession of the Reich Ministry of Education to Himmler in order to secure a position in the RFR for Mentzel, whose own position of power was temporarily on the line. In this way, the Ahnenerbe was dependent on Mentzel’s goodwill, which Himmler’s research community and thus also Sievers used to secure his own position. Reitzenstein himself states that Sievers merely sat “in the antechamber of power” (51).

Reitzenstein’s study pays special attention to the involvement of the Institute in criminal human trials. Thus Flachowsky praises Reizenstein for casting off the anonymity of the victims of the mustard gas experiments carried out by Prof. Dr. August Hirt (135–9) and for illuminating the backdrop of what led to the infamous “skull and skeleton collection” at the University of Strasbourg (114–7; 126–7 ). On the other hand, other remarks by Reitzenstein are to be assessed not only as unfortunate, but as problematic formulations. Here are two quotations from Reitzenstein’s book:

On p.61 one finds the passage:

It is shown that Rascher was striving for lethal experiments from the outset, while Sievers never called for such experimental arrangements on his own initiative. From this it follows that Sievers himself only pushed for potentially deadly procedures in two places: the mustard gas experiments by Hirt and the so-called “Jewish skeleton collection.”

And on p. 223 one reads:

After Schilling had invited Plötner to work together again, the peace between them remained only for a short time. The reason was that Plötner refused to conduct human experiments with Polygal and/or malarial parasites before the effect mechanisms had been thoroughly investigated. Plötner's refusal was confirmed not only by Neff, but also by Sievers himself in Nuremberg. There is no evidence suggesting that Sievers would have demanded human experiments if there were alternatives. This corroborates Ina Schmidt’s thesis that Sievers rejected human experiments for religious reason. Since the resignation of Rascher, Himmler’s former protégé, no lethal or particularly cruel experiments were documented at the Institut für wehrwissenschaftliche Zweckforschung (Institute for Military Scientific Research, IWZ).

Speaking of “... if there were alternatives” and Nuremberg: Sievers was sentenced to death as a war criminal during the Doctors’ Trial on August 20, 1947, and was executed the following year in the Landsberg am Lech prison.

There is also prolific evidence in Reitzenstein’s book that Sievers pushed, coordinated, and financed fatal human experiments (89–90, 92, 120–1, 122–3, 129–30, 150, 155–6), and even attended some of the experiments in person (173, 177–8). The finding that “no lethal or particularly cruel human experiments” (223) were documented at the IWZ after the withdrawal of Sigmund Rascher from the Ahnenerbe does not necessarily have to be related to Sievers. On May 15, 1944, Himmler had ordered that medical experiments carried out in concentration camps require his personal approval with immediate effect and without exception, which had largely prevented Sievers from acting autonomously.

In dealing with the departments of the IWZ, Reitzenstein describes in detail power struggles between Sievers and competing institutions, in particular with the Reichsarzt SS (Reich Physician SS) Ernst-

Robert Grawitz, but also the concrete tasks and workings of the departments, as well as obstructive material and personnel constrains. In addition, the study frequently trails off into partly long-winded details, which makes it difficult to not lose the main thread while reading. The author has analyzed many, even marginal sources, which are often referred to or quoted, but are not analyzed to the desirable extent in a historical context. Individual sections seem more like a chronological overview of letters, telephone calls, diary extracts, business trips, meetings, etc., resulting in 2,350 notes in the extensive endnote section. This as well as the unusual division into chapters, redundancies, and spelling mistakes all suggest that a formal and substantive editing on the part of the publishing house would have been helpful.

Additionally, we share Sören Flachowsky’s assessment that Reitzenstein’s book, Himmlers Forscher: Wehrwissenschaft und Medizinverbrechen im „Ahnenerbe“ der SS (Himmler’s Scientists: Military Science and Medical Crimes in the SS Ahnenerbe) confirms the scientifically, politically, and economically limited significance of the IWZ and the SS Ahnenerbe with regard to the scientific system of the NS. The research carried out at the IWZ, as summarized by Flachowsky, “on steppe horses, insects, rust inhibitors, mashed potatoes, vaccines, hemostatic agents, mustard gas, and phosgene therapies are not the result of strict planning. The results of the research undertaken there were modest at best, and especially in the case of Hirt, Rascher, Bickenbach, and Haagen—all figureheads of the institute—obtained by means of criminal human experiments.”

This is our evaluation of the book and Sören Flachowsky’s review. In our opinion, Reitzenstein’s legal action against the reviewer has no scientific basis. It should now be possible to have a scientific dialogue about the above-mentioned points of criticism regarding Reitzenstein’s study

Citation for the original Comment:

Citation for the English translation:

Commentary on Julien Reitzenstein’s book Himmlers Forscher [Himmler’s Scientists] on the occasion of the legal dispute over the review by Sören Flachowsky. H-Soz-Kult, February 20, 2017. Translated by Anne von Petersdorff. September, 2017. https://networks.h-net.org/node/513/pages/846473/comment-julien-reitzenstein%E2%80%99s-b ook-himmlers-forscher-himmler%E2%80%99s