National Socialist Model Enterprise”

Home , Bernhard Rust, Ernst Ruska, Gerhart Jander, Heinz Haber, Kaiser Wilhelm Society, Klaus Clusius

3 The “National Socialist Model Enterprise”

Though the seizure of power by the National Socialists on 30 January 1933 did not attract much attention in the Kaiser Wilhelm Society or give particular cause for concern, it was certainly apparent to a man with clear political insight, like Haber, that this regime change would have significant consequences. In a letter to his friend and colleague, Richard Willstätter, from 24 February 1933, in addition to lamenting several personal problems, Haber reported “a feeling of disquiet with regards to the future.”1 Haber’s disquiet could only have increased in the coming days. Three days later the Reichstag burned. This introduced a state of emergency that was the pretext for the Enabling Act, the overriding of German constitu- tional law and the systematic persecution of political opponents and dissidents – primarily Communists in the beginning, then Social Democrats, trade unionists and leftwing intellectuals as well. However, political developments were not the only cause for concern at the time. The military also tried to take advantage of the rapid political changes, pushing forward plans for a secret central military chemical research institute. The primary party responsible was the Army Ord- nance Office (Heereswaffenamt), which had already funded secret research into poisonous gases by Göttingen chemist Gerhart Jander. The Prussian Ministry of Culture, led by Bernhard Rust, and the Reich Ministry for Home Affairs, led by Wilhelm Frick, both of whom were amongst Hitler’s Guard “Old Fighters,”also supported plans to offer Jander better and broader research opportunities in Berlin, as he had only a modest laboratory in Göttingen. This also fulfilled a promise Hitler had made to Jander; Jander had been assured a promotion should the National Socialists come to power.2 Haber’s institute came to play a central role in these plans because of its chemical weapons research during the First World War. It also appears that Haber knew about the proposal relatively early in its development, having been asked in February of 1933 about possible locations for such an institute. As the “father of chemical warfare,” Haber had no fundamental objections to such an institute nor to ramping up research into chemical weapons in Germany, but he wanted to protect his own institute from being taken over by the military and the new government. Hence, he argued that Dahlem was not a suitable loca- tion for an armaments research institute because the area had become densely populated with villas in the years since the First World War, and he recommended that the research facility be located near the gas plant in Breloh instead.

1Werner,HaberWillstätter, p. 123. 2 Szöllösi-Janze, Haber, p. 652. 3 The “National Socialist Model Enterprise”

Fig. 3.1. Institute grounds circa 1939. Notice the dedicationto Haber around the “Haber Linden” has been removed.

There was an inspection of possible premises for the new institute on April 11 – not, as it turned out, of the gas plant in Breloh but of the former Prussian Research Institute for Hygiene and Immunology on Garystrasse in Dahlem, which had not been used since the death of its director. The idea of reﬁtting this institute also appears to have been provided by Haber, since after the inspection Jander voiced his suspicion that Haber had only suggested the Hygiene institute, which was small and unsuitable for the proposed research, to prevent them taking over the more generous rooms of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute.3

Ousters and Reorganizations

Haber’s institute was not the only target of intrigues by the new regime and the military; the entire KWG became a focus for National Socialist revisions of Ger- man science policy. Given that a signiﬁcant share of its investment capital came from Jewish donors, a considerable number of its senators were Jewish and many Jewish scientists had made the most of the career opportunities offered by its non-university research institutes, the Kaiser Wilhelm Society came to be seen in National Socialist circles as under Jewish inﬂuence, even “part of the Jewish clan.” To quote Philipp Lenard, a long-standing Nazi and the father of the Deutsche

3 GSTA, Bl. 33.

90 Ousters and Reorganizations

Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service

“The Reich Government has enacted the following Law … § 3 (1) Civil servants who are not of Aryan descent are to be retired; … § 4 Civil servants whose previous political activities afford no assur- ance that they will at all times give their fullest support to the national state, can be dismissed from the service.” This law, promulgated on 7 April 1933, served to enforce the political conformity of civil servants and formed an early peak in the persecution and disenfranchisement of citizens of Jew- ish descent in Germany. As there were no strict regulatory statutes attached, the law was also used as a basis for the dismissal of privately employed as well as self-employed professionals such as physicians and lawyers. The so- called “Paragraph on Aryans” allowed – until the Nürnberg Laws of 1935 – the exemption of civil servants who entered service before WWI, WWI frontline sol- diers and civil servants whose fathers or sons fell in WWI. Since the KWG was a private organization, the law applied only to those of its institutes that received more than half of their funding from the state. Such institutes were then treated like universities or state research institutions, and this was in fact the case for Haber’s institute. On 27 April 1933, the General Administration of the KWG sent out directives to the institutes requesting that their members fill out questionnaires about their descent and political allegiance. Dismissals were issued based on the evaluation of these questionnaires. In the KWG, there were 126 dismissals, or about 11%; the KWI for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry was affected more adversely than any other KWG institute. German universities lost on average about a third of their faculty as a conse- quence of the Law, but there were substantial disciplinary and regional differences. For instance the universities of Rostock or Tübingen remained essentially intact, as the spirit of anti-Semitism endemic at these universities had tacitly precluded appoint- ments of Jewish faculty even before 1933. On the other hand, liberal universities, such as Berlin or Frankfurt University, were affected so strongly that their international reputation and academic status were considerably damaged. Disciplinary differences were also significant: disciplines such as theoretical physics or art history largely relocated to Anglo-Saxon countries, whereby the forced migration of figures such as Albert Einstein or Aby Warburg represented but the tip of the iceberg.

91 3 The “National Socialist Model Enterprise”

Physik movement, “this entirely Jewish affair simply needs to be gotten rid of.” His colleague, Johannes Stark, wanted a “new spirit” to be imposed upon the Society at the very least. The Prussian Minister of Culture expressed a similar sentiment, which had more serious bureaucratic implications. It was hardly a coincidence, given the grounds for their criticism of the KWG, that they came to focus much of their attention on Haber’s institute. As a result, in the following years, the Institute would become a textbook example of National Socialist science policy.4 The Institute had the highest share of “non-Aryan” permanently-employed scientists of any KWG. This had been a cause for public debate even during the Weimar Republic, and in spring of 1933, it led to denunciations and attracted other forms of unwanted attention from the Party and the ministerial bureaucracy.5 The landmark “Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service” was passed on 7 April 1933. In light of this law, on April 21, the personnel officer of the Ministry of Culture, Johannes Achelis, threatened to post a State Commis- sioner at the KWG, an act which would have threatened the very existence of the Society, if the KWI for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry did not immediately respond to the new legislation and fundamentally change its staff by the end of the Easter break.6 It is difficult to assess accurately whether this was an expression of the anti-Semitic policies of the government or the ambitions of the military with respect to its plans to use the Institute for weapons research. Regard- less, the Civil Service Law became the gateway for Jander and his backers to take over the Institute. Initially, the KWG’s General Administration heeded the ministerial demands and pressured Haber to do the same. The institute was required to make immediate and significant changes to its personnel. According to a memo from Achelis’s this was the only way “to keep leading intellectuals, should they be Jewish.”This technique was part of the Society’s strategy of “self-adjustment” or “Selbstgleichschaltung.” By anticipating and obediently following the minutiae of state requirements, they hoped to avoid serious National Socialist interventions, such as the appointment of a State Commissioner at the KWG, and retain as much institutional autonomy as possible. Enforcing the Civil Service Law was a central element in the KWG self-adjustment policy, as were aligning Society research activities with the expectations set by government policy and reorganizing the Senate and other governing bodies. The hope was that by strictly implementing the law in the mid- dle and lower ranks of its staff, the Society would be granted permission to keep its preeminent Jewish scientists. Max Planck, President of the KWG, expressed this view in May 1933 on his first official visit to Hitler. He not only said that getting rid of important scientists, such as Haber, would damage German science and Germany as a whole, but added “that there are, in fact, different types

4 Cf. detailed accounts in Szöllösi-Janze, Haber and Schmaltz, Kampfstoff-Forschung. 5 MPGA Abt. I., Rep 1a, Nr.531/1; 541/3. 6 MPGA Abt. I., Rep 1a, Nr.531/1, Bl. 15.

92 Ousters and Reorganizations

Fig. 3.2. Max Planck and Minister of the Interior Wilhelm Frick, 1933. of Jews – some useful to mankind and others worthless… one must observe the distinctions.”7 Fritz Haber, however, was not quite so ready simply to obey the expectations, or rather orders, of the General Administration and the Ministry. He wanted to remain in command for the time being because, as he expressed to Schmidt-Ott on 21 April 1933, The structure of this institute is the most important of my personal responsibilities as its head. Should current circumstances render this structure unsustainable, apparently because it has become disadvantageous to the Kaiser Wilhelm Society and the institute, which I have led since its foundation, I consider it my duty as director to see through the required reorganization myself because I know best those aspects [of its structure] that are important for science and for the personnel and am best placed to make arrangements with the General Administration.8 Both department heads, Herbert Freundlich and Michael Polanyi, requested retirement on the same day Haber wrote this letter to Schmidt-Ott. Soon Haber too had decided, after much difﬁcult deliberation, that he would resign from his post as institute director once “his duties were complete;” with the inevitable conse- quence, according to Haber, “that the many individual questions related to the

7Planck,Besuch 1947, p. 143. 8 MPGAAbt.I,1a,Nr.541/3,Bl.2.

93 3 The “National Socialist Model Enterprise” required reorganization would resolve themselves.” On April 30, Haber asked the ministry that he be allowed to retire on 30 September 1933 – the date by which the Civil Service Law had to be implemented. In his request, which would later become famous, he clearly stated that he had always sought colleagues for his institute according to qualification and character, a stance from which he was both unable and unwilling to retreat, despite the new regulations. The leading figures of the KWG, specifically President Max Planck and General Director Friedrich Glum, continued to try and convince Haber to change his mind. They not only regretted losing a highly-valued and internationally-renowned colleague but also saw Haber’s demonstrative act as damaging to the KWG. They also feared that, through Haber’s retirement, their influence on a central institute within the Society would be severely compromised. But Haber was not inclined to change his mind, and the decision became irreversible after Rust delivered two speeches in which he polemicized Haber’s request for release, making Haber a persona non grata for the NS leadership. The resignation of Haber and his department heads was regarded as a kind of signal within the top ranks of the National Socialists and beyond. It was seen as a protest against the arbitrary racist directives and against the National Socialist state more broadly. It was all the more striking because all three men, as veterans of the First World War and long-standing civil servants, were exempt from the Civil Service Law and legally could have remained in their positions. Concerns for the future of his institute and its staff occupied Haber’s remaining weeks in office. His last official acts were efforts to limit as much as possible the impact of the Civil Service Law and to exploit the remaining legal framework so that he could provide the best possible provisions for staff members who had lost their positions. Having been instructed by the General Administration on 9 July 1933 to dismiss seven colleagues before the summer break, he tried to win exemptions for some of them on grounds of hardship, as well as attempting to arrange new positions for them. Rita Cracauer, the “soul of the Institute,” who had been Haber’s secretary for many years; Hartmut Kallman, Haber’s “right hand,” and Irene Sackur, daughter of Otto Sackur, were particularly difficult cases for Haber. Cracauer had made a career of her work at the Institute and was otherwise without means; moreover, her brother had been killed in the First World War. Haber felt a special obliga- tion to Irene Sackur, who had only joined the institute in 1931, because of the fatal injury her father had suffered while working at the Institute early in the First World War. In the end, Haber’s petitions made little headway in the Ministry, and 10,000 RM were taken from the Haber Fund to help the dismissed colleagues and somewhat alleviate their financial distress. Rita Cracauer, following Haber’s emi- gration, looked after his remaining property in Berlin. She subsequently emigrated via Great Britain to Palestine. Irene Sackur was able to stay on at the Institute for a short time but was soon after denounced and had to leave in the fall of 1933. She also emigrated to Palestine in the mid-1930s. It was easier for the world-renowned scientists. Freundlich first emigrated to London and worked at University College beginning in 1934. He then went to Minneapolis in the United States, where

94 Ousters and Reorganizations

Fig. 3.3. Resignation letter from Haber to Berhard Rust, 30 April 1933.

95 3 The “National Socialist Model Enterprise”

Fig. 3.4. Farewell gathering in the Institute garden, July 1933. First row standing on the right: Friedrich Epstein; seated from the right: Hartmut Kallmann, Michael Polanyi, Fritz Haber; seated in front of Haber: Rita Cracauer; two chairs left of Haber: Herbert Freundlich; far left, seated on the ground: Karl Klein, glassblower. he worked as Research Professor of Colloid Chemistry until his untimely death in 1941. He was accompanied in his travels and aided in his research by his colleague Karl Söllner, who remained in the United States after Freundlich died.9 Polanyi became Professor of Physical Chemistry in Manchester, a position he had been offered in 1932 but turned down in mid-January 1933. In Manchester, he initially continued his research into the transition state of chemical reactions, in particular the catalytic conversion of hydrogen, but he later turned his attention to philosophy and the social sciences.10 Ladislaus Farkas emigrated to Palestine in 1934, where he established the Department of Physical Chemistry at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem with his brother Adalbert.11 Despite serious efforts, Hart- mut Kallman did not succeed in emigrating. As a result of his “privileged mixed marriage,” he became an attendant at I.G. Farbenindustrie and AEG, and survived the Holocaust in Germany.12 When Haber ﬁrst left Germany, in September 1933, he went to Cambridge, where he was given the opportunity to work in the laboratories of William Pope; however, this hospitality had limited consequences. Although he did manage to perform some experiments on catalytic decomposition of hydrogen peroxide with the help of his Dahlem assistant, Joseph Weiss, his exile was more than anything

9 Reitstötter, Freundlich. 10 Nye, Po la nyi . 11 Pallo, Farkas. 12 Wolff, Kallmann. As for Kallmann’s “privileged mixed marriage” status, cf. his own account in a letter to Federal President T. Heuss of 4(?) January 1954, MPGA, PA Kallmann.

96 Ousters and Reorganizations a time of restless traveling. On one of his many journeys, on 29 January 1934, he died in a hotel room in Basel, which was supposed to be a stopover on his way to Palestine, where he had intended to advise his colleagues at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem on setting up a Faculty for Natural Sciences. His death touched more than just his former colleagues and students. There were requests throughout the Kaiser Wilhelm Society and the military for this distinguished scholar and patriotic German to be granted appropriate recognition and honor, at least in death. As President of the KWG, Planck acknowledged this sentiment and decided to organize a memorial service on the first anniversary of Haber’s death. The event was jointly hosted by the Kaiser Wilhelm Society and the Societies for Physics and Chemistry. It was the last opportunity to satisfy the duty of piety. A longer delay would not have been justifiable, particularly in light of the impression it would have made internationally, wrote Planck in the records for the Haber memorial service.13 Plans for the event met with considerable resistance in those quarters of the National Socialist bureaucracy responsible for overseeing education and scholarship since it was a gathering in honor of a Jewish scholar who had publicly disagreed with National Socialist policy and left Germany. The memorial service had the clear potential to be seen as a protest against and an affront to National Socialist leadership. The Reich Ministry of Education sent out a memorandum banning all of its employees from attending; this included civil servants and college and university professors. But Planck insisted on the event, and he made it happen. In doing so, Planck was able to rely upon the sympathy of influential figures in the military, in industry and in the Reich Ministry of Defense who had not forgotten Haber’s service during the First World War. Though the Ministry did not lift the ban on participation, Planck was allowed to “hold the event as a purely internal and private celebration of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society.” Colleagues who wanted to attend the function were supposed to apply to the Ministry for an exemption from the ban, an arrangement to which the German Chemistry Society also agreed. However, the Ministry received few applications forexemption.Manyofthoseinvitedchoseinsteadtosendtheirwivestothe memorial service as a form of silent protest. Even Max von Laue, who had repeatedly defied the Nazis in the past and would once again provoke the anger of the powers that be with a laudatory obituary for Haber, chose to forego the service. The Ministry efforts to frighten people had not been wholly ineffectual. Despite the difficulties, the memorial service took place as planned on 29 January 1935, the first anniversary of Haber’s death, in Harnack-Haus in Berlin-Dahlem. At the service only Planck and Otto Hahn gave speeches; the latter read a lecture by Karl Friedrich Bonhoeffer who, as a university teacher, was not allowed to attend. Planck, as Professor Emeritus and President of the KWG, and Hahn, as Director

13 Hoffmann, Planck, p. 94.

97 3 The “National Socialist Model Enterprise”

Fig. 3.5. Invitation to the memorial service for Fritz Haber.

98 Ousters and Reorganizations of a Kaiser Wilhelm Institute which for the most part was industry-funded, were able to defy the demands of the state bureaucracy. The Haber memorial service has often been praised, especially in the post-war era, as an act of political resistance, in particular on the part of Max Planck, against the arbitrary actions of the National Socialists and the National Socialist state. Be that as it may, it is difficult to accept the series of events briefly outlined above as real resistance, and the majority of those who participated did not show exceptional civil courage.14 Nevertheless, the memorial service can be regarded as a high point in public dissent against National Socialist science policy by the tradition-imbued academic elite. As political topics were almost never addressed in this context, the memorial service was, more than anything, an act of personal defiance and an attempt to prevent the National Socialists from interfering with the professional autonomy of scholars. The search for Haber’s successor would prove a shining example of how the new regime encroached upon this autonomy. As late as April of 1933, Haber persisted in the delusion that he would be allowed to install as his successor James Franck, whose appointment as physics professor at Berlin University and Director of the reorganized KWI for Physics had seemed a foregone conclusion in January. Political developments quickly made these plans seem absurd. Nevertheless, in May of 1933 Haber still wanted to keep Franck as a research fellow at a new Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics and Physical Chemistry – an institute to be formed through a fusion of the Haber Institute and the KWI for Physics and to have as its Directors Max von Laue and Karl Friedrich Bonhoeffer.15 This plan never came to fruition, and instead, Otto Hahn was invited to take over as acting Director of the KWI for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry in mid-July based on a decision by the General Administration and the President of the KWG. But this decision was overruled. On 4 August 1933, the Prussian Ministry of Culture, seeing itself as responsible for the KWG, informed the Society that, effective immediately, Gerhart Jander was the new acting Director of the KWI for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry, and he would be visiting the Institute the following day. In spite of this, Otto Hahn continued to serve as acting Director until mid– October, when Jander took over. Meanwhile, both the Ministry of Culture and the Reich Ministry of Defense came out in support of the decision for Jander, making it impossible for Planck and the KWG to overturn. Moreover, a letter to the Ministry of Education made it clear that Jander’s selection for this position was based entirely upon the special requirements of the Reich Ministry of Defense, rather than the usual considerations of science.16 As historian Florian Schmaltz has written, the arrival of Gerhart Jander in office marked “a new era in the history of the Institute,” characterized by a shift toward armaments research.17 One of his first official acts was to dismiss all the scientists

14 Deichmann, Flüchten, p. 92 ff. 15 Haber an Planck, 27 May 1933. MPGA Abt. I, Rep. 1a, Nr. 541/3, Bl. 27. 16 Planck an Erziehungsminister, 4 October 1933, MPGA Abt. I, Rep. 1a, Nr. 541/4, Bl. 69. 17 Schmaltz, Kampfstoff-Forschung, p. 77.

99 3 The “National Socialist Model Enterprise”

Fig. 3.6. Gerhart Jander (1892–1961). still at the institute who had not already been driven out by the Civil Service Law. Amongst the scientists removed by this second purge, the fate of Friedrich Epstein was particularly tragic. Epstein had become resentful of the General Administra- tion’s half-hearted support and left the institute at the beginning of November 1933. He emigrated to France, but after the German occupation he was deported to Auschwitz, where he was killed late in 1943. Not even those researchers at the Institute who were working on temporary, externally-funded projects were allowed to continue their activities. By contrast, the technical staff, i.e. lab technicians and skilled craftsmen, remained relatively constant across the transition, in part because their highly-specialized skills would have been difficult to replace and in part because their skills remained equally relevant to the new direction of research at the Institute. By spring 1934, the reorganization of the Institute was finally complete and, as far as Jander and the military were concerned, it was ready for service. When Jander formally took office, the Institute was already organized into three departments led by three independent department heads. According to Jander, in addition to their achievements as scientists, “all the men chosen for this task needed to possess the characteristics of discretion, tenacity, discipline, dutifulness in the old Prussian sense and manliness.”18 The specific men in question were: Peter Adolf Thiessen, formerly a student of Richard von Zsigmondy in Göttingen, he was in charge of the Physical Chemistry Department; Rudolf Mentzel, Jander’s doctoral student and colleague in Göttingen, now entrusted with the Department

18 Jander an Planck, 15 November 1933. GSTA I, Rep 76, Sek. 2, Tit 23 Nr. 108, Bl. 111.

100 Ousters and Reorganizations

Table 3.1. Members of the institute expelledon racial grounds in 1933/34:19

Name Profession, employment at KWI went into exile in Walter Beck Chemist, Assistant, 1925–1933 France, Hungary, U.S.A. Hans Beutler Physicist, Assistant, 1923–1934 U.S.A. Jakob Bikermann Chemist, Assistant, 1924–1933 U.K., U.S.A Rita Cracauer Secretary, 1917(1919)–1933 U.K., Palestine Hans Eisner Chemist, Assistant, 1923–1933 Spain, Argentina, Uruguay, U.S.A. Fritz Epstein Chemist, guest, 1912–1933 France, killed in Auschwitz in 1943 Georg Ettisch Physician, Assistant, 1921–1933 Portugal, U.S.A. Ladislaus Farkas Chemist, Assistant, 1928–1933 U.K., Palestine Herbert Freundlich Chemist, Dept. head, 1916–1933 U.K., U.S.A. Eric Flint Chemist, Assistant 1931–1933 France, U.S.A. (Erich Friedländer) Leopold Frommer Physicist, Assistant, 1928–1933 U.K. Paul Goldﬁnger Chemist, Assistant, 1929–1933 Belgium Kurt M. Guggenheimer Chemist, Physicist, Assistant, U.S.A. Mathematician, 1933 Fritz Haber Chemist, Director, 1911–1933 U.K. Wilfried Heller Physical Chemist, Assistant, France, U.S.A. 1931–1933 Hartmut Kallmann Chemist, Physicist, Assistant, stayed in Germany 1920–1933 Friedrich Kerschbaum Chemist, guest, 1914–1933, with unclear interruptions Wladimir Lasareff Physicist, Assistant, 1930–1933 Belgium Hilde Levi Physicist, Chemist, PhD student, Denmark, Sweden 1932–1933 Michael Polanyi Physician, Chemist, Dept. head, U.K. 1923–1933 Alfred Reis Chemist, guest, 1930–1933 France Boris Rosen Physicist, guest, 1928–1933 U.S.A. Irene Sackur Secretary, 1932–1933 Palestine Martin Schmalz Lab. assistant, ?–1933 U.K., Palestine Karl Söllner Chemist, Assistant, 1928–1933 U.K., U.S.A. Joseph Weiss Chemist, Assistant, 1930–1933 U.K. Ida Margarete Physicist, volunteer, 1931–1933 1936 to U.S.A. Willstätter Marie Wreschner Physicist, Chemist, fellow, stayed in Germany, suicide in 1941 1920–1933 Margarete Zuelzer Zoologist, guest, 1932–1933 1939 to the Netherlands, killed 1943 in the transit camp of Westerbork

19 Sources: Schüring, Minerva, p. 87–106. Rürup, Schüring, Schicksale. Vogt, Wissenschaftlerinnen.

101 3 The “National Socialist Model Enterprise”

Fig. 3.7. Rudolf Mentzel (1900–1987), circa 1937. of Applied Chemistry and Chemistry for Air Defense; and Hans Seel, previously a privatdozent in Hamburg, who headed the Department of Physiology and Phar- macology.20 Mentzel struggled with the field of scientific research he was assigned and increasingly concentrated on advancing his political career through service in the Reich Ministry of Education and in the SS; this left his assistant Remigius Hofmann de facto department head. In addition to these three, original departments, there were plans for departments of Inorganic Chemistry (August Winkel), Analytical Chemistry (Rudolf Kölliker) and Applied Chemistry (Fritz Bauer), with the latter two under the direct control of the Reich Defense Ministry.21 However, evidence remains only of the departments under Winkel and Kölliker. Along with the introduction of a new departmental structure came plans for extensive construction work, but these plans led to a series of skirmishes with the General Administration, and construction efforts came to a temporary halt in December of 1933, partly because it was not clear how further work would be financed. But at root, the dispute was not really about money or the new focus of the Institute, which Planck was happy to support in the “interests of the Fatherland.” Above all else, the disagreement was an attempt to safeguard the institutional autonomy of the Society. Even after his official appointment, the General Administration and other governing bodies of the Society continued to hatch schemes and forge alliances in an attempt to replace Jander with a widely-renowned scientist and to avoid the institute being separated from the KWG network, as it had been to a considerable extent during the First World War. In addition, Department Directors Mentzel and Thiessen had their own plans and

20 Ibid., Bl. 115 ff. 21 Schmaltz, Kampfstoff-Forschung, p. 78.

102 Ousters and Reorganizations were quickly gaining recognition as high-ranking employees at the Ministry of Education. The Ministry of Education, which had been created from pieces of the Prussian Ministry of Culture, took over responsibility for the Kaiser Wilhelm Soci- ety from the Ministry for Home Affairs in the summer of 1934. This led to a strange arrangement in which Mentzel worked for Jander as a department director at the KWI but, at the same time, was his senior as head of a division in the Ministry of Education. Later, Jander admitted that this situation seriously damaged their working relationship.22 The arrangement was also detrimental to Jander’s author- ity as Institute Director, which was further undermined in the spring of 1934, when his third department director, Hans Seel, was dismissed for compromising the secrecy of research at the Institute.23 As a successor to Seel’s department, a department of Fibrous Materials was created under Caeser Stuhlmann. These petty staffing problems combined with a growing feeling in the Ministry of Defense that the overall situation at the KWI was “not particularly fortunate,” provided impetus for suggestions from the military that they create their own, military-controlled research institute. Jander was unable to bolster his position or that of the Institute in response, nor was he able to resolve the conflict of interest between the military, the Ministries and the KWG. Jander was also hampered by his sympathy for the Strasser arm of the NSDAP, which was politically marginalized after the murder of Strasser during the “Night of the Long Knives” in the summer of 1934. Jan- der progressively lost political influence, and he grew personally frustrated with his position in Dahlem.24 Late in the spring of 1935, his tenure as acting director of the KWI for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry came to an abrupt and unceremonious end, and he was moved to the University of Greifswald, where he worked as Professor of Chemistry and Director of the Chemistry Institute. In 1951 he moved to the TU Berlin-Charlottenburg, as head of the Institute for Inorganic Chemistry, where he remained until his death. After Jander was relocated, on 1 April 1935, Peter Adolf Thiessen became acting Director of the Institute. Eight days later, at a meeting of the KWG administrative board, Mentzel, representing the Ministry of Education, informed representatives of the Society in no uncertain terms that Thiessen was not simply another acting Director, but rather the Ministry candidate for official Director of the Institute and that the Ministry of Defense had already approved this decision. Planck and other representatives of the KWG were unable, during this meeting or the “negotiations” that followed in its wake, to convince the Ministry of Education that the legitimate interests of the Ministry of Defense had to be brought into balance with the need to install a top-ranking scientist as Institute Director. For Planck, the Nobel laureate Hanns Fischer from Munich was the most suitable candidate, but he was an organic chemist, and on the basis of his academic profile alone the Ministry did not consider him a viable candidate. The other candidates Planck proposed,

22 Schmaltz, Kampfstoff-Forschung, p. 87. 23 Schmaltz, Kampfstoff-Forschung, p. 83 ff. 24 Schmaltz, Kampfstoff-Forschung, p. 92.

103 3 The “National Socialist Model Enterprise”

Fig. 3.8. Peter Adolf Thiessen, standing on the left, points out construction details in one of the workshops, circa 1939.

Karl Friedrich Bonhoeffer and Arnold Eucken, met similar resistance. The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Defense wanted application-oriented, military research to continue at the Institute until an appropriate military institute could be established. Hence, as far as the two Ministries were concerned, Thiessen was a far more suitable Director than the lauded scientists proposed by the KWG. While this debate unfolded between the ministries and the KWG, Thiessen was promoted to an academic post adequate for a KWG director. After he had failed to find a position in Freiburg or Frankfurt, Thiessen was offered the post of Professor of Chemistry and Director of the Chemistry Institute at Münster in March of 1935, succeeding Rudolf Schenck. Though his appointment was confirmed by the Ministry of Edu- cation on 1 April 1935, Thiessen never occupied the post. On 20 May 1935 the Ministry of Education named Thiessen Director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry, as well as Professor for Physical Chem- istry at Friedrich Wilhelm University in Berlin. In the minutes of the Institute’s board meeting a month later, Planck noted that the naming of the new Institute Director had come about in an “unusual manner;” nevertheless, he accepted the political imposition and expressed his desire to work together with Thiessen. Although Thiessen wrote in his memoirs that under Jander’s directorship “in 1933 and 1934 almost nothing happened with respect to research,” the scientific literature tells a different story. In Dahlem, Jander continued the research he had begun in Göttingen into the aggregation and the colloidal structure of high-molecular-weight, inorganic compounds, above all iso- and heteropolyacids.

104 Ousters and Reorganizations

Fig. 3.9. Peter Adolf Thiessen surrounded by colleagues at the Bunsen Congress in Düsseldorf, 1938. Left to right: Erich Hückel, Peter Debye, Peter Adolf Thiessen, Klaus Clusius and Hans-Heinrich Frank.

Another strong point of his research was conductometric analysis and its practical applications; though, his publications in this field appeared primarily in hand- books rather than journals.25 This reflected well Jander’s position in the scientific community; he did not present fundamentally new results but was widely recognized as an expert in his field. Jander may also have continued to pursue military research that he had begun in secret while still in Göttingen. In any case, when Thiessen took over in 1935, he stated explicitly in the plans he provided the Board of Directors that the Institute “would, for the moment, be dedicated to those tasks that Ministry of Defense indicated to him were urgent.” This allowed Thiessen to continue the research carried out under Jander since the beginning of 1934. On taking over the institute, Thiessen invested most of his efforts into establishing a modern, technical infrastructure, and in 1936, he initiated a compre- hensive reorganization of the Institute, which took place against the backdrop of far-reaching changes in the organization of research into chemical warfare by the Army Ordnance Office.26 As a result of the Third Reich’s public rear- mament policy, the Ordnance Office was making plans for its own centralized

25 E.g. Jander, Maßanalyse. Jander, Pfundt, Leitfähigkeitsreaktionen. 26 Cf. Schmaltz, Kampfstoff-Forschung, p. 100–124.

105 3 The “National Socialist Model Enterprise”

Peter Adolf Thiessen (1899–1990)

Peter Adolf Thiessen was born into the family of a landowner in Schweid- nitz, Silesia. After his high- school (Gymnasium) grad- uation he volunteered for service in WWI. He studied Chemistry in Breslau, Freiburg, Greifswald and Göttingen, where he grad- uated in 1923 with a the- sis on colloidal gold under Richard von Zsigmondy, for whom he subsequently became an assistant. After his habilitation in 1926 he stayed on as a privatdozent and after 1932 as Extraordinarius Professor for Physi- cal Chemistry; nevertheless, he failed to succeed his mentor as Ordinarius Professor for Inorganic Chemistry. Thiessen’s engrossment in the National Socialist movement dates back to his Göttingen time – already in 1922 he was a member of the NSDAP and the SA, whose local structures he helped to shape. However, in order not to imperil his university career, he took a break from his party affiliation later in the 1920s, then re-activated it instantly once the Nazis ascended to power. In 1933 he moved to Berlin, where he took the post of department head at and, in 1935, Director of the KWI for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry. Parallel to his scientific activities he contributed to the Nazi transformation of the German university-education system as a rapporteur in the Ministry of Education. He remained actively involved in Nazi science policy even after he withdrew from this post in the mid-1930s – after 1937 in the capacity of Chemistry Division leader of the newly created Research Council (Reichsforschungsrat). His involvement in research policy, the prestigious directorship of the KWI, membership in the Berlin Academy (since 1939), chair- manship of the Bunsen Society (1942–45) as well as other positions made Thiessen into one of the most influential and powerful scientists and science managers in the Third Reich. In 1945, Thiessen accepted an offer to work for the Soviets, so that in the following years, together with other German “specialists” at a secret research institute in the Caucasus, he contributed to the Soviet nuclear bomb project. In 1956, he arrived in his new homeland, the GDR, where he was able to start a new career at the Academy of Sciences (which had expelled him in 1945, because of his Nazi past) as Director of the Central Institute for Physical Chemistry and professor at Humboldt University in Berlin. In the GDR as well Thiessen brushed shoulders with political power: from 1957 to 1965 he was the chairman of the Research Council and from 1960 to 1963 member of the State Council (Government) of the GDR. Highly decorated, Thiessen died at age 90 in (East) Berlin.

106 Research Activities chemical weapons research facility. This meant that the KWI was not to be developed into such a research facility, as previously envisaged by Jander, Mentzel and the military. Departments relevant to chemical weapons research were separated off from the Institute and pertinent research topics discontinued in 1936; nevertheless, research at the Institute did remain focused on chemical problems related to modern warfare, and even research into chemical weapons per se continued until the end of the war.27 Sincereeffortsweremadetocontributetothe research goals set up by the National Socialist leadership, to actively promote the drive towards self-sufficiency and to fulfill the demands of the National Socialist regime for new armaments. These efforts determined the direction of both applied and basic research at the Institute, and meant that, after 1936, no clear distinction could be made between exclusively military research and research into broader technical and scientific problems. A visit by Planck in 1938 highlighted some of the differences between the way in which the Institute operated under Thiessen and the scholarly focus of the previous generation of scientists under Haber. Years later, Thiessen reported that Planck, during his visit, had lauded the Institute’s technical capabilities, particularly an X-ray diffraction apparatus designed by Thiessen, but had criticized the Institute for a lack of interest in the fundamental principles of physics.28 It is legitimate, in this sense, to speak of a “degeneration” of scholarly standards at the Institute after 1933. But it should also be kept in mind that the Institute’s achievements in applied research were widely-recognized and praised by the scientific community of the time.

Research Activities

Most of the departments in Thiessen’s institute focused on the structural analysis of fibers, glasses, synthetic materials and metals. Thiessen himself headed a relatively large department where one of the main interests was the structure of soaps and soap gels, which acted as models for the colloid properties of long- chain molecules. The intention was then to transfer these findings to a large number of substances, such as higher carbohydrates, dyes, rubber, cellulose and other high polymers. “Once we have established the processes involved in gel formation, it will be possible to clarify and explain the behavior of technolog- ically significant mixtures and to cultivate those properties [of them that have] practical value.”29 In addition to X-ray analysis and ultramicroscopy, the department also used optical and thermodynamic methods to study key interactions between the hydrophilic and hydrophobic parts of the rod-like molecular structures. Joachim Stauff observed a bilayer in soap films, which was held together by

27 Ibid. 28 Thiessen, Planck. 29 Thiessen, Seifenals Kolloide.

107 3 The “National Socialist Model Enterprise”

Fig. 3.10. A bilayer in soap films as reported by Joachim Stauff, 1939.30 water molecules that forced themselves between the hydrophilic carboxyl groups, which were directed inward, toward one another, while the lipophilic hydrocar- bon chains of the soap molecules formed an external barrier. He was thus the first to recognize clearly the fundamental principle behind the structure of cell membranes and many similar aggregates. A newly available Agfa color film was later used to document the formation of stable aggregates in soaps through color changes in polarized light. Here too, Thiessen’s group searched for relationships between the properties and the structure of the molecules and between their spatial arrangement and the twisting, shifting and stretching of their constituent parts. But the processes involved in aggregate and micelle formation are very complex, and Thiessen and his colleagues were, therefore, unable to establish any universally-applicable, quantitative laws describing the phenomenon. In keeping with the advertised focus of research at the Institute, a number of specialists in modern analytical techniques also came to work in Dahlem. Werner Wittstadt, who had completed his doctorate under Thiessen in Göttingen in 1933 and was responsible for outfitting the Institute with scientific apparatus, used X-ray analysis to study the transition between anisotropic crystal structures and isotropic glasses.31 The main objective of this research was to understand the cause of the elasticity of various materials and, ultimately, through this new understand- ing, to improve industrial products. Theodor Schoon and Rudolf Kohlhaas performed X-ray analyses of the structures of inorganic and organic materials. Their research methods resembled those of Rudolf Brill and Hermann Mark, who both

30 Stauff, Mizellenarten. 31 Thiessen, Wittstadt, Änderung.

108 Research Activities worked at BASF but later moved to TH Darmstadt and the University of Vienna respectively, as well as those of John Desmond Bernal at Cambridge. Some X-ray studies of surfaces were also carried out at the Institute, for example on the surfaces of bearings. This was yet another instance in which studies of the intricacies of boundary layers at the Institute were closely linked to the latest technologies. Structural research using electron diffraction also arrived in Dahlem during the 1930s. Electrons penetrate less deeply into a sample than X-rays, and soon after the diffraction of electrons by crystals was first recognized, in 1927, scientist realized that this limited penetrating power made electron diffraction analysis a particularly powerful tool for analyzing surface structures. However, the expen- sive equipment and elaborate mathematical methods required by the technique meant it was rarely used in chemical research. Researchers at the Institute performed electron diffraction studies using fast electrons (HEED), whose diffraction patterns were not as exclusively dependent upon surface features but which gave rise to fewer experimental difficulties. They developed both new sample preparation techniques and new methods of diffraction pattern analysis that allowed them to translate their data into an atomic or molecular structure. Later, electron microscopy also appeared a promising technique for the study of surface layers. Since surface structures play a substantial role in the adsorption processes involved in heterogeneous catalysis, Schoon and his colleagues used the new technique to investigate microcrystalline platinum catalysts and similarly active iron(III) oxide. Parallel research focused on the porosity and gas perme- ability of catalytic materials and on the systematic collection of data relating to industrial catalysts. Beginning in 1941, Schoon had access to the new electron microscope developed at Siemens by Ernst Ruska,32 who was in personal contact with Thiessen.33 Schoon used the new instrument to study the size and shape of the particles in rubber fillers, especially soots, and the effects of these fillers on the properties of the rubber mixtures. Overall, Thiessen’s style of research resembled the materials science approach developed by Gustav Tammann in Göttingen and continued by his successor Arnold Eucken; Rudolf Schenck in Münster also followed a similar approach to research. One prominent characteristic of this style was the extensive use of the latest in laboratory equipment; another was an interest in microstructure. The focus on microstructure was also common amongst colloid chemists, and like many of his colleagues in that field, Thiessen formulated both qualitative and, whenever possible, quantitative explanations of macroscopic phenomena based on his investigations of microstructure. This enabled him to link up research into fundamental principles of the natural sciences with issues of technical application. As a result, articles by Thiessen and his colleagues at the Institute found their way into journals such as Metallwirtschaft (Metal Industry), Die Chemische Fabrik (The Chemical Factory), Kautschuk (Rubber), Holz als Roh- und Werkstoff

32 Schoon, Klette, Der Aufbau. 33 Interview Klaus Thiessen.

109 3 The “National Socialist Model Enterprise”

Fig. 3.11. Theodor Schoon at the control console of a Siemens X-ray apparatus, circa 1938.

(Wood as a Raw and Construction Material), Öl und Kohle (Oil and Coal) or Fette und Seifen (Fats and Soaps), as well as appearing in the usual academic publica- tionssuchastheZeitschrift für physikalische Chemie, Zeitschrift für Elektrochemie or Kolloid-Zeitschrift. The new X-ray building, erected in 1938, embodied the highly technical nature of the research pursued at the Institute under Thiessen’s direction. It contained a wide array of measuring stations, supplied by cables that ran behind a drop ceiling. It was probably one of the best equipped research facilities in Germany in its field, and the publications coming out of the Institute at the time reflected this. Images and data from the latest instruments formed the core of many articles, and frequent references were made to new or improved instruments or experimental arrangements, such as measuring bridges, X-ray tube regulators, dilatometers,34 col- orimeters35 and photo-recording cassettes for the Siemens electron microscope.36 Of particular import to research at the Institute was the previously mentioned diffraction apparatus constructed by Schoon and Thiessen.37 The analysis and interpretation of diffraction patterns and other data from these new instruments required advanced mathematical skills. The first theoretical physicist to join the Institute was Gert Molière, who arrived at the Institute shortly after completing his doctorate under Max von Laue in 1935 and remained in Dahlem until around 1940. During this time, he formulated a quantum mechanical account of X-ray diffraction in metals based on Laue’s classical dynamic theory of diffraction, in which crystals were treated as continuous dielectrics. In

34 Klein, Überreiter, DasDilatometer. 35 Witzmann, Mikrokolorimeter. 36 Frey, Kassette. 37 Schoon, Thiessen, Elektronen-Beugungsgerät.

110 Research Activities

Fig. 3.12. Framing of the new X-ray building,1938. testament to Gert Molière’s close ties to the Institute, his younger brother Kurt completed a dissertation at the Institute in 1939 on the influence of absorption on the diffraction of electron beams. His approach resembled that of his older brother in that he sought to formulate specific laws of electron diffraction based on quantum mechanics and building on works by Laue and by Hans Bethe. To provide an experimental comparison, the younger Molière applied the theory to zinc blende, whose crystal structure had been determined over a decade earlier. By April of 1940 the Institute had gained another expert in applied mathematics, Bernard Baule. Baule had been a student of Hilbert in Göttingen and had also been active in the Catholic student associations in Graz.38 He was apparently released from “protective custody” thanks to Thiessen,39 and while at the Institute, he performed thermodynamic calculations and helped to analyze X-ray diffraction patterns. Beginning in 1934, August Winkel directed an independent Department for Colloid Chemistry, through which he furthered the research on aerosols, smokes and fogs that he had previously pursued under Jander. Winkel emphasized the relevance of research on these colloidal systems to meteorology and to occupa- tional health, e.g. protection from inhaled particulates through smoke and dust filters. He also noted, markedly more reticently, the possible military applications

38 Vortrag Kurt Überreiter, Berlin, 2. Juli 1981, MPGA Abt. VII/2 Tonträger, Überreiter T 135 1/2. Weigand, Die Technische Hochschule Graz. 39 Aktennotiz Walther Forstmann an Ernst Telschow, 8 May 1940, MPGA Abt. I, 1a, Nr.1175.

111 3 The “National Socialist Model Enterprise”

Fig. 3.13. August Winkel using the ultramicroscope, circa 1938. of such research, which, in addition to smoke screens, included distribution of poison gases, which were generally aerosols of toxic liquids. It is very likely that the Winkel department also carried out researches on filters to guard against chemical weapons and on filter-breaking compounds. Filtration research focused mainly on adsorption filters and porous materials, but also extended to industrial electro- filtering, which was important in the recovery of scarce raw and manufacturing materials. As part of this research, Hans Witzmann sought to establish a systematic basis for characterizing various filters. He established elementary laws of filtration by conducting experiments on model substances and introduced the Kz value as a characteristic measure of filter effectiveness.40 Since aerosols, smokes and fogs are difficult to produce and last only a short time, establishing such standards required extensive experimentation. Modern analytical methods were used to study particles as small as 0.1 μm; amongst the main methods were light absorption spectroscopy, X-ray crystallography and, most important of all, ultramicroscopy. Later studies used electron diffraction and electron microscopy. Con- ductivity measurements also ranked among the key analytical tools in Winkel’s department, as they had in his teacher Jander’s. In this respect the polarography techniques developed by Jaroslav Heyrovský in Prague were particularly important. These techniques were also used in analyses of the structures of organic molecules, in which differences in the reduction potential of individual functional

40 Witzmann, Elementarvorgänge.

112 Research Activities groups, e.g. keto, carbonyl or carboxyl, were related to the chemical structures surrounding the group.41 Dietrich Beischer, who began his scientific career in Winkel’s department, developed pioneering electron microscopy techniques. At the close of the 1930s, he began to focus on the preparation of samples for electron microscopy, work he pursued first in collaboration with Friedrich Krause,42 a colleague of Ruska’s at the High Voltage Institute in Neubabelsberg, and later in collaboration with Man- fred von Ardenne. In 1938, Beischer gained access to the first, prototype raster electron microscope, housed in Ardenne’s laboratory in nearby Lichterfelde. This groundbreaking device allowed certain structural details of catalysts, plastics, carbon blacks, metal oxide smokes and rubbers, including buna synthetic rubber, to be observed for the first time.43 Building on the optical microscopy results of Hermann Staudinger and previous X-ray analyses of fibers, Beischer made visible the thread-like molecular bundles of high polymers and placed them under mechanical stress in order to better understand how changes in their microscopic structure affected their macroscopic properties. In 1941, Beischer was appointed to the University of Strasbourg, where he pursued further investigations using electron microscopy. Electron microscopy research also continued at the KWI for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry, making use of the electromagnetic “Über-Microscope” developed by Siemens based on a design by Ruska beginning in 1939 and an electrostatic microscope designed by Hans Mahl at AEG beginning in 1940. Ernst Jenckel, who completed his doctorate under Tammann in Göttingen in 1932 and received his habilitation under Schenck in Münster, arrived at the Institute in 1935. His research focused on analyses of the structures of glasses, polymers and alloys. With respect to metal alloys, he systematically investigated changes induced in their mechanical properties by changes in the structures of their solid solutions; his research on glasses similarly sought to relate microscopic structure to physical properties and also included investigations of glass-like synthetics. Jenckel developed a new line of research around synthetics, borrowing concepts and categories from the study of glasses and molten materials. The research carried out under Jenckel was also of pronounced strategic importance, as attested to by the fact that he was assigned the task in 1938 of developing his own Four-Year-Plan Institute. This new institute was housed at the KWI for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry before being moved to the TH Aachen in 1941. Kurt Überreiter joined the Institute in 1937 as a doctoral student under Jenckel. He grew to be an important member of the Institute staff and carried out essential research into the structure and rigidity of plastics. Überreiter developed two fundamental concepts in early plastics research. First he characterized the glass-like

41 Proske, Winkel, Über die elektrolytische Reduktion. 42 Beischer, Krause, Elektronenmikroskop. 43 E.g. Ardenne, Beischer, Ka t a lysa t o re n .

113 3 The “National Socialist Model Enterprise”

Fig. 3.14. Ernst Jenkel, left, with a colleague in front of an air liquefier, circa 1938. state of rubber and synthetic resins that arises when the cooling process occurs quicker than the relaxation time of the polymer melt as a “liquid of fixed structure.” He identified the transition to this state via a kink in the volume versus temperature curve, and in the case of rubber, discovered that the transition occurred at the unexpectedly low temperature of around −65 ◦C.44 He attributed the elasticity of rubber to this low transition temperature. In general, he explained his observations concerning this state through the limited mobility of the individual segments of chains and nets of molecules. The second fundamental concept Überreiter made clear was the distinction between internal and external plasticiza- tion of polymers.45 Internal plasticizers become part of the polymer chain or net, preventing rigid crystallization; whereas, external plasticizers are not chemically bound to the polymer and function somewhat analogously to solvents. During the war, Überreiter began research with a more applied bent, including analyses of the quality and effectiveness of fillers, such as zinc oxide or carbon black, which is particularly important for rubber production. His findings indicated that surface structure of particles was of considerable significance, which lent even greater importance to electron microscopy and strengthened the tie to the work of Schoon and Beischer.

44 Überreiter, Kautschukund Kunstharze. 45 Überreiter, Weichmachung.

114 Research Activities

In 1936, a department for research in organic chemistry was created under the leadership of Arthur Lüttringhaus, a student of Windaus who specialized in the synthesis and analysis of elongated cyclic molecules such as cyclic ethers and thioethers. Through experiments with ring-closing reactions, he became the first to determine specific bond angles between carbon, oxygen and sulfur atoms in these compounds using a classic chemical approach.46 At the Institute, Lüttring- haus had the advantage of readily-available, high-quality diffraction analyses to which he could compare his results, thus combining crystallographic and synthetic methods of structure analysis. After Lüttringhaus accepted the offer of an associate professorship for organic chemistry at the University of Greifswald in 1940, Alfred Pongratz took over the department. Pongratz had previously pursued his research at the University of Graz and was particularly interested in gas-phase, catalytic oxidation. In 1940, a department for special colloid chemistry research was established under the direction of Otto Kratky,47 who would remain at the Institute only three years before accepting a position at the Technical University in Prague. Kratky was an expert in X-ray crystallography; while working under Mark in Vienna, he had developed small-angle scattering into an effective method for determin- ing the structure of very large aggregates of similar molecules. He focused on the structural analysis of macromolecular materials, both natural and synthetic, and worked extensively with cellulose obtained from viscose, which was important to the industrial production of artificial silk, with cellulose film and with spun rayon. Researchers in his department were able to discern the attachment of the thread-like molecules of cellulose to structures that were in part crys- talline and flake-like and in part amorphous and tangled. This complemented the previously discussed results from the Thiessen group concerning micelles of long-chain molecules. Kratky also investigated protein structures. In 1942, he and his colleague Aurelie Sekora were the first to confirm the spherical structure of chymotrypsin.48 Franz Seelich headed another, biology-oriented, working group. Seelich had worked previously at the Pasteur Institute in Paris. In 1927 he became an assistant professor in Kiel. At the Institute after 1941, he investigated the effect of anesthetics on cells and tissues. Germany’s troubled international relations notwithstanding, the Institute hardly operated in isolation. In addition to its military contacts, it had ties to industrial research institutes, which often provided samples for structural analysis, as well as to other scientific research facilities. In the early 1940s, for example, Rudolf Kohlhaas moved from Dahlem to Leuna, one of I.G. Farben’s most modern research, development and production sites. Around 1941, Georg Richard Otto Schultze, a specialist in mineral oil technologies and hydrogenation with professional experience in the U.S., who served as an assistant at the University of Berlin

46 E.g. Hauschild, Lüttringhaus, Valenzwinkelstudien. 47 Ausschnitt Deutsche Allg. Zeitung, 12 September 1940, MPGA 1. Abt., 1a, Nr.1175. 48 Kratky, Sekora, Röntgenstrahlen.

115 3 The “National Socialist Model Enterprise” and who later became a full professor at Technical University Braunschweig, conducted chemical processing research at the Institute as a guest scientist. There was also wide-ranging cooperation with the other Dahlem institutes. For example, Georg Graue, a former student of Hahn at the neighboring KWI for Chem- istry introduced a radioactive emission technique developed there to the Thiessen Institute, and in 1938, Otto Hahn left the Institute a hardness testing machine based on Caldwell’s design. Kratky cooperated with members of the KWI for Bio- chemistry, Hans Hermann and Hans Friedrich-Freksa, on the analysis of protein structures,49 and Theodor Schoon produced electron microscope images of iron oxides in Dahlem that were simultaneously being studied using X-ray analysis at the Inorganic Chemical Institute at TU Stuttgart.50 During the course of the war, the number of projects of immediate military relevance increased. In 1938, at the request of Mentzel and the SS, Thiessen set up a small, predominantly-secret military department for Eugen Weber. The department occupied a single laboratory at the Institute and probably investigated microfilm- ing techniques and counterfeit money and documents.51 Winkel and Witzmann, both closely linked to Jander, were also members of the SS since 1931 and 1932 respectively and rose through its ranks.52 The research group led by Anton Bar- tels, whom Thiessen had brought to the Institute from Leuna in 1941, carried out another project with clear military relevance. It focused on friction across bearings and lubrication, and it set up its instruments for measuring bearing wear in the main building of the KWI for Chemistry. In November 1943, at Thiessen’s invitation, an external branch of the Army Ordnance Office headed by Horst Böhme, whose offices had been destroyed by bombing, moved into the KWI for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry. Shortly before the end of the war, Böhme and his office relocated to Hesse. Böhme went on to become Professor for Pharmaceuti- cal and Organic Chemistry in Marburg in 1946.53 Robert Haul, who had joined Winkel’s staff in 1937 and completed his doctorate at the TH Berlin in 1938, was another direct contributor to the war effort. Beginning in 1944, he headed an external department of the KWI for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry based at an explosives institute of the Weapons Office in Prague. There he appears to have followed the “Dahlem style” in employing the latest in analytical equipment and techniques. Haul was clearly in contact with Jaroslav Heyrovský and had access to his polarographic equipment, which registered its output on an oscilloscope,54 and which Haul used to determine the reduction potentials of fuels and explosives.55

49 Kratky, Sekora, Weber, Kleinwinkelinterferenzen. Friedrich-Freksa, Kratky, Sekora, Röntgeninter- ferenzen. 50 Fricke, Schoon, Schröder, Umwandlungsreihe. 51 Interview Klaus Thiessen. 52 On Winkel, cf. Deichmann, Flüchten, p. 232–233 and p. 545 and Schmaltz, Kampfstoff-Forschung, p. 33, p. 78, p. 106–118 and p. 127–134. On Witzmann, cf. Deichmann, Flüchten, p. 545 and Schmaltz, Kampfstoff-Forschung, p. 108–109, p. 133 and p. 137. 53 Schmaltz, Kampstoff-Forschung, p. 118–123. 54 Podaný, Heyrovský, p. 547. 55 Haul, Scholz, Grenzflächen-Reaktionen, p. 232–234.

116 Research Activities

Research by the chemist Ludwig Ziehl presents yet another example of war materials research at the Institute. While still an undergraduate in 1944–1945, Ziehl conducted experiments with a model, stainless-steel combustion chamber in the basement of the partly destroyed KWI for Chemistry.56 His secret apparatus consisted of a sealed reaction chamber with a window through which the combustion of the samples, probably fuels and fuel additives, could be directly observed.57 Like Werner Wittstadt and Hans Bartel, Ziehl was among the members of the Institute who would follow Thiessen to the USSR in the fall of 1945 and become involved with the Soviet atomic bomb program. As an expert physical chemist, Thiessen himself evaluated and tested some, often rather fanciful, ideas for Nazi wonder weapons which had been sent to the authorities.58 The exact departmental structure of the Institute after 1939 is rather unclear. The rough sketch given in the timeline on the inside cover reflects the information that has been pieced together and confirmed so far. One source of confusion is that the terms “Department” (Abteilung) and “working group” (Arbeitsgruppe) were often used interchangeably, particularly in self-descriptions, and did not cor- respond to any recognizable difference in status. For example, the group headed by Heinz Haber, which was based in the Astrophysical Observatory in Potsdam and constructed a diffraction spectrograph, is described as a department even though it consisted of only about three members and, hence, cannot be sensibly com- pared with the departments run by Thiessen or Winkel, either in terms of size or function. The communal use of technicians and equipment, as well as the shared focus on tracing the macroscopic properties of materials back to their molecular and atomic structures, meant that many investigations were conducted as collab- orations between staff members from different departments. This further blurred the lines between the departments. During the war in particular, the departmental structure was often ignored in favor of project-oriented working groups. While the Institute did not boast any Nobel Prize-worthy achievements between 1933 and 1945, it would not be accurate to insist that “dictatorship” led to “poor science,” as the literature often does. Rather, the years of the Third Reich saw a shift in emphasis toward goal-oriented, war-relevant research, which nevertheless led to widely-recognized scientific achievements and made a lasting contribution to the reputation of the Institute and its scientists. As a result, many scientists at the Institute were able to continue their careers successfully after the war under very different academic and political conditions: Lüttringhaus became Professor of Organic Chemistry at the University of Freiburg, Haul was appointed Profes- sor for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry at the TH Hannover, and Seelich was appointed to the board of the Institute for Medical Chemistry at the Univer- sity of Vienna, where he came to be regarded as a pioneer of cancer research in Austria. Otto Kratky became Professor for Theoretical and Physical Chemistry at

56 Florek, Erinnerungen, p. 176. 57 Roth, Ziehl, Bombe. 58 Florek, Erinnerungen, p. 175.

117 3 The “National Socialist Model Enterprise”

Fig. 3.15. Werner Wittstadt, left, with a colleaguestanding next to an X-ray rectifier. the University of Graz and a world-renowned expert in the field of X-ray crystallography; Joachim Stauff served as a professor at the Institute for Physical Biochemistry at the University of Frankfurt, and Ernst Jenckel was appointed Pro- fessor for Theoretical Metallurgy and Physical Chemistry at the TH Aachen. After returning from the Soviet Union, Werner Wittstadt took up a post as Professor for Colloid Chemistry at the TU Dresden,59 and Hans Witzmann was appointed Professor for Physical Chemistry at University of Greifswald.60 Some of the Institute technical staff, on the other hand, did face professional difficulties after the war. Despite all his efforts, Anton Bartel was unable to find a position at an academic institution. He complained that MPG President Otto Hahn held his time at a “Nazi institute” against him; a similar reproach was not offered other, less exclusively technology-oriented staff members. However, for those staff members who moved with Thiessen to the Soviet Union, a focus on technology and applications appeared to be an advantage. In a similar manner,

59 Hänseroth, Petschel, Pommerin, 175 Jahre, p. 1059. 60 Beneke, Kolloidwissenschaftler.

118 Integration into the National Socialist System the western victors valued highly Dietrich Beischer’s technical expertise, and he was recruited by the U.S. Navy during Project Paperclip to work at the School of Aviation Medicine in Pensacola, Florida. He remained there until the 1970s and made a name for himself as a specialist in exomedicine and exobiology. Life magazine even did a photo proﬁle of him in 1958. Meanwhile, August Winkel was recruited by West German industry to direct an Institute for Industrial Dust Research in Bonn.

Integration into the National Socialist System

After Thiessen reorganized the Institute, research was brought fully in line with the military and economic demands of the regime, and dedicated efforts were also made to comply with the NS ideology and worldview. For example, the German Labor Front (Deutsche Arbeitsfront, DAF), founded by Robert Ley in 1933 to replace the banned labor unions, was given essentially free reign at the Institute to pursue its ideological goals. DAF initiatives treated the Institute as a microcosm of the Nazi ideal of the nation, the “Volksgemeinschaft;” it was molded into an exemplar of an administratively, socially, culturally and racially unified fighting community based on a social Darwinist model and led by a Director acting as a “Führer”figure. Each individual was required to do his or her best for the good of the community, and in return the Director-cum-Führer had a broadly defined duty to care for the members of the group and ensure their physical, mental and economic well-being. In this way, classic points of conflict between management and labor, such as low wages and long hours, were obscured.61 Attempts were made to realize most of the ideals of the DAF at the KWI for Phys- ical Chemistry and Electrochemistry. There were outings and evening meetings for the “following,” and it was considered important for the entire staff to attend the joint celebrations of the Berlin KWG Institutes to mark special occasions, e.g. the Führer’s birthday and May Day. If one of the employees fell ill, as in the case of Karl Klein, the head of the glassblowing workshop, who suffered from tuberculosis, the Institute management ensured that the family received financial support, either by providing direct grants from the Institute budget or by supporting applications for financial relief submitted to the General Administration of the KWG. The main goal of these activities was not increasing the number of dedicated National Socialists among the staff but strengthening a new social hierarchy while breaking down the old one, in other words, creating a National Socialist social structure. Georg Graue was particularly active in this respect. Having completed his doctorate at the KWI for Chemistry under Otto Hahn, Graue joined the institute in 1934 and was a Member of the Party and of the SS. He became the speaker for all the DAF organizational cells at all the Dahlem research institutes and head of the local

61 Reulecke, Leistungskampf, p. 242–272. Eibl, Thiessen, p. 178–179.

119 3 The “National Socialist Model Enterprise”

National Socialist Model Enterprise (NS-Musterbetrieb)

In May 1933, Robert Ley founded the Ger- man Labor Front (Deutsche Arbeitsfront – DAF), whose task it was to replace the banned trade unions and to contribute “to the definitive defeat of the madness of the social classes and of the class struggle.” As part of the Nazi power apparatus, it was concerned with “educating the creative German people” and building-up and strengthening NSDAP’s influence in Ger- man companies and businesses. The goal was to mobilize “the people’s community” to push through the interests of the Nazis; the mobilization was achieved through a number of measures that combined propaganda and reward systems. Among them was the “Performance Competition of the Enterprises,” announced by Hitler in 1936 and organized by DAF; bestowal of the honorable title “National Socialist Model Enterprise” took place annually, on May 1. The ideological program of the DAF came with a socialist veneer, as only “work forces” were mentioned without any reference to class distinctions among the personnel. The DAF division “Strength through Joy” organized vacations, trips and parties for the work force; however, improvements in work conditions and safety and the possibility of continued education were also supposed to give employees the feeling that both the company and state were taking good care of them. Although the golden flag of a “model enterprise” was supposed to be an “expression of the victory of the National Socialist movement in the social area,” the competition also served the pur- pose of increasing productivity and economic potential through an efficient use of labor and rationalization measures. The number of participating enterprises increased from 80,559 in 1937–38 to 272,763 in 1939–40; among these were companies from the armaments industry, mining, metal refining, the chemical industry and construction, but also government offices. Participation alone in the competition counted as a declaration of trust in the goals of the Party. In the years up to May 1940, a total of 297 Model Enterprises were recognized, 2,923 enterprises received a performance badge from the national leader of the DAF, and 5,435 enterprises were awarded diplomas handed out by the district (Gau) leaders. The KWI for physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry earned the title of a National Socialist Model Enterprise in 1940, as the scientific orientation of the institute and the management style of the director Thiessen showed it had acquiesced to the Nazi research policies and the goals of the DAF. It was the first (and probably the last) scientific institute which boasted this Nazi title of honor.

120 Integration into the National Socialist System

Fig. 3.16. Illustrated newspaper poster from the National Socialist propaganda department, 1943. Below at left, Kurt Überreiter, center Anton Bartel, at right Ernst Ruska. association of university lecturers (Dozentenbund). In 1938, he was also appointed Thiessen’s administrative director. The letters exchanged between Graue and Ernst Telschow of the KWG General Administration regarding the swimming pool that was built in 1937/38 for KWG employees on the corner of Boltzmannstraße and Garystraße, on Telschow’s initiative, show the two men engaged in a sort of competition to curry favor with the staff, as Telschow tried to adapt to the new political conditions. To continue improving the economic performance of the Reich and ideologically disciplining its population, the DAF launched a nationwide, annual competition in 1936 through which the organizations that best lived up to DAF ideals were awarded the title “NS Model Enterprise.” The competition was especially aimed at large arms companies and state offices, but the DAF indicated to the KWG in 1939 that institutes of the Society should also apply, and the General Adminis- tration promptly passed this information on to the individual institutes as a form of recommendation. The KWI for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry easily fulfilled the DAF’s application criteria and had already received a similar award at the district level a year earlier. It entered the competition immediately and, in 1940, became the first (and probably only) research institute to receive this high distinction. Rudolf Hess presented the award certificate and the Gold Flag to the institute and to other “model enterprises” at an ostentatious ceremony held at

121 3 The “National Socialist Model Enterprise”

Krupp in Essen on May 1. The title was renewed annually, as was customary after an organization had been conferred the award for the first time. With respect to its selection as a “model enterprise,” the treatment of members of the staff often marginalized or ignored in institutional histories was of key importance, including technicians, laboratory assistants, skilled craftsmen and administrative personnel. When the Institute scientific staff was gutted in 1933, the majority of the staff members filling these positions remained. While the transition meant that Thiessen and his young research staff, many of whom were already active in National Socialist organizations, were able to launch their research careers at a prestigious institute in Dahlem under outstanding conditions, members of the technical staff lacked this source of motivation, and many of them still felt a certain personal loyalty towards Haber. Nevertheless, they assimilated into the new structure of the Institute and continued to work hard for its overall success, even in cases where they had the opportunity to leave. Most of these staff members were not fervent National Socialists, and many were highly-trained experts with skills that were in high demand. Examples include the master glassblower Karl Klein, the master mechanic Edmund Ihme and the technical assistant Kurt Hauschild, who had previously worked in Polanyi’s department. Their know- how was indispensable for the expansion of the Institute buildings and apparatus begun in 1933. Realizing this, Thiessen made a special effort to win over this group of employees, and their accounts of the Institute praise the working conditions there, saying that the Institute was modern, clean and excellently equipped. Because research at the Institute was so apparatus dependent and oriented, its success hinged to a great extent on the skill of its technicians. This was reflected in several of the photographs of the laboratory taken together in a series in 1938, some of which have been included in this chapter. Most of the images feature a piece of equipment, a researcher or a technician; some include all three. In these pictures, the technicians are depicted in the same manner as the researchers; there are no visible indicators of the traditionally higher social status of the researchers. There is even an individual portrait of Karl Klein. In this respect, the photo series was without precedent at the Institute and reflected an element of NS propaganda. Members of the Institute staff were also included in propaganda exhibitions related to National Socialist science and technology,62 for example in a 1943 illustrated newspaper poster by the NSDAP propaganda department depicting the work of scientific institutes. It is striking that the images on the poster strongly resemble the pictures from the photo series mentioned above, and two of the images on the poster were probably taken at the Institute under Thiessen. The message of the poster is in line with the vision that Thiessen himself promoted: researchers and technicians working side by side to serve the national interest, equipped with the best, most-modern instruments and apparatus. The status of the technical staff received an additional boost when they began to appear prominently in Institute publications. Starting in 1935, members of the

62 Abschrift, Goebbels to Thiessen 3 September 1936, MPGA Abt. I, Rep. 1a, Nr.1174.

122 Integration into the National Socialist System

Table 3.2. Publications of the technical (workshop) staff of the KWI for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry during the Third Reich:

Wilhelm Ulfert Zerspanung des Stahles mit 18% Chrom und 8% Nickel mit Werkzeugen aus Silberstahl, Stahl und Eisen 55 (1935). Erich Franke Eine vielseitigverwendbare Vakuumkammer für Röntgenfeinstrukturauf- nahmen, Zeitschrift für physikalische Chemie 31 (1936). Walter Spatz Verbesserung der Mikrobürette, Chemische Fabrik 9 (1936). Kurt Hauschild Fraktionierte Vakuumdestillationfester Substanzen, ChemischeFabrik 10 (1937). Karl Klein Verbesserte Quecksilberreinigung, Chemische Fabrik 10 (1937). Karl Klein Über einen neuartigen Thermoregler, Zeitschrift für Instrumentenkunde 59 (1939). Wilhelm Ulfert Ein Präzisions-Schlagzahn, Feinmechanik und Präzision 48 (1940). Karl Klein Feinfraktionierkolonne ganz aus Glas unter Verwendung von Mehrkam- merrohren, Zeitschrift für physikalische Chemie A 189 (1941). Wolfgang Srocke Ein Winkel-Krauskopf, ein verstellbarer Drehstahl-Halter, Feinmechanik und Präzision 50 (1942). Wilhelm Ulfert Ankörn- und Zentriergerät, Feinmechanik und Präzision 50 (1942). Wilhelm Ulfert Verstellbare Bohrvorrichtung, Feinmechanik und Präzision 50 (1942). technical staff were not only thanked in articles, they were even credited as co- authors. Moreover, they started publishing short articles under their own names in technical journals and magazines explaining improvements they had made to instruments, apparatus or tools. Again, this had no precedent at the Institute. Wilhelm Ulfert, who had been employed as an apprentice mechanic under Haber and had become the head of the NSDAP organizational cell in 1933,63 took full advantage of these new opportunities. But Kurt Hauschild, who, unlike Ulfert, was not a National Socialist and who continued working at the Institute until the 1970s, also benefited greatly from the new publishing arrangements. Although the technical members of staff did not receive pay raises or managerial positions, the importance of their work was at least more directly acknowledged than in the past. This was not just a reflection of their significance to the Insti- tute, but was also in line with the pseudo-egalitarian ideology of the NS regime. Apparently, Thiessen himself was a paradigm of this approach. He was widely considered to be decent and even-handed, and he protected individual employees who had come into conflict with other parts of the NS system. For example, thanks to their active participation in the National Socialist power structure, he and his leading men were able to have a number of employees exempted from military service.

63 Aktenvermerk Ernst Telschow 29 August 1933, MPGA I. Abt. 1a, Nr.1168.

123 3 The “National Socialist Model Enterprise”

Fig. 3.17. Glassblower Karl Klein, circa 1938.

In 1937, Thiessen took on principal responsibility for chemistry and organic materials at the Reich Research Council (Reichsforschungsrat).64 Later physical chemistry was added to his purview. The Research Council was responsible for funding decisions within the German Scientific Research Association (DFG), which replaced the Emergency Asssociation of German Science (NG) in 1935 and was headed by Mentzel from 1936 onwards. In his work for the Research Council, Thiessen not only contributed significantly to realizing the broad directives provided by National Socialist science and research policies, in particular to pro- moting research in the field of chemistry oriented toward the Third Reich’s self- sufficiency policy, but also advocated close links between theory and practice in chemistry. Very much in the spirit of Wilhelm Ostwald, he repeatedly described physical chemistry as “general chemistry,” in that it provides the foundations for all chemical specialties. A more distinguishing characteristic of Thiessen’s science policy activities and of his guidance of the Institute, particularly in the context of the NS regime, was his support for a certain degree of creative freedom, which he even defended against anti-intellectualist attacks.65 However, he argued that the raison d’être of basic research was its relevance to practical applications, and in this respect his views anticipated the linear model of the relationship between science and technology that was later prominently advocated by Vannevar Bush in the U.S.

64 Schmaltz, Kampfstoff-Forschung, p. 125 ff. 65 Thiessen, Physikalische Chemie.

124 Integration into the National Socialist System

More important than Thiessen’s political and scientific agenda, however, was the fact that the contacts he established in his science policy work could be used for the benefit of the Institute. About 30 % of the total approved funding in the fields Thiessen oversaw went to scientists from the Institute. Several members of the KWI for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry were at the top of the list of scientists who received the most funding, including Thiessen himself, Stauff, Winkel, Kratky and Beischer.66 Many of the publications by Institute members at the time thank the DFG for scholarships or for funding the purchase of instruments and materials. The Institute also developed ties to the Military Technology faculty at TH Charlottenburg, which had been founded in 1934 as a showcase project for NS research policy. Karl Becker was dean of this faculty until his death in 1940 – the very same General Becker who had backed Jander during the Institute takeover. In 1939, August Winkel was appointed associate professor at the Gas Chemistry Institute of the new faculty, but he remained at the KWI for all practical purposes, as World War II blocked the ambitious plans to expand the Faculty of Military Technology. All this reflects the diverse and complex relations between the scientific work at the Institute and the research policy and ideological orientation it developed in light of the expectations of the National Socialist regime. For example, the main topics of research at the Institute were chosen with an eye toward self-sufficiency policies and armament needs; this decision brought with it excellent funding. Con- versely, the improved status of the instrumental and industrial aspects of physical chemistry research supported the ideologically-motivated demolition of old hier- archies and social distinctions and helped consolidate National Socialist power.67 In the final years of the war, Thiessen seems to have realized that National Socialist rule would not last a thousand years. There are indications that he even tolerated a communist-leaning resistance cell toward the end of the war, or at least knew of its existence. Among the members of this cell was the chemist Alfred Wende, who became the leader of the anti-fascist task force at the Institute after the war and was later appointed director of an institute for synthetics research in the GDR. It appears that plans were discussed even before the capitulation to offer to work for the Soviet Union after the war. Prominent among Thiessen’s reasons for his decision to work for the Soviets was the fact that he believed that the Soviet Union was the best place to continue his scientific career under suitable conditions.68 A similar move to the U.S. did not appear possible because, as Haber’s “successor,”he had a poor reputation among influential groups of German émigrés, and the material conditions alone in Germany were enough to discourage attempts to continue scientific research there. So it was no coincidence that Thiessen kept his institute operational until the end of the war or that he resisted all requests to relocate it to western or southern

66 Cf. Deichmann, Flüchten, p. 232. 67 Cf. Maier, Rüstungsforschung.Maier,Gemeinschaftsforschung. 68 Eibl, Thiessen, p. 185–187.

125 3 The “National Socialist Model Enterprise”

Fig. 3.18. Copy of a part of the speech given by P.A. Thiessen to the National Socialist Union of University Lecturers (Nationalsozialisticher Dozentenbund, NSDB) in Berlin on 18 February 1937.

126 Integration into the National Socialist System

Germany after 1944, as most of the other institutes in Dahlem had done. Only smaller departments with less complex equipment were moved. For example, the explosives department under Robert Haul was located in Prague since 1944, and most of Heinz Haber’s spectroscopic department, which had been taken over from KWI for Physics, was relocated to the astronomical observatory in Potsdam. Ini- tially, however, more ambitious plans had been pursued, starting in about 1941. The chemical industry, on behalf of the military, built a primarily subterranean factory for the production of the accelerant and fuel additive trichloramine in Falkenhagen near Frankfurt/Oder. The production process employed at the so- called “lake plant” was based on the results of a dissertation written by Siegfried Glupe under Thiessen, who himself seems to have played an advisory role in Falkenhagen.69 As late as October 1943, the construction department of I.G. Farben in Oppau drew up plans for a “KWI Petershagen” near Falkenhagen. The buildings would have been spacious enough to accommodate the entire KWI for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry, but the economic situation in 1943 rendered these plans no more than a pipe dream. As an alternative, two smaller brick buildings were constructed on the site of the lake plant at Falkenhagen in 1944 and 1945. These were designed to house Winkel’s department, likely with the idea in mind that its members would carry out production-related research. There are two documented cases of the use of slave labor under inhumane conditions in connection with the activities just discussed. Construction of the Falkenhagen lake plant was organized in a manner typical for such purposes; a military contract was carried out by a private firm, in this case a subsidiary of I. G. Farben. In response to chronic labor shortages the SS made hundreds of concentration camp prisoners available, for a fee, as forced labor for the Falkenhagen project beginning in 1943. The SS guarded the prisoners and provided for the replacement of prisoners who were killed by their labors. The Thiessen Insitute contracted and paid the I.G. Farben subsidiary to construct barracks using these methods. Begin- ning in 1944, prisoners were employed openly at the construction site, which could not have escaped the notice of Thiessen and some other members of the Institute scientific staff during their many visits.70 Furthermore, branches of the SS, the army, the Reich Research Council and the Institute for the German “Eastern Project” (Institut für deutsche Ostarbeit) had previously established special pris- oner task forces for mathematical and scientific projects in the concentration camps, among them was a task force for chemistry whose scientific directorship Winkel undertook at the recommendation of Mentzel. This task force was relocated at the end of 1944 from Cracow to the concentration camp at Flossenbürg. It designed and built, among other things, an instrument for gas analysis intended for use in a research project funded by the Research Council and undertaken by Winkel’s department at the behest of the army and marines. Finally, some reference should be made to the occasional meetings Thiessen and his administrative

69 Schmaltz, Kampfstoff-Forschung, p. 156. 70 Cf. Strebel, Wagner, Zwangsarbeit, p. 46–48 and Schmaltz, Kampfstoff-Forschung, p. 164–169.

127 Fig. 3.19. Plans for a “KWI Petershagen,”1943. Integration into the National Socialist System director, Georg Graue, had with the SS-Ahnenerbe and the concentration camp doctors regarding the coordination of poison gas research.71 Because of the war, Winkel’s department did not resume scientific operations in Falkenhagen, even though the institute library had been moved nearby and various instruments and other equipment, some of it new, had been transported there. Part of the equipment and the institute library were moved west shortly before the end of the war, initially to Winnenden in Lower Saxony. Then late in 1944, Thiessen gave the order for the construction of a site in Osterburg/Altmark for which he planned to make 20,000 marks available.72 The scattered and incomplete documents remaining from the time give the impression that Thiessen feigned a gradual move of the Institute while actually keeping its most central and modern parts in Dahlem. The Institute also incorpo- rated some parts of other KWIs that remained in Berlin. At the end of the war, Thiessen’s institute was the only large scientific institute of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society left in Dahlem, and it had become a sort of gathering place for the research groups that had remained, a role it would play even more prominently after the war. This was a result of not only Thiessen’s stalling tactics but also the limited damage the Institute had sustained from bombing raids. Parts of the neighboring KWI for Chemistry had been blown up and other parts burned down as the result of an air raid on 15 February 1944. In contrast, the damage suffered by the KWI for Physical Chemistry a month later in a night raid by British bombers, in which a firebomb ignited the roof of the front building, could be repaired relatively quickly, and research activities at the Institute were hardly affected. In view of the scarcity of materials and manpower at the time, the rapidity of the repairs illustrates not so much the limited scope of the damage as the strategic importance of the Institute and Thiessen’s excellent relationship with NS authorities. The Red Army occupied Dahlem on 25 April 1945. In the final days of the war, the families of the staff were housed in the Institute so as to give them a degree of protection from the ongoing fighting, and also to help defend them in case of a direct attack and takeover. Soviet commissions inspected the Institute immediately after the occupation and carried out extensive interrogations of the staff. Because the Red Army was contractually obliged to vacate Dahlem by the end of June 1945 and hand it over to the Americans, the Institute was completely dismantled beginning on May 25, as were many other facilities in the western part of the city. This gave the population a welcome opportunity to earn food by helping with the work. The KWIs were given special priority in the dismantling efforts, and the intact Institute for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry, with its high-quality, cutting-edge equipment, was the best of the lot. Since Thiessen was the highest-ranking representative of the KWIs in Berlin, he was appointed provisional head of the KWG by the mayor of Zehlendorf on 12 May

71 Schmaltz, Thiessen, p. 320–329. 72 Dr. Breitner to MPG, attn. Telschow, 17 June 1949, MPGA Abt. II, 1a, Institutsbetreuerakten MPI für (bio)physikalische Chemie, Allgemein, Bd. 1 1945 to 31 December 1959. Special thanks to Dr. Marion Kazemi for directing us to this source.

129 3 The “National Socialist Model Enterprise”

Fig. 3.20. KWI for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry, Summer 1944. The destroyed sections of the roof of the main building are being replaced.

1945, succeeding Vögler, the last president of the KWG. The main responsibilities of the new “president” were to limit the administrative chaos, secure the remainder of the equipment, and look after the employees. In July 1945, however, Thiessen announced that he intended to move to the Soviet Union and could not continue to perform these duties, not least of all because he and some of his employees had already followed the withdrawing Soviet troops and moved to Spindlersfeld in the Soviet sector of the city. In the fall of 1945, the group ﬂew to Moscow from the nearby airport in Adlershof and, in subsequent years, worked on the Soviet atomic bomb program. And so the Thiessen era and the Thousand-Year Reich at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry came to an end.

130