Flachowsky on Reitzenstein, 'Himmlers Forscher: Wehrwissenschaft Und Medizinverbrechen Im „Ahnenerbe“ Der SS' (Translated by Anne Von Petersdorff)

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H-Net Flachowsky on Reitzenstein, 'Himmlers Forscher: Wehrwissenschaft und Medizinverbrechen im „Ahnenerbe“ der SS' (Translated by Anne von Petersdorff)

Page published by Yelena Kalinsky on Thursday, July 20, 2017

Julien Reitzenstein. Himmlers Forscher: Wehrwissenschaft und Medizinverbrechen im „Ahnenerbe“ der SS [Himmler's scientists: Military science and medical crimes in the SS Ahnenerbe]. Paderborn: Schöhningh, 2014. 415 pp. (bound), ISBN 978-3-506-76657-1.

Reviewed by Sören Flachowsky

Originally published on H-Soz-u-Kult (June, 2016)

J. Reitzenstein: Himmler's Scientists

On December 22, 1942, Dr. August Hirt, professor of anatomy, reported to his superiors on the mustard gas experiments at the Natzweiler concentration camp, which a few days earlier had just claimed its first victim. “The experiments in Natzweiler are now under way. The new material finally worked, and in fact it worked surprisingly well. The pictures are great,” Hirt says (141). The recipient of this letter was Wolfram Sievers, managing director of the department, which had become synonymous with the medical crimes of the Nazi period ever since the Doctors' Trial N[ ürnberger Ärzteprozess] and is the subject of the work to be presented here—the SS Ahnenerbe[1].

In his book, based on a dissertation completed at the University of Dusseldorf, Reitzenstein deals with the evolution of the “Institut für wehrwissenschaftliche Zweckforschung” (Institute for applied research in military science, IWZ), which emerged from the SS Ahnenerbe, and thus focuses on the hitherto largely unknown heart of science without moral boundaries entgrenzter[ Wissenschaft]. While the Ahnenerbe has received scholarly attention again and again in recent decades, a study of the IWZ has so far been lacking. I should like to mention here only the unsurpassed study by Michael H. Kater, titled Das ”Ahnenerbe“ der SS 1935–1945. Ein Beitrag zur Kulturpolitik des Dritten Reiches [The SS Ahnenerbe, 1935-1945. A contribution to the cultural policy of the Third Reich], 3rd ed. (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2001; 1st ed., Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1974).

Not without reason does Reitzenstein therefore point to the shortcomings in the academic literature. However, by justifying his research approach by claiming that it is “almost exclusively based on sources and by presenting a 'compendium'” in which “all available sources are taken into account" (9), he formulates a claim that is difficult to meet.

Although only a small part of the book is dedicated to the origin and structure of the Ahnenerbe, Reitzenstein does present new findings on this topic. The contention that Reich Peasant Leader [Reichsbauernführer] Darré belonged to the founding members of the association (26) is disproved. Especially with regard to the financing of the Ahnenerbe, Reitzenstein shows that it received a large part of its funds from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Foundation, DFG). Moreover, he highlights that the revaluation of the Ahnenerbe to "Amt A" within

Citation: Yelena Kalinsky. Flachowsky on Reitzenstein, 'Himmlers Forscher: Wehrwissenschaft und Medizinverbrechen im „Ahnenerbe“ der SS' (Translated by Anne von Petersdorff). H-Net. 11-17-2017. https://networks.h-net.org/node/513/pages/187868/flachowsky-reitzenstein-himmlers-forscher-wehrwissenschaft-und Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. 1 H-Net the staff of the Reichsführer SS in 1942 also meant financial relief, because it was now financed by the SS-Wirtschaftsverwaltungshauptamt (SS Central Economic Administrative Office). Another new aspect is the inspection of the Ahnenerbe’s real estate properties in Berlin-Dahlem, which were appropriated partly through dubious business practices that also benefited the Ahnenerbe's “aryanization" (270–87).

The beginning of the Second World War presented the Ahnenerbe with serious problems, because its intellectual-scientific orientation lacked any “war weight.” As a result, Sievers was looking for new research areas in order to ensure his continuance. He found these new areas in the field of "military science," which were to be matched by the "Institut für wehrwissenschaftliche Zweckforschung,” especially founded for this purpose. In setting up these new structures, Sievers proceeded by no means systematically, but let himself be guided by coincidences and the personal interests of Himmler. The emphasis on medicine, however, was not unfounded. In addition to the treatment of war casualties, hygienic problems at the front and in the concentration camps demanded new methods of medical prophylaxis. However, Reitzenstein neglects to mention that Sievers had no other alternative than to establish himself in the field of medical military science, since research related to war and armor was already in full swing and covered by networks of universities and research departments, and the Ahnenerbe had simply missed the boat due to its one-sided orientation up to then.

The book focuses on the ten departments of the IWZ, and Reitzenstein concentrates less on the research undertaken at the institute and more on the formation and expansion of its departments, its networks, and the internal decision-making processes of the SS related to it. Hardly any of the departments—of which only six operated—produced "usable results." [Seeeditorial note.] Nevertheless, Reitzenstein also brings new, important findings to light: not only does he cast off the anonymity of the victims of mustard gas experiments (135–39), but he also outlines the backdrop of what led to the infamous "skull and skeleton collection" at the University of Strasbourg (114–17, 126–27).

Relying on recent theoretical concepts of the "new statism" [neue Staatlichkeit] of the Nazi regime (See Rüdiger Hachtmann and Winfried Süß, eds.,Hitlers Kommissare. Sondergewalten in der nationalsozialistischen Diktatur [Hitler's commissioners. Special powers/authorities in the National Socialist dictatorship] [Goettingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2006]; Sven Reichardt and Wolfgang Seibel, eds., Der prekäre Staat. Herrschen und Verwalten im Nationalsozialismus [The precarious state. Governance and administration in national socialism] [Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2011]), Reitzenstein comes to the conclusion with not entirely coherent evidence that Sievers was one of the "interface managers" of the NS research system who zealously worked for the leadership and developed a partly murderous dynamic. The "structural success" in establishing the IWZ was "justified in its personalization of the person of Sievers" and gave the impetus for the institute to “be on a good path” to become “an established research institution" at the end of 1944. Reitzenstein claims that through Sievert's expertise as Himmler’s special commissar, his “position of power within the SS” had expanded so much that he was "emancipated" not only from his competitors Oswald Pohl and Ernst-Robert Grawitz, but simultaneously even from Himmler and the SS. This, Reitzenstein claims, was not least due to the fact that Sievers had also taken on "influential" posts outside the Ahnenerbe after 1943—such as the Reichsforschungsrat (Reich Research Council, RFR)—and in this way coordinated the "defense research of the German Reich” (261, 302–7).

This perspective, however, demands a clear correction. Already in his introduction, Reitzenstein overstates the importance of the Ahnenerbe when he writes that "its ideologization has contributed to the radicalization of an entire generation" (10). Sievers was also no "science manager who was powerful far beyond the Ahnenerbe” (41). Although Sievers had close relations with the DFG President and department head of science in the Reich Ministry of Education, SS Brigadier general Rudolf Mentzel, it can hardly be inferred from this that he "co-managed" the Reichsforschungsrat (256). The appointment of Sievers to “Vize-Chef des Reichsforschungsrates” (Deputy Chief of the Reich Research Council) was more likely a concession of the Reich Ministry of Education to Himmler in order to secure the position of Mentzel in the RFR, whose position of power was temporarily up for discussion. In fact, the Ahnenerbe was dependent on Mentzel's goodwill, who used Himmler's research community, and thus also Sievers, to secure his own position. Reitzenstein himself states that Sievers merely sat "in the antechamber of power" (51).

The examples of karstology, breeding research, and plant genetics show that the IWZ served as a construct to provide the research and research facilities of the Ahnenerbe under the label of “war relevance.” This resulted in an institutional inflation of the Ahnenerbe, which involved fifty research posts by 1945 (82). Since some of its [the IWZ's[2]] departments existed prior to the institute’s official foundation, the impression arises that the institute was merely an umbrella association under which the military defense departments of the Ahnenerbe were combined. This would also explain why Sievers was never appointed director of the IWZ (349, n. 745).

Reitzenstein's assertion that Sievers never required fatal human trials and “'only' on two occasions” pushed for potentially deadly procedures (61) is problematic. Contrary to the statement that "there is no evidence that Sievers demanded human trials, provided that there were alternatives" (223), there is prolific evidence in Reitzenstein's book that Sievers pushed, coordinated, and financed fatal human trials (92, 120-21, 122-23, 129-30, 150, 155-56), and even attended some of the experiments in person (173, 177-78). The finding that "no lethal or particularly cruel human trials" were documented at the IWZ after the withdrawal of Sigmund Rascher from the Ahnenerbe does not necessarily have to be related to Sievers. On May 15, 1944, Himmler himself ordered that "medical experiments carried out in concentration camps” require his personal approval “with immediate effect, without exception," which largely restricted Sievers from acting autonomously. (Circular of the Reichsführer SS, 15.05.44, B Arch Berlin, R 26 III / 729, unp.)

The book Himmlers Forscher (Himmler's scientists) unintentionally proves the limited effect of the SS Ahnenerbe on the scientific enterprise of the NS in terms of scientific-political and professional significance. With its experiments, the IWZ attempted to produce “economic goods in short supply” [wirtschaftliche Mangelgüter] and thus increase the prestige of Himmler, but it did not succeed. The research on steppe horses, insects, rust inhibitors, mashed potatoes, vaccines, hemostatic agents, mustard gas, and phosgene therapies are not the result of strict planning. The results of the research undertaken there was modest at best and especially in the case of Hirt, Rascher, Bickenbach, and Haagen—all figureheads of the institute—obtained by means of criminal human experiments.

[1] The term ”Ahnenerbe” is adopted from German. Literally it translates to “ancestral heritage,” but “Ahnenerbe” in this context refers to a project in Nazi Germany that set out to research the history of the “Aryan race.” As in the German original, the term is sometimes put in quotation marks and

[2] Translator's remark

Citation for original review:

Flachowsky, Sören. Review of Himmlers Forscher: Wehrwissenschaft und Medizinverbrechen im „Ahnenerbe“ der SS,by Julien Reitzenstein. H-Soz-u-Kult, H-Net Reviews. June, 2016. https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=47143

Citation for English translation:

Flachowsky, Sören. Review of Himmlers Forscher: Wehrwissenschaft und Medizinverbrechen im „Ahnenerbe“ der SS, by Julien Reitzenstein. H-Soz-u-Kult, H-Net Reviews. June, 2016. Translated by Anne von Petersdorff. June, 2017. https://networks.h-net.org/node/513/pages/187868/flachowsky-reitzenstein-himmlers-forscher...