THE PROBLEM OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN EGYPT: “ELECTORAL”

AUTHORITARIANISM AND THE MILITARY

The popular revolts that started at the end of 2010s, shattered the base of long- established authoritarian regimes in the Arab Middle East. Those events inevitably brought about debates on the democratization in this part of the world which had been taking place since early 1990s. At the core of these debates laid whether a democratization process could be applicable in the Middle East as it happened in the

West. Most of the discussions about democratization in this region carried with a

Western centric discourse and frame. Mainstream approaches argued that the political, social, religious and cultural structures of the region were a stumbling block on the way for Western style democratization. This approach is based on the idea of the “other” and a dichotomy between the East and the West, in which this dichotomy occupied a central place. The revolts erupted in the Arab Middle East were framed with such metanarratives as the Thirty Years Wars, the Peace of Westphalia and the Prag Spring.

The Arab peoples who are the subjects of their own history and struggle for democracy have been turned into a Western-centric object of discourse. These kinds of approaches not only render the social-political struggles of region into an ahistorical process, but they have also been problematic from the outset since they argued that there is only one model for democratization and regional peace.

Instead of an overarching assessment, there needs to be an approach which tries to transcend this reading, and which acknowledges divergent democratization traditions and experiences of individual Arab societies. It is important to develop an approach that transcends imaginary geographical narratives on the one hand, and has an historical background which takes into account of social structures on the other. In an historical

1 conjuncture that implies that “authoritarianism” belongs to the “East” and democratization belongs to the West, the question why the “Middle Eastern societies are not democratizing” gains ever more significance.

The first round of the Arab Spring which started in Tunisia with a popular uprising led to the collapse of the 24 yearlong Zaynal Abidin bin Ali’s regime and his escape from the country. This shocking event represented a disenchantment (Entauberung) in the

Weberian sense and showed the vulnerability of the authoritarian regimes in the face of mass demonstrations, paving way for the other popular revolts of the discontented masses in neighbouring countries. “Starting from Tunisia, in a domino effect those uprisings spread to other countries such as Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain and

Omman.

Egypt was the second country where a 30 year long Husni Mubarak regime collapsed under pressure from the mass riots. Mubarak who was in power since 1981, left office to Omar Suleiman when he realized that the powerful military remained silent during the riots and conceded to the demands of the public. This made it possible for a relatively smooth transition. Muhammad Mursi was elected as the president who was the candidate of the Freedom and Justice Party, the political wing of the Muslim

Brotherhood organization. Although free elections were important in terms of democratization, the rapid moves in democratic backsliding led to the debates about elections equal democratization. After all, the Arab Middle East is no stranger to the election processes, but it is known that democracy as an idea and tradition and democratization as an act have not taken root in the region. Mursi was ousted from power only after he was elected a year ago by his hand-picked minister of defence

Abdulfattah es-Sisi which was followed by the elections won by a huge margin of the

2 incumbent leader. However, what Larbi Sadiki termed as “election fetishism” does not bring democratization to the region.

The events of 2011 are part of the history of the Egyptian society as well as the uprisings started in Tunisia and spread to other authoritarian regimes. Therefore, the mass riots in 2011 were not an exception in Egypt, just as it would not be correct to speak of an opposition free Egyptian political scene during the Mubarak era. Transition to the neoliberal opening and integration to the international system during the Sadat period has been the main dynamic whose impact continued even today. This policy aimed to replace social welfare practices of the Nasir’s Arab Socialism in the area of education and health and subvention of basic needs with neoliberal principles. Coupled with the high inflation and unemployment rate, the social eruption came in 1977 with the “bread uprisings”. The global contraction during the 1980s led to the riots not only in Egypt but also in other countries. When the Mubarak regime intensified its oppression in order to implement neoliberal policies, Egypt experienced mass protests in 2008 which targeted both the regime and austerity measures.

The question still hangs in the air: why Egypt struggles with democratization despite the existing oppositional forces? There maybe two explanations regarding this question.

Externally, the US-Egypt relations played a significant part in this. The US strategy in the Middle East was based on the stability in Egypt which was one of the most important actors in the Arab world. Egypt was critical in suppressing the Islamist movements the most important of which was the Muslim Brotherhood, and its recognition of Israel and diplomatic ties. Both the US and the European countries ignored human rights violations and pressures on the opposition for the sake of stability which has turned into a covert compromise.

3 The domestic reason for the lack of democratization should be the focal point, and one needs to consider the post anti-colonial dynamics. In that period, the Arab nationalists and Baathists prioritised anti-imperialism and economic development. The powerful leadership was the order of the day, single party authoritarian regimes with strong executive power were formed with a heavy emphasis on nationalist ideology. Unlike some Arab countries, in the Egyptian case, the military has a privileged place in this country. Military officers led the revolution against the Farouk regime, and wars waged against Israel turned the military into an active player in domestic politics. The post-

2011 period showed the prominent role of the Egyptian military in politics, economy and social life. The military formed the interim government after the overthrow of

Mubarak, generals maintained critical positions in the cabinet during the Mursi government and took control of the executive after the military coup in 2013.

The main consequences of strong leadership and military’s active involvement in politics has been the narrowing down of the political space and weakening of civil society and marginalizing of the opposition. The designation of the Muslim

Brotherhood which has been the most organized political group, as a terrorist organization, the imprisonment of its leading figures and the ensuing purge of its members is a case in point. Beginning from the 2000s, there emerged a rudimentary civil society, along with new generation of young people and growing urbanization which manifested itself in the formation of April 6 movement. Those liberal minded groups spearheaded anti-Mubarak protests but civil society is still weak in Egypt.

4