American University in Cairo AUC Knowledge Fountain Theses and Dissertations Student Research Spring 5-25-2021 Backsliding to Autocracy: The Case of Turkey under Erdoğan Yasmina Khaled Elazazi American University in Cairo, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds Part of the Comparative Politics Commons Recommended Citation APA Citation Elazazi, Y. K. (2021).Backsliding to Autocracy: The Case of Turkey under Erdoğan [Master's Thesis, the American University in Cairo]. AUC Knowledge Fountain. https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/1619 MLA Citation Elazazi, Yasmina Khaled. Backsliding to Autocracy: The Case of Turkey under Erdoğan. 2021. American University in Cairo, Master's Thesis. AUC Knowledge Fountain. https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/1619 This Master's Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at AUC Knowledge Fountain. 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Backsliding to Autocracy The Case of Turkey under Erdoğan Thesis Yasmina Khaled Elazazi SID: 900120380 Spring 2021 Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Nadine Sika (AUC) 1st Reader: Dr. Mostafa Hefny (AUC) 2nd Reader: Dr. Rolf Frankenberger (Tübingen University) Comparative Politics and Middle East Studies (CMEPS) Political Science Department The American University in Cairo Table of Contents Chapter I: Introduction .................................................................................................................... 3 Abstract ....................................................................................................................................... 3 Conceptual Framework ............................................................................................................... 4 Theoretical Framework ............................................................................................................... 6 Literature Review ........................................................................................................................ 8 Research Question, Hypotheses and Variables ......................................................................... 18 Research Design and Methodology........................................................................................... 19 Organizational Structure of the Thesis ...................................................................................... 21 Chapter II: The Military and Democratic Politics ........................................................................ 22 The Politicization of the Military and Democratic Politics ....................................................... 22 Theorizing Civil-Military Relations .......................................................................................... 24 Overview of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey....................................................................... 33 The Role of the Turkish Military in Politics after 2002 ............................................................ 38 “The Straw that Broke the Camel's Back” ................................................................................ 41 Chapter III: The Democratic Project: Old versus New ................................................................. 44 The Deep State .......................................................................................................................... 45 The Authoritarian Legacy ......................................................................................................... 49 The AKP “Democratic Model” ................................................................................................. 54 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 59 Chapter IV: Reversing or Surviving? ........................................................................................... 61 Personalism, Populism and the “Erdoğanization of Turkish Politics” ...................................... 61 Strategies of Reversal ................................................................................................................ 66 Threats and Responses .............................................................................................................. 67 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 82 Chapter V: Concluding Chapter.................................................................................................... 83 Review of Findings ................................................................................................................... 83 Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 88 1 Tables and Figures Figure 1: Analytic Structure of Path-Dependent Explanation……………………….....................7 Figure 2: Own Compilation of Path-dependent Explanation of Regime Change…………………8 Table 1: Mechanisms of Change and Strategies…………………………….…………................30 2 Chapter I: Introduction Abstract Democratic backsliding is a gradual process that results from changes in formal political institutions and informal political practices that significantly affect how citizens engage with the state (Lust and Waldner, 2015: 7). Even though such a phenomenon may occur in different types of democracies, there is always a threshold that determines whether the state will completely backslide to autocracy or conserve being a “minimal democracy”. For instance, a current model of democratic backsliding is Turkey; a state which has been experiencing a decline in basic civil liberties, political rights and freedoms. According to Freedom House, from 2002 to 2020, Turkey’s “political environment” has decreased from 23 to 31 (on a scale of 0 to 40, 40 being the worst); moreover, its “global freedom” has deteriorated to 32 (on a scale of 100, 100 being the worst), which labeled it “not free”, compared to being “partly free” in 2002 (Freedom House, 2020). Indeed, the literature indicates that such decline mostly stemmed from Erdoğan’s personalization of institutions and control of the military’s political power after the attempted coup of July 2016. Nevertheless, when examining the literature on democratization, studies reveal that undermining the political influence of the military is crucial to consolidate democracy, yet in the Turkish case that did not happen (Droz-Vinznet, 2014: 668). Accordingly, an emerging puzzle is: why does a regime continue to backslide from democracy despite de-politicizing its military? How do other personalized institutions, within a state, determine the outcome of democratic transitions? Looking at Turkey under Erdoğan and the AKP1, this thesis aims to examine the causes of democratic backsliding in relation to the de-politicization of the military. 1 The AKP: The Justice and Development Party, known in Turkey by its Turkish acronym AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi). 3 Keywords: democratic backsliding; politicization of the military; personalization of institutions; authoritarian legacy. Conceptual Framework Before examining the theoretical part of the thesis, a conceptual debate will be demonstrated then key terms will be defined. To begin with, there is growing uncertainty on how we should name the phenomenon “opposite to democratization”, how many distinct forms it can take in the empirical reality, and consequently how relevant and worrisome it is. Three commonly used concepts vary in degrees of differences when describing “the moving away” from democracy: “backsliding, breakdown/decay and autocratization” (Luhrmann and Lindberg, 2018: 7). However, for the purpose of this thesis, I abide by the term backsliding, arguing that democracies can lose democratic traits without necessarily breaking down or becoming autocracies. It should also be emphasized that my conception of democracy adheres to Dahl’s “procedural minimal democracy” which offers seven conditions for a modern democracy to be present: 1. Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected officials. 2. Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon. 3. Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials 4. Practically all adults have the right to run for elective offices in the government, though age limits may be higher for holding office than for the suffrage. 5. Citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly defined, including criticism of officials, the government, the regime, the socioeconomic order, and the prevailing ideology. 6. Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information. Moreover, alternative sources of information exist and are protected by law. 7. To achieve their various rights, including those listed above, citizens also have a right to form relatively independent associations or organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups (Dahl, 1982: 10-11). In general, those seven conditions capture the essence of a procedural democracy; however, I also include the additional two conditions proposed by Schmitter and Karl (1991), which are perceived