From Guardianship to Civilian Control: How Did the Turkish Military Get Here?

Outlines of global transformations Volume 10, Number 3, 2017

Азия: вызовы и перспективы1

DOI: 10.23932/2542-0240 -2017-10-3-68-82

Acar KUTAY Eastern Mediterranean University 10, Mersin St, Famagusta, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 5000 [email protected] ORCID: 0000-0003-1403-9195 From Guardianship to Civilian Control: How Did the Turkish Military Get Here?

ABSTRACT. This article examines how civil- that the Turkish government made to civilian- ian-military relations in Turkey have trans- military relations and to the organizational formed from a guardianship of the military structure of the armed forces after the recent to civilian control. To this end, it covers the failed coup attempt. following issues. It surveys the ways in which the military has instituted its influence over KEYWORDS: civil-military relations, mili- civilians from the 1960 military coup up until tary forces, guardianship, civilian control, coup the early 2000s. It elaborates major events and d’etat, Turkey processes that took place during the 2000s under the AKP governments. Then, the paper de- FOR CITATION: Kutay A. (2017 From scribes the reasons behind the failed coup at- Guardianship to Civilian Control: How did tempt of July 15, 2016, before concluding with the Turkish Military get here? Outlines of a discussion of the implications of the coup global transformations: politics, economics, attempt. There will be both immediate and law, 10 (3). 68-82. DOI: 10.23932/2542-0240 long-term implications of the radical changes -2017-10-3-68-82

68 Контуры глобальных трансформаций Том 10, Номер 3, 2017

Азия: вызовы и перспективы1

DOI: 10.23932/2542-0240 -2017-10-3-68-82

Акар КУТАЙ Восточно-Средиземноморский Университет Мерсин ул., 10, Фамагуста, 5000, Турецкая Республика Северного Кипра [email protected] ORCID: 0000-0003-1403-9195 Oт опеки к гражданскому контролю: как изменилась роль турецкой армии?

АННОТАЦИЯ. В статье рассматривает- изменилась роль турецкой армии? Кон- ся трансформация военно-гражданских от- туры глобальных трансформаций: поли- ношений в Турции на пути от опеки со сто- тика, экономика, право, 10 (3). 68-82. DOI: роны армии к гражданскому контролю. Для 10.23932/2542-0240 -2017-10-3-68-82 того чтобы произвести подобный анализ, в статье рассмотрены следующие аспекты проблемы. Автор описывает пути, по ко- Introduction торым проходила институционализация военного влияния на граждан, начиная от The coup attempt on July 15, 2016, was военного переворота 1960 г. и заканчивая startling. For the first time in history, an ex- анализом событий начала 2000-х гг. В рабо- tension of a clandestine group, the Gulenists – те приведен ряд важнейших событий и про- officially described as the Fethullah Terrorist цессов, протекавших в 2000-х гг., во время Organization (FETO) – intended to stage правления Партии справедливости и раз- a coup. This event was shocking because no вития. Затем автор рассматривает при- one could estimate the power of a secret or- чины неудачи военного переворота 15 июля ganization within the army that has long been 2016 г., что позволило также сделать вывод reputed of holding and protecting secular о влиянии попытки переворота в целом. values. The failed coup attempt was not the Радикальные действия турецкого прави- first time in modern Turkish history that the тельства станут причиной как серьезных military had planned to take over political краткосрочных, так и долгосрочных изме- power. However, the recent failed coup at- нений в гражданско-военных отношениях tempt was remarkably different from previous Турции, равно как и в самой организацион- experiences. The military has intervened four ной структуре военных сил после недавней times since the commencement of democratic неудачной попытки переворота. elections so as to restore peace and maintain secular values. But these interventions were КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА: военно-гражданские not plotted by a secret organization or faction. отношения, армия, опека, гражданский The presence of such factions has always been контроль, военный переворот, Турция inconceivable because Turkish officer corps have come to be trained in accordance with ДЛЯ ЦИТИРОВАНИЯ: Кутай А. (2017). Kemalism and secular values (Jenkins, 2005). От опеки к гражданскому контролю: как Soldiers have seen themselves as being above

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politics and political factions (Jacoby, 2003). Janowitz (Janowitz, 1960) argued that Instead, they have embodied a guardianship Huntington’s approach could best capture role in order to protect the ethos of modern- the changes in the military identity. On his ization and secularism from domestic and account, the military could not be isolated external threats (Hale, 2011). Officers have from the values and norms of the rest of not always followed the chain of command society. If society constantly changes, the in their interventions1. But the overall in- military must also adapt to such changes. tegrity and discipline of the army has never Because the military is a conservative in- been disrupted. So how has such a dramatic stitution, it might be difficult for the armed change occurred? How might the revolution- forces to follow the changes that take place in ary changes adopted by the government after society. The solution, then, is to narrow the the failed coup influence the military and gap between the military and armed forces. civilian-military relations? This paper aims to One way of achieving this, for example, is to shed some light on this question. break the monopoly of military academies To start with, civilian-military relations – by creating Reserve Training Officer Train- not merely in the Turkish case, but in gener- ing Corps at universities. al – represent a paradox. As Feaver suggests, Turkish armed forces gained autonomy in “The very institution created to protect the the 1950s after Turkey became a member of the polity is given sufficient power to become a NATO. Such autonomy strengthened the divi- threat to the polity” (Feaver, 1999, p. 214). sion between the military and civilian spheres, Until recently, two fundamental works have as soldiers grew into an independent class, dominated civilian-military relations: Samuel separate from the rest of the society. Soldiers Huntington’s The Soldier and the State and could also have autonomy in controlling their Morris Janowitz’s (Janowitz, 1960) The Profes- own organizational structure. What is more, sional Soldier. Huntington was a political sci- the Turkish military intervened in politics and entist, and he focused on how it was possible exerted influence on the shape of governments. to establish civilian control over the military. That is, professionalism did not bring about Janowitz was a sociologist; he studied cultural objective control of the military (Stepan, 1988). aspects affecting the military identity and the Since 2002, Turkey has tended to control relationship between soldiers and civilians. the military by following remedies addressed in Huntington (Huntington, 1957) stated the literature (Feaver, 1999, p. 225–230). In line that there could be two methods of controlling with Turkey’s bid for EU membership, the AKP the military: subjective or objective control. governments accepted several constitutional Subjective control refers to civilian command and administrative restraints to curtail the legal over the details of the organizational struc- grounds of the military power. However, these ture. Such control intends to make the armed were not sufficient to prevent word of mouth forces more like a civilian agency, as it eradi- spreading about the military discontent with cates the autonomy of the military by making the AKP governments during the 2000s and promotions reliant on political contacts with the onset of the July 15 coup attempt. There- the governing political party. In contrast, ob- fore, the government adopted new methods. It jective control aims to keep the civilian and deployed the military away from the political military spheres separate by giving autonomy centres and cities. Civilians took measures to to the military in terms of steering their own divide loyalties in the army by creating parallel organizational and bureaucratic structure. chains of command. They removed the coast Such autonomy would be best achieved by guard and gendarmerie from the military and professionalization in the army. included them as countervailing institutions to

1 In 1960, the military did not follow the chain of command.

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the interior ministry. In addition to these ef- its guardianship (Demirel, 2004). The Turkish forts that focus on reducing the ability of the Republic was proclaimed after a war of inde- military, the government also intends to reduce pendence and the victorious Turkish military the disposition of the military to intervene. acquired substantial prestige in the eyes of This is to be achieved by recruiting personnel the people since the early days of the republic who are inclined to obey, or by changing the (Jenkins, 2007). The military became a cen- ethic of the military in military schools. New tral element of the establishment alongside generation officer corps would thus be trained the bureaucracy in these early days. However, with the culture of obedience to civilians. In Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the sum, the government wants to control the mili- new regime, banned the officer corps from tary by following various established practices, engaging with politics. Soldiers had to resign yet without reducing the size of the army be- if they intended to take active roles in politics cause the security threats remain. However, the (Hale, 2011, p. 195). new attempts appear to establish a more sub- Despite the new regime’s strict insistence jective control over the army, eroding the or- on keeping soldiers out of the political process, ganizational and civilianizing the armed forces moral and legal grounds for future military in- by closing military courts, military hospitals, terventions were established in this period. The and military academies and schools. But how Armed Forces Internal Service Law, accepted have civilian-military relations in Turkey trans- in 1935, stipulates: “the duty of the armed forc- formed from a guardianship of the military to es is to protect and defend the Turkish home- civilian control? land and the Republic of Turkey, as determined The paper begins with an overview of the in the Constitution” (Hale, 2011, p. 195). This ways in which the military has instituted its law, abolished in 2013, expressed the motto influence over civilians from the 1960 military of the military’s guardianship role. Such a role coup up until the early 2000s. The next section was regularly used during the democratic tran- elaborates major events and processes that sition period, with the army creating further took place during the 2000s under the AKP legal and institutional prerogatives that gave governments. Then, the paper describes the soldiers control over civilians. reasons behind the failed coup attempt of July The officer corps was strictly loyal to the 15, 2016, before concluding with a discussion newly established regime and to its secular of the implications of the coup attempt. and modern reforms (Satana, 2011). It had a self-authorized claim to protect the secular principles of the republic. But it would be Military Influence incorrect to suggest that the armed forces intervened in each case (1960, 1971, 1980, 1997, How could the Turkish military influ- and 2007) merely to prevent the Islamization ence politics? What explains the power of the of the country. The primary motivation of the Turkish armed forces (TAF)? What are the 1960 takeover was to restraint the authoritar- main characteristics of the Turkish military? ian leanings of the elected government, the We need to address these questions before we Democrat Party (Güney, 2002, p. 164). The turn to the recent radical changes that took opponents of the Democrat Party, the Repub- place during the AKP period and following lican People’s Party (CHP), bureaucrats and the July 15 coup attempt. officers corps, speculated that the government of the day was about to establish a dictator- Guardianship ship. The main reason for the 1971 and 1980 The Turkish military established its self- interventions was the politically motivated vi- confidence and unchallenged power within olence in the country (Harris, 2011). In 1971, a historical process. The political role of the the military forced the government to leave military was primarily legitimated through the office to a technocratic government. In

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1982, the military itself took control in order Chief in General, Yasar Buyukanit, warned to end the political violence between the left the government and advised Mr. Gul to step and right wing groups, and to end the political back; even though a pious president may be deadlock when the violence and the political tolerable, a first lady with a headscarf was in- conflict in parliament made the country un- conceivable. The Chief in General may have governable. In short, the primary aim of the intended to mobilize the secular masses with military interventions of 1960, 1971, and 1980 this act, similar to what soldiers had done in was to make the country governable. Secular- 1997, in order to negatively influence the pub- ism has always been the central identity of the lic support of the AKP. But the opposite hap- armed forces; however, it was not the driving pened. The AKP called for an early election and force behind the military’s decision to act in it further increased its public support. It would the respective interventions. not be wrong to define the election of Mr. Gul In one particular case, the military in- as president and the AKP’s second electoral tervened politically to restore secularism in victory as a critical turning point in civilian- 1997, on February 28 (Narlı, 2011, p. 221). military relations in Turkey (Sarıgil, 2014, p. Political Islam, the roots of which date back 180). With large support from the masses, and to the 1970s, gained mass support during subsequently from disparate sectors of civil so- the 1990s as a response to the inability of the ciety, the AKP was, then, more confident in its mainstream political parties to find a solution position against the military. to growing economic problems (Harris, 2011, The failed coup attempt in 2016, which p. 209; Güney, 2002, p. 166–173). Political will be examined in detail below, was present- Islam gained momentum while mainstream ed by the plotters, the Gulenists, as a secular politics was eroding. While the coalition gov- intervention. However, even in its early hours ernment, established between the centre left when it remained unclear which group in the and right in the early 1990s, was losing sup- armed forces organized the coup, the secu- port, the election of Recep Tayyip Erdogan as lar groups did not support the coup attempt. the mayor of Istanbul in 1994 as a candidate When President Erdogan called citizens to of the Welfare Party was a critical milestone. the streets in order to resist the plotters, many Erdogan founded the AKP as a successor to secular citizens joined the AKP supporters in the Welfare Party, the party that was the target order to protect democracy. It soon became of the military intervention in 1997 and that apparent that it was not the Turkish army but was closed by the constitutional court. an army within the army, a cabal of Gulenists, The military takeover in 1980 had an un- who were behind the coup attempt. intended consequence. The military junta wanted to curb the influence of leftist ideolo- Legal guarantees and safeguards gies and for this reason encouraged the flour- The Turkish military was politically in- ishing of a more conservative political move- fluential and has always seen itself as an ar- ment that brought together nationalist and biter of domestic political problems (Jacoby, religious elements under the so-called Turk- 2003). However, it differed from praetorian ish-Islam synthesis (Kaplan, 2002). Paradoxi- militaries in the sense that it accepted the cally, the guardians of secularism unleashed a legitimacy of civilians, the rule of law, and very dynamic political movement that would democracy (Sakallioglu, 1997, p. 153). Even determine the future of Turkish politics and though soldiers did not accept the right of that would guide a process that undermines civilians to be wrong, after each intervention, their own political power and autonomy. they returned to their barracks and left power The military warned civilians again in 2007 to civilians. Nevertheless, solders left with with the purpose of protecting secularism exit guarantees that enabled them to control when the AKP planned to put forward Abdul- and influence the political field without hav- lah Gul as a candidate for the presidency. The ing to take direct control (Demirel, 2004).

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The key to the entrenchment of military in- they acted to correct the failures of civilians fluence over politics was the creation of the (Tachau, Heper, 1983). National Security Council with the 1961 con- However, the military isolated itself from stitution (Harris, 2011, p. 205). The council the rest of society. Soldiers built their own worked as a parallel executive organ under residential areas and fenced them off. They military control through which the soldiers created separate social activity centers, res- could shape vital political issues, which are taurants and summer camps (Narlı, 2000). normally determined by civilians in democ- Despite such isolation, one cannot speak of racies (Sakallıoğlu, 1997). The 1982 constitu- any conflict between society and the soldiers. tion enhanced the powers of the council, as On the contrary, Turkish culture has many af- the government was required to give priority finities to the military as an organization, and to the council’s decisions (Sakallıoğlu, 1997, it embraces militaristic values (Cizre, 2004, p. p. 153–154). The council started working as a 11; Altinay, 2004). However, Turkish culture shadow government until its composition was is not monolithic, and identities (ethnic, re- significantly changed by the EU reform pack- ligious and political) influence how people ages in 2003 and 2004 (Bayramoğlu, 2002). approach the soldiers. Sarıgil (Sarıgil, 2015) outlines some key factors that can determine Public support different attitudes towards the military. While The military could maintain supremacy Turks have a pro-military attitude, Kurds have because both the society and civilians did not an anti-military attitude. Religious people, challenge this supremacy (Demirel, 2004, p. who also largely support the AKP, are more 134). The public image of the military was sceptical towards the political role of the mili- largely positive until the 1980 coup, and the tary. Meanwhile, the opposition parties, in- armed forces were the most respected and cluding the Republicans (CHP) and national- trusted institution (Sarigil, 2015, p. 284). The ists, hold a positive view of the military2. Turkish military, too, identifies itself with the The traditionally positive image of sol- nation. Political processes were perceived diers was hampered by the 1980 military in- by soldiers to be corrupt, and political par- tervention and succeeding transitional mili- ties and politicians were seen to serve their tary junta that lasted for three years, because own interests (Sakallioglu, 1997, p. 156). On of the excessive use of violence and suppres- the whole, politicians could not completely sion of political opposition. The new constitu- restore confidence among citizens. In con- tion, written and ratified under the military’s trast, the military was not corrupted. It was control, was authoritarian (Isiksel, 2013). It seen as representing the common good, and reinforced military supremacy by means of its organizational structure privileged merit strengthening the executive power of the mili- and success. They were careful not to be as- tary. The heyday of military supremacy over sociated with any ideology or specific section civilians was established after the 1980 mili- of society. The military tried to cultivate and tary takeover and lasted until the early 2000s, maintain an image of being an institution when the EU reforms were launched. above politics, which implied not supporting any political party or taking sides with a par- National Security ticular ideology (Jacoby, 2003, p. 673). While Another important factor that helped the in politics nepotism and favouritism were be- entrenchment of the Turkish military’s influ- lieved to be the norm, soldiers could success- ence in the political sphere was its power to fully rely on this positive public image when define national security issues (Cizre, 2007).

2 The same research also finds that there is no strong evidence to suggest that military service reinforces militaristic culture and values in society.

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Civilians appeared to accept this power. The a military candidate as Chief in General and Turkish army went through a strict profes- conflicted with the General Staff in terms of sionalization process as early as the 1950s Turkey’s involvement in Operation Desert with its membership of NATO. Professional- Storm (Narlı, 2011, p. 219). However, the mili- ization, however, has not stopped the military tary could still interfere in politics and eco- from intervening in politics, as Huntington nomics. Soldiers passed through a disciplined suggested. In contrast, the military claimed and well-organized education comparable to epistemological and organizational authority Western standards. They claimed to correct over security issues. The Cold War, domes- the failures of civilians (Jenkins, 2005). Legal tic turmoil and lasting political polarization safeguards and coordination of the defense helped legitimate the soldiers’ control over sector secured the autonomy of the military security issues until the 1980s. In the 1990s, to decide on promotions, recruitment, and Islamic movements and Kurdish groups were appointments in its organizational structure, deemed two vital threats to the regime. as well as on the military budget (Sakallıoğlu, The military resisted reforms to civilian- 1997, p. 152). However, the military’s auton- military relations during the 1990s by justify- omy was not restricted to its organizational ing the need for the securitization of domestic side. Soldiers isolated themselves from the politics. Turkey’s exceptional situation resulted rest of society by building independent social from the growing power of political Islam and facilities, including their own summer camps, the activities of the separatist terror of the PKK restaurants, and recreational facilities (Narli, (Cizre, Çınar, 2003, p. 315). The military did 2000). This isolation has damaged the im- not hesitate to impose its own agenda of con- age of the military by depicting the army as trolling and correcting elected politicians, as a privileged class. What is more, the military security constituted the main political con- also had economic investments and industrial cern. Civilians lacked the relevant knowledge facilities. The military held its own holding and determination to govern the fight with the company, the Armed Forces Trust and Pen- PKK. Politicians even invited soldiers them- sion Fund (OYAK) (Akça, 2010, p. 5). selves into the political arena; the conservative PM in the mid-1990s, Tansu Ciller, left fight- AKP Period ing the PKK entirely to the military. During How did the AKP break the military’s in- the 1990s the military described itself as “a fluence? The AKP promised to build a better guarantee not only for the regime but at the democracy, and such a promise meant ending same time of democracy, societal peace and the the military influence over politics. Turkish modern life style” (Cizre, Çınar, 2003, p. 314). people trusted the military as an institution This background matters because the military but also wanted the right of civilians to decide gave up its power and privileged position in the their own future under a democratic system. Turkish political system as early as the 2000s by The AKP mobilized disparate groups with- not openly resisting the AKP government and in society that demanded change (İnsel, 2003). the move towards EU membership. It managed to mobilize a coalition that brought All in all, the military was autonomous together different sections of society with the but civilians were not. The Turkish military aim of curbing the influence of the military. The was protected from civilian interference; motivations of these groups differed. Liberals, however, the opposite was not possible. Non- socialists, and conservative democrats primar- expert civilians could not coordinate the or- ily focused on strengthening the liberal-demo- ganizational structure of the armed forces cratic nature of the regime. On their account, and determine security and defense policies. civilian supremacy over the military must be Indeed, no politician intended to change this coupled with the maintenance of rights and situation until the 2000s, with one exception: liberties. Religious groups, those which made a previous president, Turgut Ozal, appointed up the backbone of the Islamist parties includ-

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ing the AKP, supported the reforms concern- cans. However, the AKP avoided any confron- ing the establishment of civilian control over tation with either the opposition or the mili- the military because the secular army did not tary. Instead, the government concentrated on tolerate any deviation from the secular norms EU membership and economic reforms. that guided the public and social life. Turkey’s EU membership bid must be seen The military has always been adamant as the most significant factor that changed about its role as guardian of the secular re- the nature and future of the civilian-military gime throughout the republican period, since relations. When Turkey started negotiations 1923. But the so-called February 28 process with the EU, Turkey’s legal and political sys- in particular, referring to the military ultima- tem were required to adapt to EU laws and tum that dissolved the centre-right (Dogru Yol norms. An important part of those norms Partisi) Islamists (Refah Partisi) coalition, had concerned the democratic oversight of the a dramatic effect on the Islamist groups. It is military and security sector (Cizre, 2007, p. true that the non-traditional way of military 4). The so-called Copenhagen criteria – first interference through the use of threats of force applied to the Central and Eastern European was denied by many, including liberals, social- countries in their accession to the EU in the ists, and other democratic groups. However, 1990s – were also used by the EU in Turkey’s it was the Islamists who understood that it accession bid. The criteria required the estab- was not possible to converge with the military lishment of the legal and institutional struc- when they are in power. ture of a well-functioning liberal democracy The AKP abandoned political Islam at and market economy in candidate countries. the outset (Yavuz, 2006). The founders of the An important element of this condition con- AKP carefully declared the ideological motto cerned civilian control over the military. of the new movement as conservative democ- Accordingly, Turkey adopted vital politi- racy. The charismatic leader of the AKP party, cal reforms during the early 2000s in order to Mr. Erdogan, allayed fears concerning the real be granted full membership. These reforms political goals of the newly emerged party by curbed the military’s influence, among other promising to advance Turkey’s bid for EU things, by erasing the priorities of the Na- membership (Hale and Ozbudun 2009). Such tional Security Council from the constitution a promise meant anchoring Turkish democ- and by maintaining numerical supremacy of racy to EU norms including those concerning civilians over soldiers in the same council. civilian-military relations (Cizre, 2007; Gür- Constitutional amendments also removed the soy, 2011). The success of the AKP here is that administrative organ of the NSC (the NSC it has not defined the implementation of the General Secretary). Soldiers could no longer EU reform packages as a challenge to the mili- have representatives in the Council on Higher tary. There was no need for such a heroic chal- Education and the Higher Board of Radio and lenge when the governing party could already Television (Berksoy, 2013, p. 8). take steps to weaken the political influence of Despite all the reforms undertaken be- the military (Caliskan, 2017, p. 104). tween 2002 and 2005, the civilian control In the 2002 elections, only two parties of the military was not achieved to the EU’s (AKP and CHP) could pass the 10 percent standards. For instance, the Chief in General electoral threshold. The political stalemate of continued to report to the PM instead of the the 1990s alongside economic crises withered Minister of Defence. Nevertheless, the AKP the mainstream political parties. In a two- managed to convince disparate groups in civil party parliament, the AKP could dominate 66 society and secular bureaucracy, and the mili- percent of the seats. This supermajority could tary maintained their skepticism on account of allow the government to pass fundamental the party’s founding leaders’ associations with constitutional amendments without having political Islam (Yavuz, Koc, 2016, p. 136). The to consult the opposition group: the Republi- AKP broke the dominance of secularists and

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Kemalists in the bureaucracy, which was seen the plot with reference to some documents as a traditional supporter of the military, or delivered to the newspaper in a suitcase. The part of the establishment. Breaking the domi- public was stunned when the details came to nance of secularists in the armed forces was light. For example, it was said that the plotters more challenging. In such a context, it was true would create a chaotic atmosphere by bomb- that the military was not content with the elec- ing two mosques in Istanbul and shooting tion of a party with a background in political down a Turkish aircraft over the Aegean Sea. Islam. However, there were several phenomena The officer corps, however, refuted accusations that precluded the military intervention. by suggesting that the document was simply a The reforms eradicated the legal basis of scenario being discussed in a military seminar. the military’s influence. But supporting de- The cases were taken very seriously by mocratization packages and Turkey’s acces- the public as they promised to reveal coup at- sion to the EU would perfectly comply with tempts, as well as uncovering past and present the modern and Western-oriented ethos of the political criminal acts, which have been linked military (Heper, 2011). What is more, military to the deep state, or a network of actors acting intervention, or soldiers stubbornly resisting within the state (Aydınlı, 2009). On the one the EU accession process, would be too risky hand, the era of military interventions could for the country because Turkey has already finally come to end when soldiers were sen- well integrated into the EU customs union and tenced; on the other if the secret elements act- global markets. One reason for the military’s ing within the state are removed, then it would endorsement of the EU accession process, al- be possible to create a more transparent state beit half-heartedly, may be that the EU acces- structure (Aydınlı, 2012). Those hopes were sion process would seal the ethos of modern quickly dashed when the police, working in Turkey’s goal of achieving the standards of the harmony with some segments of the judiciary, Western civilization. The possibility of joining started to select several reputed scientists, aca- the Western club, then, took precedence over demics, and journalists at dawn. For instance, the military’s desire to control politics and na- many condemned the way in which an elderly tional security. All in all, the military had to scientist and activist, Turkan Saylan, who had adapt to the new environment. In this context, dedicated her life to the development of girls’ the military had neither the need nor the desire education, was detained. to intervene in politics. The evidence related to these cases was not completely convincing, but only few would Sledgehammer-Ergenekon dare to criticize the incoherencies and falla- In 2008, the Turkish public was shocked cies within the prosecutor’s note from fear of when allegations arose concerning the exis- being associated with the alleged Ergenekon tence of a secret criminal organization, Er- terrorist organization (Jenkins. 2009). These genekon. It brought together people from suspicions did not preclude the imprisonment various sectors of society, including journal- of a large number of officer corps and civil so- ists, academics, and soldiers. The members of ciety actors, as well as a former Chief in Gen- Ergenekon would create turmoil in society, the eral, Ilker Basbug. The military was silent and accusations suggested, and the chaos would never questioned the legitimacy of the judicial create legitimate grounds for the military to process. However, in July 2011, the entire se- plot a coup. While the surprise effect of this nior command, including the Chief in Gen- case was still fresh, the second historic case, eral (Isik Kosaner) and the heads of the land the Sledgehammer, appeared in the media. A forces, the navy, and the air forces, resigned large number of soldiers were charged with in protest at the prosecution of officer corps. planning an intervention in 2003. Those plans Kosaner said: “It has become impossible for were only revealed in 2010 when a newspa- me to continue in this high office, because I per, Taraf, first began publishing stories about am unable to fulfil my responsibility to pro-

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tect the rights of my personnel as the chief of a crucial role in preventing the expulsion of general staff”3. The military endorsed the su- religious personnel4. Many members of the of- premacy of the civilians. ficer corps were not content with the encour- When the conflict between the Gulenists aging attitude of Hilmi Özkök. Some officers and the AKP started in 2013, all the soldiers intended to convince him to retire. This dis- were acquitted in the early days of 2014. PM content with Özkök’s flexible attitude lasted Erdogan and the supporters of the govern- throughout his tenure. However, there was no ment claimed that Gulenists were planning an clear sign of any preparation for a military in- insidious plot against the military. The consti- tervention. It was unnecessary and too risky tutional court would soon find that the cases to commit such an act at a time when Turkey were grounded on fabricated evidence. A po- had made giant steps forward along the road litical scientist describes these cases as func- to EU membership and was still struggling tioning “to anesthetize the political reflexes of with an economic crisis. the military in order to push them into mode The alleged alliance between Erdogan and of defense” (Caliskan, 2017, p. 106–107). Gulen eventually became a power struggle, as Gulenists demanded more power (Yavuz, Koç, Gulen movement 2016). The struggle between them first emerged and on the way to the failed coup in 2012, when the secretary of National Intelli- Since 2013, the Gulen movement was of- gence, Hakan Fidan, was called by a prosecu- ficially defined as a terrorist organization, tor in Istanbul in connection with the govern- Fethullah Terör Organizasyonu (FETO). The ment’s Kurdish policy. The government did media began exposing the activities of the not allow Fidan to be interrogated. Instead, it Gulenists. The invasion of the bureaucracy, commenced a campaign against Gulenists. The the judiciary, and the police was no longer a government closed down private schools ran secret. However, the extent and the power of by the Gulen movement, took control over me- the Gulenists in the army were underestimat- dia affiliated with Gulenists, and imposed strict ed, despite the military having long strived to financial control over the companies owned by prevent the growth of Gulenists in the army. Gulen movement sympathizers. This campaign Military intelligence had introduced stricter against the Gulenists aimed at eradicating their vetting procedures of military recruitment power, since education, media, and business since the 1990s, the National Security Intel- formed three vital elements of the Gulen move- ligence defined the Gulen movement as a na- ment. Gulenists reacted quickly. In December tional security threat in 2004, and the military 2013, Gulenist judiciary members and police intended to expel suspected Gulen sympathiz- started corruption probes against Erdogan’s ers from the armed forces. These measures family, four ministers and businessmen. were ineffective. All of which begs the ques- It was long suspected that the movement tion: “How did Gulenists manage to infiltrate had an ambition to gradually infiltrate the state the most secular institution in the Republic?” institutions. Those who supported the activities (Yavuz, Koç, 2016, p. 137). of the Gulen movement until the terrible July During the AKP period, expulsions from 15 event argue that the movement was initially the military on the grounds of engaging in a liberal faith organization concentrating on regressive activities (or irtica) dwindled to education. But it later evolved into a clandes- almost nothing. The Commander-in-Chief in tine organization (Yavuz and Koc 2016: 137). office from 2002 to 2006, Hilmi Ozkok, played Alternatively, others suggest that the secretive

3 BBC, 29 July 2011. Turkey: Military chiefs resign en masse. URL: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/world-europe-14346325 (Ac- cessed: 24.04.2017) 4 Jenkins G. Post-Putsch Narratives and Turkey’s Curious Coup. URL: http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst- articles/item/562-post-putsch-narratives-and-turkeys-curious-coup.html (Accessed: 19.04.2017)

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agenda has always been a part of the move- Gulenists had meticulously but insidi- ment, but only a few knew of its real face. ously planned to penetrate into the bureau- The movement has an opaque, onion- cracy and take control over the state from like structure, composed of three layers5. At within. Gulenists initially achieved control the core lies an inner circle of utterly dedi- over the police academy. Private tutorial cated members to whom the secret goals of schools and other private schools run by the the movement were revealed. The core circle movement, expropriated by the government was guiding and controlling the global reach after the failed coup of July 15, were crucial of the movement in communication with Gu- recruitment sites for the movement. Many of len. They were aware of their privileged po- these students, having being indoctrinated by sition in the movement, but they also knew the Gulenist ideology of so-called hizmet, or that secrecy was fundamental to achieve their service, held central bureaucratic or judicial loosely and mysteriously defined objective of positions in the state. Meanwhile, the move- delivering service (Hizmet) to a sacred ideal. ment directed its student followers, mainly The second circle focused on education from the middle or lower-middle classes, to- and worked to occupy bureaucratic positions ward military high schools or military acad- within the state bureaucracy. They could do emies. Gulenists in the bureaucracy and the this not so secretly during the AKP period. judiciary opened the way for cleansing secular However, Gulenists encountered strong re- or Kemalist officers from the military by plot- sistance in one of those institutions: namely, ting the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases6. the military. The second circle, which also Gulenists in the army rapidly replaced these includes members from business and the officers and organized the failed coup attempt. media, was also composed of loyal and pious Gulenists who were indoctrinated by the teachings of Gulen. However, they were less The failed coup of 15 July privileged in their access to Gulen and to the secrecies of the movement. Since 2013, numerous Gulenists have al- The third circle was composed of sympa- ready being cleansed from the police and judi- thizers of the movement. They did not nec- ciary (Milan 2016)7. The government was also essarily work for the purpose of Hizmet, but planning to expel numerous Gulenists from rather appreciated the façade of the move- the military before August 2016. There is no ment. Many in the third group were not even doubt that the coup attempt was organized religious. The movement approached celebri- by Gulenists, and the failed “kamikaze coup ties to enhance their popularity and invited attempt” of Gulenists was a reaction to pos- reputed names to engage in their activities. sible expulsions8. Some argue it is likely that

5 Şakul K. Bir SPIN şebeke örneği olarak Gülen cemaati: Sarımsak ve soğan demetlerinden bir öbek. URL: http://t24.com.tr/yaz- arlar/kahraman-sakul/bir-spin-sebeke-ornegi-olarak-gulen-cemaati-sarimsak-ve-sogan-demetlerinden-bir-obek,15139 (Accessed: 21.04.2017) 6 Arango T. Turkish leader disowns trials that helped him tame military. URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/27/world/europe/ turkish-leader-disowns-trials-that-helped-him-tame military.html (Accessed: 17.04.2017) 7 See: Gurcan M. What went wrong with Turkey’s WhatsApp coup. URL: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/turkey- coup-attempt-basic-cause-was-premature-birth.html (Accessed: 15.04.2017); Gurcan M. Why Turkey’s coup didn’t stand a chance. URL: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/turkey-kamikaze-coup-attempt-fails.html (Accessed: 15.04.2017); Gursel K. Turkey’s Failed Coup Reveals Army Within an Army. URL: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/turkey-coup-attempt-shows-army-within-army.html (Accessed: 15.04.2017); Tol G. Mainzer M., Ekmekci, Z. Unpacking Turkey’s failed coup: causes and consequences. 2016. URL: http://www.mei.edu/content/article/unpacking-turkey-s-failed-coup-causes-and-consequences (Accessed: 17.04.2017); Filkins D. Turkey’s thirty-year coup: did an exiled cleric try to overthrow Erdoğan’s government. URL: http:// www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/10/17/turkeys-thirty-year-coup (Accessed: 17.04.2017) 8 Özkan, B. Turkey’s lamikaze coup attempt: why now and what next? URL: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/behlal-azkan/turkey- coup_b_11033324.html. (Accessed: 17.04.2017)

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other groups also joined the Gulenists either putschists against the people further reinforced to advance their careers, or because they were the people’s spirit of resistance. At least 242 threatened to do so or merely wanted to top- people died and more than 1,000 were injured. ple the government. All in all, it was apparent that the coup attempt The coup failed because it did not follow was not well-thought out or well-implemented. the chains of command. The military com- The coup attempt was brought under con- mand did not support the coup; only a few field trol during the early hours of July 16. The gov- units supported the coup attempt. The com- ernment was swift in its response. More than mander of the first army in Istanbul, General 42,000 military personnel, including high- Ümit Dündar, condemned the coup at an early ranking officers, have either been detained or stage. His statement made it clear that the coup dismissed due to their connections to the Gu- attempt did not find support in the top eche- len movement. It was the first time that a civil- lons of the military. When he straightforwardly ian government could expel soldiers without condemned the coup attempt, it was still not having to consult the council (Gurcan, 2017). possible to hear news from the Chief in Gen- Almost 40 percent of the Turkish army’s general, Hulusi Akar, and a group of other higher erals and admirals were arrested; the Chief in ranking officers. Later in the night, it became General and the commanders of the land forc- apparent that senior commanders were held es, navy, and air forces kept their positions. A captive in an airbase in Ankara. Amid such huge number of people were also expelled from chaos, General Dündar invited Erdogan to the judiciary, police, and education posts. The Istanbul, promising to protect him from the Gulenists’ private schools and universities were coup putschists. He kept his promise. Erdogan’s closed down. The government took control appearance on TV via Facetime on the night over these schools along with the businesses of July 15 and his call on citizens to resist the that were run by Gulen’s associates. coup raised the morale of the people. For the The government also took revolutionary first time in history, society stood against the steps in changing the legal structure of the ci- soldiers in a coup attempt. vilian-military relations and the institutional In addition, the failed coup was immedi- and organizational structure of the military. ately condemned by all political parties. Several A series of laws that were adopted in line parliamentarians ran to the parliament building with the EU accession bid brought significant and stayed there when it was being bombed by changes in legal and institutional terms. The a F16. It was obvious that the coup was doomed electoral victory of the AKP in 2007 follow- to fail as putschists could only mobilize a mi- ing the Chief in General’s disapproval of the nor section of the army. The plotters started the AKP’s presidential candidate, Abdullah Gul, coup attempt on Friday night at 22:30, earlier was a notable turning point, as it gave the than was planned, by blockading the Bosporus government crucial power vis-à-vis the mili- Bridge. They did not block Internet access or tary. The Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases media broadcasts. They calculated to induce weakened the institutional structure of the the sentiments of the opposition groups so as to armed forces. But the implications after July create a larger social support for their attempt. 15 on the military cannot be compared with The coup plotters presented themselves in a any of these events. Kemalist image. They described themselves as The government, adamant about main- the Peace at Home Council, a reference to Ke- taining civilian control of the army, took mal Ataturk’s motto, and in their list of griev- revolutionary steps in restructuring the army ances they gave the reason for the coup as being by decrees that were issued during the state the government’s anti-secular policies. But they of emergency (Gurcan, Gisclon, 2017). The should have known that bombing the national Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard were taken parliament would be seen as an appalling act by under the full control of the interior ministry. all sections of society. The use of violence by the Military high schools were closed. The pres-

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ent military academies will be replaced by a Neo-nationalists, like conservartives, are National Defense University and will operate also critical of the implications of globaliza- under the Ministry of Defense. The civilian tion in the military. But they want to preserve members of the military have been increased the traditonal Kemalist ideology and secular in the Supreme Military Council. The Land position of the armed forces. Eurasianists Forces, Naval Forces and Air Force commands have a good command of foreign languages; were brought under the control of the Minis- however, they strive to follow a more inde- try of Defense. The General Staff, according pendent foreign policy. This might mean to the new constitutional amendment, will be adopting an anti-American attitude and mov- represented by the presidency. Furthermore, ing closer to Russia when necessary (Gurcan, the government has taken control of all of the 2017, p. 9–10). military’s business enterprises. Many thought that the coup attempt would foster a Eurasianist turn in the military, which Concluding Remarks meant finding a new security alliance beyond that of the Western and NATO bloc. An im- The officer corps is also now more diverse mediate effect of the coup attempt was the rise in terms of their religious commitment, ideas of anti-Western and anti-American attitudes about secularism, and Turkey’s foreign policy in society9. The government viewed the US, options. Gurcan (Gurcan, 2017), who conduct- NATO, the EU and European countries (par- ed recent interviews with military personnel, ticularly Germany) as either plotters or sup- helps us understand cleavages in the military. porters of the failed coup. They were harshly His findings suggest that military elites fall into criticized by Erdogan and by the media that three categories: (1) those who would not hesi- supports the AKP. In their account, Western tate in exploiting the capabilities of the armed countries do not want a powerful Turkey; forces for their own personal benefits symbi( - therefore, a more independent foreign policy onts); (2) those who merely try to advance their should be sought. Options involving greater career opportunities without following a co- cooperation with Russia and China have be- herent worldview (pragmatists); and (3) those come more pronounced. who want to change the institutional structure There will be both immediate and long- of the armed forces (reformists). term implications of the radical changes that There are different worldviews among the Turkish government made to civilian- military elites such as conservatives, Atlanti- military relations and to the organizational cists, neo-nationalists, and Eurasianists. Con- structure of the armed forces. It is likely that servatives want to minimize the influence of the changes are meant to divide loyalties in globalization in the military. They are often the military by placing land forces, air forces, religious and intend to restore a sphere of and the navy under the Ministry of Defense. influence in Turkey’s neighboorhood by fol- Civilians intend to establish subjective control lowing a neo-Ottoman worldview. Conserva- over the military. But they will do so at the ex- tives are not interested in learning a foreign pense of breaking the chain of command in language or staying abroad for the purpose of the army. A related consequence of this is that their career development. Atlanticists adopt a the military may become more politicized as worldview that places Turkey’s future within their promotions will be determined by politi- NATO in close partnership with the US. In cians. Considering also that civilians lack the contrast to conservatives, they are better edu- necessary technical knowledge, there may be cated, and know foreign languages. some problems during the transition process.

9 Gürcan M. How the post-coup purges depleted the Turkish military. URL: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/ 2016/09/ turkey-military-needs-two-year-fill-ranks-emptied-bypurge.html A( ccessed: 23.04.2017)

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Информация об авторе About the Author

Акар Кутай, факультет политической науки Acar Kutai, Faculty of Political Science and и международных отношений, Восточно- International Relations, Eastern Mediterra- Средиземноморский Университет nean University 5000, Турецкая Республика Северного Кип 10, Mersin St, Famagusta, Turkish Republic of ра ,Фамагуста, Мерсин ул., 10 Northern Cyprus, 5000 [email protected] [email protected] ORCID: 0000-0003-1403-9195 ORCID: 0000-0003-1403-9195