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Corruption and Democratic Backsliding: a Perplexing Relationship

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Corruption and Democratic Backsliding: a Perplexing Relationship CORRUPTION AND DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING: A PERPLEXING RELATIONSHIP By MARIN EXLER Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Department of Political Science CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY May, 2020 1 CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES We hereby approve the thesis of Marin Exler candidate for the degree of Master of Arts* Committee Chair Kelly McMann Committee Member Karen Beckwith Committee Member Pete Moore Date of Defense 5/1/2020 *We also certify that written approval has been obtained for any proprietary material contained therein. 2 Table of Contents Abstract ........................................................................................................................... 4 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 5 The Phenomenon of Corruption ..................................................................................... 6 The Phenomenon of Democratic Backsliding ................................................................ 9 The Argument and Its Contributions ............................................................................ 11 Methods And Data ........................................................................................................ 14 Comparative Analysis ................................................................................................... 18 Brazil ........................................................................................................................ 21 Poland ...................................................................................................................... 22 Thailand ................................................................................................................... 23 Hungary ................................................................................................................... 24 Turkey ...................................................................................................................... 25 Argentina ................................................................................................................. 26 Case Study: Venezuela.................................................................................................. 28 Legislative Corruption............................................................................................. 30 Judicial Corruption ................................................................................................. 35 Public Sector Corruption ........................................................................................ 40 Executive Corruption .............................................................................................. 44 Addressing the Actual Potential Cause of Democratic Backsliding in Venezuela ........ 48 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 53 Appendix ....................................................................................................................... 57 Appendix A .............................................................................................................. 57 Appendix B .............................................................................................................. 59 Appendix C .............................................................................................................. 64 Appendix D .............................................................................................................. 68 Bibliography ................................................................................................................. 69 3 List of Tables Table 1 .......................................................................................................................... 68 List of Figures Figure 1 ......................................................................................................................... 21 Figure 2 ......................................................................................................................... 22 Figure 3 ......................................................................................................................... 23 Figure 4 ......................................................................................................................... 24 Figure 5 ......................................................................................................................... 25 Figure 6 ......................................................................................................................... 26 Figure 7 ......................................................................................................................... 28 Figure 8 ......................................................................................................................... 30 Figure 9 ......................................................................................................................... 35 Figure 10 ....................................................................................................................... 40 Figure 11 ....................................................................................................................... 44 Figure 12 ....................................................................................................................... 64 Figure 13 ....................................................................................................................... 64 Figure 14 ....................................................................................................................... 65 Figure 15 ....................................................................................................................... 65 Figure 16 ....................................................................................................................... 66 Figure 17 ....................................................................................................................... 66 Figure 18 ....................................................................................................................... 67 4 Corruption and Democratic Backsliding: A Perplexing Relationship Abstract By MARIN EXLER To what extent does corruption contribute to democratic backsliding? This study begins with the assumption that there is a relationship between governmental corruption and the strength of democratic institutions. Understanding the relationship between corruption and democracy is essential, as understanding what causes and facilitates democratic backsliding can be used to help inhibit backsliding. Surprisingly, this study demonstrates that corruption does not seem to contribute to backsliding. Namely, significant increases in corruption do not precede backsliding, and all of the countries that did experience backsliding had various corruption levels preceding backsliding. This thesis shows specifically that the use of public office for private gain does not necessarily erode democratic institutions to the point where they cause a democratic reversal. To illustrate these points, this study utilizes a comparative analysis of large countries that have recently experienced backsliding and a case-study of Venezuela, a country that has undergone a complete democratic reversal. 5 Introduction Countries around the world have seen a movement towards increasing democratization in the past half century, a promising indication that a global shift away from authoritarianism is occurring.1 While the world now sees the highest level of democracies that it has ever seen, a recent wave of democratic reversal has also occurred; within the past decade, numerous countries have seen their democratic institutions erode.2 Corruption has been considered to weaken democratic institutions, and therefore could be considered a factor in facilitating backsliding.3 The basic definition of corruption is use of public office for private gain.4 Essentially, government officials are making decisions for private gain rather than representing their constituencies, which logically, would weaken democratic institutions. Yet, interestingly, increases in corruption do not seem to precede democratic backsliding and not all countries with moderate to high levels of corruption experience backsliding. I will begin by discussing the varying definitions of corruption and specify the exact definition of corruption being used in this study, and then go on to discuss the theory of democratic backsliding and the global trend of democratic backsliding. I will then review the general literature regarding the relationship between corruption and democracy and how one would expect corruption to have a negative impact on democracy to the extent that it could facilitate democratic backsliding. 1 Kurlantzick, J. (2011). The great democracy meltdown. New Republic, 242(8), 12-15. 2 Varieties of Democracy (2019). Democracy facing global challenges: V-Dem annual report 2019. Retrieved from https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/99/de/99dedd73-f8bc-484c-8b91- 44ba601b6e6b/v-dem_democracy_report_2019.pdf. 3 Moreno, A. (2002). Corruption and democracy: A cultural assessment. Comparative Sociology, 1(3- 4), 495-507. 495. 4 Weyland, K. G. (1998). The politics of corruption in Latin America. Journal of Democracy,
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