På∫Ini Studies
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A new perspective on På∫ini 3 HARTMUT SCHARFE A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON PÅÍINI På∫ini Studies Indian tradition and modern scholarship 1 alike usually consider På∫ini’s grammar an almost automatic device to create correct Sanskrit sentences – its definitions and meta-rules (paribhåßå-s) steer the strings of operational rules in the build-up of forms. The definitions and some of the meta-rules are given in På∫ini’s grammar; other meta-rules have been established by a careful study of På∫ini’s formulations, by consid- 1. S.D.Joshi and J.A.F.Roodbergen, Patañjali’s Vyåkara∫a-Mahåbhåßya, Bahuvrœhidvandvåhnika, Poona 1974, p.ii: “In its derivational aspect På∫ini’s gram- mar works much like the machine mentioned by N.Chomsky in Syntactic Structures” and Patañjali’s Mahåbhåßya, Kårakåhnika, Poona 1975, p.xvii “...both grammars, the Aß™ådhyåyœ and Cåndravyåkara∫a, being of a generative type, work like a machine. They work like a programmed machine designed to produce all correct Skt words. The words are produced in steps, each step corresponding to a particular state of the machine. In order to move from its initial state to the final state, the machine needs in- structions, that is, symbols stating operational conditions. It is clear that these symbols should be sufficiently explicit to allow the machine to work mechanically.” Paul Thieme, StII 8/9 (1982/83), p.15 (Kl.Schr. vol.II, p.1182) was less emphatic: “It is not the description of the Sanskrit language, but a description of the regular word forma- tion of Sanskrit… It is throughout mechanistic…” Note the different opinion of P.S.Subrahmaniam, Pa:∫ini’s Aß™a:dhya:yi:, Pune 1992, p.23 who denied that På∫ini’s grammar was intended as “a machine that automatically produces Sanskrit sentences.” Rules like anyebhyo ’pi d®ƒyate (III 3 130), itaråbhyo ’pi d®ƒyante (V 3 14), anyeßåm api d®ƒyate (VI 3 137), gathered by G.Cardona in Jambæ-jyoti (Fs. Munivara Jambævijaya, Ahmedabad 2004, pp.91-107) show an observing rather than generative attitude: “Suffix X is seen also in others” etc., referring both to Vedic and non-Vedic usage. 4 Hartmut Scharfe erations of accepted logical principles, and by the knowledge of the cor- rect Sanskrit forms. Nothing can be meaningless in this great work of På∫ini’s, his followers declared, and the way in which he has formulat- ed his rules can therefore give us indications as to his thinking. These meta-rules (together with the definitions and meta-rules given in the body of the grammar itself), once discovered, can guide the user secure- ly in his application of the grammar, and lead him to the correct forms. Questioned why På∫ini did not give all these meta-rules in the body of the grammar, the traditional scholar would reply that some of the meta- rules are so common-place that they needed no formal declaration, that they were taught by På∫ini’s predecessors and hence were well known, and that yet others might have been taught by På∫ini in his oral expla- nation. These meta-rules – more than a hundred – not taught in the grammar itself, have been collected in special collections by Indian scholars of grammar – from the Paribhåßå-v®tti ascribed to Vyå∂i to Sœradeva’s Paribhåßå-v®tti and Någojœbha™™a’s Paribhåßêndu-ƒekhara. 2 A major concern of these meta-rules is the sequence in which the operational rules of På∫ini’s grammar are to be applied, and in case of a conflict, which of them takes precedence. The operational rules have, by traditional scholars, been placed in five categories of increas- ing force: the preceding rule, the following rule, a nitya rule, an antara√ga rule, and an exception (apavåda), e.g. in Någojœbha™™a’s paribhåßå 38. 3 The first category (a following rule prevails over a pre- ceding rule) is based on På∫ini’s rule I 4 2 vipratißedhe paraµ kåryam “In case of a conflict, the latter is to be done.” A rule is nitya if it ap- plies whether the competing rule is applied or not, but removes the base for the application of the other rule (“bleeds” the other rule in 2. In K.C.Chatterji’s edition of Candragomin’s grammar an Appendix (part II, Poona 1961, pp.396-398) contains a similar list of 86 meta-rules. Harßanåth Miƒra (A critical Study of Chandra Vyakaran Vritti, New Delhi 1974), pp.165-173 was inclined to accept them as authentic, since they match the peculiarities of Candragomin’s grammar. Other collections of paribhåßå-s are mentioned by K.V.Abhyankar in his Introduction to the second edition of Kielhorn’s edition and translation of the Paribhåßenduƒekhara, part I, Poona 1962, pp.4-8 and his Preface to part II, Poona 1960, p.4 (all numbers of paribhåßå-s refer to this edition). 3. pærva-para-nityântara√gâpavådånåm uttarôttaraµ balœya∆ “Of a preceding, subsequent, constant, interior and exception [rule] each following [rule] possesses greater force.” A new perspective on På∫ini 5 modern parlance). An antara√ga rule is triggered by a cause within a stem as opposed to a bahira√ga rule whose cause lies outside this stem. The relative force of nitya and antara√ga rules is deducted from the observation of På∫ini’s rules and the knowledge of the correct Sanskrit forms. The dominance of the exception or special rule (apavåda) over a general command (utsarga) is based on logical prin- ciple. Occasionally Patañjali made a distinction between apavåda (special rule) and anavakåƒatva (inability to apply otherwise). 4 He gave an example for the former: “Curds shall be given to the Brahmins, buttermilk to Kau∫∂inya [who is also a Brahmin] – even if it is possible [that curds are given also to Kau∫∂inya], the giving of buttermilk turns off the giving of curds” 5 and the latter: “Let the brah- mins eat (but) let Må™hara and Kau∫∂inya serve (food); thus they both don’t eat now.” 6 Kau∫∂inya and Må™hara are both brahmins them- selves; in the former example Kau∫∂inya could conceivably receive curds as well (though that is not intended), in the latter Kau∫∂inya and Må™hara are excluded from eating – but only for the time being. Kåtyåyana 7 twice declared that a rule was an apavåda, because it is anavakåƒa, “[b]ut it is not clear why he [i.e. Patañjali. H.S.] uses the term anavakåƒa wherever Kåtyåyana says apavåda.” 8 Later commen- tators often used the terms apavåda and anavakåƒatva or niravakåƒatva synonymously as indeed in grammar the exception al- ways is meant to supersede the general command. 9 4. Bhagyalata Pataskar, Nagoya Studies in Indian Culture and Buddhism: Saµbhåßå 12 (1991), pp.1-8. 5. Mahåbhåßya I p.115,2f. dadhi bråhma∫ebhyo dœyatåµ takraµ Kau∫∂inyåyêti saty api saµbhave dadhi-dånasya takra-dånaµ nivartakaµ bhavati; also III 6,23-25 and III 315,9-13. 6. Mahåbhåßya I 28,14f. bråhma∫å bhojyantåµ Må™hara-Kau∫∂i∫yau pariveviß™åm, iti nêdånœµ tau bhuñjåte. 7. Mahåbhåßya II 53,10 na vå ksasyânavakåƒatvåd apavådo gu∫asya; cf. II 326,18 na vânavakåƒatvåd apavådo maya™. 8. Bhagyalata Pataskar, Nagoya Studies 12 (1991), p.2. 9. George Cardona, JIPh 1 (1970), p.67 fn.18; S.D.Joshi, in Essays on På∫ini, ed. D.D.Mahulkar, p.52. Kåtyåyana and Patañjali differed on the conditions where apavåda-s prevail: Joshi/Roodbergen, Patañjali’s Mahåbhåßya, Anabhihitåhnika on II 3 1, translation and notes, p.15; cf. below pp.14-16. Cf. Någojœbha™™a on paribhåßå 57 and K.V.Abhyankar’s introduction to the second edition of Kielhorn’s edition and translation of the Paribhåßenduƒekhara, part I, p.30. 6 Hartmut Scharfe But there are many difficulties and contradictions involved in the application of these meta-rules. One of the most important (asiddhaµ bahira√gam antara√ge “What is outside a stem is [regarded as] non- effected in regard to [an operation] inside a stem”) 10 has so may ex- ceptions that six supplementary meta-rules 11 had to be formulated to account for them – and in the end tradition had to admit that those me- ta-rules that are inferred by studying På∫ini’s formulations (i.e., by the so-called jñåpaka-s) are not always valid. 12 Similarly the value of the nitya-prevalence is severely put in question, when several paribhåßå-s are required to let us know when a procedure that should be nitya by the given definition is not 13 – or is nitya in spite of an obstacle. Even the first pairing that lets the later (para) rule prevail over the former (pærva) – supposedly stated by På∫ini himself in I 4 2 – has almost as many counterexamples as examples; Kåtyåyana and the ˙lokavårt- tikakåra listed twenty-seven instances where the former rule instead seems to prevail over the later one (the so-called pærva-vipratißedha). This circumstance forced Patañjali in the end to claim that para here does not mean “following” but “desired” 14 in a blatant appeal to the 10. Nr. 50 in Någojœbha™™a’s Paribhåßenduƒekhara. 11. Ibid., paribhåßå-s 51-56. 12. Ibid., paribhåßå 116 jñåpaka-siddhaµ na sarvatra “What is established by a jñåpaka is not universally [valid].” jñåpaka-s are peculiarities in the formulation of På∫ini’s rules that make sense only – and are necessary – if a certain meta-rule is accepted as valid. Någojœbha™™a recognized only meta-rules that were based either on general princi- ples (nyåya) or jñåpaka-s – provided they are accepted in the vårttikas or the Mahåbhåßya: Paribhåßenduƒekhara ed.