Why Early Collective Action Pays Off: Evidence from Setting Protected Geographical Indications

Renewable Agriculture and Food Systems: 32(2); 179–192 doi:10.1017/S1742170516000168 Why early collective action pays off: evidence from setting Protected Geographical Indications

Xiomara F. Quiñones-Ruiz1*, Marianne Penker1, Giovanni Belletti2, Andrea Marescotti2 and Silvia Scaramuzzi2

1 Department of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences, Vienna (BOKU), Austria. 2 Dipartimento di Scienze per l’Economia e l’Impresa, Università di Firenze. *Corresponding author: [email protected]

Accepted 4 April 2016; First published online 22 June 2016 Research Paper

Abstract The registration of Geographical Indications (GIs) under the European Union (EU) legislation requires collective action and considerable efforts borne by multiple actors such as producers, processors, public authorities and research centers. We analyze their efforts, risks and benefits by comparing two EU GI registration processes in Italy and Austria, namely the Sorana bean Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) and the Perry from Mostviertel PGI. Results from the institutional and transaction costs analysis suggest that intensive interaction for solving conflicting interests, negotiating quality standards and defining common rules might pay off in indirect benefits and reduced risks. In particular, an inclusion of diverse and heterogeneous interest groups and a high degree of direct enterprise participation along the GI application process (as observed in the Italian case) generate benefits such as trust and social cohesion, which then support the actual use of the GI label and a better implementation of associated quality standards. A supportive legal framework with assistance from public authorities can back up the community of producers not only in technical aspects, but also as mediators when conflicts seem to be difficult to solve. As there seems to be a positive relationship between the intensity and effectiveness of collective action and the likelihood of achieving broadly accepted standards and social cohesion needed for successful GI implementation, the question for future research would not be how to avoid collective efforts but how to effectively organize the interaction among heterogeneous producer groups.

Key words: geographical indication, protected geographical indication, collective action, registration, efforts, beneﬁts, risks, EU

Introduction Due to heterogeneous interests of producers and processors diverging in size, location and quality standards, Geographical Indications (GIs) allow producers to define mutual agreements (Paus and Reviron, 2010;Galtier quality standards and defend their food products’ repu- et al., 2013) have to be reached. This requires considerable tation, while highlighting their geographical origin, collective efforts on the meso-level (Vandecandelaere et al., local skills and value to consumers. For the registration 2009). We assume that the interaction of GI enterprises will of a GI within the European Union (EU) scheme, initial- be shaped by formal and informal institutions (Reviron and ly set up by EU Council Regulation 2081/1992 (now Chappuis, 2011; Sidali and Scaramuzzi, 2014). The Regulation 1151/2012), local producers and processors European legal framework provides the overall regulatory have to organize and collectively define the area of pro- structures for GI registration; however, there is some duction, the characteristics of the production process scope for national specifications (e.g., requirements, proce- and those of the final product. These common rules are dures and authorities responsible for the national analysis summarizedintheso-calledProductSpecification, of dossiers). We assume that the way EU states design which is essential for the application to the EU. Once and organize the national phase of the GI registration EU recognition is obtained, GIs in EU territory will process is relevant, e.g., top-down processes often result in be used only for products complying with Product low ex-ante efforts and high ex-post efforts, while participa- Specification. tory processes usually have high ex-ante and low ex-post

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 28 Sep 2021 at 23:36:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. 180 X.F. Quiñones-Ruiz et al. efforts (Hanna, 1994, 1995; Jena and Grote, 2010); add- natural or human systems that generate limited benefits itionally, very weak cooperation or too centralized manage- and are challenged by over-exploitation and free-riding ment might not be efficiently run collective organizations (Ostrom et al., 1994). Collective efforts to build up and (Hanna, 1995). Furthermore, efforts made for information sustain product quality, clear rules, considerable monitor- gathering and for other forms of interaction can also result ing and sanctioning efforts are needed to maintain the GI in transaction benefits (Hanna, 1995; Enengel et al., 2014) reputation and to effectively exclude illegitimate users. that surpass the efforts made to obtain the GI registration. Producers that are located in the defined GI area and However, the governance of participatory group processes comply with the product specification are allowed to also bears risks, such as unsolvable conflicts (Hanna, benefit from the reputation of protected GIs (Babcock 1994; Enengel et al., 2014; Sidali and Scaramuzzi, 2014). and Clemens, 2004; Biénabe et al., 2011). Reviron and Chappuis (2011) explain the importance The collective action in diverse GI production systems of collective organization in the European vision of is shaped by GI firms’ own formal and informal rules Protected Geographical Indications (PGI) and Protected (e.g., rules of producer organizations, conventions of pro- Designations of Origin (PDO). However, there is yet very duction) and by the formal legal context, in which the de- little literature scrutinizing GI registration processes and velopment of a GI takes place. The opportunities or the institutional mechanisms that shape collective efforts, limitations that individuals face in a given situation, the risks and benefits of this process among the interaction information acquired, the benefits they would accrue or of various supply chain actors (Paus and Reviron, 2010) be excluded from and how they rationalize a situation and institutional diversity (Bowen and Zapata, 2009). are all affected by the rules or the lack of rules that Thus, we aim to get empirical insights on the GI regis- frame an event (Ostrom, 2005). Ostrom (1990) and tration processes and the associated efforts, risks and Ostrom and Polski (1999) claim that all efforts to organize benefits of the producers’ collective action. The aims of collective action must address a common set of problems, the paper are: such as coping with free-riding or monitoring individual compliance with GI rules. As GI enterprises also (1) to identify the types of public and private actors who manage the common reputation of their regional are involved along GI registration processes in the EU, product and protect it from free-riding, we opted for the (2) to estimate and compare efforts, risks and benefits long-standing IAD framework designed for the institu- they perceived during the registration process and tional analysis of self-organized common-pool resource (3) to identify the link between the GI registration management (Ostrom et al., 1994; Hess and Ostrom, process and the success of the GI initiative in terms 2007). of GI use by enterprises. The IAD framework distinguishes key variables that We present the theoretical framework and methods that researchers use to assess the role of institutions in guide our research in the following section. In the Results shaping human interactions and decision-making pro- section, we illustrate the analysis of the registration processes. Thus, following the IAD framework’s variables cesses and the collective efforts, risks and benefits of two (Ostrom et al., 1994; Ostrom and Polski, 1999; Hess cases from Italy and Austria. In the Discussion, we and Ostrom, 2007) and GI literature, the relevant categor- compare and discuss the case studies’ results. We end ies of analysis regarding the contextual and institutional with the Conclusion. situation include:

(1) The link of the product to the territory (analog to the Theoretical framework and methods bio-physical characteristics as defined by Hess and Ostrom 2007). Here, it is necessary to understand Following the research carried out by Quiñones-Ruiz the concept of ‘terroir’ argued by Casabianca et al. et al. (2014), the comparative study of the two GI registra- (2005). Terroir is defined as a geographical boundary, tion processes in Italy and Austria is guided by the in which a community has constructed—through Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) frame- history—an intellectual and collective know-how of work (Ostrom et al., 1994; Ostrom, 2005; Hess and production, which is based on a system of interactions Ostrom, 2007) as well as an analytical scheme that struc- between a physical and biological environment to- tures the analysis of efforts, risks and benefits of participa- gether with human factors that reveal originality, tory processes (North, 1990; Allen, 1991; Penker and confer typicality and engender a reputation for a Klemen, 2010). product. (2) The attributes of the community of producers and The IAD framework other actors involved in the GI production, with a special focus on representative organizations. GIs and the reputation they incorporate are comparable (3) The rules in use, including European and national with common-pool resources (Winfree and McCluskey, regulative GI frameworks and informal rules (e.g., 2005; Quiñones-Ruiz et al., 2015), as they refer to local customs or social norms on collaboration)

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 28 Sep 2021 at 23:36:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. Why early collective action pays off 181 affecting the stakeholders’ interaction in the action free of charge because of the personal involvement of arena. experts. We converted the remaining monetary expenses (4) The ‘action arena’, which is defined as the social place into working hours, so that all the results could be com- where actors interact, make decisions, solve problems paratively presented as time efforts. Taking the collective or fight. efforts until GI registration as boundaries of our study, we (5) The outcome of the GI process (Product Specification did not examine production costs before and after regis- setting the quality standards for the EU registration). tration, efforts to adapt to the GI requirements or certification and transaction costs for GI use after registration The IAD framework’s core is the ‘action arena’ (e.g., costs for quality control, court costs). (Ostrom, 2005; Hess and Ostrom, 2007), which—as we Ilbery and Kneafsey (2000) cautioned that some GI assume in this paper—also shapes the allocation of trans- applicants will most likely be discouraged because of action efforts, benefits and risks. high-bureaucracy hurdles and associated efforts. Transaction costs theory argues that time efforts for infor- Collective efforts, risks and benefits mation gathering, negotiations and other forms of interaction can result in transaction benefits (McCann et al., The protection of GIs, similar to agri-environmental 2005). Thus, efforts made in the registration process schemes or ethical food labeling, requires considerable or- cannot be assessed without including the benefitside. ganizational and bureaucratic efforts. In recent decades, Besides direct benefits, such as increases in product prices several empirical studies looked at these efforts borne by or sales figures, researchers and rural development agents farmers and by other public and private actors emphasize indirect benefits resulting from the intensified (McCann and Easter, 1997; Falconer and Whitby, 1999; interaction of producers and processors during the registra- McCann et al., 2005; Mettepenningen and Van tion process. Transaction cost theory provides the concep- Huylenbroeck, 2009; Enengel et al., 2014). These tual framework to contrast these indirect benefits—or studies refer to transaction cost theory and make special transaction services—with the associated transaction costs. reference to non-market transaction costs. We follow the We analyzed benefits resulting from the intensified definition of McCann et al. (2005), in which transaction interaction of producers, processors and other parties in costs are linked to the resources needed to create and the GI territory to set up the GI protection, but not the maintain property rights and as dependent on the institu- post-registration benefits from the very use of the regis- tional environment (North, 1990; Allen, 1991). tered GI. We derived relevant benefit categories from GI GI enterprises and other actors involved in GI produc- literature, e.g., vertical and horizontal integration, tion systems aiming to register and protect their GI must higher or better accepted quality standards, social learn- agree on Product Specification. According to the EU ing processes (Sanz-Cañada and Macias-Vázquez, 2005; regulation, only a group (of producers and processors) is Giovannucci et al., 2009, 2010; Reviron and Chappuis, entitled to apply for registration. Producers normally do 2011; Coulet, 2012; Bagal et al., 2013; Barjolle, 2016), not share the same production techniques and have differ- but we excluded benefits that would result from the ent interests in the GI product. For this reason, the actual use of the GI (e.g., price premiums, rural develop- process of convergence is costly, indeed interactions that ment benefits). In the action arena analysis and as ex- take place in the action arena ask for considerable effort planatory variable of efforts, we also included risks to be made by individual enterprises, collective associa- linked to possible failures of the collective GI registration tions and public organizations involved in the GI produc- process (unsolvable conflicts, lack of information, unclear tion system. The main elements are time spent in meetings regulation) (Barjolle and Sylvander, 2000; Ilbery and and the time required to acquire information and to com- Kneafsey, 2000; Giovannucci et al., 2009, 2010; Coulet, municate with other actors (Penker and Klemen, 2010; 2012; Rangnekar and Mukhopadhyay, 2016). However, Enengel et al., 2011, 2014). we excluded post-registration risks that affect the GI use However, along the GI process, some monetary (e.g., inadequate consumer knowledge of the GI). expenses may also occur. They can include consultancy costs (e.g., studies supporting the definition of Product fi Methods: comparative case study design, Speci cation, legal and technical advice), some invest- data collection and analysis ments (laboratory analysis for the product characterization) and overheads (phone calls, fuel, trips). The latter Our paper is based on a comparative analysis of two GI can be assumed to be proportional to the time spent; case studies. According to Poteete et al. (2010), a case therefore we did not include them in our comparative ana- study allows an intensive analysis of a well-bound phe- lysis. Although other expenses may highly affect GI regis- nomenon and is the only feasible choice for empirically tration costs, they were not relevant in the cases analyzed based research when cross-case data are limited. Case or transferred into time efforts. For instance, some studies studies identify the main sources of collective efforts, about product characteristics had been carried out before risks and benefits associated with the GI registration the GI registration process, and some consultancies were process and the involved actors, measure efforts in terms

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 28 Sep 2021 at 23:36:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. 182 X.F. Quiñones-Ruiz et al.

Table 1. PGI cases, afﬁliation and number of interviewees.

Sorana bean, Italy Mostviertel perry, Austria

GI management Il Ghiareto ONLUS Associazione dei Piccoli Regional Management Office, Mostviertel Produttori del Fagiolo di Sorana Affiliation and number Tuscany Region Office (3), Municipality of Pescia Regional Management, Mostviertel (3), Association of interviewees (1), Ghiareto Association (1), Producers (4) of fruit producers, Mostviertel (1), Experts (2) Documents GI documents and protocols, reports from Reports from Patent Office, GI documents and pro- Tuscany Region Office, Door Database tocols, Door Database

Source: Own compilation.

of time and identify the main features of the contextual . national (and regional) phase of the GI registration and institutional framework, which affect the magnitude process (formal procedures); and of efforts, risks and benefits. . EU phase of the GI registration following the GI We selected two comparable, registered GI cases to regulation. guarantee data quality. This relied on the recall of inter- We asked for the number of actors involved and time viewees. Considering the kind of data needed, access to in- efforts spent on each task. We included efforts borne by formation and availability of key-informants were also the community of stakeholders in the GI territory, includ- very relevant criteria for the case selection. ing producers’ and/or processors’ organizations and semi- We selected the Sorana bean PGI (Fagiolo di Sorana) in public organizations acting at sub-national level (regions, Italy and Mostviertel perry PGI (Mostviertler Birnmost) provinces, municipalities, and/or development agencies). in Austria (Table 1). They share similar value chain char- We did not include the efforts of national and EU author- acteristics (few producers involved, and producers also ities (e.g., national governments, EU Commission), as process and market the products, mainly via short market- they are located outside of the GI territory. ing channels), good product reputation and strong links Although we pursued an in-depth work, an evaluation to the territory. In both cases, producers registered a of efforts based on a recall-approach remains a rough es- PGI according to EU legislation, and in both cases the timation (Mettepenningen and Van Huylenbroeck, 2009). whole supply chain (production and processing and prep- Regarding data quality, producers documenting time and aration) is located in the delimited territory (even if monetary efforts in real time throughout the whole regis- according to EU regulation, a PGI can be granted also tration processes would be a methodological proxy. This to products even when only one stage of the production therefore required a substantial commitment from a process takes place in the indicated territory). large number of stakeholders involved in the registration After analysing value chain characteristics, we col- process that lasts several years. Thus, empirical analyses lected data from 15 diverse supply chain actors of transaction costs are still a challenge (Wang, 2003; (Table 1). The qualitative interviews (e.g., for understand- Mettepenningen and Van Huylenbroeck, 2009). ing the PGI registration process, including open questions However, multiple methods, cross-case triangulation as on benefits and risks), the structured interviews (e.g., for well as reflective loops (e.g., discussion of results with assessing the time effort of individuals involved, to rank experts and interviewees) support the validity of the com- risks and benefits derived from literature) and document parative analysis. analyses (e.g., for grasping the Product Specification and Furthermore, we asked interviewees to identify per- national GI regulations) took place from October 2013 ceived risks and benefits at the time of the GI registration. through May 2014. Qualitative interviews were tran- We conducted the interviews in two steps. The first step scribed, coded and analyzed based on the IAD was open. In the second step, we established risks and framework. benefits according to predefined answer categories For estimating collective efforts, we asked interviewees derived from literature. Interviewees answered using a to identify tasks along the four work packages of the PGI five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strong- registration process: ly agree). According to Barjolle et al. (2009), this method . conception of and consensus on starting the GI regis- can support the analysis of GI effects. Since both GIs were tration process (e.g., main efforts involved in time registered some time ago, we also consulted archives and invested in meetings by GI enterprises and related GI documents to support the memory work of the intervie- actors); wees. Data collection was followed by a qualitative text . agreement and drafting of the Product Specification analysis (Patton, 2002), in which we triangulated the (e.g., efforts needed for scientific trials to demonstrate results from the interviews and document analyses to the link between product and territory); enhance the validity of results.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 28 Sep 2021 at 23:36:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. Why early collective action pays off 183

Figure 1. Timeframe for the Sorana bean GI registration.

Results: analysis of registration processes, abuse. Following the approval of EU Council regulation transaction efforts, risks and benefits 2081/92, Sorana bean producers started considering a PGI application. The small number and physical proxim- For each case study, we first portray the contextual and in- ity of producers favored a direct, informal interaction, stitutional situation according to the IAD framework (ter- particularly in the lowlands. ritorial link to the product, attributes of the community, In the action arena, some conflicts emerged between rules in use, action arena and outcome) and then Poggio and Ghiareto producers due to the higher present the collective efforts, risks and benefits. average production per hectare in Poggio and consequently different production costs, which allowed Poggio pro- Sorana bean ducers to sell their product at a lower price. During GI registration, the Municipality of Pescia coordinated the Contextual and institutional situation. The link between scientific research, involved producers in the design of product and territory is strong. The bean cultivated today the Product Specification and facilitated the achievement belongs to the Phaseolus vulgaris L. species. The seed is of an agreement. The close relationships between produ- obtained from the plants that have been on site for cers due to the very small size of the GI area and the many generations and have thus developed an ecotype low number of actors facilitated the registration process that is perfectly adapted to the local environment, the and recognition in 2002 (Fig. 1). These relationships sup- climate and the characteristics of local soils. The produc- ported the achievement of a common GI strategy. tion of the Sorana bean is located in the municipal area of As an outcome of the GI process, producers agreed on Pescia in the district of Pistoia (Tuscany), a valley with the Product Specification. Producers finally decided to pedological characteristics that impede the adoption of extend the PGI production area to the entire Sorana modern production techniques. The PGI area covers valley (both Poggio and Ghiareto). The Municipality of around 660 hectares, from the banks of the Pescia di Pescia and regional authorities supported this solution, Pontito creek (Ghiareto) to the uplands (Poggio). The given the narrowness of the area and the limited local community is identified with the Sorana bean, but amount of production. Producers can add special men- it is also well known in Tuscany and marketed on some tions on the label when beans are from the most reputed niche channels. Consumers pay a price 6/7 times higher Ghiareto sub-area. The extension of the production area than for a standard bean, which prompted the rise of a to other historically less traditional areas, like Poggio, large amount of imitations. For the few big specialized has strengthened the quantity produced, the visibility of farms, the Sorana bean accounts for a high percentage Sorana bean in the market and the possibility to carry of total income, but it has minor economic relevance for out collective promotional activities. The PGI production many diversified small producers. area however remains very small, showing pedological As for the attributes of the community, the few bean pro- characteristics that impede the adoption of modern ducers that exist are generally non-specialized, and some farming techniques. Other important points stated by of them are retired or undertaking other working activ- the Product Specification are the ban on using chemical ities. The Associazione dei piccoli produttori del Fagiolo herbicides, a relatively low maximum yield per hectare di Sorana Il Ghiareto ONLUS, founded in 1994, was re- (20 quintals) and an exact description of product charac- sponsible for the PGI application and now represents pro- teristics as well as permitted harvesting methods. All these ducers in the lowlands, who achieve higher quality (e.g., specific elements, guaranteed by the PGI scheme, give a by developing promotional initiatives). strong identity to the product and, consequently, increase Regarding the rules in use, the good reputation of the Sorana bean’s reputation and recognizability among con- Sorana bean coupled with unclear and missing rules on sumers, thus justifying the high-resale price on the the use of its name brought problems of misuse and market.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 28 Sep 2021 at 23:36:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. 184 X.F. Quiñones-Ruiz et al.

Table 2. Efforts and number of persons involved in the Sorana bean PGI registration.

Effort1 in Number of Work packages Years person years Effort in (%) persons

I Conception of and consensus on the GI strategy 1994 1.23 66.2 21 II Agreement and drafting of the Product Speciﬁcations 1994–1995 0.34 18.3 15 III National (and regional) phase of the GI registration process 1995–2000 0.28 15.0 40 IV EU phase of the GI registration 2000–2002 0.01 0.5 1 Sum 8 1.86 100 (2)

1 The time effort was estimated as person years (7.5 working hours day−1, 220 working days year−1). 2 Not possible to sum up because of overlap/double counting between work packages. Source: Own primary data.

Table 3. Sorana Bean—risks until registration as perceived by interviewees.

Standard Coefﬁcient of Risks (shortened and translated statements from Italian and German questionnaires with scores ≥2) Score deviation variation (%)

Difficulties in reaching consensus on the definition of the territorial area 3.9 0.33 8,53 Difficulties in reaching consensus on the Product Specification about process and/or product 3.0 0.87 28,87 quality Increased frictions between actors due to debate 2.9 0.60 20,85 Lack of knowledge of the legal situation as well as the inadequate experience of involved 2.8 0.97 35,21 organizations Lack of involvement of all actor groups (due to poor level of information, poor empowerment) 2.6 0.79 30,75 The long and tedious GI registration process 2.4 0.70 29,30 The debate about inclusion of additional geographical mentions (sub-designations) 2.3 0.43 19,25 The involvement of public administrations due to their influence 2.1 0.33 15,56 The potential rejection or failure of the GI application 2.0 0.50 25,00 The elaboration of the Product Specification (e.g., scientific analyses) as a financial challenge 2.0 0.50 25,00

The score is the average level of agreement expressed by interviewees on a five-point scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree; pre-defined statements with case specific statements and specifications (in brackets) added from the interviewees.

Efforts, risks and benefits. Efforts made to register the also took place in the area of production (mandatory Sorana bean PGI were considerable, when the small according to Italian procedures of national implementa- number of producers involved and low quantities pro- tion of the EU GI regulation) aimed at informing all sta- duced are taken into account, in particular at the time keholders and to giving them the opportunity to debate the process started. According to the registration (and to oppose to) the proposed Product Specification. process (Table 2), the first work package demanded the Finally, in 2002 the Sorana bean PGI was registered. highest effort (66.2%, in absolute terms 1.23 person The EU phase of the GI registration took approximately years) due to the discussion needed for establishing the 2 years and was the lowest effort in absolute (0.01) and boundaries of the GI area and the rules for producers to percentage terms (0.5%). Not all producers actively took take part in the GI process. The second work package part in the formal GI process, as some producers are took place from 1994 to 1995 and included diverse very small and/or hobby producers. However, the strong types of actors, such as producers, members of local gov- territorial contiguity and social interactions facilitated ernment, local universities and research institutes. The the circulation of information and informal communica- Municipality of Pescia coordinated the activities for the tion of producers. design of the Product Specification. The second work Before registration, interviewees perceived the main risks package represented 18.3% of the total efforts, followed as the difficulty in reaching consensus between producers by the national (and regional) phase of the GI registration located in Ghiareto and Poggio due to diverging ideas process. Although the effort in absolute terms was low about product quality and the delimitation of the produc- (0.28 person years), it demanded about 5 years because tion area (Table 3). Initially, Ghiareto producers did not of adjustments of the Product Specification and a delay approve inclusion of the Poggio area in the PGI boundar- of the national authorities due to bureaucratic reasons. ies due to Poggio’s slightly diverging product characteris- During this second work package, the public consultation tics. After registration, the main risks still entailed

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 28 Sep 2021 at 23:36:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. Why early collective action pays off 185

Table 4. Sorana bean—beneﬁts until registration as perceived by interviewees.

Beneﬁts (shortened and translated statements from Italian and German Standard Coefﬁcient of questionnaires with scores ≥2) Score deviation variation (%)

Improved pride of local GI enterprises with regards to the product 4.3 0.48 11.07 Increased motivation to produce better quality 4.0 0.50 12.50 Broader acceptance of common quality standards 4.0 0.50 12.50 Producers’ deeper knowledge and awareness of product characteristics 3.8 0.66 17.64 External actors’ (Italian and foreign) deeper knowledge and awareness of product characteristics 3.8 0.66 17.64 Improved relations between private (enterprises) and public actors 3.6 0.48 13.36 Improved horizontal integration between producers 2.8 0.83 30.15 Improved vertical integration between producers and other supply chain actors (e.g., mass 2.3 0.43 19.25 retailers)

difficulties in reaching consensus on how to control the actors and the whole territory benefited from Sorana PGI (e.g., due to the perceived low level of market con- bean’s reputation gained through the PGI registration. trols of Sorana bean by public authority). The lack of In fact, the PGI supported the survival of agriculture in knowledge about the legal framework and the informa- this area and revitalized the marginalized territory of tion asymmetry among different producers categories the Sorana valley (Belletti et al., 2014) by facilitating the were also perceived as relevant risks. valorization of other products, such as local extra-virgin In terms of benefits, interviewees pointed out that, olive oil, or by promoting rural tourism (restaurants offer- despite conflicts, the registration process facilitated co- ing special bean menus and agro-tourism). operation between producers to achieve a common aim. Moreover, the GI process fostered the motivation to Mostviertel perry produce high-quality beans and increased the local pride of producers. Interviewees stated that the PGI registration Contextual and institutional analysis. Perry is produced process (news about the requested registration were by cask fermentation of pear juice obtained from press- reported frequently by media, from local newspapers to ing. ‘Mostviertel’ (Perry-Quarter) is the traditional geo- national TV) boosted the reputation of Sorana bean, graphical and administrative term for the south-eastern favoring its direct marketing. Traceability and quality part of the province of Lower Austria. The first denomin- control enhanced product quality on the final market ation of perry dates back to the year 1240 (Sommer et al., and opened up the access to new markets and marketing 2012). Since then, it has become integral to regional iden- channels (Table 4). tity and economy. Perry lost its reputation after the The use of the Sorana bean PGI. From a total number Second World War and was replaced by beer and wine; of 40 bean producers in Sorana valley, about 22 actually nevertheless, a perry revival has been observed since the use the GI label. The other mainly non-professional pro- 1990s (Sommer et al., 2012). Nowadays, in addition to ducers do not really need the GI certification, as many of on-farm sales, several culinary and touristic events them sell small quantities of beans to friends and relatives. promote perry. However, perry producers usually Today’s production is characterized by very low quan- depend on other sources of income. Approximately 20% tities and high-sale prices (22 euro kg−1 on average, com- of the production is classified as high-quality perry and pared with 3–4 euro kg−1 for conventional beans). Sorana obtains premium prices, which can be 10 times the beans are generally sold through direct marketing. normal price. Tuscany is the prevalent consumption market, although The analysis of the attributes of the community shows a small share of beans is sold to restaurants and agri- that approximately 250 producers yield two million food shops in Northern Italy. The PGI certified produc- liters per year (2/3 perry and 1/3 cider). These producers tion has grown from 57 quintals of certified beans in have their own individual brands and marketing strat- 2004 (first year of PGI implementation) up to 76 quintals egies. In total 150 producers are gathered under the in 2012, following a growth of surfaces (4.78 ha in 2004 to Association of Fruit Producers from Mostviertel, which 5.22 ha in 2012 and 5.21 ha in 2013). Most production is was founded in 1998 and is closely linked to the carried out by small farms often managed by non-profes- Chamber of Agriculture. Producers individually cultivate, sional producers (retired, hobby, or part-time). The harvest, process and directly market 90% of the perry to number of producers who use the PGI has slightly consumers within a distance of 40 km. Although produ- grown over the years but still remains very small (15 in cers are gathered in the association, horizontal integration 2004 and 22 in 2013). In addition, both supply chain is weak. The GI registration process was initiated by the

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 28 Sep 2021 at 23:36:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. 186 X.F. Quiñones-Ruiz et al.

Figure 2. Timeframe for the Mostviertel perry GI registration.

Table 5. Efforts and number of persons involved in the Mostviertel perry PGI registration.

Effort1 in Number of Work packages Years person years Effort in (%) persons

I Conception of and consensus on the GI strategy 2000 0.04 11.4 55 II Agreement and drafting of the Product Speciﬁcations 2001–2003 0.17 48.6 23 III National (and regional) phase of the GI registration process 2003 0.01 2.9 21 IV EU phase of the GI registration 2003–2011 0.13 37.1 22 Sum 11 0.35 100 (2) 1 The time effort was estimated as person years (7.5 working hours day−1, 220 working days year−1). 2 Not possible to sum up because of overlap/double counting between work packages. Source: Own primary data.

Regional Management Office in Mostviertel in close col- The main outcome of the GI registration process was laboration with the Association of Fruit Producers from the Product Specification. The process allowed perry pro- Mostviertel. ducers to become more aware about the product, quality As for the rules in use, the study pointed out that prior standards and their regional identity. According to the to the GI registration process, perry production was regu- Product Specification, only pears of 59 varieties typically lated by quality standards of Lower Austria and the cultivated in Mostviertel can be used to produce Austrian Wine Law. Right from the beginning, producers Mostviertel perry and approximately 2 kg of fruit are were sceptical about new, additional regulations. required for 1 liter of perry. As producers generally only Therefore, they adapted already existing quality regula- use the fruit from their own trees, it is easy to relate the tions. Producers decided to protect the name ‘Mostviertler volume of perry to the yield of a farm tree by means of Birnmost’ after they realized that a German company a plausibility test. If producers buy perry pears, they was using that name on its homepage. Producers also must ensure traceability by means of delivery notes. looked for a common and consistent marketing strategy Efforts, benefits and risks. Work package I formally to differentiate their perry from Upper Austria. started with the decision of the board of the Association The characterization of the action arena allowed iden- of Fruit Producers from Mostviertel to initiate the GI tifying the actors that played a role along the GI registra- process, after it interacted with Regional Management tion process. After consulting the Austrian Patent Office, Office and the Austrian Patent Office. The approximately the Regional Management Office started and drove the 55 members of the Association of Fruit Producers from GI registration process. In a board meeting at the end of Mostviertel were not actively involved in the debate but 2000, the Association of Fruit Producers from were informed about the board’s decision. Thus, the esti- Mostviertel on behalf of their members agreed to start mated effort of 0.04 person years (Table 5) was much the GI registration process (Fig. 2). Overall, there was lower than in the Sorana bean case. The efforts for the little collective action among producers during the second work package were higher, as most of the registra- process. The Chamber of Agriculture located in Lower tion efforts (46%) focused on preparing the Product Austria provided external support regarding horizontal Specification. Although already existing information integration, quality management and marketing, but it and quality standards were used and adapted, the had little previous GI experience. Regional Management Office hired an expert to

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 28 Sep 2021 at 23:36:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. Why early collective action pays off 187

Table 6. Mostviertel perry—risks until registration as perceived by interviewees.

Standard Coefﬁcient of Risks (shortened and translated statements from Italian and German questionnaires with scores ≥2) Score deviation variation (%)

Long and tedious GI registration process 5.0 0.00 0.00 Complex GI concept (which decreased participation of producers) 4.3 0.47 10.88 Difficulties in reaching consensus on the Product Specification about process and/or product 3.7 1.25 34.02 quality Lack of knowledge on legal situation as well as the inadequate experience of the involved 4.0 0.82 20.41 organizations Not all actor groups were involved (strategic reasons) 3.0 1.63 54.43 GI debate increased frictions between actors 3.0 0.82 27.22 Producers’ low acceptance of an external control system (already before GI registration) 2.7 1.70 63.74 Competition among producers 2.7 1.70 63.74 Unclear competence and/or the amount of public authorities involved 2.3 0.47 20.20 Difficulties in reaching consensus on the definition of the territorial area 2.0 1.41 70.71

Table 7. Mostviertel perry—beneﬁts until registration as perceived by interviewees.

Beneﬁts (shortened and translated statements from Italian and German questionnaires with scores Standard Coefﬁcient of ≥2) Score deviation variation (%)

Better product specification and product description 4.0 0.00 0.00 Motivation to debate the future of region and its development 4.0 0.00 0.00 An opportunity to increase perry sales (e.g., out of the region) 3.7 0.47 12.86 Improved horizontal integration between producers 3.0 0.82 27.22 Improved vertical integration between producers and other supply chain actors (e.g., gastronomy) 2.0 0.00 0.00 The score is the average level of agreement expressed by interviewees on a five-point scale from 1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly agree; pre-defined statements with case specific statements and specifications (in brackets) added from the interviewees.

scientifically analyze the pears. The time effort for the collective marketing’ was a benefit. Table 7 shows the third work package was minimal, since the GI application ranked benefits stated by the interviewees. was handed over to the Patent Office staff. There was little The use of the Mostviertler perry PGI. After PGI regis- need for further interaction, as the Patent Office had been tration, producers were unable to agree on a control involved from the beginning of the GI process. This phase system. As a result, in a meeting in 2014, the board of only needed 2.9% of the total registration efforts. The the Association of Fruit Producers from Mostviertel period for the fourth work package was the longest decided not to use the PGI and formally withdrew from (from 2003 to 2011), since the content of the Product the EU protection. Producers have never used the PGI, Specification did not comply with EU stipulations. After since the majority of them—particularly the smaller national registration in 2003, the EU PGI registration ones with lower quality and farm sales—did not agree was obtained in 2011, the EU phase of the GI registration on a control body, additional controls and certification demanded 37.1% of the total efforts. fees. Nonetheless during and after the PGI process, In terms of risks (Table 6), interviewees were already aware some other collective marketing strategies, such as of the challenge of finding an agreement on an external Genussregion (delicacy region), were successfully devel- control body, although the withdrawal of the PGI was oped in the region. Producers located in the only decided after the interviews. Apparently, many produ- Genussregion Mostviertel continued selling their perry cers were not truly aware of what the GI meant for them. It predominantly with their own individual brands as before. was only after debates and the negotiations after registra- Unlike the Sorana bean, the Mostviertel perry producers, tion that several producers realized that they could have after a long GI registration process, decided not to use the better protected the pears instead of the perry or that PGI, as they were not able to agree on an external control they could protect the name via wine regulations. body. In the Sorana case, the certification body did not Considering the benefits, the interviewees perceived play a role in the registration process, although in that ‘the marketing of the region under one roof, as general it may happen that the certification body

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 28 Sep 2021 at 23:36:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. 188 X.F. Quiñones-Ruiz et al. already supported the ex-ante phase. Another particular- regarding the integrity of the partner, what promotes the ity is that in the perry case local authorities were not possibility to make judgments. involved during the GI registration process, but an National institutional settings of the EU regulations on expert was recruited to scientifically analyze the pears. GIs also played a role. In Italy, for instance, the public consultation of stakeholders in the area of production is mandatory.This improves the information of all stakeholders’,but Discussion also increases the probability of time-demanding debates and oppositions before registration. The Mostviertel case, Both GI registrations were formally successful and share however, indicates that it might be useful to have these similar contexts (e.g., small production areas, products debates before, rather than after the registration. embedded in the region, heterogeneous producers both The Sorana bean case illustrates substantial collective non-professional and professional, short supply chains). efforts. Despite the diversity of producers and different However, the action arenas show very contrasting pat- reputation of the two production sub-areas implying a terns of interaction and involvement among producers, low level of trust, intensive interaction in the first two semi-public organizations and research centers that phases of the registration process facilitated consensus result in diverging transaction efforts, risks and benefits on the GI strategy. The individual producers were actively as already illustrated by Enengel et al. (2014) for the and directly involved in reaching consensus on the example of landscape co-management. A synthesis of common quality standards needed to obtain the PGI rec- both GI registration processes (Sorana bean and ognition. This happened both in formal consultations and Mostviertel perry) is shown in Table 8. in informal ways, thanks to strong territorial proximity The Sorana bean producers and associated local actors and exhaustive social interactions. Menard (2004) states put much more effort in meetings, information gathering that inter-firm arrangements imply the need for consider- and negotiation for the conception of and consensus on the able amounts of time and resources to collectively find GI strategy (1.23 person years). In the perry case, this first agreements on adjustments needed in order to reach phase was limited to 0.04 person years and restricted to a agreements and solve conflicts. Thus, beans producers board meeting and subsequent information of producers. were able to elaborate horizontal arrangements. On the This early phase in the Sorana bean case was accompanied contrary, the perry case shows that the majority of produ- by many difficulties, conflictual debates, which contrasted cers, whose perry is marketed locally and individually, the smooth consensus in Mostviertel. In addition, were not involved in the first two important phases of defining the Product Specification needed twice as much the registration process. The ones who took the lead effort for Sorana bean (0.34 person years) as for perry along the GI process together with the Regional (0.17). Many of the associated conflicts in the Sorana Management from Mostviertel might have not repre- bean territory focused on quality (quality standards, terri- sented the interests of the majority but rather those of tories of lower qualities to be included or not), whereas this few high-end quality producers looking for international was not an issue of major debate in Mostviertel, as produ- fairs and markets. cers agreed to stick to existing quality standards. According to Arnstein (1969), who distinguishes infor- The difference in the PGI use however is remarkable. mation, consultation and co-decision making as different While many professional and semi-professional Sorana forms of participation, the Sorana bean case represents a bean producers sell their beans with the PGI label, perry situation with a high degree of consultation and co-deci- producers are still selling their product under diverse indi- sion making, while most perry producers were merely vidual farm brands without the GI label. Perry producers informed of decisions made by the representative body. even decided to withdraw from the PGI protection, allow- In the Sorana bean case, exhaustive discussions and ing them to use the geographical name without having to major conflicts and negotiations ended in the broad stick to the PGI rules. accepted of common agreements and decision making We argue that these mixed outcomes arise from the diver- that inherently implied a shared understanding of GIs, ging scope of collective action and participation of the com- trust building and integration of producers. In contrast, munity of producers in the early phase of the GI registration the majority of perry producers only fully grasped the process. The Sorana bean case, in comparison with the meaning of the GI after it was granted, when the majority Mostviertel perry, showed the ability of the producers to of them realized that they do not want formalized control constitute themselves in a group and to discuss all issues but just wanted to sell their perry with individual farm related to the GI registration strategy. Our findings labels as they had before GI registration. This confirms confirm that intensified interaction of producers results in Randall’s(1981) argument that transaction costs are not higher trust and in a better appropriation of the meaning ‘money down a rat hole’ and is in line with previous em- of GI protection. The propensity to collaborate with pirical transaction studies on landscape co-management someone depends on the degree of trust previously depos- showing positive correlations between individual time ited in that person (Torre, 2006). Thus, as the relationship efforts for and benefits of participation (Enengel et al., advances, participants obtain new information, for instance 2014). In the perry case, major risks and challenges were

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 28 Sep 2021 at 23:36:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. Downloaded from h al olcieato asoff pays action collective early Why https://www.cambridge.org/core

Table 8. Synthesis of both registration processes.

Sorana bean Mostviertel perry 1 1 Effort in Number of Effort in Effort in Number of Work packages person years Effort in (%) persons Years person years (%) persons Years . 28 Sep 2021at23:36:10 I Conception of and consensus on the GI strategy 1.23 66.2 21 1994 0.04 11.4 55 2000 II Agreement and drafting of the Product Specifications 0.34 18.3 15 1994–1995 0.17 48.6 23 2001–2003 III National (and regional) phase of the GI registration process 0.28 15.0 40 1995–2000 0.01 2.9 21 2003 IV EU phase of the GI registration 0.01 0.5 1 2000–2002 0.13 37.1 22 2003–2011 Total 1.86 100.0 (2) 8 0.35 100.0 (2)11 Contextual and institutional structure , subject totheCambridge Coreterms ofuse. Link between product and territory The seed is obtained from the plants that have been on site The first denomination of perry dates back to the year for many generations, thus enabling an ecotype perfectly 1240 adapted to the local environment Attributes of the producers Mainly non-specialized farmers, some of them retired or Only few farmers produce high-quality perry, most of undertaking other working activities as well as specialized them produce average or low quality farmers Motivation to protect the product Misuse and abuse of the (unprotected) Sorana bean GI Misuse of the name ‘Mostviertler Birnmost’ by a German company, and the need for a common marketing strategy Action arena The association of small bean producers was established The GI registration process was initiated by the at the beginning of the GI process. Conflicts between Regional Management Mostviertel in collaboration Poggio and Ghiareto producers due to the higher average with the already existing Association of the Fruit production per hectare in Poggio and associated quality Producers Mostviertel, which acted on behalf of their discrepancies. The Municipality of Pescia coordinated members. The registration was successfully concluded scientific research and served as facilitator for reaching without major conflicts agreements Outcome Producers implement common quality standards and the Several producers were not actively involved in the definition of Product Specification. Ghiareto producers debate to understand what the protection of GIs are allowed to add special mentions. There is an increase implies. After the PGI was obtained, conflicts about of quantity produced and visibility of the Sorana bean the control body resulted in a withdrawal of the GI protection. Producers use other strategies to jointly market their perry (e.g., Genussregion) − − 1 The time effort was estimated as person years (7.5 working hours day 1 , 220 working days year 1 ). 2 Not possible to sum up because of overlap/double counting between work packages. Source: Own primary data. 189 190 X.F. Quiñones-Ruiz et al. postponed, as there were not truly collective debates and Office was limited, due to little GI experience in Austria, justifications for starting the GI process in the initial unclear competencies and limited personnel resources. phase. This confirms Hanna’s(1994, 1995) assertion The analysis shows that researchers and consultants can that less collective efforts invested and realized in the also act as third parties to reconcile diverse viewpoints ex-ante phase has to be spent afterwards. Debates or and interests of heterogeneous producers. Neither of the conflicts avoided during the early phases of the perry two cases involved certification bodies in the elaboration registration were observed in the implementation phase. of Product Specification, although they checked the produ- Nonetheless, we assume that the efforts for a collective cers’ compliance with the Product Specification after regis- GI process will not only depend on the degree and form of tration. The support of facilitators or innovation brokers participation but also on group size and heterogeneity of promote interaction and debate when pursuing the regis- supply chain actors (e.g., how many and what kind of pro- tration of GIs, similar to other innovative agricultural ducers are involved—specialists, artisans). Both cases systems (Klerkx and Gildemacher, 2012). present two small universes of heterogeneous producers, implying the appearance of risks, such as conflicting interests (Dentoni et al., 2012; Crespo et al., 2014; Dervillé and Conclusion Allaire, 2014). However, strong interactions among diver- gent types of producers in forms of debates, collective de- Among the manifold strategies for product differenti- cision making, knowledge sharing and communication in ation, GIs present an interesting opportunity for those itself resulted in a more beneficial ex-post situation in the products whose characteristics are strongly linked to the Sorana bean case due to the social cohesion that was territory from which they originate. In order to protect developed. Promoting the authority of individuals to for- and regulate GI use, producers have to self-organize and mulate their own rules might result in social processes that collaborate. As highlighted by our case studies, this inter- allow the evolution of social norms and therefore might action of heterogeneous supply chain actors, authorities boost the probability that individuals solve their collective and researchers can be conflict-laden, complex and action problems (Ostrom, 2000). time-demanding. Although interaction is costly in terms Both GI registration processes were initiated and driven of time, our results suggest that the early and direct in- by small groups of producers in cooperation with (regional volvement of all conflicting interest groups pays off and or national) authorities. In the Austrian case, the Regional can facilitate empowerment, trust and social cohesion, Management Office initiated the process and implemented higher acceptance of common quality standards, co- it together with the Association of Fruit Producers from learning processes on product characteristics and a Mostviertel, while in the Italian case the GI registration higher use of the GI label after registration. A supportive process was led by some producers with the support of legal framework along with the support of public author- the local municipality (Pescia). In both cases, the overall ities can back up the community of producers not only in duration of the PGI registration was long, due to the terms of technical aspects but also in a mediator when lack of knowledge for designing the Product conflicts appear to be difficult to solve. As there seems Specification, limited GI experience of the producers and to be a positive relationship between intensity and effect- national authorities in charge of the GI registration iveness of collective action and the likelihood of achieving process. The institutional environment of self-organization broadly accepted standards and the social cohesion (established rules of producer organizations but also infor- needed for the successful GI implementation, the question mal customs of collaboration) (Tregear et al., 2007; for future research is how to effectively organize the inter- Markelova et al., 2009; Belletti and Marescotti, 2011; action among heterogeneous producer groups. Belletti et al., 2015) and supportive organizations (e.g., public authorities) were more favorable in the Sorana bean case. Geographical proximity can activate collective Acknowledgments. We gratefully acknowledge the funding pro- action and the institutional networking of actors (Filippi vided by the Austrian National Bank (OeNB) for conducting and Torre, 2003). Previous collective investments on the this research. We kindly thank Elisa Barzini and Magdalena Pircher for conducting the interviews. We thank all interviewees, product (such as research to technically characterize the especially Angela Crescenzi, Luciano Zoppi, Stefano Barzagli, product made by local universities) and informal support Giovanni Piscolla, Simona Toni, Giorgio Castiglione, Fabrizio from public bodies (such as consulting, mediation and Salvadorini, Mauro Carreri, Romano Dingacci, Rita Chelini, Alfio Marchini, Ota and Olma in Italy and Andreas Ennser, moderation of group processes) facilitate applications Karl Becker, and Gerald Weinhart in Austria for the efforts of even for small producer groups, which otherwise would providing data and recalling the PGI-registration processes. be disadvantaged because of considerable fixed costs in re- We also thank Christina Roder for proofreading the paper. lation to the small production volume and value. These fixed costs include costly technical analyses justifying the link between product and territory or consultancies in References writing the Product Specification. In the Austrian case, Allen, D.W. 1991. What are transactions costs? Research Law support from the Chamber of Agriculture and the Patent and Economics, 14:1–18.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 28 Sep 2021 at 23:36:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. Why early collective action pays off 191

Arnstein, S.R. 1969. A ladder of citizen participation. Journal of Mahop (eds). Extending the Protection of Geographical the American Institute of Planners 35(4):216–224. Indications Earthscan, Abingdon. p. 101–119. Babcock, B.A. and Clemens, R. 2004. Geographical Indications Crespo, J., Requier-Desjardins, D., and Vicente, J. 2014. Why can and Property Rights: Protecting Value-Added Agricultural collective action fail in local agri-food systems? A social Products. Publications 04-mbp7, Midwest Agribusiness, network analysis of cheese producers in Acapulco, Mexico. Trade Research and Information Center (MATRIC), Iowa Food Policy 46:165–77. State University, Ames, IA. Dentoni, D., Menozzi, D., and Capelli, M.G. 2012. Group het- Bagal, M., Belletti, G., Marescotti, A., and Onori, G. 2013. Study erogeneity and cooperation on the geographical indication on the potential of marketing of Kenyan Coffee as regulation: The case of the “Prosciutto di Parma” consor- Geographical Indication. European Commission. Available at tium. Food Policy 37(3):207–216. Web site http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/external-studies/2013/ Dervillé, M. and Allaire, G. 2014. Change of competition regime gis-acp-countries/case-study-coffee-kenya_en.pdf (verified 10 and regional innovative capacities: Evidence from dairy re- October 2014). structuring in France. Food Policy 49:347–360. Barjolle, D. 2016. Geographical indications and protected Enengel, B., Penker, M., Muhar, A., and Williams, R. 2011. designations of origin: intellectual property tools for rural Benefits, efforts and risks of participants in landscape co- development objectives. In D.S. Gangjee (ed.). Research management: An analytical framework and results from Handbook on Intellectual Property and Geographical two case studies in Austria. Journal of Environmental Indications. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK. Management 92(4):1256–1267. pp. 440–462. Enengel, B., Penker, M., and Muhar, A. 2014. Landscape co-man- Barjolle, D. and Sylvander, B. 2000. Some Factors of Success for agement in Austria: The stakeholder’s perspective on efforts, ‘Origin Labelled Products’ in Agri-food Supply Chains in benefits and risks. Journal of Rural Studies 34:223–234. Europe: Market, Internal Resources and Institutions. SRVA, Falconer, K. and Whitby, M. 1999. Administrative Costs in Lausanne, Switzerland. INRA-UREQUA, Le Mans, France. Agricultural Policies: The Case of the English Barjolle, D., Paus, M., and Perret, A. 2009. Impact of Environmentally Sensitive Areas (ESAs). University of geographical indications: a review of methods and empirical Newcastle, Centre for Rural Economy, Newcastle. Research evidences. Presented at the International Association of Report. Agricultural Economists Conference, Beijing, China, Filippi, M. and Torre, A. 2003. Local organisations and institu- August 16–22. tions: How can geographical proximity be activated by col- Belletti, G. and Marescotti, A. 2011. Evaluating the effects of lective projects? International Journal of Technology protecting geographical indications: scientific context and Management 26(2/3/4):386–400. case studies. In G. Belletti, A. Deppeler, A. Marescotti, M. Galtier, F., Belletti, G., and Marescotti, A. 2013. Factors con- Paus, S. Réviron, H. Stamm, and E. Thévenod-Mottet straining building effective and fair geographical indications (eds). The Effects of Protecting Geographical Indications. for coffee: Insights from a Dominican case study. Ways and Means of their Evaluation. Publication no. 7 Development Policy Review 31(5):597–615. (07.11). Swiss Federal Institute of Intellectual Property, Giovannucci, D., Josling, T., Kerr, W., OĆonnor, B., and Berne. p. 31–121. Yeung, M.Y. 2009. Guide to Geographical Indications. Belletti, G., Brazzini, A., and Marescotti, A. 2014. The effects of Linking Products and Their Regions. Available at Web site the legal protection geographical indications: PDO/PGI in www.intracen.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=37595 Tuscany. In Proceedings of the 11th European International (verified 12 September 2014). Farming System Association (IFSA) Symposium, Berlin, Giovannucci, D., Barham, E., and Pirog, R. 2010. Defining and 1–4 April. marketing “local” foods: Geographical indications for Belletti, G., Marescotti, A., and Touzard, J.M. 2015. US products. Journal of World Intellectual Property 13(2): Geographical indications, public goods and sustainable de- 94–120. velopment: The roles of actors’ strategies and public policies. Hanna, S.S. 1994. Co-management. In K.L. Gimbel (ed.). World Development, in press. Limiting Access to Marine Fisheries: Keeping the Focus on Biénabe, E., Kirsten, J., and Bramley, C. 2011. Collective action Conservation. World Wildlife Fund and Center for Marine dynamics and product reputation. In C. Bramley, E. Bienabe, Conservation, Washington, DC. p. 233–234. and J. Kirsten (eds). Developing Geographical Indications in Hanna, S.S. 1995. Efficiencies of user participation in natural the South. Springer Netherlands, Dordrecht. p. 51–72. resources management. In S. Hanna and E. Munasinghe Bowen, S. and Zapata, A. 2009. Geographical indications, (eds). Property Rights in a Social and Ecological Context. terroir, and socioeconomic and ecological sustainability: Case Study and Design Application. The Beijer The case of tequila. Journal of Rural Studies 25:108–119. International Institute of Ecological Economics and the Casabianca, F., Sylvander, B., Noël, Y., Béranger, C., Coulon, J.B., World Bank, Washington, DC. p. 59–67. and Roncin, F. 2005. Terroir et typicité: deux concepts-clés des Hess, C. and Ostrom, E. 2007. Framework for analyzing the appellations d’origine contrôlée. Essai de définitions scien- knowledge commons. In C. Hess and E. Ostrom (eds). tifiques et opérationnelles. Communication pour le Understanding Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory Symposium international de Programme Recherche Pour et to Practice. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. p. 41–82. Sur le Développement Régional (PSDR): Territoires et Ilbery, B. and Kneafsey, M. 2000. Registering regional specialty Enjeux du Développement Régional. Lyon, France; 9–11 food and drink products in the United Kingdom: The case of March. PDOs and PGIs. Area 32:317–325. Coulet, T. 2012. Assessing the economic impact of GI protec- Jena, P.R. and Grote, U. 2010. Changing institutions to protect tion. In M. Blakeney, T. Coulet, G. Mengistie, and M.T. regional heritage: A case for geographical indications in the

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 28 Sep 2021 at 23:36:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. 192 X.F. Quiñones-Ruiz et al.

Indian agrifood sector. Development Policy Review 28(2): Quiñones-Ruiz, X.F., Belletti, B., Leitgeb, F., Marescotti, A., 217–236. Penker, M., Samper-Gartner, L.F., and Scaramuzzi, S. Klerkx, L. and Gildemacher, P. 2012. The role of innovation 2014. Comparing registration efforts for Protected brokers in agricultural innovation systems. In Agricultural Geographical Indications in Austria, Colombia and Italy. Innovation Systems: An Investment Sourcebook. The Paper presented at 11th European IFSA Symposium World Bank, Washington, DC. p. 221–230. “Farming systems facing global challenges: Capacities and Markelova, H., Meinzen-Dick, R., Hellin, J., and Dohrn, S. strategies”, Berlin (Germany), April 1–4, 2014. 2009. Collective action for smallholder market access. Food Quiñones‐Ruiz, X.F., Penker, M., Vogl, C.R., and Samper‐ Policy 34:1–7. Gartner, L.F. 2015. Can origin labels re‐shape relationships McCann, L. and Easter, K.W. 1997. Transaction costs of policies along international supply chains? ‐ The case of Café de to reduce agricultural phosphorus pollution in the Minnesota Colombia. International Journal of the Commons 9(1): River. Land Economics 75(3):402–414. 416–439. McCann, L.B., Colby, K., Easter, W., Kasterine, A., and Randall, A. 1981. Resource Economics: An Economic Kupera, K.V. 2005. Transaction cost measurement for evalu- Approach to Natural Resources and Environmental Policy. ating environmental policies. Ecological Economics 52: Grid Publishing, Colombus, Ohio. 527–542. Rangnekar, D. and Mukhopadhyay, P. 2016. Social gains from Menard, C. 2004. The economics of hybrid organizations. the GI for Feni: will market size or concentration dominate Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 160: outcomes? In D.S. Gangjee (ed.). Research Handbook on 354–376. Intellectual Property and Geographical Indications. Edward Mettepenningen, E. and Van Huylenbroeck, G. 2009. Factors Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK. pp. 463–483. influencing private transaction costs related to agri-environ- Reviron, S. and Chappuis, J.M. 2011. Geographical Indications: mental schemes in Europe. In F. Brouwer and C. Martijn Collective organization and management. In E. Barham and van der Heide (eds). Multifunctional Rural Land B. Sylvander (eds). Labels of Origin for Food: Local Management Economics and Policies. Earthscan, London. Development, Global Recognition. CABI, Wallingford. p. 145–168. p. 45–62. North, D.C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Sanz-Cañada, J. and Macías-Vázquez, A. 2005. Quality certifi- Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press, cation, institutions and innovation in local agro-food Cambridge. systems: Protected designations of origin of olive oil in Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Spain. Journal of Rural Studies 21(4):475–486. Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Sidali, K.L. and Scaramuzzi, S. 2014. Group heterogeneity and Press, New York. cooperation in the governance of geographical indications. Ostrom, E. 2000. Collective action and the evolution of social The case of Parmigiano Reggiano ‘mountain product’. norms. Journal of Economic Perspectives 14(3):137–158. International Agricultural Policy 1:21–32. Ostrom, E. 2005. Understanding Institutional Diversity. Sommer, E., Höbaus, E., and Reinthaler, D. 2012. Mostviertler Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Birnmost g.g.A. – Registernummer 20. Available at Web Ostrom, E. and Polski, M. 1999. An Institutional Framework for site http://www.bmlfuw.gv.at/land/lebensmittel/trad-lebens- Policy Analysis and Design. Workshop in Political Theory mittel/getraenke/mostviertl_birnmost.htmlg.g.A. (verified and Policy Analysis, Department of Political Science, 28 January 2015). Indiana University. Torre, A. 2006. Collective action, governance structure and or- Ostrom, E., Gardner, R., and Walker, J. 1994. Rules, Games, and ganizational trust in localized systems of production. The Common-pool Resources. University of Michigan Press, case of the AOC organization of small producers. Michigan. Entrepreneurship and Regional Development 18(1):55–72. Patton, M.Q. 2002. Qualitative Research and Evaluation Tregear, A., Arfini, F., Belletti, G., and Marescotti, A. 2007. Methods. 3rd ed. Sage Publications, London. Regional foods and rural development: The role of product Paus, M. and Reviron, S. 2010. Crystallisation of collective action qualification. Journal of Rural Studies 23(1):12–22. in the emergence of a geographical indication system. In Vandecandelaere, E., Arfini, F., Belletti, G., and Marescotti, A. Proceedings of the 116th EAAE Seminar “Spatial Dynamics 2009. Linking People, Places and Products. A Guide for in Agrifood Systems: Implications for Sustainability and Promoting Quality Linked to Geographical Origin and Consumer Welfare”.Parma,Italy27–30 October. Sustainable Geographical Indications. Food and Agriculture Penker, M. and Klemen, F. 2010. Transaction costs and transac- Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and SINER-GI, tion benefits associated with the process of PGI/PDO regis- Rome. tration in Austria. In Proceedings of the 116th EAAE Wang, N. 2003. Measuring transaction costs: An incomplete Seminar “Spatial Dynamics in Agrifood Systems: survey. Ronald Coase Institute. Working Paper Series. Implications for Sustainability and Consumer Welfare”. Working Paper Number 2. Available at Web site https:// Parma, Italy 27–30 October. www.coase.org/workingpapers/wp-2.pdf (verified 20 July Poteete, A.R., Janssen, M.A., and Ostrom, E. 2010. Working 2014). Together: Collective Action, the Commons, and Multiple Winfree, J.A. and McCluskey, J.J. 2005. Collective reputation Methods in Practice. Princeton University Press, Princeton, and quality. American Journal of Agricultural Economics NJ. 87(1):206–213.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 28 Sep 2021 at 23:36:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.